Turkmenistan Advances TAPI Pipeline and Infrastructure Projects in Herat

Turkmenistan has spent years seeking new gas export routes, and in western Afghanistan that effort is taking physical form. By mid-September, 122.3 kilometers of pipe had been welded and laid along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) route in Herat Province. Ashgabat is also pursuing two other connections with Afghanistan along the same corridor. Energy officials are discussing a 500 kV transmission line, while plans call for a railway from the Turkmen border to reach Herat and eventually extend farther south. Herat is becoming the focal point for Turkmen gas, electricity, and freight. For Ashgabat, supplying Herat could give TAPI its first functioning Afghan market without waiting for the entire pipeline to reach Pakistan and India. Afghanistan would gain energy supplies and infrastructure, as well as a chance to connect its western region more closely to regional trade. As of September 15, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum reported that 150.3 kilometers of the 153-kilometer TAPI route in Herat Province had been prepared for pipe installation. Of the 122.3 kilometers of pipe welded and laid, 71.5 kilometers had been buried. Hydrostatic testing had been completed on 33 kilometers. The ministry’s estimate of nearly 80% completion applies only to pipe-laying along this section. In May, the ministry reported that 63 kilometers of pipe had been laid. Four months later, the figure had nearly doubled. The pipeline is designed to run roughly 1,814 kilometers from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian border. Its planned capacity is 33 billion cubic meters a year. At full capacity, the Asian Development Bank’s current project description allocates 5% of the gas to Afghanistan and 47.5% each to Pakistan and India. The pipeline has been under discussion for more than three decades. Conflict, financing shortages, security threats, and disputes over commercial terms have repeatedly delayed it. Work on Afghan territory resumed in September 2024. The latest figures from Herat make it possible, for the first time in years, to measure TAPI’s progress in kilometers of pipeline rather than diplomatic statements. For Turkmenistan, the stakes are high. The country holds the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, but most of its gas exports go to China. Beijing receives around 30 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas annually and continues to work with Ashgabat on expanding production at Galkynysh. In February, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov said diversifying gas export routes was one of the country’s primary goals. Together, Pakistan and India would provide Turkmenistan with markets comparable in scale to its Chinese market. To reach them, however, the pipeline still has to cross most of Afghanistan and then Pakistan. Tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, along with the difficult relationship between Pakistan and India, continue to create political and transit risks for the full project. Herat offers a smaller market that could be reached sooner. A distribution network is planned in the city to supply gas to businesses, power plants, and households. In August, Turkmengaz and Afghan Gas signed a memorandum on the gasification of the province. The memorandum covers local infrastructure and future gas sales, but the timetable and commercial terms remain unclear. Kabul is already negotiating the terms. Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s deputy prime minister for economic affairs, proposed a long-term contract and a more flexible pricing formula that would reduce exposure to sharp fluctuations in the European market. Afghan officials also asked Ashgabat to help build the gas distribution network in Herat. The negotiations are moving TAPI closer to the most difficult part of any pipeline project: selling the gas. No contract has been signed, and neither volumes nor a start date have been agreed. Even so, talks over pricing and a local distribution network mean the Herat section is no longer defined solely by construction statistics. The second project involves electricity. Turkmenistan already supplies power to Afghanistan’s northern and western provinces. A new 500 kV transmission line would increase grid capacity and electricity supplies to Herat. On September 15, representatives of Afghanistan’s power utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, and a Turkmen technical delegation discussed the line’s specifications and construction progress, as well as the Nur-ul-Jihad substation. No completion date has been announced publicly. Available reports do not confirm that the line will be extended farther to Pakistan. The railway project has made less progress. Torghundi is already connected to Turkmenistan’s rail network. Work on the first 22-kilometer section toward Sanabar began in 2024. The full line to Herat would run for about 120 kilometers, but there are no recent public figures on how much of the route has been completed. On September 16, Herat Governor Noor Ahmad Islamjar and Turkmen Consul General Batyr Yolov again discussed rail links, trade, and electricity supplies. The talks confirmed continued interest in the route but produced no new construction figures. Herat cannot replace Pakistan and India as a market for Turkmen gas; local demand is far too small for a pipeline designed to carry 33 billion cubic meters a year. Even limited gas sales to Herat could give the southern route its first revenue, while electricity exports and a rail connection could generate trade and freight flows long before TAPI’s more distant sections are completed.

