Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers the sixth World Nomad Games, held in Kyrgyzstan last week, which brought the country unprecedented international attention. Special guests: Stephen M. Bland, Managing Editor at TCA; K. Krombie, Senior Editor at TCA, both of whom covered the event on the ground; and Jonathan Campion, who competed for Team GB in the Alysh Wrestling.

Central Asian States Call for New Arms Controls as Nuclear Framework Weakens

Foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have called for new, verifiable arms control mechanisms to prevent a nuclear arms race, warning that international disarmament efforts are losing ground. In a joint statement issued on September 8 to mark 20 years since the signing of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the five governments expressed concern over stalled disarmament, the end of key agreements, and the modernization of nuclear arsenals. They urged nuclear powers to resume negotiations. The statement comes seven months after New START, the last U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty, expired on February 5. UN Secretary-General António Guterres said its expiration left the two countries without binding limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in more than half a century. President Donald Trump has criticized New START as a “badly negotiated deal” and called instead for a new, modernized arms control treaty that would include China. The ministers also cited the failure of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which ended without a consensus outcome on May 22. Kazakhstan had already advanced a similar position. As TCA reported, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev used the August 29 anniversary of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site’s closure to call for negotiations among nuclear powers, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and renewed multilateral action to reduce nuclear risks. Kazakhstan’s connection to the issue extends beyond diplomacy. The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk between 1949 and 1989. Kazakhstan closed the site in 1991 and subsequently relinquished the nuclear arsenal it had inherited after the Soviet collapse. The regional treaty was signed in Semipalatinsk on September 8, 2006, and entered into force in 2009. It established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone located entirely in the Northern Hemisphere, directly bordering two nuclear-weapon states, Russia and China. That history gives Kazakhstan a distinctive place in regional nuclear diplomacy. Uzbekistan originated the proposal for the zone, presenting it at the UN General Assembly in September 1993. The September 8 statement explicitly acknowledges Uzbekistan’s initiative while crediting all five countries with establishing the zone. The statement also recognizes Kyrgyzstan for initiating the International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness, observed annually on March 5, and Turkmenistan for chairing the December 2024 anniversary meeting in Ashgabat. Kazakhstan has also helped coordinate cooperation beyond Central Asia. In August 2024, it hosted a conference in Astana with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs to strengthen cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones, following an earlier meeting in 2019. The five states also renewed their appeal for the United States to ratify a protocol providing security assurances to the region. In May 2014, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the protocol on negative security assurances, committing not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the five Central Asian treaty members. The other four signatories have ratified it. Washington has not. The request is longstanding. The five governments made the same appeal in their 2021 anniversary statement. The latest declaration comes less than a week after Mukhtar Tleuberdi returned as Kazakhstan’s foreign minister on September 2. He previously held the post from 2019 to 2023 and most recently served as ambassador to Austria and permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency. The five governments now want further “institutional development” of the regional treaty and closer cooperation with other nuclear-weapon-free zones. The statement specifies no new institutions or implementation timetable.

Water in Central Asia: Can the Five States Reach an Agreement?

Central Asia is entering a period of growing water stress, as climate change makes supplies less predictable while demand continues to rise. Populations are growing, economies require new energy and industrial capacity, glaciers are shrinking, and agriculture continues to consume most of the available water. The region’s two main rivers – the Amu Darya and Syr Darya – cross national borders, making it impossible for any one country to solve the problem on its own.

After decades of disputes, Central Asian states are increasingly trying to manage water jointly. In 2026, that cooperation has produced further practical steps, from plans for automated water accounting in the Syr Darya basin to new proposals for reforming regional mechanisms. The question now is whether the five countries can agree on rules when their water needs remain different.

Water and Energy: An Old Conflict

The structural conflict is rooted in the region’s geography. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are upstream states and use water in part for hydropower generation, particularly in winter. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are downstream and need large volumes in summer during the irrigation season.

During the Soviet period, a centralized exchange system was in place: upstream republics stored water in winter and released it in summer, receiving energy resources in return. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, that unified mechanism disappeared. Interstate agreements preserved a degree of coordination but did not eliminate the tension between upstream energy needs and downstream agricultural interests.

