• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Kazakhstan Plans New Measures to Attract Highly Skilled Foreign Workers

Kazakhstan is preparing to introduce new mechanisms to attract highly qualified foreign specialists as part of a broader effort to increase the country’s openness to talent, investors, and entrepreneurs.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has drafted amendments to the country’s migration legislation following a presidential decree aimed at modernizing migration policy and addressing labor shortages.

The proposed legislation introduces a targeted recruitment system for in-demand foreign specialists based on the current needs of the domestic labor market.

A key element of the reform is the creation of a government-approved list of priority professions. The list is expected to include specialists in information technology, healthcare, education, and culture, sectors currently experiencing some of the most acute labor shortages.

The draft law also establishes clearer and more transparent procedures for hiring foreign professionals at the request of employers.

Authorities are placing particular emphasis on improving conditions for foreign specialists working and living in Kazakhstan, including through an expansion of the Altyn (Golden) Visa program.

Under the proposed changes, foreign specialists would be eligible to apply for resident status after a specified period of employment in Kazakhstan. The status would provide access to tax incentives, financial services, healthcare and education opportunities, as well as the right to work outside the country’s foreign labor quota system.

Officials say the reforms are intended not only to address labor shortages, but also to facilitate the transfer of skills and expertise to local workers and accelerate technological modernization.

In the longer term, the government hopes the measures will help position Kazakhstan as a regional hub for skilled professionals and advanced technologies.

The Labor Ministry is also working to significantly expand the list of in-demand professions from 51 to 174 specialisms. The expanded list would include occupations in the nuclear industry, energy, biotechnology, genomic medicine, water management, irrigation, and healthcare.

Authorities say the initiative is designed to strengthen Kazakhstan’s competitiveness in the global race for talent and support the development of strategically important sectors of the economy.

The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan had approved its 2026 quota for foreign labor at 0.25% of the country’s total workforce.

The quota includes permits for 726 senior executives and deputies, 3,402 heads of structural divisions, 5,893 specialists, and 3,131 skilled workers. An additional 4,994 permits were allocated for seasonal labor.

Former Italian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Arrested in Rome Over Visa Scheme Allegations

Former Italian ambassador to Uzbekistan Piergabriele Papadia de Bottini di Sant’Agnese has been arrested in Rome on accusations of corruption and facilitating illegal migration, according to the Italian newspaper la Repubblica.

Italian prosecutors allege that the former diplomat and his associate, Tatiana Tarakanova, operated a scheme involving the issuance of Schengen visas from the Italian embassy in Tashkent. Tarakanova, a 53-year-old Russian-born Italian citizen living in Bulgaria, had reportedly worked with Papadia during his earlier diplomatic service at the Italian consulate in Moscow.

According to the report, Papadia assumed control of the embassy’s visa office shortly after taking charge of the Italian embassy in Uzbekistan’s capital on December 2, 2024. Investigators from Rome’s financial police unit cited testimony from a former visa office manager, identified only as Michel, who said the ambassador personally intervened in visa operations and later arranged for Tarakanova to work inside the office.

Italian authorities accuse the pair of aiding illegal immigration and committing corruption linked to official duties. Rome prosecutors opened an investigation after financial police examined activities connected to visa processing at the embassy.

The arrests were carried out under precautionary measures issued by Annalisa Marzano, a judge for preliminary investigations in Rome. Papadia was detained in Rome and taken to prison while the investigation continues. According to la Repubblica, he had already been removed from his diplomatic post in December 2025.

The case has drawn attention because it involves alleged misconduct linked to Schengen visa procedures in Central Asia, where demand for European visas has risen steadily in recent years.

Italy has expanded diplomatic and economic ties with Uzbekistan in recent years, including cooperation in trade, migration, and education. Several European countries have also increased visa and labor mobility programs for Uzbek citizens as relations with Central Asia deepen.

Kazakhstan Assesses Risk of Hantavirus Spread After Cruise Ship Outbreak

Kazakhstan’s public health authorities say the risk of imported hantavirus infections remains due to international travel but insist the country’s epidemiological surveillance system is prepared to detect and respond to potential cases.

The statement followed an outbreak of hantavirus aboard the cruise ship MV Hondius, which was traveling from Argentina to Cape Verde. According to media reports, three people died and eight confirmed infections were recorded among the ship’s 150 passengers.

Kazakhstan’s National Center for Public Health said the Andes orthohantavirus (ANDV) strain responsible for the outbreak is not circulating in Kazakhstan.

“Hantavirus infections remain under constant epidemiological control. Kazakhstan has a functioning sanitary and epidemiological surveillance system, infectious threats are continuously monitored, and laboratory facilities and specialists are prepared to diagnose and respond to possible imported cases,” the center said in a statement.