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers world leaders arriving in Bishkek for the SCO summit, one Central Asian state proposing new martial-law amendments that could concentrate enormous power in just a handful of institutions during a national crisis, Tashiev's charges being amended yet again as questions continue to grow over his political future, a Central Asian state striking an unusual military deal with a European partner, the Turkmen Border Service holding talks with its Afghan counterparts, the completion of a major new railway line in Kazakhstan, and plans to build what could become the tallest tower in the region. Before turning to our main story this week, where we look at the World Nomad Games in Kyrgyzstan and what the event tells us about the country, the region, and the way Central Asia is presenting itself to the wider world. - Jonathan Campion (British Alysh Competitor) - Stephen M. Bland (The Times of Central Asia) - K. Krombie (The Times of Central Asia) Special guests: Stephen M. Bland, Managing Editor at TCA; K. Krombie, Senior Editor at TCA, both of whom covered the event on the ground; and Jonathan Campion, who competed for Team GB in the Alysh Wrestling.

Ashgabat’s Postwar Architecture Is Disappearing One Building at a Time

In July, UNESCO added ten examples of Tashkent’s modernist architecture to the World Heritage List, recognizing the buildings and urban complexes that helped reshape the Uzbek capital after the devastating 1966 earthquake. In neighboring Kazakhstan, prominent Soviet-era buildings in Almaty are protected through national and local heritage registers. Turkmenistan has also gained international recognition for ancient sites such as Merv and Nisa, along with traditions of carpet weaving and horse breeding. Yet Ashgabat’s 20th-century architecture remains largely absent from this system of recognition. This has taken on added urgency because some of the buildings that tell the story of modern Ashgabat are already disappearing. [caption id="attachment_56051" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] In August 2026, turkmen.news reported the demolition of several buildings near Ashgabat’s 30th microdistrict. Some were residential blocks. Although some occupants received replacement apartments, other families objected to the relocation terms. In February, the former building of the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography on Azadi Street was also demolished. At different times, it had housed a court and the Cultural Heritage Center. An additional floor and marble cladding had already changed its appearance, although some neoclassical elements survived. Once a building has been demolished, its architecture can be studied only through archives and photographs. For Ashgabat, this is particularly significant because much of the city visible today emerged from one of the worst disasters in its history. The City After the Earthquake The 1948 Ashgabat earthquake struck on the night of October 6, destroying or severely damaging much of the city. The capital had to be largely rebuilt. Architectural historian Ruslan Muradov writes that postwar reconstruction began with two-story brick apartment buildings designed to meet higher seismic standards. Their facades featured decorative plasterwork and carved wooden elements on the loggias, or recessed balconies. New residential blocks were organized around shared courtyards and greenery. In the 1950s, the Academy of Sciences, the railway station, Turkmen State University, theaters, administrative buildings, and new housing transformed the city center. From the 1960s through the 1980s, hotels, public buildings, and residential districts added another architectural layer. Behind this architecture was the everyday life of several generations. Courtyards became extensions of apartments, while institutions and shops occupied the ground floors. The postwar city gradually became an ordinary, lived-in urban environment. Its surviving buildings still offer clues to how Ashgabat recovered after 1948. They show how seismic risk changed construction, how the climate influenced housing design, and how planners used the spaces between buildings. But unlike some neighboring