A Historic Gathering: The First Central Asia-European Union Summit in Samarkand
Excitement is building in Samarkand as it gears up to host the inaugural Central Asia-European Union Summit. This landmark event promises to pave the way for significant negotiations and collaboration, bringing together leaders and representatives from both regions. With a rich cultural backdrop and a vibrant atmosphere, Samarkand is poised to play a crucial role in shaping the future of partnerships and cooperation between Central Asia and the European Union. In recent weeks, Uzbekistan has experienced notable advancements in its foreign policy, signaling a proactive approach to international collaboration. A highlighted event was the fruitful engagement between Uzbekistan's head of state and Kaja Kallas, the High-level Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Additionally, a delegation led by Josef Sikela, the European Union Commissioner for International Cooperation, participated in discussions to foster deeper ties. A significant milestone on the horizon is the inaugural Central Asia-European Union summit, set to unfold in the historic city of Samarkand on April 3-4. During a pivotal meeting on March 27 with Kallas, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev meticulously explored the preparations for this groundbreaking summit, which has captured global attention due to its potential to reshape regional dynamics. The leaders engaged in a rich exchange of ideas focused on bolstering practical cooperation between their regions and planning future collaborative events that could further strengthen these ties. The significance of fostering mutually beneficial cooperation between the two regions in trade and logistics was emphasized during the meeting. This includes harnessing the potential of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, advancing digitalization, promoting green energy, addressing ecological concerns, modernizing infrastructure, and other priority areas. The introduction of effective mechanisms for implementing initiatives and projects in these fields was also highlighted. Participants exchanged views on enhancing Uzbekistan's relations with European Union organizations, discussing adopting a new agreement for enhanced partnership and cooperation and Uzbekistan's accession to the World Trade Organization. Current international and regional policy issues were also addressed. Additionally, on March 18, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met with a delegation led by Josef Sikela, the European Union Commissioner for International Cooperation. This meeting discussed critical matters regarding further developing multifaceted relations between Uzbekistan and the European Union. Moreover, plans for organizing the inaugural "Central Asia - EU" summit and the Climate Forum in Samarkand were considered. In recent years, bilateral cooperation with the European Union has accelerated across political, trade, economic, investment, and cultural-humanitarian spheres, presenting extensive opportunities for the continued expansion of these ties. A new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Uzbekistan and the European Union is anticipated to be signed soon. Both parties have expressed a keen interest in promoting joint projects and programs across transport and logistics, energy, digitalization, agriculture, water management, and other key areas. Kallas conveyed warm greetings and best wishes on behalf of key EU figures, including António Costa, the President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission. The discussions underscored the necessity of cultivating mutually beneficial cooperation across various sectors, including trade and logistics, and harnessing the untapped potential of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. Other critical themes included digitalization efforts, green energy initiatives, environmental programs, infrastructure modernization, and the establishment of effective mechanisms for executing joint projects. Furthermore, there was a focus on deepening Uzbekistan's engagement with EU organizations, including adopting a new agreement to enhance partnership and cooperation. The talks also touched on Uzbekistan’s anticipated accession to the World Trade Organization, alongside key international and regional policy matters. Earlier in the month, on March 18, Mirziyoyev held a significant meeting with Josef Sikela’s delegation. During this meeting, they addressed pressing issues related to advancing multifaceted relations between Uzbekistan and the European Union. The agenda revolved around organizing the forthcoming Central Asia-EU summit and the Climate Forum, which will take place in Samarkand. The trajectory of bilateral cooperation with the European Union has accelerated remarkably in recent years, encompassing various dimensions such as politics, trade, economics, investment, and cultural-humanitarian exchanges. Both partners recognize the prosperous opportunities available for further growth and collaboration. In March, a significant agreement was finalized in Tashkent concerning two strategic projects backed by the European Union. The delegation underscored that the "Connecting Central Asia" (C4CA) initiative focuses on enhancing digital infrastructure and fostering regional integration, which will, in turn, encourage cooperation and economic exchanges among Central Asian nations. According to Sikela, the collaboration between the European Union and Uzbekistan seeks to improve internet connectivity across Central Asia, aspiring to provide fast and secure internet access. This initiative aims to empower businesses, generate new employment opportunities, and elevate living conditions for local communities by integrating advanced European technologies and Uzbekistan’s expertise. Overall, the partnership between Uzbekistan and the European Union is entering a transformative phase, offering substantial opportunities for growth and mutual benefit as both sides work together to create a more interconnected future.
