Kazakhstan–Kashagan Dispute Heads to International Arbitration
Kazakhstan’s Vice Minister of Justice, Daniel Vaisov, announced that the country’s claims over the removal of sulfur storage limits at the Kashagan field, operated by North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (NCOC), will be heard under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes framework, which is headquartered in Washington. NCOC includes Shell, TotalEnergies, Eni, ExxonMobil, CNPC, Inpex, and KazMunayGas. In March 2023, an inspection of the Kashagan consortium by Kazakhstan’s environmental authorities identified violations of environmental legislation, including the excessive storage of sulfur volumes exceeding permitted limits. The resulting claim was valued at around $5 billion, according to the authorities. A court of first instance in Kazakhstan ruled in favor of the environmental authorities, according to Vaisov. Six of the seven NCOC participants, excluding KazMunayGas, challenged the ruling in a Kazakh court in March this year. At the same time, the foreign investors initiated international arbitration proceedings. “This claim was filed under bilateral international agreements: the agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of France, and the agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kingdom of the Netherlands,” Vaisov said during a briefing. The Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Ecology, and Ministry of Energy are jointly handling the case. Kazakhstan has been steadily tightening its position in major energy projects, seeking a larger share of revenues from fields developed under production-sharing agreements signed in the 1990s. Disputes over Kashagan and Karachaganak reflect broader efforts to rebalance terms with foreign investors as production stabilizes and fiscal pressures grow. The outcome of these cases could reshape how Central Asia’s largest economy manages foreign participation in its energy sector. A separate dispute concerning project costs, reportedly exceeding $100 billion, is being handled under the framework of the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA), in line with government policy, Vaisov said. Kazakhstan maintains that under the current terms, participating oil companies receive up to 98% of revenue from oil production at Kashagan, leaving the state with comparatively limited income in the form of royalties. Astana’s claim related to this issue has been reported at approximately $160 billion. “As far as I know, an interim decision has been made regarding Karachaganak. Further work is currently underway,” Vaisov said. In January 2026, an international arbitration tribunal ruled in favor of Kazakhstan in its dispute with shareholders in the Karachaganak Oil and Gas Projects, Eni, Shell, Chevron, and Lukoil. Compensation for the shareholders’ unjustified reimbursement of expenses has yet to be determined, but experts estimate it at between $2 billion and $4 billion. Vaisov also noted that Kazakhstan has been reducing the cost of arbitration proceedings involving foreign investors. “The Ministry of Justice has managed to reduce spending on these matters each year. Since 2021, costs have been reduced by nearly threefold. At the same time, the Republic of Kazakhstan engages leading law firms for these proceedings, as contracting companies do the same,” he said.
Kazakhstan Expands Aviation Hub with Focus on U.S. and Long-Haul Flights
Kazakhstan is preparing for an audit by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that would allow the country to launch direct flights to the United States. To achieve this, the government must demonstrate the reliability of its aviation regulatory system, the presence of an independent and effective oversight body, and transparent airline certification procedures. The country is also planning to acquire modern long-haul aircraft and has begun construction of its first maintenance center to service them. The Times of Central Asia spoke with representatives of Kazakhstan’s aviation industry about the progress of these efforts, when direct flights to North America may begin, and what challenges remain. As part of efforts to expand international routes and strengthen Kazakhstan’s position as an aviation hub between Europe and Asia, Bauyrzhan Umiraliyev, head of the Aviation Safety Department at the Civil Aviation Committee, said the national carrier Air Astana plans to purchase 15 Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft, with deliveries scheduled between 2026 and 2035. “This is a strategically important decision that can significantly boost civil aviation, the economy, and the country’s international standing,” an aviation authority representative told The Times of Central Asia. “Long-haul aircraft will allow airlines to launch direct flights to destinations in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia that were previously inaccessible or required layovers.” The aircraft will also enhance Kazakhstan’s attractiveness as a transit hub and tourist destination, while enabling airlines to compete internationally through improved efficiency, pricing, and service quality. The purchase of these aircraft, previously delayed twice since 