capitals, Ashgabat has no publicly available inventory identifying the most significant examples of its postwar architecture. The time available to document them is shrinking. [caption id="attachment_56053" align="alignnone" width="1774"] Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Turkmenistan’s Heritage Focus Turkmenistan has five properties on the World Heritage List. Ancient Merv, Kunya-Urgench, and the Parthian Fortresses of Nisa make up three of them. The other two are transnational properties, the Silk Roads: Zarafshan-Karakum Corridor and the Cold Winter Deserts of Turan. Another nine sites are on the country’s Tentative List, an inventory of properties a state may later nominate for World Heritage status. They range from Dehistan and Silk Road sites to nature reserves. The latest addition came in August 2025, when Turkmenistan proposed its part of the transboundary Karst, Canyons, and Caves of Kugitang property, which also includes neighboring Uzbekistan. Architecture from the past century does not appear among these nominations. UNESCO nominations begin at the national level. A state must first identify a property as worthy of research and protection before it can be considered internationally. The fate of Ashgabat’s 20th-century architecture is therefore determined long before UNESCO becomes involved. Tashkent’s Post-Earthquake Architecture Tashkent offers an instructive comparison. Eighteen years after Ashgabat’s disaster, the 1966 earthquake led to another large-scale reconstruction and a period of architectural experimentation. In July 2026, the World Heritage Committee inscribed Tashkent Modernist Architecture. Modernity and Tradition in Central Asia on the UNESCO World Heritage List. The serial property consists of ten buildings and urban complexes dating from the 1960s to the early 1990s, all associated with the capital’s transformation after the earthquake. In assessing Tashkent’s architecture, UNESCO highlighted how modernist planning and design were adapted to the local climate, earthquake risk, and cultural traditions. The buildings show how the Uzbek capital rebuilt itself after the disaster and what kind of city it sought to become. Almaty Takes a Different Route In Almaty, the Kazakhstan and Otrar hotels are included in the state list of historical and cultural monuments of local significance, together with other 20th-century buildings. The Palace of the Republic, opened in 1970, has the status of a historical and cultural monument of national significance. Official protection did not prevent major changes to the building itself. The ARCHCODE research project says the Palace of the Republic completely lost its original exterior appearance after reconstruction. The example illustrates the limits of formal protection, but it also shows that Soviet-era architecture can be identified and treated as part of a country’s heritage without waiting for UNESCO recognition. In Ashgabat, some buildings disappear before that discussion reaches the same stage. A City Between Nisa and White Marble Ashgabat has undergone several major transformations. The earthquake destroyed much of the prewar city, and postwar construction created another in its place. After independence, the central districts changed again as older buildings were remodeled, clad in marble, expanded upward, or demolished. Each such change reduces what remains of the 20th-century city. Ashgabat’s history today is easiest to see from its two ends. At one end stands ancient Nisa with its Parthian fortresses. At the other is the present-day capital, with broad avenues, monumental structures, and white-marble facades. Between them lies the city formed by postwar reconstruction, late-Soviet development, and another large-scale transformation after independence. Its history survives in everything from residential neighborhoods and courtyards to former institutes and hotels, even where their facades have been altered. Ashgabat first needs a map of its own 20th century: what still stands, who designed it, how the buildings were used, and how much of the original architecture has survived. The 1948 earthquake destroyed old Ashgabat in a single night. The postwar city could suffer the same fate, one building at a time.

