Turkmen Cultural Workers Fired Over Refusal to Fund Presidential TV Monitor
Another case of forced financial contributions among civil servants has emerged in Turkmenistan. In early April, four employees of the Kerki district's cultural department were dismissed after protesting salary deductions. The funds were intended to finance the purchase of a television monitor designated to display images of President Serdar Berdimuhamedov. Salary Deductions Without Consent According to an order from local authorities, 230 Turkmenistan Manat (TMT) was deducted from the March salaries of employees at urban and rural cultural centers to pay for a large monitor at the Kerki Palace of Culture. Given that average monthly salaries range between 1,800-2,100 TMT (officially $514-$600, unofficially $92-$108), the deduction represented a significant portion of income. The monitor was meant to display the president's image against a national flag backdrop during official events. At other times, it remained unused. Several employees independently refused the deduction and were subsequently dismissed. Among them was a cleaning staff member. Coercion and Unofficial Duties One of the dismissed workers, a resident of Taze Usul village, reported that such deductions are routine. Employees are also compelled to engage in activities beyond their job descriptions, such as growing silkworm cocoons, harvesting cotton, and cleaning streets ahead of official visits. These tasks often occur on weekends and public holidays. Following their refusal to pay, the dismissed workers were allegedly visited by police, who pressured them into signing resignation letters citing “health reasons.” “I wrote several letters to the etrap and velayat hakims, and to the Minister of Culture in Ashgabat. No action was taken, except my dismissal,” said one of the affected employees. As a result of the dismissals, only two individuals remain at each cultural center in the Kerki district, now personally bearing the costs of maintenance, repairs, and event organization. Pattern of Enforced Contributions This incident is part of a broader pattern. In January 2025, civil servants in the newly built city of Arkadag, including teachers and librarians, were reportedly pressured to purchase homes on mortgage, with down payments ranging from 75,000 to 80,000 TMT ($21,428-$22,857). In May 2024, state agency heads in Balkan velayat were ordered to purchase souvenir watches featuring portraits of former President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and his son, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov. Prices ranged from 1,500 to 3,000 TMT ($428-$857) depending on seniority. Similar practices go back years. In August 2020, civil servants in Farap were compelled to buy domestically manufactured televisions, with 2,400 TMT ($685) deducted from their salaries in advance. Delivery was delayed by months. In February 2018, state employees had to pay for bicycles to join a mass bike ride, with contributions per worker depending on the institutional size. The cost of a bicycle reached 4,000 TMT ($1,142). According to civil servants, refusal to participate in such initiatives increasingly results in job loss, a sign of deepening authoritarian control in Turkmenistan's public sector.
May Day in Central Asia: From Soviet Parades to a Celebration of Unity
In Soviet times, May 1 and 2 were public holidays. May 1 was International Workers' Day, marked by large-scale parades celebrating the proletariat, while May 2 served as a day to recuperate before returning to work. Today, three of the five Central Asian republics have preserved the tradition of celebrating May Day, effectively marking the arrival of spring twice, once through Central Asian customs – Nauryz - and again through European ones.
Workers of the world, unite!
Coined by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in The Communist Manifesto, this famous communist slogan once appeared on the coats of arms of the Soviet Union and its republics. International Workers' Day became the living embodiment of this phrase. Celebrated on 1 May, May Day began as a European festival of spring but gained global significance through the labor movement. The Second International, formed at the 1889 International Workers Congress in Paris, called for an annual demonstration advocating an eight-hour workday. The date honors the U.S. general strike that started on 1 May 1886 and led to the tragic Haymarket massacre on 4 May. The date became a powerful symbol of working-class solidarity and a yearly tradition across large swathes of the globe.
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Soviet-era poster for International Workers' Day[/caption]
Before the Bolsheviks came to power, political agitators in the Russian Empire used May 1 to call for change with slogans such as “Down with the Tsar” and “Give us freedom.” After the October Revolution, May 1 and 2 became official state holidays, with May Day becoming synonymous with International Workers' Day and mandatory parades. Unlike the more formal and solemn celebrations honoring the October Revolution, however, May Day events were often met with genuine enthusiasm.
