Turkmenistan Gas Exports: Could Tajikistan Become a New Market?

Turkmenistan has the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, but most of its gas exports still go to China. Ashgabat has spent years seeking other markets and is again looking to potential customers elsewhere in Central Asia. Uzbekistan already buys Turkmen gas, while Tajikistan remains a potential customer.

The prospect drew renewed attention after Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin visited Turkmenistan on August 20–21. During meetings with President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, the two sides discussed trade, transport, energy, and other areas of cooperation. The published accounts of the talks, however, made no mention of new gas supplies.

The Idea Dates Back to 2023

At an August 2023 summit in Ashgabat, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed to cooperate on supplies of natural gas, oil, petroleum products, and electricity. They instructed their energy ministries to discuss joint projects.

After the summit, Meredov identified Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as priority markets in the region. At the time, Turkmenistan said it planned to increase gas production by at least 60 billion cubic meters in the coming years, citing further development of Galkynysh, one of the world’s largest gas fields.

State-owned Turkmengaz and UzGasTrade subsequently agreed on annual supplies of up to 2 billion cubic meters under a short-term contract and discussed a longer-term arrangement.

The contract came as Uzbekistan became a net importer after decades as a gas exporter, with domestic production declining and demand rising. Output fell further in 2025 and the first half of 2026.

Any Turkmen gas bound for Tajikistan would have to pass through Uzbekistan because the two countries do not share a border. Tajikistan already imported around 267 million cubic meters of Uzbek gas in 2024, but Turkmen supplies would require a separate commercial arrangement.

No prices, volumes, or timetable have been announced, leaving the plan on paper.

A Small Market, but a Short Route

Tajikistan cannot replace China as a market for Turkmen gas. Hydropower provides almost all of its electricity, and its potential demand for imported gas is far smaller than China’s.

In February, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan’s former president and current chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, described diversifying gas exports as one of the country’s main priorities.

Turkmenistan’s landlocked position leaves it dependent on where its pipelines lead. The main route runs east through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, carrying around 30 billion cubic meters of gas to China each year via the Central Asia–China pipeline.

That reliance may deepen after China National Petroleum Corporation reached an agreement with Turkmenistan in April to develop the fourth phase of Galkynysh. The $5.1 billion project is expected to add 10 billion cubic meters of annual gas-processing capacity.

Bigger Alternatives Are Moving Slowly

The best-known alternative is the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Although construction began on its Afghan section in 2024 after decades of discussion, the pipeline remains far from delivering gas to Pakistan or India. By August 2026, Afghan authorities said 116 kilometers had been laid.

Afghanistan’s role could expand from transit country to gas buyer. On August 10, Afghan Gas and Turkmengaz signed a memorandum on purchases under the TAPI framework, although prices and volumes remain undetermined.

The memorandum also envisages cooperation to develop infrastructure in Herat Province to supply gas to businesses, power plants, and households.

In 2025, Turkmen gas began flowing to Turkey through Iran under a swap arrangement. Turkmengaz said in October that supplies had been suspended after the sides failed to agree on volumes or price.

Even further from implementation, the proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline would carry Turkmen gas across the Caspian seabed to Azerbaijan and then through the South Caucasus and Turkey to Europe, but construction has not begun.

Growing energy demand across Central Asia, driven by population growth and industrial expansion, is creating more opportunities for regional trade.

A contract with Tajikistan would give Turkmenistan another market without requiring a separate transcontinental pipeline. Deals of this scale may offer the quickest path to diversification while larger projects remain stalled or incomplete.

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team is covering one of Central Asia's leaders openly calling on Vladimir Putin to bring the war in Ukraine to an end, Russia moving to tear up a number of its military agreements with two Central Asian states, upcoming elections in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, a deepening crackdown on opposition media and journalists in Kazakhstan, and a growing wave of fighting in northern Afghanistan that is already beginning to spill across the border into neighbouring Tajikistan. Before turning to our main story this week, where we look back at the decade since Islam Karimov's death and Shavkat Mirziyoyev's rise to power, and ask just how much Uzbekistan has changed over the ten years since. Special guest: Central Asia journalist and author of Silk Mirage: Through the Looking Glass in Uzbekistan, Joanna Lillis.

