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Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

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China Regional integration Central Asia-China Summit Xi Jinping Treaty

XI Jinping’s Five Points: How China Is Looking To Reshape Central Asia

The second China-Central Asia summit on June 17, held in Astana, Kazakhstan, underscored the strengthening ties between China and the region. This event marked a significant milestone in solidifying the China-Central Asia cooperation framework with the signing of the Treaty on Eternal Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. Experts note that Central Asian countries, once unable to adopt an intra-regional treaty, collectively reached this broader agreement with China. The summit also featured a range of side events, including the Energy Forum “Energy of Central Asia - China,” the Forum on Humanitarian Exchange, the Second Forum on Industrial and Investment Cooperation, and the Central Asia-China Business Council meeting, among others. These gatherings highlighted cooperation in energy, trade, and cultural exchange, reflecting China’s deepening influence in the region. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev praised China’s approach to equal partnership, stating that relations between the two nations are “stable and free from the negative impacts of geopolitical challenges and shocks as well as the international circumstances. China has never imposed any political conditions regarding cooperation with Kazakhstan.” “This is a very important point, Kazakhstani Sinologist Adil Kaukenov explained, “as the head of state, being at the forefront of Kazakhstan's foreign and domestic policies, faces political games, manipulation, and pressure at various levels, which require considerable restraint, experience as a statesman, and popular support to overcome.” During the summit, the heads of the Central Asian states articulated their priorities for cooperation with China. Kazakhstan emphasized projects like the creation of a joint cargo terminal in the port of Kuryk on the Caspian Sea, cooperation in the fields of nuclear energy and artificial intelligence, and counteracting international cybercrime. Kyrgyzstan focused on security, transport, e-commerce, energy, and tourism. Tajikistan prioritized industrial development, trade, food security, and green economy initiatives. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, sought the further integration of Afghanistan into the region, and proposed an “Electronic Silk Road” trade platform, and the development of a long-term strategy called the “Central Asia-China Industrial and Infrastructure Belt.” Chinese President Xi Jinping used his address to outline five key points that shape China’s vision for the future of its relationship with Central Asia. “Our cooperation is rooted in more than two thousand years of friendly relations, consolidated by the solidarity and mutual trust that has been established for 30 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, and has made great progress thanks to mutually beneficial cooperation in the new era,” Xi stated in his keynote speech. According to Xi, China considers Central Asia one of the priorities of its foreign policy, and this building of peaceful, inclusive partnerships was marked by the historical milestone of the signing of the treaty at the summit. “We will improve the architecture of cooperation, which is characterized by pragmatism, efficiency, and deep integration,” the Chinese president said, adding that 2025–2026 have been declared the Years of High-Quality Development of China-Central Asia Cooperation. This initiative will focus on trade, transport connectivity, green energy, agriculture, and technology. Notably, China pledged 1.5 billion yuan ($208 million) in grants for projects aimed...

2 days ago

China South Korea France opinion Nuclear power Rosatom NPP International Diplomacy

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Diplomacy – With China Set to Build Second, Who Will Construct Third Nuclear Power Plant?

Kazakhstan’s famed hospitality, long enshrined in its national proverbs, has also become a guiding principle in its foreign policy. One recent example is the Kazakh government’s diplomatic maneuvering in the selection of partners for its nuclear power program. Leader of the Race Initially, Kazakhstan planned to build a single nuclear power plant by 2035 to address potential electricity shortages. However, following the October 6, 2024, referendum, where 71.12% of voters approved a plant in the Almaty Region, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev instructed the government to explore the construction of at least two additional facilities. This directive, as it turns out, was both timely and strategic. In March 2025, the newly formed Atomic Energy Agency, reporting directly to the president, was tasked with overseeing the selection of international consortium leaders. On June 14, the agency announced that Russia’s state-owned Rosatom would lead the consortium to build Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant. Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev welcomed the decision, stating that the VVER-1200 Generation 3+ reactors, already operating in Russia and Belarus and selected by partners in Hungary, Egypt, Turkey, Bangladesh, and China, would be used. These reactors, he emphasized, meet international safety standards and integrate both active and passive safety systems. Tricks Up Their Sleeves Behind the scenes, the selection process revealed a quiet tug-of-war between Chinese and Russian interests. Ultimately, Rosatom prevailed, thanks, in part, to two strategic moves. First, Rosatom’s supporters enlisted Assystem, an ostensibly independent nuclear engineering consultancy, to assist Kazakhstan Atomic Power Plants LLP in the evaluation process. The firm’s analysis favored Rosatom. Second, to pre-empt concerns about Western sanctions, the Kazakh authorities emphasized that Kazakhstan would be the sole owner and operator of the facility. Atomic Energy Agency head Almasadam Satkaliev stated that Kazakhstan would control the entire production cycle from uranium mining to fuel processing and plant maintenance, thereby limiting direct Russian involvement post-construction. This arrangement may allow the creation of a Kazakh legal entity immune to Western sanctions, as it would be wholly state-owned. Whether this could offer Rosatom a loophole for acquiring restricted components remains an open question but one that few may press given the global interest in nuclear safety. Another Contender Emerges Just hours after Rosatom’s contract was announced, Satkaliev made a second, equally strategic statement: China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) would lead the construction of Kazakhstan’s second nuclear power plant. Satkaliev cited CNNC’s “strongest proposals” and revealed plans for a broader agreement on nuclear cooperation with China. “Objectively, few countries can master the entire nuclear cycle. China is one of them,” Satkaliev noted. Back in February, prior to the agency’s creation, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, then also led by Satkaliev, had identified Kurchatov and Aktau as potential sites for future nuclear facilities. Kurchatov lies near the former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, while Aktau once hosted the Soviet-era BN-350 fast neutron reactor. The timing of Satkaliev’s announcement is no coincidence. Chinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to visit Kazakhstan on June 16 for the second China-Central Asia Summit. For a nation that...