Climate change is now adding another layer to the problem. Retreating glaciers in the Pamir and Tien Shan mountains are altering the timing and reliability of river flows, while populations and consumption are increasing. Countries across the region are planning new power plants, industrial facilities, mining projects, and data centers, while agriculture remains the largest consumer of water.

From Seasonal Quotas to Joint Management

The main formal mechanism for coordinating river allocations remains the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC), established in 1992. Through it, countries coordinate water withdrawal limits and reservoir operating regimes in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins.

In late 2025, the countries agreed on water allocations for 2026: for the Amu Darya, the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 was around 55.4 billion cubic meters, while the Syr Darya allocation for the non-growing season was approximately 4.2 billion cubic meters.

The five-state framework does not, however, cover every major user of the Amu Darya. Afghanistan is outside the regional allocation system, while its Qosh Tepa Canal, now under construction, has added another source of uncertainty over future downstream flows.

Such agreements keep the shared system functioning, but many decisions are still made ahead of each new season. Climate change and rising demand require a longer-term model. In February of this year, Kazakhstan proposed developing a Central Asian Framework Convention on Water Use, while joint infrastructure projects, including Kyrgyzstan’s Kambarata-1 hydropower plant with the participation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are gradually adding shared economic interests to the broader water-energy relationship.

Another practical step followed in August. States met in Turkestan for the 94th ICWC meeting, where Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan agreed to develop a plan for automated water accounting in the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan participated as an observer.

Automated monitoring is intended to address one of the most sensitive problems: the reliability of data on transboundary water flows. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are already working to automate ten transboundary monitoring stations in the Syr Darya basin, five in each country.

By August, conditions on the Syr Darya were relatively stable: since April 1, around 3 billion cubic meters of water had flowed into Kazakhstan’s Shardara Reservoir – more than a year earlier and above the long-term average.

Who Should Pay for Water?

A favorable season does not eliminate longer-term tensions. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have an interest in operating hydropower plants in winter, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan need sufficient water to remain available for summer irrigation.

The Toktogul Reservoir in Kyrgyzstan illustrates this interdependence. The country’s largest hydropower plant is located there and generates around 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s electricity, while its operating regime also determines how much water flows downstream through the Syr Darya. In May, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral protocol agreeing on a schedule for water releases from Toktogul.

Kyrgyzstan is increasingly raising the question of how costs should be shared. Bishkek points to the expense of maintaining dams, reservoirs, and other infrastructure. In February, parliamentarian Umbetaly Kydyraliyev proposed that neighboring countries compensate Kyrgyzstan for water and the costs of maintaining hydraulic infrastructure, while President Sadyr Japarov proposed a regional economic compensation mechanism for water and energy in April.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan do not support such a model, pointing out that existing agreements do not provide for payment for water from transboundary rivers.

The dispute also sits alongside a less contentious problem: large amounts of water are lost across aging canal and distribution networks, while cultivation of water-intensive crops keeps irrigation demand high.

The Issue Is No Longer Just How Much Water There Is

At Tashkent Water Week, Murad Uzakov, head of the Center for Regional Studies at Uzbekistan’s Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies, said the water problem had already moved beyond environmental concerns and become a matter of national and regional security.

Because of the condition of canals, dams, and distribution systems, water losses can reach 40%-50% in some areas, while around 90% of the region’s water withdrawals are used for irrigated agriculture. By 2050, he said, flows in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya could decline by 5%-13%.

At the same time, Uzakov pointed to stronger regional cooperation, including joint use of the Naryn basin’s water and energy resources, preparations for the Kambarata-1 hydropower project, and hydropower development on the Zarafshan River. In his view, the region needs a common strategy for the rational use of water.

Iskandar Abdullaev, a senior researcher at the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), stressed at the same forum that infrastructure and digitalization alone are not enough without better coordination and data sharing. Climate change is making water resources more unpredictable, meaning decisions need to be made at the level of shared river basins rather than by individual states alone.

