19th Century Photographs of Central Asia on Display in Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan’s Museum of Fine Arts is showcasing the work of Paul Nadar, a French photographer who documented daily life, ancient ruins and a Russian imperial railway during a three-month trip in Central Asia in the late 19th century.
People in traditional dress are seen in some of the photos in the museum exhibition, offering a glimpse of local society at a time when much of Central Asia was unfamiliar to many in Western Europe. One image shows a solitary figure beside the railway in the Karakum Desert, an expanse that covers much of modern Turkmenistan. Others depict people on horseback. Simple dwellings and a railway bridge over water are shown.
There are also photos of the ruins of a mosque, mausoleums, the citadel gate and other places in Merv, an oasis city on the Silk Road whose history stretches back several thousand years. Today, the remnants of Merv are in Turkmenistan and are on UNESCO’s world heritage list.
Paul Nadar, son of a prominent photographer widely known by the pseudonym Nadar, traveled in the region in 1890, according to the exhibition titled “Journey Through Turkmen Lands.”
“He was gathering materials for the First International Exhibition dedicated to the development of the Trans-Caspian Railway, which was scheduled to open in Tashkent,” reported Turkmenistan: Golden Age, a state media outlet. At that time, the publication said, the railway “symbolized modernization and the opening of Central Asia to Europe.”
The railway primarily served Russian imperial interests. The Russian military built it in the late 19th century as it solidified control in Central Asia, roughly following old Silk Road trade routes. Today, those routes are the basis for east-west transport channels associated with the developing Middle Corridor network.
Paul Nadar used Kodak and Nadar Express Détective instant cameras to take over 1,800 photographs during his trip in the Turkistan region of the Russian empire, in what are today Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, according to the Getty philanthropic institution, which has an album of photos from the trip. It said photos from Nadar’s journey were shown not only at the Tashkent exhibition in 1890, but also at several World’s Fairs during that decade. The images were available for purchase at Nadar’s studio in Paris, Getty said.
The photo exhibition in Ashgabat, which includes only a portion of Nadar’s work in Central Asia, opened last week and runs until June 23. It was organized with the help of the French embassy and cultural center in Ashgabat.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Soon
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be discussing the latest report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference with special guest Samuel Doveri-Vesterbye, Director of the European Neighborhood Council.
ILO Reports Rise in Child Labor in Turkmenistan’s Cotton Fields
The International Labour Organization has reported a rise in child labor during Turkmenistan’s 2025 cotton harvest, despite improvements in some working conditions and continued cooperation with the government. The findings were published in the ILO’s second consecutive assessment of labor conditions during the country’s cotton campaign. The monitoring mission was conducted between August 28 and November 4, 2025, across all five regions of Turkmenistan. Observers interviewed 1,611 cotton pickers, 458 farmers, and 1,415 public-sector employees, as well as local officials and farm managers. Children were not interviewed for safety reasons, meaning conclusions regarding child labor were based on direct observations by monitors and testimony from adult respondents. One of the report’s most significant findings was a sharp increase in reports and observations of children in cotton fields. The share of cotton pickers reporting the presence of children in the fields rose to 20% in 2025 from 11% a year earlier. Among public-sector employees surveyed, the figure increased from 14% to 18%, while among farmers it rose from 17% to 34%. ILO monitors themselves encountered children during 38% of field visits, compared with 23% in the previous year’s assessment. The highest incidence was recorded in Dashoguz Region, where children were observed on 59% of surveyed fields. Comparable figures were 41% in Mary Region, 28% in Lebap Region and 25% in Ahal Region. The report also documented increased interference by local officials in monitoring activities. Attempts to influence inspections were recorded during 35% of field visits in 2025, up from 23% in 2024. Interference was also reported during 34% of inspections involving public institutions. In Dashoguz Region, officials were present during interviews with public-sector employees in 62% of cases, according to the report. The use of public-sector workers during the cotton harvest also continued. Twelve percent of surveyed government employees said they participated in cotton picking, while around one in five of those respondents said they had been sent to the fields by employers, officials, or farming associations. Fifteen percent of farmers reported seeing public-sector employees or military personnel working in the fields. The report found that concerns about negative consequences for refusing cotton work also increased. Fifteen percent of pickers reported fearing repercussions, compared with 12% a year earlier. Nearly one-quarter of surveyed public-sector employees expressed similar concerns. Respondents cited fears of losing social benefits, employment, income, or social standing within their communities. Meanwhile, the ILO reported improvements in several labor indicators. The share of workers earning below the official minimum wage fell from 29% to 13%, while average pay increased from 4.6 cents to 4.9 cents per kilogram of cotton harvested. Access to drinking water and food also improved. However, significant challenges remain. Only 7% of cotton pickers had written employment contracts, down from 22% in 2024. More than half of workers lacked at least one required piece of protective equipment, while 11% reported health problems during the harvest. The ILO noted that cooperation with the Turkmen government has resulted in some reforms, including amendments to the Labor Code that removed several exemptions from prohibitions on forced labor. The ILO cautioned that the findings identify trends in monitored areas and should not be read as a nationwide estimate. A joint roadmap between the government and the ILO, originally covering 2024-2025, has been extended through 2026. Priorities include further legal reforms, research into the causes of child labor, improvements in wage incentives, and efforts to address structural pressures affecting the cotton sector.