Turkmenistan and the New Geopolitics of Silicon

Central Asia is not foreign to the emerging geopolitics of silicon and artificial intelligence (AI). Kazakhstan especially has made itself noticed, joining the US-led Pax Silica initiative in June and the Chinese-led World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in July. Kazakhstan is the only country participating in both initiatives, which is characteristic of Astana’s multi-vector diplomacy. Whilst other Central Asian states have joined WAICO, Turkmenistan, consistent with its permanent neutrality stance, has joined neither. Neutrality, however, does not prevent economic participation, and a case has to be made for Turkmenistan. Two Frameworks for International Cooperation Although both initiatives respond to the same underlying reality - the growing strategic importance of artificial intelligence - they differ in scope and emphasis. Pax Silica is built around the material and economic foundations of AI, focusing on securing and coordinating the physical supply chains that make computation possible and aiming implicitly to reduce reliance on China. WAICO, by contrast, is centered on the political and normative dimension of AI, prioritizing governance, safety standards, and international coordination, where Beijing could push its rhetoric in favour of open-source artificial intelligence as a model for AI development. Taken together, they reflect two complementary but distinct ways of structuring the emerging AI order: one rooted in industrial capacity and supply-chain control, the other in multilateral rules. On that matter, Turkmenistan's possible relevance does not lie in software, semiconductor fabrication or AI regulation, but much further upstream: silicon metallurgy. From Gas to Silicon Silicon is abundant in nature, but transforming it into industrial materials is an energy-intensive process. Quartz or quartzite is used to produce both silicon ferroalloys and silicon metal. Ferrosilicon is principally consumed by the iron and steel industries, where it serves as a deoxidizing and alloying agent. Silicon metal, meanwhile, is used in aluminum alloys and chemical production, while a small share is further purified into the extremely high-purity silicon required by the semiconductor industry. Ferrosilicon should not be presented as a material that goes directly into AI chips. But establishing competitive ferrosilicon production can constitute a first industrial step into the broader family of silicon metallurgy. And Turkmenistan has already begun considering precisely that. In 2020, the Turkmen authorities reported that the Ministry of Industry was studying the production of metallurgical-grade silicon using local resources. Practical tests had already been conducted using quartz sand, metal mixtures and petroleum coke, while the government presented the development of domestic mineral resources as part of a broader strategy of industrialization and export diversification. The ambition became more concrete in January 2024. Turkmenistan's Ministry of Industry and Construction Production launched an international tender for a feasibility study for a ferroalloy plant intended to manufacture ferrosilicon, silicon carbide, and technical silicon. A 2024 feasibility study for such a project envisions a plant in Balkan Velayat capable of producing 15,000 tons of FeSi75 ferrosilicon annually. The proposed complex would operate two 12,500 kVA furnaces. Rather than depending exclusively on domestic raw materials, the study envisages sourcing quartzite from nearby Iran and Uzbekistan, while petroleum coke could be supplied by the Turkmenbashi refinery complex. Electricity would be supplied domestically, while desalinated Caspian water is proposed for the plant's industrial needs. Turkmenistan could therefore position itself not simply as a country possessing one particular resource, but as an industrial processing point. For decades, the country has monetized its enormous natural-gas reserves mainly by exporting gas itself. Energy-intensive metallurgy offers another possibility: using domestic energy to transform comparatively ordinary raw materials into higher-value industrial exports. Electricity in Turkmenistan is among the cheapest worldwide, at around 20$/MWh, making such a project particularly relevant. Access to regional silica resources, domestic petroleum coke, cheap energy and a location between the major markets of Europe and Asia are Ashgabat’s value proposition. A First Step Towards a Silicon Industry Obviously, a 15,000-ton ferrosilicon plant would hardly turn Turkmenistan into a semiconductor powerhouse. Nor is the technological jump from FeSi75 to electronic-grade silicon straightforward. Semiconductor silicon requires purification standards and industrial processes far beyond conventional ferroalloy production. A ferrosilicon industry would create experience in sourcing and testing silica feedstocks, operating large electric furnaces, managing carbon reductants, controlling energy-intensive continuous production and selling silicon-based metallurgical products in international markets. Many of these capabilities are adjacent to the production of silicon