2025 due to production backlogs at Boeing, is expected to open new opportunities for Kazakhstan’s aviation sector, particularly following the anticipated attainment of Category 1 (CAT-1) safety status, confirming compliance with international aviation standards. CAT-1: The Path to the U.S. In 2024, Kazakhstan’s aviation authorities and the FAA signed an agreement to conduct a technical assessment under the International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program. According to Aslan Satzhanov, Acting Executive Director of the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan, the assessment identified areas requiring improvement in flight safety oversight. “We are currently working on amendments to regulatory acts to implement modern safety procedures and standardize processes, with technical support from FAA experts,” Satzhanov said. In parallel, experts from the U.S. Transportation Security Administration have conducted preliminary assessments of airport security under the Export Control and Border Security Program. The first visit, in October 2021, resulted in a generally positive evaluation of Kazakhstan’s aviation security framework. A follow-up visit in August 2022 focused on screening procedures for passengers, baggage, and cargo at Astana Airport. “The capital’s airport received a positive assessment, and the coordinated work of aviation security personnel was noted,” Satzhanov said. According to preliminary information, the full IASA audit may take place after long-haul aircraft enter service and relevant infrastructure is fully prepared; though, it should be noted that Kazakhstan does not control the timing of the IASA audit. Industry Awaits New Aircraft Preparations for launching new international routes, including previously announced flights to New York and Tokyo, are already underway. According to Satzhanov, flights to Tokyo may begin in the second half of 2026, while New York routes are expected no earlier than early 2027. These timelines depend directly on the delivery and operational readiness of new aircraft. Kazakhstan’s airlines are also planning broader route expansion. SCAT Airlines aims to launch flights to destinations including Tel Aviv, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Larnaca, Dalaman, and Salalah. Meanwhile, the Air Astana Group is considering routes to Tokyo, Samarkand, Xi’an, Urumqi, and Riyadh. “At the same time, long-haul aircraft may also be deployed on existing routes to increase capacity and improve efficiency,” Satzhanov added. Staffing Challenges and Foreign Pilots Training personnel for such a large-scale expansion remains a critical challenge. Under agreements with Boeing, initial training for pilots and technical staff is provided by the manufacturer. In the first phase, foreign instructors train local specialists, who then pass on their knowledge to other staff. This approach is intended to build domestic expertise over time. Air Astana has already begun training engineers for the Boeing 787 at international centers, and plans to transition to in-house training programs. The airline is also developing partnerships with local aviation institutions. However, industry representatives acknowledge that foreign pilots will be required in the short term due to a shortage of locally certified specialists qualified to operate the new aircraft. MRO Development In late February, SCAT Airlines, in partnership with Boeing, launched construction of a major Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) center in Shymkent. According to aviation officials, the project represents a key milestone in developing Kazakhstan’s aviation infrastructure. The facility will provide a full cycle of aircraft maintenance services and reduce reliance on foreign providers. The complex will cover more than 45,000 square meters, with additional apron space exceeding six hectares. It will include at least 15 specialized facilities, such as engine repair shops, avionics laboratories, and aircraft painting and interior modification units. Construction is scheduled for completion in November 2027. Initially, the center will service Boeing 737 aircraft, which make up the majority of SCAT’s fleet. Plans are in place to expand capabilities to wide-body aircraft, including the Boeing 777, by 2030. The facility is also expected to attract foreign airlines, strengthening Kazakhstan’s role as a regional aviation hub. Regional Competition Kazakhstan’s major airports, including Astana, Almaty, Aktau, Atyrau, and Shymkent, already meet International Civil Aviation Organization standards and are capable of handling long-haul aircraft. However, competition is intensifying. Uzbekistan has also secured agreements to acquire 22 Boeing aircraft for long-haul operations, positioning itself as a rival regional hub. Outlook Kazakhstan’s aviation ambitions reflect a broader strategy to position itself as a key transit hub between Asia and Europe. Achieving this will require sustained investment in infrastructure, workforce development, regulatory improvements, and international cooperation. If successfully implemented, these measures could strengthen Kazakhstan’s regional position, drive economic growth, and enhance its global connectivity.