From Culture to Critical Minerals: C5+1 Opens Busy U.S. Week in Central Asia
The United States and Central Asia moved another part of the C5+1 agenda into a working-level form on June 5, when culture officials from the five Central Asian states and Washington met in Tashkent. The meeting came just days before a separate C5+1 critical minerals session in Astana, giving the week a wider agenda: cultural heritage, public diplomacy, mining, investment, and supply chains are now moving forward in the same regional format.
The Tashkent meeting brought together Uzbekistan's Minister of Culture Ozodbek Nazarbekov, Kazakhstan's Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balayeva, Kyrgyzstan's Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy Mirbek Mambetaliev, Tajikistan's Minister of Culture Matluba Sattoriyon, Turkmenistan's Deputy Minister of Culture Gurbanmurad Miradaliev, and Sarah Rogers, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The agenda covered cultural and humanitarian cooperation, joint cultural projects, creative exchanges, and the protection and promotion of cultural heritage.
Participants discussed a permanent C5+1 Working Group on Culture, a C5+1 Culture and Innovation Forum, closer cooperation in the creative industries, and more places for Central Asian cultural professionals in U.S. education and exchange programs. Uzbekistan also proposed joint English for Culture centers with U.S. partners at cultural education institutions.
In practical terms, that could mean joint training for museum staff, touring exhibitions, film and music exchanges, English-language programs for curators and cultural managers, and U.S.-backed workshops for people working in heritage, tourism, and the creative industries. For Uzbekistan, the proposed centers would give the agenda a physical base inside cultural education institutions rather than leaving it at the level of declarations.
The meeting ended with a protocol, which reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the cultural heritage agenda adopted after the Washington summit in November 2025. The International Institute for Central Asia said it covered cooperation through joint events and festivals in art, literature, theater, cinema, and music. Kazakhstan's side also tied the discussion to museum partnerships, digitization of heritage, professional exchanges, tourism routes, and digital projects.
The Tashkent talks grew out of the C5+1 leaders’ meeting in Washington, where culture joined a wider list of priorities. That summit marked ten years of U.S. engagement with the region through the format, which began in 2015 and has since expanded from foreign-minister meetings to expert groups and presidential-level summits. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the November 2025 summit shifted the format from broad diplomacy toward deliverable agreements, with critical minerals, aviation, supply chains, and business ties among the main areas of focus.
Culture fits into that agenda, as Central Asian governments see heritage, tourism, film, music, museums, and the creative industries as economic sectors as well as identity markers. For the United States, public diplomacy gives Washington a way to stay active in the region outside security and energy talks. It also gives the C5+1 a soft-power layer, using language programs, museum links, heritage projects, and creative exchanges to build influence without framing the relationship only around security or resources.
Heritage protection has a security side as well. Trafficking in cultural property often overlaps with border management, customs work, and law enforcement. Digital records, shared museum practices, and professional training can help countries document sites and objects before they are damaged, stolen, or moved abroad. Turkmenistan's coverage of the meeting noted attention to museums, research centers, digitization, and the U.S. Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation, which has supported restoration and preservation projects in the region.
A current example is the Sher-Dor Madrasah in Samarkand, where Rogers, Uzbekistan Art and Culture Development Foundation Chairperson Gayane Umerova, and U.S. Ambassador Jonathan Henick marked the completion of the first phase of an AFCP-backed façade restoration project on June 3. The same event also produced a five-year cooperation roadmap between the foundation and the U.S. Embassy covering culture and heritage preservation.
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The Sher-Dor Madrassa; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption]
The American calendar goes beyond culture. Rogers is on a May 27-June 10 regional trip with stops including Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In Tashkent, she also met Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov for talks on education, culture, information exchange, and public diplomacy. That placed the C5+1 culture meeting inside a larger set of bilateral and regional conversations.
The next stop for the format is Astana. The current AMM 2026 program lists C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue activity on June 10, immediately before the Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress on June 11-12, which will bring Kazakhstan’s critical minerals sector, investment agenda, and role in global supply chains into sharper focus. The official program includes panels on investment conditions, taxation, transport and logistics, copper as a strategic metal, and the move from mineral resources to investment projects.
The program also lists B2B and B2G meetings, as well as a June 13 industrial tour to a Qarmet enterprise, giving the congress a direct business-development and site-visit component.
Those panels point to the kind of work investors usually need before projects move forward: clearer tax terms, transport routes for getting ore and processed metals to market, bankable project lists, and agreements on where processing will take place. Copper is a useful example because it links mining directly to power grids, electric vehicles, data centers, and other parts of the global energy transition.
Kazakhstan has strong reasons to host this event as it seeks more processing inside the country, more foreign capital, and better access to high-value industrial chains. The AMM organizers say the congress will place Central Asia's role in global supply chains of strategic resources at the center of the discussions. The exhibition plans participation from companies and groups from Kazakhstan, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, the United States, and others.
