Image TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn

Disinformation Targets Kazakhstan’s Ties with China, Russia, and the U.S.

Over an eight-day period in April 2024, a barrage of news stories featuring rumors about Kazakhstan’s foreign policy permeated Chinese media. These dubious reports alleged that the U.S. had hyped an unverified leak from a Russian Duma official claiming Kazakhstan was engaged in covert negotiations to join NATO and suggested that Kazakhstan was seeking China’s support to deter a potential Russian invasion.

The series of articles highlights the “fog of war” that pervades not only the battlefields of Ukraine but also the media landscape, representing a new front where Kazakhstan risks becoming collateral damage. Kazakhstan’s president has not deviated from the country’s neutrality and has maintained a difficult yet strategic multi-vector foreign policy that seeks to diversify economic and security arrangements rather than aligning exclusively with one partner. The evident information war underscores the diplomatic sensitivities which Kazakhstan faces, and the sinister tactics employed by outside actors to disrupt domestic and regional balances.

 

Misleading narrative #1: The U.S. is hyping an alleged voice recording of an official claiming that Kazakhstan is Russia’s next target

On April 6, an alleged audio recording, attributed to Russian State Duma deputy and General Andrei Gurulov, hinted that Kazakhstan was set to become Russia’s next target. The leak surfaced on X (Twitter) and was reported by the New Voice of Ukraine just hours later. In the following two days, the story propagated across at least five Chinese platforms, with numerous reposts claiming that “the Western media has vigorously hyped…the recording scandal”.

The above post is machine translated from Chinese into English

 

A search on Google News on 21 April 2024 for “Andrei Gurulov” yielded no results, while a wider search revealed a single defense blog reporting on the alleged leak.

 

Misleading narrative #2: Kazakhstan is in covert discussions to join NATO

Between April 10 and April 11, an array of articles and blogs appeared on at least six Chinese language media platforms (and were reposted across numerous other outlets) about Kazakhstan’s intent to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The so-called “news” was based on an unverified and unconfirmed rumor.

The above post is machine translated from Chinese into English

 

The above post is machine translated from Chinese into English

 

Kazakhstan has not expressed an intention to join NATO as a full member. Instead, it has engaged with NATO through partnership programs and dialogue, focusing on security cooperation, counter-terrorism, and military training within frameworks like the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which Kazakhstan joined in 1995.

The above post is machine translated from Chinese into English

 

This is not the first case of gaslighting by the media on Kazakhstan-NATO issues. Images taken from the 2023 opening of a conference hall at the Peacekeeping Operations Center of the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan, which was attended by the U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan, resulted in similarly bizarre misrepresentations.

 

Misleading narrative #3: Kazakhstan seeks China’s security to counterbalance the Russian threat

On April 14 and April 15, the latest barrage of messaging set China as Kazakhstan’s preferred guarantor to protect it from the threat of Russian aggression. This story presents the Russian threat to Kazakhstan through references to the Gurulov audio recording and the “defense blog” mentioned above, as well as to the former Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev’s relationship with Russian President Putin. Although the article downplayed the Russian threat, it went to great lengths to depict a strained relationship between Kazakhstan and its northern neighbor.

The postings spotlight Kazakhstan’s collaboration with the U.S. over counter-terrorism efforts and its pursuit of the trans-Caspian Middle Corridor project connecting to the China-led Belt and Road Initiative, which circumvents Russia.

 

The above post is machine translated from Chinese into English

 

Making the case for deepened Chinese security cooperation, these posts highlight a long-scheduled Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting Astana that convened in April 2024, where Kazakhstan’s Secretary to the Security Council discussed and signed a protocol agreeing to enhance regional stability and safety with China. Given that eight other SCO member countries also discussed and signed said protocol, deducting from this occasion the conclusion Kazakhstan is approaching China for security guarantees would be a gross overreach.

Nonetheless, the story appeared multiple times on at least four Chinese platforms.

 

The apparent aim of the campaign

It is not clear if the above-listed misleading story lines were a coordinated attempt. The motivation behind their dissemination is likewise not apparent. However, there are several conceivable outcomes such a campaign would seek to achieve. The articles could aim to evoke concerns between rivaling states and the communities they represent. These false representations could include:

1) Kazakhstan has abandoned its neutrality and is building alliances with NATO and/or China; and

2) Kazakhstan’s leadership is jeopardizing the security of its people by provoking a conflict with Russia.

