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Ethnic Kazakhs Returning to Their Historical Homeland

Ethnic Kazakhs holding foreign citizenship have received a total of 65 "Ata Zholy" cards, granting them the right to live and work in Kazakhstan for 10 years, the Kazakh Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population has announced. Of these, 27 cards were issued to business immigrants seeking to establish and develop enterprises in Kazakhstan, while 38 cards were granted to qualified professional, including physicists, mathematicians, chemical engineers, maxillofacial surgeons, and paediatricians. The recipients have arrived from Russia, Germany, Mongolia, China, the United States, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The Ata Zholy Program The Ata Zholy (Path of Ancestors) card was introduced in July 2023 to strengthen ties between ethnic Kazakhs abroad and their historical homeland while attracting skilled professionals and entrepreneurs to Kazakhstan. Holders of the card retain their foreign citizenship and receive a 10-year residence permit, allowing them to live anywhere in Kazakhstan. They enjoy equal rights with Kazakh citizens, including access to social benefits and employment opportunities, and can apply for Kazakh citizenship through a simplified process. However, as foreign nationals, Ata Zholy cardholders cannot vote, run for office, or hold public service positions. Growing Number of Ethnic Kazakh Returnees The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection also reported that since the beginning of 2025, 1,070 ethnic Kazakhs have returned to Kazakhstan and obtained "Kanda" status, a designation for ethnic Kazakhs and their family members who have never previously held Kazakh citizenship. The Kandas who arrived in 2024 came from: China - 51.9% Uzbekistan - 37.5% Turkmenistan - 7.1% Russia - 1.8% Other countries - 1.7% Since gaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has welcomed over a million ethnic Kazakhs back to their homeland.

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Proposed Kazakh Foreign Agents Law Sparks Heated Debate

The potential adoption of a law on foreign agents has sparked heated discussions and even serious conflicts in Kazakhstan. However, some experts believe that labeling foreign agents will help the country's citizens understand whose interests certain sections of the media and bloggers are serving. Discussions about the possible adoption of a foreign agents law in Kazakhstan have been ongoing for several years. The sharp reduction in USAID activities worldwide, including in Kazakhstan, has given new momentum to the debate. A directive from U.S. President Donald Trump to shut down the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) brought shocking details to light. It was confirmed that over the years, USAID had spent millions of dollars funding various projects in Kazakhstan. Some of these projects, including those involving the Kazakh government, were related to energy, modernization, healthcare, and other progressive fields. However, a significant portion of the funds went toward media resources that promoted a specific point of view in Kazakhstan, often leading to conflicts, as extensively reported by The Times of Central Asia (TCA) in a series of articles. Following Trump’s directive, Mazhilis (Parliament) Deputy Magerram Magerramov accused USAID of lobbying for the LGBT community. According to him, Elon Musk and Trump had called USAID a criminal organization. The deputy claimed that foreign-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were promoting an alien and harmful perspective in Kazakhstan. Sources indicate that the shutdown of USAID’s activities has already led to the closure or suspension of certain media outlets in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. For example, on February 17, Mediazona Central Asia announced it was temporarily ceasing operations. The issue of foreign funding for media and bloggers has caused an intense reaction in Kazakhstan’s information space. Amid the USAID shuttering, Mazhilis deputy from the People's Party of Kazakhstan, Irina Smirnova, proposed amending the legislation on foreign financing. Her proposal served to escalate tensions. On February 12, Smirnova submitted a parliamentary inquiry to Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov. According to Smirnova, around 200 NGOs in Kazakhstan receive foreign funding, with 70% financed through various U.S. sources. Official government data shows that the country has 165 different grant donors, including 53 international organizations, 31 foreign government organizations, and 81 foreign and Kazakh NGOs. "Even experts find it difficult to distinguish between friendly resources and those that require caution to avoid falling under the influence of destructive 'soft' power," Smirnova stated, representing this a challenge for Kazakh society. According to Smirnova, many countries counter such challenges by adopting foreign agent laws. For example, Israel has had such a law since 2016, China since 2017, Australia since 2018, the UK since 2023, and France since 2024. One of the original models for such laws is the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act, enacted in 1938 to counter Nazi propaganda. Smirnova suggested that Kazakhstan should develop national legislation on foreign agents similar to Western countries so that citizens can evaluate and compare information while understanding its source. Her statement triggered a massive backlash, however, with the most extreme reaction coming from Arman Shuraev, a former...

