Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers a heatwave sweeping across Central Asia, anti-Taliban forces briefly seizing a district headquarters in a worrying sign of cracks in the Taliban's control, a shootout between different branches of Kyrgyzstan's security forces near the Uzbek border, promising new talks between Turkmenistan and Georgia, and a major shake-up inside Uzbekistan's presidential security services. Before then turning to our main story this week, where a growing number of countries are working with Central Asian governments to forcibly return Central Asian nationals, often into incredibly dangerous situations. - Steve Swedlow (Associate Professor of the Practice of Human Rights) - Bakhtiyor "Bakh" Safarov (Central Asia Consulting)
A Signal from Uzbekistan: How Turkmen Border Villages Reach the Outside World
In Diýýar, a village in northern Turkmenistan close enough to catch Uzbekistan’s mobile signal, a foreign SIM card inserted into a small Wi-Fi router can turn a barely functioning 2G connection into usable home internet. In early July, police reportedly entered around ten households in the village, identified Uzbek-connected routers, and confiscated the SIM cards. Similar inspections have been under way across close to 60 settlements in Dashoguz Province, according to Radio Azatlyk, the Turkmen Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The campaign covers parts of Shabat and Görogly districts, including Kirov, Diýýar, Bedirkent, Aýlak, and Nyýazow, in areas where Uzbek mobile signals cross the border. The Internet Across the Border What the authorities are removing is more than a foreign phone number. Residents told Radio Azatlyk that Turkmen Telecom internet is either unavailable or extremely slow in several border villages. TMCell, the mobile brand operated by the state-owned Altyn Asyr network, often provides only 2G service, while home Wi-Fi is unavailable. Households able to obtain an Uzbek SIM card use networks such as Ucell and Uztelecom, placing the card in a router that supplies internet throughout the home. Residents said YouTube and Instagram become accessible through these connections, although TikTok and many foreign websites still require a VPN. One resident described the Uzbek service as “300 times” faster than the Turkmen alternative, a personal estimate rather than a measured comparison. The cards arrive through an informal chain of traders and other residents who regularly cross into Uzbekistan. A Dashoguz source said they sell for around 200 manats and that sellers also help buyers complete the registration. The arrangement depends on geography, personal contacts, and a signal strong enough to reach across the frontier. One local source said many people from Dashoguz work abroad, including in Russia, Poland, and Germany. For households with relatives overseas, a usable connection can provide a direct link beyond the village. It also opens independent news sites and social platforms that remain blocked or unreliable on Turkmen networks. Residents confronted by police sometimes say they use the internet only to pass the time, reportedly hoping to avoid a fine. A Signal Treated as Suspicion The reported consequences vary. Some first-time offenders receive a warning, particularly when they cannot afford a penalty. Others are threatened with fines of up to 50,000 manats or imprisonment. That amount is about $14,300 at Turkmenistan’s official exchange rate and roughly $2,500 using the widely reported informal rate. Residents said officers described the use of foreign telecommunications services as possible espionage on behalf of another country. The reports cite no court case or published provision under which simply possessing an Uzbek SIM card constitutes espionage. The threat itself, however, raises the stakes around an ordinary household connection. Police and security officers reportedly do not use specialist equipment to locate the routers. Local sources said they rely instead on informants in villages, schools, and local administrations. They allegedly gather information through schoolchildren as well. Residents who travel regularly to Uzbekistan, including small traders, are said to appear first on lists of suspected users. The authorities have given no public explanation for the campaign. Radio Azatlyk said the Dashoguz provincial administration, police, and the mobile operator did not respond to requests for comment. A source familiar with local law enforcement linked the raids to the details of a murder-suicide in Görogly district appearing online, in which a father was reported to have killed six children before taking his own life. The source said officials suspected that news of the tragedy had reached independent outlets through an Uzbek SIM card. The authorities have not confirmed that explanation. From Uzbek SIM Cards to Starlink This is not the first attempt to close an alternative route to the internet. In July 2024, Podrobno.uz reported raids targeting Uzbek SIM cards in northern and eastern Turkmenistan. The cards were said to be brought across the border by regular travelers and sold through informal dealers. That report put the average price of a usable mobile number at around $450, far above the 200-manat figure cited in the latest account. The difference may reflect a volatile underground market or different costs for cards, registration, and equipment, but neither figure can be independently verified. In April 2026, law enforcement agencies also began nationwide Starlink raids to identify and dismantle satellite equipment. Homes, offices, commercial buildings, and rooftops were searched. Users said the service had gained popularity after connectivity deteriorated in February. Starlink reportedly delivered speeds above 200 Mbps, while Turkmen Telecom packages for the general public offered a maximum of 6 Mbps. The equipment and installation cost between $1,000 and $1,500, putting it beyond the reach of most households. A More Digital State, Under Tight Control The crackdown is unfolding as Turkmenistan promotes a far more ambitious digital future. Its public-services portal advertises more than 500 functions, Arkadag has launched a 5G network, and the government has approved a Digital Economy Development Concept for 2026-2028. A recent TCA review found 3.53 million internet users in October 2025, equivalent to 46.1% of the population. Uzbekistan’s rate was estimated at 89%. These national plans sit uneasily beside the experience of a Dashoguz household searching for a signal from across the border. Digital public services, mobile banking, and online payments require reliable access, yet Human Rights Watch says internet use remains tightly controlled and independent media is unavailable inside the country. The timing also carries a diplomatic contrast. On July 14, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed an information security agreement during Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov’s visit to Ashgabat. The two governments also discussed cross-border cooperation and closer economic ties. No evidence links that agreement to the raids, which residents said began earlier in July. The police may be able to confiscate a card or router, but the demand for a workable connection remains. Residents have turned to VPNs, Uzbek mobile towers, and satellite terminals as each previous route became blocked or dangerous. In Diýýar and neighboring villages, access to the outside world can depend on whether a signal reaches the house and whether someone reports it.
