• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
19 February 2025

Our People > Andrei Matveev

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Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

Trump-Putin Deal Talks: Central Asia at the Nexus of Global Power Shifts

The reported discussions this week between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have become a central focus for global media and analysts. However, for Central Asia, the most pressing question is not when the war in Ukraine will end—an outcome that could occur as unexpectedly as the contact between U.S. and Russian leaders—but what Russia’s next move will be. The future actions of Moscow remain a primary concern for the five Central Asian countries. On February 12, Donald Trump announced via his social network, Truth Social, that he had a lengthy phone conversation with Vladimir Putin. His main message was that both leaders had agreed on the need to end the war and would take immediate action. The day before, Trump told reporters at the White House that members of his negotiating team and Putin’s representatives would meet in Munich. Despite skepticism from many analysts who anticipated a longer negotiation process, talks are already scheduled to begin on Valentine’s Day. In the same post, Trump revealed the composition of his negotiating team: “I have asked Secretary of State Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, and Ambassador and Special Representative Steve Witkoff to lead the negotiations.” Although the details of Trump’s proposed peace plan remain under discussion, a rough outline has emerged from various sources which involve: A freeze in fighting along the current front line. The establishment of a demilitarized zone spanning the entire 1,300-kilometer front. Deployment of a European military contingent, including UK troops, to patrol the demilitarized zone (U.S. troops will not be involved, but may provide training and logistical support). A 20-year postponement of Ukraine’s NATO membership bid in exchange for continued Western arms supplies. Recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied territories. Security guarantees for Ukraine from European countries. A possible EU membership pathway for Ukraine by 2030. A 10-year reconstruction plan for Ukraine, funded by European countries and Russian contributions. A gradual lifting of sanctions on Russia’s energy sector over several years. Reimbursement of U.S. military aid to Ukraine through Ukrainian natural resource revenues. Presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2025, especially if a settlement is reached between Kyiv and Moscow. If Russia accepts these terms, they are likely to be included in the final draft of the agreement. Notably, Trump’s plan takes Moscow’s interests into account, though some points were reportedly rejected during the February 12 call. The depth of the proposal suggests that Trump’s team and Putin’s representatives have been in contact for some time, well before Trump’s formal inauguration as U.S. president. Trump first hinted at such talks in March 2023,  when he claimed he could resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict within 24 hours of taking office. At the time, many dismissed this as election rhetoric. However, recent events suggest that he is following through on his promises. A striking example is the release of Mark Vogel, an American sentenced in Russia to 14 years in prison for marijuana possession. His return to the U.S. was part of a...

5 days ago

Elon Musk Calls for Closure of RFE/RL and VOA: What Would It Mean for Central Asia?

Following recent discussions on the potential closure of USAID, which has already caused concern among journalists and public activists receiving its grants, Elon Musk has weighed in on more U.S.-funded institutions. The billionaire has called for the shutting down of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA) - media organizations funded by the U.S. government. Musk criticized the outlets, labeling their employees as “radical leftist lunatics who talk to themselves while burning through $1 billion a year of American taxpayer money.” However, in Central Asia, RFE/RL's affiliates differ significantly from their European counterparts. They are far from being “radical leftists” and, in general, do not adhere to any particular ideology. Nonetheless, these branches have faced their own controversies and increasing government restrictions. [caption id="attachment_28526" align="aligncenter" width="1024"] The headquarters of Voice of America, Washington, D.C.; image: Stierch[/caption] Allegations of Bias and Internal Controversy Concerns about RFE/RL’s editorial independence in Central Asia are not new. In 2019, former Radio Azattyk (RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service) editor Asem Tokayeva publicly criticized the network’s leadership under Abbas Javadi, an Iranian journalist who headed the Central Asian division. Tokayeva accused Javadi and Azattyk editor Torokul Doorov of turning the outlet into a propaganda tool for then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev. In response, Tokayeva published a series of allegations on Facebook in early 2019, and by April of that year, Javadi was dismissed. Around the same time, Radio Ozodi (RFE/RL’s Tajik service) director Sojida Jakhfarova was also removed from her position following public pressure from the Tajik opposition. Critics accused her of aligning the outlet’s editorial policies too closely with the government of President Emomali Rahmon. Shortly after, the editor-in-chief of the entire RFE/RL media corporation, Nenad Pejic, was also dismissed. Growing Government Restrictions Beyond internal scandals, RFE/RL’s affiliates in Central Asia have faced increasing government-imposed limitations: Tajikistan: Radio Ozodi has been periodically blocked in the country and has been inaccessible since 2021. Uzbekistan: Radio Ozodlik has faced long-standing access difficulties. Kyrgyzstan: In 2022, the Ministry of Culture officially blocked the Radio Azattyk website, citing content that was allegedly against state interests. Kazakhstan: In early 2024, 36 Azattyk journalists were denied accreditation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to alleged national security concerns. RFE/RL leadership had to intervene to resolve the issue. RFE/RL’s Restructuring in Central Asia In 2023, RFE/RL announced plans to restructure its Russian-language editorial operations in Kazakhstan. The media corporation confirmed that instead of maintaining separate Russian and national-language services in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, it would consolidate its efforts into a single Central Asian bureau. “RFE/RL is fully committed to providing independent and impartial news to audiences across Central Asia in national languages and Russian,” said Karin Marie, Director of External Communications at RFE/RL. “We are working to strengthen our ability to cover the most important news in Russian, maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of our internal structures and processes. We will pool our resources and talents to create a new regional unit covering all of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan....

