Between Statistics and Reality: What the UNICEF Report Reveals About Children in Turkmenistan
The State Committee on Statistics of Turkmenistan, in partnership with UNICEF, has released the report “Census 2022 - The Situation of Children in Turkmenistan”. However, as noted by independent outlet turkmen.news, the report is based on official census data that many experts consider unreliable or inflated, potentially skewing the findings. Despite these concerns, the report offers insight into the country’s demographic and social trends. According to the report, Turkmenistan has a notably “young” population: children aged 0-14 make up 30.7% of the total. In total, 2,463,258 individuals under the age of 17 account for more than one-third of the population. However, a decline in the birth rate is evident: there are 1.2 times fewer children in the 0-4 age group compared to those aged 5-9. Household composition data reveals that families with three or more children are the most common, comprising 43% of all households nationally and 48.9% in rural areas. Families with two children account for 31.1%, and those with one child, 25.9%. This distribution correlates with a broader demographic pattern, 57.8% of all children in Turkmenistan live in rural areas. The demographic dependency ratio remains high: there are 755 dependents per 1,000 working-age individuals. Notably, the child dependency rate is 4.3 times higher than that of the elderly, suggesting a sizable future labor force. The urban-rural divide is also apparent here: in rural areas, the child dependency ratio is 698, compared to 525 in urban centers. The report addresses early marriage and childbirth: among 15-17-year-olds, 1,349 boys (0.9%) and 1,770 girls (1.2%) were in either registered or de facto marriages. Within the same age group, 339 girls had already given birth. The highest rate of teenage births was recorded in Akhal region (4.2 per 1,000), while Ashgabat reported the lowest (1.2 per 1,000). Childhood disability statistics show mobility and stair-climbing difficulties are the most prevalent, affecting 3,106 children aged 5-17. Other reported issues include concentration and memory problems (1,989 cases), hearing impairments (1,791), and visual impairments (1,784). In all categories, boys outnumber girls. One of the most striking disparities is in preschool access. Only 23.8% of children in rural areas attend preschool, compared to 64.7% in urban areas, a rural-urban equity index of just 0.37. Given that the majority of children live in rural areas, the gap reflects systemic challenges, including insufficient infrastructure, transportation issues, and household dynamics where caregiving typically falls to women. Enrollment rates improve significantly for older children. Nearly all children aged 6-15 are in school, with only 0.3-0.4% not attending. However, the dropout rate increases in older age groups, with 5.4% of adolescents not enrolled in school or vocational institutions. No significant gender disparities were observed in this regard. Despite the insights the report offers, it is underpinned by 2022 census data that many independent experts argue is inflated. While Turkmenistan's official population stands at around 7 million, alternative estimates range between 2.7 and 5.7 million. Nevertheless, the release of this report marks a step toward a more open dialogue about the country’s social policies. Regardless of potential inaccuracies, the youthful demographic profile suggests significant developmental potential and a growing obligation for the state to prioritize education and family support systems.
Central Asia Launches Regional Electricity Market with World Bank Support
On January 22, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved the 10-year Regional Electricity Market Interconnectivity and Trade (REMIT) Program, an ambitious initiative to establish Central Asia’s first regional electricity market. The program aims to boost cross-border electricity trade, expand transmission capacity, and lay the foundation for large-scale renewable energy integration across the region. Electricity demand in Central Asia is projected to triple by 2050 under a business-as-usual scenario. Yet electricity trade in the region currently accounts for only 3% of total demand. The REMIT Program seeks to harness Central Asia’s diverse and complementary energy resources: hydropower in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, thermal power from coal and natural gas in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the region’s rapidly expanding solar and wind potential. Over the next decade, REMIT aims to:
- Increase regional electricity trade to at least 15,000 GWh annually, enough to supply millions of consumers
- Triple regional transmission capacity to 16 GW
- Enable up to 9 GW of clean energy integration
Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode This Sunday with Eduards Stiprais, EU Special Representative for Central Asia
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team is joined by the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Eduards Stiprais, to discuss connectivity, critical minerals, and what's unique about the EU's engagement with Central Asia.