From Central Asia to the UN

Kazakhstan is trying to elevate the water issue to the international level. At the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana in April, discussions covered the management of transboundary resources, the state of glaciers, and a proposal to establish an International Water Organization within the UN system.

On September 1, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev again advanced the initiative, saying that the global system of water governance remains fragmented. He also proposed establishing a Water Issues Analysis Center within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

For Central Asia, however, agreements among the region’s countries will remain decisive. An international organization can help with coordination and mobilizing resources, but it cannot determine how much water should remain in reservoirs in winter and how much needs to be released to fields in summer.

Turkmenistan Methane Emissions Under Scrutiny After 192 UN Alerts

UN satellite monitoring has identified Turkmenistan as one of the world’s most serious methane hotspots, with 192 alerts for the country issued over the past year. Three of the six largest leaks detected globally by the system over the past six months were in Turkmenistan, as were nine of the top 50. Eight major leaks have since been stopped after repairs.

For Ashgabat, however, the issue is also taking on commercial significance: new EU rules are gradually linking access for imported gas to the European market with its methane footprint.

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has confirmed eight cases in which major methane leaks in Turkmenistan were stopped after operators took action. The first two were recorded in November 2024, with further cases confirmed at several oil and gas sites over the following year. In February 2026, two leaks were stopped at Dauletabad, one of Turkmenistan’s largest gas fields. The latest confirmed case dates to March, in Lebap Province, one of the country’s main gas-producing regions.

The leaks are detected by the UN's Methane Alert and Response System (MARS), which uses data from more than 30 satellite instruments. After detecting a major methane plume, MARS provides the information to the government or facility operator and then uses satellite observations to determine whether the emissions have stopped.

Meghan Demeter, program manager for MARS at UNEP’s International Methane Emissions Observatory, called the first repairs an “incredible first step.” In comments to The Guardian on August 31, she stressed that significantly more work remains to be done, saying the repairs did not yet represent a breakthrough in the overall scale of Turkmenistan’s emissions.

The scale of the problem is also reflected in data from the International Energy Agency (IEA). In its Global Methane Tracker 2026, Turkmenistan and Venezuela have by far the highest methane emissions intensities from upstream oil and gas production among major producers. The gap between the best and worst performers is more than 100-fold.

Methane intensity measures emissions relative to the amount of fuel produced, allowing producers of different sizes to be compared. According to the IEA, large emissions events visible from satellites are particularly common in Turkmenistan: the country accounts for more than a third of all oil- and gas-related MARS observations in Eurasia.

Satellite studies point to a worsening trend in recent years. One found that super-emitter activity on Turkmenistan’s western coast increased by about 8% annually between 2020 and 2023. The IEA’s own analysis shows that emissions from super-emitter events across Turkmenistan grew by more than 15% a year on average over the same period. The study of the western coast also estimated that methane emissions there rose by around 7% annually between 2020 and 2023, broadly in line with growth in natural gas production.

Methane has a much stronger short-term warming effect than carbon dioxide. At the same time, it is the main component of natural gas, meaning leaks also represent a loss of fuel that could otherwise be sold. The IEA notes that high emissions intensity is not an inevitable feature of the oil and gas industry: it can be substantially reduced through existing technologies, operational standards, and equipment repairs.

Satellite monitoring is particularly important for Turkmenistan because of limited access to information about its oil and gas sector. It makes it possible to identify major emissions independently of operators’ reporting. Since MARS was launched in 2022, the system has moved beyond detecting plumes to checking whether emissions stop after governments or operators respond. By the end of August 2026, MARS had recorded 43 such cases worldwide.

Central Asia features prominently on the list. In addition to the eight cases in Turkmenistan, UNEP has confirmed that emissions stopped at eight sites in Kazakhstan between October 2024 and March 2026.

Turkmenistan joined the Global Methane Pledge in December 2023. The initiative sets a collective goal of reducing global anthropogenic methane emissions by at least 30% from 2020 levels by 2030.

For Ashgabat, cutting emissions is also gradually becoming relevant to its gas export ambitions. Turkmenistan has some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves, but most of its exports go to China. The country is seeking additional markets and has for years considered the possibility of supplying gas to Europe. Turkmen gas also began reaching Turkey in limited volumes through a swap arrangement with Iran in 2025, while the much larger Trans-Caspian route remains unbuilt.