4 days ago

International Cooperation Organization of Turkic States TURKPA

Opinion: The Engine of Turkic Integration – Why TURKPA Is No Longer “Just Talk”

On June 12, in Astana, the 14th Plenary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TURKPA) was held under the theme: TURKTIME: The Role of Parliamentary Diplomacy. TURKPA has existed since 2008, but it is only now that the multifaceted activities of Turkic states are drawing close attention from external observers, first and foremost, from Russia. This is unsurprising since the driving forces behind Turkic initiatives are often Ankara and Astana. While Turkey promotes its national interests, Kazakhstan appears to play both of its powerful neighbors, Russia and China, against each other. Moscow, at times, does not hide its ire, hinting that its influence over Astana is diminishing in favor of Beijing. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev skillfully engages with China, securing benefits such as investments and a visa-free regime, which gives Kazakhstani carriers an advantage over their Russian and regional competitors. TURKPA was officially founded a year before its 'sister' organization, the Organization of Turkic States, was established. The first proposal to create TURKPA was made by Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the 8th Summit of Turkic Heads of States in November 2006. Interestingly, TURKPA is also listed on the website of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), although it includes Turkey, a country outside the CIS and a geopolitical rival to Russia, which dominates the organization. Equally interesting is the composition of TURKPA and its governance structure. Its full members comprise Turkey, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan, whilst Hungary and Turkmenistan are observers. The day-to-day operations of the organization are managed by a Secretariat headquartered in Baku, and the Secretary General of TURKPA is always an Azerbaijani citizen. Strategic direction is provided through annual plenary sessions, which are presided over by the Speaker of Parliament of the country currently holding the Chair. “The chairmanship rotates annually in alphabetical order according to the Latin alphabet,” explained Kazakh MP Aigul Kuspan. This brings us to a curious contradiction that nobody focuses much upon. It is believed that Azerbaijan is Turkey’s proxy state in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, to a lesser or greater degree, pursue a Russian policy in the region. As explained, in recent years Kazakhstan has also gravitated toward promoting Chinese interests. Thus, in practice, Turkey leads TURKPA through its own presidency and via Azerbaijan for two out of every four years, while Russia/China exert influence through Kazakh and Kyrgyz speakers in the other two. In theory, this tug-of-war could have rendered both TURKPA and the OTS, where geopolitical tensions are similar, meaningless forums for routine summits. That was true until recently; however, now we observe a growing geopolitical subjectivity in Central Asia and a reorientation toward its own interests. Therefore, OTS summits and TURKPA plenaries have become more purposeful. This is demonstrated by the words of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who met with delegates of the 14th Plenary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States. “Last year, Kazakhstan chaired the Organization of Turkic States. Under the motto 'TURKTIME', we implemented...

1 week ago

Central Asia-China Summit Xi Jinping Beijing’s initiatives U.S. Tariffs EU-Central Asia Summit opinion C5+1 Belt and Road Initiative

Opinion: Xi Jinping Heads to Astana – What’s at Stake in the Central Asia-China Summit?