Finland’s President Stubb Warns Russia’s Imperial Thinking Poses Risks for Central Asia
Russia’s imperial worldview may pose a greater long-term risk to Central Asia and the South Caucasus than to NATO member states, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said in an interview with The Washington Post, highlighting concerns that continue to resonate across the post-Soviet space. Speaking with columnist David Ignatius, Stubb referenced Finland’s long and complex history with its eastern neighbor, noting that expansionist thinking remains deeply rooted in Russian political culture. “I think the DNA of Russia is still expansion and imperialism,” he said, arguing that President Vladimir Putin views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a historical injustice. While much of the Western debate centers on potential threats to NATO countries such as the Baltic states, Finland, or Poland, Stubb suggested that more vulnerable regions lie elsewhere. “I think the more worrying aspect for others is the Central Asian countries, the Southern Caucasus and others,” he said, pointing to what he described as a top-down political system driven by the ideology of Russkiy mir, or the “Russian world.” Stubb also spoke about his personal interactions with Russian officials, including Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, stressing that meaningful political dialogue remains unlikely while the war in Ukraine continues. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Russian television host Vladimir Solovyov sparked backlash after suggesting that Moscow could conduct “special military operations” in Central Asia and Armenia. The remarks were widely condemned by Uzbek scholars, journalists, and analysts as destabilizing and provocative. More recently, Russian ultranationalist Alexander Dugin, often described as an ideologue of the “Russian world”, publicly questioned the sovereignty of several former Soviet republics, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. A video of his comments circulated widely online, drawing sharp criticism across the region. Russia’s Foreign Ministry later sought to distance the Kremlin from such statements. Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Solovyov’s remarks did not reflect official policy and reaffirmed that Moscow’s relationships with Central Asian countries are based on partnership and respect for sovereignty.
Disability Inclusion Is Emerging as Central Asia’s Next Social Frontier
More than 1.3 billion people worldwide live with some form of disability, yet disability remains one of the least visible dimensions of social and economic life. In Central Asia, that invisibility is especially pronounced. As governments focus on infrastructure, growth, and modernization, far less attention is paid to whether people with disabilities are becoming more present in schools, workplaces, and public life, or whether they remain largely confined to families and institutions beyond the reach of public discussion. Across the region, cities are expanding, labor mobility is increasing, and younger generations are more connected to global ideas through study and migration. These shifts are often treated as shorthand for progress. At the same time, people with disabilities consistently face lower educational attainment and weaker labor market outcomes, making inclusion a practical test of whether development reaches beyond headline indicators into everyday life. Disability policy across much of Central Asia has long centered on legal classification, benefit eligibility, and institutional care. Long-term institutionalization is associated with reduced autonomy and poorer social outcomes, yet institutions remain a common default, reinforcing the idea that disability is primarily an administrative or medical issue rather than a social one shaped by access and expectations. In practice, families remain the primary providers of care throughout the region. In Kyrgyzstan, around 200,000 people are officially registered as living with disabilities, and outside major cities, most daily support is provided by family members due to limited community-based services. In Turkmenistan, public disability data remain sparse, and undercounting is widely acknowledged, leaving extended families as the central source of long-term care. In Tajikistan, official estimates place the number of people living with disabilities between 150,000 and 200,000, with caregiving overwhelmingly home-based due to constrained public resources. Family-based care provides continuity and belonging, but it also carries an economic cost. Caregivers are more likely to reduce paid employment and experience long-term income loss, a burden that falls disproportionately on women and shapes household economic outcomes. This reliance on family support is often contrasted unfavorably with wealthier countries, but the comparison is more complicated. In the United States, more than one in four adults lives with a disability, and people with disabilities report significantly higher rates of loneliness and depression despite extensive legal protections and formal services. By contrast, strong family networks are associated with lower levels of severe social isolation, even in settings with fewer public resources. In recent years, small but notable shifts have begun to appear. Local organizations across the region are experimenting with community-based rehabilitation, inclusive education, and supported employment models that move beyond institutional care. These efforts remain fragmented and under-resourced, but they reflect a growing recognition that disability policy is about protection and participation. As Central Asian governments seek to retain talent, expand their labor force, and project social modernization, inclusion is increasingly intersecting with economic and demographic realities rather than remaining a niche social issue. Institutional care remains common across Central Asia, yet community-based rehabilitation is consistently linked to better social participation and quality of life. Families are increasingly questioning whether institutions should be the default response when local support could preserve relationships and autonomy. Disability inclusion will not define Central Asia’s future on its own. It does, however, offer a clear measure of whether modernization is reflected not only in infrastructure and growth, but in who is visible, connected, and able to participate in everyday life.