metal, which is itself produced from quartz using electric furnaces before undergoing much more sophisticated downstream purification. More importantly, Ashgabat’s own plans have never been limited to ferrosilicon. The 2024 tender explicitly combined ferrosilicon, silicon carbide and technical silicon within the same proposed industrial development. That broader approach is encouraging. Silicon carbide has applications stretching from traditional abrasives and refractories to advanced power electronics, while technical or metallurgical silicon provides a gateway toward much larger downstream value chains. Ferrosilicon could therefore be viewed not as the end product of a Turkmen silicon strategy, but as its industrial entry point. Central Asia's Silicon Geography is Still Being Written The first phase of Central Asia's post-Soviet economic geography was largely shaped by what lay beneath its soil. Kazakhstan exported oil and uranium; Turkmenistan built its external economic relations around natural gas; Uzbekistan developed gold, copper and increasingly diversified manufacturing. The emerging competition around AI could introduce a different logic. The question is increasingly not only who possesses resources, but who can transform them, provide the energy required to process them and connect them to secure international supply chains. Kazakhstan is already making itself very much visible. For Ashgabat, the opportunity may lie precisely in converting its neutrality and abundant energy into an ability to supply several markets without defining the country's future exclusively through one geopolitical camp. If the country can build competitive ferroalloy production and gradually develop silicon metal and related industries around it, it could occupy a much earlier stage of the global AI technology supply chain. In many ways it will depend on Turkmenistan's ability to attract foreign know-how. The geopolitics of silicon and artificial intelligence may be discussed in Washington, Brussels or Beijing, but part of its industrial geography will be determined much further upstream, around quartz, electricity and furnaces.   The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization roadmap in 2023. It is intended to improve real-time exchange of transport data and documents along the corridor. Uzbekistan has also pushed to connect the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway now under construction with the Middle Corridor. At an Organization of Turkic States meeting in May, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for the two routes to be integrated and for customs data exchange to be fully digitalized. In Cholpon Ata, he said the CKU railway would “fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape.” Turkmenistan’s ambassador, Esen Aydogdyyev, gave the same argument a Caspian emphasis. “The Caspian is neither a limit nor a barrier,” he said. He identified simplified customs procedures as a priority and stressed that regional cooperation had to produce tangible results. Aydogdyyev also argued that Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality should not be confused with isolation, presenting it instead as compatible with deeper economic cooperation. The focus on customs and digital systems reflects a persistent weakness in the corridor. The World Bank has identified better coordination, logistics, and digitalization as essential if the Middle Corridor is to handle significantly larger freight volumes and reduce journey times. New railways and terminals can shorten journey times, but those gains can be lost if freight is held up at borders, ports, and transfer points. A Washington Dimension, but Not Yet a C6+1 Washington gave the discussion a U.S. policy dimension. The United States has traditionally dealt with the five Central Asian republics through the C5+1 framework, while Azerbaijan has had separate bilateral and regional channels. Though the Caspian Policy Center gathering was a think-tank event and created no new U.S. diplomatic format, proposals to bring Azerbaijan into a wider U.S.-Central Asian framework are now circulating in Washington policy circles. TCA recently carried an argument for a C6+1 summit, while Ilyassov has proposed that Kazakhstan host a first C6-U.S. meeting. For now, neither has developed into an announced replacement for the established C5+1. The next question is whether the six governments can translate that political momentum into practical cooperation. On October 8, the leaders are due to meet in Turkmenistan’s Avaza National Tourist Zone, where their agenda is expected to include regional security, transport and energy connectivity, water and environmental issues, and deeper cooperation between Central Asia and Azerbaijan. The Washington discussion suggested that the grouping’s ambassadors already see the practical agenda clearly. Customs and data systems need to communicate across borders and rail networks, and Caspian transfers need to connect more smoothly. For landlocked Central Asian exporters, the prize is more reliable access to markets to the west. Whether the C6 becomes a durable regional mechanism will depend on how much of that is actually delivered.

