• KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10833 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10833 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10833 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10833 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10833 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10833 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10833 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10833 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
09 November 2025

Viewing results 91 - 96 of 509

Kyrgyzstan Significantly Boosts Fuel Exports to Afghanistan

Exports of fuel and lubricants (F&L) from Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan have surged in early 2025, according to the National Statistical Committee. In the first quarter of the year, Kyrgyzstan exported more than 40 million liters of gasoline and fuel oil to Afghanistan, a more than 100-fold increase compared to the same period in 2024. From January to March 2025, gasoline exports to Afghanistan’s Kunduz province reached $18.5 million in value, up from just 384,000 liters worth $212,000 a year earlier. Afghanistan now accounts for over 90% of Kyrgyzstan’s gasoline exports. Uzbekistan is the second-largest recipient, having imported 2.5 million liters of gasoline worth $1 million in the same period. The average export price stands at approximately $0.50 per liter. It is important to note that none of the exported gasoline is sourced from Russia. Under a bilateral agreement, fuel imported from Russia on preferential terms, grades AI-92 and AI-95, is designated solely for domestic use and is exempt from re-export. These Russian fuels are delivered duty-free via Kazakhstan, keeping retail gasoline prices in Kyrgyzstan around $0.80 per liter. According to the Oil Traders Association, the gasoline exported to Afghanistan and Uzbekistan typically includes the lower-cost AI-80 grade and fuel oil derived from local crude in southwestern Kyrgyzstan. In 2024, Kyrgyzstan imported 630 million liters of gasoline worth $277 million, primarily from Russia, with smaller volumes from Kazakhstan. Beyond fuel, Kyrgyzstan also exports other goods to Afghanistan, including: Approximately 8,000 tons of flour and vegetable oil annually; Around 12,000 tons of construction materials such as cement and metal structures. In return, Kyrgyzstan imports roughly 200,000 units of Afghan goods annually, including dried fruits, nuts, textiles, carpets, and other handicrafts.

Armenia, Azerbaijan Invited to Sign Peace Deal in Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has offered to host the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, though tensions persist between the two longtime adversaries and a date for signing has not been set. Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, the parliamentary speaker of Kyrgyzstan, made the offer during a meeting in Armenia with Alen Simonyan, leader of that country’s National Assembly. The news was reported on Monday by Aravot, a publication based in Armenia. “Alen Simonyan touched upon the already completed draft of the Peace Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, mentioning that the Armenian side is ready to sign it,” Aravot reported. “In response to this, the Head of the Kyrgyz Parliament noted that Kyrgyzstan is ready to provide a platform for the signing” of the peace deal. Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary speaker was accompanied by several other parliamentarians on the May 25-27 trip to Armenia. Armenia and Azerbaijan said in March that they had agreed on the text of a peace deal after decades of conflict and Azerbaijan´s military seizure of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2023. However, Azerbaijan says Armenia must change its constitution to remove language that allegedly lays claim to Azerbaijani territory, while Armenia says Azerbaijan is using the issue as an excuse to undermine the peace deal. Kazakhstan has also sought to assist in peace efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hosting a meeting of the foreign ministers of the two rivals in Almaty last year.

Kyrgyz Farmers in Naryn Region Receive Ecotourism Training

Farmers in Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn region are receiving specialized training to help them tap into the growing ecotourism market. Organized by the Kyrgyz Department of Tourism, the courses aim to equip rural communities with the skills and tools necessary to turn their agricultural operations into attractive destinations for eco-conscious travelers. During the sessions, local farmers were introduced to tourism opportunities specific to their region. They also learned how to register and promote their services on major digital platforms such as Booking.com, TripAdvisor, Google Maps, and 2GIS. A key focus of the training was on storytelling and digital marketing. Participants were taught how to showcase the uniqueness of their farms through reviews, videos, and visual content, tools seen as vital for attracting visitors in the digital age. Ecotourism, and agritourism in particular, has seen a notable rise in popularity among international visitors, especially from Europe. Kyrgyzstan’s rural areas attract travelers seeking an authentic glimpse into traditional life and rich local culture. The Kyrgyz Association of Tour Operators (KATO) notes that rural tourism is expanding steadily. In a recent report, the association highlighted the importance of proactive promotion. “The main thing is to position your business as a tourist attraction and actively promote it, attracting potential partners and customers. Income will depend on effort and imagination, because tourism is about selling new experiences and positive emotions,” KATO stated. With tourism continuing to diversify in Kyrgyzstan, initiatives like this are seen as essential to empowering local communities and fostering sustainable economic development in remote regions like Naryn.

Opinion – The Quiet Competition: How the U.S. Is Losing Ground to China in Central Asia

