Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be covering the environmental situation in the Caspian Sea and the recent Regional Ecological Summit in Astana. Special guest, Vadim Ni, co-founder of the Save the Caspian Sea movement.

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Diplomacy Offers Lessons for Iran Crisis

Ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran have yet to resolve a key issue: what will happen to the enriched uranium currently held by a country engulfed in conflict. Beyond political considerations, there are also significant technical challenges, namely, how such material could be safely removed from Iran if an agreement is reached. Kazakhstan, however, has previously carried out a unique operation of this kind, later documented in detail through U.S. and Kazakh accounts, and has a long track record of constructive engagement in nuclear diplomacy. The Uranium Question The parties to the conflict, the United States, Israel, and Iran, remain deeply divided on core issues. Various countries, including Pakistan, have been involved as mediators. At the same time, the situation is complicated by broader military and economic tensions, including the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian oil exports and Iran’s continuing obstruction of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz dominates headlines, often diverting attention from the central issue: the fate of Iran’s uranium stockpile. Axios reported that U.S. and Iranian negotiators had discussed a possible arrangement involving the release of frozen Iranian funds, with a figure of $20 billion under discussion. One U.S. official described that figure as a U.S. proposal, while U.S. President Donald Trump later denied that any money would change hands. IAEA-linked figures put Iran’s stockpile at about 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, close to weapons-grade levels if further enriched. Trump has expressed confidence that Iran will agree to a deal and that the uranium can be removed. Iranian officials, however, have rejected this claim, stating that they do not intend to transfer enriched uranium to the United States or any other country. Tokayev’s Position On April 17, 2026, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed the issue during a diplomatic forum in Antalya, warning that excessive focus on trade routes and the Strait of Hormuz risks overshadowing the core problem, the nuclear issue. “The essence of the problem lies in the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must be the central topic of negotiations when it comes to the conflict around Iran,” Tokayev said. Experts have since highlighted the complexity of the task facing policymakers: not only negotiating terms but physically removing enriched uranium from Iran. This would involve dealing with potentially damaged facilities, ensuring security, deploying specialist teams, defining transport routes, establishing international oversight, and determining a final destination for the material. Against this backdrop, Tokayev’s remarks carry particular weight. While the United States is reported to be insisting not only on limiting future enrichment but also on transferring existing stockpiles, Iran is seeking to separate the nuclear issue from the broader regional crisis. Tokayev, by contrast, has emphasized that energy and shipping disruptions are symptoms of a deeper conflict, with the nuclear issue at its core. Operation Sapphire Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal, after Russia, the United States, and Ukraine. The country was also home to the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, where the USSR carried out its first nuclear test in 1949. Over the next four decades, the USSR conducted 456 nuclear tests at the site. The risks associated with uncontrolled nuclear proliferation have therefore had particular resonance in Kazakhstan. The test site was closed in 1991, after decades of environmental and human impact. After gaining independence, Kazakhstan voluntarily renounced its nuclear arsenal. In 1994, it facilitated the removal of highly enriched uranium to the United States under a complex operation known as “Operation Sapphire,” details of which have since been published in U.S. and Kazakh accounts, including KNB-linked archive material released in 2021. The operation involved the removal of approximately 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, reportedly enriched to about 90% U-235, from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk. It required highly sophisticated technical and logistical planning and was conducted under strict secrecy to prevent leaks and deter interest from non-state actors, including terrorist groups. A Legacy of Nuclear Diplomacy Kazakhstan has also played a direct role in diplomatic efforts related to Iran’s nuclear program. In 2013, Almaty hosted two rounds of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group. While these talks did not produce a final agreement, they helped sustain the process that ultimately led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As part of the agreement’s implementation, Kazakhstan supplied Iran with 60 tons of natural uranium in exchange for the removal of low-enriched uranium from the country. Although Kazakhstan did not play a leading role in the agreement, it served as a neutral platform and trusted partner. The country has built a strong international reputation for its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. It maintains working relations with key stakeholders, including the United States, Iran, China, Russia, and Israel. Lessons for Today The situation in Iran is far more complex than Kazakhstan’s experience with Operation Sapphire, not least because Kazakhstan voluntarily relinquished its arsenal. The current Middle East crisis is broader in scope, involving multiple actors and potentially damaged or inaccessible nuclear facilities. For Iran, relinquishing nuclear materials would carry significant political costs. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s experience offers a practical model for the safe removal of enriched uranium. Any future agreement with Iran will likely require either the removal or dilution of uranium while allowing the country to maintain access to peaceful nuclear energy. The International Atomic Energy Agency would be expected to play a central role, and the involvement of a neutral country with a strong non-proliferation track record could help build trust. Notably, Kazakhstan hosts the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank. Tokayev’s remarks in Antalya serve as a reminder that discussions of trade routes or maritime disruptions must not overshadow the nuclear issue. Any agreement will need to address practical questions: where the uranium will be stored, who will oversee the process, what Iran will receive in return, and which countries can serve as credible guarantors. Kazakhstan may not be the only potential mediator, but its experience places it among the few nations that have successfully managed complex nuclear disarmament operations in practice. That experience could prove invaluable in de-escalating the current crisis.