Central Asia Trade with China Tops Record $100 Billion in 2025
Trade between China and Central Asia increased to a record of more than $100 billion in 2025, despite challenges to global economic growth, the Chinese government said on Monday. Citing data from China’s General Administration of Customs, Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said the trade structure with the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had improved and that more high-end products were entering the Chinese market from the region. “As global economic growth remains sluggish and the international trading system faces serious challenges, the economic and trade cooperation between China and Central Asian countries has withstood external headwinds, and the trade volume surpassed US$100 billion,” Guo said. He attributed the increasing cooperation in part to a China-Central Asia summit in Astana, Kazakhstan last year that was attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping and the five Central Asian leaders. China’s Belt and Road initiatives, which include the development of trade routes that pass through Central Asia and link up with Europe, are also making progress, according to the Chinese official. Total trade between China and Central Asia was $106.3 billion in 2025, an increase of 12 percent over the previous year, China’s state-run Xinhua news agency reported. Chinese exports such as machinery, electronics and high-tech goods were $71.2 billion, an increase of 11 percent over the previous year. Imports from Central Asia amounted to $35.1 billion, a rise of 14 percent from 2024. China is involved in major projects in Central Asia, including the extraction of minerals used for “clean” technology, equipment manufacturing and the modernization of agriculture. China imports oil and natural gas as well as a growing number of other products from the region. Russia was once the main trading partner of Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union, but China has the lead position now. The United States is also seeking to develop more trade with resource-rich Central Asia, which is diversifying its international partnerships.
“We Can’t Help You”: How Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Justice Handles Citizens’ Complaints
A recent public reception at Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Justice has highlighted the formal and often unproductive nature of interactions between citizens and state institutions in the country. On January 10 the ministry held a legal consultation session, officially scheduled to run from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. In practice, however, visitors were not admitted until 10:00 a.m. According to Chronicles of Turkmenistan, more than 50 citizens attended the reception, many of whom had previously appealed to state agencies multiple times. They arrived with letters, formal statements, and supporting documentation in hand. Entry was granted in groups of three. The commission included representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Supreme Court, and the Bar Association. Each individual was given no more than five minutes. Despite the format suggesting legal support, the outcome for most attendees was discouragingly uniform. After speaking with 38 participants, journalists reported that all had received the same response: “We can’t help you.” Several attendees stated that officials did not even review the documents submitted with their complaints. As a result, nearly all who came seeking redress left empty-handed. Many expressed hopelessness, stating that they had no viable path to resolve their issues, and that government institutions had effectively denied them access to justice. The Times of Central Asia previously reported on the broader challenges faced by Turkmen citizens in navigating bureaucratic procedures and, in particular, how elderly residents endured long waits at social security offices. Although the process appears straightforward on paper, in practice it becomes a burdensome ordeal, especially given the government’s continued refusal to index pensions and social benefits. Missing a single appointment can result in suspended payments, with delays of up to six months before back payments are processed.