On June 16-17, President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China will visit Kazakhstan. The second Central Asia-China summit is scheduled for June 17 in Astana. Leading up to the event, a series of forums, meetings, and conferences have been unfolding across Central Asia and China, drawing experts, journalists, diplomats, and energy-sector representatives. These activities suggest that the upcoming summit is poised to overshadow its predecessor. While U.S. analysts continue debating the viability of their own C5+1 framework for engaging with Central Asia, and the European Union advanced its outreach with the inaugural EU-Central Asia summit, China has relied on a well-worn path. The thousand-year legacy of the Middle Kingdom is filled with moments when it had to engage with the complex mosaic of Central Asia, once a turbulent region of khanates, emirates, and nomadic tribes. Despite the chaos, China succeeded in carving out a secure overland corridor, the Great Silk Road, which threaded through what are now the independent Central Asian republics, linking them like beads in a continental necklace. Then, as now, China is seeking stability in the region, not just for political influence but to safeguard its global supply chains. Beijing’s modern initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative and its broader “community of shared future” concept, aim to establish global “islands of comfort” conducive to Chinese interests. At the heart of this strategy lies a deeply embedded worldview: that China represents civilization itself. The Chinese learned long ago to deal with their neighbors not with violence, but through economic incentives, a method which is proving just as effective today. This layer of understanding is notably absent in many Western and post-Soviet analyses of China’s actions in Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and beyond. The reasons for this are twofold. First, Chinese officials are careful never to state views about cultural hierarchies explicitly; doing so would risk alienating partners. This reticence is a feature of traditional Eastern diplomacy. Second, Beijing has cultivated its own expert ecosystem within the post-Soviet sphere. In response to a wave of Sinophobia that swept through Central Asia a decade ago, China now primarily engages with favorable media outlets and Sinologists, many of whom are nurtured through carefully managed media tours. One such tour, organized by People’s Daily, is currently underway ahead of the Astana summit. As a result, the discourse surrounding the summit is shaped less by hard policy proposals than by diplomatic pageantry, with everything presented in the best possible light. At the recent 5th Forum of Think Tanks, “Central Asia-China: New Horizons for Regional Partnership,” Kazakhstan's State Councilor Yerlan Karin likened China and Central Asia to “the two lungs of Asia,” emphasizing the symbolic depth of their growing relationship. The 6th Central Asia-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, chaired by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and held in Almaty in April, likewise offered little in terms of concrete summit outcomes. According to a general statement from Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, topics included political dialogue, trade, connectivity, sustainable development, and security cooperation,...

1 week ago

Nuclear power opinion China Russia Finance

Opinion: In Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Race, Financial Muscle Will Decide the Winner

The most closely watched development in Kazakhstan this June is the decision over which foreign company will be awarded the contract to build the country’s first nuclear power plant. According to earlier announcements, the Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency is expected to make its decision by the end of the month. Bidders from South Korea, France, Russia, and China remain in contention, although recent expert commentary suggests that earlier assumptions favoring Russia’s Rosatom may no longer hold. Competing Interests Beneath the Surface In Kazakhstan, there appears to be an internal struggle between two strategic camps with opposing visions for the project’s future. Each faction has its own backers, deeply embedded in the country’s nuclear ambitions. One group, primarily composed of financial officials and economic policymakers, is advocating for the least expensive option. Their preferred bidder is China's China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which is offering the lowest project cost, backed by Chinese bank financing. This group is influenced not only by CNNC’s competitive pricing but also by China’s broader economic leverage over Kazakhstan. The second group consists of nuclear professionals, scientists, engineers, and technicians, who prioritize reliability and operational familiarity. Their preference leans toward Rosatom, given Russia’s historical involvement and established presence in Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector. This technical camp is widely viewed as a de facto ally of the Kremlin, as Rosatom’s participation would extend Moscow’s long-term strategic influence in Central Asia. Given the 50-60-year operational lifespan of such reactors, this influence would be enduring. Though this tension remains speculative, patterns observed over the past decade suggest a real and ongoing tug-of-war. No Thermal Power, No Nuclear Power? At the end of May, media in Kazakhstan reported that Russia might not fulfill its commitments under a 2023 memorandum signed during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Astana. The agreement with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev concerned the construction of three coal-fired thermal power plants (TPPs) in Kokshetau, Semey, and Ust-Kamenogorsk, with Russian energy giant Inter RAO designated as the turnkey builder. The total cost was estimated at $2.8 billion. However, in April 2024, First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar acknowledged financial hurdles. While design and preliminary work continue, difficulties remain in subsidizing equipment interest rates. Sklyar noted that a change in investor may be considered, and the situation could be resolved within a month. Oil and gas expert Olzhas Baidildinov has speculated that the nuclear power plant project may be bundled with the thermal plants as a “social burden”, a condition that CNNC might accept more readily than Rosatom. “If CNNC is chosen to build the nuclear power plant, the thermal plants could follow as part of the package,” Baidildinov suggested via his Telegram channel. Sergey Agafonov, head of the Kazakhstan Association of Energy Supply Organizations, also sees the nuclear and thermal plant projects as interconnected, particularly with regard to financing. Debunking the Price Myth The technical community has responded swiftly to growing narratives about CNNC's supposedly unbeatable offer to construct the nuclear plant for $5.5 billion, a claim spread via Chinese sources. Nuclear...

2 weeks ago