Turkmenistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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CAMCA

From Eurasia to Greater Central Asia: A Region Reclaims Its Voice

At its most basic, Eurasia refers to the combined landmass of Europe and Asia, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Pacific in the east, and from the Arctic in the north to South and Southeast Asia in the south. Yet when defined in political or economic terms, the concept becomes more complex. This vast region—covering over 36% of the world’s surface area—includes influential Western institutions in the west, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. In contrast, the east is shaped by post-Soviet and Sino-Russian groupings, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In policy circles, the term "Eurasia" often refers more narrowly to the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan). Yet countries in these regions rarely lead the institutions that shape their future. Instead, most regional organizations are dominated by larger powers, primarily Russia and China. One partial exception is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), though it excludes non-Turkic members such as Tajikistan, Georgia, and Armenia. Many external actors—beginning with Japan's "Central Asia plus Japan" initiative in 2001—have formed dialogue platforms with the five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, often referred to collectively as the "C5." More recently, Turkey, China, the EU, and others have created similar frameworks. While these engagements have value, they are usually shaped by external agendas. The fundamental issue remains: Central Asia lacks strong, self-directed institutions of its own. In response to this institutional vacuum, Professor S. Frederick Starr proposed in 2015 a broader regional framing: Greater Central Asia. He called for moving beyond the Soviet-era definition of Central Asia to include neighboring regions with shared historical, cultural, and strategic ties. He also noted a stark reality: Greater Central Asia is the only region of its kind without its own exclusive institutions—ones not directed by outsiders. That may be starting to change. A more distinct regional identity is emerging, with new frameworks for cooperation gradually taking shape. As countries in the region increasingly define their own development priorities and diversify partnerships beyond Moscow and Beijing, there is growing momentum for a more autonomous and inclusive model of regional integration. One of the clearest examples is CAMCA—an initiative that reflects the full geographic and political scope of Greater Central Asia. Over the past decade, the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI), founded by Professor Starr, has worked with the Rumsfeld Foundation to support a new generation of regional leaders through the CAMCA Fellowship Program. Originally conceived by alumni of a joint initiative between Starr and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld more than fifteen years ago, the CAMCA Network has become one of the few institutions uniting the entire Greater Central Asia region. Each year, the fellowship culminates in a regional forum hosted by a different CAMCA country. The most recent—held last week in Ulaanbaatar—marked the 11th such gathering and the second time the event has been hosted by CAMCA...

Israel-Iran Escalation

After High Hopes, Central Asia Views Iran Trade Routes with More Caution

Like some Central Asian neighbors, Uzbekistan is urgently reviewing possible changes to some trade routes because of conflict in the Middle East, even though that could entail sharply higher transport costs. The contingency planning follows a surge in trade talks between officials from Iran and countries in Central Asia earlier this year, prior to the intense strikes that Israel and Iran launched at each other this month. A ceasefire between Israel and Iran appeared to be holding on Wednesday, but questions remain about Iran’s ability to build a nuclear bomb even after the U.S. attacked Iranian nuclear sites. U.S. President Donald Trump said the sites were “obliterated,” but, according to some Western media organizations, a preliminary U.S. intelligence report concluded that the U.S. attacks may have only set back Iran’s nuclear program by months. A June 25 statement by the Central Intelligence Agency says that “Iran’s nuclear program has been severely damaged by the recent, targeted strikes.” Against this murky backdrop, and the partial uncertainty over Central Asia’s extensive web of trade links, Uzbekistan is reviewing transport and logistics arrangements to keep its economy and connections with international partners running as smoothly as possible. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev discussed options with key advisers at a meeting on Monday. “The military actions that have taken place in the Middle East in recent days have further aggravated the already unstable situation. This cannot but affect Uzbekistan's foreign economic relations and access to world markets,” Uzbekistan’s presidential office said. “In particular, the need to diversify export routes and redirect cargo to other, safer ports was noted. According to preliminary estimates, this could lead to an increase in transportation costs by up to 30%. In this regard, instructions were given to coordinate alternative routes with partner countries and support export-oriented enterprises,” the presidency said. It said the trade and transport ministers, as well as other key officials, have been instructed to help business groups with export-import operations and finding new sales markets. Maintaining price stability in the domestic market and sustainable production rates are also key concerns. Last month, Uzbek and Iranian officials met in Tehran and agreed to expand trade between their countries to an annual $2 billion, four times the current amount. Iranian ports offer Central Asian exporters access to the Indian Ocean and international markets beyond. “The five Central Asian republics — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan — are increasingly seeking alternatives to the traditional transit routes that have tied them to Moscow or made them dependent on Chinese infrastructure,” said a commentary posted by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, an Israel-based group that studies Mideast security and foreign policy. “Iran offers an appealing option: a gateway to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, access to European markets via Turkey, and industrial and technological partnerships that diversify the region’s economic relationships,” said the analysis, which was published on June 4, shortly before the recent round of fighting between Israel and Iran. Officials in Kazakhstan have warned of disruption to southern...

