Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Russia's War Soviet Legacy Historical Repressions Collective Memory Gulag ALZhIR

Tokayev Honors Victims While Putin Rewrites Stalin’s Past

On May 31, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan stood at the Museum and Memorial Complex “ALZhIR,” which Stalin had established in 1937 as a camp in the Soviet Gulag. Akmola was the name of Astana at the time, and “ALZhIR” is a Russian acronym for “Akmola Camp of Wives of Traitors to the Motherland.” The former Gulag camp, as its name indicates, was for women (a total of roughly 8,000, not to mention over 1,500 children born in the camp) who were detained solely for their familial associations with accused intellectuals or political dissidents. The full name of the Complex, which opened in 2007, is the Museum and Memorial Complex in Memory of Victims of Political Repression and Totalitarianism. In a solemn wreath-laying ceremony, declaring the imperative to preserve memory and confront the Soviet past directly, Tokayev provided a stark contrast to simultaneous developments in Russia, where orchestrated celebrations and symbolic gestures have contributed to the resurrection and sanitization of Stalin’s legacy. [caption id="attachment_32500" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] The Museum and Memorial Complex “ALZhIR”; image: TCA [/caption] This year, Russia’s state apparatus has initiated a broad and deliberate campaign to reinsert Stalin into the country’s national consciousness. Major new monuments have been erected, existing public spaces have been renamed, and state-controlled media have popularized new narratives of Stalin’s leadership. The unveiling of a statue of Stalin in mid-May at the Taganskaya metro, one of Moscow’s busiest stations, received a significant degree of international attention. It was a meticulous restoration of the bas-relief sculpture, “The People’s Gratitude to the Commander-in-Chief,” a work that had been destroyed during the Khrushchev-era de-Stalinization. Cities like Vologda, where Stalin was exiled from 1911 to 1914, have joined this revival, with local leaders organizing public lectures praising his wartime “strategic genius.” Volgograd’s airport was renamed as Stalingrad International Airport by presidential decree. The 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany provided a ready pretext for these efforts. The resurrection of Stalin’s image in Russia serves more than a commemorative function. It represents a strategic deployment of a historical narrative to justify present-day authoritarian practices. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly drawn explicit parallels between the sacrifices of the Battle of Stalingrad and contemporary military operations in Ukraine, framing the use of force as a historical imperative. State-controlled media in Russia reinforce this framing, while educational curricula have been revised to highlight Stalin’s leadership while marginalizing the atrocities of his regime. This selective memory is an active construction of ideological hegemony, consolidating state power through the manipulation of historical truth. Yet while Russia is reconstructing a mythic narrative that merges nostalgia with political expediency, Kazakhstan is confronting the traumas of its past. Over the past five years, the State Commission on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression has reviewed thousands of cases, exonerating over 300,000 individuals. Public debates, academic conferences, and community initiatives have reinforced this commitment, along with the publication of survivor testimonies and the release of new archival materials. These materials cover not just...

2 months ago

Italy Middle Corridor Oil and Gas Bilateral Cooperation Bilateral Investment Central Asia-Italy Summit

Kazakhstan and Italy Forge a New Strategic Nexus

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's visit to Kazakhstan marks a pivotal moment in the deepening relationship between the two nations. This diplomatic mission comes on the heels of historical ties reinforced by Pope Benedict XVI’s 2022 visit to the Central Asian nation, where he met with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Benedict’s trip was a testament to Kazakhstan’s role in promoting interfaith dialogue and global peace, a legacy that continues to shape its international relationships. Now, with a new American Pope at the helm of the Vatican, Meloni has renewed Italy’s commitment to strengthening its partnership with Kazakhstan. Her meeting with Tokayev and participation in the C5+Italy Summit underline her focus on fostering collaboration in energy diversification, regional stability, and economic growth. The terms for Meloni’s arrival in Astana were set by Kazakhstan’s previous engagements with Italy, including President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Rome in early 2024 and his meeting with Meloni in Abu Dhabi in January 2025. Those substantive bilateral talks set the bilateral agenda in the joint context of Italian active Eurasian diplomacy and Kazakhstan’s own strategic vision. Meloni’s direct discussions with Tokayev focused on deepening bilateral diplomatic and economic ties; expanding cooperation in energy, trade, and defense; and discussing regional security and joint training programs. As she put it prior to departing Italy, “This visit confirms the strategic value of our collaboration and the excellent level of relations between our nations.” Kazakhstan’s geography, resource wealth, and evolving political posture since independence over a third of a century have also enabled it to craft a nuanced foreign policy balancing traditional ties with Russia and China against emerging alignments with Europe and beyond. Italy’s diplomacy, underpinned by proactive outreach and sustained by major trade and investment flows, has become Kazakhstan’s principal EU partner and third-largest global trading counterpart. Meloni’s engagement with Kazakhstan underscores her broader strategic vision of positioning Italy as a pivotal player in the evolving geopolitical landscape. Central to this ambition is her ability to connect Italy’s foreign policy with global power structures, including her relationship with former U.S. President Donald Trump, a bond that has bolstered both her personal stature and Italy’s diplomatic leverage. This alignment, rooted in shared ideologies of nationalism and sovereignty, allows Italy to project itself as a transatlantic bridge linking Europe, the United States, and strategically critical regions like Central Asia. Beyond energy and trade, Italy’s approach aims to institutionalize its presence in the region, as demonstrated by the simultaneous hosting of the Central Asia–Italy Summit, which builds on the “5+1” dialogue launched in 2019 and its 2024 iteration at the foreign-ministerial level. Convening this summit at the head-of-government/head-of-state level in Astana subtly underscores Kazakhstan’s linchpin role in regional coordination and Italy’s capacity to frame its engagement as a multilateral and strategic enterprise. Meloni’s ambitions extend to securing Italy’s role in stabilizing ties with Central Asia and former Soviet states. For instance, strengthening relationships with energy-rich nations like Kazakhstan underpins her focus on energy diversification, critical for reducing Europe’s reliance on Russian gas while...

