Saving The Caspian Seal: An Interview with Assel Baimukanova

The Caspian seal is the only marine mammal native to the Caspian Sea and the world’s only seal species found exclusively in an inland body of water. Once numbering close to one million, its population has declined dramatically over the past century due to commercial hunting, habitat degradation, pollution, accidental entanglement in fishing gear, and climate change. Today, the species is listed as Endangered on the IUCN Red List.

Kazakh zoologist Assel Baimukanova has spent the past 13 years studying the Caspian seal alongside her father, renowned scientist Mirgaliy Baimukanov. Their work takes them to remote islands in the northern Caspian, where they spend weeks living in tents, monitoring the animals and collecting data essential to understanding the rapidly changing sea.

The Times of Central Asia spoke with Baimukanova about how the Caspian seal coexists with offshore oil production, why scientists perform necropsies on dead animals, and what the future holds for the sea’s only endemic marine mammal.

TCA: Assel, you have been studying the Caspian seal for 13 years. Since it is an endemic species found nowhere else in the world, are there many international researchers working on it, or is it studied mainly by Kazakh scientists?

Baimukanova: The Caspian seal is indeed an endemic species, meaning it is found only in the Caspian Sea. But it is not studied only by our Institute of Hydrobiology and Ecology. Several research organizations, both in Kazakhstan and abroad, are involved in studying the species. Russian and Iranian scientists also work on the Caspian seal. In addition, we cooperate with researchers who study other seal species in Estonia, Finland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Each of these countries has experience studying different pinniped species, so we regularly exchange expertise and research findings. Our cooperation with international colleagues was particularly active between 2005 and 2017, when we carried out a number of joint research projects.

TCA: In your documentary film, you say that although the Caspian Sea is shared by several countries, Kazakhstan bears the greatest responsibility for protecting the Caspian sealbecause the species’ most important habitats are located in Kazakh waters.

Baimukanova: Yes, that is true. In spring and autumn, up to 90% of the Caspian seal population may gather in Kazakhstan’s sector of the Caspian Sea. In winter, the animals breed on the ice in the northern Caspian. Depending on ice conditions, breeding colonies may be located in either the Kazakh or Russian sectors. During spring and autumn, however, most seals are found in the shallow and hard-to-reach northeastern part of Kazakhstan’s sector of the sea. That is why the condition of our part of the Caspian is critical to the conservation of the species.

TCA: But the ice cover is shrinking every year because of climate change. Should we already be worried, or is there no immediate cause for concern?

Baimukanova: There is every reason to be concerned. Warm winters are becoming more common, while cold and severe winters are becoming increasingly rare. Ice still forms, but it covers a smaller area each year and is becoming thinner. Overall, warming is a serious concern because Caspian seals breed primarily on the ice. Mating takes place during the winter.

TCA: Two years ago, Kazakhstan established the Caspian State Nature Reserve to protect the seal. Can we already say that it is producing results?

Baimukanova: It is still too early to draw conclusions. The reserve was established only in 2024, and such a short period is not enough to assess its effectiveness objectively. It is only beginning its work.

We very much hope that, in the future, it will include a rehabilitation center where sick and injured animals can be treated and where research that cannot be carried out in the wild will be possible.

For our part, together with the Fisheries Committee, we are doing our best to support the new reserve so that it can become an effective conservation institution. The government has begun supporting efforts to protect the Caspian seal, but another problem is emerging: the Caspian Sea itself is changing very rapidly.

TCA: So the current conservation efforts are still not enough?

Baimukanova: Not yet. We recently published a study on the regression of the Caspian Sea, which shows that the sea is gradually retreating and that seal haul-out sites are shifting every year along with the changing coastline. Suitable islands are also becoming fewer in number.

The northeastern Caspian is becoming shallower, which means fixed protected areas are no longer sufficient. We believe that, in the future, conservation efforts should move toward a system of dynamic protected areas: where the seals are, protection should follow.

TCA: What happens if the seals move into industrial areas?

Baimukanova: Unfortunately, we believe their haul-out sites will gradually shift into industrial areas, where oil production, fishing, and shipping are concentrated. This creates additional risks for the animals.

Seals are rather shy. If they are disturbed repeatedly, they simply abandon their traditional resting sites. No wild animal can adapt quickly to changes like these. Neither can people, if you think about it.

TCA: But it is impossible simply to ban oil production. What solution do you see?

Baimukanova: We fully understand that Kazakhstan is an oil-producing country, so banning oil production is not an option.

In my view, the solution lies elsewhere: we need to learn how to work together. It is important that the interests of industry and nature conservation are taken into account at the same time. I believe this is entirely possible. The key is to learn to listen to one another.

TCA: It is often said that there are about 300,000 Caspian seals left. How accurate is that figure?

Baimukanova: It is only an estimate. At present, no one can say with certainty how many Caspian seals remain because much depends on the methodology used.

We believe the figure of 300,000 is more of a rapid assessment than a precise population estimate. In fact, we think the actual number is probably lower.

The last aerial survey was carried out almost five years ago, and since then we have observed a declining population trend. To produce a more accurate estimate, we need at least three more years of research on the winter ice. That will allow us to build a mathematical model of the population’s dynamics.

TCA: How do you count the seals?

Baimukanova: We conduct field expeditions twice a year, in spring and autumn, to survey haul-out sites along a specially planned route.

Before each expedition, we analyze sea levels, wind patterns, and satellite imagery. We then compare those data with the location of islands and search the area using drones. When we find a haul-out site, we photograph the seals and later count them from the images in the laboratory, assigning each animal its own identification number.

We also analyze the population’s size structure by measuring the animals from the photographs to determine the age and size groups present at the haul-out sites.

TCA: Is the main purpose of this work to estimate and analyze the population?

Baimukanova: Yes, but not only that. We have several research areas.

For example, we study the Caspian seal’s diet. During expeditions, we collect fecal samples to determine what the animals eat.

Another area of research focuses on seal mortality. We record every dead seal we encounter, collect samples for further analysis, and preserve teeth and claws, which allow us to determine the animal’s age at the time of death.

TCA: Is studying dead seals just as important?

Baimukanova: Of course. We need to understand why they died and which environmental factors are having the greatest impact on them.

Unfortunately, many carcasses are already badly decomposed by the time we find them, but we try to perform necropsies whenever possible. The samples are then sent for histological, histopathological, and parasitological analyses to help determine the likely cause of death.

