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Bruce Pannier

Bruce Pannier is a Central Asia Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the advisory board at the Caspian Policy Center, and a longtime journalist and correspondent covering Central Asia. He currently appears regularly on the Majlis podcast for RFE/RL.

Articles

International Diplomacy Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Bilateral Relations

A Final Deal Along Central Asia’s Deadliest Border

It took some 33 years, but on December 4, Kyrgyz and Tajik officials reached a final agreement on delimitation of the last sections of their 972-kilometer border. It is a relief for the entire Central Asian region. In those 33 years the five Central Asian countries (including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have been independent, the only open conflicts between the armed forces of two Central Asian countries happened between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the southern Kyrgyz city of Batken on December 4, Kyrgyz security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and Tajik counterpart Saimumin Yatimov announced an agreement that Tajik state news agency Khovar said “fully completed the delimitation of the remaining sections of the Tajik-Kyrgyz state border.” Most of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border runs through the Pamir Mountains. The eastern part, approximately two-thirds of the common frontier, passes through remote and sparsely inhabited areas. Agreement on where the dividing line between the two countries was easy to reach in this section. The remaining one-third of the border in the west proved far more difficult to find compromises. [caption id="attachment_26293" align="aligncenter" width="2256"] Road near the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai. On one side of the road is Tajikistan, the other side, Kyrgyzstan; image: Bruce Pannier[/caption] Kyrgyz and Tajiks are two of the oldest peoples in Central Asia. Their ancestors lived in what is now the border area many hundreds of years before there were any borders. The Soviet Union changed that when it created the Kyrgyz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics, not only drawing lines on a map, which were redrawn more than once, but also including enclaves on either side of the border. Roads in the area zigzagged back and forth, one minute through Kyrgyzstan, and few minutes later through Tajikistan, over and over again. As border tensions began to appear toward the end of the 2000-2010 period, both countries started building roads to avoid crossing into the neighboring state, but the terrain is rugged, limiting possibilities for alternate routes. Also, new road construction is expensive and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are both poor countries. [caption id="attachment_26294" align="aligncenter" width="2256"] The entrance to Tajikistan's Vorukh enclave; image: Bruce Pannier[/caption] The lone road leading from Batken to the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai and the Tajik enclave of Vorukh weaves through both countries several times and in some places, the road is the border. Visible from any village in this area are the snow-capped mountains, but down in the valleys, water has always been a problem. Like the roads, small rivers and canals meander across both sides of the border, and unsurprisingly, water use is a major source of tensions and has been a significant obstacle in deciding where the border should be. The first hints of trouble came after 2000 and involved petty vandalism, usually children throwing rocks at passing vehicles with license plates from the neighboring country. This escalated and after 2010, when incidents of physical altercations between members of border communities started, followed by vandalism targeting homes and businesses in border villages. Since much of...

1 month ago

Revolution Coup attempt Japarov Kyrgyz assassination plot Opposition Security

Just Another Reported Assassination Attempt in Kyrgyzstan

The head of Kyrgyzstan’s State National Security Committee (GKNB), Kamchybek Tashiyev, says someone was plotting to kill him, and it is not the first time, and it is not only Tashiyev people want to assassinate. On November 20, Tashiyev said he received an anonymous letter with a flash drive that contained a death threat. Tashiyev also remarked that already “5-6 assassination attempts were prepared against me,” and “GKNB officers prevented two attempts on the life of President Sadyr Japarov.” Normally this would be amazing, even chilling news. However, Japarov and Tashiyev have been uncovering so many plots, some rather dubious, to overthrow the government since they bulldozed their way to power in late 2020 that it is difficult to gauge the seriousness of these assassination claims. According to the GKNB, by November 25, those responsible for this most recent threat were already apprehended. Surveillance cameras outside a GKNB station in Bishkek recorded the person who dropped off the letter with the threat. He turned out to be a homeless man who delivered the letter after a person identified only by his initials “Zh. A. S.” offered him food in exchange for dropping off the letter. Zh. A. S. was identified as a former Kyrgyz military pilot who served in the CIS peacekeeping force guarding Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The suspect was convicted twice. It was not mentioned for which crimes, but the GKNB did say he had been plotting “for a long time” to kill Tashiyev. A report from Kyrgyzstan’s KNEWS media outlet included a curious comment attributed to the GKNB that the suspect was connected to “intelligence services of foreign states and destructive forces, pursuing interests in destabilizing the socio-political situation in the Kyrgyz Republic…“ The Mafia Since 2023, Japarov’s government has been waging the fiercest campaign in Kyrgyzstan’s history against organized crime, and Tashiyev and the GKNB have been leading this battle. Tashiyev alluded to this in his November 20 comments. “When I started fighting organized crime groups and others, I knew that such threats would exist,” Tashiyev said, adding, “I knew they would put pressure on me to give up the fight.” Certainly, the campaign against organized crime has made the government, and Tashiyev specifically, some powerful enemies. Raimbek “Millions” Matraimov amassed a fortune when he was deputy chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Customs Service from 2015-2017, and even then, people knew he was an organized crime leader. He was so powerful that when Sadyr Japarov was catapulted from a prison cell into the president’s office when unrest broke out in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020, there were suspicions that Matraimov’s wealth and clout backed this meteoric ascent.If that is true, Matraimov misjudged Japarov. In early October 2023, the GKNB killed Kamchybek Asanbek, alias Kamchy Kolbaev, alias Kolya Kyrgyz, while trying to arrest him at a Bishkek restaurant. Kolbayev was believed to be the top kingpin of the organized criminal world in Kyrgyzstan. Matraimov fled Kyrgyzstan shortly after that. Kyrgyz authorities started confiscating Matraimov’s assets in...

