Kazakhstan Tiger Reintroduction: Second Amur Tiger Released into the Wild
Kazakhstan has released a second Amur tiger into the wild as part of a program to restore the big cats to Central Asia. The male, named Amur, was freed in the Ile-Balkhash State Nature Reserve in southeastern Kazakhstan on October 31. The first tiger, a female named Umit, was released on July 31. According to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, she is already hunting independently and exploring her new territory. Both animals are being tracked using satellite collars. Tigers disappeared from the wild in Kazakhstan by the middle of the 20th century. Hunting contributed to their local extinction, while the development of river valleys destroyed the dense woodlands and shrublands along rivers in Central Asia's arid regions. Populations of wild boar, deer, and other prey animals also declined. The Turan, or Caspian, tiger once ranged from Central Asia to the Caucasus and northern Iran. Genetic studies have established its close relationship with the Amur tiger, which inhabits Russia's Far East. Conservationists therefore selected Amur tigers for reintroduction to this historical range. In November 2025, Kazakhstan and Russia agreed to transfer four tigers. In May 2026, two adult tigers and two cubs captured in the wild were brought from Russia's Khabarovsk region. They were placed in enclosures to adjust to conditions at the reserve, established in 2018 on the southern shore of Lake Balkhash. Before releasing Amur, specialists assessed his health, ability to find food independently, and response to human presence. The two cubs remain under observation. A decision on their release will be made once they reach an appropriate age and pass the necessary assessments. The return of tigers has raised concerns among some Kazakhstanis. After Umit's release, social media users questioned the safety of tourists and residents around Lake Balkhash. They worried that the tigress might approach settlements or attack livestock, while some said they were reconsidering trips to the lake. The ministry outlined a system of three safety zones around Umit's habitat. A specialized response team is tasked with intervening if a tiger approaches populated areas. Measures include warning residents, driving the animal back to a safe area, and, if necessary, sedating and relocating it. Public access to the reserve is restricted. An AI-generated tiger adjusting to life near Lake Balkhash has become a social media sensation through videos posted by @qreative_qazaq on Instagram. In the videos, the tiger speaks Russian and Kazakh, complains about mosquitoes, searches for a mobile phone signal, and tries to figure out where to find food. By August 11, the first video had attracted approximately 3.2 million views. Other images circulating online have caused confusion. In August, the ministry rejected a photograph purportedly showing a chance sighting of Umit. Officials said the image showed signs of possible AI generation and that specialists knew Umit's actual location through satellite monitoring. To support the tigers' return, conservationists are restoring tugai forests, woodlands that grow along rivers, and increasing populations of wild hoofed animals in the delta of the Ili River, which flows into Lake Balkhash. In September 2026, 30 kulans, or Asiatic wild asses, were relocated there from Altyn-Emel National Park. Bukhara deer, once native to Central Asia's riverine forests, had previously been reintroduced to the reserve. The Ili Delta remains one of the region's best-preserved large river ecosystems. Its forests, reed beds, and wetlands provide habitats for numerous species. However, the area depends on water flowing down the Ili River, which originates in China. The future of the restored tiger population is therefore also tied to protecting the water resources of this transboundary river. The program involves Russia's Amur Tiger Center, the World Wide Fund for Nature, and other partners. Russian specialists helped prepare the animals for relocation, while conservation organizations worked to restore their habitat. For the program to succeed, the animals must adapt to their new surroundings, hunt independently, and reproduce. The birth of the first cubs in the wild would represent a far more significant milestone than the relocation itself.
Osinovsky Pass Bypass Opens in Kazakhstan After Years of Delays
A new road bypassing the Osinovsky Pass in eastern Kazakhstan opened to traffic on October 30, offering motorists an alternative to a route frequently subject to winter travel restrictions. The bypass's centerpiece is a 175-meter bridge across the Pikhtovka River, rising up to 45 meters above a gorge. The construction and reconstruction project is valued at 20.9 billion tenge, approximately $46 million.
