Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Peace Talks

Opinion: After the UN Gaza Resolution – Kazakhstan’s Potential Role

The implementation of any new approaches aimed at a rapid, peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict, including the latest UN Security Council resolution, which authorizes the deployment of International Stabilization Forces (ISF), shows that the international community is once again reaching the limits of tools that rely solely on security measures, temporary control, and external administration. Even the most carefully calibrated political or administrative frameworks cannot produce sustainable results unless the ideological nature of the conflict, including its spiritual, historical, and value-based foundations, is changed. It is increasingly clear today that peace in the Holy Land requires not only diplomatic and humanitarian efforts, but also a deep dialogue between the religious and civilizational traditions of the region. In this context, the experience of Kazakhstan, which initiated the creation of a unique collective mechanism for religious reconciliation, deserves particular attention. After lengthy discussions, the UN Security Council approved the U.S.-proposed resolution to form an international stabilization force in Gaza. That means authorizing external actors - for the first time through a UN-mandated transitional authority - to participate in Gaza’s administrative and security arrangements. Thirteen countries supported the resolution, with only Russia and China abstaining. This step creates a new legal reality: the international community now holds a formal mandate to support Gaza’s security, humanitarian access, and reconstruction. Yet the resolution raises another question: will this become the foundation for lasting peace, or merely another temporary structure that keeps the situation under control without changing its essence? The U.S.-Israeli planning model - widely discussed in reporting - proposing dividing Gaza into "green" and "red" zones, reflects an approach in which security replaces reconciliation. Historical cases, such as Bosnia and Lebanon, suggest to many analysts that such strategies rarely lead to sustainable stability. Territorial divisions, from Bosnia to Lebanon, tend to freeze conflicts rather than resolve them. The Palestinian enclave risks becoming an example of a “permanent transitional zone,” where military stability exists without political resolution or trust. In the future, a divided Gaza could face humanitarian collapse, intensified radicalization, and deep fractures in how the Islamic world perceives the West, especially if European troops are deployed. All this underscores a key point: without addressing the ideological and religious dimensions of the conflict - as many experts argue - territorial schemes remain temporary. The conflict in the Holy Land cannot be resolved solely with demarcation maps and international mandates. Breaking the deadlock requires more than another control mechanism; it requires a new architecture of reconciliation. And it must engage the roots of the conflict, including religious thinking, historical grievances, and cultural trauma, rather than its surface-level manifestations. Kazakhstan can play a unique role here. It is not just a new participant in the Abraham Accords, but a country with remarkable political, diplomatic, and spiritual legitimacy. It enjoys the trust of the Islamic world, maintains stable relations with Israel, is perceived by the West as a neutral partner, and has a successful record of coordinating great-power and regional actor efforts, such as the Astana process on...

Trans-Afghan Railway

Icy Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Threaten Central Asian Trade Plans

On November 25, the Afghan authorities accused Pakistan of a new round of airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing killed nine children and a woman, injuring several others. The attacks are the latest escalation in rapidly worsening tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban-led government in Kabul, with key border crossings currently closed, and Afghan refugees being expelled from Pakistan. At the heart of the crisis is Pakistan’s claim that Kabul is providing support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban, or TPP), a militant group seeking to topple Pakistan’s government and impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law. The fallout may ripple beyond bilateral relations, with significant consequences for Central Asian trade, particularly the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan plan for a Trans-Afghan railway. The planned 647-kilometer line is set to connect the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif with Peshawar in Pakistan. When combined with existing infrastructure, this will mean that trains can travel from southern Uzbekistan all the way to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi, granting landlocked Uzbekistan and Afghanistan a long-sought gateway to the Indian Ocean. But mounting instability, along with Islamabad’s willingness to shut borders as leverage, may now place the project in serious jeopardy. “The moment a state weaponizes geography, every financier in Tashkent, Moscow, or Beijing prices in risk, delays commitments, and quietly explores alternative alignments,” Anant Mishra, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, told The Times of Central Asia. So, what are the prospects for salvaging the Trans-Afghan railway? How can Pakistan and Afghanistan de-escalate? And what does this turmoil mean for Central Asia’s wider economic ambitions? A sudden frost On July 17, Uzbekistan’s Transport Minister Ilkhom Makhkamov, Pakistan’s Railway Minister Muhammad Hanif Abbasi, and Afghanistan’s acting Public Works Minister Mohammad Esa Thani signed an agreement to conduct a feasibility study for the proposed railway. Many hoped the railway would presage a new era of fraternal relations between Central and South Asia. “Civil society, the intelligentsia, media, and business community of Pakistan have been loudly calling for intimate trade relations with the Central Asian Republics,” Khadim Hussain, Research Director at the Centre for Regional Policy and Dialogue (CRPD), Islamabad, told TCA. For Uzbekistan, which has aggressively pursued diversification of trade routes to reduce reliance on transit through Iran and Kazakhstan, the project promised a cheaper, faster corridor to global markets. According to Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, the trans-Afghan is one of two high-priority transport projects, along with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – work on which began in April 2025. But the ink had barely dried on the July accord when tensions between Afghanistan’s Taliban government and Islamabad began escalating, throwing the ambitious railway into doubt. [caption id="attachment_40211" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Uzbek passenger and freight trains parked in Andijan; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] In early October, Pakistan launched an airstrike in Kabul targeting the leader of the...

