Kazakhstan Investigates Recipients of USAID Funding
Following the cancellation of USAID funding, the Kazakhstani government and parliament are scrutinizing the recipients of U.S. financial assistance. The issue has sparked significant public debate and online discussions. Deputies Demand Explanations On March 10, the U.S. administration announced the cancellation of 83% of USAID programs. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated: “After a six-week review, we are officially canceling 83% of USAID programs. The 5,200 contracts now canceled spent tens of billions of dollars in ways that did not serve (and in some cases even harmed) the core national interests of the United States.” Earlier, on March 5, deputies from the People's Party of Kazakhstan (PPK) formally requested that the Minister of National Economy and the Minister of Justice conduct an audit of foreign funding for non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Lawmakers called for transparency regarding project financing, allocated amounts, and fund usage. According to the deputies, some USAID-funded programs contradicted traditional Kazakhstani values, particularly those related to LGBT rights and feminist movements. Reports indicate that members of the parliamentary majority faction, Amanat, also supported the request. Government Investigation Underway The government's position remained unclear until March 12, when Respublika newspaper reported that Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Jumangarin had responded to the Mazhilis on behalf of the Cabinet of Ministers. Respublika is associated with Mukhtar Ablyazov, a fugitive oligarch sentenced in absentia to a lengthy prison term in Kazakhstan. According to the report, 28 long-term USAID programs were active in Kazakhstan under bilateral agreements in 2024. In total, USAID allocated $26.5 million for projects implemented in the country between 2023 and 2024. These initiatives covered sectors such as the economy, energy, healthcare, civil society, and media. Some projects extended beyond Kazakhstan, impacting other Central Asian nations. Among the NGOs operating under USAID programs in 2024-2025 were:
- Public Foundation "Desenta"
- NGO "Kadyr-Kasiyet"
- Representative Office of Eurasia Foundation in Kazakhstan
- Representative Office of Winrock International
- Representative Office of Internews Network
- Representative Office of the American Bar Association
- ArtKoshe PF
- The YouTube channel "Hyperborey"
- Oksana Gabitova (Akulova)
- Vlast Media Group LLP
- DEPPA podcast
- Täuelhsız project
- Tasadagy Omir project
- Aftertutor IP, an online magazine focused on combating misinformation.
- $34.17 million for the Central Asia Trade Program (DAI Global, LLC)
- $13 million for two Eurasia Foundation programs: Social Innovations in Central Asia and Kazakhstan QADAM Program
- $15 million for Resilient Communities (DAI Global, LLC)
- $3.5 million for Strengthening Human Rights and Equality in Central Asia (ILGA-Europe, TGEU)
- Over $2 million for Balanced and Credible Information in Central Asia (Internews Network)
Opinion: What the Loss of RFE/RL Would Mean for Central Asia
The decision to terminate the federal grant agreement funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a crushing blow for hundreds of millions of people. These people know their governments are not telling them the full truth about what is happening in their countries or in the world outside. The objective information provided by RFE/RL has been important to people such as these. Perhaps as important, since the end of the Cold War, was the platform RFE/RL provides, whenever possible, for people in these countries to explain their views to the outside world. I know, because I worked at RFE/RL for 25 years covering Central Asia. RFE/RL was founded in 1950, and I didn’t show up there until 1997. I can only speak about what I saw and heard when I was an RFE/RL employee. My understanding of my tasks as an RFE/RL employee was that we were supposed to keep close track of what was happening in Central Asia, cover as many of the important topics of the region as possible, and make objective and accurate information on these topics available to the people in Central Asia. During Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, for example, RFE/RL’s Tajik service, Radio Ozodi, was the most trusted source of information for the people of Tajikistan. During the Coronavirus pandemic, the Turkmen government would not even allow the word COVID to be spoken and denied there were any cases of the virus in the country, leaving RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, Azatlyk, as one of the only sources of information for Turkmenistan’s people about the illness. I lived in Central Asia before joining RFE/RL, so I had some idea of what was important to people there. Calling for respect for fundamental rights is a big part of RFE/RL’s work. Read the constitutions of any Central Asian country and you will see enshrined there the