The new bypass, approximately 12 kilometers long, allows motorists to avoid a dangerous winding section of the highway from Oskemen (Ust-Kamenogorsk), the administrative center of the East Kazakhstan region, toward Altai and Katon-Karagay. It forms part of a 28-kilometer section where the main reconstruction work has been completed.
The previous route ran along a narrow mountain road with sharp turns. Built in the 1940s, it was closed to trucks with trailers and semitrailers during winter. Snowstorms and avalanche prevention operations could lead to complete road closures, while rockfalls posed a danger in summer.
Darkhan Imanashev, chairman of the national road company KazAvtoZhol, told journalists that the bypass shortens the journey and would allow trucks to use the route in winter.
The new road is 13 meters wide, compared with approximately six meters on the previous section. The extra width will make it easier for large vehicles traveling in opposite directions to pass each other.
The bridge follows a curved alignment designed to accommodate the mountainous terrain. It has seven spans and eight supports, with 79 reinforced concrete beams installed across the structure.
Construction work along the route began in 2017. The project was repeatedly delayed, with work suspended over land-use issues before resuming in 2023. Previous contractors also failed to complete the project, leading to legal disputes, Imanashev told Ulysmedia.kz. Crews had to cut a road through rocky terrain, prepare sites for heavy machinery, and transport materials along temporary dirt access roads. These routes often became difficult to navigate after rainfall.
Nigmatulla Abdulkhakov, deputy director for bridge construction at contractor OblShygysZhol, described the scale of the excavation work beneath the bridge.
"The mountainous terrain here is extremely challenging. We had to move around 100,000 cubic meters of earth just beneath the bridge. This involved excavating foundation pits, removing soil, backfilling, and preparing foundations for the supports. We also had to create special platforms to install the structures, then clear those areas to prepare for the next stages of construction," Abdulkhakov explained.
Engineers considered filling the gorge with an earth embankment instead of building a bridge. According to Abdulkhakov, that option would have required moving several million cubic meters of earth. It would also have involved installing a drainage culvert several hundred meters long beneath the embankment.
"The question immediately arose of how such a culvert would be maintained and cleaned. That is why building a bridge proved to be the best option. Yes, it was a complex project that required considerable effort, but we managed to complete it," Abdulkhakov said.
The final bridge span was installed on September 20, followed by concreting and road paving. According to the contractor's representative, teams worked in two shifts, almost around the clock, to open the road before winter.
During reconstruction of the 28-kilometer section, crews moved 545,000 cubic meters of earth and carried out drilling and blasting work totaling 603,000 cubic meters. In addition to the Pikhtovka bridge, another bridge and 38 culverts were built, including two livestock crossings.
Road authorities said some work would continue after the opening. In the days beforehand, crews were still installing guardrails and road signs along certain sections.
The old winding road will remain open as a secondary route.
The new highway provides access to Katon-Karagay National Park, one of Kazakhstan's largest protected natural areas, located in the Kazakh section of the Altai Mountains near the borders with Russia and China. The same route leads to Rakhmanov Springs, a mountain resort known for its thermal mineral waters.
For residents of remote districts, the road promises more reliable access to Oskemen, especially in winter. For tourists, the new route makes the Altai's natural attractions easier to reach, although mountain weather can still disrupt travel.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at OTS cooperation, Azerbaijan President Aliyev's decision not to attend the OTS summit in Ankara, and the Middle Corridor. Special guest: Dr. Robert Cutler
Kazakhstan Detains Ten Over Alleged Plot to Change Constitutional Order
Kazakhstan's security service has detained ten people in the western city of Atyrau over an alleged plan to change the constitutional order by force. Investigators also say the suspects operated three underground educational centers for children and teenagers.
The National Security Committee (KNB) announced on November 2 that the arrests took place on October 30. The operation was coordinated with the prosecutor's office, and all ten suspects were detained simultaneously. Investigators suspect the detainees of creating, leading, or participating in an extremist group. The allegations also include promoting terrorism and inciting religious discord.
According to the KNB, the group sought to “forcibly change the foundations of the constitutional order” in western Kazakhstan. The authorities have not identified the group or disclosed a specific plan of attack.