Kazakhstan’s Abraham Accords Dividend

Astana’s entry into the Abraham Accords is not the opening of a relationship with Israel so much as the re-platforming of one. Kazakhstan recognized Israel in the early 1990s and has maintained a functional, if understated, partnership since then. What has changed is the format. An existing bilateral channel is being placed inside diplomatic architecture with better access to political attention, private capital, and commercially useful networks. Kazakhstan announced its intention to join the Accords on November 6, 2025, ahead of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Donald Trump in Washington. The Times of Central Asia described Kazakhstan as the first Central Asian state and the only non-Middle Eastern or North African country to enter the framework. An official accession ceremony is still pending. For Kazakhstan, the value lies not in symbolism but in the Accords’ convening power. The Accords make Kazakhstan more legible to Israeli technology firms, Gulf investors, American policymakers, and the growing ecosystem of institutions and policy platforms built around regional economic integration. For Astana, this is the practical utility of membership. It does not need the Accords to talk to Israel. It can use them to widen the circle around specific projects. The formulation is also consistent with Kazakhstan’s foreign-policy habits. Astana has not presented the decision as a strategic turn against any other partner. Its Foreign Ministry said accession was made “solely in the interests of Kazakhstan,” and was consistent with a “balanced, constructive, and peaceful foreign policy.” The same statement reaffirmed support for a two-state settlement of the Middle East conflict. That wording appears carefully calibrated. It allows Astana to engage with a Trump-associated diplomatic framework while presenting the decision as an extension of Kazakhstan’s established multi-vector foreign policy, not a departure from it. The better interpretation is additive multi-vectorism in the form of another channel, another table, and another set of possible transactions. A Times of Central Asia analysis made this point directly, arguing that Kazakhstan’s aims include converting symbolic capital into policy traction, developing Gulf co-financing, and preserving equilibrium with Moscow and Beijing. The commercial agenda is already visible. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s January 2026 visit to Astana, the first by an Israeli foreign minister in 16 years, produced a package of institutional and economic steps. A Kazakhstan-Israel business forum ran alongside the official meetings, and the sides identified a project map covering high-tech agriculture, water management, digital technologies, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, logistics, energy efficiency, renewables, healthcare, and pharmaceuticals. These sectors are not ornamental but match Kazakhstan’s own reform priorities of productivity, digital administration, non-resource growth, infrastructure modernization, and technology transfer. Israel’s appeal lies less in its market size than in its applied capability. Gulf participation, where available, adds scale and financing. The Accords can help package those elements into projects that are easier for companies, development institutions, and governments to recognize. Energy and infrastructure may become the most consequential tests. The Times of Central Asia has argued that the Accords could give Israeli firms a clearer political and legal framework for work in Kazakhstan’s energy and infrastructure sectors, while Gulf Cooperation Council states, especially the UAE, could provide project finance. If that model works, the Accords become not a communiqué but a deal structure. The April 27, 2026 visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Astana reinforced the same trajectory. Tokayev described Kazakhstan’s decision to join the Accords as a contribution to normalization between Middle Eastern countries and Israel, but his emphasis quickly moved to economic cooperation, the potential of which he called “extremely vast.” Herzog arrived with a delegation focused especially on technology. In expanded talks, Tokayev proposed holding an official accession ceremony in Astana, signaling that Kazakhstan sees itself not as a quiet entrant into the Accords but as a visible supporter and potential mediator in their expanding geography. Platforms such as the N7 Initiative help explain why the Accords now have relevance beyond their original Arab-Israeli context. N7 has described Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as a “new frontier” for the Accords, arguing that membership can provide access to a network organized around investment, prosperity, and broader cooperation with Israel and the United States. That framing suits Kazakhstan precisely because it is project-based rather than alliance-based. For Astana, the promise of the Accords lies in their practical utility. They offer Kazakhstan another channel through which to connect Israeli technology, Gulf investment, and its own modernization agenda. The real dividend will come not from the ceremony, but from the partnerships, financing, and projects that follow.