The scale is already significant. The International Trade Administration says Kazakhstan accounted for 39% of global uranium production and 48.8% of global natural uranium exports, while hard minerals and metals made up 18% of the country’s exports by value in 2024. Refined copper exports alone generated $2 billion that year, with zinc exports at $788 million and silver at $588 million.
Kazakhstan is also trying to turn early-stage rare earth potential into bankable projects. In 2025, Kazakh officials announced the discovery of the Zhana Kazakhstan rare earth deposit, with estimated resources of more than 20 million metric tons and containing neodymium, cerium, lanthanum, and yttrium, though Reuters reported that no developer or timeline had yet been specified.
For Washington, critical minerals have become one of the strongest economic reasons to keep the C5+1 format moving. The United States wants supply chains that are less vulnerable to political pressure, export controls, and transport bottlenecks. Central Asian governments want technology, finance, new routes to markets, and a larger share of the value from their own resources. The format also suits the region’s multi-vector approach: it gives all six governments involved a common forum, while each Central Asian state keeps working bilaterally with other partners.
Kazakhstan enters the critical minerals race with an advantage many countries lack: an industrial base already in place. The country has substantial mining, smelting, and metallurgical capacity, active geological exploration, growing technical and laboratory infrastructure, and long-running partnerships with international energy and mining companies, including Chevron’s presence through Tengizchevroil since 1993. The next step is to expand domestic processing, attract more investment in critical minerals, and capture more of the value chain inside the country. For U.S. companies, that means looking beyond access to raw materials and assessing where refining, logistics, equipment supply, geological services, environmental technologies, and long-term offtake agreements could fit.
The sequence building up to Astana shows how the format is changing. Leaders set broad priorities in Washington last November. Ministers and sector officials are now turning those priorities into practical areas of work. Culture may produce working groups, exchanges, festivals, and digitization projects, while minerals may produce project lists, roundtables, investment contacts, and long-term purchase talks.
That does not mean all proposals will become funded programs, but it does show that the C5+1 is becoming more regular and more specific. For Central Asia and the United States, that is the point. After the meetings, the real measure will be whether funded programs, signed contracts, and regular work continue after the summit photos have faded.
For more on the Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress and Exhibition 2026, see our special coverage.
Megaprojects Instead of Quotas: How Central Asia’s Water Diplomacy Is Changing
Central Asia’s water politics are moving beyond Soviet-era quotas. As glaciers in the Tien Shan retreat and climate pressure increases, river management has become a question of energy security, food production, and regional stability. The Soviet-era system of river-water allocation has reached its limits, forcing Central Asian states to look beyond traditional negotiations and toward joint ownership of strategic water infrastructure. Even as regional governments learn to cooperate more closely, a new challenge is emerging on Central Asia’s southern frontier, one that could disrupt the region’s hydrological balance. The Illusion of Control Formally, Central Asia’s water resources are governed through a network of interstate institutions. The principal mechanisms are the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). On paper, the system appears effective. Twice a year, ahead of the spring-summer irrigation season and the autumn-winter period, representatives of the region’s countries meet to approve water-withdrawal quotas from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. At the end of 2025, for example, officials meeting in Ashgabat agreed on water allocations for 2026, setting total withdrawals from the Amu Darya at nearly 55.4 billion cubic meters. This framework has helped prevent open interstate conflicts by providing a permanent forum for dialogue. However, its foundation remains the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which essentially preserved a Soviet-era quota system designed for a single centrally planned state rather than a group of independent countries with competing interests. The greatest weakness of the system is the absence of any meaningful enforcement mechanism. If one country exceeds its agreed allocation during a drought year, there are no legal or economic penalties. Disputes are instead resolved through emergency negotiations between ministries or, in some cases, direct interventions by heads of state. A system dependent on political goodwill and personal relationships is increasingly fragile in an era of climate stress. Turning Water Disputes Into Joint Investments As the quota system shows signs of strain, Central Asian countries have begun experimenting with a more pragmatic approach: shared ownership of infrastructure. The central paradox of the Syr Darya basin is that upstream and downstream countries need water at different times of the year. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the river’s headwaters, require releases in the winter to generate electricity and heat their cities. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, need that same water in summer to irrigate millions of hectares of farmland. Winter releases often flow downstream when demand is low, while shortages emerge during the peak agricultural season. The proposed solution is the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant on Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn River, a project now estimated to cost around $4.2 billion. What makes the project unusual is its ownership structure. Under a 2024 agreement, Kyrgyzstan will hold a 34% stake, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will each own 33%. By investing billions of dollars in infrastructure located outside their territory, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are effectively purchasing seats at the decision-making table. As shareholders, they gain a direct role in determining reservoir operations, helping ensure water is stored during winter and released according to agricultural needs in summer. For Kyrgyzstan, the project promises greater energy independence. For downstream states, it offers more predictable