• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
02 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 14

JICA’s Sota Tosaka on Afghanistan’s Economic Ties With Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is deepening trade and transport ties with Afghanistan despite continuing political and humanitarian concerns, drawing its southern neighbor closer to Central Asian markets. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Sota Tosaka, chief representative of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for Afghanistan, described that engagement as part of a practical regional approach. Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries, he said, are seeking areas where economic cooperation can continue. Tosaka, who previously worked at JICA headquarters overseeing Central Asia and the Caucasus, has also visited Uzbekistan several times, including Termez. He said his current position gives him a different perspective on the relationship between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors. “I previously visited Termez in 2019 when I was overseeing the Central Asia and Caucasus region at JICA headquarters,” Tosaka told The Times of Central Asia. “At that time, the free trade zone aimed at facilitating business with Afghanistan did not exist yet. Returning to Termez recently, I was genuinely surprised to see how much progress has been made and how actively various cross-border initiatives are now being explored and implemented through Termez to connect Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.” Since taking charge of JICA’s Afghanistan operations, his work has focused on supporting Afghan people through international organizations. Tosaka noted that JICA’s primary focus remains on addressing the immediate needs of the Afghan population. To ensure that assistance directly reaches local communities and vulnerable groups, the agency coordinates its support through United Nations agencies and international partners. “Our priority is to deliver tangible support directly to the people of Afghanistan,” he said. “Working alongside UN partners allows us to effectively implement humanitarian activities that address daily challenges on the ground.” “Although the geopolitical environment surrounding Afghanistan has shifted significantly, Central Asian nations are actively pursuing opportunities to expand economic ties from their respective strategic viewpoints,” Tosaka continued. “Recognizing the importance of regional stability, countries like Uzbekistan are taking pragmatic steps to foster trade and commercial cooperation that serve mutual interests.” In particular, Uzbekistan’s proactive approach to encouraging business initiatives reflects a broader regional trend aimed at maintaining essential economic linkages. For Uzbekistan, the economic relationship has already become significant. Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev said in February that bilateral trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan has increased 2.5 times over the past five years, from $653 million in 2021 to $1.7 billion in 2025. The two countries have set a goal of raising annual trade to $5 billion. Tosaka noted that this economic orientation may become increasingly crucial given the diplomatic and logistical constraints Afghanistan faces on its eastern and western borders. “Complex relations with Pakistan and the geopolitical situation involving Iran present significant challenges for Afghanistan,” he explained. “Consequently, deepening economic ties with its northern neighbors becomes a vital strategic alternative. In this context, Central Asian nations serve as indispensable partners, creating mutually beneficial opportunities for sustainable regional development.” In parallel with these macro-economic trends, JICA is dedicated to strengthening grassroots economic resilience by empowering Afghan entrepreneurs, particularly women, in...

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...

Pakistani Airstrikes in Afghanistan Kill at Least 28 Civilians, UN Says

The United Nations says at least 28 civilians were killed and 49 injured in Pakistani airstrikes in several provinces in Afghanistan, as violence continues in the border region following ceasefire efforts that have repeatedly broken down. Women and children were among the casualties in the airstrikes in Paktia, Paktika, and Kunar provinces on Sunday night, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) said on Monday. UNAMA said the figures were preliminary and that the toll could increase as hospitals treat the injured. Hamdullah Fitrat, a spokesman for the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan, announced a higher casualty toll than the UN. At least 36 civilians were killed and 163 others were injured, Fitrat said on X. Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar said the airstrikes hit militant hideouts and strongholds on the Afghan side of the border, killing at least two dozen militants in retaliation for attacks on targets in Pakistan. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of providing sanctuary to militants who carry out attacks against Pakistani security forces, an allegation that the Taliban in Afghanistan denies. Besides humanitarian concerns, the ongoing violence is also a concern for Central Asian governments and business groups that are working to develop trade corridors and infrastructure projects linking their region with South Asia. Those projects, which would require close collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan, include the Trans-Afghan Railway, the TAPI natural gas pipeline, and the CASA-1000 electricity project.

Rail Reform and Regional Corridors Put Uzbekistan at the Center of Central Asia’s Logistics Map

At the Tashkent International Investment Forum, officials and transport executives discussed railway reform and new corridor projects, with private investment as a main point. World Bank Senior Transport Specialist Mansur Bustoni described rail as “essential” for Uzbekistan, which depends on land routes for access to seaports and export markets. The World Bank wants to help turn Uzbekistan Railways from a state monopoly into “a commercial bankable enterprise,” he told the forum. Uzbekistan Railways has about 4,700 route kilometers, according to Bustoni. The system carries around 60 million tons of freight and 15 million passengers a year and contributes about 8% of GDP. Much of that freight is linked to exports. The World Bank is supporting 44 activities across seven reform programs. Bustoni listed legal separation inside Uzbekistan Railways, financial reform, operational efficiency, and investment planning among the main areas. Each activity has been ranked by priority, he added. Tariff reform was one of Bustoni’s main topics. He called the proposed change “not a price hike.” The aim is to replace ad hoc increases with rules-based pricing. Cost-reflective tariffs would give the railway company more predictable revenue and reduce state cross-subsidies. Bustoni also cited capital-market plans. Uzbekistan’s infrastructure company is part of the National Investment Fund of the Republic of Uzbekistan (UzNIF), which he described as a $2.4 billion fund managed by Franklin Templeton, with a planned dual listing in London and Tashkent. The railway sector recorded a roughly $188 million net loss in 2023, reached break-even in 2024, and is expected to post a positive $138 million result in 2025, he added. [caption id="attachment_50833" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Image: TCA[/caption] Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) Secretary General Jasurbek Choriyev linked corridor development to Uzbekistan’s national priorities. He cited double-digit growth in passenger air traffic over five years and 15 million tourists last year, attributing the figures to national data and analysts at Airports Council International and the World Bank. Uzbekistan’s aircraft fleet has expanded to more than 100 planes from about 40 to 50 in recent years. A target of 188 aircraft by 2030 could be reached earlier, Choriyev noted. Uzbek airlines are also carrying more freight on the China-Europe route, driven in part by e-commerce. Choriyev described rail as the backbone of national connectivity, carrying about 90% of internal and external traffic. He pointed to the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Iran railway and gave 2030 as the expected completion date, with 2028 or 2029 possible. He also cited the Trans-Afghan corridor as a route to Pakistan. About 52% of Uzbekistan’s rail network is electrified, with a target of 70% by 2030. Innokenty Ivanov, a principal consultant at Freshfields, said Uzbekistan’s railway reform is creating legal routes for private investment through market mechanisms and public-private partnerships. The reform covers the reorganization of Uzbekistan Railways as a holding company and a legal framework for private investment and independent operation. Ivanov compared the process with Germany, where railway reform led to long-term contracts between the government and the infrastructure company. Financing tied to measurable targets gives investors more certainty...