These articles could have been created by a state actor aiming to influence Kazakhstan’s government to alter its diplomatic stance towards the U.S., China or Russia. They could have also been placed by private Kazakhstani actors intent on making political gains by presenting Kazakhstan’s leadership as unhinged in its diplomatic engagement and thereby undermining the security of the country’s people.

While it should not be ruled out that the articles were placed in Chinese media to specifically target a Chinese audience, the reason behind this choice of placement may also have to do with obfuscating the original source of misinformation.

In any circumstance, this case serves to remind world audiences once again that purported news pertaining to any country’s relationship with Russia, China or the U.S. should be viewed with extreme prejudice and caution in the current geopolitical environment.

@iStock

A Third Of Kazakhstan’s Flood-Protection Structures Are Damaged

More than 500 hydraulic structures in Kazakhstan intended to hold back water during floods need to be repaired, according to a report from the country’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation.

Specialists from the ministry, together with akimats (local administrations), counted 1,502 hydraulic structures in the country, of which 537 are damaged. According to the department, the hydraulic structures will be repaired as funds are received from the national budget.

The survey comes amid Kazakhstan’s battle with historic spring flooding, which has set in motion a frantic grind of evacuations, pumping water and shoring up dams. While the threat remains, water levels are declining in some areas and the country is working to help disaster victims over the long term.

Some 22,700 people who fled their homes to escape floodwaters have returned, and the flood situation has stabilized in some hard-hit places such as the Aktobe region, according to the government. Still, thousands of residents — many of them children — remain in evacuation centers, whilst others are in temporary housing. More than 100,000 people have been evacuated over the course of the crisis, which began in March as snow melted quickly in the warmer weather.

 

@iStock

Kazakhstan Has Become Main Trade Partner of China’s Xinjiang Province

According to Chinese Customs Service data from the first quarter of 2024, Kazakhstan became the main trade partner of China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Since the beginning of the year, Xinjiang has conducted trade with 193 countries and regions of the world. The volume of imports and exports with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in currency terms has increased by 58.8% and 1.9% respectively.

The volume of foreign trade originating from Xinjiang since the beginning of 2024 has increased by 42.7% year-on-year and reached about $13.2 billion. That puts Xinjiang in second place in China in terms of trade growth at the provincial level. Imports of agricultural products specifically increased by 36%.

According to the General Customs Administration (GCA) of China, last year the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang increased by 63% and reached $20.3 billion.

In the first half of 2023 China became Kazakhstan’s main trading partner, displacing Russia. China supplies the country with cars, computers and laptops, plastics and plastic products — and from Kazakhstan imports oil, natural gas, uranium, ferroalloys, mined ores and concentrates and oilseeds.

@Kaktus.media

Kyrgyzstan’s Law on NGOs: What Alarms Human Rights Activists?

In April 2024 Kyrgyz president Sadyr Zhaparov signed a law on non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Now all NGOs must submit full financial reports and register with the Ministry of Justice. Despite the authorities’ statements about the need for a document regulating the financing of such organizations, the law has numerous opponents.

President Zhaparov himself claims that some NGOs have deceived donors by using foreign funds — meant for roundtable discussions, training sessions and projects — for personal purposes.

“If you say that this is not true, I can prove it. Why do NGOs in developed countries register with the Ministry of Justice, tax service, open a bank account and do not do the same when they come to us? Or are we a second-rate country? No, we are not. We will not allow such dubious actions anymore,” Zhaparov said after criticism from NGO representatives.

Under the new legislation, an NGO that has received foreign aid will be called a “foreign representative”. Public activists claim that the rule is consonant with the Russian law on foreign agent status for nonprofits that accept foreign funding. Such a situation will carry certain reputational risks: according to the law, organizations that receive funding from abroad and deal with political issues must be included in a special register and operate under the control of state bodies.

In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Azisbek Ashurov, head of the NGO ‘Lawyers of Fergana Valley Without Borders’ and a human rights activist, spoke about the pitfalls of the law. In Ashurov’s opinion, the document is designed to limit the activities of the private sector.

“We are concerned about the re-registration procedure itself. Either it is just an application procedure, or someone will approve, make decisions. When decisions are made, how transparent and non-corrupt will it be?” he asked. Ashurov gave the example that in Kyrgyzstan there are NGOs providing legal assistance to citizens. If there is a dispute with a government body, the decision is challenged in the courts. However, now such structures will be dependent on the state and will not be able to work fully independently.