Central Asian States Call for New Arms Controls as Nuclear Framework Weakens

Foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have called for new, verifiable arms control mechanisms to prevent a nuclear arms race, warning that international disarmament efforts are losing ground. In a joint statement issued on September 8 to mark 20 years since the signing of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the five governments expressed concern over stalled disarmament, the end of key agreements, and the modernization of nuclear arsenals. They urged nuclear powers to resume negotiations. The statement comes seven months after New START, the last U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty, expired on February 5. UN Secretary-General António Guterres said its expiration left the two countries without binding limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in more than half a century. President Donald Trump has criticized New START as a “badly negotiated deal” and called instead for a new, modernized arms control treaty that would include China. The ministers also cited the failure of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which ended without a consensus outcome on May 22. Kazakhstan had already advanced a similar position. As TCA reported, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev used the August 29 anniversary of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site’s closure to call for negotiations among nuclear powers, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and renewed multilateral action to reduce nuclear risks. Kazakhstan’s connection to the issue extends beyond diplomacy. The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk between 1949 and 1989. Kazakhstan closed the site in 1991 and subsequently relinquished the nuclear arsenal it had inherited after the Soviet collapse. The regional treaty was signed in Semipalatinsk on September 8, 2006, and entered into force in 2009. It established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone located entirely in the Northern Hemisphere, directly bordering two nuclear-weapon states, Russia and China. That history gives Kazakhstan a distinctive place in regional nuclear diplomacy. Uzbekistan originated the proposal for the zone, presenting it at the UN General Assembly in September 1993. The September 8 statement explicitly acknowledges Uzbekistan’s initiative while crediting all five countries with establishing the zone. The statement also recognizes Kyrgyzstan for initiating the International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness, observed annually on March 5, and Turkmenistan for chairing the December 2024 anniversary meeting in Ashgabat. Kazakhstan has also helped coordinate cooperation beyond Central Asia. In August 2024, it hosted a conference in Astana with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs to strengthen cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones, following an earlier meeting in 2019. The five states also renewed their appeal for the United States to ratify a protocol providing security assurances to the region. In May 2014, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the protocol on negative security assurances, committing not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the five Central Asian treaty members. The other four signatories have ratified it. Washington has not. The request is longstanding. The five governments made the same appeal in their 2021 anniversary statement. The latest declaration comes less than a week after Mukhtar Tleuberdi returned as Kazakhstan’s foreign minister on September 2. He previously held the post from 2019 to 2023 and most recently served as ambassador to Austria and permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency. The five governments now want further “institutional development” of the regional treaty and closer cooperation with other nuclear-weapon-free zones. The statement specifies no new institutions or implementation timetable.

Water in Central Asia: Can the Five States Reach an Agreement?

Central Asia is entering a period of growing water stress, as climate change makes supplies less predictable while demand continues to rise. Populations are growing, economies require new energy and industrial capacity, glaciers are shrinking, and agriculture continues to consume most of the available water. The region’s two main rivers – the Amu Darya and Syr Darya – cross national borders, making it impossible for any one country to solve the problem on its own.

After decades of disputes, Central Asian states are increasingly trying to manage water jointly. In 2026, that cooperation has produced further practical steps, from plans for automated water accounting in the Syr Darya basin to new proposals for reforming regional mechanisms. The question now is whether the five countries can agree on rules when their water needs remain different.

Water and Energy: An Old Conflict

The structural conflict is rooted in the region’s geography. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are upstream states and use water in part for hydropower generation, particularly in winter. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are downstream and need large volumes in summer during the irrigation season.

During the Soviet period, a centralized exchange system was in place: upstream republics stored water in winter and released it in summer, receiving energy resources in return. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, that unified mechanism disappeared. Interstate agreements preserved a degree of coordination but did not eliminate the tension between upstream energy needs and downstream agricultural interests.

Climate change is now adding another layer to the problem. Retreating glaciers in the Pamir and Tien Shan mountains are altering the timing and reliability of river flows, while populations and consumption are increasing. Countries across the region are planning new power plants, industrial facilities, mining projects, and data centers, while agriculture remains the largest consumer of water.

From Seasonal Quotas to Joint Management

The main formal mechanism for coordinating river allocations remains the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC), established in 1992. Through it, countries coordinate water withdrawal limits and reservoir operating regimes in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins.

In late 2025, the countries agreed on water allocations for 2026: for the Amu Darya, the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 was around 55.4 billion cubic meters, while the Syr Darya allocation for the non-growing season was approximately 4.2 billion cubic meters.

The five-state framework does not, however, cover every major user of the Amu Darya. Afghanistan is outside the regional allocation system, while its Qosh Tepa Canal, now under construction, has added another source of uncertainty over future downstream flows.

Such agreements keep the shared system functioning, but many decisions are still made ahead of each new season. Climate change and rising demand require a longer-term model. In February of this year, Kazakhstan proposed developing a Central Asian Framework Convention on Water Use, while joint infrastructure projects, including Kyrgyzstan’s Kambarata-1 hydropower plant with the participation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are gradually adding shared economic interests to the broader water-energy relationship.