water management. In that sense, economic incentives may prove more reliable than traditional intergovernmental agreements. The Qosh Tepa Canal and the Domino Effect While Central Asian states are developing new models of cooperation on the Syr Darya, a potentially far greater challenge is emerging in the Amu Darya basin. The Taliban authorities in Afghanistan are pressing ahead with construction of the massive Qosh Tepa Canal in the country’s north. Stretching 285 kilometers and measuring roughly 100 meters in width, the canal could divert as much as 25% to 30% of the Amu Darya’s total flow, according to some estimates. The problem is not only the scale of the project, but its construction methods. Because Afghanistan remains largely isolated from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the canal is being financed primarily through domestic revenues. To reduce costs, large sections are being excavated through sandy terrain without concrete lining, increasing the risk of substantial water losses through seepage. At first glance, Kazakhstan may appear distant from the issue, with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan likely to bear the immediate impact. Yet because Central Asia’s hydrological system functions as an interconnected network, the consequences could ripple across the region. Faced with reduced water availability from the Amu Darya, Uzbekistan could seek to compensate by increasing withdrawals from the Syr Darya basin. Kazakh political figure Azamatkhan Amirtayev has warned that this could reduce water flows into Kazakhstan by as much as 30% to 40%. The effects could fall hardest on rice farmers in Kazakhstan’s Kyzylorda Region, agricultural producers in Turkistan Region, and the fragile recovery of the North Aral Sea. Searching for a New Framework Afghanistan presents a particularly difficult challenge because it lies outside the existing regional water-management framework. Kabul has not signed the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and is not bound by ICWC allocation quotas. Recognizing the risks, Uzbekistan, likely to be the first country directly affected, offered assistance to Afghanistan in the spring of 2026, proposing support for engineering work and concrete lining of the Qosh Tepa Canal to reduce water losses and improve efficiency. Today, Central Asia’s water-security architecture is being pulled in two directions. The region is moving toward a more pragmatic model, with stability built through joint investment and shared ownership of strategic infrastructure. Yet it remains vulnerable to external shocks that lie beyond its control. The shift from quotas to investment-driven cooperation also creates a new challenge: ensuring that multibillion-dollar agreements are respected and enforced. For that reason, Kazakhstan has proposed creating a Specialized International Water Organization under the auspices of the United Nations. As water management becomes more closely tied to infrastructure finance and regional security, Kazakhstan argues that a neutral international body could help strengthen cooperation over this most vital resource.
UNDP Opinion: Central Asia – Shared Wildlife, Shared Landscapes, Shared Responsibility
As global leaders gather for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly in Samarkand, Central Asia has an opportunity to send a clear message to the world: protecting biodiversity is not only about saving species — it is about securing water, livelihoods, resilience and long-term stability for millions of people across our region.
From the glaciers of the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains to the deserts, steppes and river basins downstream, Central Asia’s ecosystems are deeply interconnected across borders. Rivers flow between countries. Wildlife migrates through shared landscapes. Mountain ecosystems regulate water systems that sustain agriculture, energy production and communities far beyond the highlands themselves.
Among the most powerful symbols of this shared natural heritage is the snow leopard — the silent guardian of Central Asia’s mountains.
The snow leopard represents far more than a rare and iconic species. Its survival reflects the health of entire ecosystems that millions of people depend upon every day. Healthy mountain landscapes help secure freshwater resources, reduce disaster risks, sustain pastures and agriculture, preserve biodiversity, and strengthen resilience to climate change across the region.
But today, these ecosystems are under growing pressure.
Climate change is accelerating glacier melting and intensifying water stress. Land degradation, unsustainable grazing, habitat fragmentation and biodiversity loss are placing increasing pressure on fragile mountain environments and rural livelihoods. Communities living closest to nature are often the first to feel the consequences — through declining water availability, degraded pastures, reduced agricultural productivity and increasing climate-related risks.
These challenges do not stop at national borders. And neither can the solutions. Only a coordinated regional response can match the scale of the challenge.
Protecting Central Asia’s mountain ecosystems requires countries to work together to conserve ecological corridors, strengthen transboundary protected areas, improve water and land governance, and invest in climate-resilient livelihoods for communities whose futures are closely tied to nature.
There are already successful examples of regional agreements. For example, a highly successful transboundary nature conservation agreement in Central Asia protects the Ustyurt Plateau and the Turan Temperate Deserts. Spanning across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this initiative has successfully safeguarded vulnerable ecosystems and migratory species like the saiga antelope and snow leopard.
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Photo: Saiga calf. Kazakhstan/UNDP Kazakhstan[/caption]
It is encouraging that transboundary cooperation has already taken shape across the region.
Across Central Asia, governments, communities and development partners are already demonstrating that conservation and development can advance together. While each country's experience is unique, the lessons are remarkably similar: when communities benefit from healthy ecosystems, nature and people both thrive.
In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard has become one of the clearest examples of how coordinated conservation efforts can help restore fragile ecosystems across borders. The species inhabits mountain systems that extend beyond national boundaries into China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, making its protection inseparable from regional cooperation.