Repeated Drone Incidents Expose Airspace Risks on Russia–Central Asia Frontier
A new drone-related incident in western Kazakhstan has reinforced a pattern that is becoming harder to dismiss. Police in West Kazakhstan Region confirmed that an object resembling an unmanned aerial vehicle was found in the Akzhayik district near the village of Karaulytobe. Images circulating locally appeared to show a largely intact fixed-wing drone. No casualties or damage were reported. “The object was discovered outside a populated area. All circumstances of the incident are being investigated,” the department said. Reports and images of the object initially circulated on messaging apps before being confirmed by regional authorities. This latest discovery fits a sequence of similar incidents across the same region over the past year. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, on March 18, 2025, a drone about three meters long was found near Atameken village in Taskala district, around 60 kilometers from the district center. That case followed another discovery on February 18, 2025, in the Bokeyorda district, where a smaller unidentified object was recovered in a remote area. Within days, further debris was found near the Russian border in Zhanibek district, marking the third such case in a single month. The pattern continued later in the year. On October 23, 2025, a drone of unknown origin exploded near Kyzyltal village in the Burlin district. Residents reported an explosion that damaged rooftops and left a crater near the village, although no casualties were recorded. Authorities opened a criminal case, with the military prosecutor’s office involved alongside police and emergency services. Similar findings have appeared beyond the West Kazakhstan Region. On June 19, 2025, fragments resembling a UAV were found in Mangistau Region near the Bolashak border station. The debris was located in an uninhabited area, and no damage was reported. Taken together, these incidents form a clear geographic cluster along Kazakhstan’s western frontier. Most occurred near the Russian border and in sparsely populated areas. The objects were typically discovered after impact, with no confirmed flight paths or official attribution. Investigations into earlier cases have linked several incidents to areas used for Russian military testing. Western Kazakhstan includes zones connected to long-standing Russian defense activity under bilateral agreements, and parts of the region remain associated with testing operations. This context explains the cautious official response. None of the incidents have been described as attacks, and none have been attributed to a foreign state. At the same time, the repeated discoveries point to a growing exposure that goes beyond routine testing. The wider regional environment has shifted rapidly. The war in Ukraine has driven a sharp expansion in drone use across Eurasia. Both Russia and Ukraine deploy long-range UAVs for reconnaissance and strikes, often over extended distances. Drone activity has already affected infrastructure linked to Kazakhstan’s economy. On February 17, 2025, a drone attack targeted the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Kropotkinskaya pumping station in Russia’s Krasnodar region, part of a key export route for Kazakh oil. Further attacks on offshore loading facilities and terminals continued later in the year, with additional incidents in early 2026. This string of incidents disrupted operations and highlighted Kazakhstan’s indirect exposure to drone warfare beyond its borders. Even when incidents occur outside the country, they can affect the infrastructure that underpins its economy. The repeated discoveries inside Kazakhstan show a different form of exposure. They do not involve confirmed strikes or deliberate targeting but reflect spillover from expanding drone activity across shared airspace. Western Kazakhstan’s proximity to Russian military activity increases the risk of unintended incursions. The terrain is flat and sparsely populated, allowing UAVs to travel long distances without detection, while navigation failures or signal loss can push them off course. As drone use expands, such incidents are becoming more likely. More systems are operating over longer ranges, increasing the risk of cross-border drift. Countries near testing zones or conflict-adjacent regions face growing exposure, even without direct involvement. Kazakhstan has begun to respond. Following the Burlin district explosion, the Ministry of Defense introduced additional measures to strengthen airspace monitoring and prevent unauthorized aerial crossings. The incidents in western Kazakhstan show how this challenge is developing. The country is not a battlefield, but it lies close to areas where military activity continues at scale. Repeated drone discoveries now show that Central Asia is no longer insulated from the technological and military changes reshaping nearby regions.