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Kyrgyzstan’s Aviation Authorities Await Removal from EU Blacklist

Kyrgyzstan’s State Civil Aviation Agency has announced that auditors from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) will visit the country on March 9 to assess the possibility of lifting the EU’s long-standing flight ban on Kyrgyz airlines. Kyrgyz airlines have been on the EU’s aviation blacklist since 2006, with repeated but unsuccessful attempts by the country’s authorities to resolve the issue. The EU has cited multiple concerns, including shortcomings in Kyrgyzstan’s aviation legislation, inadequate inspector training, and a lack of flight crew development programs. The aging aircraft fleet has also been a key factor in maintaining the ban. Over the past two years, Kyrgyzstan has undergone two separate aviation audits, one focused on flight safety and another on aviation security. “Flight safety covers everything related to flight operations, while aviation security deals with protecting airports and aircraft from illegal interference,” explained Daniyar Bostonov, director of the State Civil Aviation Agency. According to Bostonov, Kyrgyzstan has been working since 2017 to meet all EU requirements. Hundreds of industry documents have been translated into English to demonstrate transparency and regulatory compliance. Bostonov believes the country now meets international aviation standards, and a final decision on Kyrgyzstan’s removal from the blacklist is expected in November 2025 at a meeting of the European Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN). “The question is no longer whether we will be removed from the EU blacklist - it is a certainty. We may just need to submit some additional documents to the European Parliament,” Bostonov stated. If the ban is lifted, Kyrgyzstan will be able to resume direct flights to the European Union and gain access to more favorable aircraft leasing agreements. “For example, if an Airbus aircraft is sold for $1,000, that price remains the same for non-blacklisted countries. However, if it is delivered to a blacklisted state, the price can drop to $800, which discourages investors,” Bostonov explained. Further supporting the possibility of removal from the blacklist, Manas International Airport recently became a member of ACI Europe, an organization representing over 500 airports across the continent.

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Right Place, Right Time: Central Asia Basks in Russia’s Eastern Energy Pivot

On January 1, with the closure of pipelines through Ukraine, deliveries of Russian gas to Europe came to a virtual standstill. Prices across the continent have ratcheted up in the first six weeks of 2025 and have now hit two-year highs. In Central Asia, the effects of the Russo-European decoupling have also been profound. In 2024, Kyrgyzstan posted a 48% year-on-year increase in Russian gas imports, while Uzbekistan’s inbound gas purchases soared over 142% to $1.68 billion. But while Gazprom’s reorientation has been a boon to Central Asia’s economies, this phenomenon appears to be more than short-term supply dumping due to the war in Ukraine. Rather, it is part of a lasting trend that could define the region’s, and the world’s, energy map. Russia’s Supply Glut In 2018, Russia exported a record 201 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Europe. The closure of the Yamal and Nord Stream pipelines had already brought these supplies down to 49.5 bcm by 2024 and will be further impacted by the cut in supplies via Ukraine. Despite some gas supplied via Turkstream and a steady trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG), Russian gas supplied to Europe is a fraction of what it once was. The Central Asian market offers both short and long-term solutions to this. “Most likely, Gazprom views its expansion into Central Asia as a partial and immediate solution to the challenge of finding new markets for its gas,” said Shaimerden Chikanayev, a partner at GRATA International, a law firm. “While the region cannot fully replace the volumes or profit margins previously achieved in Europe, it offers a readily accessible and stable outlet for Russian gas exports.” Central Asia is accessible due to old Soviet pipelines that link the region to Moscow. These pipelines, known as Central Asia–Center, were originally built to take gas from Turkmenistan, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. This system has now been engineered to run in reverse. The pipeline has a capacity of around 50 bcm per year, but there are ongoing efforts to increase it. Still, this is only a quarter of what was once supplied to Europe, nor are the revenues as lucrative. In 2023, the average rate charged by Gazprom to Uzbekistan for gas was $160 per thousand cubic meters (tcm), this compares to European prices that fluctuated between $200-400tcm throughout the 2010s. For Stanislav Pritchin, head of the Central Asia sector at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, the price is not a major factor. “Russia of course sells gas to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan lower than the market price. This is a politically motivated decision. And this is not just because it is struggling with [selling to] Eastern Europe. Russia could sell it to Central Asia at market prices, but this is the Russian approach towards its allies in the region,” he said. Central Asian Serendipity For Central Asian states, these new supplies have come at a good time. Countries such as Kyrgyzstan are trying hard to...