Officials added that the current situation remains under control and there are no grounds for public concern at this stage.

Health authorities advised citizens to consider the epidemiological situation when traveling abroad, including by consulting the Saqbol health risk map.

Residents were also urged to avoid contact with wild rodents, refrain from touching dead animals without protective equipment, ventilate enclosed spaces, and follow basic hygiene rules.

The center noted that hantaviruses belong to a group of zoonotic infections carried primarily by rodents. Infection usually occurs through inhalation of air contaminated with particles from the urine, saliva, or droppings of infected animals.

Special attention is being paid to the Andes orthohantavirus strain, which differs from most other hantaviruses in its ability to spread from person to person through close and prolonged contact.

“This feature makes it epidemiologically significant,” the center said.

The incubation period can range from one week to more than a month. Symptoms include fever, headache, muscle weakness, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, cough, and shortness of breath.

In severe cases, the virus can rapidly damage the lungs, leading to respiratory failure and shock. According to health officials, the fatality rate for Andes virus infections can reach 30–40%.

The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan declined to introduce quarantine restrictions in response to detected cases of metapneumovirus.

Identity and a New National Canon: Interview with Kazakhstan Historian Zhaxylyk Sabitov

Interest in Kazakhstan’s history is increasingly moving beyond academic circles. For many people, it has become a way to understand the country’s modern identity as well as its past.

The Times of Central Asia spoke with historian Zhaxylyk Sabitov, director of the Institute for the Study of the Ulus of Jochi, about why many chapters of Kazakhstan’s history remain insufficiently studied. The Ulus of Jochi, also known as the Golden Horde, was one of the largest medieval states in Eurasia and is closely tied to debates over Kazakhstan’s statehood and historical memory. The interview also explored which topics resonate most strongly with society today and how a new understanding of national memory is taking shape.

TCA: To begin, please tell us a little about yourself. How did you become interested in history, and why did you decide to work in this field?

Zhaxylyk: I am the director of the Research Institute for the Study of the Jochi Ulus.

My interest in history began in childhood. The problem was that in the 1980s and 1990s, history in Kazakhstan was taught rather poorly. There were few textbooks and teaching materials, and schoolchildren generally knew little about the subject. That is why I was always interested in trying to understand the past for myself.

In addition, I inherited a library of history books from my grandfather. I read those books, and in the 1990s my mother helped me buy new publications. All of this gradually shaped my interest in the history of Kazakhstan. You could say I became interested in history while still at school and later continued to study it professionally.

TCA: For readers who may not know much about you, how would you describe your research work and the main topics you focus on?

Zhaxylyk: I have several main areas of work. The first is the history of the Golden Horde. This was the state that preceded the Kazakh Khanate and occupied a vast territory stretching from the Altai to the Danube.

The second area is the history of the Kazakh Khanate. This also remains insufficiently studied. In the history of both the Golden Horde and the Kazakh Khanate, there were more than 100 khans. It is interesting to study how they interacted, where and how they ruled, and under what circumstances their rule took place.

The third area is genetics, or the genetic history of Kazakh tribes and clans, as well as those of other Turkic peoples, including Kyrgyz, Karakalpaks, Nogais, and Bashkirs. This topic allows us to address questions that have been debated for two centuries.

For example, there are many theories regarding the origins of certain Kazakh tribes. With the help of genetics, we are trying to understand which of these theories is closer to the truth and, more broadly, to better understand the ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs and other Turkic peoples.

The fourth topic is nation-building policy and historical memory. I am interested in how the state constructs the canon of national history and how this influences society’s perception of the past.

TCA: How would you explain to our audience why interest in history, culture, and national identity has grown noticeably in Kazakhstan in recent years?

Zhaxylyk: The growing interest in history, culture, and identity is connected above all with the fact that many periods of Kazakhstan’s past remain poorly studied. My friend Radik Temirgaliyev says that the history of the city of Lyon is described better than the entire history of Kazakhstan. There is some truth in that. We really do know very little about certain periods.

School textbooks and other publications provide only limited information. So, there is demand for history, but not enough supply. That is where the growing interest comes from.

The second important factor is the changing demographic situation. Kazakhstan is becoming more Kazakh, and people’s interest in their own history is growing.

There is also a foreign policy factor. In my view, after the events related to Crimea and Ukraine, interest in national history and people’s own roots in Kazakhstan became stronger. These events also contributed to the growth of national identity and self-awareness.

TCA: Can we say that Kazakhstan is now undergoing a kind of cultural restoration? How do you see this as a historian?