Officers searched the suspects' homes and seized firearms, drugs, religious items, literature, and other materials, the committee said. It released images and video from the operation, showing armed officers taking suspects into custody.
The three educational centers are a notable element of the investigation. The KNB said the suspected group established the facilities for children and teenagers and that officers had stopped their activities.
The committee gave no attendance figures or details of what the children were being taught. It also said several suspects had previously been convicted of terrorism-related or other criminal offenses.
In its announcement, the KNB cited Article 201 of Kazakhstan's Criminal Procedure Code, which restricts the release of information during a pretrial investigation. The suspects' identities have not been released.
Earlier Extremism Investigations
The Atyrau case follows a series of security operations involving alleged extremist propaganda and recruitment across Kazakhstan. The authorities have increased investigations into the distribution of extremist material, including through social media.
In a June 12 statement, the KNB reported eleven arrests during April and May, including operations in the Atyrau region. The detainees included two foreign nationals and three Kazakh citizens extradited from abroad.
Investigators in those cases alleged the distribution of extremist materials online and among acquaintances. They also cited calls to travel to areas of terrorist activity and use violence against people who held different beliefs.
The same report listed 13 prison sentences in terrorism and extremism cases. An Astana resident received eight years for urging travel to areas of terrorist activity. In another case, a Shymkent man was sentenced to seven years after advocating for a theocratic state and spreading terrorist ideas.
A subsequent KNB update reported that 19 people were convicted of terrorism and extremism offenses between June and August. Another 28 were detained on suspicion of related offenses over the same period.
The KNB has repeatedly carried out raids in Atyrau and other regions. In February 2024, it conducted 49 searches across several regions and detained 23 suspects, according to a TCA analysis of the government's intensifying campaign against extremism. That reporting also examined expanded powers for the committee to monitor online activity.
The authorities have not announced formal indictments or court dates, and the allegations against the ten detainees remain to be tested in court.
Interview with Umud Shokri: Can Kazakhstan Reduce Its Dependence on Russian Oil Export Routes?
Kazakhstan sent more than four-fifths of its oil exports in 2025 through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which crosses Russia to the Black Sea. Repeated disruptions have exposed the risks of relying so heavily on a single route. While alternative shipments across the Caspian Sea are growing, volumes remain small. Falling water levels and higher transport costs complicate efforts to expand these alternative routes, while tensions around Iran pose risks to routes farther south. These challenges extend beyond Kazakhstan. The country is Central Asia’s largest oil producer, and its export decisions affect trade and energy infrastructure across the Caspian region, the South Caucasus and Europe. Meanwhile, plans to export renewable electricity across the Caspian could create new connections between Central Asia and European energy markets. To examine the region’s options, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Dr. Umud Shokri, a Washington-based energy strategist and Visiting Senior Fellow at George Mason University. He is the author of U.S. Energy Diplomacy in the Caspian Sea Basin (Springer, 2021) and is preparing two books: Hormuz and the Geopolitics of Eurasian Energy Infrastructure (Routledge) and Iran’s Energy Transition Under Constraint: War, Sanctions, and Systemic Vulnerability (Springer). TCA: How is Central Asia’s role in Eurasian energy security changing, and where does Kazakhstan fit into this shift? Umud Shokri: I think the biggest change is that Central Asian countries are looking beyond the routes they have relied on for decades. Oil and gas still move mainly through Russia and China, but governments are also exploring connections across the Caspian and south through Iran. They want more choices and greater control over how their resources reach markets. Kazakhstan is central to this shift. It is the region's largest oil producer, and its location gives it links to Russia, China, the Caspian and the South Caucasus. However, its heavy dependence on a single major oil export route remains a significant vulnerability. There is also a growing focus on electricity. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are working on plans for a green-energy corridor across the Caspian. Commissioning of the Central Asia–Azerbaijan link is planned to begin in 2032, while the separate Caspian–Black Sea–Europe corridor is expected to reach full capacity by 2040. These are long-term goals; neither corridor is operating yet. Kazakhstan is therefore both a major energy supplier and a country seeking to broaden its options. Its relationships with Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye and its neighbors all matter. But diplomacy alone is not enough. The region needs investment in pipelines, ports, power lines and domestic grids to turn diversification plans into reliable alternatives. TCA: Kazakhstan relies heavily on the CPC pipeline. Can the route through Azerbaijan and Türkiye become a substantial alternative? Umud Shokri: The CPC is still Kazakhstan's main oil export route. It carried 64.8 million metric tons of Kazakh oil in 2025, or about four-fifths of the country's exports. That volume cannot be shifted elsewhere quickly. But repeated disruptions