Daines’s Tour Signals an Emerging U.S. Caspian Corridor Strategy
Senator Steve Daines’s July 7–9 visit to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan brought three bilateral relationships into a single, compressed Caspian itinerary. In Baku, he met President Ilham Aliyev and senior economic and foreign-policy officials; in Astana, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and representatives of government and business; and in Ashgabat, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Although official accounts treated each stop separately, the sequence suggests a regional pattern whose significance exceeds any single announcement. Daines had already supplied the clearest public articulation of the governing logic in his June 11 speech to the Caspian Policy Center’s Trans-Caspian Forum. There he joined Central Asia and the South Caucasus in a discussion about westward connectivity, investment, and supply-chain diversification. Daines identified critical minerals, energy, telecommunications, and physical and digital infrastructure as fields for public and private investment, while calling for TRIPP, a Caspian gas interconnector, and a continuous route from Central Asia to Western markets that avoids Russia and Iran. Together, these sectors give the proposed route both commercial and strategic content, though not the form of a single named program. Read against the June speech, Daines’s itinerary marks an emerging corridor-centered effort aligned with the Trump administration’s broader Caspian engagement, even without a formal declaration of purpose. Azerbaijan Anchors the Corridor’s Western Connections Baku gives the corridor logic its strongest institutional and bilateral footing. Aliyev and Daines discussed Azerbaijan’s geopolitical role, regional peace, and TRIPP’s importance for transport connectivity. Separate meetings with Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Economy Minister Mikayil Jabbarov extended the agenda to economic cooperation. With SOCAR President Rovshan Najaf, Jabbarov and Daines took up the Middle Corridor, energy, transport, digital development, and critical-mineral extraction and processing. Across the meetings, political, commercial, and technical portfolios converged around Azerbaijan’s place at the corridor’s western Caspian egress. The U.S.–Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership Charter, signed in February, places the Middle Corridor alongside energy, trade, transit, digital connectivity, and critical-mineral movement. It identifies Azerbaijan as an energy, transport, trade, and logistics hub for the Caspian region. Working groups regularize cooperation on trade, energy, connectivity, digital development, and security. The charter also calls for project lists and implementation roadmaps within three months of signing and for meetings at least once a year. In June, the first Azerbaijan-U.S. Economic Dialogue began translating that direction into an operational agenda. Government, financial institutions, and private-sector participants met on regional connectivity and transit, energy security, investment, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure. The agenda connected the Middle Corridor and TRIPP with logistics, the Southern Gas Corridor, critical mineral supply chains, transport and energy investment, and the Alat Free Economic Zone. Closing documents covered digital infrastructure, technology transfer, and industrial solutions. The workstreams are clear, but the consolidated project portfolio and its financing have yet to take public form. Azerbaijan’s role also rests on physical infrastructure already in use. The established Middle Corridor crosses Kazakhstan and the Caspian before passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia, then onward toward Türkiye or Europe via the Black Sea. At Alat, 70 kilometers south of Baku, the port handled 7.6 million tons of cargo in 2024. Its annual capacity is 15 million tons and 100,000 TEU; the planned second phase would raise those figures to 25 million tons and 500,000 TEU. Westward links already carry some oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline has transported gas to Europe since the end of 2020. TRIPP would add a route through southern Armenia toward Nakhchivan and the existing Azerbaijan-Georgia-Türkiye network. The immediate policy challenge is to expand operating routes and complete unfinished connections within a system already carrying traffic. Kazakhstan Anchors the Corridor’s Eastern Caspian Reach Astana has demonstrated how the regional framework outlined in Baku connects with Central Asia’s largest economy, a major source of Middle Corridor freight, and an expanding critical minerals base. Tokayev and Daines discussed expanding trade and investment, implementing earlier bilateral agreements, deepening the strategic partnership, and repealing Jackson–Vanik restrictions. The U.S. Embassy recorded an American