Meanwhile, the European Union is gradually introducing requirements governing the methane footprint of imported fuels. From January 1, 2027, importers under contracts signed or renewed after August 4, 2024, will have to show that the gas was produced under methane oversight equivalent to EU standards, or meets an accepted company-level standard. For older contracts, importers must make all reasonable efforts to obtain the necessary information.

From August 5, 2028, importers must report the methane intensity of gas covered by contracts signed or renewed after August 4, 2024. From August 5, 2030, gas under contracts signed or renewed after that date will have to meet a maximum methane-intensity threshold set by the European Commission. In practical terms, methane performance will increasingly become one of the conditions suppliers must meet to sell gas into the EU.

Turkmenistan’s interest in these requirements has already surfaced in discussions with international organizations. The Clean Air Task Force, which works on methane reduction in Central Asia, has reported discussions with Turkmenistan’s Deputy Minister of Environmental Protection Nury Jumashov on methane regulation and related work. CATF also says the government is interested in understanding the EU’s import standards as it considers access to the European market.

Reducing methane leaks alone will not open the way for Turkmen gas to Europe. The long-discussed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which could carry significantly larger volumes west through Azerbaijan and Turkey, still needs to be built.

World Nomad Games Return Home as Kyrgyzstan Welcomes World Leaders

Few periods since independence have put Kyrgyzstan so squarely in the international spotlight. On August 31, the country marked 35 years of independence, opened the sixth World Nomad Games, and prepared to host a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit that has brought more than a dozen foreign leaders to Bishkek. The Games themselves were back where they began. Kyrgyzstan launched the World Nomad Games in 2014 and staged the first three editions at Cholpon Ata before the event moved to Turkey in 2022 and Kazakhstan in 2024. This year's Games run through September 6, with The Times of Central Asia reporting from Bishkek and Issyk-Kul throughout the week in our special coverage. The opening took place at the new Bishkek Arena, rising out of the dust on the southwestern edge of the capital near the foothills of the Kyrgyz Ala-Too Range. Around 30,000 spectators attended the ceremony. The stadium will eventually hold more than 51,000, but it is not formally due to open until October 5. The Games opened while work on the arena was still underway, with parts of the building still looking unfinished. In the weeks before the ceremony, horses had circled the arena floor during rehearsals while drilling continued around them. By the time the spectators arrived, the construction site had become the biggest show in town. Before the politics and pageantry, there was pop. Kyrgyzstan put many of its best-known performers on stage in a concert that at times had a distinctly Eurovision feel. Energetic hosts introduced a succession of singers and rappers while tightly choreographed dancers moved between traditional dress and contemporary styling. The lineup included Bayastan, Malika Dina, Erlan Andashev, Begish, and others, but veteran singer Baktiyar Toktorov received the loudest reaction. When he launched into "Yza," known almost universally by its "Bui-Bui" refrain, spectators rose from their seats and sang with him. Even some of the security guards joined in. The refrain does not demand many words, but almost everybody in the arena seemed to know them. The new stadium also showed some early teething problems, with concession stands running out of bottled water and food as crowds built. After the concert, the momentum disappeared. The audience waited for around 90 minutes while footage of arriving dignitaries played on the giant screens. The reason for the pause soon became clear, as one motorcade after another delivered guests for the formal ceremony. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko were among those in the stands. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan also attended, along with leaders and senior officials from elsewhere in Asia, the Caucasus, and Africa. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres was among the international guests. One expected heavyweight was missing. Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Bishkek for a state visit and the SCO summit, had been due to attend the opening. Presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov said Xi had stayed away because of the deadly flooding and landslides in Tibet, where rescue operations were continuing. His bilateral meetings in Kyrgyzstan were to proceed as planned. [video width="1024" height="576" mp4="https://timesca.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/WhatsApp-Video-2026-09-01-at-07.58.22.mp4"][/video] Once the dignitaries had taken their seats, the parade began. More than 3,000 athletes from 104 countries entered the arena behind their national flags, including 517 from Kyrgyzstan. Visiting leaders stood or waved as their delegations passed. The biggest roar of the night came when the home team entered, and the stands erupted in national pride. The ceremony then shifted into a vast theatrical retelling of Kyrgyz history and legend. Swirling graphics covered the arena floor as galloping horses and trick riders crossed the stadium. Performers drew on the equestrian traditions that will feature in competition at Issyk-Kul, while mass choreography, music, and fireworks pushed the show deep into the night. President Sadyr Japarov used his speech to bind the Games to Independence Day and the diplomatic gathering around them. "Our foundation is independence, and our roots are in nomadic civilization," he said. "Our chosen course is international friendship and partnership, and our future lies in building a developed, strong new Kyrgyzstan." Japarov said the confluence of the Games and the SCO gathering carried a wider meaning. "At one event, state leaders seek paths to peace and cooperation through dialogue; at the other, the peoples of the world draw closer through sport and culture," he said. "At the heart of both are humanity's highest values: peace and friendship." Japarov also used the ceremony to advertise the government's development agenda, singling out the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and saying its construction would "change perceptions of Kyrgyzstan's geopolitical role." He also highlighted the Kambar-Ata-1 hydropower project and announced that Russia had formally expressed its readiness to host the seventh World Nomad Games in Tatarstan in 2028. [video width="1024" height="576" mp4="https://timesca.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/WhatsApp-Video-2026-09-01-at-07.58.38.mp4"][/video] For all the visiting presidents and geopolitical messaging, the strongest moments belonged to the crowd: thousands singing an old pop hit together, the explosion of noise for the Kyrgyz team, and horses thundering across the floor of a stadium that was a building site only weeks earlier. The Games now move to Issyk-Kul, where the sporting, cultural, and scientific programs continue through September 6. For Kyrgyzstan, the opening night was only the beginning of an unusually crowded week on the world stage. For more from our World Nomad Games 2026 special coverage, click here.

