Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at OTS cooperation, Azerbaijan President Aliyev's decision not to attend the OTS summit in Ankara, and the Middle Corridor. Special guest: Dr. Robert Cutler
Central Asian States Set Out Priorities After Rubio Talks in Samarkand
Central Asian governments backed closer cooperation on mineral processing and transport at the October 19 C5+1 meeting in Samarkand. Separate talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio covered possible aircraft purchases for Kyrgyzstan and further diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan announced a $12 billion package of agreements and prospective initiatives during the visit. For the other four Central Asian participants, the published accounts centered largely on cooperation priorities and follow-up discussions. The gathering followed the November 2025 White House summit and accompanied Uzbekistan’s signing of the Artemis Accords. It brought Rubio together with all five Central Asian foreign ministers, combining regional discussions with separate bilateral meetings. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi discussed implementation of earlier presidential agreements with Rubio. The talks addressed attracting American investment and technology, with energy and critical minerals among the priorities. Washington also expressed interest in cooperation on artificial intelligence and communications infrastructure. According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, Rubio expressed interest in visiting Kazakhstan after the December G20 summit in Miami. Kyrgyzstan’s talks included immediate obstacles to closer relations. Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev raised sanctions policy and visa restrictions with Rubio, alongside opportunities for American investment. The Kyrgyz side sought solutions that would facilitate educational and business exchanges. Presidential special representative Bakyt Sydykov briefed the U.S. delegation on Kyrgyzstan’s sanctions-related efforts, with Bishkek reaffirming its willingness to work with Washington to prevent sanctions circumvention. In a separate meeting, Kulubaev discussed possible Boeing aircraft deliveries to Kyrgyz airlines with company vice president Michael Schnabel. Financing options included possible involvement by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The discussions also covered aircraft maintenance and aviation infrastructure. Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin discussed expanding trade and investment with Rubio. The ministry’s account also described an exchange on regional security and stability in Central Asia. Turkmenistan reported a more specific diplomatic follow-up. Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and Rubio outlined a schedule of further meetings and political consultations. U.S. special envoy Sergio Gor also attended the talks. The shared C5+1 statement set out the broader economic agenda. The six governments supported further development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route and more closely aligned customs procedures. They also backed stronger industrial cooperation within Central Asia. On minerals, the statement envisaged expanded extraction and processing, alongside more production of higher-value goods within the region. It also supported exchanging expertise on geological data. These were collective policy intentions, without country-by-country financing allocations or project completion dates. Security commitments covered stronger border protection and counterterrorism cooperation, alongside efforts against transnational crime. The governments also supported practical cooperation on nuclear security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Uzbekistan Signs Space Accords as Rubio Opens Samarkand Talks
Uzbekistan joined the U.S.-led Artemis Accords on October 19 as Secretary of State Marco Rubio held talks in Samarkand. The signing accompanied the first Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue between the two countries, with critical minerals among the priorities. Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov announced the signing after bilateral talks with Rubio. He said Uzbekistan had become the 77th country to join the framework for peaceful space exploration. Saidov said accession would support closer cooperation with NASA and other participating space agencies. He identified training for Uzbek specialists and access to space technologies as potential benefits. Established in 2020, the Artemis Accords set out principles for civilian space exploration. Signatories commit to peaceful operations and greater transparency, including sharing scientific data. The framework also addresses interference between missions and the preservation of historic sites in space. NASA describes the accords as nonbinding principles. Posting on X, Rubio confirmed he had met all five Central Asian foreign ministers during the C5+1 gathering. He said cooperation would expand commercial opportunities and strengthen regional security. American businesses also joined the visit as Washington seeks deeper economic ties across Central Asia. The visit follows the November 2025 White House summit, where Trump hosted all five Central Asian presidents. That meeting gave the partnership a stronger commercial focus, with aircraft orders and minerals projects featuring prominently. Samarkand brings ministers and businesses together to advance that agenda. The strategic dialogue focused on implementing agreements reached by the countries’ leaders and expanding economic cooperation. Saidov said the discussions covered