Chamber of Commerce breakfast attended by representatives of Exxon, Caterpillar, and Apple, together with meetings involving the foreign affairs, industry and construction, and energy authorities. Its account referred to supply chains, trade, and energy innovation. As Central Asia’s largest economy and the principal source of Middle Corridor freight, Kazakhstan is not simply one link in the route. It is an indispensable co-shaper of any commercially viable Trans-Caspian strategy. That role is already visible in Caspian freight flows, port expansion, and investable mineral projects. A U.S. trade mission visited Aktau in 2025 to examine Trans-Caspian opportunities. Kazakhstani authorities reported Middle Corridor freight of 4.5 million tons in 2024, while government plans would raise container-handling capacity from 80,000 to 300,000 TEU by 2029 and reduce route times from 18 to 10 days. A separate package of U.S.-Kazakhstan agreements included a $1.1 billion tungsten venture with domestic processing, possible U.S. Ex-Im support of $900 million, and priority U.S. access to output. Together, these plans and projects give the Middle Corridor’s eastern side both freight scale and mineral stakes. They also provide relevant context for Daines’s visit, even where the official readouts did not enumerate every project. Turkmenistan Adds Energy Optionality In Ashgabat, the same themes appeared in a bilateral relationship whose institutional architecture remains less formalized. Daines met President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Official accounts ranged across trade, energy, transport, investment, logistics, advanced technology, regional connectivity, and the Turkmenistan-U.S. Business Council; the readout of the meeting with Gurbanguly also cited work with Boeing, GE, John Deere, and Case. The only pipeline named in the public accounts was TAPI, the long-planned route through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. The short Caspian interconnector that Daines has advocated elsewhere did not appear on the documented July agenda. Turkmenistan’s gas reserves nevertheless leave open another export direction across the Caspian. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates proved reserves at over 11 trillion cubic meters and identifies China as the dominant destination for pipeline exports, including 34 billion cubic meters in 2022. Daines has placed a connection to European-bound pipelines within his regional program, and Turkmenistan’s leaders have endorsed Trans-Caspian export diversification. Yet no agreed intergovernmental project, financing structure, or timetable establishes the interconnector as work in progress. A Caspian Strategy Taking Shape The three countries contribute complementary strengths: Kazakhstan provides economic scale, freight volumes, and mineral potential; Turkmenistan adds energy optionality; and Azerbaijan supplies the western Caspian hub, established onward infrastructure, and the most developed U.S. institutional framework. None of these roles is exclusive. Kazakhstan also produces energy, Azerbaijan also supplies it, and Turkmenistan also operates transport infrastructure. Their distinct but overlapping functions give the three bilateral relationships regional weight. The emerging approach is best understood as a diversification of the three countries’ geoeconomic options, not an attempt to sever them from Russia or China. Additional routes and partners can widen their sovereign room for maneuver, reduce concentrated exposure, and connect regional resources and production to more investors and markets. That logic is compatible with Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy and with the broader regional preference for practical, non-exclusive partnerships. The Middle Corridor’s strategic value lies not in immediately redrawing regional alignments but in gradually expanding commercial and strategic autonomy. Regional stability acquires a commercial meaning here: infrastructure and investment require politically usable routes, predictable transit arrangements, and sustained cooperation across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. Daines’s tour gave visible momentum to an emerging U.S. strategy for connecting Central Asia and the South Caucasus, consistent with the Trump administration’s emphasis on commercially grounded partnerships. Its institutional and financial architecture remains incomplete, but the direction is increasingly clear. There is no single three-country framework. The relationships are advancing through bilateral charters, dialogues, commercial agreements, and high-level visits. For now, the common direction appears in the sequence and convergence of U.S. initiatives rather than in a unifying institution. Project selection, financing, and delivery remain the proper tests of Washington’s effort. A durable regional structure will emerge from those results rather than from a declaration alone.
