Kazakhstan To Hold Referendum on New Constitution On March 15
Kazakhstan will hold a constitutional referendum on March 15 in what President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has described as “a complete reboot” to modernize government and introduce more institutional accountability. The date of the referendum was announced in a notice that was published on the presidential website on Wednesday. It said the draft of the proposed new constitution will appear in the media on Thursday, and the question to be posed to voters in March is: "Do you accept the new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the draft of which was published in the mass media on February 12, 2026?" The Central Election Commission will oversee the referendum, according to the notice. The outlines of the proposed changes are already circulating publicly in Kazakhstan, which has made a number of amendments to the current constitution dating from the mid-1990s. The planned changes include replacing the current bicameral parliament with a single chamber and introducing the post of vice president. “The proposed amendments will allow for the redistribution of powers, strengthen the balance in the system of checks and balances, and, most importantly, increase the effectiveness and sustainability of all political institutions,” Tokayev has said. Analysts view the shift from personality-driven rule to more institutionalized governance as a step toward building a more resilient state capable of managing leadership transitions and broadening stakeholder participation. While the foundation for greater representation is being laid, critics say progress should move faster, particularly in expanding political and civic space. If sustained, however, the current trajectory could open the way to deeper and more durable reform through strengthened institutional processes.
Choking on Smog: Air Crisis in Öskemen Deepens
Heavy smog and sustained NMU-II adverse meteorological conditions reported by Kazhydromet continue to affect the city of Öskemen (Ust-Kamenogorsk) in eastern Kazakhstan, after authorities moved all students in grades 0–11 to remote learning on February 2. The decision followed several days of windless weather and a temperature inversion that trapped pollutants close to the ground.
According to Kazhydromet forecasts, unfavorable meteorological conditions are likely to remain in place, limiting dispersion. Air quality monitoring platforms show persistent spikes in fine particulate matter, raising renewed health concerns among residents.
Data from IQAir indicates that PM2.5 concentrations in Öskemen have at times reached levels classified as “hazardous,” significantly exceeding World Health Organization guidelines. Live readings continue to fluctuate depending on wind and temperature shifts, but pollution levels remain elevated compared to recommended norms.
Local authorities say the health of students remains the priority. The regional Department of Education confirmed that distance learning was introduced as a precautionary measure during the NMU-II period. Environmental specialists have advised residents to reduce outdoor activity, particularly children, the elderly, and those with respiratory conditions.
What’s Behind the Smog?
Specialists attribute the pollution to a combination of meteorological and structural factors.
A temperature inversion has created what meteorologists describe as a “thermal cap,” with warmer air overlaying colder surface air, preventing pollutants from dispersing. The absence of sustained wind has compounded the buildup.
Öskemen is also one of Kazakhstan’s most industrialized cities, home to major metallurgical enterprises, a coal-fired thermal power plant, and titanium-magnesium production facilities. Vehicle emissions and winter heating from coal and firewood in private homes add to the concentration of fine particulate matter.
The city’s geography further complicates the situation. Surrounded by mountainous terrain, Öskemen experiences restricted air circulation during stagnant winter conditions, allowing pollution to accumulate.
Monitoring and Mitigation
The East Kazakhstan Department of Ecology reported that an interagency task force, including Kazhydromet meteorologists and sanitary inspectors, conducted mobile laboratory monitoring during the peak of the episode. Authorities said industrial facilities reduced output under NMU protocols and that transport and municipal services were instructed to limit emissions.
Officials stated that monitored pollutants, including carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur compounds, chlorides, and suspended particles, were measured daily. While authorities described overall average indicators as remaining within permissible limits, independent monitoring services recorded significantly higher short-term PM2.5 spikes.
Public Reaction
Residents have expressed frustration online, posting photos and videos showing the city enveloped in haze. In comments responding to official statements, users described sore throats, headaches, and difficulty breathing.
One resident wrote: “It’s impossible to breathe in the city. This isn’t exaggeration, it’s reality. You, your children, your loved ones are breathing this air.”
Others questioned the official assessment, asking why schools were closed if pollution posed no threat to public health.
What Comes Next?