Regional Influence

Iran–Israel War Highlights Central Asia as Zone of Strategic Stability

The explosive conflict between Iran and Israel, including coordinated U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, has drawn global attention to the Persian Gulf and Levant. The escalatory spectacle, however, has blinded most observers to a quieter structural shift. This is the rising indispensability of Central Asia, including its linkages with the South Caucasus. Unaligned in rhetoric and untouched by spillover, Central Asia's very stability quietly threw into relief its increasing centrality to Eurasian energy and logistics calculations. As maritime chokepoints came into question and ideological rhetoric became more inflamed, Central Asia offers a reminder that the most valuable nodes in a network are the ones that continue operating silently and without disruption. Neither Israel nor Iran has real operational depth in Central Asia, and this has made a difference. Unlike Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen — where proxy networks or ideological leverage allowed Tehran to externalize confrontation — no such mechanisms exist east of the Caspian Sea. Iran’s efforts in Tajikistan, grounded in shared linguistic heritage and periodic religious diplomacy, today remain cultural and informational rather than sectarian and clientelist. The influence of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Central Asia is minimal; Israeli presence, while diplomatically steady in places like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, is neither controversial nor militarized. There are no significant arms flows or dual-use infrastructure for either side to use. As a result, Central Asia has remained untouched by the conflict. Although the Iran–Israel conflict is relatively geographically localized, it has shed light on global systems far beyond the immediate zone of combat. Although not so far from the missile trajectories and nuclear facilities, Central Asia and the South Caucasus are remarkably insulated from their effects. Rather than becoming another theater of contestation, they have demonstrated their value as stabilizing elements at a time of heightened geostrategic volatility. It is no longer optional to take into account the Central Asian space, which geoeconomically includes Azerbaijan, now a permanent fixture at the region's summits. As the war now produces a phase of reactive adaptation in international geoeconomics and diplomacy, the region has become a control parameter of the international system rather than a fluctuating variable dependent upon it. The Iran–Israel conflict has drawn new attention to the vulnerability of maritime energy corridors, especially the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes. While contingency planning has focused on naval logistics and airpower deterrents in the Gulf, the Eurasian interior has remained materially unaffected, reflecting its structural indispensability. Central Asia and the South Caucasus, particularly Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, offer existing and potential overland alternatives that bypass maritime chokepoints entirely. Kazakhstan’s oil continues to flow via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline to the Black Sea, while Azerbaijan’s infrastructure, anchored by the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) corridor, links Caspian energy to Mediterranean terminals. These routes are not replacements for Persian Gulf volumes, but, as redundancies, they acquire significance as stabilizing arteries as well as increased relevance in moments of system stress. The war has thus sharpened a fact...

Israel-Iran Escalation

After U.S. Bombs Iran, Central Asia Calls for Diplomacy and Restraint

In the early hours of June 22, the United States launched airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, triggering widespread concern across Central Asia. Despite the potential economic upside for Kazakhstan, with the possibility of rising oil prices, the region’s governments have uniformly called for restraint and a peaceful resolution. The operation, dubbed “Midnight Hammer” by the U.S. Department of Defense, reportedly targeted facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. While Washington claimed success, the Iranian authorities asserted they had evacuated uranium from the Fordow site in advance, calling the mission a failure. Military experts continue to debate the extent of the damage. Coordinated Responses from Central Asian Capitals The foreign ministries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan issued similarly worded statements expressing concern over the rapidly deteriorating situation. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the U.S. airstrikes marked a dangerous escalation and emphasized the need for negotiations grounded in the UN Charter. “Kazakhstan is part of the group of Caspian countries and is developing cooperation with Iran in various areas. Our country believes that all disagreements, including nuclear issues, should be resolved through negotiations,” the statement said. It also urged international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and establish security guarantees for nations adhering to the non-proliferation regime. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry echoed this sentiment and advised citizens to avoid traveling to Israel and Iran. It also urged those currently in those countries to leave high-risk areas where possible. Kyrgyzstan called on all parties to exercise “maximum restraint” and avoid steps that could exacerbate the crisis. Turkmenistan reaffirmed its policy of "positive neutrality," stressing the importance of diplomacy and adherence to international law. Ashgabat stated that it “does not accept the use or threat of force as a means of resolving political and other disputes”. Tajikistan, meanwhile, issued the strongest statement, condemning the U.S. and Israeli strikes outright and warning that the conflict could lead to a prolonged regional war. Dushanbe called on the UN, IAEA, and other global bodies to prevent violations of international law and work towards peace and environmental safety. The Economic Subtext: Rising Oil Prices While official reactions were uniformly cautious, analysts in Kazakhstan noted the economic implications. Expert Olzhas Baidildin pointed out that shares in KazMunayGas surged by 11% following the strikes, with its market capitalization rising to 10.3 trillion KZT ($19.8 billion). Baidildin previously argued that Iran is unlikely to follow through on threats to block the Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, he noted that such a move would dramatically increase the strategic importance of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian energy producers to major consumers such as China and India. Financial analyst Andrei Chebotarev agreed, stating: "Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz is no longer the ace it once was. The West has diversified away from Gulf oil, while the real impact would fall on China, the region’s largest importer. Meanwhile, the U.S. could benefit from a price surge through its shale exports". It is estimated that China purchases approximately 90% of Iran's oil exports...