Exposing the Cracks: Asem Tokayeva on the Decline of RFE/RL and Central Asia’s Media Future
Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, Asem Tokayeva, a seasoned journalist with years of experience at Radio Azattyq - Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, offers a compelling critique of RFE/RL's challenges, from internal corruption allegations to its declining relevance in Central Asia's evolving media landscape.
Tokayeva started her career with Express K and other publications in Astana before joining Radio Azattyq as a freelancer in 2004 and contributing to the groundbreaking Russian-language program, Паровоз ("locomotive"). In 2008, she played a pivotal role in launching Radio Azattyq’s Russian-language website, a platform recognized for tackling sensitive issues and fostering free discussion. Her work contributed to the site's recognition by the Online News Association in 2009 for "Protecting Citizens' Rights to Information."
After nearly 14 years at Azattyq, including over seven at its Prague office, Tokayeva left in late 2017 to further her academic pursuits, earning a Master's degree from Charles University in Prague, where her dissertation focused on Media Framing: Transformation of Nursultan Nazarbayev's Image in the U.S. Media.
TCA: How do you feel about the funding cuts to the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which oversees projects like RFE/RL and Voice of America?I have always advocated for the reform of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and now the new U.S. administration has simply cut its funding in one fell swoop. However, I don't see this as just Trump's whim. The work of this media outlet had long been criticized in Washington, and not only during his tenure. During Barack Obama’s and Joe Biden’s presidencies, American media published investigations into abuses, including the infiltration of pro-Kremlin agents, within international broadcasting corporations funded through USAGM.
When Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State, she called the entire U.S. international broadcasting structure, which includes Radio Azattyq, "practically defunct." Even during Bill Clinton’s presidency, there were serious discussions in Washington about shutting down these radio stations, as they were considered outdated following the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. By the 1990s, it was already difficult to claim that Radio Liberty was the sole source of alternative information. During the August 1991 coup in Moscow, other radio stations provided more timely and comprehensive field reports. For instance, Echo of Moscow became one of the most listened-to stations at the time.
Today's media landscape has different challenges, such as media literacy and combating fake news, rather than a shortage of news organizations. While the mission and goals of Radio Liberty have renewed significance, given the persistence of authoritarianism in many former Soviet countries, the U.S. administration no longer sees value in its international broadcasting system. They simply decided to shut down another bloated bureaucratic structure, one that had also been plagued by corruption. For example, its parent agency had been overpaying exorbitant amounts for office space in downtown Washington D.C. for 15 years.
Radio Azattyq destroyed its uniqueness when it completely shut down shortwave broadcasting in 2012 at the insistence of its then-editor, Yedige Magauin. Yet, in 2011, during the protests in the oil town of Zhanaozen, Azattyq was one of the few alternative sources of information. However, if we analyze Azattyq’s content over the past decade, it's ceased to be an important or exclusive source of information. [There are multiple examples of] topics, especially those sensitive to the Kazakh authorities, that have either been ignored by Azattyq or are covered in the same way as most other media outlets in Kazakhstan.
TCA: You have consistently criticized the management of RFE/RL, including Radio Azattyq, for nepotism, corruption, labor rights violations, and more. In your opinion, how have these issues affected the core mission of the organization?Corruption, nepotism, and censorship within Azattyq have effectively destroyed its mission to provide independent and objective information to people in authoritarian countries. Journalism has turned into a mere imitation when top managers are more concerned with keeping their positions and inflating their salaries and benefits rather than ensuring the quality of their content.
In an attempt to regain its audience, Azattyq's Kazakh-language website even published sexualized videos and fostered sexism and chauvinism under the guise of promoting aitys, a traditional Kazakh poetic duel. As for its supposed mission of promoting democratic values, the same website actively facilitated smear campaigns against opposition leaders and distorted reports on the deaths of civil activists.
As a result of these developments, RFE/RL's Central Asian services have steadily lost the trust of their audience and have ultimately alienated their most loyal listeners and readers. Internal editorial problems played a major role in weakening the outlets’ influence and significance in the region.
Thus, the reduction of government grants was a consequence of a prolonged crisis in the management of USAGM and its affiliated media outlets. When an organization's top management disregards its own mission to disseminate uncensored information in countries where the press is suppressed and instead becomes mired in corruption and nepotism, it's hardly surprising that the U.S. administration not only questioned the rationale for continued funding but ultimately decided to terminate grants to this corporation, which has repeatedly been exposed for mismanagement, infiltration, spreading disinformation, and even promoting authoritarian propaganda.