Lavrov in Astana as Kazakhstan Prepares for Putin State Visit

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has visited Astana for talks with Kazakhstan’s leadership, as the two countries prepare for a planned state visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin in late May. Lavrov arrived in Kazakhstan on April 29. The main working part of the visit took place on April 30, with meetings with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev. Russia’s Foreign Ministry said the agenda covered political, trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties, as well as cooperation in the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At expanded talks in Astana, Kosherbayev said Russia remains one of Kazakhstan’s key trade partners. Bilateral trade exceeded $27 billion last year, and the two governments are working toward a target of $30 billion. Kosherbayev said the talks covered energy, transport, logistics, industry, digitalization, cultural ties, and international issues. The foreign ministers signed a cooperation plan between the two ministries for 2027-2028 during the visit. Kosherbayev said the plan reflected close coordination between Astana and Moscow on bilateral and international issues. The visit also comes ahead of Putin’s expected trip to Kazakhstan. The Kremlin said in February that Putin had confirmed his participation in the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting in Astana in late May and accepted Tokayev’s invitation to make a state visit linked to the event. For Kazakhstan, relations with Russia remain a central part of its multi-vector diplomacy, alongside growing ties with China, the European Union, Turkey, the Gulf states, and the United States. The two countries share a long border, have deep trade links, and work together through several regional organizations. Russia also remains central to Kazakhstan’s energy export network. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal near Novorossiysk handles roughly 80% of Kazakhstan’s crude exports. That gives Astana a strong reason to keep stable ties with Moscow, but it also explains why Kazakhstan is pushing to diversify transport routes. The government has promoted the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, as a way to move freight between China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Europe with less reliance on Russian territory. The war in Ukraine has made that approach harder to sustain. Kazakhstan has kept ties with Moscow, but Tokayev has also stressed the importance of the UN Charter, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on August 10, 2025, Tokayev said Kazakhstan supported the UN Charter, the inviolability of sovereign borders, and the territorial integrity of sovereign states. Economic pressure has also grown. Western governments have increased scrutiny of trade routes that could be used to bypass sanctions on Russia. Kazakhstan has tried to protect its own trade from that pressure while avoiding a direct break with Moscow. Energy adds another dimension. Any disruption to the CPC route can quickly become a national economic issue for Kazakhstan. In April, Kazakhstan’s energy ministry said CPC exports through the Black Sea remained stable after Russia reported a drone attack near Novorossiysk. The episode showed once again how Kazakhstan’s oil exports can be exposed to security events on Russian territory. Lavrov’s visit, therefore, goes beyond routine diplomacy. It took place as Astana prepares for Putin’s state visit, manages sanctions risk, and tries to keep open several foreign policy tracks at once. Moscow wants to show it remains a central partner for Kazakhstan. Astana wants to keep that relationship stable without closing off its other options. Lavrov’s visit showed how much of Kazakhstan’s Russia policy is still shaped by geography and infrastructure. Astana is building wider ties with other powers, but its oil exports, rail routes, border trade, and security contacts still run through or alongside Russia. That does not point to a rupture. It points to a relationship Kazakhstan cannot afford to mishandle.