Kazhydromet forecasts suggest that wind and snowfall could help disperse accumulated pollutants in the coming days. However, recurring winter smog episodes have reignited debate over industrial emissions, household coal use, and long-term urban air quality policy.
In early February, regional Maslikhat deputy Bashimov Sovetovich filed a parliamentary inquiry urging stronger measures to address what he called the “systematic pollution” of Öskemen’s air.
Residents and environmental advocates are calling for tighter emissions controls, expansion of gas infrastructure to reduce coal heating, and greater transparency in monitoring data.
For now, pollution levels remain volatile, and the episode has once again highlighted the structural challenges facing one of Kazakhstan’s most industrialized cities.
Opinion: Afghanistan and Central Asia – Security Without Illusions
Over the past year, Afghanistan has become neither markedly more stable nor dramatically more dangerous, despite how it is often portrayed in public discourse. There has been neither the collapse that many feared, nor the breakthrough that some had hoped for. Instead, a relatively unchanged but fragile status quo has persisted, one that Central Asian countries confront daily. For the C5 countries, Afghanistan is increasingly less a topic of speculative discussion and more a persistent factor in their immediate reality. It is no longer just an object of foreign policy, but a constant variable impacting security, trade, humanitarian issues, and regional stability. As such, many of last year’s forecasts have become outdated, based as they were on assumptions of dramatic change, whereas the reality has proven far more inertial. Illusion #1: Afghanistan Can Be Ignored The belief that Afghanistan can be temporarily “put on the back burner” is rooted in the assumption that a lack of public dialogue or political statements equates to a lack of interaction. But the actions of Central Asian states show that ignoring Afghanistan is not a viable option, even when countries intentionally avoid politicizing relations. Turkmenistan offers a clear example. Ashgabat has maintained stable trade, economic, and infrastructure ties with Afghanistan for years, all with minimal foreign policy rhetoric. Energy supplies, cross-border trade, and logistical cooperation have continued despite political and financial constraints, and regardless of international debates over the legitimacy of the Afghan authorities. This quiet pragmatism stands in contrast to both isolationist strategies and symbolic or ideological engagement. Turkmenistan may avoid making public declarations about its relationship with Afghanistan, but it nonetheless maintains robust cooperation. This calculated calmness reduces risks without signaling disengagement. Importantly, this approach does not eliminate structural asymmetries or deeper vulnerabilities. But it dispels the illusion that distancing reduces risk. On the contrary, sustained economic and logistical ties foster predictability, without which attempts to “ignore” a neighboring country become a form of strategic blindness. In this sense, Turkmenistan’s experience affirms a broader regional truth: Afghanistan cannot be removed from Central Asia’s geopolitical equation by simply looking away. It must be engaged pragmatically or dealt with later, in potentially more destabilizing forms. Illusion #2: Security Is Achieved Through Isolation Closely related to the first is the illusion that security can be ensured by building walls. Security in Afghanistan, and in the broader Afghan-Pakistani zone, is often seen as an external issue, something that can be kept out by sealing borders or minimizing engagement. Yet in practice, security is determined less by geography and more by the nature of involvement. This is reflected in the recent decision by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to participate in U.S. President Donald Trump's “Board of Peace” initiative. While the initiative focuses on resolving crises outside Central Asia, both countries have framed their participation as essential to their own national and regional security interests. As Abdulaziz Kamilov, advisor to the President of Uzbekistan, explained, Tashkent’s involvement stems from three factors: its own security needs, its foreign policy principles, and the recognition that the Middle East remains a region of vital interest to Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s past experience supports this logic. During periods of conflict in the Middle East, Uzbeks and other Central Asians were drawn into international terrorist networks, posing significant security threats upon their return. The interconnection between Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Central Asia is clear. According to the Uzbek authorities, terrorist organizations entered Afghanistan from elsewhere, primarily conflict zones in the Middle East. Given this framing, Uzbek officials have argued that Afghanistan often functions as a transit environment