Over the past decade, habitat countries have strengthened efforts to protect the species through national conservation strategies, expanded protected areas, and improved ecosystem monitoring. Supported by cooperation between the Government, UNDP, the Global Environment Facility, and the scientific community, large-scale monitoring and habitat conservation initiatives have generated new data on snow leopard populations and migration routes across the Tien Shan and Altai Mountain systems.
In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard population had declined to an estimated 80–100 animals by the mid-1990s, as habitat degradation, human pressure, and ecosystem fragmentation intensified across mountain landscapes. Over the years, systemic interventions, including digital monitoring, the establishment of a genetic bank, and studies of behavior and migration routes, helped support the creation of the Merke Regional Nature Park in 2026, strengthening the protection of critical habitats and ecological corridors shared across borders.
Today, the population is estimated at 152–189 snow leopards, with around 70 percent of the species’ range in Kazakhstan now falling within protected areas.
The growing snow leopard population, a symbol of the “health” of mountain ecosystems, shows that countries can create the conditions needed to conserve this rare and majestic species. It also demonstrates how biodiversity conservation in Central Asia increasingly depends on long-term regional cooperation, scientific collaboration, and shared responsibility for ecosystems that connect communities across borders.
For Kyrgyzstan, the snow leopard has become far more than a symbol of a rare species. It represents a broader commitment to safeguarding the mountain ecosystems that underpin water security, biodiversity, climate resilience, and the well-being of millions across Central Asia.
A longstanding symbol of strength, freedom, and harmony with nature, the snow leopard was officially designated a national symbol of the Kyrgyz Republic, reflecting the country’s deep connection to its mountain heritage.
As one of the world’s most mountainous countries, Kyrgyzstan views the conservation of snow leopard landscapes as both a national and regional priority. Protecting these habitats also means safeguarding forests, pastures, glaciers, snowfields, and watersheds that sustain communities and economies far beyond national borders. Recognizing their critical role in maintaining biodiversity and freshwater resources, Kyrgyzstan has established a legal basis for the protection of glaciers and snowfields and is developing mechanisms for their long-term conservation.
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Photo: UNDP Kyrgyzstan/Vlad Ushakov[/caption]
Kyrgyzstan has also used snow leopard conservation as a platform for advancing mountain resilience and regional cooperation. The country championed the UN Five Years of Action for the Development of Mountain Regions (2023–2027), supported the establishment of International Snow Leopard Day, and promotes transboundary cooperation through GSLEP, regional agreements, and joint conservation efforts among range countries.
Kyrgyzstan’s experience demonstrates how conserving one iconic species can unite countries around a shared agenda for mountain resilience, biodiversity conservation, water security, and sustainable development.
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Photo: Snow leopard’s habitat/UNDP Tajikistan[/caption]
High in the mountains of Tajikistan, people have lived alongside snow leopards for generations. But for many years, life was becoming harder for both. Shrinking pastures and disappearing wildlife pushed communities and predators into conflict. When snow leopards attacked livestock, families suffered. And when wild prey disappeared, the future of the snow leopard became uncertain.
Today, there is hope.
According to the 2025 edition of Tajikistan’s national Red Book, the country’s snow leopard population has grown to around 500 individuals — nearly double the estimated 250 recorded in 2017. Behind these numbers is a powerful lesson: protecting nature only works when local people are part of the solution.
A conservation project led by UNDP and funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) helped mountain communities enhance their livelihoods while protecting wildlife. Women in remote villages were trained in wildlife monitoring and ecotourism, gaining new opportunities while helping monitor and protect nature.
Altogether, 450 people from remote mountain areas, including protected area rangers and community members, strengthened their skills in smart patrolling and wildlife monitoring through project-supported trainings. These enhanced capacities improved wildlife tracking and threat detection, contributing to reduced illegal hunting and tree cutting.
The project also introduced a simple but effective solution to reduce conflict between people and snow leopards. Communities received hay to feed livestock for just 20 extra days in spring, allowing mountain pastures to recover and wild prey to return. With more food in the wild, snow leopards were less likely to attack farm animals.
Most importantly, communities were trusted to lead. Through small grants and local initiatives, they supported restoration of degraded pastures and forests, adoption of sustainable livestock practices, and reduced pressure on fragile mountain ecosystems, helping conserve iconic species while strengthening local livelihoods.
The story of the snow leopard in Tajikistan shows that when communities are empowered, nature can recover too.
Importantly, conservation success was not driven by communities alone. It was also enabled by stronger institutions, enhanced protected area management, expanded wildlife monitoring, and closer cooperation among scientists and conservation agencies. At the same time, while biodiversity frameworks are in place, their implementation depends on the capacities of staff at national and subnational levels. Continued education, skills development, awareness raising and, overall, investment in people remain essential to sustaining conservation efforts.
The return of the snow leopard reflects the recovery of entire mountain ecosystems.
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Photo: UNDP Turkmenistan / Dovlet Rejepov[/caption]
In Turkmenistan, in the Aral Sea Basin, communities are restoring degraded pastures and adopting more sustainable land management practices to improve productivity while reducing pressure on fragile ecosystems. These efforts are helping rural households strengthen resilience to climate change while supporting biodiversity conservation.