have shown why Kazakhstan needs alternatives. The route through Azerbaijan and Türkiye is already operating. Kazakh oil is shipped from Aktau across the Caspian to Baku, then moves through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which runs through Georgia and Türkiye to the Mediterranean. Kazakhstan shipped about 1.26 million metric tons through BTC in 2025. In the first nine months of 2026, shipments toward the pipeline reached 1.164 million metric tons, with a target of 1.7 million metric tons for the full year. That is meaningful progress, but the volumes remain small compared with the CPC. Expanding the route would require more capacity at Aktau and Baku, enough tankers on the Caspian, reliable arrangements with transit partners and room for additional crude in the pipeline system. It also costs more because the oil has to be handled and transferred several times. I would describe the route as a practical backup, not a near-term replacement for the CPC. Even at today's scale, it gives Kazakhstan another option when its main outlet is disrupted. The best approach is to increase shipments steadily and coordinate closely with transit partners. The aim is to make Kazakhstan less exposed to any single route, not to switch dependence from one corridor to another. TCA: The Caspian Sea’s water level continues to fall. What does this mean for Kazakhstan’s ports, oil shipments and plans to expand the Trans-Caspian route? Umud Shokri: The falling water level is already making shipping more difficult, particularly along Kazakhstan's shallow coastline. Vessels may have to carry lighter loads, raising transport costs and reducing the competitiveness of oil shipments across the Caspian toward the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Kazakhstan is responding with dredging at Aktau and Kuryk, but this is a costly, ongoing adaptation rather than a solution to the underlying decline. Ports, ships and loading facilities may also need to adjust to shallower waters. The risk for Kazakhstan is particularly significant because it is seeking to expand the Trans-Caspian route as an alternative to the CPC. Lower water levels can also affect offshore facilities and threaten coastal ecosystems. With higher temperatures, evaporation and changing river inflows contributing to the decline, the Caspian states need to coordinate their responses. Sharing water-level data and planning infrastructure adaptation together will be essential. Otherwise, a corridor intended to diversify Kazakhstan's exports could become less reliable just as the country needs it most. TCA: Could tensions around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz undermine Central Asia’s plans to develop southern export and transport routes? Umud Shokri: Central Asian oil and gas do not normally pass through the Strait of Hormuz, so tensions there do not directly close the region's main export routes. The effects are still felt. Conflict can push up oil and freight prices, increase insurance costs and make companies more cautious about trade and investment. It can also disrupt supplies of goods that Central Asian economies import. The southern route through Iran is attractive because it offers landlocked countries access to ports and markets in the Gulf and South Asia. Kazakhstan and Iran have agreed to develop a Kazakh logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. That could support trade, but Bandar Abbas is inside the Persian Gulf. Ships using it remain exposed to risks around Hormuz. Chabahar is on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait, so it offers a different geographic option. But a port's location is only one part of a corridor. Sanctions, financing, security and the quality of road and rail links all affect whether businesses can use it reliably. Higher oil prices may bring more revenue to Central Asian exporters, but that benefit can be offset by costlier transport and imports. I would not treat the southern route as a guaranteed alternative to routes through Russia or across the Caspian. It is one option, with its own risks. The region will be better positioned if it develops several usable corridors and can shift trade when one becomes unsafe or too expensive. TCA: What practical steps should Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbors take by 2030–2035 to make their energy systems and export routes more resilient? Umud Shokri: First, Kazakhstan should focus on building practical alternatives to the CPC without assuming the main route can be replaced quickly. Diversification is most valuable when alternative corridors have the operational capacity and reliable transit arrangements needed to handle additional volumes during disruptions. The region should also be realistic about green-energy plans. The proposed Central Asia–Azerbaijan corridor could become important, but it needs new renewable generation, transmission links, financing and agreements on how electricity will be traded. Governments should distinguish clearly between what is planned, what is being built and what is already operating. Another priority is strengthening regional energy resilience. Cooperation on electricity grids, seasonal balancing and emergency supply could improve security even before major export projects are completed. Joint planning for changing Caspian conditions should also form part of a broader regional strategy. Finally, Central Asian governments should keep their diplomatic and commercial options open. Every route has political, financial and security risks; the goal is to avoid becoming too dependent on any single transit country or market. By combining more export options with stronger domestic grids and better regional planning, Kazakhstan and its neighbors can make disruptions easier to manage. They cannot remove geopolitical risk, but they can reduce the cost of being caught with only one way forward.