rather than the source of extremist threats. Kazakhstan's recent move to join the Abraham Accords, a diplomatic framework aimed at reducing tensions in the Middle East, is similarly revealing. Though at first glance the decision may appear to lie outside Central Asia’s immediate interests, it reflects an understanding that regional instability is contagious. In an era when radical ideologies and transnational threats ignore borders, participation in conflict-mitigation mechanisms, even those based outside the region, is no longer symbolic. It is a form of pre-emptive security. Security today is less about hard boundaries and more about proactive engagement. In this light, efforts to isolate are not only ineffective but they may also prove counterproductive, depriving states of influence in regions where risk is incubated. Illusion #3: Recognition Equals Control Another persistent illusion is that formal recognition of Afghanistan’s government confers control or influence, while its absence renders engagement difficult or illegitimate. But diplomatic practice paints a different picture. As of February 2026, multiple foreign diplomatic missions are active in Afghanistan, including embassies from all Central Asian countries. Other nations with diplomatic representation include Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the Gulf states, Japan, and the European Union. Beyond Kabul, multiple provinces also host consulates. Mazar-i-Sharif hosts several regional consulates, including those of Russia and Turkmenistan, along with other neighboring states. Iran, Turkey, and Turkmenistan are present in Herat, and Pakistan maintains a consulate in Nangarhar. This broad diplomatic presence is not merely symbolic. These missions underscore a critical reality: formal recognition has not been a prerequisite for functional engagement. Instead, countries have pursued de facto diplomacy, addressing issues such as security, trade, logistics, humanitarian aid, and border management. This blurs the once-binary view of “recognition vs. isolation.” In effect, the continued presence of Central Asian missions in Afghanistan suggests that pragmatic engagement now outweighs normative debates. Influence and risk management come through sustained presence and open channels, not formal status. From Illusions to Realism The common flaw in many approaches to Afghanistan is the tendency to treat it as a project, whether political, economic, or integrational. This perspective breeds unrealistic expectations and inevitable disappointment. Afghanistan is not a project for Central Asia. It is a permanent geopolitical factor. It cannot be “switched off” from regional dynamics. The task for Central Asia is not to solve Afghanistan but to coexist with it, based on pragmatism, not illusion. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode – B5+1, Sanctions, and a New Constitution – Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be covering the B5+1 summit in Bishkek, the prospect of new EU sanctions targeting Kyrgyzstan, fresh complications around Rosatom's nuclear plans in Uzbekistan, shake-ups inside Uzbekistan's internal security services, and some genuinely surprising new drug-use statistics coming out of Tajikistan. We'll also look at the latest shootout on the Tajikistan–Afghanistan border. And then, for our main story, we will be diving into Kazakhstan's newly released draft constitution and what it signals about where the political system is heading next. On the show this week: - Yevgeny Zhovtis (Human Rights Activist) - Aiman Umarova (Kazakh Lawyer) Hosted by Bruce Pannier and Michael Hilliard
A Eurasian Imprint on Judo’s Paris Grand Slam
The Paris Judo Grand Slam took place on February 7–8 at a sold-out Accor Arena, drawing more than 20,000 spectators to one of the sport’s most prestigious annual events.
Held under the auspices of the International Judo Federation (IJF) as a flagship stop on the IJF World Tour, the competition carried significant world-ranking points early in the qualification cycle for the Los Angeles 2028 Olympic Games. Nearly 500 athletes from 78 countries participated.
While Japan and France dominated the medal table at the Paris Judo Grand Slam, the tournament also underscored a quieter but enduring force in international judo: the sustained competitive influence of Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
Japan topped the medal table with gold medals from Takeshi Takeoka (–66 kg), Yuhei Oino (–81 kg), Goki Tajima (–90 kg), and Dota Arai (–100 kg). France secured three home victories through Shirine Boukli (–48 kg), Sarah-Léonie Cysique (–57 kg), and Romane Dicko (+78 kg).
The remaining titles reflected the tournament’s global reach. Balabay Aghayev delivered gold for Azerbaijan at –60 kg, Distria Krasniqi won –52 kg for Kosovo, Rafaela Silva captured –63 kg for Brazil, Makhmadbek Makhmadbekov claimed the –73 kg title representing the United Arab Emirates, and Szofi Özbas secured the –70 kg title for Hungary, according to official IJF results.