TCA: Your Instagram video diaries are fascinating. Are they simply a personal passion, or are they also part of your scientific research?

Baimukanova: Video observation is part of the research. I go out to the islands, try to approach the animals as quietly as possible, and record them on video. Later, back in the office, I analyze the footage to see how the seals interact with one another, how they respond to birds, people, weather conditions, and other external factors. I am interested in their behavior in different situations and in how they adapt to changes in their environment.

This is an important part of our work. We also collect hydrological and hydrobiological samples around the haul-out sites and assess biodiversity and the condition of the surrounding environment. In essence, we study not only the seals themselves, but the entire ecosystem they are part of.

TCA: Do you spend most of your time on these expeditions?

Baimukanova: In fact, fieldwork is only a small part of what we do. We usually spend about 30 to 40 days in the field each spring and autumn, living in tents on the islands, surveying the seals’ habitat, observing their annual molt in spring, and watching them gather on island haul-out sites in autumn as they prepare for winter and wait for the ice to form.

Altogether, we spend about three months a year on expeditions. The rest of the time is devoted to analyzing the material we have collected.

TCA: Looking at the beautiful photographs and videos of the seals, it seems like a dream job. But I imagine the reality is not nearly as romantic as it appears.

Baimukanova: There is certainly some romance to it. For me, it is the opportunity to spend 30 or 40 days in a place with no people, no cars, and no city noise. We have become so used to living in a constant flow of information that the chance to experience complete silence has become something truly valuable.

Long trips by boat, living in tents, waiting for storms to pass, I can no longer imagine my life without these things.

But the work itself is psychologically demanding because we study a rare species and constantly deal with animal mortality. We perform necropsies and sometimes have to work in very difficult conditions. At such moments, you have to put your emotions aside and maintain a professional, objective approach.

By the end of a month-long expedition, you are exhausted not only physically, but emotionally as well.

TCA: Seals are often portrayed in popular culture as gentle and adorable animals, and the way they move on their flippers makes them look rather funny. What are they really like?

Baimukanova: They really are very cute and incredibly interesting animals. Each one has its own personality, its own behavior, and its own way of living. But, like any wild animal, a seal can become aggressive, especially if it feels threatened or is protecting its space. So, it is important not to think of them only as harmless and amusing creatures.

I often say that Caspian seals have their own special vibe. First, they are the smallest of all true seals, and second, they remind me very much of dogs.

TCA: Dogs?

Baimukanova: Yes. In Kazakh, they are called it-balyq, which literally means “dog-fish.” You can build a connection with them. But it is important to remember that they are still wild animals. If you try to get too close, catch, or pet a seal, it will naturally defend itself and may bite.

At the same time, if you respect its boundaries, it will not show any aggression. We have had seals swim right up to us or even lie down nearby, but they have never attacked people without reason.

TCA: Are seals social animals?

Baimukanova: As a zoologist and an ethologist, I have to be careful when describing animal behavior. Scientists must rely on observations rather than emotions.

That said, after observing them for 13 years, I can say they are quite social animals. They interact with one another: they sniff each other, touch noses, rest their heads on one another, and sleep together. We have even seen healthy animals stay close to sick ones despite significant disturbance from people.

So we can say that they have social bonds, although we should avoid attributing human emotions to them.

TCA: You mentioned that you are an ethologist. What does that mean?

Baimukanova: Ethology is the study of animal behavior. My job is not simply to observe animals, but to record every type of behavior I see.

To do this, we compile what is known as an ethogram, a description of all observed behaviors. Only then can we draw scientific conclusions based on evidence rather than assumptions.

TCA: Does the behavior and lifestyle of Caspian seals change significantly from year to year? Is it really necessary to observe them every season?

Baimukanova: Environmental conditions are changing so quickly that we have to stay alert. Every field season is different from the previous one. That is why this work never becomes routine.

It is impossible to understand a species in a single season. Seals migrate and move constantly. Unlike people, they cannot arrange a meeting or tell you what has changed over the past year. A researcher is always an observer, trying to collect as much information as possible during the most important periods of the animals’ lives.

All our conservation recommendations are based on long-term research. For example, our data show that the maximum lifespan of Caspian seals has declined. In the past, we found animals that lived to around 50 years of age. Today, the oldest seal we have recorded lived to 32.

TCA: So their lifespan has decreased by almost 20 years?

Baimukanova: Unfortunately, yes. We have also documented changes in the distribution of the animals. In the past, tens of thousands of seals gathered on Durneva Island, but as the sea has become shallower, those haul-out sites have disappeared, and the animals have dispersed among other islands in the northeastern Caspian.

Only long-term observations like these allow us to recognize when it is truly time to sound the alarm.

TCA: After 13 years of studying the Caspian seal, can you say that you understand this animal?

Baimukanova: No, it still holds many mysteries for me.

It is much like human relationships. Even if you spend many years with another person, you can never say you know everything about them. The same is true of wild animals. There are always new aspects of their behavior waiting to be understood.

That is why it is impossible to observe seals a few times and conclude that you know everything about the species.

TCA: What if the Caspian seal were to disappear one day?

Baimukanova: I do not even want to imagine such a scenario. In any case, we are doing everything we can to make sure it never happens.

No matter how difficult the environmental situation becomes, I never lose hope or allow myself to think that this species could disappear. But if it did, it would be an enormous loss;not only for us and for the Caspian Sea, but for global biodiversity.

TCA: What impact would that have on the ecosystem?

Baimukanova: Even hypothetically, that is a very difficult question to answer.

We know of cases where the disappearance of a single species has led to major changes throughout an ecosystem. One of the best-documented examples is Yellowstone National Park in the United States, where the elimination of wolves caused the elk population to increase dramatically, leading to the degradation of riverside vegetation. Wolves were reintroducedin 1995, and the ecosystem gradually began to recover.

The Caspian seal is at the top of the food chain and is also an indicator of the health of the sea. By studying its health, mortality, diseases, and even its diet, we can assess the condition of the entire Caspian ecosystem. It may also play a role in removing weakened and diseased fish from the population.

The disappearance of such a species would inevitably have consequences, although it is difficult to fully assess their scale today.

TCA: So if the seal population begins to recover, would that mean the ecosystem is recovering as well?