U.S. Strikes on Iranian Rail and Coastal Infrastructure Put Central Asia’s Southern Routes Under Pressure
U.S. strikes on Iranian rail and coastal infrastructure have put Central Asia's southern transport plans under new pressure. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have spent years building routes through Iran to reach the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and markets beyond Russia. Public statements so far do not show a confirmed halt in Central Asian freight, but bridge damage near Iran's border with Turkmenistan and strikes along Iran's southern coast have made the security picture more concrete. Reports and a video posted on July 9 showed damage to the Aq Taqeh Khan railway bridge, on Iran's rail link to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, after overnight U.S. strikes. Reuters said it verified the location by matching the bridge, riverbank, road, fields, and nearby town with satellite imagery, and found no earlier versions of the video online. Iran's Revolutionary Guard-linked Neynava Corps in Golestan said the area around the Aq Taqeh Khan railway bridge in Aq Qala County was targeted by U.S. cruise missiles early on July 9, with no casualties reported. The bridge sits on the Gorgan-Incheh Borun railway line, which reaches the Incheh Borun border crossing with Turkmenistan and links onward to Kazakhstan. Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways, Jabar-Ali Zakeri, said engineers had rebuilt one damaged track on the Mashhad route and returned it to service in less than 15 hours, according to Fars News Agency. He said work on a second damaged line was continuing and was expected to finish within hours. That statement concerned the Mashhad route, however, and does not confirm the status of the Gorgan-Incheh Borun line. The route sits inside a wider transport effort that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, China, and Russia have all tried to expand. TCA has previously reported on a 2024 test container train on the China-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran route, which ran from Xi'an to Tehran. It carried 45 forty-foot containers loaded with auto parts and cut the China-Iran delivery time to 15 days. The Gorgan-Incheh Borun railroad was inaugurated in December 2014, linking Iran to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan along the eastern side of the Caspian Sea. The wider Uzen-Bereket-Gorgan route runs for more than 900 kilometers from western Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan into northern Iran. It connects Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan’s rail networks to Iran’s system and onward to the Persian Gulf and Asian markets. The U.S. military has framed the latest strikes as a response to Iranian attacks on commercial shipping. U.S. Central Command said on July 8 that its forces had struck about 90 Iranian military targets, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance assets, missile and drone storage sites, naval capabilities, and military logistics infrastructure along Iran's coastline. CENTCOM said the operation was designed “to further degrade Iran's ability to attack commercial shipping and innocent civilian mariners in the Strait of Hormuz.” The coastal security picture also impacts Kazakhstan through Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year Build-Operate-Transfer agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal there. The Kazakh embassy in Tehran said the deal grants Kazakhstan a land plot for the terminal, with two years for construction and 25 years of operation. Commercial operations are planned in the third year of the project. On July 8, a spokesperson for Kazakhstan's Ministry of Trade and Integration, Toigul Zhubanisova, denied reports that the Kazakh site had been hit. “This information is untrue. While there were precision airstrikes in the area, none hit our site. We would like to note that Kazakhstan only recently acquired the land, and there is currently no infrastructure on the property," she said. The denial rules out damage to Kazakhstan’s leased site, but it does not settle the broader security question around Iranian ports. Eyewitness video carried by Reuters showed smoke rising from a port in Kuhestak, in Hormozgan Province, after U.S. strikes. The agency's Connect service also carried satellite imagery showing damage to an Iranian port building in Sarkhur Tahruyi, also in Hormozgan, on July 9. Chabahar gives Kazakhstan another reason to watch Iran’s coastal security closely. TCA reported in June that Iran had offered Kazakhstan the chance to operate at Chabahar, a deep-water port on the Gulf of Oman. Iranian officials described Chabahar as a node in the International North-South Transport Corridor, and said the Chabahar-Zahedan railway was more than 90% complete. Once finished, that railway is expected to connect Chabahar to wider regional cargo networks. On July 10, AP reported new, unclaimed strikes and explosions in southern Iran, including Chabahar, after the U.S. said its latest round of attacks had ended. Satellite imagery supplied by Planet Labs and published by Reuters on July 10 showed damage to the maritime traffic control tower at Chabahar port following the latest U.S. strikes. No port closure or freight suspension has been confirmed. For Central Asia, the issue now reaches beyond the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan want southern routes that reduce dependence on Russia, ease pressure on the Caspian, and give exporters access to Gulf and Indian Ocean markets. The Middle Corridor gives Kazakhstan access to Europe through the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, but Iran gives Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan a southern outlet toward the Gulf and South Asia. Alua Korpebayeva, head of the Project Office for Transport and Logistics under Kazakhstan's Presidential Administration, told TCA that the Middle Corridor is becoming “a foundation for stable and predictable supply chains in global trade.” She also said that geopolitical factors had increased business interest in alternative routes. The strikes in Iran show why that interest keeps growing, and why every alternative route carries its own exposure. For now, the evidence points to heightened exposure rather than confirmed disruption. Kazakhstan has denied damage to its site at Shahid Rajaee Port, and no public KTZ statement has announced a suspension on the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran route. For Astana and Ashgabat, the question is whether Iran can still serve as a reliable southern outlet if rail links, ports, and insurance costs continue to come under military pressure. - Follow our interactive timeline of the Gulf crisis and its impact on Central Asia for the latest developments and the full sequence of events.
