@kmg.kz

Kazakh-Italian Project to Install New Hybrid Power Plant in Zhanaozen

On March 26 the chairman of Kazakhstan’s state oil & gas company JSC KazMunayGas (KMG) Magzum Mirzaliyev met with Luca Vignati, a senior executive at the Italian oil & gas company Eni, to discuss the construction of a hybrid power plant in Zhanaozen.

The parties discussed the current status of construction of a hybrid power plant in Zhanaozen, where wind (77 MW), solar energy (50 MW) and gas (120 MW) are planned to all be used in the energy mix. “We express our gratitude to Eni for fruitful cooperation and exchange of experience in the framework of this strategic energy project. We hope for further development of our cooperation in this area,” said Mirzaliyev in a press release.

On January 18 the parties signed an agreement in Rome for the construction of a hybrid power plant in the city of Zhanaozen, in Mangistau region. Additionally, the heads of KMG and Eni discussed drilling the first exploration well at the Abay site in the Caspian Sea — as well as developing further stages of production at the Kashagan and Karachaganak fields, taking into account the priority to increase the production of marketable gas.

@OrbisKazakhstan

Kazakhstan to Start Producing Cars for Chinese Brand KAIYI

The Kazakh automotive company Orbis Manufacturing plans to build a full-cycle plant in Almaty’s industrial zone to manufacture cars under the Chinese brand KAIYI. According to Orbis’s press service, a subsidiary of Orbis Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of cooperation with China’s Yibin Kaiyi Automobile Co. at the second Forum of Kazakh Exporters in Astana.

“We plan to invest about 72 billion tenge (~$160 million) in organizing the production of high-tech cars of leading Chinese brands,” commented the president of Orbis Kazakhstan, Sukhrab Mahmudov.

Orbis Kazakhstan emphasized that design and estimate documentation (DED) for the production line is currently being finalized. The plant’s production capacity is planned at 80,00 vehicles per year. It will initially create 1,500 jobs.

In May 2023 Orbis Kazakhstan signed an agreement with EXEED International, a premium brand of the Chinese automaker Chery, on the production of cars under the EXEED brand in Kazakhstan.

@gov.kg

Kyrgyzstan to Switch to 12-Year School System

From the next academic year pupils in Kyrgyzstan are to stay at school for an extra year, a move that authorities believe will improve the quality of education, and make it easier for students to enter foreign universities.

The Kyrgyz Ministry of Education and Science said the 12-year system will be introduced in schools in stages from September. By common consensus, Kyrgyzstan’s school system has long been in need of modernization, as many approaches to education have not changed in decades.

“We will gradually introduce this system so that children will not be overloaded. We have been working on this for more than a year. The transformation of the education system is aimed at updating the content of school education, improving its structure, aimed at preparing competitive youth, and integrating [them] into the global educational space,” said education minister Dogdurkul Kendirbayeva at a press conference in Bishkek.

Ms Kendirbayeva also explained how the transition to a 12-year system would take place. All of the country’s first grade students will be tested in September this year; those children who are already comfortable with the second-grade curriculum will move to the second grade in January 2025.

To improve the quality of teaching at Kyrgyz schools, the Asian Development Bank has provided a $20 million grant, as well as a loan for the same amount for 24 years. This money will pay for teachers to go on courses in science, technology, engineering and math.

A new education system is also needed because currently only 30% of preschool-aged children in Kyrgyzstan are in preschools. This is partly because many parents use their young children as additional labor in the household, or use them as nannies for their younger siblings, and are in no hurry to send their children to school. Many families also don’t have the money to send their children to preschool classes. But from the fall the preschool education program will become compulsory for all as part of the first year of education.

Critics of the new system argue that it will hamper the most able young children, because they will now have to wait for their peers.

@kmg.kz

Kazakhstan Wants to Import Gas, Electricity From Turkmenistan

Kazakhstan’s energy minister Almasadam Satkaliev voiced the idea of importing energy from Turkmenistan at a government meeting on March 26. “We have regular discussions about the supply and exchange of energy resources with our Central Asian counterparts. Turkmenistan is able to provide electricity. At the moment, [Turkmenistan] exports to Kyrgyzstan,” said Satkaliev.

