Essential but Unwelcome: Central Asian Migrants in Russia
The Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow on March 22, 2024 triggered strong anti-migrant sentiment in Russian society. Since then, the nation’s authorities have been imposing stricter migration rules. But how does this impact millions of Central Asian labor migrants and their families living and working in Russia? Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia became a major destination for migrant workers from Central Asia. According to the official Russian statistics, there are currently almost four million citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan living in Russia, along with approximately 670,000 illegal migrants. Rosstat (the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation) reports that 260,400 migrants arrived in Russia from January to July this year, with 60% (about 156,200) coming from Central Asian countries. The majority of them are citizens of Tajikistan. In 2023, over one million Tajiks have moved to Russia in search of work. With a large community of its citizens in Russia, the Tajik government seems to be working to not only improve their legal status in the Russian Federation, but also to coordinate some of their actions, particularly in the field of culture. On April 9, in Dushanbe, a meeting took place between Tajikistan’s Minister of Labor, Migration, and Employment of the Population, Solekhi Kholmakhmadzoda, and leaders and activists of the Tajik diaspora living in Russia. Tajikistan initiated the summit after Russia began testing migrant children on their knowledge of the Russian language before admitting them to school. Starting April 1, a law came into effect that prevents Russian schools from enrolling migrant children who do not speak Russian or are in Russia illegally. This measure is just the tip of the iceberg in the Kremlin’s plans to regulate the migrant issue in the country. Alexey Nechaev, the leader of the New People party – one of the handful of the so-called systemic opposition parties in Russia – said on March 19 that “artificial intelligence should be made a new tool for monitoring migrants… It is unfair that Russian citizens are digitized from head to toe, while migrants continue to live with paper documents without any problems,” Nechaev stressed, pointing out that monitoring migrants’ activities through AI could “help keep a closer eye on what foreigners are doing and make it easier to track illegal money flows.” Last year, the Liberal Democratic Party – another ‘systemic opposition’ group – proposed restricting the rights of migrant workers to bring their families into Russia. This initiative raised concerns in neighboring Kazakhstan. The ambassador of the largest Central Asian nation expressed unease to Moscow about such ambitions, referring to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the foundation of which, as he highlighted, is based on ensuring the four freedoms – the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. Russian reports, however, claim that, as a result of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s membership in the EAEU, their citizens living in Russia have a much better status than those from other Central Asian states. Despite that, on April 14, Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry summoned Russia’s ambassador to demand answers over reports that Moscow police used violence against Kyrgyz nationals during a raid on a bathhouse. Such a move represents a humiliation for the Kremlin, considering Kyrgyzstan’s heavily dependence on Russia, especially in terms of remittances from Kyrgyz labor migrants living in the Russian Federation. But given the ongoing war in Ukraine and Russia’s isolation from the West, Moscow is not in a position to jeopardize its relations with Bishkek over the migrant issue. That, however, does not mean Russia will stop quietly passing laws that could, at least to a certain extent, change the status of Kyrgyz, and other Central Asian migrants in the Russian Federation. According to State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, the Russian Parliament has initiated and passed 15 laws related to combating illegal migration since 2024. In his view, “It is important that these laws are now effectively enforced.” Nevertheless, the Kremlin must strike a delicate balance between the growing anti-migrant sentiment in the country and its ambitions to preserve the remnants of its influence in Central Asia. That is why, despite 66% of Russians supporting a ban on wearing niqabs in public places – a measure already implemented in most Central Asian countries – Moscow has remained silent on the issue. Moreover, the Kremlin is under pressure to stop, or at least significantly reduce, the influx of Central Asian migrants. To strike a balance, the authorities in Russia’s Tatarstan region – the fourth most popular destination for labor workers from Central Asia – reportedly aim to attract young female workers from Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Research Associate at Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Yulia Florinskaya, however, has claimed that in the coming years the number of foreign workers in Russia will remain the same, with the majority still being citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Currently, she argues, no other country can compete with them in terms of the number of labor migrants coming to Russia. Moscow needs migrants to help address the labor shortage, as Russia lacked around 4.8 million workers in 2023. Still, according to a Human Rights Watch report, Central Asian labor migrants in Russia experience “increased xenophobic harassment and violence,” with the Russian Defense Ministry continuing to forcibly recruit them to fight in Ukraine. It is, therefore, no surprise that the number of migrants in Russia declined by 18% in 2024 as compared to 2023. Migration – be it from Central Asia or other parts of the world – remains both a necessity and a challenge for Russia. As pressure mounts from within, in the coming months and years the Kremlin will have a hard time navigating a complex balancing act between anti-migrant sentiment at home, the country’s economic needs, and its geopolitical interests in Central Asia.