Baimukanova: Yes. It would indicate that conditions are becoming more favorable for the animals. Population growth usually means that the habitat is becoming healthier and more stable. That is why the status of the Caspian seal population is one of the key indicators of what is happening in the Caspian Sea.

TCA: Is the opposite scenario possible? Could the sea recover and the seal population begin to grow again, or have we already passed the point of no return?

Baimukanova: I believe there should always be hope.

Natural systems are capable of recovering, although it is a very long process. Much will depend on climate change, the condition of the Caspian Sea, and the measures taken to conserve the species.

It is too early to give a definite answer, but it is certainly something we should strive for.

TCA: Three years ago, the documentary Haulout, made by Yakut filmmakers, was nominated for an Academy Award. Do you think Kazakhstan has the potential to produce a film of similar impact about the Caspian seal?

Baimukanova: I think it does.

Right now, documentary filmmaker Katerina Suvorova is making a film about the Caspian seal and our work, and I believe that is very important.

We want to show not only the animals themselves, but also how the research is carried out, the challenges scientists face, and why this work matters.

In many ways, we are documenting the history of the Caspian Sea itself. We are preserving a record of what it looks like today because we do not know what it will look like in the future.

We are working not only to conserve the Caspian seal, but also the Caspian ecosystem as a whole. Most importantly, Kazakhstan’s scientists must continue to have the opportunity to carry out this work.

How a New Generation of Startups From Kazakhstan Attracted International Investors

A software engineering team writes code in Almaty for a parent company incorporated in Delaware. Most of its revenue comes from customers in the United States and Singapore, with the United Kingdom another important market. Until recently, this business model was unusual in Kazakhstan. It is now becoming more common as entrepreneurs launch international companies from the outset rather than focus solely on the domestic market. Rather than adapt foreign products for Kazakhstan’s population of about 20 million, these founders are developing technology for customers abroad. Their success is drawing interest from international venture capital firms and raising Kazakhstan’s profile as a source of high-growth technology companies. Growth Measured in Numbers The latest Startups and Venture Capital in Central Asia 2026 report by RISE Research shows how quickly Kazakhstan’s venture sector is growing. Venture investment reached $209 million in 2025, nearly three times the $71 million raised a year earlier. The figure also exceeded the combined total elsewhere in Central Asia. The aggregate valuation of funded startups in Kazakhstan rose to $2.16 billion. RISE Research also found that U.S.-oriented startups with roots in Kazakhstan raised more than $214 million in 2025. This helps explain the rise in international interest. Venture funds are backing companies built for global markets rather than businesses dependent on a relatively small domestic customer base. Among the best-known examples is Higgsfield AI, which develops software for creating and editing AI-generated video. The company raised $50 million in Series A financing in September 2025. An $80 million extension in January 2026 brought the round to more than $130 million and valued the company at over $1.3 billion, confirming its status as Kazakhstan’s first unicorn. Cerebra AI develops software that analyzes CT scans to help clinicians detect ischemic and hemorrhagic strokes. The platform uses the ASPECTS scale and can return an analysis within minutes. Codiplay supplies educational software and Internet of Things kits used to teach programming and hands-on electronics in 13 countries, including South Korea and the UK. The company raised $9 million in Series A financing in January 2025. Parqour develops parking management software with automated license plate recognition. Its systems operate in 22 countries and cover more than 300 parking areas. These companies work in different fields, but their businesses are built mainly around software and intellectual property, even where hardware is part of the product. That makes expansion abroad less capital-intensive and helps explain their appeal to foreign investors. Why Investors Are Paying Attention Now Kazakhstan’s emergence as Central Asia’s leading venture capital market did not happen overnight. The record investment figures of 2025 followed several years of work in the startup sector, including Astana Hub’s accelerator programs and tax incentives. More founders also began developing products for international markets. One clear sign was international recognition. Three startups with founders from Kazakhstan were accepted into Y Combinator in 2025, matching the total accepted in all previous years combined, according to RISE Research. For international investors, acceptance into the Silicon Valley accelerator provides external validation as well as access to funding. Another important shift occurred within Kazakhstan. Excluding Higgsfield AI, private investors accounted for 44.7% of venture investment in 2025, according to the RISE report. Local business angels were the largest investor category by capital. This marks an important stage in the development of a venture market. Local investors often provide the first outside capital that allows a startup to move beyond the idea stage. Larger venture funds usually enter after a company has shown demand for its product and the capacity to expand abroad. A deeper domestic investor base can therefore increase the number of companies ready to attract global capital. Kazakhstan has also begun developing institutional sources of venture financing. One of the largest initiatives is Alem Ventures Fund, a fund of funds with a target size of $1 billion. The fund invests mainly in venture funds rather than startups directly, although it can also make co-investments. In September 2025, Qazaqstan Investment Corporation said it expected to invest $30 million in the fund. In November, Qazaqstan Venture Group, then the fund’s management company, announced that the first close had secured $115 million. The initiative is intended to address one of Kazakhstan’s biggest structural weaknesses: limited access to growth-stage capital. Early-stage funding has become more available, but companies seeking larger rounds to expand internationally still often depend on foreign investors. Kazakhstan also benefits from Astana Hub and the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC). Astana Hub offers accelerator programs and tax incentives, while the AIFC has a legal framework based on the laws and principles of England and Wales. These institutions give founders practical support and a legal structure designed for international business. International recognition and a growing domestic investor base help explain why Kazakhstan has moved ahead of the rest of Central Asia. Founders now have a clearer route from early local funding to global accelerators and international investors. The market’s rise reflects several years of development, although Higgsfield AI had an exceptional effect on the 2025 figures. Why Silicon Valley Is Still a Long Way Off Record investment does not place Kazakhstan among the world’s leading technology hubs. The RISE report describes a market that is growing quickly but remains constrained by a shortage of investable startups and later-stage capital. Although $209 million was a record for Kazakhstan’s venture industry, the total remains modest by international standards. Excluding Higgsfield AI, the market was worth $79 million, showing how heavily the annual figure depended on one company. Growth-stage funding remains another challenge. The pool of investors able to write checks of $5 million to $10 million is still small, and some startups founded in Kazakhstan establish parent companies in the U.S. or UK before seeking larger rounds. Within the venture capital industry, this practice is commonly known as “flipping.” It does not necessarily mean that a company leaves Kazakhstan. Engineering and product teams may remain in Almaty or Astana while the legal holding company moves abroad. Familiar corporate jurisdictions can simplify governance and legal due diligence for international investors. The market also faces what venture investors call a “pipeline gap,” meaning there are too few mature startups ready to use available capital. RISE Research estimates that Central Asia has about 2,000 startups at the minimum viable product stage or beyond, but only 370 received funding over the past three years. About 18.5% of the startups reviewed received investment, equal to 4.6 funded startups per million residents. The figures suggest that investment capital is growing faster than the pool of companies ready for institutional funding. The report estimates that Central Asia will need between $500 million and $1.1 billion in annual investment to align with international benchmarks. Reaching that range will also require more startups capable of using institutional capital effectively. Despite those constraints, Kazakhstan has become Central Asia’s largest venture market and is drawing more attention from international funds. Whether that momentum lasts will depend on the next stage of development. A few international successes have shown what is possible, but continued investor interest will require a much larger pool of companies ready for later-stage funding. Founders will also need better options for raising capital without moving their corporate headquarters abroad. A more realistic goal than becoming the next Silicon Valley is to establish Kazakhstan as Central Asia’s main innovation hub. Its lead in regional venture investment makes that goal increasingly attainable.