energy and advanced technologies, alongside critical minerals. Education and security cooperation were also on the agenda. Rubio said separately that the talks addressed infrastructure and space cooperation, as well as engagement through C5+1, which brings together the United States and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In a separate meeting with Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi, Rubio reaffirmed plans to expand economic and security cooperation. He thanked Kazakhstan for supporting “President Trump’s peace initiatives, including the Abraham Accords.” Speaking to reporters in Samarkand, Rubio said nearly 300 American businesses were represented, and that agreements potentially worth billions of dollars were under discussion. He presented the visit as the start of deeper U.S. economic engagement with Central Asia. “I think we’ll have some concrete deals to announce,” he said, according to Euronews. A final list of agreements and their value had not been circulated at the time of those remarks. Rubio identified critical minerals as a priority, arguing that concentrated supplies created risks for countries dependent on them. "This is not about coming here to say, stop talking to somebody else or stop working with some other country," he said. Days earlier, at the October 15 summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in Baku, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed a transport strategy spanning several international initiatives. His proposal included China’s Belt and Road and the planned Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) through Armenia. It illustrated the region’s pursuit of transport links involving different international partners, consistent with Rubio’s stated approach to U.S. engagement. Samarkand also connects the current talks to the format’s origins. Following a proposal from Kazakhstan, John Kerry and the five Central Asian foreign ministers met in New York in September 2015 and again in Samarkand on November 1. The six governments initially focused on shared security concerns and economic connectivity, alongside environmental challenges. A secretariat followed in 2022, before Joe Biden hosted the first presidential-level meeting in New York in September 2023. The 2023 summit also set the groundwork for a dedicated business platform and the Critical Minerals Dialogue, which began in February 2024. These initiatives widened cooperation beyond periodic diplomatic meetings, giving companies a more direct role in identifying investment opportunities and obstacles. At the November 2025 summit, the U.S. Commerce Department announced more than $25 billion in commercial deals. Aviation formed a substantial part of the package, with Uzbekistan Airways ordering eight additional Boeing 787s, while Air Astana selected up to 15. The announcements also covered agricultural machinery and advanced computing, showing the breadth of U.S. commercial interest beyond mineral extraction. The package included firm orders alongside preliminary commitments. The minerals discussions continued in Astana on June 10, when U.S. envoy Sergio Gor met officials from all five Central Asian countries. Sessions covered exploration and processing, with supply chain security central to Washington’s approach. Kazakhstan emphasized its interest in domestic processing and skilled jobs, seeking a larger industrial role than supplying raw materials alone. Minerals cooperation already has a bilateral foundation. On February 4, Saidov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau signed a memorandum on supply chain security covering critical minerals and rare earth elements. It included both mining and processing. Later that month, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation signed preliminary commercial terms for a joint investment framework with Uzbekistan. The proposed structure included a joint holding company intended to help develop investment projects. The five countries have also developed their own regional consultation process, beginning with a leaders’ meeting in 2018. Their cooperation now extends to transport and energy, areas central to foreign investment. The region is pursuing parallel partnerships with China, the European Union, and other partners, giving the U.S. initiative a place within a broader expansion of Central Asia’s international economic ties.
Central Asian Leaders Link Trade and Security at Baku Summit
Central Asian leaders called for better transport links and joint action on water shortages at the Baku summit in Azerbaijan on October 15, arguing that practical cooperation could prevent political disputes from turning into conflict. The seventh summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) adopted the Baku Declaration, admitted Laos as a new member, and approved Azerbaijan’s continued chairmanship through 2028. Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for an “infrastructure of trust” based on transparent government actions and the fulfillment of commitments. His proposed concept would connect conflict prevention with joint transport and energy projects, trade, and digital links. He pointed to the damage that conflicts in Asia were causing to economies and security far from the fighting. Mirziyoyev warned, “When dialogue weakens, the risk of misguided decisions increases.” He urged governments to prevent political disagreements from becoming armed confrontations. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed a preventive diplomacy mechanism within CICA, enabling members to contribute before a crisis develops. He told the summit, “Peace is best built before crises emerge.” According to the Azerbaijani state news agency AZERTAC’s account, the Baku Declaration includes provisions on economic ties, transport and digital connections, and energy security. It addresses the opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence. Trade Routes Across the Caspian Sea The meeting came one week after the Avaza summit, where Central Asian presidents and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev discussed east-west and north-south trade routes. In Baku, those regional priorities entered a wider Asian forum, alongside calls to make commercial relationships more dependable. Tokayev proposed a CICA Transport Connectivity Strategy covering major routes, including the Middle Corridor across the Caspian Sea. He linked Azerbaijan’s rapprochement with Armenia to new opportunities for east-west transport. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon called in his summit address for simpler customs and logistics procedures and better connections between different forms of transport. He presented economic cooperation as a foundation for lasting peace, alongside continued action against terrorism and its financing. On the summit’s sidelines, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan discussed transport and transit cooperation. Their talks covered improvements to logistics infrastructure and international routes connecting Central Asia with the Caucasus, according to Turkmenistan’s government account. During a separate bilateral meeting, Tokayev and Aliyev inaugurated the Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable Line remotely, opening an approximately 380-kilometer connection between Aktau in Kazakhstan and Sumgayit in Azerbaijan. The project forms part of the Digital Silk Way initiative, with onward connections intended to carry data between China, Central Asia, and Europe. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development gives the cable a design capacity exceeding 400 terabits per second. The ministry says the additional route will provide backup for existing international connections and allow operators to distribute traffic across more channels. It expects the connection to attract investment in data centers and cloud services as Kazakhstan seeks a larger role in carrying international data. Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov similarly called for fiber-optic routes linking Asia and Europe. He invited technology companies to build data centers and computing facilities in Kyrgyzstan, citing its hydropower resources and climate. He said Kyrgyzstan’s trade with CICA members had more than doubled over four years to exceed $14 billion in 2025. Calls for AI Safeguards and Water Conservation The push for more digital infrastructure was accompanied by proposals to manage its risks. Mirziyoyev suggested an expert platform within CICA to develop shared recommendations on responsible artificial intelligence, under an Asian initiative on technological trust. Tokayev called for artificial intelligence to become a sixth dimension of CICA’s work, citing risks to interstate stability. Kazakhstan advocated a CICA Water Partnership for joint research, technology exchange, and water-saving solutions. Uzbekistan suggested a Partnership for Climate Resilience that would combine water-saving technologies with green energy and continuous environmental monitoring. Japarov proposed a joint trust fund under United Nations auspices to protect Issyk-Kul and offered an initial contribution of $10 million, according to a presidential statement carried by Kyrgyzstan’s state news agency Kabar. He presented the fund as a means of attracting technology, scientific expertise, and international financing to protect vulnerable mountain ecosystems. Tokayev and Mirziyoyev called for continued work on CICA’s charter. Members agreed in Astana in 2022 to turn the conference into a full international organization, and both presidents presented the charter as a next step in that process. The gap between proposals and implementation had already been raised at Avaza. In his October 8 address, Tokayev said more than 200 initiatives had been put forward in the regional consultative format since 2018, but only a small proportion had been implemented. He called on foreign ministries to review those initiatives and assess which remained relevant and achievable.
Central Asia in the Global Innovation Rankings: Supercomputers, Engineers, and the Economics of Government Ambitions
In the Global Innovation Index (GII), published on September 29 by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Kazakhstan climbed eight places to rank 73rd among 139 economies. Uzbekistan ranked 77th and Kyrgyzstan 92nd. Tajikistan placed 112th, while Turkmenistan was not included in the study. The overall rankings, however, conceal some interesting details. Uzbekistan ranks second worldwide in the share of graduates in science and engineering. Kyrgyzstan ranks second in labor productivity growth, while Tajikistan leads in utility model applications relative to the size of its economy. Utility models are a simpler form of patent protection, usually for smaller inventions. Such strong results in individual indicators stand in contrast to the countries' relatively modest overall rankings. Part of the explanation lies in the study's methodology. WIPO evaluates education and scientific capacity alongside infrastructure and investment. It also considers business activity and research output. A country may train large numbers of engineers or register technical innovations while lagging in research output and investment, with limited commercial