right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to freely receive or disseminate information, and much more. In practice, these rights are not always observed in Central Asia. In such a situations RFE/RL’s Central Asian services are a voice for those who, with good reason, are afraid to speak out publicly, or more importantly, for those who did speak out and are punished for that. At RFE/RL we looked for “impact stories,” testimony from people of the region about unfulfilled government promises, abuses, or state mismanagement that were hurting communities and individuals. Central Asian government officials are among the most faithful RFE/RL listeners, and often RFE/RL reports that raised social issues led officials to rectify the situation. Ramshackle buildings or schools were suddenly repaired, electricity or running water became accessible to city districts and rural areas, sufficient food became available to communities. The pleas of average citizens too often fell on deaf ears in government halls, but the criticism of an international organization such as RFE/RL, which was broadcasting to the entire country and Central Asian region, was too embarrassing for officials to ignore. This made RFE/RL unpopular with Central Asian governments, but if it resulted in an improvement in the lives of the Central Asian people; that was really what was important. In all those years I was working for RFE/RL and traveling in Central Asia, hundreds of people told me how much they appreciated RFE/RL for helping shed light on their problems. The people of Central Asia also told me, and tell RFE/RL’s Central Asian services every day, about how they see their countries and the world. This is hugely important for the world’s understanding of Central Asia. Too many reports from foreign media refer to “post-Soviet” Central Asia, or “the Stans,” but behind these terms are a variety of peoples and cultures that pre-date by millennia the Soviet Union or the use of the suffix “stan.” Anyone accessing RFE/RL’s Central Asian services’ website can find out what people living in Central Asia are saying about Russia, China, the United States, Europe, the Middle East, or issues such as climate change, global trade, terrorism, and other topics. Their views are often different from what their governments say publicly. One last point is RFE/RL’s legacy. When I started working there, it was less than a decade since the wall came down and countries in East and Central Europe were freed from being part of the Communist Bloc. Czech President Vaclav Havel visited the RFE/RL building several times. So did top officials from the governments of former Communist countries. Like Havel, they were opposed to the Soviet-imposed governments in their countries. I and other RFE/RL employees would gather to listen to them speak, and these officials told us how much RFE/RL meant to them when they were living under communism. RFE/RL was a source of information, in the local languages, about what was happening in their countries and in the wider world, and they were grateful for that information. What I remember best was that some of these Central and Eastern European officials said RFE/RL’s broadcasts were a reminder that America had not forgotten them. Those broadcasts brought hope, and when hope became reality and independence finally came, the leaders of these countries wanted to express their gratitude to RFE/RL, and more broadly to the United States, for never forgetting about them and their countries, and for supporting their nations’ aspirations to be free. I am not looking to sugarcoat RFE/RL or America’s reputation in Central Asia. For every person there who expressed their gratitude to me for RFE/RL’s work, there were at least two others who criticized RFE/RL as American propaganda and an attempt to push Western values on Central Asia. But even this shows the huge difference between RFE/RL and media from countries such as China or Russia. Central Asians felt comfortable enough to exercise their right to freedom of speech and tell me, an American, about what they believed were RFE/RL’s shortcomings. Would they feel sufficiently comfortable to criticize Russian or Chinese reporting on Central Asia to a Russian or Chinese journalist? And here is where the real dilemma of abandoning RFE/RL’s media space in its target countries is clearly seen. Recent incidents in Central Asia highlight the use of force by authorities to manage unrest, often leading to casualties. Examples include events in Andijan (2005), and Kazakhstan, Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan, and Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan (2022). Critics have suggested these responses involved excessive force. While outlets like RFE/RL raised concerns, Russian and Chinese media backed the government’s actions, reflecting their interest in supporting the stability of existing regimes and aligning their narratives with local authorities. The loss of RFE/RL is the loss of the other side of the story.