1 week ago

EU Sanctions Envoy’s Kazakh Visit Signals Rising Stakes

On January 30, David O’Sullivan, the European Union’s Special Envoy for Sanctions, made his fourth visit to Kazakhstan. Following the visit, he gave a briefing in Astana, where he discussed the new sanctions package, which could theoretically include Kazakh companies that assist Russia in circumventing restrictions. What O’Sullivan Said  According to O'Sullivan, only companies with indisputable evidence against them of involvement in violations will added to the sanctions list. “We are currently working on preparing a new, 16th package of sanctions. It is possible that Kazakh companies may be added to the list, but no decision has been made yet. We conduct a detailed analysis of companies, examine their trade relations, and review the goods they have previously traded. Of course, we prefer to work with governments to find a systematic solution rather than simply adding individual companies to the list. However, when there is no other option, we do add them,” O’Sullivan explained. The EU Sanctions Envoy reiterated that the EU remains one of Kazakhstan’s key economic partners, with mutual trade turnover reaching nearly 40 billion euros per annum. The EU accounts for 38% of Kazakhstan’s exports and 55 billion euros in direct foreign investments. Highlighting the importance of economic ties, O’Sullivan stated that the EU fully respects Kazakhstan’s position on sanctions, but urged authorities to take strict measures against third-party entities using the country’s trade channels. “We have concerns that unscrupulous actors may try to use Kazakhstan as a platform to circumvent our sanctions,” O’Sullivan warned, pointing to the import of high-tech goods such as microchips, sensors, and circuits, which have been found in Russian drones, missiles, and artillery shells. O'Sullivan noted that these goods, listed in an open “common high-priority list” of 50 codes, are not produced in Kazakhstan but are allegedly being re-exported from EU and G7 countries through Kazakh intermediaries. While they make up less than 1% of Kazakhstan’s total trade volume, O’Sullivan emphasized that these are “lethal products that kill innocent Ukrainian civilians.” The special envoy recalled that in 2024, the EU blacklisted two Kazakh companies and issued a warning that this list could be expanded. He noted that particular attention is being given to companies that emerged immediately after the invasion of Ukraine and the start of the new sanctions regime. “These are usually not well-established, well-known companies with a long history of trading. The fact that a company was created right after the invasion and the imposition of sanctions suggests that its sole purpose may be to evade sanctions,” he stated while stressing that merely registering after 2022 is not sufficient grounds for inclusion on the sanctions list. Strategically Important Central Asia Given the statistics cited by O’Sullivan, there was no pressing need for his fourth personal visit to Kazakhstan. The blacklisting of two Kazakh companies last year went largely unnoticed by the country’s general public. However, his visit highlights the mechanisms of international politics set in motion following Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the opening gambits of his administration,...