2 months ago

Astana International Forum Middle Powers International Diplomacy Global South

Astana International Forum: Not Just Another Davos

Kazakhstan’s Astana International Forum (AIF) has quietly entered a new phase in its development. Set to convene again this month, it began in 2008 as a targeted economic forum. Over time it has gradually evolved into a broader diplomatic platform aspiring to serve the so-called “Global South” as a whole. The AIF seeks to offer a deliberately open space for structured yet flexible dialogue across economic, political, and security domains, in a world full of international gatherings either overdetermined by legacy institutions or narrowly focused on crisis response. The AIF does not model itself on any existing institution. It is meant neither to replicate global summits nor to impose consensus, nor to replace regional blocs or legacy mechanisms. Rather, it reflects Kazakhstan’s own diplomatic philosophy — what President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev calls “multi-vector foreign policy” — seeking to extend this philosophy outward through a forum that prioritizes engagement over alignment and dialogue over doctrine. The AIF’s early period, from 2008 through roughly 2015, was defined by foundational work. Then called the Astana Economic Forum, it brought together central bankers, financial policymakers, and development agencies. The scope was technocratic, focusing on macroeconomic modernization and public-sector reform. Even in this limited format, however, the initiative revealed Kazakhstan's national aspiration to connect with wider global trends in institutional development and governance. Those formative years correspond to what, in terms of complex-systems theory, might be called the Forum’s phase of “emergence”: a period of assembling functions, testing formats, and learning the rhythms of international convening. These years were not marked by geopolitical ambition, but they did set in motion a process of institutional self-recognition. Kazakhstan was not just hosting events; it was experimenting with a type of global presence that would grow more distinct in later years. From 2015 to 2022, the Forum entered a more self-defining stage. It retained its core economic focus, but it increasingly attracted participants from beyond financial and development sectors. This broadened its scope to include questions of connectivity, regional stability, and sustainable development. The shift was not an accident. It accompanied Kazakhstan’s growing involvement in regional diplomacy and its active participation in a range of other multilateral structures. During this second period, the Forum took on the character of an institution with internal momentum. (This is what complex-systems theorists might term “autopoiesis,” i.e., the ability of a system to reproduce and maintain itself.) By adapting to a wider field of participants and issues, the AIF began to articulate a mission no longer limited to showcasing Kazakhstan’s domestic reforms but extending toward the creation of new transnational linkages. The rebranding of the old Astana Economic Forum as the Astana International Forum affirmed this shift in mandate, scope, and ambition. That rebranding marked the beginning of what now appears to be a critical inflection point. The cancellation of the 2024 edition due to catastrophic flooding created a rupture; but the organizers, rather than rush a replacement, deferred the Forum and used the intervening time to clarify its structure and message. The...

2 months ago

Multi-vector Foreign Policy Astana International Forum International Diplomacy Global South

