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The Amu Darya and the Aral Sea Crisis: Voices from the Heart of an Environmental Disaster

A documentary entitled Amu Darya: Missing to the River has been produced as part of Project Amu Darya. This initiative began in 2022, and is a collaboration between students from Karakalpakstan, Khorezm, and Oxford University in the UK. This research is important for several reasons. Firstly, the Aral Sea crisis, which is one of the most severe man-made ecological disasters in history, is under-reported by the global media. Secondly, the academic field is limited - outside of Uzbekistan, the historiography of the Aral crisis is still a developing field. Thirdly, the geographical scope of research is limited. Research is often focused on the Aral Sea itself, and does not take into account the impact on the wider region. Finally, there is no involvement of stakeholders. The personal experiences of those living along the Amu Darya River are often excluded from studies. [caption id="attachment_25946" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Amu Darya: Missing to the River screening - image: TCA, Sadokat Jalolova[/caption] The Amu Darya is one of the two main rivers feeding the Aral Sea. Irrigation in the Amu Darya basin has been carried out for more than three thousand years. However, the current Aral Sea crisis was caused by mismanagement during the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. International donors have intensified their efforts to address the crisis. By December 2022, the UN Multi-Partner Human Security Trust Fund for the Aral Sea Region had raised over $16 million to support communities affected by the disaster. Established in 2018, the fund helps mitigate the environmental and social consequences of the crisis. President Mirziyoyev’s government has also lifted many data restrictions, allowing more research in the region. In 2017, the United Nations conducted the first socioeconomic survey of Aral Sea communities. [caption id="attachment_25948" align="aligncenter" width="884"] Aralkum Desert, former Aral Sea; image: TCA, Sadokat Jalolova[/caption] Central Asian countries are also cooperating to solve the problem of water level reduction in the Aral Sea. This year, as a result of the introduction of water-saving technologies on 55,000 hectares of rice fields in Kazakhstan, more than 200 million cubic meters of water were directed to the Aral Sea. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Annie Liddell, one of Project Amu Darya’s co-founders. She shared her thoughts about the inspiration behind the documentary. According to Liddell, the team were inspired by Svetlana Alexievich’s book Voices of Chernobyl. The author used oral interviews to highlight the personal stories behind the environmental disaster, making it more relatable. Liddell explained that the film aims to preserve the authenticity of interviewees’ voices and connect their stories of the Amu Darya’s past with the reality of its present state, which is a rapidly spreading desert. Local communities played a central role in the film’s creation. Students from Karakalpak State University and Urgench State University contributed to the research. Residents of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm also shared their personal stories, and provided insights into their culture and stability. [caption id="attachment_25949" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: Project Amu Darya[/caption] The documentary depicts different historical periods and personal experiences. It covers...

The Geopolitical Battle for Control Over Transportation Routes in Central Asia

Russia and Kazakhstan may be nominal allies, but their geoeconomic interests are not always aligned. As Astana seeks to develop the Middle Corridor – a transportation link connecting China and Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, bypassing Russia – Moscow reportedly aims to build a trade and logistics route that would connect Russia and Kyrgyzstan, thereby circumventing Kazakhstan.  While various regional actors and international institutions actively invest in the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Route (TITR), a potential route linking Russia and Kyrgyzstan, through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, remains merely an idea. From the geopolitical perspective, the TITR is seen as an alternative to reach European and international markets and bypass Russia. But what is the primary goal of the Russia-Kyrgyzstan route? Although both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are members of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, queues of trucks at the Kyrgyz-Kazakh state border seem to have become a norm. Bishkek accuses Kazakhstan of “artificially creating obstacles at the border to weaken competition from Kyrgyzstan”, while the Kazakh authorities claim that Kyrgyz truckers are “unwilling to comply with Astana’s requirements and submit fraudulent documents for cargo.” Since Kyrgyzstan’s main connection with Russia – the major market for its agricultural products – goes through Kazakhstan, it is Astana that has the upper hand over Bishkek. From a purely economic perspective, a new route, including sea transport across the Caspian Sea, would enable faster delivery of vegetables, fruits, as well as other goods from Kyrgyzstan to Russia. However, it remains highly uncertain if Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as transit countries, are genuinely interested in this project. “Both nations are far more interested in East-West trade, actual supply chain relocations into the region, and new gas contracts with the West,” Samuel Doveri Vesterbye, Managing Director of the European Neighborhood Council, told The Times of Central Asia. In his view, a Kyrgyzstan-Russia corridor would offer a limited amount of trade, due to the sanctions the West imposed on Moscow over its actions in Ukraine. But in spite of that, Kyrgyzstan, like all countries, tries to be part of any connectivity corridor. “There is a lot of ‘corridor competition’ at the moment. Most of it is bluff. It is important to look at which projects are being built and how much investments is going into them. The Russia-Kyrgyzstan corridor, at present, is more hot air than reality. There is no funding from the United States, the European Union, China or Turkey. Also, major players like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) do not seem interested in funding the construction of this route. Therefore, its lifespan and potential look rather limited,” Vesterbye stressed. European institutions seem interested in further development of the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Route. From the European Union’s perspective, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased the need to find alternative, reliable, safe and efficient trade routes between Europe and Asia. That is why Brussels is reportedly willing to invest €10 billion ($10.5...