China

China Demands That Tajikistan Protect Chinese Citizens After Attack

China is urging Tajikistan to “take all necessary measures” to protect Chinese citizens and businesses in Tajikistan’s border area, where several Chinese workers were killed in a drone attack that was carried out from neighboring Afghanistan last week. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, meanwhile, met senior security officials in his government on Monday to discuss ways to strengthen security on the southern border with Afghanistan, whose ruling Taliban movement has expressed sorrow and promised to help find the attackers. “According to reports from officials, during the past week two incidents of gunfire occurred across the border into Tajikistan, resulting in five deaths and five injuries,” Tajikistan’s presidential office said. It said Rahmon “strongly condemned the illegal and provocative actions of Afghan citizens” and ordered security officials “to resolve the issue and prevent the recurrence of such unfortunate incidents.” The statement did not provide details on the five people who were killed. The government previously said a drone attack from Afghanistan targeted a camp housing company employees in Tajikistan’s southwestern Khatlon region last week, killing three Chinese workers. The government meeting on Monday came a day after Chinese ambassador Guo Zhijun called Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin as well as a senior Tajik security official to discuss the border situation. “Guo demanded that Tajikistan take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of Chinese enterprises and citizens in Tajikistan,” the Chinese embassy in Dushanbe said on Monday. It noted that Tajikistan said it “will immediately upgrade its security measures to protect the safety of Chinese enterprises and citizens to the fullest extent of the law.” Chinese workers are involved in mining and construction projects in Tajikistan, which along with other countries in Central Asia is seeking to improve relations and develop trade with Afghanistan despite persistent security concerns. Tajikistan said that it used a drone to kill two suspected drug smugglers from Afghanistan in the border area last month. In August, Tajik guards and fighters from the Afghan Taliban exchanged fire. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has condemned the killings of the three Chinese workers last week and blamed that attack on “those seeking to create disorder, instability, & mistrust among the countries of the region.” It said it “stands ready for information-sharing, technical collaboration, & joint assessments in order to identify those responsible for the incident.” Separately, Afghanistan’s border to the east and south with Pakistan has been the focus of recent clashes between the two countries that killed dozens of people and disrupted trade. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of providing sanctuary to militants who carry out attacks against Pakistani security forces, an allegation that the Taliban in Afghanistan denies.

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Why Attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium Could Alter Kazakhstan’s Strategic Plans

Attacks on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), reduced export flows, and volatility in commodity markets are generating serious pressures for Kazakhstan. In the coming years, both the country’s financial system and its domestic political balance may face significant tests. A number of experts warn that disruptions in oil logistics via the CPC, which remains the main artery for Kazakh crude exports, could depress budget revenues, strain national companies, and worsen the sovereign outlook. Kazakhstan pumps roughly 80% of its oil exports through the CPC system, and oil revenues account for more than half of the country’s total export earnings. Because CPC Blend is Kazakhstan’s primary export-grade crude, even short interruptions can reverberate through the state budget, the National Fund, and the balance sheets of national companies. This could trigger a domino effect, destabilizing broad swathes of the economy and undermining public finances. Already, the recent rounds of disruption around Black Sea oil shipping are eroding a substantial source of tax revenue for the state. Continued Risk of Strikes Political scientist Dosym Satpaev argues that Kazakhstan may be underestimating the intensity and persistence of the conflict surrounding Ukraine. He contends that both sides in that conflict have used strikes on energy infrastructure as key tools, a tactic that will likely continue. The recent strike targeted the CPC’s single-point moorings (SPMs) at Novorossiysk, a coastal terminal on the Russian Black Sea. These offshore loading points sit in relatively shallow waters and are physically exposed, making them susceptible to the naval drones Ukraine has increasingly deployed against Russian maritime infrastructure. Although the attack officially targeted Russian facilities, the collateral implications for Kazakh oil exports were immediate. According to Satpaev, that means further risks for the CPC. The fact that Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on this single pipeline reflects a broader failure to diversify exports and reduce reliance on raw material transit. The vulnerability is magnified by the CPC’s ownership structure: although Kazakhstan relies on it for most of its exports, the pipeline network and the Novorossiysk terminal lie on Russian territory and operate under Russian regulatory oversight. Russia holds a majority stake in the consortium, while U.S. firms such as Chevron and Exxon also have significant shares, creating a complex web of interests that limits Astana’s room for manoeuvre. Kazakhstan has already experienced how this dependence can be leveraged. In 2022, Russian regulators repeatedly halted CPC operations over alleged “environmental violations,” moves widely interpreted as political pressure at a moment of diplomatic friction. That precedent underscores how strategic vulnerability to CPC disruptions predates the current wave of attacks. Satpaev is skeptical that alternative export routes, such as via pipelines through the Caspian Sea to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or transit to China, can substitute for the CPC in the near term. Given the global trend toward reduced oil demand, he believes this leaves Kazakhstan exposed to long-term structural risks. At the same time, Satpaev views as unlikely the possibility that Ukraine would attempt to directly stop the CPC’s operations, given the broader consequences such...