Another practical step followed in August. States met in Turkestan for the 94th ICWC meeting, where Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan agreed to develop a plan for automated water accounting in the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan participated as an observer.

Automated monitoring is intended to address one of the most sensitive problems: the reliability of data on transboundary water flows. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are already working to automate ten transboundary monitoring stations in the Syr Darya basin, five in each country.

By August, conditions on the Syr Darya were relatively stable: since April 1, around 3 billion cubic meters of water had flowed into Kazakhstan’s Shardara Reservoir – more than a year earlier and above the long-term average.

Who Should Pay for Water?

A favorable season does not eliminate longer-term tensions. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have an interest in operating hydropower plants in winter, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan need sufficient water to remain available for summer irrigation.

The Toktogul Reservoir in Kyrgyzstan illustrates this interdependence. The country’s largest hydropower plant is located there and generates around 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s electricity, while its operating regime also determines how much water flows downstream through the Syr Darya. In May, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral protocol agreeing on a schedule for water releases from Toktogul.

Kyrgyzstan is increasingly raising the question of how costs should be shared. Bishkek points to the expense of maintaining dams, reservoirs, and other infrastructure. In February, parliamentarian Umbetaly Kydyraliyev proposed that neighboring countries compensate Kyrgyzstan for water and the costs of maintaining hydraulic infrastructure, while President Sadyr Japarov proposed a regional economic compensation mechanism for water and energy in April.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan do not support such a model, pointing out that existing agreements do not provide for payment for water from transboundary rivers.

The dispute also sits alongside a less contentious problem: large amounts of water are lost across aging canal and distribution networks, while cultivation of water-intensive crops keeps irrigation demand high.

The Issue Is No Longer Just How Much Water There Is

At Tashkent Water Week, Murad Uzakov, head of the Center for Regional Studies at Uzbekistan’s Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies, said the water problem had already moved beyond environmental concerns and become a matter of national and regional security.

Because of the condition of canals, dams, and distribution systems, water losses can reach 40%-50% in some areas, while around 90% of the region’s water withdrawals are used for irrigated agriculture. By 2050, he said, flows in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya could decline by 5%-13%.

At the same time, Uzakov pointed to stronger regional cooperation, including joint use of the Naryn basin’s water and energy resources, preparations for the Kambarata-1 hydropower project, and hydropower development on the Zarafshan River. In his view, the region needs a common strategy for the rational use of water.

Iskandar Abdullaev, a senior researcher at the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), stressed at the same forum that infrastructure and digitalization alone are not enough without better coordination and data sharing. Climate change is making water resources more unpredictable, meaning decisions need to be made at the level of shared river basins rather than by individual states alone.

From Central Asia to the UN

Kazakhstan is trying to elevate the water issue to the international level. At the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana in April, discussions covered the management of transboundary resources, the state of glaciers, and a proposal to establish an International Water Organization within the UN system.

On September 1, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev again advanced the initiative, saying that the global system of water governance remains fragmented. He also proposed establishing a Water Issues Analysis Center within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

For Central Asia, however, agreements among the region’s countries will remain decisive. An international organization can help with coordination and mobilizing resources, but it cannot determine how much water should remain in reservoirs in winter and how much needs to be released to fields in summer.

Turkmenistan Methane Emissions Under Scrutiny After 192 UN Alerts

UN satellite monitoring has identified Turkmenistan as one of the world’s most serious methane hotspots, with 192 alerts for the country issued over the past year. Three of the six largest leaks detected globally by the system over the past six months were in Turkmenistan, as were nine of the top 50. Eight major leaks have since been stopped after repairs.

For Ashgabat, however, the issue is also taking on commercial significance: new EU rules are gradually linking access for imported gas to the European market with its methane footprint.