Kazakhstan Wildfires: Heatwave Tests Reforms Three Years After Semey Ormany

Between July 5 and 11, Kazakhstan’s state forest fund recorded 43 wildfires as an intense heatwave pushed much of the country into conditions of high and extreme fire danger. The Ministry of Ecology said all of the fires were contained before they could develop into large-scale disasters.

For Kazakhstan, however, the significance of those figures extends beyond a single week. Three years after the deadly Semey Ormany wildfire exposed serious shortcomings in the country’s emergency response system, each fire season has become a test of whether the reforms introduced since 2023 are keeping pace with increasingly severe weather conditions.

How the Fires Were Fought

Of the 43 recorded wildfires, 34 occurred within the state forest fund, while nine affected forests managed by regional authorities.

Officials said the fires were detected and contained through a combination of aerial surveillance, early warning systems, and coordinated operations involving forestry services and emergency responders. Aircraft conducted reconnaissance flights, transported firefighting crews to remote locations, and carried out water drops where ground access was limited. Firefighters and forestry personnel established firebreaks, extinguished smoldering vegetation, and continued patrols after the flames had been brought under control to prevent reignition.

The most difficult situation developed in Akmola Region, where the number of forest fires since the beginning of the fire-hazard season has risen 68.4% compared with the same period last year. Regional authorities responded by strengthening forest patrols and increasing monitoring of high-risk areas, while urging residents to avoid lighting fires or burning dry vegetation during the continuing hot and dry weather.

Heat Keeps Raising the Stakes

Even as firefighters succeeded in containing the week’s blazes, weather conditions continued to increase the likelihood of new outbreaks.

According to Kazhydromet, prolonged heat and limited rainfall have left much of Kazakhstan under high or extreme wildfire danger. Forecasters expect only limited relief. A cold front may bring localized rain and thunderstorms to northern Kazakhstan, but meteorologists say the precipitation is unlikely to significantly reduce wildfire risks. Southern regions are forecast to remain under temperatures of 104-113°F (40-45°C), allowing vegetation to dry rapidly and creating conditions in which even relatively small fires can spread quickly.

The persistence of these weather patterns highlights a broader challenge. Kazakhstan’s emergency services are increasingly responding not to isolated wildfire events, but to prolonged periods during which multiple regions face elevated fire danger simultaneously.

What Has Changed in Three Years

Kazakhstan’s approach to wildfire management changed fundamentally after the June 2023 Semey Ormany disaster, when a fast-moving forest fire in the Abai Region killed 14 forestry workers, destroyed more than 60,000 hectares of forest, and caused an estimated $354 million in damage. A subsequent investigation identified serious shortcomings in the country's preparedness and a lack of regard to the protection of frontline personnel, prompting one of the most significant reforms of the country’s forest protection system since independence.

In 2024, Kazakhstan established the Forest Fund Protection and Defense Service to train a generation of specialists and strengthen coordination during major wildfires.

The upgraded response system has already faced a major test. In July, emergency crews contained another wildfire in the Semey Ormany reserve before it escalated into a disaster comparable to that of 2023. The operation involved hundreds of firefighters, aircraft and heavy equipment, illustrating how these improvements have strengthened Kazakhstan’s ability to respond to large forest fires.

The reforms have also expanded beyond emergency response. Kazakhstan’s Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market has proposed mandatory residential insurance against natural disasters to speed up compensation for households affected by future disasters.

This summer’s fire season suggests that Kazakhstan’s capacity to respond to wildfires has improved considerably since the Semey Ormany disaster. At the same time, extreme heat, prolonged drought, and elevated fire danger are becoming increasingly frequent across Kazakhstan. Even well-equipped emergency services may face growing pressure if several large wildfires occur simultaneously.

The priority is to ensure that emergency response, forest management, and climate adaptation develop at the same pace as the risks themselves.

Kazakhstan’s experience reflects a wider trend across Central Asia, where hotter summers and more volatile weather are increasing pressure on forest ecosystems and emergency services alike. While this season has demonstrated measurable progress in wildfire response, it has also shown that adapting to a changing climate is becoming a long-term policy challenge rather than simply an emergency-management issue.

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers a heatwave sweeping across Central Asia, anti-Taliban forces briefly seizing a district headquarters in a worrying sign of cracks in the Taliban's control, a shootout between different branches of Kyrgyzstan's security forces near the Uzbek border, promising new talks between Turkmenistan and Georgia, and a major shake-up inside Uzbekistan's presidential security services. Before then turning to our main story this week, where a growing number of countries are working with Central Asian governments to forcibly return Central Asian nationals, often into incredibly dangerous situations. - Steve Swedlow (Associate Professor of the Practice of Human Rights) - Bakhtiyor "Bakh" Safarov (Central Asia Consulting)