U.S. Commission Again Cites Turkmenistan for Religious Freedom Violations
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has once again designated Turkmenistan as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC), citing ongoing and systematic violations of religious freedom in its 2024 annual report. Persistent State Control and Persecution The USCIRF report emphasizes that religious freedoms in Turkmenistan remain severely restricted, with the state maintaining tight control over religious life and prosecuting individuals whose beliefs deviate from officially sanctioned interpretations. Notably, the commission highlighted the imprisonment of ten Muslims for participating in peaceful religious activities, a case that underscores the regime's repressive stance toward nonconforming Islamic practices. Turkmenistan’s legal framework continues to draw criticism. The 2016 Religion Law prohibits unregistered religious groups and heavily restricts the distribution of religious literature, instruction, and rituals. The 2015 Law on Combating Extremism also remains a concern, as its vague provisions allow for the prosecution of peaceful religious activity. Harassment of Religious Minorities The report also documents the continued harassment of Protestant Christians and Jehovah’s Witnesses. In one case, a mosque official in Lebap province reportedly threatened to "shut down" a pastor of an unregistered Protestant church, prompting a visit from the Ministry of National Security. The pastor’s relatives later received anonymous threats. In January, law enforcement officers raided a Jehovah’s Witnesses' home in the village of Sakara, detaining five individuals who were subjected to eight hours of interrogation. Restrictions on Religious Travel The Turkmen authorities also restrict international travel on religious grounds. In January 2024, Pygamberdy Allaberdyev, a lawyer and activist from Balkanabat, was barred from traveling to Iran to attend a relative’s funeral. According to USCIRF, he was informed by Department of Homeland Security officials that he was under surveillance and would be prohibited from leaving the country for five years. Religion and the Cult of Personality The commission's report also criticizes the use of religion to reinforce the cult of personality surrounding former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Although he currently serves as chairman of the Khalk Maslahaty, his influence remains widespread. Officials in Balkanabat and Turkmenbashi reportedly interfered with wedding ceremonies, mandating the exclusive use of Turkmen music, including songs from the former president’s personal repertoire. Authorities have also targeted religious expression among civil servants. Men have been forced to shave their beards, and women have been ordered to remove their hijabs. Ahead of the Berdimuhamedov family’s vacation in Avaza, police carried out raids targeting religious symbols. In October, women in Ashgabat wearing hijabs were reportedly detained, had their belongings confiscated, and were banned from traveling abroad. They were also lectured about the secular nature of the state. Policy Recommendations In its conclusions, USCIRF recommends targeted sanctions against officials and agencies responsible for egregious violations of religious freedom, including asset freezes and visa bans. The commission also urged the U.S. Congress to take a more active role in addressing these issues through hearings and delegations to the region. Turkmenistan has consistently appeared on USCIRF’s CPC list since 2000, reflecting its entrenched policies of religious control, suppression of non-state-approved faiths, and ongoing violations against believers. The 2024 report reaffirms the country’s status as one of the world’s most restrictive environments for religious freedom.