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has confirmed eight cases in which major methane leaks in Turkmenistan were stopped after operators took action. The first two were recorded in November 2024, with further cases confirmed at several oil and gas sites over the following year. In February 2026, two leaks were stopped at Dauletabad, one of Turkmenistan’s largest gas fields. The latest confirmed case dates to March, in Lebap Province, one of the country’s main gas-producing regions.

The leaks are detected by the UN's Methane Alert and Response System (MARS), which uses data from more than 30 satellite instruments. After detecting a major methane plume, MARS provides the information to the government or facility operator and then uses satellite observations to determine whether the emissions have stopped.

Meghan Demeter, program manager for MARS at UNEP’s International Methane Emissions Observatory, called the first repairs an “incredible first step.” In comments to The Guardian on August 31, she stressed that significantly more work remains to be done, saying the repairs did not yet represent a breakthrough in the overall scale of Turkmenistan’s emissions.

The scale of the problem is also reflected in data from the International Energy Agency (IEA). In its Global Methane Tracker 2026, Turkmenistan and Venezuela have by far the highest methane emissions intensities from upstream oil and gas production among major producers. The gap between the best and worst performers is more than 100-fold.

Methane intensity measures emissions relative to the amount of fuel produced, allowing producers of different sizes to be compared. According to the IEA, large emissions events visible from satellites are particularly common in Turkmenistan: the country accounts for more than a third of all oil- and gas-related MARS observations in Eurasia.

Satellite studies point to a worsening trend in recent years. One found that super-emitter activity on Turkmenistan’s western coast increased by about 8% annually between 2020 and 2023. The IEA’s own analysis shows that emissions from super-emitter events across Turkmenistan grew by more than 15% a year on average over the same period. The study of the western coast also estimated that methane emissions there rose by around 7% annually between 2020 and 2023, broadly in line with growth in natural gas production.

Methane has a much stronger short-term warming effect than carbon dioxide. At the same time, it is the main component of natural gas, meaning leaks also represent a loss of fuel that could otherwise be sold. The IEA notes that high emissions intensity is not an inevitable feature of the oil and gas industry: it can be substantially reduced through existing technologies, operational standards, and equipment repairs.

Satellite monitoring is particularly important for Turkmenistan because of limited access to information about its oil and gas sector. It makes it possible to identify major emissions independently of operators’ reporting. Since MARS was launched in 2022, the system has moved beyond detecting plumes to checking whether emissions stop after governments or operators respond. By the end of August 2026, MARS had recorded 43 such cases worldwide.

Central Asia features prominently on the list. In addition to the eight cases in Turkmenistan, UNEP has confirmed that emissions stopped at eight sites in Kazakhstan between October 2024 and March 2026.

Turkmenistan joined the Global Methane Pledge in December 2023. The initiative sets a collective goal of reducing global anthropogenic methane emissions by at least 30% from 2020 levels by 2030.

For Ashgabat, cutting emissions is also gradually becoming relevant to its gas export ambitions. Turkmenistan has some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves, but most of its exports go to China. The country is seeking additional markets and has for years considered the possibility of supplying gas to Europe. Turkmen gas also began reaching Turkey in limited volumes through a swap arrangement with Iran in 2025, while the much larger Trans-Caspian route remains unbuilt.

Meanwhile, the European Union is gradually introducing requirements governing the methane footprint of imported fuels. From January 1, 2027, importers under contracts signed or renewed after August 4, 2024, will have to show that the gas was produced under methane oversight equivalent to EU standards, or meets an accepted company-level standard. For older contracts, importers must make all reasonable efforts to obtain the necessary information.

From August 5, 2028, importers must report the methane intensity of gas covered by contracts signed or renewed after August 4, 2024. From August 5, 2030, gas under contracts signed or renewed after that date will have to meet a maximum methane-intensity threshold set by the European Commission. In practical terms, methane performance will increasingly become one of the conditions suppliers must meet to sell gas into the EU.