Turkmenistan’s Wage Puzzle: Official Salaries Rise, but Transparency Remains Elusive
In most Central Asian countries, checking the average salary is as simple as visiting the national statistics agency’s website. In Turkmenistan, however, wage data remain largely inaccessible. The State Statistics Committee does not publish salary figures online, and its annual statistical yearbooks are available only in printed form inside the country. Nevertheless, occasional official figures emerge, offering a glimpse into a labor market that differs markedly from those of its regional neighbors. As of January 1, 2025, Turkmenistan’s monthly minimum wage stands at 1,410 manats, equivalent to approximately $403 at the official exchange rate. An increase was introduced by presidential decree in July 2024 as part of a nationwide 10% rise in wages, pensions, and social benefits. The minimum wage was about $366 in 2024, and roughly $331 in 2023 at the official exchange rate. Unlike neighboring economies, where wages are increasingly shaped by labor-market conditions, inflation, and private-sector demand, Turkmenistan’s minimum wage is established exclusively by presidential decree and applies uniformly across all sectors, occupations, and age groups. The centralized system leaves little room for market-based wage formation. Although comprehensive official wage statistics remain unavailable, one rare set of figures attributed to the State Statistics Committee was published in 2017. According to those figures, the country’s highest-paid employees worked in the Merchant Marine Fleet, earning 2,387.6 manats per month, or about $682 at the official exchange rate then in use. They were followed by the National Space Agency under the President of Turkmenistan, at 1,909.9 manats, or about $546, and the state-owned Turkmenneft oil company, at 1,861.4 manats, or about $532. The lowest salaries were reportedly paid to employees of the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations. The ranking, although dated, is revealing. Rather than finance or technology, which dominate wage tables in many countries, Turkmenistan’s highest-paid sectors in that snapshot were closely tied to state prestige projects and strategic natural-resource industries. A key factor complicating any assessment of income is the country’s dual exchange-rate system. The official rate has long been fixed at about 3.5 manats per U.S. dollar, which is used to calculate salaries in dollar terms for international reporting. However, the parallel market rate is substantially weaker, reducing the real international purchasing power of household incomes. Consequently, official salary figures converted into dollars should be interpreted with caution because they do not necessarily reflect the exchange rate available to ordinary citizens. The gap between official wages and actual living costs also appears significant. While the government continues to subsidize basic food staples such as bread and flour, shortages have often forced households to buy goods in private markets at much higher prices. Free natural gas and water supplies ended in 2019, and utility costs have gradually increased since then, despite continuing subsidies. Public cost-of-living data should be treated carefully, but they point in the same direction. The user-submitted database Numbeo estimates monthly costs for a single person in Ashgabat at about 6,475 manats before rent, more than four times the official minimum wage. Regional comparisons further illustrate the ambiguity surrounding Turkmenistan’s official figures. As of mid-2025, the average monthly salary stood at approximately $314 in Tajikistan, $481 in Kyrgyzstan, $484 in Uzbekistan, and $790 in Kazakhstan. These figures come from different national reporting periods and methodologies, so they are useful as indicators rather than direct like-for-like comparisons. On paper, Turkmenistan’s official minimum wage of about $403 does not appear to be the lowest in Central Asia. Yet the country’s limited statistical transparency, combined with its dual exchange-rate system, makes direct comparisons with neighboring economies considerably more difficult than official figures alone would suggest. For now, Turkmenistan’s annual wage increases reveal less about household income than about how little economic data the state is willing to release.
As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches
The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the Safarov brothers, Huseyn and Ziyaddin, whose brother Sayfaddin Huseynli publicly alleged they had been tortured. In response, Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Sputnik Azerbaijan and detained several Russian citizens. In October 2025, during a meeting with President Ilham Aliyev in Dushanbe, Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that Russian air defenses were responsible for striking the Azerbaijan Airlines plane. In April 2026, Moscow and Baku announced an official settlement that included compensation. The agreement appeared to close one of the most damaging episodes between Baku and Moscow since Azerbaijan’s independence. But Baku evidently sees matters differently. Azerbaijani officials view the strikes on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine and the damage to Azerbaijani diplomatic buildings as evidence that tensions with Moscow continue, even after the AZAL settlement. Member of Parliament Rasim Musabayov told journalists that several SOCAR facilities in Ukraine had already come under Russian attack. “We summoned the ambassador and delivered a protest note. I doubt Moscow will change its behavior because of this, but Azerbaijan has done everything required under diplomatic procedure. I do not believe this happened because it was an Azerbaijani facility; had it been a Kazakh one, the same thing would likely have happened. Given Russia’s broader attacks on civilian infrastructure, where people, including women and children, are dying, making a major issue solely over material damage may not be appropriate. Nevertheless, what needed to be said has been said,” Musabayov noted. The diplomatic protest should not have come as a surprise to Moscow. Two weeks earlier, Azerbaijan had already taken a step that further strained relations. An Azerbaijani court sentenced eight Russian citizens to prison terms ranging from three to four years on charges of large-scale drug trafficking. All eight had been detained in the summer of 2025 amid the sharp deterioration in bilateral relations. At that time, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested a group of Russian