New Uzbekistan is pressing ahead with democratic reforms while pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy, deepening dialogue with the international community, and rolling out reforms that reinforce guarantees for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Within the framework of the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy – now paired with the State Program, “Year of Environmental Protection and the Green Economy” – the authorities are upgrading legal safeguards and institutional mechanisms aimed at protecting citizens’ rights.
As President Shavkat Mirziyoyev stated, “The dreams and aspirations of our people, shaped over centuries through diverse ideas and practical endeavors, are today embodied in the concept of New Uzbekistan.” That vision has coincided with rapid socioeconomic change: GDP has topped $110 billion; preschool enrollment has risen sharply since 2017; higher-education participation has climbed from about 9% in 2017 to roughly 42%; and elite public schools – creative, specialized, and presidential – have taken root. Uzbek athletes placed among the top national teams at recent global competitions, and football milestones at both the youth and senior levels have broadened the country’s international profile. Together, these gains bolster Uzbekistan’s status as a sovereign, democratic, legal, social, and secular state, and as a more reliable partner on the global stage.
The Pragmatic Diplomacy of New Uzbekistan
Against a backdrop of armed conflicts, environmental emergencies, trade frictions, and evolving security threats, Uzbekistan has worked to strengthen peace and regional stability while educating its youth in the spirit of both national and universal values. In recent years, high-level outreach has rebuilt trust with neighbors and helped popularize concepts such as a “Central Asian spirit” and “Central Asian identity.” The March unveiling of a Friendship Stele at the junction of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan borders symbolized this thaw, while cooperation on transit, water and energy exchanges, and security has become more predictable.
A “New Central Asia” is taking shape as a unified transport and logistics space. Mutual trade volumes in the region have multiplied, investment flows have increased, and cross-border ventures have expanded. Major projects—from the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway to rising cargo across the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye corridor—are laying the ground for a trans-continental transit hub. At the same time, Uzbekistan’s convening role has grown. In April 2025, Samarkand hosted the first EU–Central Asia Summit, chaired by President Mirziyoyev and attended by EU leaders and all five Central Asian presidents – an event that elevated ties to a strategic partnership and set a broader agenda on connectivity, critical raw materials, energy, and digital links.
Environmental diplomacy has also moved up the agenda. The Samarkand Climate Forum gathered UN deputy secretary generals, heads of major environmental organizations, and experts from dozens of countries, signaling a step-change in the region’s engagement on ecology, desertification, and resilience.
The Parliamentary Dimension of New Uzbekistan
Tashkent’s rising parliamentary diplomacy culminated in the 150th Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Assembly, held between 5–9 April 2025 – the first of its kind in Central Asia – which brought together some 2,000 parliamentarians from more than 140 countries, plus over 20 international organizations. The proceedings, themed “Parliamentary Action for Social Development and Justice,” concluded with the Tashkent Declaration, later circulated as an official UN General Assembly document. The declaration sketches a framework for parliamentary action across peacebuilding, sustainable development, social justice, human rights, gender equality, youth policy, and inclusive education.
Domestically, the parliamentary architecture has been modernized. Under the new edition of the Constitution adopted via referendum on April 30, 2023, the legislature’s exclusive powers expanded significantly, including new roles in forming judicial and competition bodies and in overseeing law enforcement. Inter-parliamentary ties have widened to nearly 100 partner legislatures; friendship groups and joint commissions are active. Recent elections under a mixed system strengthened party roles and increased women’s representation; women now account for a markedly higher share of MPs than a decade ago, a trend recognized by international parliamentary observers.
Institutional change has filtered down to local government. More than 30 competencies have shifted to regional and municipal councils (Kengashes), which now set floors for rent on public assets, approve burial site maintenance rules and tariffs, reserve jobs for vulnerable groups, and even adjust speed limits on designated roads. A new “Kengash Hour” compels governors to report publicly, while portions of fees and fines are reallocated to local budgets. Youth councils and civil-society advisory bodies are being replicated at a local level, and candidates for deputy-governor posts are now vetted in committee hearings with their development programs on record. This spring’s nationwide election of 8,852 mahalla chairs – with longer terms, more women leaders, and a younger cohort – rounded out reforms to representative institutions.
New Uzbekistan as a Social State
The revised Constitution enshrines Uzbekistan as a social state with clear obligations to ensure employment, protect citizens’ jobs, cut poverty, and scale up vocational training. The 2030 Strategy targets a halving of poverty from 2022 levels by mid-decade and sustained income gains for at-risk households by 2030, while training 500,000 qualified specialists through public–private partnerships. Authorities report that more than seven million people have exited poverty over the past eight years, with the nationwide rate falling from the mid-30s percentile to single digits; the aim is to reduce it further this year to 6%.