Kazakhstan Wheat Ban Raises Risk of Renewed Trade Spat With Russia

A truck crossing into Kazakhstan through a northern border post can be declared as carrying 18 tonnes of wheat while hauling as much as 40 tonnes. Grain Union analyst Evgeny Karabanov described that gap as part of the country’s problem with undeclared Russian grain. Astana’s answer is a six-month ban on most wheat imports from July 27. The measure may curb grey-market loads and support domestic farmers, but it also risks reopening a trade dispute with Russia and deepening the gap between the Eurasian Economic Union’s promises and daily commerce. Agriculture Minister Aidarbek Saparov’s order covers wheat arriving by road, water, and rail from EAEU members and other countries. Poultry farms, grain processors, licensed elevators, and the state Food Contract Corporation may still import by rail. Wheat imported for poultry farms and grain processors cannot be resold inside Kazakhstan or abroad. Rail transit through Kazakhstan remains exempt. The government says the ban will support local producers and secure sales. Deputy Agriculture Minister Azat Sultanov said Kazakhstan has large carryover stocks that need storage. “The decision was taken to stimulate the domestic market,” he said in June. The order names every foreign supplier, but its commercial impact will fall mainly on Russia. In January, the Grain Union forecast about one million tonnes of wheat imports during the September 2025 to August 2026 marketing year. Karabanov said practically all of that grain would come from Russia. Cheap wheat crosses a long shared border into Kazakhstan’s main grain belt. That can lower costs for millers and poultry farms, but it also undercuts growers before they sell their harvest. The ban shifts that pressure rather than removing it. Baimurat Group CEO Daniyar Kuanshaliyev called the measure a “crude administrative intervention” that could raise raw-material prices. He argued that reduced competition for wheat could leave processors paying more while traders and exporters compete for the same domestic stocks. Karabanov takes a less alarmed view. “We generally oppose various bans and restrictions,” he said, but the rail exemptions should limit the number of businesses harmed. He said the clearest cost could be higher transport charges, since trucks are often cheaper than trains for journeys under 500 kilometres. Kazakhstan imposed a broad wheat ban in 2024 after Russian grain continued entering despite earlier controls. TCA’s reporting on the earlier grain dispute found that more than 1.1 million tonnes had arrived in six months before Astana tightened the rules. Russia then restricted Kazakh grain and other agricultural products, citing phytosanitary concerns. Exporters said the effects spread beyond the stated products. “Trucks loaded with those products are being turned away at the border,” Karabanov told Reuters in October 2024. The cycle continued in 2025. Russia reinstated restrictions on Kazakh wheat, flaxseed, and lentils from April, while allowing sealed rail transit. The Grain Union said Moscow had lifted one set of restrictions the previous day, then introduced a new ban with altered terms. That history does not prove Moscow will retaliate this time. Kazakhstan’s order is country-neutral and preserves supplies to approved processors. Yet previous countermeasures often arrived through plant-health rules, certificate disputes, and border controls rather than openly declared retaliation. The wider problem lies inside the EAEU. In theory, the bloc exists to provide for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. The treaty entered into force in 2015, building on a customs union that had removed routine checks at internal borders. Kazakhstan holds the EAEU chairmanship in 2026, and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev began the year by calling for the removal of internal trade barriers and more predictable transport links. Contradictions surfaced in March as Kazakhstan’s chairmanship promoted a barrier-free market, while members added national controls. The wheat order typifies these contradictions. Kazakhstan is protecting farmers from cheaper imports while allowing selected industries to keep buying foreign grain. Russia has used similar exceptions and temporary bans, while Kyrgyzstan and Belarus have also challenged restrictions imposed by partners. The Eurasian Economic Commission can identify barriers and convene negotiations, but it has struggled to stop national protection measures being implemented when prices or food security become politically sensitive. Trade disputes now affect goods ranging from food to road cargo, despite the common-market rules. Duty-free trade, shared customs rules, and labor mobility mean the EAEU still has value. Kazakhstan depends on Russia as a market and transit route, while Russian businesses sell heavily into Kazakhstan. A ten-year review found rising trade despite repeated disputes. The wheat ban, however, shows how the union now functions through exceptions. For northern Kazakhstan’s farmers, fewer cheap truckloads will support crop prices, while millers pay more for rail deliveries. Rail transit will remain exempt, but the argument over what an EAEU common market should provide is growing harder to contain.

The Central Asia Debt Divide: Why the Region’s Borrowing Risks Are Not the Same

Central Asia’s biggest debtor is not necessarily its most vulnerable. Kazakhstan accounts for roughly two-thirds of the region’s external liabilities, but much of that debt sits on corporate balance sheets rather than the government’s. Tajikistan owes a fraction of the amount, yet remains at high risk of debt distress.

The total is an approximate calculation compiled from national statistics rather than a regional aggregate published by a single institution. The countries also release their debt data for different reporting dates and use different classifications, requiring caution when making direct comparisons.

Total external debt includes obligations owed to non-residents by governments, central banks, commercial banks, private companies, and, in some countries, local subsidiaries of foreign corporations. Government external debt is a narrower measure covering liabilities that are directly serviced or guaranteed by the state.

China remains an important bilateral creditor, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while multilateral institutions provide much of the region’s infrastructure and public-sector financing.

Kyrgyzstan: Rising Debt, but a Broader Creditor Base

Kyrgyzstan’s public debt has risen alongside increased infrastructure spending and domestic borrowing, although its creditor base has become more diversified. A smaller share is now owed to a single bilateral lender, while multilateral financing and the domestic securities market have grown in importance.

According to the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance’s public debt data, the country’s total public debt stood at approximately $8.94 billion as of May 31, 2026, including around $6.1 billion in external obligations.

The debt debate has also become part of President Sadyr Japarov’s broader economic narrative. In an interview with the Kabar national news agency published on October 8, 2025, Japarov said his government was continuing to borrow but argued that new loans were being directed toward commercial projects expected to repay their own financing rather than place an additional burden on the state budget. He also said Kyrgyzstan intended to repay its older debts by 2035.

The International Monetary Fund said in its 2026 Article IV consultation that Kyrgyzstan had recorded strong economic growth for a fourth consecutive year, giving the authorities an opportunity to strengthen fiscal buffers and accelerate structural reforms. It also warned that the outlook remained exposed to significant downside risks.

Kazakhstan: A Large External Debt, but a Different Risk Profile

Kazakhstan accounts for the largest share of Central Asia’s external debt, but its headline figure can be misleading. Unlike several of its neighbors, the country’s external liabilities are dominated by corporate and intercompany borrowing rather than direct obligations of the government.

According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the country’s gross external debt stood at $182.8 billion as of April 1, 2026, an increase of $900 million during the first quarter.

The National Bank defines external debt as all outstanding liabilities of Kazakhstan’s residents to non-residents. This includes the government, the central bank, commercial banks, private companies, and intercompany loans between foreign parent companies and their subsidiaries operating in Kazakhstan.