Israel-Iran Escalation

Central Asia and Israel, a Pragmatic Relationship That Never Truly Blossomed

The conflict between Israel and Iran is having both international and regional repercussions. The situation has been further inflamed by the U.S. bombing of several Iranian nuclear sites over the weekend, with Tehran responding by threatening retaliation on U.S. soil through the use of sleeper terrorist cells and the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which over a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. While Israel's geographical position places it at the heart of the Middle East, Iran's location brings the Islamic Republic into close contact with Central Asia. The consequences of the conflict are therefore likely to be felt heavily in the Central Asian region. The close relations between Tehran and the capitals of Central Asia, due in part to their geographical proximity, are often highlighted. Less explored is the nature of the relationship between Tel Aviv and Central Asia and the lines along which it has developed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On both the Israeli and Central Asian sides, despite all the differences, relations began in the early 1990s, mainly based on certain mutual interests. From Israel's point of view, relations with Central Asia would mean expanding the circle of Muslim countries with which it had friendly ties, gaining greater influence in the region, and reducing its diplomatic isolation. From the Central Asian perspective, the appeal lay in increasing the number of its international partners, coupled with a desire to access Israeli know-how in numerous fields, and the possibility, through relations with Tel Aviv, of having a privileged channel of dialogue with the United States. More than three decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, relations remain good for the most part. “The positive relationship between Israel and Central Asia is driven by a combination of strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors,” Dr Zeev Levin, Coordinator of the Central Asian Research Unit at the Harry S. Truman Institute, told The Times of Central Asia. “One of the primary drivers is mutual interest in security and counterterrorism. Economically, Israel’s expertise in water management, agriculture, and technology is highly attractive to the arid, resource-seeking nations of Central Asia that aim to modernize their infrastructure and diversify their economies beyond oil and gas. Additionally, fostering ties with Israel provides a means of diversifying the foreign policy portfolios of the Central Asian republics.” This positive relationship, however, seems to have lost momentum in recent years due to several factors. Central Asian republics have increasingly oriented towards the East, moving closer to China and other players such as South Korea, Japan, and India, or towards other partners, such as the European ones, with Italy at the forefront in this regard. As Levin points out, the relation has cooled due to several factors: “Central Asian republics did look to Israel in the first decade of independence, but in the last decade to a much lesser extent, since Turkey and China are less complicated and cheaper options. For Israel, the region was never a priority or a point of...

Oil and Gas

Turkmenistan’s Gas Swap Deals Could Be Collateral Damage from Israeli-Iran Conflict

Turkmenistan has the fourth largest reserves of natural gas in the world, but the country has found it difficult to export substantial volumes. Lack of export pipelines are one of the problems and it seemed Turkmenistan had partially solved this dilemma by arranging gas swap deals. Unfortunately for Turkmenistan, these deals involve Iran as the key country, and the Israeli-Iran conflict sheds new doubt on the ability of Iran to fulfill its part in the swap arrangements. So Close Turkmenistan signed a deal to supply 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to Iraq in late October 2024. It was the first major gas export deal Turkmenistan had signed in nearly two decades. That last big agreement was signed with China in 2006. It involved building four gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to China to eventually carry a combined 85 bcm of gas, 65 bcm of which would be Turkmen gas. Since the pipelines cross through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, both of those countries are allotted 10 bcm each of the capacity for their gas exports. The fourth branch that would have carried 30 bcm of Turkmen gas has not been built, leaving Turkmen gas exports to China averaging 35 bcm per year. At the moment, China is the only major customer for Turkmen gas. The second largest buyer of Turkmen gas is Uzbekistan, which only purchases about 2 bcm. Not even 20 years ago, Russia was purchasing more than 40 bcm of Turkmen gas, but by 2023 that had dwindled to 5.5 bcm, still leaving Russia as the second largest buyer of Turkmen gas. In July 2024, after negotiations over price broke down, the two parties chose not to renew that contract. That made the agreement with Iraq all the more important for Turkmenistan. However, there are no pipelines connecting the two countries. Yet So Far The Turkmen-Iraqi agreement calls for Turkmenistan to ship 10 bcm of gas to Iran, with Iran then sending 10 bcm of its gas to Iraq. Iran needs gas for its northern regions that are not connected to the domestic pipeline network that sources gas from the fields of in the south of the country. Turkmenistan has two pipelines to export gas to Iran. Both were built after independence in 1991, and could carry up to a combined 20 bcm. Since January 2017, when the Turkmen government made good on a threat to cut off Iran over unpaid bills for gas, almost no gas has been shipped through these pipelines. The first task is to perform maintenance, repairs, and upgrades on these pipelines so that Turkmenistan can physically send 10 bcm of gas to Iran. The Iranian pipeline to Iraq is functional. Iran was exporting gas to Iraq, but international sanctions on Iran hindered Iraq’s ability to pay for that gas. Prior to the agreement with Iraq, Turkmenistan signed a contract in early July 2024 with Iranian officials for the transfer of gas. It is unclear how far along Turkmenistan is in performing its pipeline...