Central Asia Creates a Rift in the Turkic World Over Cyprus
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the five Central Asian republics have been performing a very complex balancing act. In some cases, this dynamic has forced them to make difficult decisions from a geopolitical point of view. This is the case with what has happened in recent weeks regarding diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, a member of the European Union since 2004. Between December 2024 and the end of March 2025, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have each appointed diplomatic representatives in the Republic of Cyprus. Kazakhstan has decided to open its own embassy in Cyprus directly, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have accredited their respective ambassadors in Italy as diplomatic representatives for the Eastern Mediterranean Island also. Looking at the calendar, it doesn't seem to be a coincidence that these decisions were taken in the weeks leading up to the first historic summit between the European Union and Central Asia at the level of heads of state and government. The fourth point of the official joint declaration issued at the end of the meeting clarifies the matter: the text clearly states the support of the parties involved - the European Union and Central Asia - for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). These two resolutions make it clear that the only recognized authority on the island is that of the Republic of Cyprus. In recent years, there has been no shortage of explicit references to the Cyprus issue in relations between the European Union and Central Asia. This was the case, for example, in September 2023: during a conference in Brussels, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were warned against officially accepting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TNRT) as an observer member of the Ankara-led Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Dietmar Krissler, head of the European External Action Service's Central Asia desk, spoke of the possible “negative effects” for the Central Asian members if they were to ratify TRNT's access to the Organization as an observer. Returning to the summit held in Samarkand at the beginning of April, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced during the discussions that €12 billion would be invested in Central Asia in various sectors. By also using the prospect of these investments, the European Union's diplomatic pressure on the Central Asian republics over Cyprus has been successful. As BBC Türkçe reports, this is not just a formal declaration of intent: in the official joint statement, future cooperation is in fact closely linked to compliance with the principles contained in the two UN resolutions, a very clear position. From Turkey's point of view, however, the picture is quite different. Turkey is the only country in the world to officially recognize the TRNC, which became a self-proclaimed independent entity in 1984 after Turkey invaded part of the island in 1974. Over the years, Ankara’s pressure has succeeded in preventing relations between the Central Asian republics and the Republic of Cyprus from going as far as the appointment of official diplomatic representatives. But now the situation has changed. The move by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan is particularly significant from another point of view: The three countries, with Turkmenistan only as an observer, are part of the abovementioned Organization of Turkic States, of which the TRNC has also been an observer since 2022. From the Turkish perspective, therefore, the position adopted by Astana, Tashkent, and Ashgabat can be interpreted as a betrayal of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's efforts on the pan-Turkic front, one of his key foreign policy doctrines. At the latest meeting in November last year, the Turkish President called on the Organization's member states to give more support to the TRNC. The occasion was the summit in Kyrgyzstan, which was also attended by the president of the self-proclaimed entity, Ersin Tatar. This year, the summit of the OTS will be held in Azerbaijan, and it will be interesting to see how the issue of the appointment of Ambassadors from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the Republic of Cyprus will be handled. So far, the Turkish authorities have made no official statement on the move by the three Central Asian republics. Although the OTS has made progress in terms of economic integration among its members through initiatives such as the launch of the Turkic Investment Fund, repercussions cannot be ruled out. During an interview on Turkish television, the TRNC Minister of Transport, Erhan Arıklı, clearly stated that he expects Turkey to take effective countermeasures. The Turkish press has highlighted the nature of the decision as a real diplomatic slap in the face for President Erdoğan and also emphasized the concurrence with the announcement of European investment in Central Asia. The message to the country's public is that countries formally allied to Turkey have sold the unity of the Turkish world to Brussels. The Cyprus issue shows how difficult it can be for Central Asian republics to maneuver in the current international context. The pressure exerted by the European Union and Turkey also highlights the diplomatic importance of the region. This is true not only for Russia, which is facing international isolation following its invasion of Ukraine. It is a situation that offers opportunities but also contains risks. The main opportunity is the possibility of using this increased diplomatic relevance on various fronts to obtain concessions, as in the case of European investments related to critical sectors such as minerals and regional logistics. On the other hand, the main risk is the inability to maintain a balance between the different demands of the various partners of the Central Asian republics. This is a key match for the geopolitical and diplomatic relevance of Central Asia, a match for which cooperation between the regional republics, to be perceived as a united bloc, becomes even more fundamental
UN Calls on Turkmenistan to Probe Suspected Poisoning of Journalist Soltan Achilova