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Human Capital Problem – How State Scholarships Are Building a Talent Pipeline for the West

Kazakhstan spends millions of dollars every year sending its brightest students to the world's best universities through two flagship programs: the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools (NIS) and Bolashak. For NIS, the state invests millions with no public record of what becomes of its graduates once they enter foreign educational institutions. For Bolashak, the return figures look reassuring on paper, but only until one asks what happens the moment the obligation expires. For Kazakhstan’s economy, heavily reliant on oil and gas exports, human capital is what can bring the country to its goal of economic diversification through the ideas and skills that no natural resource can replicate. Students from Kazakhstan studying abroad, with access to the world’s best professors and cutting-edge technologies, are exactly the human capital the country cannot afford to lose. However, they are also the ones the government has been paying to send away without a sustainable retention strategy in place. Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools Founded in 2008, the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools network offers an internationally recognized 12-year curriculum, directly compatible with many foreign university admissions systems. It also provides some of its students with grants covering the full cost of attendance. The state funds NIS generously: in 2023 alone, more than $37 million was invested into the network. The results are extraordinary: from 2010 to 2024, 654 students received offers from the top 100 universities in the world, with 32 of them from the Ivy League. However, which country these graduates end up in is a different question, and the available statistics offer no public answer to. One former NIS student, who received a full scholarship to study abroad, says, "I'm extremely grateful for all the resources that the NIS provided me with. However, after my graduation from the university, I will be moving to San Francisco to work as an AI engineer. It would take me at least seven years to make the same salary I'll be earning here in a year." Another says, "It is not only about the higher wages in the U.S. It’s about the opportunities and autonomy one gets. The research lab I've joined since graduation has far more funding and resources for the work I'm actually passionate about." Bolashak Program Unlike NIS, the Bolashak program, established in 1993 and widely regarded as one of the most generous scholarship programs in the world, does require its recipients to return. Graduates must work in Kazakhstan for up to four years or face financial penalties. On paper, this looks like a solution to the human capital problem. In practice, it is only a delay. While the state at least partially recovers its investment, it is developed markets that eventually inherit the talent. "After completing my requirement back home, I was able to get an American company to sponsor my visa," says one Bolashak recipient. "I moved to the U.S. shortly after." "I was offered a transfer to the European branch of my company," says another, one year after fulfilling their obligation. The Solution to the Brain Drain Kazakhstan's investment in NIS and Bolashak was never intended to benefit the research labs of MIT, Google's engineering department, or European process manufacturing. Yet the accounts of graduates suggest this is precisely what is happening. While comprehensive data on retention rates remains unavailable, the pattern emerging from interviews with former NIS students and Bolashak recipients is consistent enough to warrant attention. The existence of financial penalties in Bolashak itself signals that voluntary return was never guaranteed as the government designed enforcement mechanisms precisely because it anticipated the problem. The issue is not the graduates themselves as every person will naturally pursue the best opportunities available to them. The question is why Kazakhstan has invested so heavily in sending talent abroad without an equally serious strategy for bringing it back. Addressing this requires action on multiple fronts: To begin with, Kazakhstan should introduce targeted return incentives for recipients of state-funded scholarships. This could include additional compensation packages and relocation support. This model exists in other Asian markets, such as South Korea, which offers returnees financial incentives under the Brain Pool program. Kazakhstan could develop its own version, built for the sectors it most urgently needs, such as technology, AI, and engineering. Moreover, government support for the private sector could unlock what policy alone cannot. Tax breaks, co-investment schemes, and streamlined business registration for technology companies in priority sectors would give returning graduates an option beyond taking a government job: starting their own tech company in Kazakhstan. Finally, the prestige and quality of local universities must improve. State-led efforts to open campuses of foreign universities in Kazakhstan are a step in the right direction, but they are not sufficient. Kazakhstani universities themselves need investment, particularly in research. A scientist who can access world-class research opportunities at home has more reasons to return. Lessons for Central Asia Kazakhstan is not alone in facing this challenge. Across Central Asia, governments, including Uzbekistan’s, are investing in the education of their young people with the hope that knowledge brought home from abroad will strengthen their economies. Kazakhstan, as the region's largest economy, serves as a reminder for other Central Asian states that are following the same path. Sending students abroad is the easy part; however, building opportunities worth coming back for is harder, and, unfortunately, it is the question no scholarship program can answer on its own. The brain drain paradox is not inevitable, and it will most certainly not resolve itself. The countries that recognize this early enough to act will be the ones that actually diversify their economies. The ones that do not will continue growing talent for the rest of the world at their own expense.   The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

Belousov’s Bishkek Warning: Russia Uses SCO Meeting to Target Outside Influence in Central Asia