TCA: How did U.S. legislative and executive officials react to your 2019 testimony about violations in the RFE’RL's Central Asian services during the USAGM hearing in Washington?Some participants expressed concern that the Central Asian services of RFE/RL were effectively operating in coordination with authoritarian regimes. I noticed how the top managers of USAGM and RFE/RL became visibly uneasy. Key figures like RFE/RL Vice President Nenad Pejic and Central Asia Regional Director Abbas Djavadi, both responsible for the crisis, were quietly forced into retirement or resigned. However, there was no real investigation, and they were given generous severance packages, which, incidentally, was one of the Trump administration’s criticisms of USAGM.
The organization has long had an opaque management system and a culture of mutual protection. Real control over the content and personnel decisions rests with mid-level managers, vice presidents, and regional directors, who actively resist reforms. The leadership shields its own from accountability, allowing the system to remain unchanged. As a result, their successors continued the same practices, particularly in Central Asian services, where nepotism, favoritism, and political bias thrive, a fact repeatedly pointed out by civil society representatives in these countries. It is therefore unsurprising that the directors of these services were caught hiring their wives, stepdaughters, or mistresses. The fact that nearly an entire newsroom could be staffed by people from just one region or a single Islamic community has become a routine occurrence.
TCA: Are you aware of the current situation at Radio Azattyq? What will happen to the editorial staff if the closure of the outlet is upheld? Will they receive compensation, and will they be protected from potential persecution by the authorities?I sympathize with my colleagues, the ordinary journalists who worked honestly and professionally. They face losing not only their jobs but also, in many ways, their sense of purpose, their ideals, and their values. I cannot say what kind of compensation they could receive or whether they will receive any at all; much depends on USAGM’s decisions. However, given the stark inequalities within RFE/RL, it is likely that many rank-and-file employees, especially those outside the Prague office, will be left without protection or support.
The income gap and levels of job security at the outlets are enormous. The six-figure salaries of the president and other top executives have consistently increased year after year. I wouldn’t be surprised if it turns out that the leadership raised their salaries ahead of the upcoming layoffs. Washington has a well-developed accountability system that allows NGOs to track government spending with relative transparency. According to the nonprofit ProPublica, Jamie Fly’s salary as the head of RFE/RL rose from $141,722 in 2020 to $308,491 in 2023.
Meanwhile, freelancers risking their freedom in places like Iran or Afghanistan receive meager fees, with rates that have remained stagnant for years. When I started as a freelancer in Astana, the rate for reporting was $7.50 per minute. It has probably increased since then, but I doubt it has increased by much, considering how reluctant management is to raise salaries. And even when they do, they are selective — loyalists and sycophants receive annual raises and bonuses, while honest but inconvenient employees are kept in the doghouse and subjected to internal harassment.
TCA: Will the shutdown of RFE/RL projects in Central Asia affect freedom of speech in the region?
In my view, the loss of RFE/RL as an important source of information occurred long ago, when it voluntarily ceased broadcasting on shortwave, except in a few countries where the media situation is dire, such as Turkmenistan. The current content on the websites of the Central Asian services cannot compete with local media or even independent bloggers, who operate with far smaller budgets but are free from internal censorship and bureaucratic constraints. Under the leadership of Torokul Doorov, the RFE/RL Kazakh service has seen a decline in website traffic. That’s why I don’t think most news consumers will notice its absence. Had RFE/RL maintained high journalistic standards and true independence, its closure would have been a much bigger blow.
Clearly, a time of major change has arrived. This could open doors for new independent media initiatives. In the digital era, large traditional media organizations are no longer the sole providers of information. Perhaps the shutdown of RFE/RL in the region will push independent journalists and civil society to develop alternative platforms for delivering objective news.
Explore our Special Coverage section to dive deeper into the shifting priorities of U.S. funding for media in Central Asia.