What Do Former Presidents Do? From Akayev to Nazarbayev, the Fates of Central Asia’s Ex-Leaders

Central Asia has produced remarkably few former presidents who simply retired from public life. In Kyrgyzstan, former leaders have been driven from office, prosecuted, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev has followed a different path, largely withdrawing from public view after losing much of his political influence. Elsewhere, some of the region’s founding presidents died in office, leaving no post-presidential career to examine. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined how political succession has developed across the region. The fate of leaders after they leave office reveals another side of that political tradition. The architect of Kyrgyzstan’s early post-Soviet political model was its first president, Askar Akayev, who remained in office until 2005. Akayev introduced democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, but gradually tightened the pressure on his opponents as his presidency progressed. His rule was badly shaken by the Aksy shootings in 2002, which followed the prosecution of opposition lawmaker Azimbek Beknazarov and a territorial dispute with China. Akayev’s government had agreed to transfer disputed border territory to China, a decision fiercely criticized by the opposition. In March 2002, demonstrators in southern Kyrgyzstan demanded Akayev’s impeachment. Security forces opened fire during the unrest, killing several people. The shootings became one of the defining political crises of his presidency. In a 2003 referendum, Akayev significantly strengthened presidential powers at parliament’s expense. Economic hardship, unemployment, widespread corruption, and allegations of fraud in the 2005 parliamentary elections eventually helped trigger the Tulip Revolution in March of that year. Akayev had to flee, with rumors at the time claiming that he was smuggled out in the trunk of an official car, wrapped in a carpet. Criminal cases involving corruption were opened against him and members of his family in Kyrgyzstan. The authorities repeatedly sought his extradition from Russia, but were unsuccessful. After leaving Kyrgyzstan, Akayev lived in Moscow and taught at Moscow State University. In 2006, he became a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In August 2021, Akayev reappeared in Bishkek. He unexpectedly flew into the country and was immediately questioned as part of the criminal investigation into corruption surrounding the Kumtor gold mine. Afterward, he said he had come to Bishkek for a week and was prepared to assist investigators. “I came to speak honestly and sincerely about how we built Kumtor, why we built it, and what mistakes may have been made. The investigation will continue,” he said. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the criminal prosecution of Akayev had been terminated because the statute of limitations had expired. Tajikistan’s former president Rahmon Nabiyev was also forced from power. The former Soviet politician lost power amid the country’s civil war in 1992. He died at his home in Khujand the following year, at the age of 62, reportedly from a heart attack. According to his wife, Nabiyev spent his final months in Khujand in conditions resembling house arrest and received a pension of just five rubles. While Tajikistan did not repeat the experiment of violently removing a ruler, Kyrgyzstan saw another overthrow just five years after the Tulip Revolution. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who had succeeded Akayev as president, was forced to flee, this time not to Moscow but to Minsk. Kazakhstan helped broker Bakiyev’s departure from Kyrgyzstan, as part of international mediation involving Russia, the United States, and the OSCE. Bakiyev was subsequently handed down a series of prison sentences in absentia. In February 2013, a Kyrgyz court convicted him of abuse of office and sentenced him to 24 years. In April 2014, a Bishkek court sentenced Bakiyev in absentia to 25 years in prison for plotting the attempted murder of British businessman Sean Daley. In 2014, the Bishkek Garrison Military Court also sentenced him to life imprisonment over the killing of protesters in Bishkek on April 7, 2010. The Supreme Court reduced that sentence to 30 years in 2016. In 2023, Bishkek’s Pervomaisky District Court sentenced Bakiyev to another 10 years in prison on corruption charges related to the Kumtor gold mine. Taking his previous sentence into account, the court set his final punishment at 30 years in a maximum-security prison, with confiscation of property and a three-year ban on holding public office. The former Kyrgyz president received Belarusian citizenship, as did members of his family. His wife, Nazgul Tolomusheva, died in January 2023. Minsk has repeatedly rejected Kyrgyzstan’s requests for Bakiyev’s extradition. In 2022, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office sent its Belarusian counterpart four extradition requests, along with a request that Bakiyev’s Kyrgyz court sentences be enforced in Belarus. The Belarusian authorities refused to extradite him, citing the risk of political persecution in Kyrgyzstan. In 2025, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko effectively put an end to speculation about whether Bakiyev might be extradited to Kyrgyzstan. “Bakiyev is living well. Fine. We’re not going to let him go back to you. I told him: ‘No more trips, that’s enough! Live in Belarus.’ He’s doing fine. I sometimes visit him when he invites me. So we won’t hand him over to you,” Lukashenko said during a visit to Bishkek. The next elected Kyrgyz president after Bakiyev, Almazbek Atambayev, is also living abroad. In 2024, he and his son were photographed on the Barcelona metro in Spain. Atambayev served as president of Kyrgyzstan from 2011 to 2017. In 2019, he was stripped of presidential immunity amid criminal investigations. Law enforcement officers eventually stormed Atambayev’s residence in the village of Koi-Tash to arrest him after his supporters resisted an initial operation. Several criminal cases were brought against Atambayev. In June 2020, a Bishkek court sentenced him to more than 11 years in prison in connection with the illegal release of crime boss Aziz Batukayev. That conviction was later overturned, and Atambayev was released in February 2023 and allowed to travel abroad for medical treatment. He subsequently settled in Spain. His legal troubles, however, did not end there. In June 2025, a Bishkek court sentenced Atambayev in absentia to 11 years and six months in prison on charges including corruption and organizing mass unrest related to the 2019 events in Koi-Tash. His successor as president and former party ally, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, whose presidency saw the prosecution of Atambayev, remains in Kyrgyzstan and retains the status of a former president. But his future has not always appeared entirely secure. In 2023, members of parliament raised the possibility of stripping him of that status. Such a move would remove his immunity from prosecution and the privileges provided to a former president, including accommodation at a state residence, state protection, transportation, government communications, and free medical care for him and his family. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan provide fewer examples of conventional post-presidential life. Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, died in office in September 2016, so he never became a retired national leader. Turkmenistan’s first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, likewise died while still in power in December 2006. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow presents a different case. He stepped down as president in 2022, when his son Serdar became president, but did not withdraw from political life. He remains chairman of the Halk Maslahaty and is officially described as the National Leader of the Turkmen people. His position is therefore very different from that of a former president who has retired from public affairs. Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, initially left office under very different circumstances. When he resigned in 2019, he retained considerable influence as chairman of the ruling Nur Otan party, lifetime chairman of the Security Council, and holder of the special title of Elbasy, or Leader of the Nation. The capital was renamed Nur-Sultan in his honor immediately after his resignation. That position changed sharply after the unrest of January 2022. Nazarbayev’s remaining political influence was progressively dismantled, while many of the symbols and legal privileges associated with his rule were removed. The capital reverted to Astana later that year, references to his status as Leader of the Nation were removed from the Constitution, and the law granting the first president special privileges and protections was subsequently repealed. The Times of Central Asia has described 2022 as the beginning of the end of Nazarbayev’s remaining rule and influence. Nazarbayev now rarely appears in public, although occasional meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin continue to attract attention. Despite the dismantling of Nazarbayev’s former political position, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has continued to acknowledge his historical role in the formation of independent Kazakhstan. In an interview in January 2025, Tokayev said that Nazarbayev himself initiated the meetings with Putin and that the Russian leader could hardly refuse him. “Nursultan Abishevich initiates these meetings; they are extremely important to him. We should not forget that, as a former chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, a party leader, and later president of sovereign Kazakhstan, he is morally and politically closely connected with the Kremlin. After all, he spent so much time on business trips to Moscow, at congresses and plenums, and on working and official visits,” Tokayev explained. As for the former president’s place of residence, his spokesman, Aidos Ukibay, has repeatedly said that Nazarbayev permanently resides in Kazakhstan. Astana residents may see him again on August 23 at the polling station where the former president is registered. Kazakhstan is holding an election to its new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, on that date. Nazarbayev has continued to appear publicly to vote in elections and referendums in recent years. Across Central Asia, former presidents have followed very different paths. Kyrgyzstan has seen exile, prosecution, and repeated battles over the legal status of former leaders. Tajikistan’s early post-Soviet experience ended with a president forced from power during civil war. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan produced fewer conventional former presidents because their founding leaders died in office, while Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow remains politically prominent despite leaving the presidency. Nazarbayev represents another model, having left office without facing the exile or criminal prosecution experienced by several former Kyrgyz leaders.