Kazakhstan Tree Planting Drive Faces Wildfires and Low Survival Rates
In late October, as firefighters battled forest fires in three regions of Kazakhstan, authorities announced a 300 million tenge (approximately $660,000) project, funded by state-owned Samruk-Kazyna, to restore pine forests in the Semey Ormany nature reserve in the country's east. The project involves planting three million pine seedlings across 762 hectares. Three years earlier, a wildfire swept through approximately 60,000 hectares of the reserve. Fourteen forestry workers died, while authorities also counted a local tractor driver who went to help fight the blaze as a 15th victim. Experts estimate that the wider ecosystem could take at least 70 years to recover. Such losses are particularly severe for Kazakhstan, where forests cover only about 5% of the country's territory. Kazakhstan is now in the sixth year of a program to plant two billion trees. By the end of 2025, authorities had reported approximately 1.6 billion plantings and seedings, although a later government report put the figure at 1.7 billion. In some years, most seedlings have failed to survive. What Counts Toward Two Billion Trees? The program was launched in 2020, with planting originally scheduled for completion by 2025. The deadline was subsequently extended to 2027. Ecology Minister Yerlan Nysanbayev attributed the delay to insufficient funding and a shortage of equipment and resources. In July 2025, the Ministry of Ecology reported that approximately 743 million were seedlings and another 640 million were seeds sown directly into the ground. Government statistics therefore include both planting and seeding, although the success of the latter depends on germination rates. Much of the work is taking place on the dried seabed of the Aral Sea. Once one of the world's largest lakes, the Aral Sea shrank dramatically after water was diverted from its feeder rivers for irrigation, causing an environmental disaster. Its exposed seabed became a source of salt-laden dust carried by winds far beyond the Aral Sea region, which spans parts of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. To stabilize the sands, workers plant saxaul, a desert tree or shrub with an extensive root system. Between 2021 and 2025, forest reclamation work covered approximately 1.1 million hectares of the former seabed, using both seedlings and seeds. Saxaul planting helps reduce dust storms, but it serves a different ecological purpose from restoring conventional forests. The two-billion-tree target therefore combines activities designed to address different environmental problems. Why Seedlings Fail to Survive According to the Ministry of Ecology, the survival rate of planted trees was 45.3% in 2021, 35.1% in 2022, and 31.2% in 2023. It rose to 50.5% in 2024. Before the program began, the rate had been approximately 54%. In western and southern Kazakhstan, young plants suffer from drought and high temperatures. Conditions are more favorable in the north and east, where survival rates can reach 70%. At Semey Ormany, the target survival rate for planted pine seedlings is 70% to 90%. Problems also arise from the way planting campaigns are organized. In October 2024, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov accused regional administrations of inflating greening figures and concealing actual results. In the Akmola and Zhetysu regions, no more than 60% of seedlings remained alive after three years. In March 2026, the government ordered stricter monitoring of seedling survival rates. Until then, public reporting had focused primarily