Forced and Child Labor Persist in Turkmen Cotton Harvest, UN Experts Say
The International Labour Organization (ILO), a United Nations agency focused on labor rights, has confirmed cases of forced labor involving public sector employees and children during Turkmenistan’s 2024 cotton harvest, despite a formal government ban introduced in July of that year. Public Sector Employees and Children Sent to the Fields According to the ILO’s findings, employees of state institutions, including kindergartens, schools, and hospitals, were mobilized for cotton picking alongside children. These violations occurred even after the official prohibition on such practices was enacted. During a visit to Turkmenistan in autumn 2024, ILO experts found that around 20% of surveyed farmers admitted to employing public sector workers. This included both technical staff, such as cleaners, and professionals like nurses, doctors, and educators. Over one-third of public sector employees reported facing pressure from management to participate in the harvest, with threats of wage cuts or dismissal. The ILO categorized these practices as a form of “psychological coercion.” Minors in the Fields, Women Dominate the Labor Force Despite the legal ban on child labor, 14% of surveyed government workers and 11% of farmers confirmed the involvement of minors in cotton picking. The report links this to poor socio-economic conditions in rural areas, low-income levels, unemployment, and prevailing cultural expectations. Women accounted for over 90% of all cotton pickers in 2024. The average working day lasted 8.5 hours, often extending beyond that. Approximately 80% of pickers had no written employment contracts, exposing them to potential exploitation. Many reported being forced to accept whatever terms their employers offered. While in 2023 only 12% of pickers earned more than one Turkmen manat per kilogram of cotton, this figure rose to over 70% in 2024. Nevertheless, experts noted that pay remained unstable, with widespread delays and opaque compensation practices. Obstacles for Observers, Risk of Sanctions The ILO conducted monitoring at 472 cotton plantations across Turkmenistan, interviewing 1,762 pickers, 472 farmers, and 2,500 public officials. However, the report notes that in some instances, officials and farmers attempted to obstruct monitoring efforts, interfering with observers and misrepresenting facts. While the ILO acknowledged government efforts to ban child labor and reduce coercion, it warned that the absence of effective oversight mechanisms continues to enable violations. “Risks remain, especially when there are threats of dismissal or fines for refusing to go into the field,” the report states. International Repercussions Loom Under newly adopted European Union regulations banning imports of goods produced using forced labor, Turkmen cotton exports could face restrictions. In November 2024, EU officials discussed a potential ban on imports of Turkmen cotton for this reason. The ILO report underscores that sustainable reform is only achievable through transparent oversight, full respect for human rights, and the complete elimination of coercive labor practices for both adults and children.
Inside the EU’s New Power Play in Eurasia
Kaja Kallas’s late-March 2025 tour of Central Asia, in her role as the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was a high-signal intervention in structural terms. It indicates a major re-evaluation of the EU’s posture toward a region historically treated as a far-flung, liminal borderland. As the inaugural EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand on April 3–4 approaches, her visible diplomatic activity was less about spectacle than about configuring a new field of co-adaptive engagement. Not only the European Union but also, separately, the United Kingdom are both seeking new regional footholds for building durable alignments. Central Asia, for decades considered through a lens of post-Soviet dependency or one of Chinese infrastructural absorption, is now increasingly recognized as a network node of emergent geopolitical agency. No longer just a space "between" other spaces, it is becoming a strategic space in its own right. Kallas’s mission and the UK’s parallel outreach signify a turn toward a negotiated interdependence that does not dissolve classical interest-based diplomacy but rather "complexifies" it by embedding it in a landscape of developmental trajectories and overlapping power centers. The arc of Kallas’s visit traced a deliberate sequence: Ashgabat, Tashkent, Almaty, Bishkek. In Ashgabat, she chaired the 20th EU–Central Asia Ministerial Meeting, a session nominally bureaucratic but substantively strategic. Discussions reaffirmed the 2023 EU–Central Asia Roadmap and activated the Global Gateway as an organizing frame for infrastructural, digital, and energy cooperation. Bilateral exchanges with officials in Turkmenistan brought the sensitive issue of sanctions circumvention into the open: Turkmenistan, though nominally neutral, remains enmeshed in logistics corridors proximate to Russian interest. From there, Kallas moved to Uzbekistan, where preparations for the April 3–4 Samarkand summit took clearer shape. Talks with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov in Tashkent widened the terrain of diplomatic discourse to include the energy transition, educational exchange, and regional transport integration. By hosting summits and fostering cooperation, Uzbekistan is seeking to establish for itself a profile as a key facilitator in Eurasian affairs. In Kazakhstan, her final significant stop, the meetings with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu emphasized macroeconomic diversification and critical raw material supply chains. These are areas in which the EU is not merely a partner but a principal stakeholder. And yet, it is not only the EU that has begun this strategic deepening. The United Kingdom, post-Brexit and still actively reconfiguring its global engagements, has moved in parallel. April 2025 marked the first anniversary of the UK–Kazakhstan Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Foreign Office Minister Stephen Doughty’s recent hosting of the Kazakhstan–UK Strategic Dialogue marked 33 years of formal relations. These diplomatic celebrations, beyond their performativity, represent the UK’s recognition that Kazakhstan, and Central Asia more broadly, is a region where its strategic, commercial, and normative interests intersect. In this broader convergence, Kazakhstan plays a central structural role of a balancing nature. It shares long borders with both Russia and China; it hosts a significant Russian-speaking population; and it has maintained a political posture of calibrated neutrality during a period of sharply escalated geopolitical tensions. For both the EU and the UK, Kazakhstan’s independence and stability transcend bilateral issues; they have become, indeed, system-stabilizing. With Russia's unabated aggression in Ukraine and China's unceasing infrastructure diplomacy across