Environmental degradation has had significant social and economic consequences, particularly for women and vulnerable households that depend heavily on natural resources for livelihoods and food security. As climate-related pressures such as declining agricultural productivity, degraded grazing lands and increasing water stress intensify, strengthening women’s participation in sustainable resource management and local decision-making is becoming increasingly important.
Across affected landscapes, practical efforts are helping reduce pressure on natural resources while supporting livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. Communities are increasingly engaged in identifying solutions that strengthen resilience, improve resource management, and promote inclusive participation in sustainable local development.
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Photo: UNDP Uzbekistan[/caption]
In Uzbekistan, community-led solutions in biodiversity-rich landscapes are demonstrating how ecosystem protection can go hand in hand with improving everyday life. Among many locally driven initiatives, families like Gulnoza Nuriddinova’s benefited from practical measures such as fencing, which helped protect household gardens and crops from wildlife intrusion and uncontrolled grazing, improving food security and reducing economic losses. For families like Sharofat Fayziddinova’s, access to piped water within the village transformed daily life by eliminating the need for frequent journeys to remote water sources, saving time and effort while improving living conditions.
While these were individual solutions tailored to local needs, together they helped reduce pressure on sensitive natural areas, lower the risk of human-wildlife encounters, and strengthen the relationship between communities and the ecosystems on which they depend. They reflect an important lesson: conservation efforts are most effective when communities benefit directly from environmental protection and become active partners in safeguarding nature.
For people living in mountain and rural areas, biodiversity is not an abstract concept. It is directly connected to water access, food security, incomes, health and resilience. The experiences of communities across Central Asia show that conservation is most effective when it improves people's lives while protecting the ecosystems on which they depend.
Healthy mountain ecosystems help regulate river systems that sustain economies and populations across borders. Degraded forests, pastures and watersheds increase erosion, water insecurity and disaster risks for entire regions downstream. Protecting nature is therefore also an investment in regional stability, economic resilience and human security.
The region has already demonstrated growing cooperation on climate action, biodiversity protection and sustainable natural resource management. Countries are expanding protected areas, strengthening environmental governance and investing in ecosystem restoration. Regional dialogue and collaboration are increasing.
But much more is needed to match the scale of today’s environmental challenges.
If Central Asia is to safeguard its shared natural heritage, three priorities deserve greater attention: investment in transboundary ecological corridors; stronger cooperation on water, land and biodiversity governance; and expanded support for communities whose livelihoods depend directly on healthy ecosystems.
The GEF Assembly provides an important opportunity to strengthen this momentum.
As Resident Representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Central Asia, we believe that with the leadership of the five Central Asian countries, the region can become a global example of how biodiversity conservation, climate resilience and sustainable development can advance together across borders.
The future of the snow leopard, like the future of Central Asia’s shared mountain ecosystems, depends on continued cooperation across borders.
At this moment, we call for stronger partnerships and greater investment in transboundary biodiversity conservation across Central Asia — investment that protects ecosystems while creating opportunity, resilience and hope for the people who call these mountains home.
The snow leopard does not recognize national borders. Neither do rivers, droughts, dust storms or climate impacts. Our response cannot stop at borders either. By investing together in nature, Central Asia can strengthen resilience, create opportunity and protect the ecosystems that sustain future generations.
Washington Links TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik Repeal in Push Toward Central Asia
A notable strategic shift is taking place in U.S. foreign policy, one that could have a long-term impact on the economic architecture of Eurasia. After decades in which Central Asia and the South Caucasus were viewed largely through the lens of security, counterterrorism, and competition with Russia and China, Washington is increasingly emphasizing trade, investment, transport routes, and access to critical minerals. One of the clearest signs of this shift came during a recent hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Senator Steve Daines and Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the implementation of the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) framework, as well as the need to remove the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. At first glance, these may appear to be separate issues: the peace process in the South Caucasus and Cold War-era trade legislation. In reality, however, they are closely connected. Together, they point to a broader U.S. effort to link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Western markets through trade, transport, and investment. In recent years, Republican Senator Steve Daines of Montana has emerged as one of the most active advocates of expanding America’s presence in Central Asia. As co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus and one of the leading proponents of legislative efforts to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions, Daines has consistently argued for stronger trade and investment ties between the United States and the countries of the region. During the hearing, Daines placed particular emphasis on the importance of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, describing it as one of the most underappreciated diplomatic efforts of recent years. According to the senator, resolving the conflict could open the door to a large-scale economic transformation of the wider region. Particularly noteworthy was his reference to a geopolitical concept associated with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In Daines’ formulation, Central Asia represents the “bottle,” while Azerbaijan serves as its “cork.” Opening transport routes through the South Caucasus, he argued, would allow flows of oil, gas, critical minerals, and other resources to move toward Western markets rather than toward Russia, China, or Iran. Daines said this approach helped address some of the most difficult issues in the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement process and laid the foundation for what he called a “landmark agreement” after nearly four decades of conflict. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described TRIPP as an initiative capable of fundamentally transforming Armenia’s economic role in the region. According to Rubio, the framework not only addresses the issue of transport access, which had long been a source of disagreement between Baku and Yerevan, but also creates an opportunity for Armenia to become a major trade and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia. Rubio described TRIPP as central to the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement framework, emphasizing that the project could generate substantial investment flows and attract U.S. companies to infrastructure and transport projects across the region. Washington’s argument is that trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure can give the political settlement a stronger economic base. Unlike many previous peace initiatives, TRIPP is built around tangible economic incentives: trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure development. It is within this broader strategy that the question of repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment acquires new significance. The amendment was adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1974 as a means of pressuring the Soviet Union and other non-market economies that restricted freedom of emigration. The law denied such countries most-favored-nation trade status and imposed additional trade restrictions. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union more than three decades ago, the amendment formally remains in effect for several post-Soviet states, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. Although most of these countries receive annual waivers and effectively enjoy normal trade relations with the United States, the legislation itself remains on the books. At the hearing, Daines described Jackson-Vanik as one of the principal irritants in U.S. relations with both Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia. The senator argued that the restrictions have long since lost their original relevance and continue to impede the development of economic ties. Rubio’s response when asked about the Jackson-Vanik amendment was unequivocal. “It's a detriment. We'd like to see it removed,” the Secretary of State said. Kazakhstan’s ambassador to the United States, Magzhan Ilyassov, welcomed the exchange. “U.S.-Kazakhstan relations are at new heights and your engagement with Central Asia has played a pivotal role in that progress,” Magzhan Ilyassov said on X. He said that removing the “relic” of the Jackson-Vanik amendment would support “the new chapter in the partnership.” For many American policymakers, the issue has long ceased to be merely a trade matter. Today, Jackson-Vanik is increasingly viewed as a symbolic reminder that U.S. policy toward Central Asia still relies in part on instruments inherited from the Cold War era. For business, the issue is certainty. Major investment projects in mining, energy, transport infrastructure, and manufacturing are planned over decades. If normal trade relations depend on annual waivers, companies face an added layer of political and regulatory risk. This is why Congress regularly sees initiatives aimed at granting Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states permanent normal trade relations status. In recent years, such initiatives have attracted support from both Republicans and Democrats. That leaves Washington with a policy contradiction: it is encouraging American companies to invest billions of dollars in the region while maintaining legislative restrictions adopted more than half a century ago for an entirely different geopolitical era. The principal driver of growing U.S. interest in the region remains the desire to diversify global supply chains and reduce dependence on China. Today, Beijing occupies a dominant position in the production and processing of rare earth elements that are essential for batteries, semiconductors, defense products, and technologies associated with the energy transition. According to available estimates, approximately 170 rare earth deposits have been identified across the region. Kazakhstan possesses substantial reserves of tungsten, uranium, and other strategic metals, while Uzbekistan is actively attracting foreign investors to projects involving the extraction and processing of mineral resources. At the C5+1 Summit in Washington in November 2025, Kazakhstan signed agreements with American companies worth approximately $17 billion in aviation, digital technologies, and critical minerals. Uzbekistan also concluded major commercial agreements in the aviation and energy sectors. These projects suggest that Washington increasingly views Central Asia not as a temporary foreign policy priority, but as a long-term component of its economic security strategy. Despite growing U.S. engagement, competition in the region remains intense. China remains Central Asia’s largest single-country trading partner, while the EU is also one of the region’s main trade and investment partners. In 2025, trade between China and the countries of the region reached $106.3 billion. By comparison, trade between the United States and Kazakhstan, Washington’s largest partner in Central Asia, stands at approximately $5.5 billion. Moreover, governments in the region have increasingly pursued multi-vector foreign policies and have shown little interest in choosing openly between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. This means that attitudes in Central Asia and the South Caucasus depend far less on high-profile political statements than on the ability to offer real investment, technology, financing, and infrastructure solutions. The hearing featuring Daines and Rubio was therefore a revealing moment in understanding how Washington’s view of Eurasia is evolving. In that sense, TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik repeal now sit in the same policy frame. One is meant to open new trade and logistics routes. The other would remove a Cold War-era barrier that still complicates American business engagement across the region.