The April 28 meeting of defense ministers from the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), held in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, received relatively modest coverage in Central Asia and China. Russia’s Ministry of Defense, however, used the routine gathering to send a sharper message: Moscow remains opposed to any non-regional military presence in Central Asia. According to the SCO Secretariat, the meeting was attended by defense ministers from member states, the organization’s Secretary-General, and the director of the Executive Committee of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. “During the meeting, the parties held a substantive exchange of views on pressing regional and international security issues, noting persistent challenges and threats, including international terrorism, extremism, transnational crime, as well as emerging risks in information and cybersecurity,” the SCO said in a general statement. The statement also emphasized the need to strengthen trust between the armed forces of member states, expand practical cooperation, conduct joint exercises, exchange experience, and develop mechanisms for military cooperation within the SCO. China’s Defense Minister Dong Jun used similar institutional language. According to Xinhua, Dong said the SCO should uphold the international order, improve security governance, and “eliminate the sources of turmoil and conflict through shared development.” He also called for deeper defense and security cooperation among member states. Kazakhstan’s Defense Minister Dauren Kosanov presented a report on the country’s approach to strengthening regional security, developing cooperation within the SCO, and improving joint responses to contemporary challenges, according to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry said participants also discussed the expansion of practical cooperation between defense agencies and approved a cooperation plan for SCO defense ministries for 2027. Defense ministers from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan also held bilateral talks on the sidelines of the meeting, discussing military-technical cooperation, joint training, experience-sharing among officers, and initiatives aimed at strengthening regional security. Uzbek media described the talks as being held in a constructive and friendly atmosphere. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov adopted a markedly different tone. His remarks were not limited to general SCO language about counterterrorism or cyber threats. They directly targeted the possible presence of outside powers in Central Asia. “We are closely monitoring attempts by non-regional states to establish a military presence and address logistical tasks in Central Asia. We consider this unacceptable,” Belousov said, according to RIA Novosti. Belousov also expressed concern about Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, warning that militants from crisis zones could infiltrate neighboring countries, including the SCO space. Belousov further argued that U.S. activity in the Asia-Pacific region was having a destabilizing effect. “Their efforts to reshape the regional security system into a U.S.-centric model by strengthening military-political structures under Washington’s control provoke tensions, undermine regional stability, and increase the risks of armed conflict,” he said. The contrast was striking. The SCO Secretariat spoke in broad terms about common threats and institutional cooperation. China emphasized development, governance, and multilateral stability. Russia used the same setting to issue a direct warning over Central Asia. Iran added another layer to the meeting’s harder security tone. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Reza Talaei-Nik used the Bishkek meeting to propose expanded defense cooperation with SCO partners, saying Tehran was ready to share its defensive capabilities with “independent countries,” especially SCO member states. The statement reinforced the sense that the Bishkek meeting was not only about routine SCO defense coordination, but also about how several member states are positioning the organization as a platform resistant to Western military pressure. In Russian pro-state commentary, Belousov’s speech was quickly framed not only as a warning to Washington, but also as a message to Central Asian partners. Political commentator Natalya Starichkova described the statement as “clearly demanding” and argued that it was addressed not only to “non-regional states,” but also to SCO and CSTO partners in Central Asia. “Some of them have recently been actively exploring participation elsewhere — or showing excessive responsiveness to ‘non-regional’ proposals,” she wrote. Her interpretation is not official policy. But it reflects a wider Russian anxiety: that Central Asian states, while maintaining security ties with Moscow, are also widening their diplomatic, economic, and defense contacts with other powers. Just days before the Bishkek meeting, Belousov met Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun in Moscow. According to Vedomosti, the Russian minister highlighted regular contacts between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping and emphasized the “special importance” of military cooperation between Russia and China. Reuters, citing Beijing, reported that the two defense ministers agreed to enhance strategic communication and deepen practical cooperation across military fields. Belousov’s remarks fit into a broader pattern in which Russia and China have increasingly used SCO platforms to promote overlapping security concepts: opposition to outside military influence, support for state sovereignty, and a preference for regional security arrangements not led by the West. For Central Asia, this overlap is significant. The region has long tried to balance Russia, China, the West, Turkey, and other partners without being locked into a single security orbit. Moscow’s Bishkek message was therefore not just about Washington. It was also a reminder to Central Asian governments that Russia still sees the region as a core security space where outside military involvement will be treated as a direct challenge. China’s position is more carefully phrased. Beijing tends to speak through the language of development, governance, and stability, rather than direct warnings. Yet its vision for Eurasian security also leaves little room for a Western military role in Central Asia. The SCO provides a forum where these Russian and Chinese preferences can reinforce one another, even when their rhetoric differs. Belousov’s Bishkek speech should therefore be read less as an isolated Russian outburst than as a signal delivered inside a favorable multilateral setting. Moscow used the SCO platform to warn against Western military or logistical activity in Central Asia. Beijing did not need to echo the warning directly for the broader message to be clear. The SCO meeting itself may have been routine, but Belousov’s intervention was not. It showed how Russia is using regional security forums to restate its opposition to outside military involvement in Central Asia, while relying on an institutional environment in which China’s language about security governance and external interference gives that message wider political resonance.