the region, Kazakhstan’s capacity to maintain equidistance becomes a geopolitical asset in itself, even for outsiders like the EU and the UK. The material vectors of this engagement are principally energy and infrastructure. Kazakhstan remains central to Europe’s energy diversification strategy. For the UK, the logic is even more direct: Kazakhstan supplies approximately 20% of British crude oil imports. British companies such as BP and Shell maintain longstanding investments in the Tengiz and Kashagan fields. The pragmatism of maintaining hydrocarbon fuel flows during the "energy transition" coexists with investment in green energy and renewables, supported through mechanisms like the EU’s Global Gateway and private-sector coordination. The institutional layer is also to be noted. The Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), which operates under English common law, offers a familiar regulatory ecosystem for UK-based investors. It also acts as a vector for Kazakhstan’s economic diversification. This policy aspires to curb rentier dependence and to stimulate innovation in finance, technology, and professional services. The EU has historically emphasized regulatory alignment as a strategic vector, so Kazakhstan’s legal and financial modernization presents an attractive pathway to long-term structural alignment. Beyond finance and energy lie the questions of corridors, logistics, and flows. Kazakhstan’s promotion of the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR), also called the Middle Corridor, is no longer a boutique project. As trade through Russian territory becomes politically and economically volatile, the corridor has already taken on significant strategic importance. Both Brussels and London have recognized this. The EU backs multimodal infrastructure investment across Central Asia through Global Gateway, while the UK has sought project-specific partnerships aligning with its goals of trade facilitation. Such convergence, however, takes place within a competitive field. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) still has life in Central Asia, where governments do not see engagement with Europe or the UK as a replacement for Chinese partnership but as a diversification of their own strategic portfolios. What differentiates European and British engagement is not their magnitude but their method of introducing conditionality frameworks, legal transparency, and sustainability metrics. Their models of partnership offer what might be called "predictive credibility" that provides higher informational clarity and so also lower volatility. The Samarkand summit on April 3–4 will formalize these trajectories. It is expected to produce memoranda and initiatives across digital infrastructure, educational exchange, logistics coordination, and green energy. The summit crystallizes how Europe is shifting its engagement with the region. Central Asia is no longer a periphery but rather a partner, no longer a mere object of policy but a co-agent in system evolution. Kallas’s mission demonstrates, and UK engagement reinforces, that the architecture of Eurasian engagement is no longer founded on dominance or dependency. It is increasingly shaped by distributed agency, managed asymmetry, and negotiated interdependence. This increased compatibility among the partners enables efficient differentiation and mutual adaptation. This convergence does not ensure broader geopolitical stability, but it does enhance the number of degrees of freedom available to any emergent equilibrium.
EU’s Kallas Tours Central Asia Ahead of Landmark Samarkand Summit
Last week, Kaja Kallas, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, toured Central Asia in advance of the first-ever EU-Central Asia Summit. The notable meeting is set to take place in the ancient Uzbek city of Samarkand on April 3-4. EU-Central Asia Summit Samarkand, a city increasingly popular among international travelers, has hosted high-level gatherings before, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in September 2022. However, the upcoming summit marks the first time the top leadership of all five post-Soviet Central Asian republics will convene with the EU at this level. Key topics on the agenda include energy cooperation, trade corridors, and climate change. The summit is expected to produce several agreements that will outline the progress of EU-Central Asia relations and establish strategic policy directions for the future. Visit to Turkmenistan Kallas began her tour in Ashgabat, where she chaired the 20th EU-Central Asia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. There, she addressed the implications of EU sanctions on Russia. “The European Union has enacted 16 sanctions packages and is currently preparing the 17th. I understand these measures impact the region’s economies, but Russian companies must not be allowed to use Central Asia to circumvent them,” Kallas warned. The meeting also focused on the EU-Central Asia roadmap adopted in Luxembourg in October 2023. Discussions centered on deepening trade, economic, and transport ties, along with expanding digital connectivity as part of the EU's Global Gateway initiative. Kallas also met with Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, praising Turkmenistan’s development and expressing appreciation for bilateral cooperation. Her remarks drew criticism from some observers. Belarusian political analyst Dzmitry Balkunets criticized Kallas on social media, accusing the EU of compromising its values by praising authoritarian regimes. Uzbekistan Visit In Tashkent, Kallas met with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Discussions highlighted the upcoming Samarkand summit and stressed the importance of deepening EU-Uzbek cooperation in trade, logistics, digitalization, green energy, and infrastructure. Both sides also explored steps toward a new enhanced partnership agreement and Uzbekistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Visit to Kazakhstan Kallas concluded her tour in Astana, where she met with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on March 28. A statement from Tokayev’s office underlined Kazakhstan’s cautious diplomatic approach to global tensions. "President Tokayev emphasized the importance of restraint and responsibility in evaluating complex global developments. Kazakhstan remains committed to resolving international conflicts through diplomacy," the statement read. Analysts suggest Kallas may have encouraged Tokayev to distance Astana from both Moscow and Washington, as Brussels often diverges from Washington on issues like the war in Ukraine. However, Tokayev reiterated Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, which avoids aligning with any single global power. In a notable development, Tokayev met with Uzbek President Mirziyoyev last weekend in Almaty. Though unannounced, the working visit suggests that the two leaders were coordinating positions ahead of the Samarkand summit. Whether their joint stance aligns with Brussels' expectations remains to be seen.