citizens that included IT specialists, entrepreneurs, and tourists. Their case became another symbol of the widening political dispute, with Russian and independent outlets reporting that some of the defendants denied any connection to drug trafficking. So far, Moscow has not publicly responded to Baku’s latest diplomatic démarche. Escalating the confrontation, however, would not be in Russia’s interests. Azerbaijan serves as a key rail transit route for Russian exports to Armenia, including grain, fertilizers, aluminum, buckwheat, and anthracite coal. On July 6, the first train carrying 30 railcars loaded with 1,026 tons of propane departed from the Bilajari station near Baku en route to Armenia. This transport angle is where the South Caucasus and Central Asia meet. A disruption in Russian-Azerbaijani transit would not automatically threaten the Middle Corridor, but it would remind Central Asian governments that every westward route passes through contested geopolitics. Kazakhstan has made container growth along the Trans-Caspian route a priority, Uzbekistan is looking more closely toward the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and Turkmenistan’s Caspian position gives Ashgabat a direct stake in the corridor’s future. None of these countries wants a confrontation with Moscow, but each wants alternatives. The attack on SOCAR facilities may therefore have served merely as a catalyst for a new round of diplomatic escalation. The deeper driver appears to be growing engagement by the European Union and the United States. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Baku on July 1 and announced up to €200 million in grant funding for transport, energy, and digital projects across the South Caucasus, along with a separate €20 million program for local communities in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The initiative links peace-building with infrastructure, a formula that matters to Central Asia as much as it does to the Caucasus. For Central Asia, this follows the EU’s launch of a connectivity platform intended to mobilize up to €2 billion for links between Europe and Central Asia through the Black Sea and the South Caucasus. Washington has added its own signal: U.S. President Donald Trump has invited Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to the G20 Summit in Miami on December 14-15, 2026. Central Asian governments are unlikely to follow Baku into open confrontation with Moscow. Labor migration, security cooperation, energy infrastructure, and trade still impose real constraints. Their absence from the Shusha conference underlined that caution. But caution should not be mistaken for immobility. Like Azerbaijan, the Central Asian states are expanding their options through the EU, the United States, Türkiye, China, and intra-regional cooperation. External engagement with the South Caucasus has clearly intensified. Russia, increasingly preoccupied with military operations in eastern Ukraine and pressure from sanctions, risks losing ground in a region it has long regarded as part of its sphere of influence. Central Asia may not be next in the same dramatic fashion, but it is already part of the same process. Azerbaijan is moving faster and louder; Central Asia is moving more carefully. The direction, however, is increasingly visible.
Kyrgyzstan’s Water Compensation Push Tests Central Asian Unity
Central Asia’s water diplomacy is entering a contentious phase. Kyrgyzstan, where much of the region’s runoff is formed, is reviving calls for economic compensation from downstream users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected the idea, saying current agreements do not provide for payments for transboundary river water. The dispute comes as the region tries to maintain annual water-allocation deals while adapting agriculture to worsening scarcity and climate pressure. Water has long tied together the region’s upstream and downstream states. The 2021 and 2022 clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border showed how disputes over land, border infrastructure, roads, security posts, and water access can escalate when local tensions are not contained. Yet political will alone does not guarantee agreements between countries. The Central Asian republics cooperate on water issues through two interstate bodies. One is the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, established in 1993 by all five Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan suspended its participation in IFAS in 2016, and now attends the fund’s meetings as an observer. The second body is the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, whose meetings are held once a quarter. At its 93rd meeting in Bukhara in early April, the commission confirmed limits for water withdrawal from transboundary rivers, following decisions approved at the 92nd meeting in Dushanbe. For the Amu Darya, the 2026 water allocations set the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 at about 55.4 billion cubic meters. Of this, 15.9 billion cubic meters is allocated for the cold period, from October to April. Tajikistan has been allocated 9.8 billion cubic meters per year, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each receive 22 billion. A significant part of the flow, 44 billion cubic meters, must pass through the adjusted section of the Kerki hydrological post, helping secure the lower reaches of the river. For the Syr Darya, the total water withdrawal limit for the non-growing season is 4.219 billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan will receive 460 million cubic meters through the Dustlik Canal, Kyrgyzstan 47 million, and Tajikistan 365 million, while the largest share will go to Uzbekistan, 3.347 billion cubic meters. The inherited framework is also facing pressure from outside the five-state system. Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal, which is being advanced outside the Soviet-era allocation structure, has added uncertainty on the Amu Darya. The Central Asian republics also cooperate in bilateral and trilateral formats. In January, Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan joint working groups met in Turkestan. The sides reaffirmed water cooperation, agreed to continue repairs on the Dostyk canal, and planned automated hydrological posts on the Syr Darya. In May, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed on the operating regime of the Bahri-Tojik Reservoir for the summer of 2026. From June to August, the reservoir is to operate in a coordinated mode to supply irrigation water to farmers in the Maktaaral and Zhetysai districts of southern Kazakhstan. These agreements show that regional mechanisms still work, but experts continue to warn that climate pressure, data gaps, and uneven national interests could overwhelm existing formats. “Forecasting the likelihood of ‘water conflicts’ in the near future is difficult, since much depends not only on the political will of states, but also on the availability of effective tools for managing water resources amid scientific uncertainty and discrepancies in data assessment,” according to Shamshagul Mashtayeva, a Kazakh hydrologist and water-diplomacy specialist. “The time has come for a paradigm shift in the management of these resources and in water diplomacy in order to give the second scenario a greater chance, since the well-being of future generations directly depends on the success of these efforts.” In her view, the combined impact of irregular weather patterns, glacier melt, and biodiversity loss creates uncertainty. That uncertainty could lead to two scenarios: growing economic, social, environmental, and political shocks and conflicts over water, or improved policy with large-scale reforms in the water sector. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have responded partly by introducing digital and water-saving technologies, and by changing crop structures. In Kazakhstan, priority in this year’s sowing campaign was given to higher-margin and strategically important crops. Oilseed crops will exceed 4 million hectares, while more than 3.3 million hectares have been allocated for fodder crops. Wheat acreage has been reduced to 12.1 million hectares, 125,000 hectares less than last year. Corn acreage was also reduced. Rice fields were reduced by 20,600 hectares, and the area of cotton under drip irrigation increased by 29,800 hectares as water-saving technologies were expanded. Kazakhstan has taken a stricter approach to reducing rice planting. In the Shardara district of the Turkestan Region, dozens of farmers who planted rice fields beyond approved volumes were left without irrigation water. Permits were processed through an electronic system, and once the limit was reached, registration of new areas was closed. Uzbekistan has also started to shift land away from water-intensive crops. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev supported a proposal in late April to reduce cotton and grain areas by 7,400 hectares in the Ferghana Region and redistribute land to more profitable crops. Orchards and export-oriented plantations are being created in the Ferghana, Yozyovon, Kuva, and Uzbekistan districts. Uzbekistan’s cotton sector has prepared for intensive planting schemes on 888,000 hectares. Of these, 500,000 hectares are planned for high-yielding, salt-resistant, and drought-resistant foreign varieties. Work is also being organized to plant cotton on 300,000 hectares based on Xinjiang’s experience. Kyrgyzstan, where about half of the region’s runoff is formed and which uses roughly a quarter of that water itself, has repeatedly raised the issue of economic compensation for irrigation water. On January 1, 2026, a new Water Code came into force in the republic, changing the approach to the use of water resources. Water is now recognized as a commodity, and fees will be charged for its use by domestic and external consumers. This marks a shift away from the old “water in exchange for electricity” system toward a market model of water use. The new code regulates domestic water use and its distribution among neighbors such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In February, Jogorku Kenesh (parliamentary) deputy Umbetaly Kydyraliyev also raised the issue, saying Kyrgyzstan bears the cost of maintaining hydraulic facilities, including repairs and maintenance of dams, but receives no direct economic compensation. He cited international practice in which countries pay compensation for the use of water resources. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov raised the issue again at a regional economic summit in Astana in April. He said emergencies in Kyrgyzstan have increased significantly in recent years: mudflows and floods have become three times more frequent, while annual damage reaches about $16 million. The glacier area has also shrunk by 16%, and by the end of the century, the country could lose up to 80% of its glaciers. “We propose resuming the introduction of a mutually beneficial economic compensation mechanism in the water and energy sector under modern conditions. It is necessary to find a balance of interests and develop mutually acceptable solutions based on a comprehensive approach,” Japarov said. Professor Yarash Pulodov, a Tajik scholar in water resources and ecology, has supported the introduction of water-use fees in Kyrgyzstan. He said the transition to market mechanisms, under which water would be treated as a commodity, is a logical step. In his view, charging for water is aimed at modernizing water-resource management, increasing transparency, and ensuring efficient distribution in water-scarce regions. “Although water is a gift from heaven and its use can be regarded as the legitimate right of everyone, in a developed society the infrastructure for delivering this water requires significant costs. Ultimately, all water users and consumers must pay for delivery,” he said. Downstream governments do not accept that premise. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan say no agreement has ever existed, and none exists now, to pay for river water. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation said: “The introduction of payment for transboundary water is not provided for by the current contractual and legal framework and is not under consideration. The main emphasis is on improving the efficiency of water use within the country, building and modernizing reservoirs, reducing losses, and introducing water-saving technologies. The system remains based on recognized principles of water sharing, equality of parties, and long-term regional cooperation.” That leaves Central Asian water diplomacy with less room for ambiguity. Annual allocation agreements still function, and governments are investing in more efficient usage. Yet Kyrgyzstan’s warning has put a price tag on a resource downstream states have long treated as shared under existing agreements. Tajikistan, another upstream state, may face similar incentives as glacier loss and infrastructure costs rise. Whether the region can manage that debate without turning water into a new interstate dispute will depend on stronger data, clearer rules, and trust between upstream and downstream states.