Navigating Energy and Diplomacy: Putin’s Visit to Kazakhstan

The Kremlin has confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Kazakhstan on November 27 at the invitation of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The visit is expected to focus on several key issues, with the construction of Kazakhstan's first nuclear power plant likely to be high on the agenda. As part of the visit, the two leaders will participate in the 20th Forum of Inter-regional Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia via video conference. Additionally, Putin will attend the regular session of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Collective Security Council, chaired by President Tokayev, on November 28. The meeting will involve heads of state from Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov. The agenda includes discussions on regional and international security, with a program to strengthen Tajik-Afghan border security set to be adopted. Notably, given its currently tumultuous relationship with Russia in the wake of Azerbaijan's invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia will not participate, with its Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan having opted out of attending. Focus on Nuclear Power and the Role of a Consortium Experts believe that Putin’s visit will include discussions on nuclear energy. This aligns with recent remarks by Kazakh Energy Minister Almasadam Satkaliyev, who stated that Kazakhstan is open to discussing nuclear power plant construction with Russia, among other potential partners. Satkaliyev emphasized that energy issues remain a cornerstone of international cooperation, and Kazakhstan has established an intergovernmental commission to evaluate proposals from various vendors on a competitive basis. Kazakhstan’s First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar has highlighted the importance of forming an international consortium for the project. Speaking in September, Sklyar noted that political risks and safety concerns would be addressed during the process. He also emphasized the need to incorporate cutting-edge technologies from global leaders in the nuclear energy sector. On November 14, Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov met with Alexei Likhachev, Director General of the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom. The meeting focused on cooperation in nuclear energy, quantum technologies, digitization, and the development of human resources. Rosatom, a diversified company involved in engineering and construction, currently has 39 nuclear power units in various stages of development across ten countries. Public Support and Future Plans The potential construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan has garnered significant public support. In an October 2024 referendum, 71.2% of Kazakh voters approved the initiative. Commenting on the result, Tokayev suggested that an international consortium involving global companies with advanced technologies would be the best approach for the project. Kazakhstan’s energy landscape is characterized by a reliance on aging thermal power plants, which are increasingly unable to meet the demands of a growing population and economy, with electricity shortages projected to worsen, particularly in the rapidly developing southern regions. The construction of a nuclear power plant, therefore, is seen as a crucial step toward alleviating these shortages, reducing dependence on overpriced imports from Russia, and achieving carbon neutrality goals. The construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant presents both...

Kazakhstan Needs a Fourth Oil Refinery to Meet Its Growing Demand for Motor Fuel

Speaking in parliament on November 25, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Almasadam Satkaliyev announced that the country anticipates a shortage of motor fuel by 2036. To address this, he emphasized the need to design a new oil refinery with a capacity of 10 million tons per year by 2030, with construction slated to begin in 2032. According to Satkaliyev, the proposed refinery will ensure Kazakhstan’s fuel demands are met from 2040 to 2050 while also enabling exports to rapidly developing markets in Central, South, and Southwest Asia. Currently, Kazakhstan operates three oil refineries - located in Shymkent, Pavlodar, and Atyrau - which are sufficient to meet domestic demand for gasoline and diesel fuel. However, during seasonal shortages, Kazakhstan imports additional fuel from Russia. Satkaliyev provided details on the country’s fuel production and import figures for 2024. Kazakhstan plans to produce 10.9 million tons of fuel this year, including 5.1 million tons of gasoline, 0.6 million tons of aviation fuel, and 5.2 million tons of diesel. In addition, approximately 1 million tons of fuel will be imported from Russia, comprising 0.285 million tons of gasoline, 0.3 million tons of aviation fuel, and 0.45 million tons of diesel. By 2032, Kazakhstan’s annual fuel production is expected to reach 19 million tons, including 8.2 million tons of gasoline, 1.5 million tons of aviation fuel, and 9.3 million tons of diesel. This increase will not only eliminate the need for imports but also enable the country to export surplus fuel. Satkaliyev also addressed the domestic supply of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), which is the most affordable and widely used automobile fuel in Kazakhstan. From January to October 2024, Kazakhstan produced 2.5 million tons of LPG, compared to 2.4 million tons in 2023. The Energy Ministry has set the planned production volume for 2024 at 2.9 million tons. To stabilize the LPG market, the ministry has banned its exports since November 2023. The domestic market requires 164,000 tons of LPG monthly, while the ministry distributes 130,000-140,000 tons. Looking ahead, the government aims to meet rising LPG consumption by introducing new production capacities, with plans to increase annual LPG production to 4.2 million tons by 2032.