The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Mary Lawlor, has called on Turkmenistan to launch an independent investigation into alleged attempts to poison 75-year-old journalist and human rights activist Soltan Achilova and her family members. The appeal was published on the website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. “These are extremely serious allegations which, if confirmed, would constitute a violation of Achilova's right to life,” Lawlor stated. “Authorities have an obligation to conduct a thorough investigation and bring the perpetrators to justice.” The alleged poisoning incident occurred in November 2024 when Achilova and her daughter were forcibly hospitalized in an infectious disease clinic on the day they were scheduled to leave the country. Phones were disconnected, and security personnel were reportedly present at the hospital, leading Lawlor to suspect a deliberate attempt to block their departure. “The forced hospitalization of Achilova and her daughter on the day of their departure suggests an attempt to prevent them from traveling,” she said. Lawlor also cited disturbing conditions during their detention. For the first three days, they were not given food, water, or hygiene products. “Such treatment seems to be aimed at further humiliating and intimidating them,” she added. Long-Term Harassment and Intimidation Achilova has endured years of state pressure, including surveillance, travel bans, and property damage. Her phone and online activities are reportedly monitored, and she has not received alternative housing or compensation since her home was demolished in 2006. In both 2017 and 2024, unknown individuals vandalized her family’s property, breaking the windows of her son’s car, but the authorities did not investigate. “Gurbansoltan Achilova has faced years of harassment and intimidation, including previous travel restrictions, concerns that we have already raised with the government on June 19, 2020, and January 11, 2024,” Lawlor said. “Given our repeated appeals, I expect more than another letter refuting the allegations. The authorities must immediately stop all harassment and guarantee Achilova's safety and her ability to work and travel freely.” A Voice for Independent Journalism Soltan Achilova is one of Turkmenistan’s last independent female journalists publishing under her real name. Since 2006, she has been subjected to repeated threats, surveillance, and attacks. In 2023, her passport was deliberately damaged before she could travel to Geneva. In another incident in November 2024, as she prepared for an international trip, unidentified men in white coats broke into her home. One reportedly seized her keys and told her, “Why do you need a key in the other world?” before forcibly taking her to a medical facility. Repression Amid Global Scrutiny Turkmenistan ranks among the worst countries for press freedom, placing 175th out of 180 in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders. The report highlights the systematic persecution of the nation’s remaining independent journalists. The UN continues to monitor Achilova’s case and has urged the Turkmen government to take meaningful steps to end harassment and ensure her safety. The international community is watching closely for signs of accountability and reform.
A New Great Game: Multipolar Competition in Central Asia
At a time when the European Union, China, and Turkey are seeking to strengthen their presence in Central Asia, the United States administration is consumed with bilaterally implementing a seismic shift in its trade policy with the entire world. Although this region of post-Soviet space is widely seen as a new front of rivalry between Washington and Beijing, in many aspects, American influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan lags far behind that of other actors. Culture (soft power) has always played an important role in the foreign policy of every great power. The Soviet Union was no exception. As a result, even today, Russian, rather than English, is still the lingua franca in Central Asia, although Moscow, following its invasion of Ukraine, has had a hard time preserving remnants of its former dominance in the region. Russian cinema, however, maintains a notable presence in most, if not all, Central Asian states. While Hollywood movies have a strong global presence, Russian films in Central Asia often act as a link between Western content and the region's cultural traditions. Millions of Central Asian migrants working in Russia also serve as a bridge between their nations and the Russian Federation, facilitating cultural exchange, economic ties, and the spread of the Russian language. However, Russia’s fiasco in Ukraine has created space for the EU to assert its influence in a region that has traditionally been in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit. Nevertheless, although Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, are Tajikistan are members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, they have remained neutral in the Ukraine conflict. For Central Asian nations, the EU serves as a counterweight they can use to balance their relations with Moscow. The EU, however, faces strong economic competition from China. With a trade volume of $94.8 billion with Central Asian states, Beijing is positioning itself as the major economic power operating in the five regional nations. Although the European Union’s influence in Central Asia is expected to continue to grow in the coming years, if investment trends from recent years persist, the balance in the region will likely tilt towards China, which will increase its presence and influence at the expense of Russia. But where does the United States fit into this dynamic? Even though the U.S. is the largest economy in the world, with which almost everyone wants to engage, American bilateral trade with the region has never been particularly strong, with the exception of Kazakhstan. Interestingly enough, it is Astana that is expected to suffer the most among Central Asian actors due to U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs – 27% on Kazakhstan compared to 10% on all other nations in the region. Exceptions may be made for Kazakhstan’s critical minerals, however, which are now the third largest in the world based on a recent discovery, with reports suggesting that some goods, including “certain minerals that are not available in the United States,” as well as energy, will not be subject to the tariffs. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration, the core of the country’s exports to the U.S. consists of crude oil, uranium, silver, ferroalloys, and other minerals, which account for 92% of shipments. In spite of this, the Kazakh Government is reportedly initiating consultations with the Trump administration to discuss the possibility of exempting Kazakhstan from additional tariffs, which means that Astana is very unlikely to follow the EU’s approach and respond to Trump’s move in a retaliatory fashion. Some experts, however, argue that Trump’s tariff policy could result in Kazakhstan, as well as other regional states, becoming more dependent on China for trade. The verdict is still out on whether the new U.S. tariff policy will push Central Asia deeper into Beijing’s geoeconomic orbit. However, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has repeatedly stated that Astana is seeking to replace the Great Game – a rivalry between the 19th-century British and Russian empires over influence in Central Asia – with “Great Gain for all in the heart of Eurasia”. But while in the 19th century there were two major rivals, this time it remains unclear who could be Beijing’s major opponent in Central Asia. The U.S. under Trump has demonstrated less of a desire to influence the region and the rest of the world, as indicated through the practical shuttering of USAID. In Ukraine, Trump has also aimed to pull back resources while staying committed on the condition of gaining access. However, in energy-rich Central Asia, Washington seems to behave rather ambivalently. It is the European Union, rather than the United States, that is eyeing Central Asia’s critical minerals, while Turkey, mainly through the Organization of Turkic States, is also attempting to strengthen its role. China is doing this largely through economic means, which is why some authors claim that Beijing has emerged as the "primary Eurasian power in the new age of multipolarity that is upon us.” The United States, on the other hand, seems to have chosen a new path, focusing on pragmatic, non-ideological diplomacy in the region. The Trump administration, unlike most of its predecessors, is unlikely to pressure regional actors to follow Western values, human rights, and various principles of liberal democracy, which could yet make the U.S. a desirable partner. Thus, in the long-term, the United States might emerge as China’s rival in the so-called New Great Game in Central Asia. For the time being, however, the region will likely remain in a multipolar competition for influence.
Samarkand Declaration Paves the Way for a Stronger Central Asia–EU Partnership
The inaugural Central Asia-European Union Summit, held in Samarkand on April 3-4, marked a significant milestone in strengthening ties between the two regions. According to Sherzod Asadov, press secretary to Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the summit's most significant outcome is the adoption of the Samarkand Declaration, which is expected to provide strong momentum for expanding constructive dialogue and cooperation across all sectors.
In a statement, the EU reaffirmed its "commitment to deeper cooperation in an evolving global and regional geopolitical landscape [and] upgrade relations between the European Union and Central Asia to a strategic partnership." The EU declaration also committed the bloc to respect the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states within the framework of all international and regional fora" and expressed readiness to "address common security challenges."
Strengthening Economic Ties
Economic cooperation featured prominently on the agenda. Since 2020, trade between Uzbekistan and the EU has doubled, now exceeding €6 billion. Uzbek exports to the EU have quadrupled, and the number of joint ventures has surpassed a thousand. European investment projects in Uzbekistan, meanwhile, are now valued at over €30 billion.
A key development was the agreement to open a regional office of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Tashkent. Established in 1958, the EIB is the EU’s primary financial institution, and its new office is expected to attract greater investment in green energy, modern infrastructure, and digitalization.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has also deepened its engagement in Uzbekistan, investing over €5 billion to date. “We must work together to simplify trade procedures and ensure that Central Asian products gain greater access to European markets. Only through joint efforts can we build a strong and resilient economic partnership,” Mirziyoyev told Euronews. "Over the past seven years, the trade turnover between Central Asian countries and the EU has quadrupled, amounting to 54 billion euros... The signing of the Samarkand Declaration will reflect the common aspiration of the parties to establish a strategic partnership and lay the foundation for deepening ties between our regions."
During the summit, Mirziyoyev met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. Discussions focused on trade, investment, green energy, and digital development, with the EU’s "Global Gateway” strategy, a counterpart to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a central topic. The initiative is seeking to enhance global infrastructure and connectivity while promoting sustainability and transparency.
“The EU and Central Asia are becoming closer partners, and this summit marks the beginning of a new phase in our cooperation,” von der Leyen stated. An Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Uzbekistan and the EU is also under negotiation.
Regional Dialogue Among Central Asian Leaders
The Summit also offered a platform for Central Asian heads of state to hold bilateral discussions. Mirziyoyev met with his counterparts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Talks centered on increasing trade, improving border security, and advancing major infrastructure projects. A recent landmark border agreement between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was lauded as a breakthrough.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan agreed to accelerate the development of the International Industrial Cooperation Center, which was ratified by the Kazakh Mazhilis in early February, while progress was also made on the planned “Shovot-Tashovuz” joint border trade zone between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
As economic ties between Central Asia and Europe deepen, recent U.S. trade tariffs may further accelerate the shift. The Trump Administration's new tariffs imposed a 10% duty on exports from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, whilst Kazakhstan faces a notably higher 27% duty.