Zhaxylyk: I would not use the term “cultural restoration.” Rather, there is a revival of interest in history, the construction of a new nation-state, and the formation of a new canon of national history.

During the Nazarbayev era, history, especially ancient and medieval history, did not occupy such a prominent place. At that time, the main emphasis was on the formation of modern Kazakhstan, in which Nazarbayev was presented as the founder of the new state. In my view, this concept was met with skepticism by part of society.

There were also alternative views within society. For example, some people considered Dinmukhamed Kunayev a key historical figure. For others, it was Alikhan Bukeikhanov. Under Nazarbayev, it seems to me that these figures did not occupy the place they could have held in the national historical canon, partly because of political sensitivities. That is why the 100th and 150th anniversaries of these prominent figures passed relatively quietly, while Dinmukhamed Kunayev was portrayed negatively in the previous five-volume academic history.

After Nazarbayev’s departure, under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, both Alikhan Bukeikhanov and Dinmukhamed Kunayev began to assume a more prominent place in the national historical canon. 

TCA: Why has the younger generation become one of the main driving forces behind this interest in the past?

Zhaxylyk: Each new generation of young people is interested in the history of Kazakhstan in its own way. In many respects, this is connected to the school curriculum, which does not always fully answer all questions. It contains mistakes and approaches that were established during the Nazarbayev era. As I understand it, this will now be corrected, including through the publication of a new seven-volume history of Kazakhstan.

Apart from school, young people also have a genuine desire to learn more about their history. Much of Kazakhstan’s past remains insufficiently studied; there is little fiction, academic work, documentary film, or feature film devoted to it. That is why interest in the past continues to grow every year.

TCA: What image of history is especially important for young Kazakhstanis today: the history of the state, everyday culture, the steppe, nomadic civilization, or something else?

Zhaxylyk: It is difficult to give one general answer, because all Kazakhstanis are different. On the one hand, many people are interested in the history of the state and its rulers: who ruled, how they governed, and what events took place during different periods.

The history of everyday life may attract somewhat less interest. But there is another important area, interest in the origins of one’s own ancestors, Kazakh clans, and tribes. That interest is also very noticeable.

TCA: Which historical topics, in your view, resonate most strongly with society today?

Zhaxylyk: In my view, several periods resonate especially strongly. First, the Middle Ages, the eras of the Golden Horde and the Kazakh Khanate.

Second, the history of the 20th century. Third, the history of the 21st century. These are the periods at the center of public interest today.

TCA: Is there a difference between how the older generation perceives history and how young people approach it?

Zhaxylyk: There is certainly a difference. The older generation is, in many ways, a carrier of old Soviet myths. Young people already perceive history differently.

But to speak precisely about these differences, serious sociological research, surveys, and focus groups are needed. Without such studies, it is difficult to explain in detail exactly how the older and younger generations perceive history differently.

TCA: What role does language, culture, music, cinema, social media, and popular media play in this renewed interest in history?

Zhaxylyk: They play a very important role. Through language, culture, music, cinema, social media, and popular media, history becomes closer and more understandable to a broad audience.

When interest in history moves beyond academia, it is popular culture and the media that begin to shape how people perceive the past.

TCA: Is there a risk that growing interest in history will lead not only to greater knowledge, but also to romanticization or simplification of the past?

Zhaxylyk: Yes, there is such a risk. But this happens everywhere. When interest in history grows within society, romanticization and simplification of the past almost inevitably appear alongside it.

It is impossible to avoid this completely. It is a parallel process that accompanies any rise in public interest in history.

TCA: Which moments in Kazakhstan’s history do you personally consider especially important for understanding the country today?

Zhaxylyk: Several periods are important for understanding Kazakhstan today. First of all, the Middle Ages: the era of the Golden Horde and the Kazakh Khanate.

The famine of the 1920s and 1930s is also critically important. The Kunayev era matters as well, particularly the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s associated with figures such as Tashenov, Yusupov, and Kunayev. More broadly, the period up to the 1980s shaped much of Kazakhstan’s modern history.

In addition, there is the Nazarbayev era, which has not yet been fully interpreted. He ruled Kazakhstan for a very long time, but there are still no full-fledged scholarly monographs examining his personality and role in the country’s history. Undoubtedly, there were positive aspects to his rule, especially in the 1990s, as well as negative aspects associated with the 2000s and 2010s.

Overall, there are many important periods in Kazakhstan’s history, but a significant number of them have not yet been sufficiently interpreted, reconsidered, or studied.

TCA: How would you explain to a foreign reader why the conversation about history is important for understanding modern Kazakhstan today?