After the collapse
The fall of the USSR brought about a widespread reevaluation of Soviet holidays. The celebration of the October Revolution on November 7 was widely discarded, but many post-Soviet republics retained May 1 as a public holiday, albeit with new interpretations and meanings.
In Central Asia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not officially celebrate May 1. Turkmenistan has developed a distinct holiday calendar, while in Uzbekistan, May 1 is observed symbolically as the Day of Fountains.
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Day of Fountains, Tashkent; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption]
Though celebrations are more modest and it is no longer officially a day off, Tajikistan has retained the holiday’s Soviet-era name, International Workers’ Day. Some traditions, such as honoring outstanding workers, persist.
Kyrgyzstan calls the holiday Labor Day, in line with its American equivalent. It is marked by festive events and activities organized by trade unions.
Kazakhstan has taken a different approach, reimagining May Day as the Day of Unity of the People of Kazakhstan. The name reflects the country’s emphasis on stability and interethnic harmony, a model promoted by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, an institution established on March 1, 1995, at the initiative of the country’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Since 2016, March 1 has also been celebrated as Thanksgiving Day, another holiday focused on national unity. Over a hundred different nationalities and ethnic groups reside within Kazakhstan.
On the Day of Unity, cities across Kazakhstan host concerts featuring ethnic groups and pop stars, fairs, exhibitions, and traditional folk festivities. The holiday is a vibrant expression of the country’s multicultural identity, underscoring the idea that “We are different, but we are equal,” a phrase frequently invoked by the current president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
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Day of Unity of the People of Kazakhstan celebration; image: el.kz[/caption]
The modern iteration of May Day originated as a commemoration of American workers’ struggles in the late 19th century, but in East Slavic traditions, among Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, May 1 also marked the seasonal transition from winter to spring. Bonfires were lit, and straw effigies representing winter were burned. These celebrations often involved gatherings with family and friends, symbolizing rebirth and renewal.
In essence, May Day is the East Slavic counterpart to Nowruz, the Central Asian New Year, which is celebrated at the end of March. While the ideological undertones of May Day have faded, it remains one of the most beloved and eagerly anticipated holidays in the post-Soviet world.
Turkmenistan Denies Torture Allegations in Case of Activist Mansur Mingelov
At the 82nd session of the UN Committee Against Torture, held on April 23-24 in Geneva, Turkmenistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vepa Hajiyev, rejected allegations that human rights activist Mansur Mingelov was tortured while in detention. Speaking in Geneva, Hajiyev stated that a domestic investigation found “no facts confirming such violations during criminal proceedings and during Mansur Mingelov's stay in places of detention.” He also provided an official medical diagnosis for Mingelov, tuberculous arthritis in both knees, and denied claims that Mingelov was not informed of his medical status. Background: Arrest and Allegations of Abuse Mansur Mingelov, a member of the Baluchi minority, was first detained in June 2012 by officers of the now-defunct Turkmenistan Drug Control Service. According to human rights groups, he was beaten and sustained a broken leg during his arrest. Although initially released without charge, Mingelov later submitted formal complaints to the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Presidential Administration, alleging torture against himself and other Baluchi community members. He compiled testimonies from at least 11 individuals who described being subjected to electric shocks, beatings with plastic bottles and chairs, and having bones broken with chisels. After attempting to deliver this evidence, including video and audio recordings, to the U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat, Mingelov was rearrested. Authorities subsequently charged him with drug smuggling, distribution of pornography, and involving minors in anti-social activities. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison. Health Condition and Calls for Release In 2018, Mingelov was diagnosed with tuberculosis, later complicated by osteomyelitis. Prison doctors recommended amputation of his leg, which he refused. In 2024, a commission led by Interior Ministry-affiliated physician Professor Elena Geldieva concluded that amputation was unnecessary and that his condition could be treated abroad. A 2017 presidential decree in Turkmenistan permits the release of seriously ill prisoners. Despite Mingelov’s confirmed diagnosis, he has not received the requisite documentation for release, nor has any court ruled in favor of it. The UN Human Rights Committee, several international organizations, and U.S. senators have all urged Turkmenistan to release Mingelov. However, activists claim the matter is stalled at the Ministry of National Security. At the Geneva meeting, Hajiyev asserted that a release requires a court decision based on a multi-agency commission’s findings, but did not clarify whether Mingelov's illness qualifies under the existing criteria. Mansur Mingelov remains incarcerated, as international watchdogs once again spotlight Turkmenistan’s human rights record.