Turkmenistan’s interest in these requirements has already surfaced in discussions with international organizations. The Clean Air Task Force, which works on methane reduction in Central Asia, has reported discussions with Turkmenistan’s Deputy Minister of Environmental Protection Nury Jumashov on methane regulation and related work. CATF also says the government is interested in understanding the EU’s import standards as it considers access to the European market.

Reducing methane leaks alone will not open the way for Turkmen gas to Europe. The long-discussed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which could carry significantly larger volumes west through Azerbaijan and Turkey, still needs to be built.

World Nomad Games Return Home as Kyrgyzstan Welcomes World Leaders

Few periods since independence have put Kyrgyzstan so squarely in the international spotlight. On August 31, the country marked 35 years of independence, opened the sixth World Nomad Games, and prepared to host a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit that has brought more than a dozen foreign leaders to Bishkek. The Games themselves were back where they began. Kyrgyzstan launched the World Nomad Games in 2014 and staged the first three editions at Cholpon Ata before the event moved to Turkey in 2022 and Kazakhstan in 2024. This year's Games run through September 6, with The Times of Central Asia reporting from Bishkek and Issyk-Kul throughout the week in our special coverage. The opening took place at the new Bishkek Arena, rising out of the dust on the southwestern edge of the capital near the foothills of the Kyrgyz Ala-Too Range. Around 30,000 spectators attended the ceremony. The stadium will eventually hold more than 51,000, but it is not formally due to open until October 5. The Games opened while work on the arena was still underway, with parts of the building still looking unfinished. In the weeks before the ceremony, horses had circled the arena floor during rehearsals while drilling continued around them. By the time the spectators arrived, the construction site had become the biggest show in town. Before the politics and pageantry, there was pop. Kyrgyzstan put many of its best-known performers on stage in a concert that at times had a distinctly Eurovision feel. Energetic hosts introduced a succession of singers and rappers while tightly choreographed dancers moved between traditional dress and contemporary styling. The lineup included Bayastan, Malika Dina, Erlan Andashev, Begish, and others, but veteran singer Baktiyar Toktorov received the loudest reaction. When he launched into "Yza," known almost universally by its "Bui-Bui" refrain, spectators rose from their seats and sang with him. Even some of the security guards joined in. The refrain does not demand many words, but almost everybody in the arena seemed to know them. The new stadium also showed some early teething problems, with concession stands running out of bottled water and food as crowds built. After the concert, the momentum disappeared. The audience waited for around 90 minutes while footage of arriving dignitaries played on the giant screens. The reason for the pause soon became clear, as one motorcade after another delivered guests for the formal ceremony. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko were among those in the stands. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan also attended, along with leaders and senior officials from elsewhere in Asia, the Caucasus, and Africa. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres was among the international guests. One expected heavyweight was missing. Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Bishkek for a state visit and the SCO summit, had been due to attend the opening. Presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov said Xi had stayed away because of the deadly flooding and landslides in Tibet, where rescue operations were continuing. His bilateral meetings in Kyrgyzstan were to proceed as planned. [video width="1024" height="576" mp4="https://timesca.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/WhatsApp-Video-2026-09-01-at-07.58.22.mp4"][/video] Once the dignitaries had taken their seats, the parade began. More than 3,000 athletes from 104 countries entered the arena behind their national flags, including 517 from Kyrgyzstan. Visiting leaders stood or waved as their delegations passed. The biggest roar of the night came when the home team entered, and the stands erupted in national pride. The ceremony then shifted into a vast theatrical retelling of Kyrgyz history and legend. Swirling graphics covered the arena floor as galloping horses and trick riders crossed the stadium. Performers drew on the equestrian traditions that will feature in competition at Issyk-Kul, while mass choreography, music, and fireworks pushed the show deep into the night. President Sadyr Japarov used his speech to bind the Games to Independence Day and the diplomatic gathering around them. "Our foundation is independence, and our roots are in nomadic civilization," he said. "Our chosen course is international friendship and partnership, and our future lies in building a developed, strong new Kyrgyzstan." Japarov said the confluence of the Games and the SCO gathering carried a wider meaning. "At one event, state leaders seek paths to peace and cooperation through dialogue; at the other, the peoples of the world draw closer through sport and culture," he said. "At the heart of both are humanity's highest values: peace and friendship." Japarov also used the ceremony to advertise the government's development agenda, singling out the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and saying its construction would "change perceptions of Kyrgyzstan's geopolitical role." He also highlighted the Kambar-Ata-1 hydropower project and announced that Russia had formally expressed its readiness to host the seventh World Nomad Games in Tatarstan in 2028. [video width="1024" height="576" mp4="https://timesca.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/WhatsApp-Video-2026-09-01-at-07.58.38.mp4"][/video] For all the visiting presidents and geopolitical messaging, the strongest moments belonged to the crowd: thousands singing an old pop hit together, the explosion of noise for the Kyrgyz team, and horses thundering across the floor of a stadium that was a building site only weeks earlier. The Games now move to Issyk-Kul, where the sporting, cultural, and scientific programs continue through September 6. For Kyrgyzstan, the opening night was only the beginning of an unusually crowded week on the world stage. For more from our World Nomad Games 2026 special coverage, click here.