Kazakhstan’s Astana Forum Offers Global South a New Multi-Vector Platform

Kazakhstan will convene the Astana International Forum (AIF) later this month, on May 29–30, emphasizing its profile as an active mediator in the evolving architecture of global diplomacy. The AIF began in 2008 as the Astana Economic Forum, originally conceived as a technocratic venue focused on macroeconomic development, fiscal strategy, and public-sector reform. In its early iterations, it drew regional economists, central bankers, and international development agencies together to discuss Kazakhstan’s integration into global financial institutions. While modest in its geopolitical profile, the Forum reflected Astana’s broader ambitions to participate in the global rules-based order without overt alignment. In 2023, the AIF was reconstituted with its new, broader mandate in response to international demands for such forums, given the evident erosion of consensus in multilateral governance structures. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has invoked Kazakhstan’s unique geopolitical position to advocate for the AIF as a new platform of balanced engagement, to serve as a “bridge between East and West,” reflecting Astana’s accumulated experience in dialogue facilitation and its ambition to ameliorate the deepening fragmentation of the international system. The rebranding of the Forum was more than cosmetic. It marked a deliberate effort by Kazakhstan to reach out beyond its customary Eurasian frame of reference. The Forum aspires to be a diplomatic innovation, seeking to complement existing institutions like the UN or OSCE without replacing them: a more flexible platform that would be more responsive to emergent global dynamics. This aspiration is of a piece with Kazakhstan’s growing participation in multilateral forums, serving different geopolitical functions, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and its engagements within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The AIF is envisioned as a complementary structure that transcends bloc affiliations, facilitating fluid dialogue among ideologically diverse actors. The 2024 edition of the Forum was intended to be larger-scale than the 2023 version, but it was abruptly canceled after catastrophic flooding struck several regions, an event President Tokayev described as the most devastating natural disaster in the country in eight decades. The state redirected its attention and resources toward recovery, and the Forum was deferred. The 2025 iteration, now reactivated, has adopted the banner message, “Connecting Minds, Shaping the Future.” This reflects an underlying logic in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy that privileges "multi-vectorialism" as a structure for autonomy. Within that structure, the AIF is seeking to create space for engagement among actors that often find themselves excluded from the inner circles of traditional diplomacy: the so-called "Global South," mid-sized Western powers, and immediate regional stakeholders. The agenda of the 2025 AIF consolidates four previous thematic streams into three: Foreign Policy and International Security, Energy and Climate Change, and Economy and Finance. This thematic restructuring signals an intention to deepen the Forum’s analytical focus while retaining general breadth across domains characterizing Kazakhstan’s long-term strategic interests. These interests are conditioned by the continuing development of Kazakhstan's economy. Domestic economic growth is projected to reach 4.5 to 5.0% in 2025, driven by...

2 months ago

Kashagan Oil and Gas Energy Security KazMunaiGas

Tokayev Moves to Reclaim Kazakhstan’s Energy Future

In January 2025, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev instructed the government to seek revisions to the nation’s production-sharing agreements (PSAs). The first known result of that directive has now surfaced, with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) publishing a report regarding a confidential interim ruling in an arbitration case. According to this information, Kazakhstan is pursuing a $160 billion claim against the North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC), the consortium managing the Kashagan oil field. The ruling states that after royalty payments, NCOC receives 98% of remaining revenue from Kashagan’s output. The document concerns a narrower environmental dispute, but the 98% figure alters the landscape. The contract in question dates to the 1990s, when Kazakhstan — newly independent, fiscally constrained, and eager for technical expertise — entered into deals that prioritized attracting investment over securing long-term national benefit. The government now argues that those historical constraints no longer apply, while the revenue-sharing terms remain effectively frozen in place. Rather than seek unilateral redress or executive override, Tokayev’s administration has turned to arbitration. The venue, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and the legal framing mark a continuation of Kazakhstan’s methodical approach to reasserting national interests in its domestic political economy. This latest move cannot be understood as an isolated decision. It reflects a trajectory of state behavior extending back three decades. In the early 1990s, when Chevron’s bid for Tengiz was effectively imposed as a condition for U.S. bilateral assistance, Kazakhstan lacked both the leverage and the institutional competence to resist — a dynamic I analyzed in detail at the time. Chevron’s refusal to direct more than a token amount of investment to social infrastructure nearly sank the agreement. A similar dynamic surrounded the financing and structuring of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Kazakhstan’s attempts to assert greater influence were often thwarted, not least by the asymmetry of legal expertise and negotiating experience. That imbalance began to shift by the early 2000s. The creation of KazMunaiGas (KMG) in 2002 consolidated the state's participation in the energy sector and enabled its strategic action to become more coordinated. By 2003, Kazakhstan was insisting on conformity with international accounting standards at Tengiz, not only to ensure transparency but also to block attempts by foreign operators to defer investment obligations. Environmental enforcement became more assertive as well, with fines imposed on Tengizchevroil for massive open-air sulfur storage, a practice that had long provoked public concern. The Kashagan field, discovered in the late 1990s and described as the largest oil find since Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay in 1968, became the focal point of these tensions. From the outset, Kazakhstan’s participation in the consortium was marginal. A restructuring of the consortium in the early 2000s brought KMG back in, but cost overruns and delays continued. By 2007, the government had suspended work at Kashagan, citing both ecological violations and spiraling expenditures, in a sequence of events I traced contemporaneously during the legislative and consortium restructuring that followed. Amendments to the Law on the Subsurface followed, granting...

3 months ago