From Enemy Waves to Fading Signals: Radio Liberty’s Journey in Central Asia
I went to school in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in the 1970s. This period in the Soviet Union is now commonly referred to as the "Era of Stagnation." We felt its effects firsthand. We did not know what freedom of speech was. All media belonged to the state, and all were "party-affiliated." Since there was only one party in the USSR, the Communist Party, all information was exclusively communist. Naturally, the media spoke only of the incredible successes of the working class and the over-fulfillment of party and government plans. We found this completely uninteresting, so we searched for alternative sources of information.
Radio broadcasting helped. Almost every home had a radio receiver capable of picking up various wave frequencies. That was when I first heard Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and the BBC. My father listened to these stations. Around the age of 14–15, I also began to listen to these "enemy voices," as they were called at the time. I was primarily interested in the news reports about events that the Soviet press did not cover. And, of course, music. Western radio stations were one of the few sources of information about Western music, which was largely ignored in the USSR. Yes, even music was under ideological pressure.
Today, not everyone remembers, but back then, popular bands released new albums almost annually. It was an incredible time for the invention of new sounds — Pink Floyd, Deep Purple, Rainbow, Led Zeppelin, The Rolling Stones, The Beatles, Manfred Mann's Earth Band, 10cc, and many other artists who are now largely forgotten. But they were giants of their time. Thanks to musical radio programs, we were aware of what was happening.
The first broadcasts of the Russian Service of Radio Liberty, originally called "Radio Liberation," went on air on March 1, 1953. On March 18 of the same year, the Turkestan editorial office was established, broadcasting in several languages, including Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, Karakalpak, and Uyghur. Initially, broadcasts in Kazakh, known as "Bostandyk Radiosy" (Radio Liberation), aired four times a week for five minutes each.
In the 1960s, the volume of Kazakh-language broadcasting increased to one hour per week, with a four-person team working on its production. By the late 1960s, the Turkestan editorial office was reorganized into "Northern" and "Southern" departments, with the Kazakh program included in the "Northern" department. Khasen Oraltai headed the Kazakh service.
In 1971, the Turkestan Editorial Office was further divided into three separate editorial teams: "Turkestan-1," "Turkestan-2," and "Turkestan-3," with Kazakh-language broadcasts conducted through "Turkestan-3." By 1975, broadcast time had increased to half an hour in the morning and evening.
Broadcasts were transmitted on shortwave from Munich. Radio Liberty had no correspondents within the Kazakh SSR. In the USSR, the station's broadcasts were jammed until 1988. In the foothills of Almaty, towers that housed jamming equipment for these broadcasts still stand today.
In 1993, a Radio Liberty bureau was opened in Almaty, followed by a branch in Astana. However, after President Trump signed an executive order for the Reduction of the Federal Bureaucracy, the future of these radio stations has been cast into doubt. Nonetheless, Kazakh Service Director Torokul Doorov wrote on Facebook that despite all developments, the editorial office would continue its work. Similarly, Venera Dzhumataeva, a representative of the Kyrgyz service, stated that they were continuing their operations for now.
Assessing the effectiveness of these radio stations is difficult. It is clear that in dictatorships that still exist in Central Asia, and under covert censorship, such activities can be beneficial. However, an analysis of the audience for the popular YouTube channel Azattyq using the Empty Subscriber calculator service revealed that out of 1.88 million subscribers, only 2% were active users. The remaining 98% constitute a "dead" subscriber base.
In Kazakhstan, for example, despite the prevailing belief in implicit censorship, access to information is virtually unrestricted. There is a different problem here — the overabundance of state-owned media. These media outlets often, as Elon Musk put it, "talk to themselves."
I remember well how my mother asked me to listen to these radio broadcasts at low volume so that no one outside could hear. She was afraid that listening to "enemy voices" could lead to persecution. She remembered the repressions of the 1930s when her father was declared an "enemy of the people" and their family was exiled to Uzbekistan. The reason? He was a private entrepreneur and a rather successful one. But when she voiced her concerns, my father confidently replied, "It's a different time now. They wouldn't dare."