Iran Proposes Defense Cooperation to SCO Partners at Bishkek Meeting

Iran used a Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense meeting in Bishkek to signal that it is ready to share military experience and defense capabilities with other SCO members, giving a sharper geopolitical edge to the gathering hosted by Kyrgyzstan under its current chairmanship of the bloc.

The meeting of SCO defense ministers opened on April 28 at the Ala-Archa state residence in Bishkek. Defense officials from the organization’s member states attended, along with SCO Secretary General Nurlan Yermekbayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Ruslan Mukambetov chaired the session.

Iran was represented by Deputy Defense Minister Reza Talaei-Nik. In a statement carried by Mehr News Agency, Talaei-Nik said Iran was ready to share its defense weapons capabilities and experience with “independent countries,” especially SCO member states. He also described the SCO as part of a wider shift away from what Tehran called a “unipolar” international order.

The remarks came after weeks of fighting between Iran, the United States, and Israel, including Iranian drone and missile strikes on U.S. bases in the region and Israeli sites. A ceasefire announced earlier this month reduced hostilities, but efforts to reach a wider settlement have stalled.

Talaei-Nik also used the meeting to frame the recent conflict as a lesson for other states, declaring, “We are ready to share our experiences in defeating America with other members of the organization.”

The SCO meeting gave Tehran a platform inside a bloc that now includes China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran became a full member in 2023. The SCO also has a wider circle of observer states and dialogue partners, including 15 dialogue partners listed by the organization’s secretariat.

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov received the SCO defense delegations before the ministerial session. He said Kyrgyzstan, as the SCO chair, attaches special importance to practical defense cooperation, including joint exercises, experience-sharing, and stronger coordination. He said agreements reached in Bishkek should strengthen defense cooperation and security across the SCO region.

Kyrgyzstan’s SCO chairmanship is being held under the slogan “25 Years of the SCO: Together Towards Sustainable Peace, Development, and Prosperity.” Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Mukambetov said the organization needed solidarity, mutual trust, and collective responsibility to respond to current security challenges. Kyrgyz state agency Kabar said the participants discussed military cooperation, regional security, and joint responses to current threats.

The SCO began as a border-security framework. Its roots go back to agreements signed in 1996 and 1997 by Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan on military trust and troop reductions along border areas. Uzbekistan later joined, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formally founded in 2001. Since then, the bloc has grown into a wider Eurasian platform covering security, defense contacts, counterterrorism, transport, energy, and economic cooperation.

Talaei-Nik also held talks with Russian and Belarusian defense officials on the fringes of the Bishkek meeting, with both sides discussing continued cooperation with Tehran.

For Central Asian governments, including non-SCO member Turkmenistan, the Bishkek meeting highlighted the pressures facing multi-vector diplomacy. All five have spent years balancing security ties with Russia, deepening economic ties with China, engagement with the United States and Europe, and links to the wider Islamic world. That approach gives them room to maneuver, but it also means that conflicts involving Iran, Russia, China, or the West can quickly enter regional platforms such as the SCO, especially when security cooperation is already on the agenda.