Opinion – Central Asia’s Looming Water Crisis: A Ticking Time Bomb
When people think of Central Asia, they often picture vast deserts, ancient Silk Road cities, and oil pipelines stretching to distant markets. Yet the region’s most urgent and combustible resource is not buried underground — it flows above it. Water, or more precisely the lack of it, is rapidly becoming the defining fault line of Central Asia’s future. For decades, the five Central Asian republics have tiptoed around a growing water crisis. The two major rivers that sustain life in this arid region, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, are now so contested and depleted that what was once a technical issue has metastasized into a geopolitical threat. The region's major rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya are under immense pressure, threatening agriculture, livelihoods, and regional stability. At the heart of the crisis is a tragic irony. The upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are rich in water but poor in energy and cash. They need to release water in winter to generate hydropower. Downstream nations, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, want water stored until the summer to irrigate vast cotton and wheat fields. The result? Mutual distrust, occasional diplomatic spats, and an accelerating race to dam, divert, and hoard water in a region already gasping under the weight of climate change. A Region Parched Central Asia annually utilizes over 60 billion cubic meters of water for irrigation from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins. However, recent years have seen a decline in river flows, with the actual flow of the Syr Darya being 20–23% less than the norm. Further, the ghost of the Aral Sea — a once-thriving inland lake that has now shrunk by over 90% in its volume and 74 % in surface area — serves as a haunting reminder of the cost of mismanagement. The Soviet legacy of excessive irrigation has morphed into a post-Soviet scramble for control, where water is not just a tool of survival but a lever of power. This desiccation has transformed the region, leading to the emergence of the Aralkum Desert and causing severe ecological and health issues. Climate Change Intensifies the Crisis Climate change is exacerbating water scarcity in Central Asia. A recent study revealed that an extreme heatwave in March 2025, with temperatures soaring 5 to 10°C above pre-industrial levels, was significantly amplified by global warming. Such temperature surges accelerate glacier melt and increase evaporation rates, further reducing water availability. By some estimates, Central Asia could lose over 30% of its freshwater resources by 2050. Yet, rather than galvanize cooperation, this existential threat has sparked more competition. International efforts have largely fallen flat. The International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), the region’s main water cooperation body, is riddled with inefficiencies and lacks enforcement power. External actors like China and Russia have their own interests, often deepening the regional divide rather than healing it. Inefficient Water Management Inefficient agricultural practices remain one of the most profound and persistent contributors to water mismanagement across Central Asia. In Uzbekistan — a country heavily reliant on irrigation for its agricultural output — only an estimated 12% of irrigation canals are lined or waterproofed, resulting in extensive water losses through seepage and infiltration. This infrastructural inadequacy is symptomatic of a broader systemic neglect, wherein outdated Soviet-era irrigation systems continue to dominate the rural landscape, despite their inefficiency and ecological cost. Scholars like Philip Micklin have extensively documented how the expansion of irrigation since the 1960s has drastically reduced the inflow of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers into the Aral Sea. Similarly, Michael Glantz has highlighted that the lack of water-saving technologies and poor irrigation management have been primary culprits in the ecological collapse of the Aral Sea. The persistence of these outdated practices, coupled with inadequate policy reforms, underscores a critical need for investment in water-efficient technologies and the implementation of sustainable water management practices to mitigate further environmental degradation. The consequences are not merely environmental but profoundly socio-economic. Excessive water withdrawals have not only decimated one of the world's largest inland seas but have also led to increased soil salinization, declining crop yields, and heightened rural vulnerability. This failure to modernize irrigation infrastructure, in the face of growing climatic stress and declining freshwater reserves, reflects a critical policy inertia that continues to undermine regional sustainability and transboundary resource cooperation. Geopolitical Tensions Over Water A fundamental tension underpins Central Asia’s transboundary water dynamics: the stark temporal mismatch between upstream and downstream water demands. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — both resource-constrained yet water-rich — are heavily dependent on winter water releases to fuel hydropower generation, their primary source of domestic energy and economic stability. In sharp contrast, downstream states such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan require substantial water flows during the summer months to sustain their irrigation-intensive agriculture, particularly cotton and wheat cultivation. This seasonal disjuncture has given rise to persistent friction, exacerbated by the absence of binding, enforceable water-sharing frameworks. What could serve as a foundation for cooperative interdependence has instead become a vector for recurring discord. The lack of integrated water governance mechanisms has not only stymied trust among riparian states but also entrenched a zero-sum mindset, where unilateral action often replaces coordinated planning. In effect, Central Asia's water diplomacy remains a fragile patchwork, vulnerable to political volatility, climate shocks, and the centrifugal pull of national self-interest. A Call for Cooperative Action What is urgently required is not merely policy reform, but a fundamental reimagining of water governance across Central Asia. The region must transcend the outdated perception of water as a sovereign commodity and instead embrace it as a shared, existential resource — a vital artery sustaining multiple nations. Transparent data exchange, equitable distribution frameworks, and strategic investment in water-efficient technologies must no longer be considered optional aspirations, but essential instruments for regional survival. Yet even these measures will prove insufficient without the political will to act collectively. So long as national leaders weaponize water as an instrument of influence rather than a foundation for cooperation, the rivers that once unified ancient civilizations will continue to fracture modern states. Hence, resolving Central Asia’s water crisis demands more than technical interventions; it necessitates a renewed ethos of collaboration, robust infrastructure planning, and a bold commitment to sustainable water management. In the absence of such concerted regional action, the future portends not only ecological collapse but also intensified economic vulnerability and geopolitical discord.
Breaking Old Ties: Central Asia’s Delicate Dance Between Russia and the West
Central Asian countries are increasingly asserting their independence in foreign policy, distancing themselves from traditional centers of global influence. Recent developments highlight a nuanced balancing act as states in the region navigate growing tensions between Russia and the West. Kyrgyzstan Pushes Back In Kyrgyzstan, the recent arrest of Natalya Sekerina, an employee of the Russian House in Osh, marked a notable assertion of sovereignty. Sekerina was detained under Part 1 of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, which pertains to the recruitment, financing, and training of mercenaries for armed conflict or attempts to overthrow state authority. Earlier, Sergei Lapushkin, an employee of Osh city hall, and two others were also detained in connection with the case. All suspects were later placed under house arrest. Nevertheless, the arrests are seen by observers as a clear signal that Kyrgyzstan is not simply aligning with Russian policy, despite its economic dependence on Moscow, particularly due to labor migration. The move was reportedly a response to the April 17 detention of over 50 Kyrgyz nationals in a Moscow bathhouse, where Russian security forces allegedly used excessive force. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal note of protest. Russia later stated that the detainees were in the country illegally and some were suspected of links to radical groups. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan is scrutinizing Western influence as well. In February, U.S. President Donald Trump announced funding cuts and a wind-down of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The announcement triggered debate in Kyrgyzstan, where some voices argued that while USAID had supported civil society, it also fostered instability and economic dependency. Critics claim the agency promoted Western values and helped establish a network of NGOs that played outsized roles in the country’s politics. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Seek Equilibrium In Kazakhstan, USAID also came under fire. Parliamentary Deputy Magherram Magherramov criticized the agency for promoting what he described as values alien to Kazakh society, referencing controversial events such as women’s rights marches and LGBTQ+ parades in Almaty. He called for a formal review of foreign-funded NGOs. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan witnessed a diplomatic rift during an April visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the “Grieving Mother” memorial in Samarkand. Lavrov commented on the absence of a Russian-language inscription, provoking widespread backlash on Uzbek social media. Sherzodkhon Kudratkhodzha, rector of the University of Journalism and Mass Communications, responded sharply: “We are not their colony.” He also cited ongoing discrimination against Uzbek migrants in Russia, which, he argued, has been met with silence from Russian officials. A More Independent Foreign Policy Central Asian nations are increasingly holding intra-regional and international meetings, often excluding Russia. On April 25, intelligence chiefs from the region gathered in Tashkent to coordinate on regional security threats. The following day, a meeting of foreign ministers from Central Asia and China took place in Almaty. It was attended by Kazakh Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a Turkmen representative. Earlier in April, Samarkand hosted the inaugural summit between Central Asia and the European Union. Presidents Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (Kazakhstan), Shavkat Mirziyoyev (Uzbekistan), Sadyr Japarov (Kyrgyzstan), Emomali Rahmon (Tajikistan), and Serdar Berdimuhamedov (Turkmenistan) were in attendance, along with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Still, this shift should not be interpreted as a full-scale pivot away from Russia. As of April 28, all Central Asian presidents except Turkmenistan’s had confirmed their attendance at the Victory Day military parade in Moscow on May 9, commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. Regional Outlook In the face of global instability, Central Asian states appear increasingly aware of their strategic role as both a geopolitical crossroads and a zone of relative stability. Their growing assertiveness suggests a regional push toward a more autonomous and pragmatic foreign policy.
World Bank to Investigate Regional Risks of Rogun Dam Project
The World Bank’s Inspection Panel has agreed to review a formal complaint filed by residents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan concerning the environmental and social risks associated with the Rogun Hydropower Project (HPP) in Tajikistan. The complaint, submitted by the regional environmental coalition Rivers Without Boundaries, targets a $350 million World Bank loan and related technical assistance used to revise the project’s 2014 environmental and social impact assessments. The complainants argue that the current studies are outdated and inadequate, relying on assumptions that are more than a decade old. They contend the assessments fail to account for the downstream effects of storing and diverting water from the Vakhsh River, one of the primary tributaries of the Amu Darya basin, on communities and ecosystems in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Preliminary estimates from the World Bank suggest that filling the Rogun reservoir could decrease the flow into the Aral Sea by 0.8 to 1.2 cubic kilometers annually, potentially cutting today’s levels by as much as 25%. Such a reduction, critics warn, could exacerbate ongoing issues in the region, including desertification, soil salinity, and land degradation. These challenges have plagued villages in the lower Amu Darya since Soviet-era irrigation schemes dramatically reduced the sea’s volume, leading to persistent dust storms and declining water quality. Local farmers are particularly concerned about the dam’s effect on the timing of water availability. If the dam shifts the river’s flow from spring and summer into winter storage, it could disrupt traditional irrigation cycles, forcing expensive infrastructure adjustments. Some communities fear economic collapse and forced migration if water needs go unmet during critical planting seasons. Environmental experts also highlight the cumulative threat posed by the Rogun HPP in conjunction with Afghanistan’s planned Qosh Tepa canal. No comprehensive analysis has been conducted to evaluate the combined impact of these two major water diversion projects on regional hydrology and biodiversity. The World Bank itself estimates that climate change could reduce water availability in the region by 15-30% by 2050, potentially costing Uzbekistan up to 250,000 agricultural jobs and requiring billions in climate adaptation investments. In response, Rivers Without Boundaries has called on the World Bank and its co-financiers, who have collectively pledged over $1 billion, to suspend further funding until a transparent, independent risk assessment is completed. The coalition advocates for a thorough study of alternative project designs, such as a lower dam height, to mitigate environmental and social damage. They also demand genuine public consultation with all Amu Darya basin countries, equitable compensation mechanisms, and legally binding water management agreements. Failure to address these concerns, the group warns, risks triggering an irreversible ecological and humanitarian crisis across Central Asia.