Turkmenistan Tightens Diesel Limits as Fuel Shortages Persist

Turkmenistan has halved the amount of diesel that vehicles may carry in their tanks when leaving the country, cutting the limit from 300 to 150 liters from August 10. The charge for every liter above the limit has also risen from 20 manat (about $1) to 30 manat (about $1.50). The move is the second tightening of the rules in several months. According to Chronicles of Turkmenistan, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov signed the relevant decree on August 5. At the beginning of April, vehicles leaving Turkmenistan were limited to 300 liters of diesel in their tanks, with a charge of 20 manat, or about $1 at the market exchange rate, for every additional liter. Enforcement was assigned to the border and customs services, as well as the state-owned concern Turkmenneft, The Times of Central Asia reported. The large price difference between Turkmenistan and neighboring markets creates an incentive to take fuel across the border. In April, The Times of Central Asia reported that diesel in Turkmenistan cost around $0.05 per liter, compared with approximately $1 in Uzbekistan, $0.60 in Kazakhstan, and $0.90 in Russia. Low regulated prices extend beyond diesel. In July, petrol in Turkmenistan cost around $0.43 per liter, placing the country among the world's cheapest markets. By comparison, AI-95 petrol cost about $0.68 in Kazakhstan, approximately $1.02 in Kyrgyzstan, and around $1.34 in Uzbekistan, according to Chronicles of Turkmenistan. Independent media have also reported persistent shortages of petrol and diesel inside Turkmenistan, particularly outside Ashgabat. In July, Turkmen.news reported large queues at filling stations and shortages of both petrol and diesel in the regions. The outlet also published documents indicating problems with aviation kerosene supplies at Ashgabat International Airport. One document from June 2024 said the airport had 2,500 tons of kerosene available, enough for only two to three days at prevailing consumption levels. By December 2024, another document showed reserves had fallen to 728 tons, less than one day's supply. Turkmen.news reported that problems with kerosene allocations continued into 2026. The situation is notable because Turkmenistan produces and refines its own oil. The country has two major refining centers, the Turkmenbashi oil refinery complex on the Caspian Sea and the Seydi refinery in the east. Petroleum products are supplied to the domestic market and also exported. Fuel shortages have occurred repeatedly. In 2024, eastern regions of Turkmenistan experienced serious petrol shortages. Drivers in the Lebap and Mary regions waited for hours at filling stations, while some stations imposed purchase limits. The shortage also disrupted public transport and contributed to higher food prices, The Times of Central Asia reported. The latest border restrictions add another element to this picture. Independent outlets have linked the limits to the wide gap between heavily regulated domestic fuel prices and prices abroad, which creates opportunities for cross-border resale. Halving the diesel allowance to 150 liters further restricts the amount that can leave Turkmenistan in vehicle tanks as reports of domestic shortages continue.