He added: “We act on our own needs and repair schedule. We are ready to consider the proposals of our Turkmen colleagues for both gas and electricity, based on their commercial attractiveness for our consumers.”

Satkaliev further stated that although Turkmenistan had not yet disclosed any official prices for power or gas, Kazakh companies themselves would clarify the details to determine the commercial attractiveness of the offer.

Earlier this month, news outlet Chronicles of Turkmenistan reported that the head of the country’s parliament, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, has spoken of Turkmenistan’s willingness to export natural gas and electricity to Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

Flowers laid on a tank in Nagorno-Karabakh; photo: TCA

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: the EU’s Indecisive Strategy Towards Eurasia

Marking the next chapter in the geopolitical re-balancing competition between Russia and the West, the European Parliament (EP) on 13 March passed a resolution on deepening ties between the EU and Armenia. The document puts forth the possibility of granting Armenia candidate status for EU membership. Shortly after, Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister stated that a new cooperation agreement with the EU could be signed by July 2024. The EP’s “Renew Europe” block, at the forefront of some of the harshest motions and resolutions against Central Asian republics in the EU, endorsed this outreach towards Armenia. This comes a few weeks after Armenia froze its participation in the Russian-led military alliance of six post-Soviet states, known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), after citing the Organization’s failure to fulfill its obligations towards Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan.

These recent developments should be considered in the wider context of the EU’s eastward outlook, which has not always been evenhanded. Previously, on 17 January 2024, the EP had passed a resolution detailing the EU’s strategy on Central Asia, which recognized that the region is of “strategic interest to the EU in terms of security and connectivity, as well as energy and resource diversification, conflict resolution, and the defense of the multilateral rules-based international order”. European leaders ostensibly want to bring the Caucasus and Central Asia into the Western fold and away from Russia, China and other competing regimes or ideologies.

Economic and security considerations may indeed pull European and Eurasian interests closer. Nonetheless, Central Asian states will likely, and understandably, choose to implement a multi-faceted foreign policy to diversify their trade and security alliances as they continue to transact and maintain working relationships with their powerful regional neighbors. Note that Chinese, Russian and other non-Western investment promises in Central Asia outweigh similar engagements from the EU.

There remain other potential obstacles to further cooperation. Not surprisingly, the EU seeks to have a degree of “values alignment” before establishing economic and security partnerships in the region, such as strengthened rule of law, human rights, and freedoms. On the other hand, the EU is sometimes perceived as giving conflicting and even insincere messages. Examples with regard to Central Asia include instances where the EU has asked for progress in certain areas, but then failed to acknowledge policy implementation, or even doubled down on its criticisms despite positive steps taken by the targeted country’s leadership.

Take, for instance, the discussions in the EU around the violent unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022. The EU has called on Kazakhstan to investigate the events and to undertake reforms. In the last two years, Kazakhstan’s president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has overseen a batch of ambitious reforms, including enhanced political participation and representation as well as a stronger legal system and improved human rights, which are essentially unprecedented in the region. The progress made, however, does not seem to have materially swayed the EU’s outlook on the country.

In terms of the investigations and court proceedings related to the deadly 2022 riots, officials involved in the abuse of detainees were arrested and tried in court (recently, on 18 March, three received prison sentences). The more egregious acts, however, appear to have been led by hangers-on from former president Nursultan Nazarbayev’s rule, who wanted to regain power. They joined forces with thugs and jihadists to overthrow the current government, effectively attempting to stage a coup-d’état. Testimonies of eye witnesses to the January 2022 events prove their links to at least one local crime boss and point to the involvement of high-level officials linked to Nazarbayev in fueling the violence to weaken the government. Other coup orchestrators include Karim Massimov, who led the National Security Committee during the attempted coup, and Kairat Satybaldy, his General-Major and the nephew of former President Nazarbayev. Massimov, who has been linked to money laundering and bribes and a growing list of corruption scandals, is serving an 18-year sentence for high treason, abuse of power, and actions aimed at violently seizing power. Satybaldy is likewise serving a six-year sentence for major embezzlement and has reportedly paid back nearly 700 billion tenge, or around $1.5 billion, allegedly obtained through illicit means into the state coffers, according to Eurasianet.