TAPI Pipeline Moves Closer to First Gas Sales in Afghanistan

After decades of delays, the TAPI gas pipeline has moved closer than ever to actual gas sales – but first to the smallest of its intended markets. Turkmenistan is preparing to supply gas to Afghanistan’s Herat province, while the timeline for extending the pipeline to Pakistan and India remains uncertain.

On August 10, state-owned Turkmengaz and Afghan Gas signed a memorandum covering the purchase of gas through TAPI. The document does not itself set a price or supply volume, but it brings closer the prospect that Afghanistan could become the first TAPI customer actually to receive gas.

Afghanistan was already part of TAPI’s original customer base. Afghan Gas and Turkmengaz signed a gas sale-and-purchase agreement in 2013. What has changed is that the pipeline is now approaching a market it can physically serve.

On August 27, Herat Governor Islam Jar said the local section of TAPI was expected to be commissioned within two months. Turkmenistan has not announced an equally specific date for the start of commercial gas supplies.

TAPI was conceived as an approximately 1,800-kilometer pipeline running from Turkmenistan’s giant Galkynysh gas field through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian border. Its planned capacity is 33 billion cubic meters of gas a year. At full capacity, Pakistan and India are each allocated 14 billion cubic meters of gas a year, while Afghanistan is allocated 5 billion.

But after decades of planning, the pipeline has still not reached its principal intended customers. Construction of the 153-kilometer section from the Turkmen border toward Herat began in September 2024. Earlier this year, Turkmenistan said it expected to complete the section by the end of 2026, but no timetable has been announced for extending the pipeline farther south.

According to the Afghan side, 116 kilometers of pipeline had been laid by early August.

The August agreement also envisages the infrastructure needed to use the gas locally. Turkmen and Afghan officials have agreed to develop infrastructure in Herat to supply gas to industrial facilities, power plants, and households.

The volumes involved would be modest compared with the roughly 30 billion cubic meters of gas Turkmenistan exports to China each year. But even limited sales through TAPI would give Ashgabat another export outlet. In February, Turkmenistan's still-influential former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov described diversification of gas exports as one of the country’s main priorities.