From Tehran to Tashkent: How Iran’s Crisis and U.S. Tariffs Reverberate Across Central Asia
At the end of 2025, Iran once again emerged as a flashpoint on the global political map. Mass protests erupted across the country, fueled by spiraling inflation and economic hardship. At present, the Iranian rial has plummeted to the point where it is effectively worth less than the paper it's printed on. The current wave of unrest, already the largest and deadliest nationwide unrest Iran has seen since 2022, is not occurring in isolation. U.S. President Donald Trump has renewed what his administration describes as a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, and his administration is now pursuing what observers have characterized as a strategy of “pushing the falling,” a move aimed at reshaping the political order of the Middle East. What might this mean for neighboring Central Asia? Tajik political analyst Muhammad Shamsuddinov argues the crisis must be viewed within a broader geopolitical context. “The situation in Iran is directly tied to Trump’s second-term pressure campaign,” Shamsuddinov said, referencing a string of destabilizing events. “These include the 12-day U.S.-Israel war against Iran and the reimposition of U.N. sanctions in September 2025," he added, referring to the 12-day June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran, during which U.S. forces also struck Iranian nuclear facilities. "All of these have deepened the domestic crisis in Iran.” In a further escalation, on January 12, Trump announced 25% tariffs on countries conducting trade with Iran. The move appears targeted primarily at Russia, China, and India - Iran’s largest international partners, but also has implications for Central Asian economies. In the first nine months of 2025, trade between Kazakhstan and Iran grew by nearly 45%, reaching $310.8 million. Tajikistan, which maintains the closest economic ties to Tehran among Central Asian states, reported trade worth $430.7 million in the first eleven months of 2025, an increase of 28% over the same period in 2024. Uzbekistan, while less directly exposed to Iran than Kazakhstan or Tajikistan, has also moved cautiously in recent years to expand trade links with Tehran, making it sensitive to further sanctions pressure. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, faces its own exposure through gas swap arrangements involving Iran, which could become collateral damage of escalating regional tensions. Iranian investments in Tajikistan are also substantial. Among the most prominent projects is the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric power plant, estimated at $256 million. The Iranian government contributed approximately $180 million, with an additional $36 million from an Iranian contractor. The remainder was financed by Tajikistan. According to official data, roughly 160 companies with Iranian capital are currently operating in Tajikistan across multiple sectors. In Kazakhstan, around 650 Iranian companies are registered, with over 350 operational, primarily in manufacturing, infrastructure, and agriculture. By contrast, trade between Iran and Russia, a strategic partner since the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement in January 2025, increased by only 8% in the first nine months of 2025, according to official figures. Despite modest growth, Russian analysts view the figures optimistically. “Growth is happening under challenging geopolitical conditions, with sanctions, logistical restructuring, and financial hurdles,” said Farhad Ibragimov, a political analyst at the Faculty of Economics of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. “The North-South transport corridor linking Russia, Iran, and India offers a strategic advantage by reducing shipping costs and transit times compared to the Suez Canal.” Inside Iran, the government has reportedly shut down internet access nationwide, aiming to prevent coordination among protest groups. Whether this move will succeed in quelling the unrest remains uncertain. Georgian Middle East analyst Vasiko Papava believes the standoff has reached a critical impasse. “There is no clear path to victory for either side. Both the regime and the protest movement possess significant resources, but each also faces existential threats,” he said. “In this case, ‘victory’ means the ability to define the country’s future narrative, not necessarily defeating the opponent outright,” Papava added. He forecasts a painful and protracted transformation: “The regime could morph into a military dictatorship cloaked in Islamic rhetoric, led by IRGC-linked technocrats. Conversely, a popular movement might erode the regime’s legitimacy over time through sustained civil disobedience.” Beyond immediate economic and security concerns, Iran’s turmoil is also being interpreted in Central Asia through a broader lens of alliance fatigue and declining great-power credibility. For ordinary citizens, Iran’s crisis, following Venezuela’s turmoil after the U.S. armed intervention and capture of its president, signals something more personal: a visible decline in Moscow’s regional influence. As Russia loses key allies, countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are witnessing a rise in anti-Russian sentiment, adding volatility to domestic politics. Notably, Russia’s own state media has contributed to these sentiments. Their increasingly belligerent rhetoric has drawn more public attention in Central Asia than the unfolding events in Iran itself, underscoring the region’s growing unease with the Kremlin’s messaging and its geopolitical consequences.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