New Study Finds Sharp Decline in Amu Darya Flows
Central Asia’s water woes continue to grow worse. The water flow in the Amu Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers, is slowly but significantly diminishing in Tajikistan, where the river originates. A recently released report shows the Amu Darya’s water flow in the middle and lower reaches in Tajikistan has fallen over the course of recent decades by 54-77%. And the report lays the blame firmly on human activity, not climate change. Up In the Mountains of Tajikistan The study published on ScienceDirect looked at data collected over 90 years and concludes that “streamflow decreased by 54–77% in the middle and lower reaches” of the Amu Darya in Tajikistan. Interestingly, the report mentions that precipitation in the mountains of Tajikistan has actually increased between 6 and 13%, but the Amu Darya’s water level is falling because people are using more water. The expansion of agriculture is the reason, accounting for 92% of the water reduction in Tajikistan, but the recent construction of water reservoirs is also playing a role. Lower flows of water were noted on many of the tributaries in Tajikistan that feed into the Amu Darya, including the “Vakhsh, Kunduz, Kofirnihon, Surkhandarya, Zeravshan, and Kashkadarya (rivers),” which showed streamflow reductions of 4–34%. The report said that areas in the upper reaches of the Amu Darya should see increased water levels, but this is mainly due to climate change hastening the melting of snow and glaciers. Once the glaciers are gone, the water will rapidly decrease. Bad News Downstream Water problems upstream in Tajikistan translate to bigger problems downstream in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Both have already noticed a reduction in the amount of water in the Amu Darya, most visibly that the river has not reached the Aral Sea for about two decades now, contributing to the sea shrinking by some 90% since the 1960s. Every year the river recedes further south, forcing downstream communities suddenly without water to relocate. Climate change is now hastening this process in the arid, desert lands along the Uzbek-Turkmen border, but both countries are preparing for a bigger, impending shock. The Taliban started construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal in 2022, with the project scheduled to be completed in 2028. While Central Asia was liberally taking water from the Amu Darya for agricultural use, Afghanistan was in no position to claim its share until now. The canal will draw water from the Amu Darya at an area across from Uzbekistan and open up new agricultural land in northern Afghanistan, where food has long been in short supply. The 280-kilometer canal is expected to take some 16-20% of the water left in the Amu Darya after it leaves Tajikistan. Upstream Tajikistan’s falling water levels, of course, mean the Qosh Tepa Canal will also be receiving less and less water. The Combination For most of the 2020s, large areas of Central Asia have been experiencing droughts, prompting the governments there to implement water conservation measures. But as they find more ways to save water, there is less water to save. In December 2025, Uzbekistan’s hydrometeorological service said autumn temperatures were 1-2 Celsius hotter than average, and precipitation across the country was between 2 and 35% below the seasonal norm. May brought some relief, with 50% more rain than usual falling in the Tashkent Province, as well as substantial amounts in the Samarkand and Jizzakh provinces. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, was warning as early as January that his country could face water shortages in the summer. As summer 2026 begins, large areas of Central Asia are already experiencing abnormally high temperatures and below-average rainfall. Kazhydromet warned at the end of June that districts in nine of the country’s 17 provinces could enter drought in July. Uzhydromet has also forecast hot and dry conditions for July. The growing population in Central Asia has been a concern as water scarcity increases. On June 30, Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee announced the country’s population now exceeds 39 million people, up from about 20 million when Uzbekistan became independent in late 1991. Tajikistan’s population is reportedly approaching eleven million, more than double the population of just over five million in 1989. The Central Asian governments have been taking measures to alleviate the effects of climate change for the past few years, especially in terms of water management. Irrigation canals have been repaired, new water reservoirs built, and old reservoirs fixed and improved. But they have always been racing against the clock, and some might say they stand little chance of being able to prevent significant migration pressure of people from southern and western areas of Central Asia in the not-too-distant future as water sources vanish. This recent report indicates that the reduction of water in the Amu Darya is already a long-term problem with no quick solutions in sight. Even hundreds of years ago, water was regarded as the region’s most important resource, and now that message is becoming increasingly tangible across Central Asia.
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