For TAPI itself, however, the first gas sales could matter even if the volumes are modest. Writing for The Times of Central Asia, Central Asia analyst Bruce Pannier noted that amid strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as between Pakistan and India, completion of the entire TAPI pipeline remains a distant prospect. He argued that supplying Herat alone could demonstrate to potential investors that the pipeline actually works.

The memorandum signed on August 10 has offered little clarity on price, volumes and start dates. Afghanistan has separately proposed negotiating a long-term contract and pricing formula, while the gas distribution network in Herat still needs to be developed.

The governor’s statement that the Herat section of TAPI could be operational within two months therefore does not necessarily mean that commercial deliveries to end users will begin at the same time. The trunk pipeline section must first be completed, commercial terms agreed, and local distribution infrastructure prepared.

Turkmenistan Gas Exports: Could Tajikistan Become a New Market?

Turkmenistan has the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, but most of its gas exports still go to China. Ashgabat has spent years seeking other markets and is again looking to potential customers elsewhere in Central Asia. Uzbekistan already buys Turkmen gas, while Tajikistan remains a potential customer.

The prospect drew renewed attention after Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin visited Turkmenistan on August 20–21. During meetings with President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, the two sides discussed trade, transport, energy, and other areas of cooperation. The published accounts of the talks, however, made no mention of new gas supplies.

The Idea Dates Back to 2023

At an August 2023 summit in Ashgabat, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed to cooperate on supplies of natural gas, oil, petroleum products, and electricity. They instructed their energy ministries to discuss joint projects.

After the summit, Meredov identified Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as priority markets in the region. At the time, Turkmenistan said it planned to increase gas production by at least 60 billion cubic meters in the coming years, citing further development of Galkynysh, one of the world’s largest gas fields.

State-owned Turkmengaz and UzGasTrade subsequently agreed on annual supplies of up to 2 billion cubic meters under a short-term contract and discussed a longer-term arrangement.

The contract came as Uzbekistan became a net importer after decades as a gas exporter, with domestic production declining and demand rising. Output fell further in 2025 and the first half of 2026.

Any Turkmen gas bound for Tajikistan would have to pass through Uzbekistan because the two countries do not share a border. Tajikistan already imported around 267 million cubic meters of Uzbek gas in 2024, but Turkmen supplies would require a separate commercial arrangement.

No prices, volumes, or timetable have been announced, leaving the plan on paper.

A Small Market, but a Short Route

Tajikistan cannot replace China as a market for Turkmen gas. Hydropower provides almost all of its electricity, and its potential demand for imported gas is far smaller than China’s.

In February, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan’s former president and current chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, described diversifying gas exports as one of the country’s main priorities.

Turkmenistan’s landlocked position leaves it dependent on where its pipelines lead. The main route runs east through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, carrying around 30 billion cubic meters of gas to China each year via the Central Asia–China pipeline.

That reliance may deepen after China National Petroleum Corporation reached an agreement with Turkmenistan in April to develop the fourth phase of Galkynysh. The $5.1 billion project is expected to add 10 billion cubic meters of annual gas-processing capacity.

Bigger Alternatives Are Moving Slowly

The best-known alternative is the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Although construction began on its Afghan section in 2024 after decades of discussion, the pipeline remains far from delivering gas to Pakistan or India. By August 2026, Afghan authorities said 116 kilometers had been laid.

Afghanistan’s role could expand from transit country to gas buyer. On August 10, Afghan Gas and Turkmengaz signed a memorandum on purchases under the TAPI framework, although prices and volumes remain undetermined.

The memorandum also envisages cooperation to develop infrastructure in Herat Province to supply gas to businesses, power plants, and households.

In 2025, Turkmen gas began flowing to Turkey through Iran under a swap arrangement. Turkmengaz said in October that supplies had been suspended after the sides failed to agree on volumes or price.

Even further from implementation, the proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline would carry Turkmen gas across the Caspian seabed to Azerbaijan and then through the South Caucasus and Turkey to Europe, but construction has not begun.

Growing energy demand across Central Asia, driven by population growth and industrial expansion, is creating more opportunities for regional trade.