These tariffs could disrupt regional trade flows, positioning the EU as an increasingly attractive economic partner.
A Historic Gathering: The First Central Asia-European Union Summit in Samarkand
Excitement is building in Samarkand as it gears up to host the inaugural Central Asia-European Union Summit. This landmark event promises to pave the way for significant negotiations and collaboration, bringing together leaders and representatives from both regions. With a rich cultural backdrop and a vibrant atmosphere, Samarkand is poised to play a crucial role in shaping the future of partnerships and cooperation between Central Asia and the European Union. In recent weeks, Uzbekistan has experienced notable advancements in its foreign policy, signaling a proactive approach to international collaboration. A highlighted event was the fruitful engagement between Uzbekistan's head of state and Kaja Kallas, the High-level Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Additionally, a delegation led by Josef Sikela, the European Union Commissioner for International Cooperation, participated in discussions to foster deeper ties. A significant milestone on the horizon is the inaugural Central Asia-European Union summit, set to unfold in the historic city of Samarkand on April 3-4. During a pivotal meeting on March 27 with Kallas, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev meticulously explored the preparations for this groundbreaking summit, which has captured global attention due to its potential to reshape regional dynamics. The leaders engaged in a rich exchange of ideas focused on bolstering practical cooperation between their regions and planning future collaborative events that could further strengthen these ties. The significance of fostering mutually beneficial cooperation between the two regions in trade and logistics was emphasized during the meeting. This includes harnessing the potential of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, advancing digitalization, promoting green energy, addressing ecological concerns, modernizing infrastructure, and other priority areas. The introduction of effective mechanisms for implementing initiatives and projects in these fields was also highlighted. Participants exchanged views on enhancing Uzbekistan's relations with European Union organizations, discussing adopting a new agreement for enhanced partnership and cooperation and Uzbekistan's accession to the World Trade Organization. Current international and regional policy issues were also addressed. Additionally, on March 18, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met with a delegation led by Josef Sikela, the European Union Commissioner for International Cooperation. This meeting discussed critical matters regarding further developing multifaceted relations between Uzbekistan and the European Union. Moreover, plans for organizing the inaugural "Central Asia - EU" summit and the Climate Forum in Samarkand were considered. In recent years, bilateral cooperation with the European Union has accelerated across political, trade, economic, investment, and cultural-humanitarian spheres, presenting extensive opportunities for the continued expansion of these ties. A new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Uzbekistan and the European Union is anticipated to be signed soon. Both parties have expressed a keen interest in promoting joint projects and programs across transport and logistics, energy, digitalization, agriculture, water management, and other key areas. Kallas conveyed warm greetings and best wishes on behalf of key EU figures, including António Costa, the President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission. The discussions underscored the necessity of cultivating mutually beneficial cooperation across various sectors, including trade and logistics, and harnessing the untapped potential of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. Other critical themes included digitalization efforts, green energy initiatives, environmental programs, infrastructure modernization, and the establishment of effective mechanisms for executing joint projects. Furthermore, there was a focus on deepening Uzbekistan's engagement with EU organizations, including adopting a new agreement to enhance partnership and cooperation. The talks also touched on Uzbekistan’s anticipated accession to the World Trade Organization, alongside key international and regional policy matters. Earlier in the month, on March 18, Mirziyoyev held a significant meeting with Josef Sikela’s delegation. During this meeting, they addressed pressing issues related to advancing multifaceted relations between Uzbekistan and the European Union. The agenda revolved around organizing the forthcoming Central Asia-EU summit and the Climate Forum, which will take place in Samarkand. The trajectory of bilateral cooperation with the European Union has accelerated remarkably in recent years, encompassing various dimensions such as politics, trade, economics, investment, and cultural-humanitarian exchanges. Both partners recognize the prosperous opportunities available for further growth and collaboration. In March, a significant agreement was finalized in Tashkent concerning two strategic projects backed by the European Union. The delegation underscored that the "Connecting Central Asia" (C4CA) initiative focuses on enhancing digital infrastructure and fostering regional integration, which will, in turn, encourage cooperation and economic exchanges among Central Asian nations. According to Sikela, the collaboration between the European Union and Uzbekistan seeks to improve internet connectivity across Central Asia, aspiring to provide fast and secure internet access. This initiative aims to empower businesses, generate new employment opportunities, and elevate living conditions for local communities by integrating advanced European technologies and Uzbekistan’s expertise. Overall, the partnership between Uzbekistan and the European Union is entering a transformative phase, offering substantial opportunities for growth and mutual benefit as both sides work together to create a more interconnected future.