Human Rights

Human Rights Groups Urge Turkmenistan to Release Activists Ahead of Neutrality Anniversary

As Turkmenistan prepares to mark the 30th anniversary of its policy of permanent neutrality, international human rights organizations are urging the government to commemorate the occasion by releasing civil society activists imprisoned for peacefully expressing their views. In a joint appeal, the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR), the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR), Turkmen.News, and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC) called on Turkmen authorities to use the milestone as an opportunity to take a humanitarian step by pardoning activists jailed on politically motivated charges. The organizations emphasized that presidential pardons remain the only available legal mechanism for early release in Turkmenistan. Including these cases in the official pardon process, they argue, would demonstrate the country’s willingness to align with international human rights standards. Among the prisoners named in the appeal is Mansur Mingelov, a human rights activist who has been incarcerated since 2012. He is serving a 22 year sentence after publicly denouncing the abuse of ethnic Baloch people. Another activist, Murat Dushemov, was sentenced to four years for publicly criticizing the government and its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. He was expected to be released in the summer of 2025. The rights groups also expressed growing concern about activists and citizen journalists who were detained abroad and reportedly subjected to forced return to Turkmenistan, where they face prosecution under opaque legal processes. Citizen journalists Alisher Sakhatov and Abdulla Orusov were detained in Turkey in April 2025 on charges of “threatening public safety.” Farhat Meymankuliev was deported from Turkey in 2023 and, according to human rights monitors, subsequently imprisoned following a closed trial. In another case, Malikberdy Allamyrradov was secretly transferred from Russia to Turkmenistan in December 2023 and later charged with assaulting a cellmate. Saddam Gulamov was also forcibly returned from Russia and sentenced to a prison colony in the Lebap region. The human rights groups argue that freeing these individuals would send a strong message of goodwill during a major national celebration and offer a concrete signal of Turkmenistan’s readiness to uphold its international obligations.

Wildlife Conservation

Samarkand’s CoP20 Opens with High-Stakes Debates on Wildlife Trade and Species Protection

The world’s largest conference on wildlife trade opened last week in Samarkand, drawing nearly 3,000 delegates to Uzbekistan for two weeks of critical negotiations that could reshape global conservation policy. The 20th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES CoP20) is being held in Central Asia for the first time, a region increasingly impacted by transcontinental wildlife trafficking routes connecting Africa and Asia. Hosted by Uzbekistan’s National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change, CoP20 carries the theme “CITES at 50 in Samarkand: Bridging Nature and People,” commemorating five decades of global conservation under the Convention and echoing the city’s legacy as a historic crossroads of commerce and ideas. One of the central issues dominating this year’s meeting is a series of proposals concerning African megafauna, particularly elephants, rhinos, and giraffes. These proposals, submitted by several African range states, challenge the extent to which legal trade in vulnerable species should be permitted, given decades of poaching and habitat degradation. Audrey Delsink, Senior Director at Humane World for Animals, warned of the dangers these proposals pose. “All the species proposals concerning African megafauna are highly concerning because of the impact they will have on the respective species and the repercussions on illegal trade should the proposals be accepted,” she told The Times of Central Asia. Among the most controversial is a joint proposal by Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe to remove most southern African giraffe populations from CITES Appendix II. Delsink cautioned that this would create a fragmented regulatory regime, complicating enforcement. “It is very difficult to differentiate bones and pelts of the different species and subspecies, making it easy to launder endangered giraffe species through the system,” she said. With wild giraffe populations estimated at fewer than 120,000, any weakening of controls could prove disastrous. Similar concerns surround Namibia’s proposal to sell ivory from registered government stockpiles. Delsink warned that the legal ivory trade has historically masked illicit flows and could trigger renewed poaching. “Legal trade provides a cover for illegal ivory and fuels illegal trade, poaching, and consumer demand,” she said, noting that CITES members have rejected such proposals for nearly two decades. Central Asian countries, increasingly used as transit corridors for high-value wildlife contraband, are becoming key players in enforcement. Smuggling networks exploit Eurasian air, rail, and road links to move products such as ivory, rhino horn, and exotic animals. Delsink highlighted the “Samarkand Declaration and Action Plan (2025-2032),” signed this week by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as a major step toward regional coordination. The agreement commits signatories to harmonize laws and improve intelligence-sharing mechanisms. [caption id="attachment_40166" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Image: National Committee on Ecology of Uzbekistan[/caption] “Intelligence-led operations and rapid information exchange between agencies can disrupt organized crime networks that exploit porous borders,” Delsink said. She also underscored the need for customs modernization and officer training, supported by organizations such as TRAFFIC and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Beyond...