Central Asia and Azerbaijan Extend Cooperation Across the Caspian

Central Asia’s presidential forum now spans both shores of the Caspian. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan anchor the principal Caspian crossing at the center of the Middle Corridor, the rail-and-sea network linking Central Asia to European markets through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Azerbaijan’s full participation brings the corridor’s eastern and western Caspian gateways into the same regular political setting. The six governments can use it to coordinate the transport, energy, digital, and investment links already developing across the Caspian, even though Georgia and Türkiye remain essential to the route’s westward operation. On July 31, 2026, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan signed the Cholpon-Ata Declaration at an informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan in Kyrgyzstan. The Declaration gave formal political expression to cooperation that had already been developing. Official accounts said the leaders emphasized expanded regional cooperation, including trade, transport and logistics, and energy. The full text has not been released, so those priorities come from official accounts rather than the declaration itself. Proposed by Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2017 and first convened in Astana in March 2018, the Consultative Meetings brought together the five Central Asian states in an informal presidential format. They expanded in November 2025 with Azerbaijan’s admission as a full-fledged participant, while retaining their consultative character. Azerbaijan attended in 2023 and 2024 as a guest; Cholpon-Ata was its first informal meeting in the new capacity. Official documents continue to call the format “Central Asia and Azerbaijan.” C6 is analytical shorthand for the enlargement, not the name of a new bloc or formal organization. Azerbaijan’s admission follows several years of practical cooperation. At a ministerial meeting in Aktau on November 25, 2022, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye signed a 2022–2027 roadmap for the simultaneous elimination of bottlenecks and development of the Middle Corridor. At its 2023 Baku summit, the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) adopted a digitalization roadmap and established a multi-partner trust fund, followed by work on digital data exchange and port-to-port cooperation. The transport roadmap includes Georgia and Türkiye, while SPECA also includes Afghanistan; neither is institutionally identical to C6. The enlarged format gives the six governments a regular political setting in which to coordinate existing transport, digital, and investment mechanisms. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association reports that freight through the seaports of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan reached 3.3 million tons in 2024, 20% above the 2023 level, while container traffic within the same scope rose 176% to 56,500 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). Freight remains the principal basis of integration. Oil transit, prospective electricity links, and joint investment instruments are extending cooperation into adjacent sectors. Kazakhstan's use of the route for oil exports is also rising: according to KazMunayGas reports, Kazakhstani oil shipments from Aktau through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan route increased by 34% to 1.4 million tons in 2024. At COP29 in Baku on November 13, 2024, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic-partnership agreement on producing and transmitting green energy, with a prospective Trans-Caspian connection toward European markets. Azerbaijan maintains joint investment funds with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; in July 2026, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said the authorized capital of the Azerbaijan–Kyrgyzstan fund had increased from $100 million to $200 million. Oil transit is already operational. The electricity connection remains prospective, and higher fund capitalization does not establish how much has actually been invested. The corridor rests on complementary infrastructure on both shores of the Caspian. Kazakhstan’s ports at Aktau and Kuryk connect Central Asian rail networks with maritime services, while Azerbaijan’s participation gives the regional format a direct connection to the South Caucasus transport system. The Port of Baku receives Trans-Caspian traffic with a current design capacity of 15 million tons and 100,000 TEU; its reported annual container throughput reached 100,000 TEU in 2025. Modernization of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway has raised its stated freight capacity from one million to five million tons annually. Together, the port and railway define the physical basis of Azerbaijan’s role, while Aktau and Kuryk anchor Kazakhstan’s side of the crossing. Baku is the principal transit node linking the Caspian with Georgia and Türkiye. Neither Georgia nor Türkiye participates in C6, but both remain indispensable to the corridor. The six states can improve coordination across the Central Asian and Trans-Caspian sections, while further development will require cooperation with both countries and investment from European and other international partners. At the 2024 Investors Forum, the EU and its partners announced €10 billion in commitments for sustainable transport connectivity. An EU–EBRD study had identified 33 hard-infrastructure needs and seven soft-connectivity actions; the forum set an objective of approximately fifteen days for transit between Europe and Central Asia. In this sense, western-facing refers to the route’s direction of market access rather than to an exclusive geopolitical alignment. The rapid growth of the Xi’an–Baku service shows that the corridor’s westward development remains compatible with substantial Chinese participation. The service handled 85 rail-sea trips in the first quarter of 2026, a year-on-year increase of 150%, with an average Xi’an-to-Baku transit time of approximately fifteen days and a fastest journey of eleven days. Those timings apply to this service, not to shipments continuing to Europe. Chinese shippers are a growing source of cargo; European markets and financial institutions support the route’s westward commercial development. While not eliminating external dependence, the corridor can strengthen sovereignty by widening the range of routes, markets, and partners available to the participating states. The World Bank gives regional trade along the route at least as much weight as end-to-end traffic between China and Europe. Greater commerce among Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and neighboring markets can reduce exposure to any single transit route and increase governments’ leverage in economic negotiation. It can strengthen economic and political autonomy. A more self-standing regional framework should not be confused with economic self-sufficiency. At Cholpon-Ata, Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said Azerbaijan’s full participation created conditions for a deeper political dialogue and cooperation in investment, energy, industry, and the formation of a unified transport-logistics system. Separately, he proposed an action plan with clear benchmarks to implement the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the Twenty-First Century. Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said Azerbaijan’s inclusion raised cooperation to a new macroregional level and advocated stronger institutions, sectoral links, value chains, digital services, and investment platforms. Aliyev said Central Asia and Azerbaijan had effectively become a single geopolitical and geoeconomic space and pledged Azerbaijan’s active participation in the format. The next step is for the six governments to formulate and implement a common agenda within a format that remains consultative and non-supranational. Regional agency would not emerge from the construction of a centralized authority but from sustained coordination among sovereign states. Turkmenistan has scheduled the eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan for October 8 at Avaza, with trade, economic cooperation, energy, and sustainable transport among the announced fields. The October meeting will show whether the political convergence expressed at Cholpon-Ata can improve corridor operation. Because the route continues through Georgia and Türkiye, both countries will remain essential even though they are outside the format. The C6’s contribution to the Middle Corridor will ultimately be measured by whether it can streamline customs procedures, improve data exchange, make schedules more reliable, and mobilize investment.