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Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...

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Ukraine’s Drone Strike on Russian Oil Hub Sparks Concerns Over Kazakhstan’s Energy Security

On February 17, seven Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) attacked an oil transportation facility of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), targeting the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station in Russia. Following the attack, reports emerged that the volume of oil pumped from Kazakhstan through the CPC could decrease by 30% for a period of one and a half to two months. Conflicting Reports on the Impact On February 18, Ukraine officially confirmed the strike. "Yesterday, the Ukrainian defense forces carried out a pinpoint strike on strategic facilities of the military and fuel and energy infrastructure of the Russian Federation... The Kropotkinskaya and Andriapol oil pumping stations, which played a key role in transporting fuel for the occupiers, were hit. After the strike, they were put out of action, significantly complicating the logistics of fuel supplies to the aggressor," the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated. Shortly after, Transneft, the Russian shareholder in the CPC, warned that oil pumping volumes from Kazakhstan could drop by approximately 30% due to the damage. Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak provided an even bleaker assessment. During a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, he stated: "We see a decrease in pumping volumes by about 30 - 40% compared to levels before the drone attack." Novak estimated that restoring the CPC infrastructure would take "several months, at least," citing the need to replace damaged Western-made equipment, including Siemens gas turbines. However, later that day, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy issued a statement disputing these claims. "Currently, there are no restrictions on Kazakh oil shipments via the CPC, and acceptance is proceeding as scheduled," the ministry said. Despite this, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov framed the attack as a direct assault on Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure. Expert Perspectives: Overreaction or Serious Threat? While officials issued conflicting statements, financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov urged against panic. Writing on his Telegram channel ArtFinanze, he dismissed talk of a 30% reduction in pumping volumes as an "overreaction." However, he acknowledged that the attack exposed the risks of Kazakhstan’s reliance on foreign transit routes. "Geopolitical and other risks when exporting through third countries can easily double. It’s too early to panic; there are few catastrophic scenarios at this stage. But if attacks on infrastructure continue, it will become increasingly difficult to protect the underwater pipeline system, especially considering the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s recent losses. Kazakhstan’s oil facilities have been largely spared so far, but there’s no guarantee this will continue. Contrary to popular belief, the fact that companies like Chevron are involved won’t deter anyone; on the contrary, such infrastructure can be used to exert pressure on entire countries," he warned. Kazakhstan’s Dilemma: Dependence on Russian Routes While experts downplay immediate consequences, Kazakhstan’s vulnerability is undeniable. Calls to boost domestic petrochemical production to reduce dependence on foreign pipelines remain largely aspirational. Meanwhile, efforts to diversify oil export routes have yielded little progress. Currently, 93% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russian territory, leaving the country with limited alternatives: Caspian Pipeline Consortium...