Opinion: In Central Asia, the EU Defies Its “Geopolitical Dwarf” Label
As the United States and Russia reportedly aim to create a new global security architecture, other major actors in the international arena are working to improve their positions in the redefined world order. Often underestimated in terms of its geopolitical influence, the European Union has actively focused its attention on the post-Soviet space, particularly the strategically important Central Asian region. The EU, despite Russia’s and the United States' attempts to undermine its role in the settlement of the Ukraine War and to portray it as a “geopolitical dwarf”, is seeking to increase its presence in global affairs. In Central Asia, the 27-nation bloc is often viewed as a key actor that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan can rely on to balance China’s growing dominance, as well as their security and dependence on Moscow. The EU's desire to strengthen cooperation with Central Asia can be seen as Brussels’ attempt to reduce Russia's influence in the region. Indeed, bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow is slowly but surely being pushed out of Central Asia – a region that has traditionally been within the Kremlin’s geopolitical orbit. As a result, China has managed to significantly increase its economic presence in all five Central Asian nations. The EU is now attempting to do the same. The recent visit of the European Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela to Central Asia, as well as the upcoming EU-Central Asia summit scheduled for April 3-4, 2025 in Samarkand, clearly indicates the intensifying geopolitical competition between the EU and China over the region. One of Síkela’s major goals was to expand the scope of the EU's investment strategy, Global Gateway, in Central Asia. The project, launched in 2021, is often viewed as the EU’s version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As part of its strategy to increase its economic presence in Central Asia, the European Union seems to have four priorities: the development of transport infrastructure (particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor), cooperation in raw materials, digital connectivity, and the development of the water resources, energy, and climate sectors. The problem for Brussels is that China, due to its proximity to Central Asia and the lack of bureaucratic procedures, is ahead of the EU in most, if not all of these areas. Beijing has had 12 years to strengthen economic ties with the region through the BRI. As a result, in 2024, China’s overall turnover with Central Asia reached $94.8 billion, nearly double the EU's trade volume with the region in 2022, which stood at $47 billion. Last year, the world’s second-largest economy replaced Russia as Kazakhstan's biggest trade partner. In neighboring Uzbekistan, it remains the top trading partner, while in Tajikistan, over the past 18 years, China has become the major investor in the landlocked nation’s economy. The same applies to Tajikistan and China’s neighbor Kyrgyzstan. The European Union, however, is now intensifying its efforts to position itself as a major foreign power operating in Central Asia. According to the EU Delegation to Uzbekistan, the upcoming summit in Samarkand will present a “key opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its geopolitical interest in intensifying bilateral engagement and enhance regional cooperation with Central Asia.” For Brussels, critical minerals, along with natural gas and oil, play perhaps the most important role in its Central Asia strategy. The 27-nation bloc has already signed memoranda of understanding with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on raw materials, while it is also eyeing establishing closer energy ties with gas-rich Turkmenistan. The EU is aiming to help Ashgabat integrate into regional and global trade networks and to take part in the modernization of the nation’s infrastructure. Such an approach aligns perfectly with the EU’s 2019 New Strategy for Central Asia, which emphasizes the growing strategic importance of the region for the interests of the European Union. In other words, the EU’s goals in Central Asia are not much different from U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambitions of gaining access to Ukraine’s natural resources. Unlike the American leader, however, the European Union is not in a position to issue ultimatums. Fully aware of that, the EU is seeking to increase its soft power in the region. Its plans to improve internet connections in remote rural areas in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan perfectly illustrate Brussels’ strategy to strengthen influence in the region by winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Moreover, given the fundamental transformation of USAID and the Trump administration's reluctance to allocate billions of dollars for grant projects, the EU has the opportunity to seize the initiative and expand its presence in Central Asia by funding local non-governmental organizations and media. Euronews’ ambitions to develop media cooperation with Turkmenistan could be interpreted as one of the first steps in that direction. Central Asian nations, on the other hand, see the EU as a counterbalance to the growing Chinese economic dominance in the region. For them, cooperation with the 27-nation bloc could be a chance to diversify their foreign trade and attract additional investments for the development of infrastructure and other key sectors of their economies. Although policymakers in Beijing are undoubtedly aware that the EU, in the long-term, could become China’s major competitor in Central Asia, the People’s Republic does not seem to oppose Brussels’ plans to develop the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. The route – beginning in China and running through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and on into Europe – effectively bypasses Russia, and reduces delivery times between Europe and China to 15 days. From a purely economic perspective, the Middle Corridor benefits China’s cooperation with Europe. More importantly, Ukrainian officials claim that some goods from China will be transported to Europe through Ukraine via the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, suggesting that Russia may eventually stop playing the role of a transit country. As a result, the Kremlin may have a hard time preserving remnants of its influence in Central Asia, where the EU and China could soon start a geopolitical battle for dominance.