A substantial share of these liabilities is connected to foreign investment in the oil, gas, and mining industries, where multinational companies frequently finance their Kazakh operations through loans from parent corporations. Such obligations are recorded as external debt under international statistical standards but are normally serviced from corporate revenue rather than directly from the national budget.

To provide a clearer picture of public exposure, the National Bank publishes a separate indicator covering public-sector external debt in an expanded definition. This includes the general government, the National Bank, state-controlled financial and non-financial corporations, and external obligations guaranteed by the government.

As a result, Kazakhstan's headline external debt overstates the government's direct exposure, since much of the liability sits on corporate rather than public balance sheets.

This structure creates a different set of vulnerabilities. Lower commodity prices, tighter international financing conditions, or reduced access to foreign capital could affect the ability of major companies to refinance their liabilities, with potential consequences for investment, exports, and financial stability.

Uzbekistan: Corporate Borrowing Drives Debt Growth

Uzbekistan has become the region’s second-largest external borrower as economic expansion and infrastructure investment have increased demand for foreign financing.

According to the Central Bank of Uzbekistan, the country’s total external debt reached $82.2 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2026. Public external debt amounted to $40.5 billion, while corporate external debt stood at $41.7 billion.

The figures illustrate a gradual change in Uzbekistan’s financing model. The government continues to attract international funding for infrastructure and social development, while banks, state-owned enterprises, and private companies are assuming a larger share of borrowing to finance expansion.

The growing corporate component does not necessarily represent a direct liability for the state. However, borrowing by state-controlled enterprises and banks may still create contingent risks if companies cannot service their obligations without government assistance.

The IMF said in its 2026 Article IV consultation that Uzbekistan’s economy continued to perform strongly and assessed its risk of external debt distress as low, while urging tighter oversight of state-owned enterprises, public-private partnerships, and other contingent liabilities.

Tajikistan: Lower Debt, Higher Vulnerability

Tajikistan has one of the smallest external debt stocks in Central Asia, but its limited export base and restricted access to private capital make it more vulnerable to repayment pressures.

According to the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics, Tajikistan’s total external debt stood at approximately $4.1 billion at the end of 2024, the latest internationally comparable figure available.

Most of Tajikistan’s external financing comes from official creditors. Multilateral institutions finance much of the country’s public investment, while bilateral lenders, including China, have backed major infrastructure projects.

The IMF concluded in its latest Debt Sustainability Analysis that Tajikistan’s public debt remained sustainable, but the country continued to face a high risk of external debt distress. The assessment reflected projections that repayments on government and government-guaranteed external debt would consume an excessive share of export earnings, particularly between 2025 and 2027.

Debt Quality Matters More Than Debt Size

The Central Asia debt divide shows why headline borrowing figures can be misleading. Kazakhstan’s liabilities are largely corporate, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain more dependent on sovereign and concessional financing. Uzbekistan lies between the two.

Tokayev Offers Astana to Host New Global AI Body’s First Meeting

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev put Astana forward at the opening of the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai on July 17, saying that Kazakhstan is ready to host the first meeting of a new global AI organization. He also proposed placing the organization’s Central Asian office in Kazakhstan. Together, the offers set out Tokayev’s wider aim: Kazakhstan wants a role in writing AI rules as well as building the technology at home. Twenty-nine countries signed the agreement establishing the World AI Cooperation Organization on July 16. The founding states included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while Turkmenistan did not sign. China first proposed the Shanghai-based intergovernmental body at last year’s conference. Tokayev called the creation of the organization a historic decision and said it could underpin a universal framework for AI governance. “No country should remain merely a consumer of AI,” he said. “Every state must have the opportunity to develop its own human capital, digital infrastructure, and institutional capacity. Here too, the issue is fairness and integrity.” Tokayev also endorsed the conference’s guiding principle, “AI for good, AI for all,” arguing that technological progress should benefit people broadly rather than deepen inequalities within and between countries. His offer to host the new organization’s first meeting in Astana and to establish its Central Asian office in Kazakhstan were aimed at giving the country a role in shaping that agenda. [caption id="attachment_52389" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Image: Akorda[/caption] Astana Bids for a Role in the New AI Body Tokayev’s proposals went beyond hosting a ceremonial gathering. He called for a permanent expert platform on AI regulation, standards and ethics. He also proposed an international network of schools, centers of excellence and academic partnerships. The Kazakh president urged members to develop common standards for testing and certifying AI systems. He said safeguards should address malicious uses, including cyberthreats, deepfakes and digital fraud. AI should remain under human control, he said. Tokayev placed those proposals within his wider diplomatic agenda. He argued that AI could help spot crises earlier and improve humanitarian work and peacekeeping. He said governments spend too much effort dealing with conflicts after they begin and too little preventing them. The new organization adds another layer to Kazakhstan’s technology policy. Citing a person familiar with the U.S. position, Reuters reported that Kazakhstan is the only country listed in both the 29-member body and Washington’s AI Opportunity Statement. Kazakhstan had already joined the U.S.-backed Pax Silica framework on June 25, which covers chips, critical minerals, energy and secure AI supply chains. That overlap carries Kazakhstan’s long-standing multi-vector diplomacy into AI policy. Astana is deepening ties with China while expanding ties to U.S.-linked technology and supply chains. Tokayev’s speech showed that Kazakhstan also wants a voice in the institutions shaping global AI rules. A Digital Bridge With China In Shanghai, Tokayev also proposed a “Kazakhstan-China Digital Bridge.” He said the project should promote digital trade and provide a working model for connecting digital economies through the Belt and Road Initiative. He asked China to support naming 2027 a Year of Joint AI Initiatives in both countries, and called for faster use of AI in manufacturing, mining, energy, agriculture, healthcare and water management. The proposal followed a large commercial package signed during Tokayev’s Shanghai visit. Kazakhstan and China announced more than 70 documents worth over $15 billion on July 16. The package includes agreements and memoranda, meaning the headline figure does not represent funds already invested. Technology featured prominently. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development signed a strategic partnership with Huawei, while Kazakhtelecom and China’s Hengtong Group agreed on basic principles for developing the Data Center Valley in Ekibastuz. Other documents covered robotics and research, with one agreement addressing the use of AI in vehicle production. Tokayev presented the Ekibastuz project to Chinese executives on July 16, calling it a “key pillar of the digital infrastructure of Kazakhstan and all of Central Asia.” [caption id="attachment_52390" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Image: Akorda[/caption] From Coal Power to Computing In Ekibastuz, Kazakhstan’s AI ambitions are beginning to take physical form. The northern industrial city grew around coal mines and giant power stations, but its industrial base has not been enough to keep people there. Ekibastuz lost more than 1,000 residents in 2025, reflecting the wider population decline across northern and eastern Kazakhstan as younger workers leave in search of better jobs and services. But new investment may offer the city a different future. Crews have started excavating pits for modular data-center blocks. The first 125-megawatt facility is planned for the first half of 2027, followed by another of the same size in 2028. Later phases could take the site to one gigawatt by 2033. The government says the wider project has attracted more than $10 billion in foreign investment, but it has not explained how that figure relates to the $10 billion package of AI agreements announced in June. The June package involved U.S. companies Firebird and NVIDIA, with NVIDIA presenting technology for the Ekibastuz development. The plan reaches beyond server halls. It is intended to include AI laboratories, research facilities, training programs and startups. The first facilities are expected to create more than 1,500 temporary construction jobs and over 250 permanent positions. The project also shows the scale of Tokayev’s ambition. Data centers need reliable electricity, cooling, fiber links and expensive chips. Kazakhstan has abundant energy resources, but it still imported nearly 1.5 billion kilowatt-hours from Russia to cover a power shortfall in 2025. At full load around the clock, the first two facilities, with a combined capacity of 250 megawatts, could consume about 2.19 billion kilowatt-hours a year. Building the Domestic Base Tokayev has spent the past year pushing AI toward the center of state policy, setting a goal of turning Kazakhstan into a “fully digital nation within three years.” The country created a dedicated AI ministry and declared 2026 the Year of Digitalization and Artificial Intelligence. In June, Tokayev approved the Digital Qazaqstan strategy through 2029. Kazakhstan has also adopted an AI law and a Digital Code. The new Constitution guarantees the protection of personal data, a point Tokayev repeated in Shanghai. The domestic program also extends beyond Astana. A UN ESCAP digital solutions center planned for Almaty is expected to employ up to 130 staff, with Kazakhstan covering up to $15 million in operating costs over five years. Tokayev also promoted Alatau as a fully integrated digital city designed to attract technology companies and investors. Tokayev’s Shanghai address connected those domestic projects to a larger international role. Astana wants the new AI organization’s first meeting and its Central Asian office. Tokayev also wants a bilateral digital bridge with China and continued cooperation with the U.S. and access to U.S.-linked technology. The offer gives Kazakhstan an opportunity to shape the global AI agenda, but its influence will depend on whether projects such as Ekibastuz move from excavation to operation, and whether the country can turn AI investment into lasting technical capacity and practical gains at home.