Turkmenistan Steps into the Spotlight with Regional Diplomacy and Economic Reforms
Long known for its isolationist policies, Turkmenistan is gradually opening up to the international community through significant economic and diplomatic initiatives. Recent efforts include diversifying its natural gas exports, engaging in regional infrastructure projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline, and expanding trade partnerships. Additionally, the government has taken steps toward modernization and economic reforms to attract foreign investment, signaling a shift towards enhanced regional cooperation and global integration. This week, these initiatives gathered pace, as Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, continued his diplomatic tour of Central Asia with official visits to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Berdimuhamedov's meetings focused on strengthening strategic partnerships, expanding trade and economic cooperation, and deepening cultural dialogue. Visit to Kazakhstan: Cultural Diplomacy and Strategic Cooperation On April 21, Berdimuhamedov arrived in the city of Turkestan, where he was welcomed by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The leaders held an informal meeting and visited key cultural and infrastructure sites, including the mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yassawi, a UNESCO World Heritage Site considered a spiritual center of the Turkic world. The tour also included the “Ethnoaul” ethnographic complex, the Turkistan Visit Centre, and an inspection of ongoing archaeological and restoration work at the ancient settlement of Kultobe. At the SPK Turkistan industrial park, they reviewed six investment projects worth a total of 36.5 billion tenge, encompassing production from tractors to medical equipment, with future expansion plans involving 112 facilities. During the meeting, Tokayev highlighted growing bilateral ties and discussed joint initiatives in energy, transport, and digitalization. Tokayev reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s interest in participating in the development of Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field and regional infrastructure projects, including the Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Buldak railway and various transit highways connecting the two nations. Tokayev also offered support in digital governance and IT training, aligning with broader goals of regional modernization. Speaking to Toppress.kz, political analyst Tair Nigmanov interpreted Berdimuhamedov’s regional tour as a sign of Turkmenistan’s gradual emergence from diplomatic isolation. Nigmanov emphasized the symbolic significance of Turkestan, which Kazakhstan is positioning as a regional diplomatic hub for the Turkic world. Visit to Kyrgyzstan: Tradition and Informal Diplomacy On April 22, Berdimuhamedov arrived in Kyrgyzstan, where he was met at Issyk-Kul Airport by President Sadyr Japarov, who personally drove his guest along the visit route, a gesture that drew public attention. The leaders toured the Rukh-Ordo cultural center in Cholpon-Ata, and held informal discussions. During the visit, Japarov gifted a komuz, a traditional Kyrgyz string instrument, and invited Berdimuhamedov to sample the national kuurma tea. Talks on April 23 focused on enhancing bilateral relations. President Japarov praised the “centuries-old friendship” between the two nations and proposed establishing a Kyrgyz-Turkmen Development Fund, modeled on similar funds with Russia, Hungary, and Uzbekistan. Berdimuhamedov responded positively, expressing a desire to expand cooperation in trade, energy, education, and cultural exchange. Next Stop: Uzbekistan Berdimuhamedov is scheduled to visit Uzbekistan on April 23-24 at the invitation of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The agenda includes political, economic, and transportation cooperation, continuing the regional outreach and reinforcing Turkmenistan’s strategic presence in Central Asia.