“State bodies have been authorized to interfere in the activities of NGOs. This is participation in their internal activities. We discuss some of our cases [via] collegiums, when lawyers discuss the strategy for different cases. Now, imagine, a representative of the state will sit and listen to confidential information that in the interest of the citizen we should not disclose. The balance is grossly upset. The adversarial principle is violated if we are preparing for court hearings against state bodies, for example, against the Ministry of Justice,” Ashurov added.

According to him, the Ministry of Justice was given the opportunity to suspend the activities of NGOs for violations. However, the current legislative framework doesn’t specify the violations for which an NGO can be suspended. The law prescribes that state bodies may request information from NGOs — however, it’s not specified what kind of information should be provided. In fact, the rules conflict with each other, Ashurov said.

A big challenge for independent organizations will be the mandatory annual financial audit. “The procedure is extremely costly. Small regional NGOs will have a particularly difficult time. Most of Kyrgyzstan’s auditing companies are located in Bishkek and other major population centers of the country. This will be costly for human rights defenders in the regions,” Ashurov said.

The authorities’ claims that NGOs are not financially transparent are also unfounded. Previously, organizations provided the grantor with a full report upon request — not on a regular basis, but once or twice a year. “Under the terms of the grantor, they do their own audits with us. They have their own financial departments, and they fully check the fulfillment of grant obligations. And, in parallel, we make a report to the state,” Ashurov explained.

NGOs in Kyrgyzstan are already registered as legal entities. They submit reports to the tax service and other government agencies. Ashurov added: “We receive all our funds through banks. Our transfers, according to the law on banking, are transparent and controlled by the National Bank. We provide banks with full information about the registration of the legal entity, founders, donors and so on. We provide a certificate from the tax authorities on the absence of debts. Our financial activity is absolutely transparent.”

“I believe that the new law is a tool to limit the activities of NGOs. In any case, this is the impression one gets after reading the text of the document. It is not aimed at achieving more transparent activities of NGOs,” he concluded.

Uzbekistan Seeks to Expand Trade Horizons with Europe

– Opinion by Robert Cutler

 

Uzbekistan’s economic landscape has been evolving, with announcements of major reforms and international cooperation aimed at economic modernization and increasing its profile in global markets. Its partnership with the European Union (EU) has focused on critical raw materials. At the same time, Tashkent plans to reduce gas exports in favour of expanding petrochemical production and inviting foreign investment into its mining sector.

In October 2023, the European Parliament (EP) had endorsed this policy direction by adopting a resolution on Uzbekistan based on a series of broad programmatic documents regarding Central Asia, including a previous Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Uzbekistan on energy cooperation. The EP also favorably mentioned the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) concluded in July 2022 to “modernize” the EU’s Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed with Uzbekistan in 1999.

A new MoU signed earlier this month by the European Commission’s Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis and Uzbekistan’s Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade Laziz Kudratov foresees an ambitious intensification of the partnership. The agreement is touted as a step towards diversifying supply chains to Europe for critical raw materials (CRMs) required for the energy transition.

 

The EU’s strategic economic partnership with Uzbekistan

The new MoU follows on the EU’s 25 October 2023 agreement with Uzbekistan during the Global Gateway Forum. That agreement had confirmed that Uzbekistan, with its reserves of metals such as silver, titanium, and lithium, would join the so-called Critical Raw Materials Forum. However, a critical evaluation of the MoU shows that a lot of hard work will be necessary to realize its plans and promises.

In fact, the MoU represents a list of possibilities for cooperation without a guarantee of follow-through. The new partnership focuses on a number of areas of potential collaboration. These may be grouped under three general categories: (1) integrating CRM value and supply chains and their resilience; (2) mobilization of funding; and (3) cooperation on production, research, innovation and capacity building. The MoU itself admits that further specific cooperation is required to establish an operational roadmap that would specify particular joint actions for implementation.

This partnership is in line with the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative, which seeks to mobilize up to €300 billion in investments by 2027, although the initiative has been criticized for largely being a re-packaging of previously established programs without significant new funding. As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, the big unspoken problem is the need to enhance the country’s economic competitiveness in global markets.