Despite Growth Plans, Trade Between Kazakhstan and Russia Declined in 2025
Trade and economic ties between Kazakhstan and Russia showed signs of slowing in 2025. By the end of the year, bilateral trade totaled $27.4 billion, a slight decrease compared with the previous year. The figures were announced by Kazakhstan’s Minister of Trade and Integration, Arman Shakkaliev, following talks in Astana between Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. A year earlier, bilateral trade had demonstrated growth. In 2024, trade turnover increased by 3% to reach $27.8 billion, largely driven by rising imports of Russian goods into Kazakhstan. At the same time, exports of Kazakhstani products to Russia declined, pointing to a persistent imbalance in the structure of trade. The contraction recorded in 2025 reflects a broader trend, a slowdown in growth while overall trade volumes remain relatively high. Despite the decline, both sides continue to set ambitious targets for expanding economic cooperation. “At the same time, the goal has been set to bring bilateral trade to $30 billion. During the meeting of the heads of government, measures and priority sectors that could generate additional trade growth were discussed. These include energy, commerce, transport and logistics. We also reviewed issues related to the negotiation process and our integration agenda,” Shakkaliev said. Kazakh authorities expect digitalisation measures to help accelerate trade flows. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of Finance, Yerzhan Birzhanov, outlined plans to introduce electronic waybills and modernize 30 checkpoints along the Kazakhstan–Russia border. These steps are expected to reduce transit times and improve operational transparency. Russia remains one of the largest investors in Kazakhstan’s economy. “There is a very significant presence of Russian business in Kazakhstan, and we welcome it. We are ready to explore new areas of cooperation. I am confident that there are ample opportunities for this. The Government of Kazakhstan will make every effort to intensify and enhance our cooperation,” Bektenov said. In turn, Mishustin highlighted prospects for further joint initiatives. “There is considerable potential in bilateral cooperation to launch joint projects in energy, industry, transport infrastructure, agriculture and the digital economy,” he stated. In addition to economic issues, the two sides discussed joint efforts to preserve the ecosystem of the Caspian Sea and implement environmental initiatives. External factors are also influencing trade dynamics. In particular, tighter foreign trade procedures introduced by Russia could reshape logistics routes and alter commodity flows across Central Asia.
The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors
Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks onward to Türkiye and connected European systems, with the further possibility of reaching southern ports on the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. Under ordinary conditions, that continuity is its main advantage over routes that require repeated port and rail transfers: it reduces transshipment points, shortens the route in practice, and can make timing more predictable. Under wartime conditions, however, the same corridor is exposed to airspace closures, border disruption, sanctions complications, financing friction, insurance risk, and broader political uncertainty. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, avoids Iran-linked routes and instead depends on a more segmented chain. It relies on port capacity, scheduling, and political stability across a wider set of nodes: rail or road to Caspian shipping ports such as Aktau or Kuryk, sea passage across the Caspian, and stable conditions in the South Caucasus to keep traffic moving on time through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Türkiye and Europe. Tehran’s March 5 drone strike on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, one of the most serious recent incidents in bilateral relations, showed how directly the conflict could affect the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan complicates the picture because alternatives through Afghanistan and Pakistan toward the Arabian Sea and Gulf markets pass through it. Uzbekistan is not just a single-corridor user. It