TAPI Pipeline Moves Closer to First Gas Sales in Afghanistan

After decades of delays, the TAPI gas pipeline has moved closer than ever to actual gas sales – but first to the smallest of its intended markets. Turkmenistan is preparing to supply gas to Afghanistan’s Herat province, while the timeline for extending the pipeline to Pakistan and India remains uncertain.

On August 10, state-owned Turkmengaz and Afghan Gas signed a memorandum covering the purchase of gas through TAPI. The document does not itself set a price or supply volume, but it brings closer the prospect that Afghanistan could become the first TAPI customer actually to receive gas.

Afghanistan was already part of TAPI’s original customer base. Afghan Gas and Turkmengaz signed a gas sale-and-purchase agreement in 2013. What has changed is that the pipeline is now approaching a market it can physically serve.

On August 27, Herat Governor Islam Jar said the local section of TAPI was expected to be commissioned within two months. Turkmenistan has not announced an equally specific date for the start of commercial gas supplies.

TAPI was conceived as an approximately 1,800-kilometer pipeline running from Turkmenistan’s giant Galkynysh gas field through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian border. Its planned capacity is 33 billion cubic meters of gas a year. At full capacity, Pakistan and India are each allocated 14 billion cubic meters of gas a year, while Afghanistan is allocated 5 billion.

But after decades of planning, the pipeline has still not reached its principal intended customers. Construction of the 153-kilometer section from the Turkmen border toward Herat began in September 2024. Earlier this year, Turkmenistan said it expected to complete the section by the end of 2026, but no timetable has been announced for extending the pipeline farther south.

According to the Afghan side, 116 kilometers of pipeline had been laid by early August.

The August agreement also envisages the infrastructure needed to use the gas locally. Turkmen and Afghan officials have agreed to develop infrastructure in Herat to supply gas to industrial facilities, power plants, and households.

The volumes involved would be modest compared with the roughly 30 billion cubic meters of gas Turkmenistan exports to China each year. But even limited sales through TAPI would give Ashgabat another export outlet. In February, Turkmenistan's still-influential former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov described diversification of gas exports as one of the country’s main priorities.

For TAPI itself, however, the first gas sales could matter even if the volumes are modest. Writing for The Times of Central Asia, Central Asia analyst Bruce Pannier noted that amid strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as between Pakistan and India, completion of the entire TAPI pipeline remains a distant prospect. He argued that supplying Herat alone could demonstrate to potential investors that the pipeline actually works.

The memorandum signed on August 10 has offered little clarity on price, volumes and start dates. Afghanistan has separately proposed negotiating a long-term contract and pricing formula, while the gas distribution network in Herat still needs to be developed.

The governor’s statement that the Herat section of TAPI could be operational within two months therefore does not necessarily mean that commercial deliveries to end users will begin at the same time. The trunk pipeline section must first be completed, commercial terms agreed, and local distribution infrastructure prepared.