 

Uzbekistan’s mineral resources exploration

Only about 20 percent of Uzbekistan’s territory has been explored. Potential mineral resources are evaluated at US$5.7 billion, with the country’s explored reserves representing about US$1 billion of this amount. This unexplored potential represents a significant opportunity for further enhancing Uzbekistan’s potential global competitiveness in the mineral resources sector, but only if transportation logistics can be economically put into place.

According to the U.S. Geological Service, Uzbekistan also has reserves of other minerals – such as calcium, kaolin, rhenium and vermiculite – that can be leveraged for various energy production and industrial processes. The country has already offered 29 identified deposits of strategically important solid minerals to foreign investors for industrial development, including 12 gold deposits, eight tungsten deposits and three deposits each of iron, lithium and uranium. With the exception of uranium for nuclear energy, notably absent from the list are any “green energy” minerals favored by the EU.

 

Strategic energy shifts and industrial development

Uzbekistan has been trying to implement large-scale reforms in recent years to strengthen its energy industry. The government has decided to phase out international gas exports by 2025 and direct its gas resources towards expanding petrochemicals production. In terms of regional effects, this will likely decrease Kazakhstan’s security of supply, whereas China’s gas imports from Uzbekistan can be made up by Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan’s strategic move to keep its gas within its own borders has the potential to influence to energy security and economic growth.

The government is also seeking to develop a legal framework to make the mining sector more attractive to foreign investors. International financial and development institutions are seeking to assist in this process. Such a legal framework will have multiple far-reaching components that will need to be intricately integrated, such as accounting law, banking law, bankruptcy law, property law, and even inheritance law. This list does not include improvements required in various operational fields such as management structures, methods for assessing and accounting for mineral reserves, and financial reporting. There is unlikely to be any quick fix for these issues, especially given the need to train personnel in Uzbekistan after mechanisms have been established.

 

Economic reforms and the challenges in attracting investment

The World Bank is supporting strategic reforms that seek to transform Uzbekistan’s entire system into a market economy. Yet this support to the government consists of low-interest, low-cost loans totaling around a relatively low figure of $800 million. It is targeted at reforms in critical sectors of the economy, notably the energy sector but also agriculture, railway and chemicals. The goal is to reduce the state’s dominance in these sectors, but the transition to a market economy is complicated by the mandate to shift quickly towards a “greener” economic model. In current circumstances, such a quick shift would objectively require significant state intervention.

Other issues that need to be addressed, beyond questions about the legal structure, include the depreciation of physical equipment over time, the failure of timely infrastructure updates, and the inadequate introduction of resource and energy-saving technologies. These problems both increase technological losses and make fuel and energy resource supply interruptions more frequent.

 

Conclusion

The success of Uzbekistan’s reforms will hinge on the country’s ability to implement legal and structural changes in an effective manner, address technological inefficiencies, and engage more comprehensively with the global economy.

EU members are at present not major players in Uzbekistan’s economy. The main countries currently investing here are China, Kazakhstan, Russia, South Korea and Turkey. Nearly half of all foreign direct investment is targeted at the coal, oil and natural gas industries, which are likely to remain at the commanding heights of the economy for the foreseeable future.

 

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets. He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

@Asia-Plus

Uzbekistan to Open Centres for Workers Seeking Employment Abroad

The Uzbek government is to open 27 educational institutions across the country for the purpose of training potential migrants in professions in demand by foreign employers. Students will also have access to lessons in various languages including English, German, Japanese, Korean and Arabic.

Courses will be offered on a paid-contract basis for a year. Attendees with existing proficiency in languages spoken in countries of their choice, will be eligible for a 50% reimbursement by the state of costs incurred in attaining related certificates. Teachers at the centres will receive a 100% salary supplement.

The government of Uzbekistan had earlier announced measures to support citizens seeking employment abroad and from June this year, migrant workers will be offered compensation for passing the qualification exam, obtaining a work visa in a foreign country, travel costs and insurance. In addition to training programmes to open up opportunities in better-paid and professional jobs outside Uzbekistan, the government has now confirmed further subsidies for legal and material assistance.

According to the Uzbek Agency for External Labour Migration, some 70,000 citizens have legally secured work abroad over the past two years and Germany, Great Britain and Japan have recently shown great interest in employing Uzbek migrants. Remittances from labour migrants to Uzbekistan remain a material part of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) — accounting for 17.8% in 2023. In neighbouring Tajikistan, migrant remittances account for almost half of the country’s economic output, and in Kyrgyzstan, 20%.