is one of the main gateways for several southward routes at once: west-southwest through Turkmenistan and Iran, south through Afghanistan toward Pakistani ports, and east-west through projects linking China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan more closely to downstream routes. None of these options can simply substitute for another, and none escapes the wider instability to the south. Current conditions cast doubt on all of them. The war is testing not just routes through Iran but the broader logic of southward diversification. Second-order Stress Transmission The same pressure is now visible in the skies. Europe-Asia flight patterns have already shifted as carriers avoid Iranian and other risky airspace. TCA reported that Central Asia’s airspace has value not as a substitute for Gulf hubs but in a narrower, more practical sense, as overflight space when southern corridors become harder to use. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency has meanwhile kept in force a conflict-zone bulletin warning operators about Iranian and neighboring airspace. Disruption in the usual geometry of Europe-Asia air traffic increases the importance of Central Asia’s skies. TCA also noted early in the crisis that a wider conflict could reverberate across Central Asia through rising energy prices and pressure on major transport corridors. Spillover from the Iran war affects not only routes that stop functioning. It also forces airlines onto longer routes with higher fuel costs, alters shipping and insurance calculations, and raises logistics costs more generally. The cost, timing, and insurability of goods movement to and through landlocked Central Asia already depend on long-distance logistics. Changes here channel the effects of a distant war into domestic economies. Turkmenistan offers the clearest early sign of how fast an Iranian supply shock can spread across Central Asia. Retailers and consumers in Ashgabat have told Reuters that prices for key goods imported from Iran have risen sharply because cross-border trade has slowed. Kyrgyzstan has also seen direct disruption of logistics, forcing importers and logistics firms to seek alternative arrangements, as freight forwarders told TCA that cargo transit through Iran had effectively stopped. These are concrete examples of how the war’s shocks are spreading through Central Asia. The broader regional question is how far such pressures extend into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan through fuel, shipping, construction inputs, consumer goods, and supply costs more generally. Implications for the Caspian Region and Beyond The conflict’s movement toward the Caspian Sea littoral broadens the stakes. Israeli strikes on Iranian naval targets in the Caspian brought the war into a maritime zone relevant to regional energy and transit flows. The issue is no longer limited to Gulf shipping or borderland evacuation. It now reaches into a maritime-energy space central to Central Asian economic security and wider Eurasian connectivity. For Central Asia, the immediate question is where resilience must now be strengthened: in evacuation coordination, alternative routes, transport-risk management, and protection against import shocks. The deeper question concerns regional agency. The current shock exposes logistical weak points. It could strengthen corridor diversification, but only if the region finds ways to act on those weaknesses rather than merely react to them. The wider Eurasian significance extends beyond Central Asia. China has an interest in containing instability to preserve reliable westward and southward corridors. Greater instability around the Caspian is not in Moscow’s interest, even if Russia may benefit when southern alternatives weaken. The European Union has a clear stake in resilient non-Russian connectivity across the Caspian and South Caucasus, not least because many of its current assumptions about Eurasian connectivity depend on those corridors functioning with reasonable predictability. The United States, for its part, has an interest in regional stability and in preventing Central Asia’s room for maneuver from narrowing under the pressure of war. The deeper question is whether Central Asia can remain connected on terms that preserve strategic flexibility across Eurasia in a more sharply divided order.