on the number of plants put into the ground. Forest area also changes through natural regeneration. According to Kazakhstan's Bureau of National Statistics, the country's forest resources covered 13.9 million hectares at the end of 2024, approximately 201,600 hectares more than a year earlier. Natural processes, rather than artificial planting, accounted for most of the increase. Forests That Will Take Decades to Restore The 2023 fire in Semey Ormany was one of the largest forest disasters in Kazakhstan's post-independence history. The flames spread through the ribbon pine forests of the Abai region, near the Russian border. Ribbon pine forests are rare woodlands that extend in narrow strips across steppes and sandy landscapes. They protect soils from wind erosion and provide habitats for wildlife and plants. Similar forest systems are found in Kazakhstan and neighboring parts of Russia. In 2023, wildfires damaged more than 116,000 hectares of state forest land across Kazakhstan, including approximately 61,100 hectares of forested land. In 2025, authorities recorded 609 fires affecting approximately 62,700 hectares. Not every tree in a burned area dies: some survive, while certain sections regenerate naturally. But developing a mature pine forest takes decades. The Semey Ormany project includes upgrading tree-planting equipment, renovating nursery greenhouses, and establishing two modular fire stations. The work is scheduled to continue through 2027, although Samruk-Kazyna said in October 2026 that the planting was already nearing completion. To expand planting capacity, the government has also announced plans to build six forest nurseries capable of producing up to 36 million seedlings annually. During the first seven months of 2026, authorities reported another 234 million seedlings planted, although inconsistent official totals make it difficult to establish precisely how close Kazakhstan is to its two-billion-tree target. In Semey Ormany, the project covers 762 hectares, less than 2% of the area affected by the 2023 fire. Even if every seedling survives, restoring the devastated ribbon pine forests will continue long after the government planting program ends.
Kazakh–Korean Action Film KESU Sets Sights on South Korean Cinemas
A Kazakh former special forces officer and a South Korean taekwondo champion find themselves on the same side when their shared mentor disappears. Their search takes them from Kazakhstan to Seoul, where they become entangled in a dangerous conflict rooted in their teacher's past. This is the story of KESU, a Kazakhstan–South Korea action film directed by Daulet Zhumabayev that opened in Kazakhstan on October 15. The film topped the country's box office during its opening weekend, earning approximately 77 million tenge ($160,000), according to Forbes Kazakhstan. The film was commissioned by the Kazakhstan Taekwondo Federation, whose president, Kudret Shamiyev, served as its principal producer. Shamiyev has said the project aims to attract young people to taekwondo and present the sport as a philosophy and a way of life. The film stars Asylkhan Tolepov as Didar, a former special forces officer haunted by a fatal mission. South Korean actor Joo Woo Geon plays Ryu, a taekwondo champion visiting Kazakhstan for a tournament. Merey Makazhan plays Asiya, who also becomes involved in their increasingly dangerous adventure. KESU opens with a special forces raid before shifting to taekwondo competition and confrontations with criminal gangs. The film is Zhumabayev's second feature, following the boxing drama Arlan: The Final Round.