Celebrating Nauryz: A Timeless Tradition of Unity, Renewal, and Heritage in Central Asia
Nauryz is more than just a holiday - it is a symbol of spring renewal, harmony, and unity that has been celebrated by the peoples of Central Asia for centuries. Marking the arrival of the spring equinox, Turkic communities welcome the New Year with purification rituals, festive gatherings, and traditional games. While the holiday shares common roots across the region, each country celebrates it uniquely, reflecting its distinct cultural heritage.
Nauryz has survived through the centuries, and despite the evolution of the celebration in the modern era, it continues to unite people through traditions.
Kazakhstan
In Kazakhstan, Nauryz is celebrated on a large scale, transforming cities and villages into festival grounds filled with folk rituals, sporting events, and cultural performances. The holiday begins with blessings from elders and family visits. At the heart of the festive table is Nauryz-kozhe, a traditional soup made from seven ingredients, each symbolizing key values in life.
“Nauryz without Nauryz-kozhe is not Nauryz," Daniyar, 29, from Almaty, told The Times of Central Asia. "When I was a child, my grandmother told me that eating it would bring luck for the year. That’s why the whole family gathers around the table.”
Beyond feasting, Nauryz is a time for competitions. Among the most popular are kokpar, an equestrian contest where riders traditionally competed for a goat carcass - now often replaced with a dummy version (serke), asyk atu, a traditional game of precision using sheep bones, and kazaksha kures, a national wrestling competition.
“As a child, I always looked forward to this day because it was when I could see adults displaying strength and skill," Sanzhar, 25, from Taraz, told TCA. "These traditions are passed down through generations and strengthen our culture.”
Ancient customs also come to life during the festival. People wear traditional Kazakh attire, exchange gifts, and partake in purification rituals.
“When I put on a [traditional] Kazakh costume, I feel a deep connection with my ancestors. There’s something magical about this holiday - the aroma of freshly cooked kozhe, the sound of the dombra, the folk dances, and the spirit of unity. It’s a day to remember who we are and take pride in our culture,” said Aizhan, 40, from Astana.
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Nauryz celebration in Almaty; image: TCA[/caption]
Kyrgyzstan
In Kyrgyzstan, Nauryz represents renewal and rebirth. The celebrations begin with a cleansing ritual, where people clean their homes, courtyards, and even their minds, symbolizing a fresh start. Hospitality plays a central role, as it is customary to host and visit seven guests, symbolizing openness and strong social bonds.
Like in Kazakhstan, Nauryz-kozhe is a staple of the festive table. However, Kyrgyz cuisine also features kuurdak, fried meat with potatoes and onions, and osh - also known as plov or palov - emphasizing the tradition of generous feasting.
The holiday is further enriched by national sporting competitions, including horse races, wrestling (kuresh), ordo, a traditional strategy game, and arkan tartysh, a tug-of-war contest.
“For us, Nauryz is more than just a holiday. It’s a time to come together, reconnect with traditions, and welcome the fresh energy of spring,” Asyl, 28, from Bishkek, told TCA.
Uzbekistan
In Uzbekistan, Nauryz carries a deep historical significance. The festival begins with a purification ritual, followed by family gatherings around a festive table. The centerpiece of the Uzbek Nauryz feast is sumalyak, a dish made from sprouted wheat, symbolizing fertility and prosperity. Its preparation is a social event in itself, accompanied by singing and well-wishing.