activity. For Central Asia, the rankings also offer a way to compare economic performance with the scale of governments' technological ambitions. Kazakhstan: Supercomputers in Search of Customers In recent years, Kazakhstan has assembled an impressive portfolio of digital projects. The Alem.Cloud and Al-Farabium supercomputers, along with the Data Center Valley project in Ekibastuz, are intended to improve the country's computing infrastructure. The Alem.ai artificial intelligence (AI) center and the KazLLM and AlemLLM large language models are designed to develop its AI capabilities. Training opportunities are also expanding through AI-Sana and Tomorrow School, with TUMO Astana offering education in AI and other digital fields. However, the wider use of AI remains relatively modest. The Digital Qazaqstan strategy through 2029 cites figures for the second half of 2025 showing that generative AI adoption in Kazakhstan stood at 13.7%, compared with a global average of 16.3%. Kazakhstan ranked 24th in the United Nations (UN) E-Government Development Index in its 2024 survey but 73rd in the 2026 GII. Kazakhstan's digitalization model has long centered on government services. The country's high position in the UN study reflects this focus. Commercial technologies present a more complicated picture: here, the government must rely on research teams, private developers, investors, and customers willing to pay for their services. The arrival of supercomputers expands the country's technical capabilities. How extensively they will be used outside government projects remains to be seen. Uzbekistan: Engineering Education and IT Services Exports The country has long focused on workforce development for the IT industry. An export-oriented digital services sector is growing around IT Park. Foreign companies are operating in the country, while training programs in programming and AI are expanding. Tashkent intends to support its workforce development policies with domestic computing infrastructure. Under the AI development strategy adopted in 2024, Uzbekistan plans $50 million in AI infrastructure spending and the training of one million specialists. AI laboratories are also planned at 15 universities. A smaller supercomputer is already operating, and preparations are underway to acquire a more powerful system. The high share of technical graduates demonstrates Uzbekistan's workforce potential but says little about the structure of its domestic IT industry. Developing software for foreign clients generates export revenue and creates jobs. Producing its own software products requires more investment in research and marketing, including reaching customers abroad. Kyrgyzstan: Global Leaders in Individual Indicators Kyrgyzstan climbed four places to 92nd. It also ranks eighth in education expenditure and 15th in microfinance. That said, in most cases the country is developing from a low base. In October 2024, then-Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Akylbek Japarov reported that only three of the 49 measures planned for that year under the digital transformation program had been completed. At a government meeting, agencies were criticized for delays and poor coordination. While those figures from two years ago do not necessarily describe the program's current state of implementation, they illustrate the problems encountered during its rollout. Tajikistan: Clean Energy Amid Seasonal Electricity Shortages Tajikistan ranks 112th overall but stands out in two categories. WIPO places the country first in utility models and 12th in the use of low-carbon energy. A high ranking for utility model applications does not mean these inventions have been manufactured or sold. Tajikistan's reliance on hydroelectric plants gives its electricity mix a high proportion of low-carbon energy. Behind these figures lies a familiar problem for Tajikistan's industry: seasonal restrictions on electricity supply. The share of hydropower in the energy mix and the reliability of electricity supply measure different aspects of the energy system. Construction continues on the Rogun Hydropower Plant, the country's largest energy project. How effectively the country can turn its energy potential into reliable power for industry will likely influence its future innovation performance. Turkmenistan: Outside the Rankings Turkmenistan is absent from the GII, leaving a significant gap in the regional picture. Nevertheless, Ashgabat has also announced a transition toward a digital economy. In October 2025, the authorities approved the Concept for the Development of the Digital Economy in Turkmenistan for 2026–2028. The stated priorities include electronic government services and industrial digitalization, along with AI and workforce training. Technology Plans and Economic Realities For all the differences between Central Asian countries, technology policy across the region still relies heavily on government initiatives and investment. The private sector, however, follows its own economic logic. Governments can pay for computing capacity or engineering programs, but the use of this equipment or the employment prospects for graduates depend on demand from customers and businesses. Kazakhstan's Economic Research Institute, in its analysis of the GII 2026 results, points to the need to expand venture capital financing and turn more scientific research into commercial products. There is also a timing issue. Many programs run through 2028–2030, while the innovation index draws on statistics from previous years. The impact of recently launched projects will become apparent later, provided they find practical applications in the economy.