Zhaxylyk: I would explain it this way: in terms of studying its own history, Kazakhstan today is roughly at the level France was in the 18th century. Kazakhstan is a relatively new state that restored its independence and is only now beginning large-scale work to rethink and study its past.

We know very little about many periods. For example, the entire 17th century of the Kazakh Khanate has been studied far less thoroughly than any decade of the 19th century or any single year of the 20th century.

That is why interest in Kazakhstan’s history is so important. Only now is a more professional and systematic study of this history beginning. During the Soviet period, the history of Kazakhstan was studied as well, but it was not considered a priority. There were some breakthrough projects, for example, research on the history of the Kazakh Khanate in the 1950s and 1960s but overall, there were too few such works.

This is why interest in history has grown so much in independent Kazakhstan: for a long time, many topics did not receive sufficient attention, and now both society and researchers are beginning to rethink the country’s past anew.

How Koreans Were Deported to Central Asia: Myths and Reality

The 1937 deportation from the Soviet Far East was the greatest tragedy in the history of Soviet Koreans, Koryo-saram, the self-designation of ethnic Koreans living across the former Soviet Union. It became the first case in Soviet history in which an entire ethnic group was forcibly relocated solely on the basis of ethnicity. Later, Soviet Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, Poles, Kurds, and many other peoples would endure similar repression.

For decades, this history remained largely suppressed, giving rise to numerous myths and misconceptions surrounding the deportation.

Yet it is inaccurate to claim that Koreans first appeared in Kazakhstan and Central Asia only in 1937. Historical and archaeological evidence points to earlier Korean ties with the region. The 1897 census of the Russian Empire recorded 42 Koreans living in Turkestan, while in 1929 a Korean agricultural cooperative called “Kazakh Rice” was established in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, 1937 marked the beginning of the modern history of Koreans in Central Asia.

Myth One: The Deportation Was a Sudden Decision

One common belief is that Joseph Stalin suddenly decided to deport Koreans from the Soviet Far East as part of a campaign against Japanese espionage.

Reality

In fact, plans to relocate Koreans had been discussed since the late 1920s. The Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party repeatedly revisited the issue of the Korean population living in border regions. The joint decree issued by the Soviet government and Communist Party on August 21, 1937 (No. 1428-326ss), was the culmination of a long-term state policy.

By the mid-1930s, the Soviet Far East was increasingly viewed as a vulnerable frontier zone. Japan had expanded its military presence in the region, and Soviet authorities feared a possible war. Koreans living in compact settlements near the border, while maintaining cultural and family ties with Korea, came to be regarded as politically unreliable. Ironically, many of them had originally fled to Russia precisely to escape Japanese colonial rule in Korea.

Myth Two: The Deportation Was Entirely About Japanese Espionage

Officially, Soviet authorities justified the deportation as a measure aimed at preventing Japanese espionage.

Reality

The espionage threat served more as a pretext than the principal cause. During the years of the Great Terror, Stalin’s regime perceived danger not only in individuals, but also in entire social and ethnic groups. Suspicion replaced evidence, and ethnic origin itself could become grounds for repression.

Local officials sought to demonstrate political vigilance, while the state simultaneously pursued broader strategic and economic goals: strengthening military control in the Far East and redirecting labor resources to Kazakhstan and Central Asia, regions devastated by collectivization and famine.

Museum of the History of Russian Koreans (Koryo-saram) in Ussuriysk.

Myth Three: The Operation Was Chaotic

For many deported families, the expulsion felt like a sudden catastrophe, creating the impression of disorder and improvisation.

Reality

At the state level, however, the operation was carefully organized. Before the deportation, party purges and political repression had already targeted the Korean intelligentsia. Soviet authorities fabricated cases involving alleged “spy networks” and “insurrectionary organizations.”

In the spring of 1937, Soviet newspapers actively promoted narratives about Japanese espionage, fueling an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. At the same time, officials compiled population lists, calculated the number of trains required, determined transportation routes, and designated settlement areas.

Myth Four: Koreans Were Passive Victims

Another widespread perception is that deported Koreans silently accepted their fate.

Reality

Koreans found themselves effectively stripped of their rights. Identity documents were confiscated, strict surveillance imposed, and even private remarks could be labeled anti-Soviet. Yet people did resist. NKVD records document protest conversations, attempted escapes, and acts of defiance.

Open protest was nearly impossible, so the most important forms of resistance became internal resilience, the preservation of family ties, collective memory, language, and professional skills.

Myth Five: The Soviet State Sent Koreans to Certain Death

The deportation is often portrayed as a deliberate attempt to physically exterminate the Korean population.