3 weeks ago

Tokayev Outlines Economic Reforms and Calls for Revised Energy Contracts

On January 28, Kazakhstan's capital Astana hosted an expanded government meeting led by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The event focused on the country's socio-economic development in 2024, but this year’s discussion carried broader implications, addressing both domestic and international concerns. Addressing Budget Constraints From the outset, Tokayev made it clear that a key issue for his government is the state budget’s financial shortfall. Analyst Gaziz Abishev noted on his Telegram channel that the problem is not just a lack of funds but a long-standing habit - dating back to 2003 - of addressing challenges by simply increasing spending. “There is no longer an oil windfall to revitalize the dry economy as there was 20 years ago,” Abishev wrote. Adding to the uncertainty, Kazakhstan’s oil revenues face potential disruption from Donald Trump’s stated intention to drive down global hydrocarbon prices. Tokayev outlined a range of measures to fill budget gaps, urging his government to take bold, unconventional steps. He called on officials to act in the country’s best interests without fear of pressure from the Anti-Corruption Service or public opinion. He also stressed the importance of depoliticizing economic partnerships, particularly with Russia and China, cautioning against allowing Russophobic or Sinophobic rhetoric to interfere with business deals. “Money must be attracted from abroad, and this is more important than ever. Without investment, we cannot sustain ourselves. Money doesn’t smell, but it disappears. We need to attract investment from all sides - within the law - without falling into populism. The future of the national economy, and to some extent the country as a whole, is at stake,” Abishev commented. Public Reaction to Tax Reforms Although tax reform was only the sixth of eight key points in Tokayev’s speech, it quickly became the most widely discussed issue among the public. Kazakhstan’s value-added tax (VAT) is currently 12%, with a sufficiency threshold of 78 million tenge ($150,937). The government is considering raising the VAT rate to 20% and lowering the sufficiency threshold to 15 million tenge ($29,026). If implemented, nearly all small businesses would become VAT payers, while the increased tax rate is expected to drive inflation. The government maintains that inflation will not exceed 4.5%, but Tokayev’s mention of “belt-tightening” has already led many to expect rising retail prices. To offset the burden on businesses, the government proposes eliminating mandatory employer pension contributions and reducing the social tax. However, Tokayev himself expressed reservations about cutting the social tax, emphasizing that regional governors (akims) need financial incentives. “Think again. I believe it would be wrong to deprive akims of incentives, especially financial ones. After all, the regions are the country. Find a solution. We will meet again to discuss these issues,” he told the government. The tax reforms will also be debated in Parliament, where the lower house is currently reviewing the draft of the new Tax Code. The government will have to negotiate with members of the Majilis and Senate over the VAT rate, sufficiency threshold, and other sensitive issues. Messages to Foreign Partners...

3 weeks ago

Wild Arman Sentenced: From Thief-In-Law to Coup Plotter

On January 27, another high-profile trial related to the January 2022 events concluded in Almaty. More than 40 individuals were in the dock, but the main figures in the proceedings were three individuals: former Almaty city council deputy and popular blogger Kairat Kudaibergen, former head of the Fifth Department of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee Ruslan Iskakov, and crime boss Arman Jumageldiev, better known by his criminal nickname, 'Wild Arman.' Harsh Sentences Most of the defendants received short sentences and were released due to time already served. However, for the main figures in the case, the court handed down the following punishments: Kairat Kudaibergen, former deputy and entrepreneur, received eight years in prison. He was also banned from appearing on social media, organizing rallies, debates, and events, and publishing in the media. Ruslan Iskakov, the former head of the Fifth Department of the National Security Committee, was sentenced to 15 and a half years in prison. Arman Jumageldiev (Wild Arman) was sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was prohibited from participating in organizations, organizing events, and publishing in the media or on social networks. In addition to this trio, two other lengthy sentences were handed down: former financial police agent Talgat Makhatov received 15 years, whilst journalist Berdakh Berdymuratov was sentenced to seven years. During the trial, two of the four charges initially brought against Kairat Kudaibergen were dropped. Meanwhile, Arman Jumageldiev, who was originally charged under eleven articles of the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan, faced eight charges by the end of the trial. The 40-year-old crime boss, who along with his defense team has long denied his ties to organized crime, will be released close to the age of retirement should his sentence remain unchanged after his appeal. Under Surveillance Senior Prosecutor of the Almaty Regional Transport Prosecutor’s Office, Mukhit Rysbekov, provided detailed comments on the verdict for Wild Arman (Arman Jumageldiev), revealing the defense’s strategy during the trial. "The court deliberated on the case for about a year. During this time, Jumageldiev’s defenders tried to present him to the court and the public as a patriot, a national hero who helped and protected citizens during the tragic January events. Despite the active campaign organized by Jumageldiev and his defense to rehabilitate his image, we managed to prove the opposite. We proved that back in 2016, long before those events, Jumageldiev led a criminal organization, an armed gang, which included the same representatives of the criminal world,” said Rysbekov. Commenting on Jumageldiev’s sentencing, political analyst Daniyar Ashimbaev noted that the trial had addressed one of the key facets in a broader scheme. "It is clear that the National Security Committee (KNB) was ‘tracking’ this organized criminal group (OCG), which during the January events was supposed to take on the role of establishing 'public governance,' subduing looters, presenting 20 pre-captured individuals as instigators, and ultimately calling for power to be handed over to a 'people’s government' led by the coup organizers," Ashimbaev stated. "This was evident as early as the...

3 weeks ago