Opinion: Central Asia’s Minilateral Diplomacy and the Limits of Cooperation
In the contemporary, largely fragmented world order, the concept of minilateralism has become increasingly relevant. As less powerful, smaller states are struggling with often ineffective multilateral diplomatic frameworks, cooperation on a smaller scale has been gaining momentum in international relations. Central Asian countries, although with an intrinsic set of strengths and resources, still lack the power to individually address some of their own issues and advocate more proactively for their interests, especially in global forums dominated by major powers and entities. Geopolitical weaknesses of each Central Asian country lie in insufficiently developed domestic economic and military power to compete with much stronger neighbors such as Russia or China. Furthermore, unfavorable geography, where Central Asia, as a landlocked region, has limited access to global trade chains, also dilutes its geopolitical strength. In addition, the transboundary nature of critical resources, especially concerning water flows and supply, often causes tensions among states of Central Asia. In such discouraging circumstances, minilateralism promises more realistic solutions that can place Central Asia on a more equal footing with external partners and enable the region to play a more significant role in regional and, to some extent, international politics. That is why the consultative meetings of the five Central Asian countries (C5), now expanded to include Azerbaijan as C6, and C5+1 dialogues with external partners have become important platforms for Central Asia’s diplomatic standing. Minilateralism and Central Asia Minilateralism represents an international relations concept that implies cooperation of a smaller group of countries (usually three to nine members) in order to resolve shared problems or pursue mutual objectives. While bilateralism remains the main form of cooperation in international politics and multilateralism is necessary for tackling global issues, minilateralism has emerged as a more appropriate response for addressing specific regional issues in a more flexible and efficient manner. One of the main features of minilateralism is prioritizing shared interests over values or ideological principles, which allows collaborating states to focus more on solving issues and avoid being burdened by ideological discrepancies. Take, for example, the Abraham Accords that managed to gather countries with very different ideological views, especially Israel and the United Arab Emirates, but still produced tangible results of cooperation. Another advantage of minilateralism is a quicker response to crises, as well as opportunities, with less of the bureaucratic hassle that often follows multilateral diplomacy. For Central Asia, working together provides a stronger platform for negotiating better outcomes, especially in the economic area. While the current major geopolitical tensions, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Iran war, continue to shake the international order, the Central Asian countries have become more aware of their opportunities, especially in terms of transit routes and natural resource demand. Central Asia has definitely caught the attention of major powers, and its geographical position along alternative transportation routes, as well as its considerable wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and critical materials, opens doors for the region to gain more influence and power. However, for all of these opportunities to materialize, Central Asian countries need stronger and more formal cooperative frameworks both among themselves and with external partners. Minilateral Formats In 2018, the five countries of Central Asia began to organize consultative annual meetings among the heads of state to develop their regional ties and discuss common issues and opportunities regarding trade, water, security, and transit. As the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor started gaining more attention and offering numerous opportunities for the mostly politically isolated region of Central Asia, Azerbaijan’s role in the meetings has grown from a guest to a full member of the framework, transforming the platform from C5 to C6 in 2025. On October 8, leaders of Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan met in Turkmenistan for the 8th Consultative Meeting to deepen cooperation and discuss regional issues and opportunities. The meeting confirmed the extensive format of the platform that recognized Azerbaijan’s full membership and expanded its dialogue across the Caspian Sea. One of the important outcomes of the meeting was of a regulatory nature. All six countries signed a Joint Statement of the Eighth Consultative Meeting and a Decision on the Regulatory Documents of the Consultative Meeting, which represents a further step toward developing the institutional side of the C6 format. This meeting carries an important message: stronger collaboration between Central Asia and the South Caucasus is possible and even inevitable, considering the current geopolitical landscape that encourages creating new, alternative trade routes and boosting regional energy cooperation. Advancing logistics chains can also lead toward better connectivity between East and West. The transformation from C5 to C6 only confirms how minilateralism allows greater flexibility, especially if the change promises greater benefits for participating states. A minilateral approach that implies stronger collaboration with more frequent diplomatic consultations enables member countries to utilize promising projects, like the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, to gain more economic and political leverage. Central Asian countries also look beyond their immediate neighborhood. The C5+1 format is perceived as an opportunity to include global and regional powers in the region’s development strategy while expanding its diplomatic outreach. So far, Central Asia has included the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union in its minilateral foreign policy pursuit. Through the C5+1 platform, Central Asia and the U.S. are actively sustaining dialogue on critical minerals business, which has brought some targeted, billion-dollar investment commitments involving private capital to the region. The minilateral format of C5+1 enables Central Asia to form collaborative relations with external partners