It seems that these "enemy voices", Radio Liberty and VOA, may be coming to an end. However, it is entirely possible that the battle for people's minds is moving to a new stage, and radio broadcasting is simply outdated, with more modern technologies replacing traditional formats.
National Bank of Kazakhstan to Launch Digital Investment and Gold Coins
The National Bank of Kazakhstan has announced the launch of the Gold Coin project, a digital investment coin, starting March 17. The coin’s value is pegged to 1/20 of a troy ounce of gold, fluctuating based on global gold prices. According to the National Bank, the Gold Coin project aims to offer Kazakhstani citizens an alternative investment tool, integrating digital assets with modern financial technology. One unit of the Gold Coin corresponds to 1/20 of a troy ounce of gold (with one troy ounce equaling 31.1035 grams). The coin’s value will be determined by the price of gold, as set by the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), and the official exchange rate of the tenge against the U.S. dollar on the preceding day of a transaction. As of the evening of March 13, the price of gold on the London Stock Exchange stood at $2,924.80 per troy ounce. “The new investment instrument will be available through the Tabys mobile application of the Astana International Exchange (AIX), part of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC). Users will be able to buy, sell, and gift Gold Coins online. Additionally, holders who accumulate 20 units of Gold Coin can exchange them for a physical ÚKI gold investment coin at National Bank branches nationwide. The ÚKI coin will be introduced into circulation on March 17, 2025,” the National Bank stated in a press release. The ÚKI gold coin was unveiled in February 2025 at the World Money Fair in Berlin, the world's largest numismatic event. The fair gathers central banks, mints, coin production companies, designers, and numismatic publishers. Kazakhstan’s National Bank presented the ÚKI coin, which is made of 99.99% pure gold (Au 999.9), weighs 31.1 grams, and has a face value of 100 tenge. The coin will also be available for purchase via the Tabys application. At the end of 2024, the National Bank of Kazakhstan issued commemorative collector coins, including S. Nurmagambetov. 100 JYL from the “Outstanding Events and People” series and Alexander the Great from the “Great Commanders” series. The first coin, honoring Kazakhstan’s first Minister of Defense and national hero Sagadat Nurmagambetov, is made of cupronickel (MN 25), weighs 15 grams, has a face value of 200 tenge, and was minted in a quantity of 5,000. The Alexander the Great coin is made of sterling silver, weighs 31.1 grams, has a face value of 1,000 tenge (approximately $2), and was issued in a limited run of 2,000 copies. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan began issuing coins with inscriptions in its new Latin-based alphabet in 2019.
Kazakh MP Calls for Restrictions on Children’s Access to TikTok
Kazakh MP Murat Abenov has proposed limiting children's access to TikTok, citing concerns over its negative effects on young users’ mental health. He warned that the platform could contribute to depression, reduced concentration, and memory problems, urging parents to monitor their children’s screen time. Abenov referenced a case described by journalist Gulmira Abykay on her Facebook page, where a seven-year-old girl reportedly stopped recognizing her loved ones after excessive exposure to TikTok content. He emphasized that such concerns are backed by research, as TikTok’s algorithm is designed to maximize user engagement by presenting emotionally stimulating or even distressing videos. The MP pointed out that TikTok has already faced regulatory scrutiny in the United States, where efforts have been made to ban it, and in Europe, where restrictions on data collection from minors have been imposed. He argued that Kazakhstan should also consider introducing regulations for such platforms. “TikTok is structured in a way that delivers an emotional surge every 15 seconds, whether admiration, fear, anxiety, or sadness. Studies show that frequent TikTok users are more prone to depression, struggle with academic performance, and face challenges in processing large amounts of information and logical thinking,” Abenov stated. While many countries have imposed restrictions on TikTok, the platform remains widely accessible in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia. However, TikTok has recently taken steps to enhance child protection, expanding its Family Settings feature. This allows parents to set time limits for app use, including restrictions after 10p.m. and during school hours.