Drone Strikes on Russian Baltic Ports Raise Risks for Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports
Drone attacks on Russian Baltic ports have heightened concerns about potential risks to Kazakhstan’s oil export routes. Ukrainian drone strikes targeted the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga in Russia’s Leningrad Oblast earlier this week, disrupting operations at both major oil export hubs. Primorsk has an estimated capacity of around one million barrels of crude oil and approximately 300,000 barrels of diesel fuel per day. Large fuel storage facilities are also located at both ports. Further strikes were reported on March 25, when drones again targeted both ports. Media reports indicated that shipments of oil and petroleum products were suspended, and that fires broke out at Ust-Luga. As of March 26, loadings at both ports were reportedly still suspended following the latest strikes, with no confirmed return to normal operations. Kazakhstan has increasingly used Baltic routes for part of its oil exports following periodic disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system. Commenting on the situation, Kazakh oil and gas journalist Oleg Chervinsky said that the port of Ust-Luga has been used to export Kazakh crude marketed under the KEBCO brand, with volumes rising after earlier challenges affecting CPC shipments. Kazakhstan’s national pipeline operator, KazTransOil, transports crude through Russian pipeline infrastructure under agreements with Russia’s Transneft. From there, oil can be delivered to Germany, shipped via Baltic ports such as Ust-Luga, or exported through Black Sea terminals, including Novorossiysk, which has also been targeted by drone attacks in the past year. According to open-source intelligence analysts cited in international media, energy infrastructure in the Ust-Luga industrial zone, including facilities linked to NOVATEK’s gas processing complex, was affected by the latest strike. The Ust-Luga site is located roughly 850 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. A similar attack on infrastructure in the Ust-Luga area was reported in August 2025. At that time, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy stated that Kazakh oil exports had not been affected. As of March 26, the ministry had not publicly commented on the latest incidents. Officials have previously emphasized the importance of diversifying export routes amid geopolitical risks and infrastructure disruptions.
Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia
Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,” as well as “the central command post of the Iranian Navy and infrastructure used for the repair and maintenance of Iranian military vessels.” The basin is also central to regional energy flows, with offshore infrastructure, shipping routes, and pipeline-linked export systems connecting Caspian producers to global markets. Any expansion of conflict into this space raises risks for both energy exports and maritime transport. Security in the Caspian basin is a shared concern for both littoral states and their regional partners. According to analyst Denis Borisov, Iran’s Caspian transport infrastructure forms part of regional corridors used by Central Asian states, making stability in the basin strategically important. Kazakhstan, one of the five Caspian littoral states, began actively signaling support for de-escalation shortly after the strikes. On March 21, speaking in the Turkestan region, President Tokayev called for an end to attacks on civilian and economic targets and urged parties to engage in negotiations. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s readiness to host potential peace talks. On March 22, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Iran exchanged congratulatory messages on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr and Nauryz. Tokayev expressed hopes for strengthened unity and stability in the Middle East. Diplomatic contacts intensified on March 23, when Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart Seyed Abbas Araghchi to discuss regional developments and possible steps toward reducing military tensions, including the need to maintain security in the Caspian region. On the same day, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov also spoke with Araghchi. Iranian readouts of the call warned that recent strikes could have security and environmental consequences for the Caspian Sea. Also on March 23, Tokayev received the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Mohammed Said Mohammed al-Ariqi. During the meeting, Tokayev expressed concern over Iranian bombardments targeting the UAE, reiterated Kazakhstan’s opposition to involving neutral states in the conflict, and once again offered Kazakhstan as a platform for peace talks. The escalation affecting the Caspian region has therefore acted as a catalyst for intensified diplomatic engagement by Central Asian states and Azerbaijan aimed at steering the crisis toward dialogue. As Tokayev has suggested, such efforts may prove critical before the window for negotiated solutions narrows. As the conflict edges closer to key transit and energy routes, the stakes for Central Asia are no longer peripheral, but immediate.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team examine a series of major developments across Central Asia, from the results of Kazakhstan's constitutional referendum to the announcement of new Chinese-funded border outposts and fortifications along Tajikistan's frontier. We also look at the continuing fallout from the security shake-up in Kyrgyzstan, with further arrests and resignations, as well as the increasingly strange foreign movements of Turkmenistan's senior leadership while war continues to rage just across the border in Iran, alongside Tehran's threats to strike Turkmen infrastructure. The episode then turns to the escalating conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where some of the heaviest fighting in months is raising fresh questions about border stability, regional security, and the risk of wider spillover. Finally, for our main story, we bring on a panel of experts to discuss the growing issues surrounding the Rogun Dam and its resettlement project, and how both are likely to affect the states downstream. On the show this week: - Eugene Simonov (Rivers Without Boundaries Coalition) - Mark Fodor (Coalition for Human Rights in Development)
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