Opinion: Could Vanadium Be Kazakhstan’s Next Breakout Critical Metals Story?

Vanadium is viewed as a critical mineral by the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and many other countries because of its importance to energy storage and industrial alloys. At the Astana Metals & Metallurgy (AMM) Congress, Ferro-Alloy Resources CEO Nicholas Bridgen discussed the company’s assets, strategy, and valuation with The Times of Central Asia, noting that the company appears undervalued amid supply chain disruptions and the rising strategic importance of vanadium. The discussion highlighted vanadium’s emerging demand-supply imbalance and efforts to better align market perception with fundamentals. Of the critical metals that will define the next half-century, vanadium has perhaps the strongest claim to indispensability: it hardens the steel in our infrastructure and defense systems, and it stores the energy that our grids will increasingly depend on. Yet the market has consistently failed to price that future in, and nowhere is that mispricing more visible than in the vanadium deposits of Kazakhstan. In 1941, with the Second World War raging, Soviet geologists fanned out across Central Asia looking for strategic minerals. Around 180 kilometers east of Almaty, in the foothills of the Tian Shan mountain range along the borders with China and Kyrgyzstan, they found tungsten at the Boguty deposit. At roughly the same time, they were delineating what would become the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits. The geology was well understood, and the resource was real, but nothing happened for the better part of 75 years. The deposits sat idle not because tungsten was unimportant, but because there was no pressing reason for, first, the Soviet Union or later the West to develop them. That changed when the scale of China's dominance in critical metals became impossible to ignore. By the early 2020s, China was producing over 75% of the world’s tungsten output, alongside similarly dominant shares of rare earth elements and a range of other strategic minerals. This concentration of supply was not accidental. It was the product of decades of deliberate industrial policy, patient capital, and a willingness to operate at low margins long enough to drive out competitors. The Tungsten Lesson Chinese mining company Jiaxin International Resources Investment Ltd. moved in 2014 to acquire Boguty for an undisclosed sum, almost certainly a modest one. The deal further consolidated China’s grip on global tungsten supply. Jiaxin then spent approximately $300 million developing the deposit and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at a valuation in excess of $600 million. The investment thesis seemed straightforward enough at the time. In 2025, it looked positively prescient: China imposed export controls on tungsten, and key prices outside China more than doubled. According to the Financial Times, Jiaxin’s market capitalization stands at close to HKD 22.3 billion, equal to $2.84 billion, approximately 9.5 times the stated development expenditure. [caption id="attachment_52262" align="aligncenter" width="1432"] Image: Kaz Resources[/caption] Meanwhile, Skyline Builders Group Holding Ltd. and Cove Kaz Capital Group LLC (“Cove Kaz”) have moved to acquire the two other formerly dormant tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan, Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty. On this occasion, the U.S. was not content to watch from the sidelines. Washington supported the projects through letters of interest totaling up to $1.6 billion. The Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) issued a letter of interest for up to $900 million under its Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation issued a separate letter of interest for up to $700 million in debt and project-development financing. Cove is a private company, so there is no market capitalization to examine, but the directional logic is not hard to follow. The pattern is instructive in its simplicity. Consider a critical mineral deposit, known for decades, that sits undeveloped and undervalued despite being well-understood and strategic. Over a brief period of time, geopolitics shifts the price calculus. The early mover captures extraordinary value. The late mover pays a strategic premium to catch up. The question worth asking now is: where is the next version of this story to play out? The Case for Vanadium The answer may already be visible if the tungsten lesson is applied with any consistency. China currently accounts for over 72.4% of global vanadium production, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, while Russia supplies around 18.5%. Producers outside this duopoly are under pressure: South African output fell sharply in 2025, while Brazil’s Largo cut output amid financial strain. The supply picture for the West has been deteriorating for a variety of reasons at exactly the moment that demand is beginning a structural upswing. Vanadium has two distinct demand drivers. The first, and older, is its use as an alloying agent in high-strength steel, which is essential to infrastructure, including pipelines, and to defense applications. The second is its role in vanadium redox flow batteries (VRFBs), increasingly viewed as the optimal technology for large-scale, long-duration electricity storage on power grids. As renewable generation capacity grows and grid operators require multi-hour storage to manage intermittency, VRFB deployment is moving from pilot scale to industrial rollout. While projections vary across research firms, the consensus base case points to growth of four to six times in the VRFB market over the next decade, with Asia-Pacific leading installed capacity and North America recording the fastest growth. This is expected to contribute to a significant structural vanadium supply deficit. One major forecaster estimates that the vanadium market will grow at a compound annual growth rate of around 7% over the next 15 years. Vanadium features on the critical minerals list of every country that maintains one because of both its supply concentration and its battery metal status. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, a congressional letter to the Pentagon made the supply problem concrete: the U.S. consumed 14,000 metric tons of vanadium in 2024 while producing only 3,800 tons domestically, with imports from South Africa and other producers at growing risk. The current situation with vanadium is almost identical to what happened with tungsten before China imposed export controls in 2025. In other words, the warning signs are familiar. Like tungsten before it, vanadium is embedded in China-dominated mining, processing, and supply chains under geopolitical and national security strain. If history repeats, export restrictions and severe market disruption may follow. Kazakhstan’s Balasausqandiq: The Numbers Ferro-Alloy Resources Limited (FAR), a company based in the United Kingdom and listed on the London and Astana stock exchanges, holds the exploration and development rights to the Balasausqandiq vanadium deposit in Kazakhstan. The company has been developing the project for more than two decades. Kazakhstan leads Central Asia in vanadium assets, and Balasausqandiq is the most advanced of its three known deposits. Balasausqandiq’s most recent resource estimate stands at 32.9 million tons at a mean grade of 0.62% vanadium pentoxide (V₂O₅). However, this is from just one of seven known ore bodies covered by the company’s mining rights. According to FAR, the full deposit could meet the projected global shortfall on its own. What distinguishes the project is not scale alone, but geology and cost structure. Most vanadium deposits are hosted in vanadiferous titano-magnetite ore, which requires energy-intensive roasting to process. Balasausqandiq is a shale deposit amenable to whole-ore acid leaching, a substantially cheaper and more environmentally benign processing route. FAR CEO Bridgen has described this as giving the project the lowest production costs of any current or planned vanadium operation in the world, a structural advantage that persists regardless of where the vanadium price settles. FAR’s October 2025 feasibility study sets out the financial case in detail. Phase 1, drawing on just one of seven identified ore bodies, targets annual production of 8,500 tons of vanadium pentoxide with a net present value (NPV) of around $0.75 billion and an internal rate of return (IRR) of 22% at conservative price assumptions that stand well below average levels this century in markets outside China. The IRR is notable: 22% represents a return profile that comfortably clears the hurdle rates of major mining houses and infrastructure funds, and it is calculated before any premium for the project's strategic value to Western governments is factored in. Using a provisional capital cost estimate from a Chinese construction company, those figures rise to an NPV of nearly $1 billion and an IRR of 31%. FAR’s strategy, according to Bridgen, is to scale output to 23,000 tons from four ore bodies, more than 10% of current global supply, drawn from a deposit that can be expanded in multiple open-pit stages, giving a mine life that would sustain operations well beyond any planning horizon currently relevant to investors. FAR's current market capitalization is approximately $37 million. Set against a Phase 1 NPV of close to $1 billion, the discount is not easily explained by project risk or development-stage uncertainty: the company has operated in Kazakhstan for over two decades, the feasibility study is complete, and it has an existing concentrate-processing operation. The gap between its market value, what buyers and sellers are willing to pay at present, and its intrinsic value, what an asset is worth based on its fundamentals and discounted cash flows, is, instead, almost entirely a function of a depressed vanadium price driven by the Chinese construction slowdown, the same cyclical dynamic that periodically made Kazakhstan's tungsten deposits look uninvestable to Western capital for decades at a stretch. FAR: Ready for the Major Leagues According to Bridgen, FAR is not a grassroots explorer. It is a company that has crossed the threshold that separates junior development-stage miners from operators capable of competing with the sector's larger players. Two decades of in-country operations have produced an established relationship with Kazakhstani regulators, a functioning processing facility, and a management team with the track record to execute at scale. The feasibility study, the IRR, and the Phase 1 production plan are the outputs of a management team that has done the engineering work and is ready to scale up. The strategic context reinforces the timing. In December 2025, President Trump held calls with the leaders of both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The White House and the U.S. Department of State are focused on Central Asia and its critical minerals wealth. The November 2025 gathering of Central Asian heads of state at the White House under the C5+1 format placed the region more firmly on Washington's strategic map than at any previous point. At the 16th AMM Congress on June 11–12, David L. Fogel, assistant secretary of commerce and director general of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service, said the U.S. is moving from discussion to strategic execution in Central Asia’s critical minerals sector. On June 30, the U.S. Department of War awarded Canada’s Largo Inc., through Largo Resources USA Inc., a five-year contract to supply high-purity vanadium pentoxide from its Largo Vanádio de Maracás operation in Brazil. Kazakhstan, with its established record of foreign investment from major energy companies such as Chevron and ExxonMobil, and now with investment from Cove Kaz, is a natural entry point for Western governments, private funds, and corporate groups seeking to diversify and secure vanadium supplies outside China and Russia. That is the niche FAR operates in and has operated in, at meaningful development cost, for more than 20 years. The Boguty tungsten deposit was discovered in 1941. By 2025, the company that moved early had achieved a multibillion-dollar valuation. The Balasausqandiq vanadium deposit, meanwhile, has been known for decades, with a pilot and concentrate-processing facility already operating at the site, a completed feasibility study, a nearly $1 billion NPV, a 31% IRR, and a $37 million market cap. Vanadium will not stay in a depressed pricing environment indefinitely. The question is who is positioned early enough to capture that value while securing geostrategic interests to boot.   The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.