Exposing the Cracks: Asem Tokayeva on the Decline of RFE/RL and Central Asia’s Media Future
Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, Asem Tokayeva, a seasoned journalist with years of experience at Radio Azattyq - Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, offers a compelling critique of RFE/RL's challenges, from internal corruption allegations to its declining relevance in Central Asia's evolving media landscape.
Tokayeva started her career with Express K and other publications in Astana before joining Radio Azattyq as a freelancer in 2004 and contributing to the groundbreaking Russian-language program, Паровоз ("locomotive"). In 2008, she played a pivotal role in launching Radio Azattyq’s Russian-language website, a platform recognized for tackling sensitive issues and fostering free discussion. Her work contributed to the site's recognition by the Online News Association in 2009 for "Protecting Citizens' Rights to Information."
After nearly 14 years at Azattyq, including over seven at its Prague office, Tokayeva left in late 2017 to further her academic pursuits, earning a Master's degree from Charles University in Prague, where her dissertation focused on Media Framing: Transformation of Nursultan Nazarbayev's Image in the U.S. Media.
TCA: How do you feel about the funding cuts to the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which oversees projects like RFE/RL and Voice of America?I have always advocated for the reform of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and now the new U.S. administration has simply cut its funding in one fell swoop. However, I don't see this as just Trump's whim. The work of this media outlet had long been criticized in Washington, and not only during his tenure. During Barack Obama’s and Joe Biden’s presidencies, American media published investigations into abuses, including the infiltration of pro-Kremlin agents, within international broadcasting corporations funded through USAGM.
When Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State, she called the entire U.S. international broadcasting structure, which includes Radio Azattyq, "practically defunct." Even during Bill Clinton’s presidency, there were serious discussions in Washington about shutting down these radio stations, as they were considered outdated following the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. By the 1990s, it was already difficult to claim that Radio Liberty was the sole source of alternative information. During the August 1991 coup in Moscow, other radio stations provided more timely and comprehensive field reports. For instance, Echo of Moscow became one of the most listened-to stations at the time.
Today's media landscape has different challenges, such as media literacy and combating fake news, rather than a shortage of news organizations. While the mission and goals of Radio Liberty have renewed significance, given the persistence of authoritarianism in many former Soviet countries, the U.S. administration no longer sees value in its international broadcasting system. They simply decided to shut down another bloated bureaucratic structure, one that had also been plagued by corruption. For example, its parent agency had been overpaying exorbitant amounts for office space in downtown Washington D.C. for 15 years.
Radio Azattyq destroyed its uniqueness when it completely shut down shortwave broadcasting in 2012 at the insistence of its then-editor, Yedige Magauin. Yet, in 2011, during the protests in the oil town of Zhanaozen, Azattyq was one of the few alternative sources of information. However, if we analyze Azattyq’s content over the past decade, it's ceased to be an important or exclusive source of information. [There are multiple examples of] topics, especially those sensitive to the Kazakh authorities, that have either been ignored by Azattyq or are covered in the same way as most other media outlets in Kazakhstan.
TCA: You have consistently criticized the management of RFE/RL, including Radio Azattyq, for nepotism, corruption, labor rights violations, and more. In your opinion, how have these issues affected the core mission of the organization?Corruption, nepotism, and censorship within Azattyq have effectively destroyed its mission to provide independent and objective information to people in authoritarian countries. Journalism has turned into a mere imitation when top managers are more concerned with keeping their positions and inflating their salaries and benefits rather than ensuring the quality of their content.
In an attempt to regain its audience, Azattyq's Kazakh-language website even published sexualized videos and fostered sexism and chauvinism under the guise of promoting aitys, a traditional Kazakh poetic duel. As for its supposed mission of promoting democratic values, the same website actively facilitated smear campaigns against opposition leaders and distorted reports on the deaths of civil activists.
As a result of these developments, RFE/RL's Central Asian services have steadily lost the trust of their audience and have ultimately alienated their most loyal listeners and readers. Internal editorial problems played a major role in weakening the outlets’ influence and significance in the region.