The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules

In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days before being officially confirmed. Mirziyoyev, then prime minister, was appointed chairman of the state funeral commission. Under the constitution, Senate Chairman Nigmatilla Yuldashev should have become acting president, but he stood aside and parliament appointed Mirziyoyev instead. During his presidency, Mirziyoyev has transformed Uzbekistan's economy, opened the country to foreign investment, and pursued a far more active foreign policy. Yet the political system has retained its strongly presidential character. The appointment of his daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, as Head of the Presidential Administration in June 2025 has fuelled renewed speculation about possible future succession scenarios, even though the authorities have never publicly discussed the issue. Tajikistan arrived at its current political model by a different route. Emomali Rahmon emerged as the country's leader during the civil war after becoming Chairman of the Supreme Council following the resignation of President Rahmon Nabiyev. When the presidency was restored in 1994, Rahmon assumed the office and has remained there ever since. For years, political analysts and representatives of the Tajik opposition have regarded Rahmon's eldest son, Rustam Emomali – Chairman of the National Assembly and Mayor of Dushanbe – as the most likely successor. Under Article 71 of Tajikistan's Constitution, the president's duties pass to the Chairman of the Majlisi Milli in the event of death, resignation, or incapacity until a newly elected president takes office. Kazakhstan long appeared to be the exception. In March 2019, First President Nursultan Nazarbayev unexpectedly resigned, and under the Constitution the presidency passed to Senate Speaker Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Nazarbayev later acknowledged that he had viewed Tokayev as his preferred successor well before the formal transfer of power. The January 2022 unrest marked a turning point in Kazakhstan's political development. After the crisis, Tokayev significantly strengthened his position, while the reforms that followed eventually culminated in a new Constitution, approved in March 2026 and in force from July 1, which created a vice presidency and further reshaped the architecture of the state. Whether the current model represents another stage in its evolution remains to be seen. In July 2026, the Constitutional Court ruled that Tokayev may seek another presidential term under the new constitutional order, although he has not announced that he will do so. Kyrgyzstan occupies a unique place in this story. President Sadyr Japarov came to power in the aftermath of yet another political upheaval following the disputed parliamentary elections of October 2020. The protests that swept the country led to his release from prison and propelled him to the presidency. One of the central figures behind those events was Kamchybek Tashiyev, who became one of the most influential figures in Kyrgyz politics. Japarov is already the sixth president in Kyrgyzstan's history as an independent state. The 2017 handover from Almazbek Atambayev to Sooronbay Jeenbekov was the country's first peaceful transfer from one elected president to another. Kyrgyzstan has nevertheless experienced repeated presidential upheavals, including revolutions in 2005, 2010, and 2020. For years, Western observers described Kyrgyzstan as Central Asia's "island of democracy." Yet repeated political crises have gradually changed the country's trajectory. The current leadership has steadily strengthened presidential authority, tightened control over political life, and made little secret of its determination to prevent a repeat of past upheavals. The presidential election scheduled for January 2027 is expected to show how firmly that strategy has taken hold. Thirty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has developed its own approach to political succession. It is not a single model. In some countries, continuity increasingly revolves around political families; in others, carefully prepared successors inherit power through established institutions. Kazakhstan has followed a different course, combining constitutional procedures with political reform, while Kyrgyzstan continues to search for a formula capable of delivering stability without repeating the turbulence that has defined much of its modern history. The region's systems differ in form, but they share one objective: ensuring that political transitions remain as controlled and predictable as possible. Perhaps the greatest irony is that Kyrgyzstan – the only Central Asian state where power has repeatedly changed hands through popular protest – is now moving closer to the governance model long associated with its neighbors. How far that transformation will go may become clearer after the presidential election in January 2027.