The lack of acknowledgment for positive steps taken in this case points to another problem: the amount of scrutiny the EU directs towards a particular state is not always proportional to that state’s progress (or lack thereof) in the various EU-defined “value” areas, but rather to its strategic importance for Europe combined with the successful lobbying efforts by individuals and organizations inside the EU’s halls for or against that state. Going back to the Kazakhstan example, the EP’s above-mentioned January 2024 resolution asks for the release of five “political prisoners” in Kazakhstan. Three of these names are openly linked to an organization identified by Kazakhstani authorities as extremist, which is also known to be controlled by an internationally convicted fraudster. Furthermore, underlining the impact of negative lobbying efforts, this resolution is based on a report where a controversial NGO is listed as a source. This NGO is also associated with multiple notorious individuals charged with various crimes, such as murder and embezzlement, including the aforementioned fugitive fraudster.

Making its position vis-à-vis Central Asia even more disingenuous is the fact that the EU itself is showing a decline in its transparency and rule of law. The so-called Qatargate scandal that broke out in 2022 famously involved bribery and corruption charges against multiple EU officials and their linked NGOs and laid bare the ease with which outside actors could simply purchase influence and shape the EU’s decision-making. Unfortunately, not much has changed since then: Transparency International reported in December 2023 that “the European Parliament one year after Qatargate remains a democratic legislative body with a weak ethics system that is open to undue influence.” It is also noteworthy that the acting head of the Human Rights Sub-Committee (DROI) in the European Parliament called for the “immediate and unconditional release of Mr. Karim Massimov” in November of 2022, just weeks prior to herself being implicated in the Qatargate scandal, which led to her resignation.

Finally, in passing judgement on Central Asia in particular, European officials should keep in mind distinct local factors that inevitably influence domestic policies and priorities. Central Asian people have a different agenda than the populations living within the EU. These include not only improving their economic and social welfare but also finding justice for the massive amounts of public assets stolen by kleptocrats over the years and putting an end to decades-long corruption in their states. Another key issue for the region is the growing threat of Islamic extremism, which undermines Central Asia’s nascent democracies where the populations have historically been secular. Regardless of what distant observers proclaim, these countries are trying to take measures, often supported by their own people, to stop jihadist entities and/or well-funded kleptocrats from further destabilizing their domestic institutions.

In short, while the EU’s intentions towards Eurasia may be promising, the need for a more honest and consistently constructive strategy is apparent.

@gknb.kg

Former Kyrgyz Official Matraimov Extradited in Connection with Assassination Plot

According to statements issued by the special services of Kyrgyzstan, former deputy head of the customs service Raimbek Matraimov is connected with assassins who recently came to Bishkek from Azerbaijan to assassinate members of Kyrgyzstan’s leadership.

On March 23 Kyrgyz law enforcement became aware that the wanted Matraimov was in Baku, Azerbaijan’s capital. The State Committee for National Security of Kyrgyzstan (CNSK) sent a letter to the Azeri authorities with a request to detain and extradite him. In Baku this request was fulfilled. Matraimov’s brothers were also detained and flown to Kyrgyzstan, the CNSK reported.

The investigation into Matraimov alleges that his clan once had its own people in virtually all government agencies, including the police, prosecutor’s office, and parliament, where an entire political party worked on his behalf. Matraimov’s group had enormous resources, and numerous levers of influence over the authorities. The 2020 coup d’état in Kyrgyzstan was carried out in part because Matraimov’s party won the elections. As a result, those elections were deemed as corrupt, and subsequently voided.

Matraimov was put on an international wanted list on January 26. He was charged in absentia under two articles of the Kyrgyz criminal code: illegal imprisonment and legalization of criminal proceeds.

As The Times of Central Asia has previously reported, on March 22 in the center of Bishkek authorities detained members of a transnational criminal group, who came to Bishkek from Azerbaijan to assassinate the Kyrgyz political leadership. Kyrgyzstan’s special services believe that Matraimov is linked to the criminals and is involved in organizing the assassination attempt. It was also reported that the former official was extradited with the aid of a government board of Kyrgyz authorities.