2 months ago

Oil and Gas Gazprom Gas Pipelines Russia China

Russia Looking to Export Gas to China via Kazakhstan

Russia continues to try to reorient its natural gas exports from Europe to Asia and is planning a new pipeline route to China that would pass through Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan stands to benefit not only from transit fees, but could also import some Russia gas for regions in northeastern Kazakhstan that are desperately in need of more energy sources. The Russian plans are bad news for Turkmenistan as China is Turkmenistan’s main gas customer and Turkmen authorities were hoping to sell China even more gas. On November 15, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak mentioned the pipeline plan on the sidelines of a Chinese-Russian forum in Kazan, Russia. Novak said such a project is still only being discussed, but Russian media outlet Kommersant wrote on November 18 that there are already three options for the pipeline. All three possibilities pass though northeastern Kazakhstan, but Kazakhstan’s level of participation in the pipeline is different in each variation. One of the projects would require Kazakhstan to build a pipeline for gasification of the northeastern Pavlodar, Abai, and Karaganda provinces. A second proposal would include only the Abai and Zhetysu provinces. Russian gas giant Gazprom’s financial obligation also changes depending on the pipeline project selected. The most expensive option for Gazprom would cost more than $10 billion to construct and would not operate at full capacity until 2034. All versions foresee at least 35 billion cubic meters of Russian gas (bcm) shipped via the pipeline with Kazakhstan receiving some 10 bcm, which would greatly alleviate recent power shortages in northeastern Kazakhstan. Despite Novak saying the pipeline project was only being discussed, Kazakhstan and Russia appear well along in their planning. In early May, Kazakh Ambassador to Russia Duaren Abayev gave an interview to Russia’s TASS news agency and mentioned there was a “roadmap” for supplying 35 bcm of gas to China via Kazakhstan. Russia already exports gas to China via the “Sila Sibiri” (Power of Siberia) pipeline and expects that in 2024 the pipeline will for the first time reach its full capacity of 38 bcm. Construction of Sila Sibiri-2 with a planned capacity of some 50 bcm has been delayed due to China’s reluctance to loan Russia money for construction, differences over price, and China’s increasing purchases of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Novak commented on Sila Sibiri-2, saying the pipeline project involving Kazakhstan was separate and the Russian government will continue to negotiate with China about construction of Sila Sibiri-2. Russia is seeking to replace its former main customer, the European Union. Prior to the Kremlin launching its full-scale war on Ukraine in February 2022, the EU was buying between 150-160 bcm of Russian gas annually. The EU sharply cut back on Russian gas imports in response to the invasion of Ukraine and in 2023 imported less than 43 bcm. Russia’s pivot to Asia for gas exports targets the Chinese market, but Gazprom is looking to take any possible Asian customers and has found some in Central Asia. Russia’s surge into the Asian...