Kazakhstan’s Migration Trends: Growth in Skilled Labor, No Signs of Chinese Influx
A positive migration trend is emerging in Kazakhstan, with new data indicating a significant increase in net migration. In 2024, the country recorded a migration balance of 17,200 people, an 85% increase from the previous year. The gap between arrivals and departures expanded 2.3 times, with 30,000 people moving to Kazakhstan compared to 12,800 leaving the country. Experts from the Institute of Public Policy highlighted that Kazakhstan’s emigration rate has reached a historic low in contrast to outflows observed in other countries. In 2024, net migration losses were significantly higher in Georgia (-39,200), Israel (-18,200), Uzbekistan (-14,300), and Bulgaria (-9,200). Kazakhstan has seen a significant reduction in emigration. In the early 2000s, the annual outflow was around 289,000 people, but by 2024, this number had dropped to the aforementioned 12,800. Meanwhile, the inflow of migrants continues to rise. Last year, 12,200 people arrived from Uzbekistan, 8,100 from Russia, 2,000 from China, 1,400 from Mongolia, and 1,100 from Turkmenistan. Additionally, several hundred people from Turkey, Germany, Georgia, the United States, and South Korea also relocated to Kazakhstan. Currently, 13,000 foreign specialists are employed in Kazakhstan’s economy, including 5,300 in construction, 2,600 in industry, and 700 in agriculture. The country is also attracting international students, some of whom choose to stay after graduation, suggesting that Kazakhstan is on track to become a leading destination for skilled professionals in Central Asia and the CIS. In November 2023, Kazakhstan and China implemented a visa-free regime, allowing short-term travel between the two countries. However, this agreement does not grant Chinese citizens the right to work, study, or engage in missionary activities in Kazakhstan. Despite this, social media was flooded with concerns that millions of Chinese citizens would move to Kazakhstan, take jobs, and even claim territory. Experts dismissed these fears as unfounded, arguing that the visa-free regime was primarily designed to boost trade and tourism rather than encourage large-scale migration. More than a year and a half has passed since the agreement came into effect, and no such wave of migration has occurred. Political scientist Marat Shibutov criticized the initial panic, stating: “Those who spread fear about mass Chinese migration should look in the mirror because nothing has happened. The Chinese do not need to come here.” According to Shibutov, young and ambitious Chinese migrants prefer destinations such as Singapore, the United States, Europe, Canada, and Australia. Official data further debunks fears of Chinese migration. According to the Bureau of National Statistics, the number of Chinese citizens moving to Kazakhstan permanently has been steadily decreasing since 2017. Most of those who do relocate are ethnic Kazakhs returning to their ancestral homeland, a process actively encouraged by the Kazakh government through state programs for repatriates, known as Kandas. The figures speak for themselves. In 2017, 3,000 Chinese citizens moved to Kazakhstan. By 2023, this number had dropped to just 416, of whom 398 were ethnic Kazakhs and only four were ethnic Chinese. Additionally, the vast majority of repatriated ethnic Kazakhs, 63.5%, came from Uzbekistan, while fewer than 9% originated from China. Kazakhstan’s current migration trends position the country as a locus for skilled professionals, international students, and returning ethnic Kazakhs. At the same time, official data contradicts fears of mass migration from China, reaffirming that the visa-free regime is primarily an economic and tourism-driven agreement rather than a pathway for large-scale relocation. Whilst the outflow of local talent has slowed significantly, with schemes such as the introduction in February of a Digital Nomad Visa, Kazakhstan has made significant progress in establishing an immigration policy that serves the nation's interests.