Video: Kesu Official Trailer
Opinion: A Deeper Understanding of Transshipment
The White House recently issued a report on the transshipment of goods. It focuses on allegations that some countries with lower tariffs seek to evade U.S. tariffs on China by exporting goods that are really produced in China and only slightly modified, if at all, before further export to the U.S. The report groups more than 40 countries in what it terms a “shadow transshipment network” into three different categories based on how much it estimates the risk of transshipment and the integration of the economy into supply chains involving China. The first tier, mostly advanced countries, are larger economies where transshipment can show up in otherwise “broadly legitimate” trade. The second tier are a few larger developing countries, which have close links with the Chinese economy. The third tier the report terms “small, opportunistic Chinese targets” with “specific weak-link advantages” that increase transshipment risk. To be clear, transshipment is a risk in some economies. There is also legitimate transshipment (for instance, through normal supply chains and logistics channels) and illegal transshipment (where an exporter files a false certification as to the origin, character, or value of goods). False certifications are punishable by civil and criminal penalties in the U.S. and in most other countries. The World Customs Organization also has international standards on transshipment. So there are reasons to be vigilant about the risk of illegal transshipment. But to see why the report also misses the mark, consider the example of a country increasingly important to the U.S. with a fast-growing economy. To top it off, the country borders China. It’s Kazakhstan. First, the report is wrong to call Kazakhstan “small.” It’s 49th in the world by GDP – quite an accomplishment for a country which was formerly part of the Soviet Union. Second, to term Kazakhstan an “opportunistic Chinese target” is simply not accurate. There is strong trade and investment between China and Kazakhstan, as one would expect from large neighboring countries. And Kazakhstan, particularly at its Khorgos border cooperation center, plays a vital role in the rapidly growing Middle Corridor of trade between China and Europe. But this is legitimate transshipment of goods, and it is deeply unfair to suggest that Kazakhstan may not be fulfilling its duties. Let’s also not forget why the Middle Corridor is growing: because the West sought another route for Chinese goods after the Russian invasion of Ukraine made shipment through Russia impractical or subject to sanctions. Kazakhstan is a regional and even global leader in digitalization of both tax and Customs systems. The “smart border” policy is a success in facilitating legal trade while maintaining vigilance and security: in the first half of 2026, about 60% of declarations of goods were automatic, and 80% of transit declarations were completed without the need for Customs control forms. Deepening digital exchange protocols with regional partners including China, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan will speed legal trade even further. Digitalization builds honest systems, free from corruption – and by definition lowering the risk of transshipment. Kazakhstan should be commended for this work, not lumped in with other countries that have not made similar investments in digitizing legitimate trade flows. Most relevant, however, is the growing importance of U.S.-Kazakhstan trade. The U.S. exports a wide variety of products – turbines, aircraft, prescription drugs, agricultural machinery, and other goods as well as services such as software. Imports are concentrated in commodities including petroleum, chemicals, uranium, silver, ferroalloys, and titanium. Faced with growing needs to find critical minerals, the U.S. has turned to Kazakhstan and other sources precisely to avoid overdependence on China. The U.S. and Kazakhstan have a critical minerals agreement precisely for this purpose. Again, all this should be commended rather than regarded with suspicion. In fact, imports from Kazakhstan are so vital to the U.S. that most are exempt from U.S. tariffs, because the U.S. recognizes that tariffs would hurt supplies of minerals the country needs. More to the point, these goods have an exceptionally low risk of transshipment. The U.S. has invested in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry since the early 1990s and is well founded there. Oil would not be mislabeled as Chinese – it would make no sense to ship oil through a pipeline and then export via the Caspian Sea when Kazakhstan can fill those pipelines and tankers itself. And no one would send truckloads or boxcars of uranium and ferroalloys from China to Kazakhstan simply to avoid tariffs; that would be uneconomic. The types of goods about which the report worries are typically finished manufactured goods (for instance, solar panels or auto parts) that might have originated in China and then been only “lightly” processed in another country. Not the kinds of goods that Kazakhstan exports, for which it also receives high-value U.S. goods in a growing trade relationship. If there is a concern about Chinese investment in Kazakhstan and other countries, then the solution is to increase U.S. investment in natural resources and a wide variety of other economic sectors, from retail to light manufacturing. Ending the annual Jackson-Vanik certification 35 years after the end of the Soviet Union would help grow trade, too – Kazakhstan has free emigration policies and a thriving if small Jewish community. That Amendment has served its purpose and should be ended through the U.S.-Kazakhstan Trade Modernization Act. The report therefore paints with too broad a brush. That metaphor works in another way as well: a paintbrush is small, portable, and generally inexpensive – the type of good for which a major difference in tariffs has a significant impact on competitiveness. But not uranium or iron alloys or titanium. In addressing serious risks to trade such as transshipment, it’s important to be precise – and to remember which of America’s friends are already taking the actions America seeks. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Short Stories from the Region