To support this, the government launched “From Poverty to Prosperity,” created a National Agency for Social Protection, and built out Inson (“Human”) service centers. Social coverage now reaches multiples of the 2017 baseline, with targeted registers used to identify and assist vulnerable groups. International cooperation is core: Uzbekistan has joined the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, rolled out pilot models based on global experience, and encouraged banks to co-design job-creation tools with mahallas. A new emphasis on vocational education – free online courses, retraining via professional vouchers, tighter employer partnerships – aims to raise employability and productivity.
International Initiatives and the UN Track
Openness to global practice has underpinned reforms in public administration, digital transformation, and service delivery, consistent with the principle of the “state for the people.” In March 2025, the UN Secretary-General launched the “UN-80” reform initiative to streamline mandates and modernize the organization’s work; Uzbekistan has voiced support and stepped up programmatic cooperation with UN agencies. The country has implemented or launched 160 joint projects with the UN, welcomed senior agency heads to Tashkent, and opened an expanded UN Women’s office.
Uzbekistan’s footprint in UN organs has also broadened, from a recent stint on the Human Rights Council to seats on ECOSOC, the ILO Governing Body, and, from 2028–2029, the FAO Council. A new cooperation framework with the UN focused on Sustainable Development Goals is in preparation; Samarkand will host major UNESCO proceedings, underscoring the city’s growing convening power.
Uzbekistan’s multilateral activism also reflects the constraints of geography. As one of only two “double landlocked” states globally, Uzbekistan has argued for global transit guarantees for landlocked developing countries, citing World Bank estimates of GDP losses tied to high logistics costs and transit uncertainty. The region’s strategy is to turn this vulnerability into a strength with new corridors, power and water linkages, and harmonized customs, an approach now embedded in EU–Central Asia and broader Eurasian dialogues.
Building the Legal Foundations for Human Rights
At the core of this era of reform is the National Human Rights Strategy adopted in 2020 – the country’s first. It has driven changes to child and family protection, women’s rights, disability inclusion, and torture prevention, and codified the end of forced and child labor. Over four years, lawmakers have passed multiple codes and dozens of laws, alongside presidential and cabinet acts, directly tied to human rights guarantees. In 2025 alone, new statutes strengthened penalties for human trafficking, enhanced support systems for families and women, reinforced safeguards against the torture of detainees, and approved a concept for state policy in the religious sphere. Uzbekistan has ratified 25 ILO conventions and, in 2021, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Citizenship policy has been liberalized in line with UN guidance on reducing statelessness: while only a few hundred people obtained nationality between 1991 and 2016, more than 80,000 have acquired Uzbek citizenship since 2017, reflecting a more inclusive stance toward long-resident populations. Engagement with UN special procedures has intensified; seven national action plans have translated UN recommendations into domestic workstreams, covering women, peace, and security (UNSCR 1325), anti-discrimination, economic and social rights, disability rights, the High Commissioner’s recommendations, counter-terrorism standards, and child rights. A roadmap to implementing recommendations from the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing followed his visit to the country.
Human rights education has expanded, and a national curriculum integrates rights courses at all levels. The National Human Rights Centre (NHRC) has trained thousands of justice-sector professionals across all regions, and signed cooperation agreements with sectoral academies to build teaching and research capacity in rights-related fields.
In 2025, drafting began on a National Human Rights Strategy to 2030, aligned with environmental goals under the state program. The process – managed by a working group spanning the NHRC, the Prosecutor General’s Office, Ministries of Justice and Interior, Supreme Court, national ombuds institutions, and the Social Protection Agency – has been open. More than 150 proposals from over 50 state and non-state organizations informed early drafts; revisions incorporated expert feedback from 30 institutions, and public consultation on the normative-acts portal drew hundreds of comments. National roundtables and international consultations – including inputs from the OHCHR, OSCE, and the UN Country Team – refined the text, which was also presented at major legal and human-rights forums.
The draft sets six priorities: protection of civil and political rights; protection of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights; focused support for vulnerable groups; development of national human-rights and civil-society institutions; broader human-rights education and awareness; and intensified international cooperation. Implementing these goals is meant to strengthen constitutional guarantees, improve the execution of international recommendations, and consolidate the legal foundations for rights across the spectrum.
A Rights-First Reform Trajectory
The reform sequence – constitutional overhaul, strengthening of parliament, empowering local governance, social-state commitments, and human-rights codification – has created a more coherent legal scaffold for protecting rights. It is anchored by Uzbekistan–2030 targets, underpinned by the 2023 Constitution, validated by high-profile parliamentary diplomacy at the 150th IPU Assembly, broadened through the National Human Rights Strategy, and amplified by region-shaping diplomacy at the EU–Central Asia Summit. The next phase will be judged by its execution: turning legal texts and programmatic frameworks into everyday guarantees for citizens, measured transparently and refined through sustained public input.
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