Why the Caspian Is Becoming Eurasia’s New Energy Crossroads
Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East are accelerating the emergence of a new Eurasian energy architecture, with the Caspian region increasingly at its center. In international politics, moments when several global crises simultaneously create opportunities for new centers of influence are rare. Today, a vast area stretching from Central Asia to the South Caucasus is experiencing just such a moment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped Europe’s approach to energy security. Tensions in the Middle East have also raised questions about the reliability of traditional energy supply routes. Meanwhile, the global energy transition is driving demand for both clean-energy sources and alternative transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the Caspian region is no longer viewed as a peripheral economic space. It is increasingly emerging as a critical hub in Eurasia’s evolving energy system. Baku Energy Week 2026 shows how far this shift has come, highlighting Azerbaijan’s transformation from a traditional oil and gas producer into a strategic connector linking Central Asia, Türkiye, Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. One of the forum’s most significant political signals came in the form of a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to participants. His remarks went beyond a routine diplomatic greeting and reflected a broader shift toward a more pragmatic view of global energy policy. Trump described the United States as a strong supporter of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas industry and said the U.S.-Azerbaijan energy partnership would become more important in the years ahead. For much of the past decade, Western energy strategies appeared increasingly focused on rapid decarbonization and climate objectives. However, rising energy prices, Europe’s energy crisis, and growing global electricity demand have prompted policymakers to reassess those priorities. Trump openly reaffirmed support for the oil and gas sector and emphasized that the United States remains a long-standing energy partner of Azerbaijan. More importantly, Washington appears to recognize Baku’s strategic role in global energy security. The Trump administration increasingly views energy security as an element of geopolitical competition and is prepared to support projects that diversify supplies of hydrocarbons and critical raw materials. Speaking at the opening of Baku Energy Week, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said Trump’s policies had helped return energy policy to “normality.” Aliyev also noted that the oil and gas industry had faced sustained pressure from advocates of a rapid energy transition. It was therefore no coincidence that Azerbaijan signed a series of agreements during the forum with major American companies, including Chevron, JPMorgan, Oracle, and Comstock Resources. Particularly noteworthy was a cooperation agreement covering critical minerals and rare earth elements. For Washington, access to these resources is increasingly a matter not only of energy policy but also of technological and national security amid intensifying competition with China. In effect, Washington is beginning to view Azerbaijan as an important platform in a changing Eurasian energy map. While Washington is signaling renewed political backing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains one of the principal architects of the region’s practical integration. Over the past two decades, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have built one of the world’s most successful energy partnerships. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, TANAP, and the Southern Gas Corridor have collectively reshaped Eurasia’s energy geography. At Baku Energy Week, Turkish officials highlighted plans for an “electricity version of TANAP,” involving Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bulgaria, and other Southeast European countries. The concept reflects Ankara’s ambition to expand its energy role beyond oil and gas into electricity transmission and green-energy corridors. For Ankara, this vision extends beyond energy. Türkiye is steadily developing a broader geoeconomic strategy in which Azerbaijan serves as a gateway to Central Asian resources. What is emerging is a new economic axis stretching from Ankara to Baku, Astana, and Tashkent. For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, these developments could prove transformative. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of the region’s export infrastructure has remained oriented toward Russia. The new geopolitical environment is encouraging governments to pursue alternative routes and partnerships. Particular attention is now focused on the Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are working on a subsea electricity cable across the Caspian Sea that would enable exports of Central Asian electricity to Europe via the South Caucasus. The first phase of the feasibility study, backed by the Asian Development Bank and led by CESI, was launched in January 2026. It is assessing the technical, economic, regulatory, and environmental viability of the proposed interconnection. The project is still at the feasibility-study stage, with capacity, routing, financing, and regulatory issues yet to be finalized. For Kazakhstan, the project would also complement growing oil exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route and help reduce dependence on traditional export channels. The most complex element of the emerging regional architecture remains Armenia. Following the 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent decline of Russian influence in the South Caucasus, Yerevan faces a difficult strategic choice. Armenia is seeking deeper ties with the European Union and the United States, but many of the region’s major infrastructure and energy projects are increasingly developing around the Azerbaijan-Türkiye-Central Asia axis. The question of transport integration through Armenia’s Syunik Province has become particularly significant. For Azerbaijan and Türkiye, a route through Syunik is viewed as a logical extension of the Middle Corridor connecting China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. For Armenia, the issue remains highly sensitive and closely tied to sovereignty and national security concerns. Participation could give Armenia access to one of the region’s most important economic initiatives. Domestic sensitivities over the route have contributed to friction between Yerevan and its partners in both the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia’s westward tilt has also sharpened tensions with Moscow. For Russia, these developments present both challenges and opportunities. The Kremlin recognizes that the war in Ukraine has reduced its ability to control regional transport and energy flows. As the Russian economy adapts to sanctions and new trade realities, Central Asian countries are increasingly diversifying their external economic relationships. In the 19th century, the great powers competed for influence in Central Asia in what became known as the “Great Game.” Today, a new version appears to be emerging, but this time, the competition is not primarily over territory. Instead, it revolves around energy corridors, digital infrastructure, rare earth minerals, green-energy projects, and transport networks. The United States is seeking to strengthen alternative energy routes beyond the influence of Russia and China. Türkiye is building a geoeconomic axis linking the Mediterranean to Central Asia. Europe is searching for new guarantees of energy security. China depends on reliable overland routes to keep the Belt and Road Initiative moving across Eurasia. At the center of this evolving geopolitical landscape stands the Caspian region. Its role is no longer limited to oil and gas. As energy exports, electricity transmission, critical minerals, and overland trade routes converge, the Caspian is becoming one of Eurasia’s most important strategic crossroads.
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