Kazakhstan-EU Cooperation Focuses on Critical Raw Materials and Regional Connectivity
On March 13, European Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela visited Kazakhstan and held negotiations with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Murat Nurtleu. As a result of the visit, the European Union and Kazakhstan have taken steps to strengthen their partnership, signing key agreements to support sustainable economic growth and foster regional connectivity, according to the EU Delegation to Kazakhstan. Investments in Transport and Renewable Energy During the visit, Commissioner Síkela and Kazakh officials oversaw the signing of a €200 million framework loan agreement between the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Development Bank of Kazakhstan (DBK). This loan, backed by an €18 million EU guarantee, will finance investments in sustainable transport and renewable energy. The initiative aligns with the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, particularly its programs on the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy, and Climate Change. Síkela underscored the EU’s commitment to strengthening economic ties with Kazakhstan through sustainable investments. “This financing agreement will boost connectivity, enhance renewable energy infrastructure, and further integrate Kazakhstan into the Trans-Caspian Corridor, a key component of the Global Gateway strategy,” he stated. Critical Raw Materials Cooperation The visit also marked the signing of a €3 million contract to enhance cooperation between the EU and Central Asia in the critical raw materials (CRM) sector. The agreement, implemented by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), will support the identification of joint projects and promote international best practices for sustainable and responsible supply chains. Síkela highlighted the importance of the agreement, stating: “The EU and Kazakhstan are natural partners. Europe needs reliable access to critical raw materials, which are essential for modernizing our economy. We are committed to advancing mutually beneficial cooperation with Kazakhstan on their extraction and development. This partnership will support all Central Asian countries, strengthen Kazakhstan’s industrial capacity, create new opportunities for Kazakh businesses, drive innovation, and generate high-quality jobs.” Kazakhstan-EU Trade and Investments Foreign Minister Nurtleu reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s commitment to expanding its partnership with the EU. “Astana and Brussels have built a strong political dialogue, established dynamic cooperation between executive bodies, and fostered productive cultural and humanitarian ties between our peoples,” he said. According to the Kazakh Foreign Ministry, the EU is Kazakhstan’s primary trade and investment partner. In 2024, bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and the EU totaled $49.7 billion, with Kazakhstan’s exports reaching $38.6 billion and imports totaling $11.1 billion. From 2005 to October 2024, the total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow from EU countries reached $200.7 billion, accounting for 47.8% of Kazakhstan’s total FDI inflows ($419.5 billion).
Kazakhstan’s Karaganda Among World’s Most Polluted Cities as Central Asia Struggles with Air Quality
Kazakhstan’s Karaganda - the heartland of the nation's coal and metallurgical industries - was ranked as the world’s third most polluted city in 2024, according to the 2024 World Air Quality Report released by IQAir. The report evaluates global air quality for 2024, presenting PM2.5 air pollution data collected from 8,954 cities across 138 countries, regions, and territories. PM2.5, or fine particulate matter, is measured in micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m³) and is a key indicator of air pollution. Karaganda recorded an annual average PM2.5 concentration of 104.8 µg/m³ in 2024. In comparison, Byrnihat, India, the world's most polluted city, had an average PM2.5 concentration of 128.2 µg/m³. Central Asian Cities in the Global Ranking Among the world’s most polluted cities, Central Asia’s major cities ranked as follows:
- Dushanbe, Tajikistan - 176th, PM2.5: 46.3 µg/m³
- Tashkent, Uzbekistan - 510th, PM2.5: 31.4 µg/m³
- Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan - 1009th, PM2.5: 21.2 µg/m³
- Almaty, Kazakhstan - 1072nd, PM2.5: 20.3 µg/m³
- Astana, Kazakhstan - 1608th, PM2.5: 15.4 µg/m³
- Tajikistan - 6th most polluted country
- Uzbekistan - 19th
- Turkmenistan - 26th
- Kyrgyzstan - 41st
- Australia
- Bahamas
- Barbados
- Estonia
- Grenada
- Iceland
- New Zealand
- Chad – 91.8 µg/m³ (more than 18 times higher than the WHO guideline)
- Bangladesh – 78.0 µg/m³ (more than 15 times higher)
- Pakistan – 73.7 µg/m³ (more than 14 times higher)
- Democratic Republic of the Congo – 58.2 µg/m³ (more than 11 times higher)
- India – 50.6 µg/m³ (more than 10 times higher)
Sunkar Podcast
Repatriating Islamic State Fighters and Families: Balancing Security and Humanity