Uzbekistan Approves Feasibility Study for Trans-Afghan Railway

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has approved an intergovernmental agreement on the joint development of a feasibility study for the construction of the Trans-Afghan railway, which will link Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. According to the presidential resolution, the agreement between Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Transport, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works, and Pakistan’s Ministry of Railways provides for the preparation of technical and economic documentation for a new railway line from Naibabad to Kharlachi. The document formalizes cooperation on the next stage of the long-discussed regional transport corridor. Under the resolution, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to notify the Afghan and Pakistani sides that all necessary domestic procedures required for the agreement’s entry into force have been completed. The Trans-Afghan railway project was first proposed by Tashkent in December 2018 as a strategic initiative to provide Central Asia with direct access to Pakistani seaports. The original concept envisaged extending Afghanistan’s rail network from Mazar-i-Sharif through Kabul and Logar province before crossing into Pakistan. An earlier proposed route was expected to pass through Nangarhar province and the Torkham border crossing into Peshawar. In July 2023, however, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan agreed on a revised alignment. The updated route will run from Termez to Naibabad, then through Maidan Shahr and Logar to Kharlachi, excluding the previously discussed Torkham crossing. Once connected to Pakistan’s railway network, cargo will be able to reach the Pakistani ports of Karachi, Gwadar, and Qasim. The railway is expected to stretch approximately 647 kilometers. According to recent statements by Uzbek officials, the estimated construction cost is $6.9 billion, although earlier projections ranged from $4.6 billion to $7 billion. The project is regarded by the participating countries as a key component of efforts to strengthen regional connectivity and expand trade routes between Central and South Asia.

Icy Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Threaten Central Asian Trade Plans

On November 25, the Afghan authorities accused Pakistan of a new round of airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing killed nine children and a woman, injuring several others. The attacks are the latest escalation in rapidly worsening tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban-led government in Kabul, with key border crossings currently closed, and Afghan refugees being expelled from Pakistan. At the heart of the crisis is Pakistan’s claim that Kabul is providing support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban, or TPP), a militant group seeking to topple Pakistan’s government and impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law. The fallout may ripple beyond bilateral relations, with significant consequences for Central Asian trade, particularly the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan plan for a Trans-Afghan railway. The planned 647-kilometer line is set to connect the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif with Peshawar in Pakistan. When combined with existing infrastructure, this will mean that trains can travel from southern Uzbekistan all the way to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi, granting landlocked Uzbekistan and Afghanistan a long-sought gateway to the Indian Ocean. But mounting instability, along with Islamabad’s willingness to shut borders as leverage, may now place the project in serious jeopardy. “The moment a state weaponizes geography, every financier in Tashkent, Moscow, or Beijing prices in risk, delays commitments, and quietly explores alternative alignments,” Anant Mishra, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, told The Times of Central Asia. So, what are the prospects for salvaging the Trans-Afghan railway? How can Pakistan and Afghanistan de-escalate? And what does this turmoil mean for Central Asia’s wider economic ambitions? A sudden frost On July 17, Uzbekistan’s Transport Minister Ilkhom Makhkamov, Pakistan’s Railway Minister Muhammad Hanif Abbasi, and Afghanistan’s acting Public Works Minister Mohammad Esa Thani signed an agreement to conduct a feasibility study for the proposed railway. Many hoped the railway would presage a new era of fraternal relations between Central and South Asia. “Civil society, the intelligentsia, media, and business community of Pakistan have been loudly calling for intimate trade relations with the Central Asian Republics,” Khadim Hussain, Research Director at the Centre for Regional Policy and Dialogue (CRPD), Islamabad, told TCA. For Uzbekistan, which has aggressively pursued diversification of trade routes to reduce reliance on transit through Iran and Kazakhstan, the project promised a cheaper, faster corridor to global markets. According to Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, the trans-Afghan is one of two high-priority transport projects, along with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – work on which began in April 2025. But the ink had barely dried on the July accord when tensions between Afghanistan’s Taliban government and Islamabad began escalating, throwing the ambitious railway into doubt. [caption id="attachment_40211" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Uzbek passenger and freight trains parked in Andijan; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] In early October, Pakistan launched an airstrike in Kabul targeting the leader of the...