Over the past decade, China has steadily expanded its presence in Central Asia, not through military force, but by building roads, trade corridors, and digital infrastructure. As the United States scaled back its regional footprint following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Beijing moved quickly to fill the void. Today, China has positioned itself as the region's dominant external power, while the U.S. risks being left on the sidelines. At the heart of China’s strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has provided over $1 trillion into infrastructure projects globally since its launch in 2013. This includes $704 billion in construction contracts and $470 billion in non-financial investments. In 2024 alone, BRI engagement reached $121.8 billion – $70.7 billion in construction and $51 billion in investments – and trade between China and the countries of Central Asia hit a record $95 billion, highlighting the depth of China's economic integration. This engagement has also created significant financial dependencies. Central Asian countries owe China roughly $15.7 billion, about 8% of the region's total external debt, and these loans are often opaque and carry terms that provide Beijing with outsized political leverage. Chinese firms are also laying fiber-optic networks and constructing electric vehicle corridors to link western China with its neighbors. In Tajikistan, for example, contractors are upgrading the Pamir Highway to support cross-border EV transport. Huawei and other Chinese tech giants are also expanding the region’s telecommunications infrastructure, raising serious concerns about surveillance, data sovereignty, and long-term digital dependency. China’s economic outreach is reinforced by high-level diplomacy. The China–Central Asia (C+C5) format has become the centerpiece of Beijing’s regional engagement. At the 2025 summit, leaders from across the region gathered to coordinate on connectivity, climate resilience, and trade facilitation. The regularity and substance of these summits stand in sharp contrast to the United States’ more sporadic diplomatic presence. The U.S. maintains the C5+1 platform and launched a promising Critical Minerals Dialogue in 2024. However, these initiatives have yet to match the scale or consistency of China's approach as U.S. infrastructure investment is limited, its commercial footprint is small, and diplomatic engagement is too infrequent to shift the region’s strategic trajectory. This matters. Central Asia is strategically located, resource-rich, and increasingly central to global supply chains and geopolitical competition. Kazakhstan alone supplies more than 40% of the world’s uranium. The region also serves as a testing ground for competing development models, and if the United States fails to become a more engaged and credible partner, China’s infrastructure-heavy, state-centric model may become the default. To remain competitive, Washington should recalibrate its approach in Central Asia. This includes pursuing bilateral deals that deliver real impact, such as deepening ties with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan through targeted investment packages, trade agreements, and joint-sector initiatives. It also means securing access to critical minerals by expanding private-sector investment in mining, processing, and transport infrastructure aligned with U.S. supply chain needs. Offering digital infrastructure alternatives is equally essential; the United States must support secure, interoperable, and transparent technology networks that...

Russia: Thousands of Central Asia-Born Russians Sent to Ukraine Front Line

A senior Russian official has said that thousands of migrants from Central Asia who became Russian citizens were sent to fight in Ukraine after they tried to dodge conscription. "Our military investigations directorate conducts regular raids,” Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, said on Tuesday in remarks that were reported by the Russian state-run TASS news agency. “So far, we've tracked down 80,000 such Russian citizens who didn't just avoid the front lines — they wouldn’t even show up at military enlistment offices. We’ve registered them for military service, and about 20,000 of these 'new' Russian citizens, who for some reason no longer want to live in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kyrgyzstan, are now on the front lines," Bastrykin said at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum. Bastrykin’s comments contributed a piece to the often murky picture of the involvement of people from Central Asia in Russia’s war effort in Ukraine in the last three years. In addition to conscription measures, Russia has also sought to replenish its ranks by offering contracts and other incentives to foreigners willing to fight. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are among Central Asian countries that ban their nationals from fighting in foreign conflicts and there have been several high-profile prosecutions of citizens who fought for Russia and returned home. It is a sensitive political matter in Central Asia, a region that seeks to project neutrality in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Kazakhstan has said it is reviewing a report by a Ukrainian institution that said about 661 Kazakh citizens have fought for Russia since it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The I Want To Live center, which is run by the Ukrainian security services and assists with surrender requests from soldiers fighting for Russia, published a list of what it said were the Kazakh nationals. Of the 661, at least 78 have been killed, according to the center. Without providing details, it said it received the list from its own sources within the Russian military. Uzbekistan is conducting a similar investigation based on data from the Ukrainian group.

Italy Raises the Bar in Central Asia: What to Expect from Giorgia Meloni’s Visit

In recent years, Italy has emerged as one of the European countries most keen to maintain close relations with the countries of Central Asia. In mid-April, confirmation arrived that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni would be travelling to the region this spring. The purpose of the trip is to visit Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and attend a summit in Astana with the presidents of the five countries.  Meloni's visit is scheduled for the end of May, although the exact dates are not yet known. Italy was the first European country to involve the Central Asia region in a "1+5" summit. The first meeting was held in Rome in December 2019, and involved the then Italian Foreign Minister, Luigi Di Maio, and all Central Asian Foreign Ministers. This meeting took place a few months after Italy, the first and only EU country to take this step, signed a memorandum of understanding with China on the Belt & Road Initiative (in 2023, Rome decided to withdraw from the project). Central Asia is one of the regions at the heart of the original BRI project: the launch was announced in Kazakhstan in 2013. The most recent meeting at foreign minister level took place in May 2024, again in Rome, and was attended by the current Italian Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani. But now Italy has decided to raise the bar and directly involve Meloni and her Central Asian counterparts. The multilateral forum is complemented by frequent visits to Italy by leaders from the region: Uzbekistan's Mirziyoyev in June 2023, Kazakhstan's Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in January 2024 and Tajikistan's Emomali Rahmon at the end of April 2024. For Italy, President Sergio Mattarella visited Uzbekistan in November 2023 and Kazakhstan in March 2025. Italy is one of the main economic partners in the region, and especially in Kazakhstan; the country ranks third (behind only China and Russia) in terms of trade with Astana. Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Italy rose 25% in 2024 and reached almost $20 billion. The relationship is particularly strong in the energy sector, with over $18 billion accounted for exports of Kazakh oil and petroleum products in 2024. The Italian national oil and natural gas company Eni has been present in Kazakhstan since 1992, where it is a co-operator of the Karachaganak oil field and participates in the North Caspian Sea PSA consortium responsible for operations at the Kashagan oil field. Other significant sectors of trade between Italy and Kazakhstan are those of agricultural machinery and agricultural production. One area that could be subject to greater cooperation is defense, as demonstrated by the visit to Italy by Kazakhstan's Minister of Defense, Ruslan Zhakssylykov, in March this year. The potential is truly remarkable: during Mattarella's aforementioned flash visit to the country this March, with a meeting with Tokayev held directly at Astana airport, the Italian president emphasized the potential for further deepening the strategic partnership between Rome and Astana, which has been in place since 2011. Speaking of official documents, in June 2023, Italy and Uzbekistan...