Ukrainian Ambassador to Kazakhstan: From Chornobyl to Zaporizhzhia – Lessons Humanity Risks Forgetting

April 26 marks a date that changed the course of world history. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster, one of the world’s worst nuclear accidents, the consequences of which are still felt today. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Ukraine’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Kazakhstan, Victor Mayko, spoke about the scale of the tragedy and emerging threats to nuclear safety. TCA: Forty years have passed. Why does Chornobyl remain a relevant issue today? Ambassador Mayko: Because it is not a story that has ended. It is an ongoing process, the consequences of which continue to unfold. Chornobyl is not only the explosion of a reactor; it is the long-term impact on people, nature, and the economy. In terms of scale, it is, without exaggeration, the largest manmade disaster in human history. TCA: What exactly defines that scale? Ambassador Mayko: First and foremost, the territory. Around 150,000 square kilometers were contaminated. The most dangerous area is the 10-kilometer zone. Isotopes were recorded there that had not previously been observed; they were formed as a result of processes during the explosion. According to estimates, this territory will only become suitable for habitation in about 20,000 years, once the decay of radioactive isotopes reaches safe levels. These were fertile lands, chernozem soils suitable for agriculture. Today, the area is a protected zone, essentially a vast natural reserve where wild animals live. But this is a forced outcome. TCA: As far as we know, you were personally a liquidator. What did you witness? Ambassador Mayko: I was sent there through mobilization. I spent almost a month at the plant, in two rotations. I saw people working on the reactor roof, clearing debris and removing radioactive materials. These were difficult, frightening scenes. People went there understanding the risk, but not always fully realizing its scale. TCA: How many people were affected? Ambassador Mayko: We still don’t know the exact figures. The Soviet system concealed information. I believe the immediate death toll was at least 10,000. But if we include those who later died from radiation-related illnesses, thyroid cancer, stomach cancer, and others, the number rises into the hundreds of thousands. In total, around 600,000 people took part in the cleanup. That is an enormous figure. TCA: Why was information about the accident concealed for so long? Ambassador Mayko: Because the system was built that way. Until the radioactive cloud moved beyond the borders of the USSR, there was silence. Only when elevated radiation levels were detected in Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom did international inquiries begin. Then the Soviet Union was forced to acknowledge the accident. TCA: How did this affect people in the first days? Ambassador Mayko: People continued living their normal lives. On May 1, there was a public demonstration. I was there myself with my family, with a small child. No one warned us about the danger. Many felt throat irritation and coughing, but didn’t understand the cause. If people had been informed in time to close windows and stay indoors, it would have been possible to reduce the impact. But that didn’t happen. TCA: Was there panic? Ambassador Mayko: It was more fear of the unknown. People didn’t understand what radiation was. Of course, many tried to take their children away. But over time, the situation stabilized. There was no mass panic; rather, anxiety that gradually faded as more information became available. TCA: How do you assess the role of the liquidators? Ambassador Mayko: They are heroes, without exaggeration. They saved millions of lives. If not for their actions, the consequences could have been far worse. People worked without fully understanding the level of the threat, but they carried out their task. TCA: What is happening today at the Chornobyl plant? Ambassador Mayko: After the accident, a sarcophagus was built, a complex engineering structure designed to isolate the destroyed reactor and prevent radiation leaks. It was an international project that cost billions. Today, however, its integrity has been compromised. The structure was not designed for military activity. Following a strike by a Russian drone, it sustained serious damage. Now it is no longer simply a question of repair, but of potentially replacing the structure entirely. This presents a serious risk. Any loss of containment is a threat, especially given the structure’s age. TCA: Much is being said today about the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. How alarming is the situation there? Ambassador Mayko: Very alarming. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is the largest nuclear facility in Europe. It is currently under the control of Russian forces and, according to available information, has been mined. This in itself is unprecedented. There have also been instances when the plant lost external power supply and, therefore, cooling capacity for the reactors. This is a critical risk factor. TCA: What consequences could this lead to? Ambassador Mayko: According to some experts, a potential accident at Zaporizhzhia could be several times larger than Chornobyl. Some estimates suggest “up to 100 Chornobyls.” This would put all of Europe and a significant part of Asia at risk. TCA: Can we say that humanity has learned the lessons of Chornobyl? Ambassador Mayko: Partially but not fully. We see that even today issues of nuclear safety can be neglected. The main lesson is that political interests must never be placed above human safety. The second is transparency: information must be shared immediately, without concealment. And the third is memory. While witnesses are still alive, their stories must be heard and preserved. Only then can we hope to prevent such tragedies in the future.