Thus, the reduction of government grants was a consequence of a prolonged crisis in the management of USAGM and its affiliated media outlets. When an organization's top management disregards its own mission to disseminate uncensored information in countries where the press is suppressed and instead becomes mired in corruption and nepotism, it's hardly surprising that the U.S. administration not only questioned the rationale for continued funding but ultimately decided to terminate grants to this corporation, which has repeatedly been exposed for mismanagement, infiltration, spreading disinformation, and even promoting authoritarian propaganda.
TCA: How did U.S. legislative and executive officials react to your 2019 testimony about violations in the RFE’RL's Central Asian services during the USAGM hearing in Washington?Some participants expressed concern that the Central Asian services of RFE/RL were effectively operating in coordination with authoritarian regimes. I noticed how the top managers of USAGM and RFE/RL became visibly uneasy. Key figures like RFE/RL Vice President Nenad Pejic and Central Asia Regional Director Abbas Djavadi, both responsible for the crisis, were quietly forced into retirement or resigned. However, there was no real investigation, and they were given generous severance packages, which, incidentally, was one of the Trump administration’s criticisms of USAGM.
The organization has long had an opaque management system and a culture of mutual protection. Real control over the content and personnel decisions rests with mid-level managers, vice presidents, and regional directors, who actively resist reforms. The leadership shields its own from accountability, allowing the system to remain unchanged. As a result, their successors continued the same practices, particularly in Central Asian services, where nepotism, favoritism, and political bias thrive, a fact repeatedly pointed out by civil society representatives in these countries. It is therefore unsurprising that the directors of these services were caught hiring their wives, stepdaughters, or mistresses. The fact that nearly an entire newsroom could be staffed by people from just one region or a single Islamic community has become a routine occurrence.
TCA: Are you aware of the current situation at Radio Azattyq? What will happen to the editorial staff if the closure of the outlet is upheld? Will they receive compensation, and will they be protected from potential persecution by the authorities?I sympathize with my colleagues, the ordinary journalists who worked honestly and professionally. They face losing not only their jobs but also, in many ways, their sense of purpose, their ideals, and their values. I cannot say what kind of compensation they could receive or whether they will receive any at all; much depends on USAGM’s decisions. However, given the stark inequalities within RFE/RL, it is likely that many rank-and-file employees, especially those outside the Prague office, will be left without protection or support.
The income gap and levels of job security at the outlets are enormous. The six-figure salaries of the president and other top executives have consistently increased year after year. I wouldn’t be surprised if it turns out that the leadership raised their salaries ahead of the upcoming layoffs. Washington has a well-developed accountability system that allows NGOs to track government spending with relative transparency. According to the nonprofit ProPublica, Jamie Fly’s salary as the head of RFE/RL rose from $141,722 in 2020 to $308,491 in 2023.
Meanwhile, freelancers risking their freedom in places like Iran or Afghanistan receive meager fees, with rates that have remained stagnant for years. When I started as a freelancer in Astana, the rate for reporting was $7.50 per minute. It has probably increased since then, but I doubt it has increased by much, considering how reluctant management is to raise salaries. And even when they do, they are selective — loyalists and sycophants receive annual raises and bonuses, while honest but inconvenient employees are kept in the doghouse and subjected to internal harassment.
TCA: Will the shutdown of RFE/RL projects in Central Asia affect freedom of speech in the region?
In my view, the loss of RFE/RL as an important source of information occurred long ago, when it voluntarily ceased broadcasting on shortwave, except in a few countries where the media situation is dire, such as Turkmenistan. The current content on the websites of the Central Asian services cannot compete with local media or even independent bloggers, who operate with far smaller budgets but are free from internal censorship and bureaucratic constraints. Under the leadership of Torokul Doorov, the RFE/RL Kazakh service has seen a decline in website traffic. That’s why I don’t think most news consumers will notice its absence. Had RFE/RL maintained high journalistic standards and true independence, its closure would have been a much bigger blow.
Clearly, a time of major change has arrived. This could open doors for new independent media initiatives. In the digital era, large traditional media organizations are no longer the sole providers of information. Perhaps the shutdown of RFE/RL in the region will push independent journalists and civil society to develop alternative platforms for delivering objective news.
Explore our Special Coverage section to dive deeper into the shifting priorities of U.S. funding for media in Central Asia.Sunkar Podcast
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