Why Kazakhstan is Tightening Requirements for Importing Foreign Cars

The Bureau of National Statistics (BNS) of Kazakhstan predicts a significant decline in domestic motor vehicle production in 2024, with the largest drops—over 14%—in the car and truck sectors. Experts attribute this downturn to challenges in sourcing components and the prevalence of "gray" car imports. In response, the government will implement stricter regulations on importing foreign cars starting December 1. In 2023, Kazakhstan’s official car sales market surged by 61% compared to the previous year. Official dealers reported 198,686 cars sold, with 70.7% (approximately 150,000 vehicles) produced domestically. However, by late 2023, experts were forecasting a sharp slowdown in domestic production growth. “Production declines reflect short-term logistical issues, such as securing equipment, raw materials, and components from neighboring countries. To address this, manufacturers are already committing to deepening technological processes for small-unit production. This involves investments in new equipment, expanded facilities, and workforce training,” said Anar Makasheva, President of the Kazakhstan Automobile Union (KAU). “By July 1, 2024, all new production facilities must produce at least one model using this method, while existing ones face the same requirement from January 1, 2026.” Artur Miskaryan, General Director of Kazakhstan's Automobile Market Monitoring and Analysis Agency (KAMMAA), agreed that localization requirements are affecting production rates. “Tougher localization demands mean enterprises are investing in infrastructure and training, which temporarily slows production,” he said. Miskaryan also cited logistical challenges at the Kazakhstan-China border, particularly with the delivery of components from China. While logistical issues may be resolved over time through domestic manufacturing of components, the problem of "gray" imports requires government intervention. “The issue of ‘gray’ imports has existed for a long time but escalated after customs policy adjustments in 2022 allowed for the legalization of such vehicles imported from EAEU countries,” Miskaryan explained. These vehicles are sourced from various countries—cargo vehicles primarily from China and cars from South Korea, China, the U.S., and the UAE. Such imports often involve falsified environmental compliance documents, counterfeit exhaust system components, or violations of design safety certifications. Miskaryan emphasized the need for stricter controls on the technical and environmental standards of imported vehicles. He noted, “Reducing government leniency toward imports could follow the example set by neighboring countries, addressing these issues effectively.” Last year alone, gray imports accounted for 345,000 vehicles—three out of every five cars imported. This undermines domestic manufacturers and poses risks to consumers, as these vehicles often fail to meet Kazakhstan’s environmental and safety standards or adapt to local fuel and climate conditions. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov has called for decisive action against gray imports. “This is a serious issue, creating unfair competition for domestic automakers. Customs authorities, the Standardization Committee, and law enforcement must address it,” Bektenov said at a government meeting. “Manufacturers cannot compete with vehicles labeled Euro5 but meeting only Euro2 standards. This situation demands stricter oversight.” The government’s first step has been to limit individual car imports. Starting December 1, an individual can import only one vehicle per year. Additional vehicles registered by the same person within the same year...

Train Link Connects China and Afghanistan via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

The first freight train from China arrived at Afghanistan’s Hairatan dry port on November 23, following a route through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, according to a report by Afghan TOLOnews. Hairatan, a border town in northern Afghanistan, lies a short distance from the Uzbek city of Termez and serves as a critical transit hub between the two nations. Speaking at a ceremony marking the train’s arrival, Afghanistan’s Acting Minister of Industry and Commerce Nooruddin Azizi noted that the freight journey through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan took 20 days. Azizi also announced plans to use the rail link to transport Afghan goods to China. Beijing has been working to increase its economic footprint in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, focusing on the nation’s rich mineral reserves and infrastructure projects to boost bilateral trade. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, too, are eager to enhance their trade relations with Afghanistan and participate in the country’s railway infrastructure development. In October, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan signed a roadmap to boost bilateral trade to $3 billion and to include Kazakhstan in the construction of two major railway lines in Afghanistan: Turgundi – Herat – Kandahar - Spin Boldak and Mazar-i-Sharif - Harlachi. This milestone train link highlights a growing regional commitment to economic connectivity and trade expansion.