and preserve its strategic autonomy and geopolitical stability, which further reinforces the region’s multi-vector balancing between competing powers. Minilateralism as a Desirable Course of Action Despite Its Shortcomings Minilateralism, like any other lateralism, is not without setbacks. Its exclusivity and prioritization of interests over values might lead to more fragmentation and interest-based politics, where it becomes extremely difficult to advocate for the resolution of global problems and long-term solutions. In the case of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, minilateral frameworks can be beneficial for better organization of economic and energy-related activities. However, from a political and security point of view, the C6 format doesn’t go beyond words of mutual support and friendship. In times of crisis and security threats, countries are still hesitant to provide meaningful support to each other. And the discussions in the meetings are more focused on areas that guarantee greater economic benefits, such as trade and transportation connectivity. With C5+1 formats, Central Asia may be pressured to prioritize the interests of a more powerful partner. Even though the C5+1, in general, allows for greater balancing, the countries of Central Asia are still influenced by geopolitical realities where powerful states often have the upper hand in diplomatic negotiations and setting the terms of agreements. However, countries rarely limit themselves to one type of lateralism but pursue a combined approach where collaborating with others on a bilateral and multilateral basis, alongside minilateral cooperation, gives more balanced and beneficial diplomatic engagement. For Central Asian countries, minilateralism presents a fairly new concept that has become a promising format for their foreign policy endeavors. The newly developed geopolitical conditions with global and regional consequences, such as the emergence of multipolarity, made minilateral diplomacy across Central Asia a powerful diplomatic instrument for regional integration. With every new meeting, the C6 format has been gaining more structural and institutional outlines, which opens an avenue for turning this diplomatic platform into a mechanism for achieving more concrete outcomes. However, as geopolitical circumstances are often unpredictable, the evolution of the minilateral formats is difficult to anticipate. At the current pace and if the geopolitical landscape remains largely unchanged, Central Asian minilateral frameworks might achieve the status of effective mechanisms that produce practical results in the foreseeable future. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan Ties Could Reorient Central Asian Integration
The five Central Asian presidents met with Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev in Avaza on October 8 for the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s participation brings a principal outlet for Central Asian trade into the six governments’ economic deliberations. Within their consultative format, the states can coordinate industrial projects with the transport services through which regional producers reach foreign markets. If Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan connect cross-Caspian transport more closely to industrial cooperation, the corridor could become an organizing axis for regional integration. The Case for Trans-Caspian Integration Closer Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan cooperation would make cross-Caspian transport more dependable if trains reach Kazakhstani ports in time for Caspian sailings and cargo arriving at Azerbaijani terminals connects with onward services through Georgia. A 2023 assessment by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also called the World Bank, identified trade among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Europe as a driver of corridor demand, giving regional exporters a place alongside China–Europe transit traffic. Onward connections from the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway now under construction could run through Turkmenistan and across the Caspian to Azerbaijan, providing an alternative to routes through Iran. Conflict involving Iran strengthens Azerbaijan’s position as the more dependable western outlet for Europe-bound exports. Greater predictability could offset the cost of a Caspian crossing by reducing the stocks firms must hold against delays and the losses caused by interrupted deliveries. Extending the operating coordination developed with Kazakhstan to these southern connections could make Azerbaijan commercially preferable for Central Asian exporters serving European markets. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan occupy the principal positions in this prospective reorientation. Together, they represent approximately one-third of the six countries’ population but account for more than three-fifths of their nominal GDP. Yet bilateral merchandise trade amounted to only $470.7 million in 2025. Their combined economic weight is thus disproportionate to the commerce presently linking them. The infrastructure and institutions connecting industrial investment to markets across the Caspian could give the two countries a basis for organizing wider regional integration, provided firms sustain commercial relationships through those connections. The Bilateral Basis for Regional Integration Export commitments depend on the cost and timing of the complete transport service. At Avaza, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attached “particular importance” to developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. His Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, advocated joint investment, manufacturing, and entry into foreign markets. For firms undertaking joint production, the commercial viability of Aliyev’s proposal would depend on transport coordinated from departure to delivery. Kazakhstan is developing the Middle Corridor along with the eastern branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At Avaza, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov supported the development of North–South corridors in addition to East–West routes. Tokayev also highlighted the continuing importance to Kazakhstan of the North–South route in cooperation with Russia. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector approach thus extends to transport infrastructure: the Middle Corridor strengthens westward access without displacing the commercial connections maintained through Russia and Iran. Middle Corridor Multimodal (MCM), formed by the railway operators of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia, provides an organizational basis for coordinating east-west connections already in service. Azerbaijan Railways’ August 2025 emphasis on stronger digital integration addresses the venture’s reliability; its value to shippers ultimately depends on coordinating train movements with Caspian sailings. That month, MCM’s railway partners signed a protocol for China Railway Container Transport’s inclusion in the venture. Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry confirmed in July 2024 that the two countries had signed an agreement on a $300 million investment fund in Astana. The announcement specifies the fund’s intended scale without showing how much has been disbursed or which production projects have received financing. At Avaza, Aliyev called for more active use of joint funds to support manufacturing. Oil exports demonstrate how onward constraints affect the cross-Caspian connection. KazMunayGas’s 2025 trading update recorded a temporary suspension of Aktau–Baku shipments from August to October that year because of technological constraints on the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. The update also identified scheduled tanker modernization as a constraint on marine transport. The oil chain differs from containerized rail and maritime freight, but both require onward services to accommodate shipments originating on the Kazakhstani side. Conditions for Supply-Chain Participation Predictable delivery times are essential for Central Asian suppliers to meet foreign buyers’ production and distribution schedules. By reducing the need for precautionary inventories or alternative suppliers, dependable delivery would make continuing contracts with Central Asian firms more practicable: intermediate-goods suppliers could commit to manufacturers’ production schedules, while finished-goods exporters could meet buyers’ distribution schedules. These export commitments would constitute regional demand for corridor services alongside third-country transit, consistent with the World Bank’s regional trade analysis. Regional producers will also have to meet buyers’ quality requirements and sustain output at the volumes their contracts specify. Joint production would require firms in different countries to fulfill their commitments within a common production chain. Tokayev proposed linking industrial cooperation centers with border trade and logistics facilities, which he said “could be interconnected to build regional value chains.” Growing transit traffic demonstrates use of the route, without establishing that regional firms have entered continuing supplier relationships or can fulfill supply contracts. The World Bank’s September 2026 assessment notes that uneven implementation of regulatory norms and fragmented governance require administrative remedy. To reduce administrative fragmentation across the journey, the report proposes a digital system combining contracts of carriage with customs and onward transport records in a single data entry. Corridor-wide monitoring would help governments and operators resolve bottlenecks, while more commercial management of state enterprises would sustain the joint service. Feeder routes that connect production sites to the main network by road or rail would extend the corridor’s commercial reach inland, supported by terminals through which producers could consolidate their shipments. The World Bank estimates investment needs through 2040 of at least $25 billion for physical bottlenecks and about $30 billion for enabling infrastructure. The estimates cover nine economies and represent investment requirements, rather than financing pledged by the six states at Avaza. Industrial Cooperation and Regional Reorientation Uzbekistan is seeking to connect transport investment with industrial cooperation among the six economies. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev proposed joint industrial and technological production chains under the formula “six economies—one product.” At Avaza, he also proposed a platform to prepare joint projects, for which he has sought financial and technical support. Alongside project preparation, Mirziyoyev urged accelerated establishment of an infrastructure development council to coordinate infrastructure serving production sites and their export routes. He also offered to host a Central Asia–Azerbaijan business forum in Khiva in 2027. These arrangements would need to respond to the commercial requirements of participating firms. For producers in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, competitive access to the corridor depends on feeder routes supported by inland logistics facilities; otherwise, the cost of reaching Caspian ports can absorb savings achieved on the trunk route. Connecting the CKU railway to this network would therefore need to serve regional producers as well as Chinese transit cargo. Without the domestic connections included in the World Bank’s enabling investment agenda, corridor gains could concentrate around the principal transport facilities, leaving inland producers unable to use maritime services at competitive cost. If industrial investment and production partnerships develop around access to foreign markets through the Trans-Caspian corridor, the economic center of regional integration would shift toward that route. Decisions in Baku and Astana about transport capacity and joint project finance would increasingly shape industrial development in inland states exporting through these partnerships. Economic cooperation would then be organized around the corridor without requiring production to relocate. Within the six governments’ consultative format, joint projects involving inland producers could supply the freight base for regular cross-Caspian sailings. As Tokayev noted, however, out of more than 200 regional initiatives proposed since 2018, only a “small proportion” have been implemented. During Azerbaijan’s 2027 chairmanship, project preparation could be coordinated with the transport capacity required to carry the resulting exports. Closer Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan ties will deepen regional integration if firms elsewhere in Central Asia can build cross-Caspian routes into their production and export plans.
