Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters.

A Historical Perspective

Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires.

Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.

Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.”

Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020.

The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric

Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership.

Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region.

While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence.

Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist.

Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead.

Turkey’s Role in the OTS

According to Kazakh political analyst Marat Shibutov, Russia tends to overstate Turkey’s sway in Central Asia. “Russia significantly overestimates Turkey’s influence in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, not realizing that historical connections are minimal. A thousand years have passed since the Seljuks left, and the region only reconnected with Turkey after the exile of the Meskhetian Turks under Stalin,” Shibutov wrote.

In reality, the OTS serves primarily as a logistical and economic tool for Astana and Tashkent. In other sectors, China is a more attractive partner for technology, while Russia remains key for investment and industrial cooperation.

The Turkic Council officially became the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2021, amid the COVID-19 pandemic and increasing logistical disruptions. The Ukraine War and Russia’s growing isolation have further accelerated economic cooperation among Turkic nations. At the 10th OTS Summit in Astana (November 2023), discussions largely focused on financial and logistical matters, particularly the expansion of the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian transport route. Notably, Kazakhstan, not Turkey, was designated the Financial Center of the Turkic World.

Turkey’s military influence within the Turkic world, meanwhile, has largely stemmed from two factors: Azerbaijan’s military successes in Karabakh, achieved with Turkish support, and Ukraine’s early use of Turkish Bayraktar drones in the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, Turkey’s military reputation has waned as the effectiveness of Bayraktar drones declined over time.

A Geopolitical Challenger?

While Russia perceives Turkey as a geopolitical challenger in Central Asia, the reality is far more nuanced. Even within the OTS, Turkey’s role is limited, as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain wary of external forces seeking to dominate. The economic and logistical priorities of the OTS nations, meanwhile, favor China and Russia over Ankara.

Ultimately, the OTS remains an instrument for regional cooperation rather than a geopolitical bloc, and Turkey’s leadership ambitions face significant resistance from within.