A contract with Tajikistan would give Turkmenistan another market without requiring a separate transcontinental pipeline. Deals of this scale may offer the quickest path to diversification while larger projects remain stalled or incomplete.

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean. Iran, for its part, is interested in access to Kazakhstan’s Aktau and Kuryk ports on the Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan Has Already Hit the Sanctions Barrier In late July, Sadegh traveled to Turkmenistan, where she met President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov. The talks covered transport, energy, communications, construction, and other economic projects. That relationship has already collided with U.S. sanctions. In 2024, Turkmenistan agreed to supply Iraq with up to 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually through a swap arrangement: Turkmen gas would go to Iran, with Iran sending an equivalent volume to Iraq. U.S. sanctions on Iran eventually scuttled the plan. The precedent shows how restrictions aimed at Tehran can block a Central Asian export even when the underlying commercial deal was between Turkmenistan and a third country. Tajikistan Needs Routes and Fuel Tajikistan was another focus of Iranian outreach. On August 15, a Tajik delegation in Tehran that included Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma held talks with Iranian officials. Sadegh discussed transport and logistics cooperation with the delegation, while Tehran also encouraged Tajikistan to consider greater use of Chabahar and logistics infrastructure in Iran. A broader transport project had already emerged by then. Tajikistan, Iran, and Afghanistan agreed in July to launch a joint road corridor and created a permanent trilateral working group. The agreement was publicly reported in early August. The route could later be extended to other Central Asian countries and China. For Dushanbe, however, the most immediate issue is fuel. On August 15, Juma met Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad in Tehran. They discussed supplies of diesel and aviation fuel, Iranian crude for processing at Tajik refineries, and the possibility of preferential pricing. During the first six months of 2026, 432,800 metric tons of freight moved between the two countries, up 17.5% from a year earlier. Nearly 334,000 tons moved by rail and about 99,000 tons by road. Tajikistan has now asked Iran for a total of 2.55 million tons of crude and petroleum products, including 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel. There is a political dimension as well. During talks with the Tajik delegation, Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref proposed discussing the creation of an association of Persian-speaking countries and regions. For Tehran, linguistic and cultural ties with Tajikistan remain an additional channel for strengthening relations, although Dushanbe’s current negotiations have a largely practical focus: transport, energy, and fuel. Uzbekistan Calculates the Cost of Disruption An Uzbek delegation arrived in Tehran at almost the same time. For Tashkent, relations with Iran are particularly closely tied to transit. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Economy and Finance has estimated potential losses from disruptions to foreign trade and logistics caused by instability in the Middle East at $1 billion to $1.5 billion, equivalent to about 0.7% to 1% of GDP. In 2025, roughly 9% of Uzbekistan’s imports and 10% of its non-gold exports passed through Iran. On August 17, Uzbekistan’s First Deputy Foreign Minister Bakhromjon Aloyev met in Tehran with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Diplomacy Hamid Ghanbari. Among the main subjects were transport and transit links, improving existing routes, and increasing freight volumes between the two countries. Aloyev also met Sadegh on August 18. Those talks again focused on transport and transit, including international corridors, logistics efficiency, and conditions for increasing freight traffic. Iran’s geography gives landlocked Uzbekistan another route toward southern seaports. The Limits of Isolation Iran’s economic ties with Central Asia have not been shrinking in recent months: Kazakhstan has signed a 27-year agreement for a terminal at Iran’s largest commercial port; Tajikistan is seeking Iranian fuel and new transport routes; Uzbekistan is calculating the potential cost of disruptions to trade that passes through Iran; and Turkmenistan is continuing negotiations with Tehran on transport, energy, and wider economic cooperation. For Tehran, Central Asia offers a way to maintain and expand economic links under external pressure. For the region itself, relations with Iran rest on more pragmatic interests: ports, transit, fuel, and access to markets south of Central Asia. Trump’s latest threat therefore poses a question for Central Asian governments that is less about political support for Iran than about the economic cost of joining its isolation. For the region, pulling back from cooperation with Tehran could also mean giving up one of the few direct overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.