Reality

The deportation was unquestionably a criminal act that caused immense suffering and countless deaths. People were transported in freight wagons without adequate food or medical care, and the journey could last up to 40 days.

On October 29, 1937, NKVD chief Nikolai Yezhov reported to Stalin that the operation had been completed: 124 trains carrying 36,442 families, a total of 171,781 people, had been dispatched.

The greatest losses occurred after arrival. Koreans were unloaded in late autumn without proper housing, food supplies, or medical assistance. Children and the elderly suffered the most, and many families lost infants and young children during the first months of resettlement.

Myth Six: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Were Unprepared

There is sometimes an impression that local authorities in Central Asia were unaware that deportation trains were arriving.

Reality

The leaderships of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had received secret directives from Moscow in advance and established commissions to organize the settlement process. However, the scale of the operation and the weakness of regional infrastructure made adequate preparation virtually impossible.

By 1938, more than 18,000 Korean families had been settled in Kazakhstan, while approximately 74,000 Koreans were relocated to Uzbekistan. They were placed both in specially created collective farms and in existing agricultural and urban communities.

Myth Seven: The Deportation Ended Upon Arrival

Many assume the deportation concluded in the autumn of 1937.

Reality

In reality, the harshest period began afterward. People lived in dugouts and barracks while facing severe shortages of fuel, clothing, and food. Assistance from local populations, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Russians, and others played a critical role in helping deportees survive.

Some Koreans continued to move within Kazakhstan and Central Asia in search of better conditions. In 1941, another wave of deportations affected Koreans living in the Astrakhan region, who were also relocated to Kazakhstan.

Museum of the History of Russian Koreans (Koryo-saram) in Ussuriysk.

Myth Eight: Koreans Vanished From History After Deportation

Because Soviet authorities long prohibited research into deported peoples, the impression of a historical rupture persists.

Reality

Koreans did not disappear. They rebuilt their lives under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. During World War II, many were mobilized into labor battalions and worked in mines, on construction sites, and in defense industries. Only a small number were allowed to serve on the front lines. The best-known example was Captain Alexander Min, the only ethnic Korean awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, Koreans made a major contribution to the agricultural development of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. More than 200 Koreans became Heroes of Socialist Labor. Over time, Koreans increasingly participated in the scientific, cultural, and public life of the Central Asian republics.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Koryo-saram once again faced the challenge of adapting, this time within newly independent states. Many moved to Russia, Kazakhstan, South Korea, and elsewhere, while preserving a complex and multilayered identity.

The Central Reality: A Crime of the Regime and the Resilience of a People

The deportation of Soviet Koreans was a violent state campaign based on collective punishment along ethnic lines. It formed part of the broader system of Stalinist repression, in which the state claimed the right to determine the fate of entire peoples.

But this history is not only a story of tragedy. Koreans survived, rebuilt communities and livelihoods, raised new generations, and made lasting contributions to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and other countries. Decades later, they were fully rehabilitated, and Soviet repressions against them were officially declared illegal.

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession.

In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia.

On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place.

At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan.

These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise.

It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy.

This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass.

Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia.

Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience.

Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future.

This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia.

India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it peripheral to Beijing’s continental strategy.

Treating these regions as a single unit blurs critical distinctions and complicates the formulation of a strategy for one of the most important arenas of geopolitical competition.

If Washington is searching for a more coherent framework, it should consider a broader conceptual map—what might be called a “Greater Asia.” This would span the Eurasian landmass from Turkey to Japan, echoing the logic of the ancient Silk Road. Within this framework, Central Asia is not marginal—it is pivotal.

In the same context, the U.S. government should also rethink how it organizes expertise on China itself. Much of Washington’s China-focused policymaking remains concentrated among East Asia specialists. A deeper understanding of China’s westward push – often described as “marching West” – and the strategic logic of the Belt and Road Initiative would lead to more accurate prescriptions. This would do more than tidy up bureaucratic inconsistencies; it would align U.S. policymaking with geopolitical realities.

China already treats Central Asia as crucial to its westward strategy. Russia, despite its diminished influence, still views the region as part of its near abroad. If the United States persists with fragmented and outdated regional definitions, it risks becoming the great power without a coherent strategic approach.

Reorganizing government bureaus may seem like a technical fix, but it is also a signal of priority. A framework that places Central Asia within a broader Eurasian and China-focused strategy would demonstrate that Washington understands the region not as an appendage of somewhere else, but as a central piece of the strategic landscape.

More than a century ago, British geographer Halford Mackinder warned that control of the Eurasian “Heartland” would shape global power. Central Asia lies at the core of that insight. China understands this geography instinctively and is acting on it. It is time for Washington to do so, too.

 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.