2 months ago

Iran Oil and Gas Gas Pipelines Iraq

After Long Search, Turkmenistan Finally Finds a New Gas Customer – Iraq

Turkmenistan is reconfiguring its natural gas export options. Despite holding the world’s fourth largest gas reserves, Turkmenistan is exporting less of its gas today than it was 16 years ago. The big gas pipeline projects conceived nearly 30 years ago – a trans-Afghan pipeline to supply gas to Pakistan and India and a trans-Caspian pipeline to send gas to Europe - remain unfeasible for political reasons. Russia has been a leading customer for Turkmen gas for most of those three decades, but now Russia is competing for some of the same buyers as Turkmenistan. Stymied in its search for new markets at seemingly every turn, Turkmenistan is now planning on selling gas to Iraq, via a swap arrangement with Iran that includes bring Iranian companies to Turkmenistan to construct a new pipeline. Running Out of Options Turkmenistan is always looking for new gas customers. Iraq was never a potential gas buyer until recently, and in fact, the defunct Nabucco gas pipeline project of some 15 years ago considered Iraq to be a possible supplier of gas for Europe. Turkmenistan’s deal with Iraq appears to be the only deal possible at the moment, and it is an interesting arrangement. The two countries are not connected by any pipelines, so Turkmenistan will ship up to 10 bcm of gas to Iran, and Iran will send 10 bcm of its gas to Iraq. Turkmenistan signed what was described as a “binding agreement” for gas shipments after Iraq agreed to “an advance payment scheme and tax concessions.” In recent years, about 40% of Iraq’s gas imports came from Iran. After some 20 years of conflict, Iraq’s gas industry is still recovering, and gas imports are needed to operate the country’s power plants. However, sanctions on Iran made it difficult for Iraq to make payments for that gas. A Rocky Gas History There are already two gas pipelines connecting Turkmenistan’s gas fields to northern Iran. At the end of December 1997, the 200-kilometer Korpeje-Kurdkui pipeline with a capacity of some 8 bcm of gas was launched. In January 2010, the Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipeline with a capacity of some 12 bcm started operation. Turkmenistan was never close to shipping the 20 bcm combined capacity. Exports ranged from 6-8 bcm annually for years. Iran usually paid for its Turkmen gas in barter, sending a variety of goods, from food to engineering goods and services to Turkmenistan. In late 2016, a dispute developed between Turkmenistan and Iran over gas. Turkmenistan claimed Iran owed some $2 billion for gas supplies received in the winter of 2007-2008. Iran responded that Turkmenistan was inflating the price. The winter of 2007-2008 was especially cold causing severe gas shortages in 20 Iranian provinces. One Iranian media outlet reported on December 31, 2016, “Turkmenistan pounced on the occasion to demand a nine-fold hike which yanked the price up to $360 from $40 for every 1,000 cubic meters of gas.” On January 1, 2017, Turkmenistan halted gas supplies to Iran. The two countries took their...

2 months ago

Mining Raw Materials Mining Disaster Critical Minerals

New Era of Mining Starts in Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan will soon be issuing licenses for mining critical raw materials (CRM), which would have been almost unthinkable five years ago. However, a lot has changed in Kyrgyzstan, where a new president came to power in late 2020 and has since radically changed the form of leadership and is seeking new sources of revenue. A lot has changed in the world also, as governments are realizing the importance of CRMs for their economies and are scrambling to find supplies. Past Experiences Kyrgyzstan does not have significant reserves of natural gas or oil as most of the other Central Asian countries do. It was clear from the first days of independence that Kyrgyzstan’s main source of export revenue would come from mining, and Kyrgyzstan has significant deposits of CRMs. The Kumtor gold mine, 4,000-meters high in the mountains on the south part of the massive Lake Issyk-Kul, quickly became the economic savior for a country where most exports were agricultural products. Initial estimates put gold reserves at Kumtor at some 514 tons, but subsequent exploration revealed more gold at the site. Kumtor was a joint venture with Canadian company Cameco, but over time Cameco acquired nearly 75% of the project. There was environmental damage at the site that almost completely destroyed two nearby glaciers - Davidov and Lysiy. The most infamous incident involving Kumtor occurred in May 1998, when a Kumtor truck overturned into the Barskoon River, dumping nearly two tons of sodium cyanide into the water. Thousands of people were evacuated from area, several died, and business at Issyk-Kul, Kyrgyzstan’s premier tourst attraction, plummetted. The example of environmental problems at Kumtor turned public opinion in Kyrgyzstan against mining projects. Some 20 year later, the issue again came to the fore over the Kyzyl-Ompol uranium site in the Tong district of Issyl-Kul Province. In April 2019, nearly 30,000 people signed a petition to halt work at Kyzyl-Ompol. Anti-mining sentiment grew and by October 31, 2019, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament approved a moratorium on exploration and extraction of uranium and thorium that was signed into law in December that year. Something Everyone Wants The European Commission wrote that CRMs are crucial for “producing a broad range of goods and applications used in everyday life and modern technologies,” and noted, “Reliable and unhindered access to certain raw materials is a growing concern within the EU and across the globe.” Additionally, the attempts by many nations to wean themselves off fossil fuels have led to a surge in countries seeking to construct nuclear power plants (NPP) to meet their energy needs. There are currently some 440 operating NPPs in the world, 60 new reactors are under construction, and another 110 are planned to be built. Current President Sadyr Japarov rose to power after Kyrgyzstan’s revolution in 2020. Japarov, who is from the Issyk-Kul area, was an opponent of foreign ownership of the Kumtor gold mine, and in 2021 his government forced out Canadian company Centerra (which took over from Cameco in 2004). Kumtor was...

3 months ago