Essential but Unwelcome: Central Asian Migrants in Russia
The Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow on March 22, 2024 triggered strong anti-migrant sentiment in Russian society. Since then, the nation’s authorities have been imposing stricter migration rules. But how does this impact millions of Central Asian labor migrants and their families living and working in Russia? Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia became a major destination for migrant workers from Central Asia. According to the official Russian statistics, there are currently almost four million citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan living in Russia, along with approximately 670,000 illegal migrants. Rosstat (the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation) reports that 260,400 migrants arrived in Russia from January to July this year, with 60% (about 156,200) coming from Central Asian countries. The majority of them are citizens of Tajikistan. In 2023, over one million Tajiks have moved to Russia in search of work. With a large community of its citizens in Russia, the Tajik government seems to be working to not only improve their legal status in the Russian Federation, but also to coordinate some of their actions, particularly in the field of culture. On April 9, in Dushanbe, a meeting took place between Tajikistan’s Minister of Labor, Migration, and Employment of the Population, Solekhi Kholmakhmadzoda, and leaders and activists of the Tajik diaspora living in Russia. Tajikistan initiated the summit after Russia began testing migrant children on their knowledge of the Russian language before admitting them to school. Starting April 1, a law came into effect that prevents Russian schools from enrolling migrant children who do not speak Russian or are in Russia illegally. This measure is just the tip of the iceberg in the Kremlin’s plans to regulate the migrant issue in the country. Alexey Nechaev, the leader of the New People party – one of the handful of the so-called systemic opposition parties in Russia – said on March 19 that “artificial intelligence should be made a new tool for monitoring migrants… It is unfair that Russian citizens are digitized from head to toe, while migrants continue to live with paper documents without any problems,” Nechaev stressed, pointing out that monitoring migrants’ activities through AI could “help keep a closer eye on what foreigners are doing and make it easier to track illegal money flows.” Last year, the Liberal Democratic Party – another ‘systemic opposition’ group – proposed restricting the rights of migrant workers to bring their families into Russia. This initiative raised concerns in neighboring Kazakhstan. The ambassador of the largest Central Asian nation expressed unease to Moscow about such ambitions, referring to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the foundation of which, as he highlighted, is based on ensuring the four freedoms – the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. Russian reports, however, claim that, as a result of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s membership in the EAEU, their citizens living in Russia have a much better status than those from other Central Asian states. Despite that, on April 14, Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry summoned Russia’s ambassador to demand answers over reports that Moscow police used violence against Kyrgyz nationals during a raid on a bathhouse. Such a move represents a humiliation for the Kremlin, considering Kyrgyzstan’s heavily dependence on Russia, especially in terms of remittances from Kyrgyz labor migrants living in the Russian Federation. But given the ongoing war in Ukraine and Russia’s isolation from the West, Moscow is not in a position to jeopardize its relations with Bishkek over the migrant issue. That, however, does not mean Russia will stop quietly passing laws that could, at least to a certain extent, change the status of Kyrgyz, and other Central Asian migrants in the Russian Federation. According to State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, the Russian Parliament has initiated and passed 15 laws related to combating illegal migration since 2024. In his view, “It is important that these laws are now effectively enforced.” Nevertheless, the Kremlin must strike a delicate balance between the growing anti-migrant sentiment in the country and its ambitions to preserve the remnants of its influence in Central Asia. That is why, despite 66% of Russians supporting a ban on wearing niqabs in public places – a measure already implemented in most Central Asian countries – Moscow has remained silent on the issue. Moreover, the Kremlin is under pressure to stop, or at least significantly reduce, the influx of Central Asian migrants. To strike a balance, the authorities in Russia’s Tatarstan region – the fourth most popular destination for labor workers from Central Asia – reportedly aim to attract young female workers from Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Research Associate at Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Yulia Florinskaya, however, has claimed that in the coming years the number of foreign workers in Russia will remain the same, with the majority still being citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Currently, she argues, no other country can compete with them in terms of the number of labor migrants coming to Russia. Moscow needs migrants to help address the labor shortage, as Russia lacked around 4.8 million workers in 2023. Still, according to a Human Rights Watch report, Central Asian labor migrants in Russia experience “increased xenophobic harassment and violence,” with the Russian Defense Ministry continuing to forcibly recruit them to fight in Ukraine. It is, therefore, no surprise that the number of migrants in Russia declined by 18% in 2024 as compared to 2023. Migration – be it from Central Asia or other parts of the world – remains both a necessity and a challenge for Russia. As pressure mounts from within, in the coming months and years the Kremlin will have a hard time navigating a complex balancing act between anti-migrant sentiment at home, the country’s economic needs, and its geopolitical interests in Central Asia.
Sunkar Podcast
Repatriating Islamic State Fighters and Families: Balancing Security and Humanity