Avaza Summit Highlights East–West and North–South Trade Routes
On October 8, the presidents of five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan gathered in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast, to discuss closer economic and political cooperation. Hosted by Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the annual Consultative Meeting included Azerbaijan as a full participant for the first time, extending the forum across the Caspian to the South Caucasus. The six leaders adopted a joint statement recognizing East–West and North–South transport corridors as priorities for regional development. The summit highlighted the region's growing importance in Eurasian trade and international supply chains. Beyond expanding transport networks, the leaders proposed closer industrial cooperation and cross-border investment, seeking to capitalize on their geographic advantages while preserving flexibility in their international economic relationships. Transport Corridors in Multiple Directions Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov said, "I believe it is now important to intensify negotiations and practical steps toward establishing transport and logistics connectivity along the East–West and North–South routes." He added, "The Central Asia–Caspian Sea–South Caucasus–Europe corridor should play a key role here." He also emphasized that cooperation among Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as Caspian states could help integrate the wider Central Asian region and other countries into these transport networks. Turkmenistan remained prepared to make its Caspian infrastructure available for mutually beneficial projects. Its port at Turkmenbashi and rail connections toward Iran give it a practical role in both East–West and North–South trade. The Turkmen president's emphasis on North–South connectivity also reflects ongoing transport cooperation with Russia. In May 2026, Turkmenistan reported that Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran were working on an agreement to improve freight movement along the corridor's eastern branch. Turkmen officials also outlined preferential railway tariffs and container services linking Turkmenbashi with Russia's Olya port. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also highlighted growing demand for the Middle Corridor, while emphasizing the continued importance of the North–South route. "For Kazakhstan, the North–South route in cooperation with Russia remains particularly relevant," Tokayev said. The statement is consistent with Kazakhstan's longstanding multivector foreign policy, which seeks to maintain established trade connections while expanding access to alternative transport routes. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy, occupies a strategic position at the intersection of major East–West and North–South transport routes. For the region’s landlocked economies, a wider choice of reliable routes can improve access to markets and reduce dependence on individual transit connections. Expanding the Middle Corridor Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized investments on both shores of the Caspian, noting that transit cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor increased by more than 10% in 2025 and by almost 20% during the first eight months of 2026. Azerbaijan has invested in ports, railways, highways and other infrastructure to facilitate trade between Central Asia and international markets. It also serves as a transit route for Kazakh and Turkmen oil exports, giving the country a growing role in connecting Central Asian producers with markets to the west. Tokayev proposed exploring the integration of the Middle Corridor with the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a planned transport link through Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave and onward routes toward Turkey. On the eastern side of the Caspian, Kazakhstan is expanding its domestic railway network, including the Moyynty–Kyzylzhar and Bakhty–Ayagoz projects, to strengthen connections between China, the Caspian Sea and western markets. A World Bank report released in September 2026 estimated that infrastructure investment combined with improvements in transport efficiency could quadruple cargo volumes along the Trans-Caspian corridor by 2040. Connecting the Wider Region Farther east, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov highlighted the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, intended to strengthen regional transit capacity and create additional connections between Chinese and international markets. Reliable routes, competitive transport costs and predictable transit conditions, he argued, were essential to economic cooperation. For Uzbekistan, the challenge extends beyond individual railway projects to the integration of regional transport networks. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for closer coordination of infrastructure development, with new railway and road connections accompanied by manufacturing facilities, logistics centers and industrial zones. He proposed accelerating the establishment of a regional Council for Infrastructure Development to coordinate major projects. Uzbekistan borders every other Central Asian country as well as Afghanistan, giving it an important role in connecting regional corridors with markets farther south. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon focused on the practical obstacles facing cross-border freight. He emphasized developing multimodal transport routes while removing administrative and infrastructure barriers, including through simpler transit procedures and greater digitalization of freight operations. Trade and Industry Along the Corridors Tokayev said intraregional trade stood at approximately $13 billion in 2025, representing only about 8% of the participating countries' combined foreign trade. He proposed raising that figure to at least $20 billion and connecting industrial and logistics centers into regional production chains. Mirziyoyev advanced the concept of "six economies – one product," encouraging companies from different countries to participate in shared manufacturing processes. Aliyev called for greater use of Azerbaijan's joint investment funds with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to establish manufacturing facilities and expand exports. Berdimuhamedov also proposed closer industrial cooperation, including export-oriented agricultural-processing facilities. From Routes to Results Tokayev cautioned that more than 200 regional initiatives had been proposed since 2018, but only a small proportion had been implemented. He called for a review of existing commitments and greater attention to practical results. That record raises questions for the transport projects discussed at Avaza. New railway lines and proposed international connections will require financing, sustained freight demand, efficient border crossings and coordination among the countries through which they pass. With Azerbaijan assuming the chairmanship in 2027, the six-country format faces a familiar challenge. The region has no shortage of proposed transport corridors. The harder task is making them commercially viable.
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