Other traditional dishes include pilaf, manty (steamed dumplings), naryn (a cold noodle dish), and flatbreads (non). The holiday is marked by folk performances, concerts, and sporting competitions. Among them, Kurash, Uzbekistan’s national form of wrestling, remains a crowd favorite.
“In our family, Nauryz is a special occasion," Dildora, 32, from Tashkent, told TCA. "We not only bring our relatives together but also pass down our traditions and values to the younger generation. While modern celebrations now include large concerts and street performances in Tashkent, we remain committed to our traditions.”
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Traditional treats for Nauryz; image: TCA[/caption]
Tajikistan
In Tajikistan, Nauryz is a time for renewing family ties, strengthening friendships, and seeking forgiveness. People visit relatives and friends, exchange gifts, and offer sincere well-wishes, embracing the spirit of unity.
As in other Central Asian nations, the Tajik festive table is central to the celebration, with the most important dish being plov. The communal meal brings families together to share not only their food but also joy.
Music is an integral part of Tajik Nauryz traditions. Folk instruments such as the dutar, tanbur, dumbrak, and Kashgar rubab fill the air with festive melodies, while traditional dances serve as a joyful expression of the holiday.
Turkmenistan
Nauryz in Turkmenistan is a vibrant celebration that symbolizes renewal, unity, and the return of warmth following the harsh winter. Deeply rooted in Turkmen heritage, the holiday is celebrated with family gatherings, traditional music, dances, and festive meals. A highlight of the celebration is the preparation of semeni, a dish made from sprouted wheat, symbolizing abundance and prosperity. Communities engage in cultural performances and sports, reaffirming their sense of national pride and cultural identity.
Despite globalization and modernization, Nauryz continues to unite the peoples of Central Asia. It is not just a holiday, but a living tradition, a time for family, gratitude, and cultural pride. Whether through age-old customs, festive meals, or exhilarating competitions, Nauryz remains a powerful symbol of renewal and shared heritage across the region.
Turkmenistan Government Monitoring Former Law Enforcers and Imposing Travel Restrictions
Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Justice has launched an initiative to collect data on former Interior Ministry officials to track those who have left the country. This move is the latest in a series of efforts by the government to monitor and restrict its citizens’ ability to travel abroad. Tracking Former Law Enforcement Officers Since February 2025, the Ministry of Justice has been compiling information on former law enforcement officers who held ranks of major or higher and served between 1991 and 2024. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of National Security (MNS), the Migration Service, and the Prosecutor’s Office have been instructed to assist in the campaign, which is expected to conclude by the end of April. The main objective is to identify retired officers who have relocated abroad. Several theories have emerged regarding the authorities' motives. One explanation is that routine inspections revealed cases of former officers settling in other countries after retirement. Another theory links the initiative to the recent controversy surrounding Rustam Inoyatov, the former head of Uzbekistan’s National Security Service, who, along with his family, acquired Vanuatu citizenship through a “golden passport” program. Turkmen security services suspect that similar schemes may have been used by their own former colleagues. Particular scrutiny is being placed on those who had professional ties with Inoyatov during his tenure. Law enforcement veterans are now required to submit reports detailing their current residence and occupation. In cases where an ex-officer has passed away, their relatives must provide official documentation, including death certificates and burial site information. New Restrictions on Travel Abroad Retired law enforcement officers have been informed that they may only leave the country for medical reasons and must obtain official authorization from the Ministry of Health. This is not the first instance of the government tightening travel restrictions. In September 2024, reports surfaced that public sector employees were being compelled to surrender their biometric passports or provide proof that they did not possess one. While officials have not commented on these measures, observers believe they are linked to the increasing number of citizens emigrating in search of work or permanent residency. Additionally, recent reports indicate that some Turkmen nationals have participated in Russia’s war against Ukraine, with some receiving Russian citizenship in return for their military service. Confiscation of Student Passports Travel restrictions have also been extended to students. In the fall of 2024, media reports revealed that students enrolling in Turkmen universities were required to surrender their passports to prevent them from traveling abroad. Students who refuse to comply and sign a receipt acknowledging the surrender of their passports face the risk of being denied admission. According to sources, this policy has been in place for two years, with passports held by faculty deans for the duration of students’ studies. Although officials have not provided explanations for these measures, university professors suggest that they aim to curb mass youth migration. Previously, students were only required to sign receipts, but authorities have now escalated their efforts by confiscating passports entirely.
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