While Azerbaijan is geographically part of the South Caucasus, its Turkic cultural ties, Soviet-era sporting systems, and shared wrestling traditions closely align with Central Asia’s judo landscape. Aghayev’s gold for Azerbaijan, alongside Makhmadbekov’s –73 kg victory, highlighted transnational athlete pathways rooted in a common Eurasian combat sports tradition.
Makhmadbekov—an ethnically Tajik judoka born in Russia—has represented the United Arab Emirates in international competition since 2024, reflecting the increasingly transnational nature of elite judo careers.
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73 kg Final: Makhmadbek Makhmadbekov (United Arab Emirates) vs. Manuel Lombardo (Italy); image: Tamara Kulumbegashvili[/caption]
Kazakhstan’s national judo team reinforced that regional presence by concluding the Paris Grand Slam with three bronze medals, one of its strongest results in the tournament’s history. Aman Bakhytzhan reached the podium in the –60 kg division, while Abylaikhan Zhubanazar (–81 kg) and Nurlykhan Sharkhan (–100 kg) added further medals on the second day.
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60 kg Final: Balabay Aghayev (Azerbaijan) vs. Dilshot Khalmatov (Uzbekistan); image: Tamara Kulumbegashvili [/caption]
Martial arts occupy a distinctive place across Central Asia and Azerbaijan, where indigenous wrestling traditions long predate modern Olympic disciplines. Styles such as kurash in Uzbekistan, kazakh kuresi in Kazakhstan, and gushtingiri in Azerbaijan, alongside their more traditional forms such as gulesh and zorkhana-influenced pekhlivan wrestling, emphasize balance, explosive throws, and physical control. These attributes remain clearly visible in contemporary judo.
These traditions continue to be showcased at events such as the World Nomad Games and regional festivals across Central Asia and the Caspian region. They were further refined during the Soviet era, which institutionalized sports and established the region as a major development base for elite combat athletes.
Since gaining their independence, Central Asian countries, as well as Azerbaijan, have continued to produce high-level judoka, with shared coaching lineages and training systems consistently feeding the top tiers of international competition. Olympic champions such as Yeldos Smetov from Kazakhstan, Diyora Keldiyorova from Uzbekistan, and Elnur Mammadli from Azerbaijan, alongside long-time world-level contenders including Abiba Abuzhakynova, point to the region’s sustained presence at the sport’s highest level—a pattern previously noted by The Times of Central Asia during its coverage of the Paris 2024 Olympic cycle.
That influence extends beyond the competitors themselves. Following the conclusion of the opening-day contests in Paris, Timur Kemell, a member of the official International Judo Federation (IJF) ceremony delegation of Kazakh origin, took part in presenting the medals. Kemell has been active in regional and international judo governance and development, participating in events organized under the auspices of the IJF.
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Day 1 Medal Ceremony: Timur Kemell, Dilshot Khalmatov, Balabay Aghayev, Izhak Ashpiz, Aman Bakhytzhan, and David Inquel at the Paris Judo Grand Slam; image: International Judo Federation (IJF)[/caption]
The Paris Judo Grand Slam was officially opened by the International Judo Federation, with Marius Vizer, President of the IJF, and Stéphane Nomis, IJF Vice President and President of the French Judo Federation, leading the ceremony. Award presentations throughout the event also featured figures from sport and culture, including David Inquel, Albano Carrisi, Corinne Virulo-Cucchiara, Igor Tulchinsky, and Erika Merion, underscoring the tournament’s institutional and international stature.
At the Paris Judo Grand Slam, Eurasia’s role was not defined by flag dominance or overall medal totals, but by something more enduring: a deeply rooted martial-arts culture that continues to shape the technical and competitive foundations of international judo on one of the sport’s most visible global stages.
Ukrainian Ambassador to Kazakhstan: “The War Will End This Year. I Truly Believe In That.”
As the war between Russia and Ukraine approaches its fifth year, diplomatic efforts to reshape trade routes, energy flows, and regional partnerships are intensifying far beyond the battlefield. For Ukraine, Central Asia has emerged as an increasingly important economic and logistical partner, particularly as Kyiv seeks alternatives to disrupted transport corridors and supply chains.
The Times of Central Asia spoke with Viсtor Mayko, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan, about the prospects for deeper economic cooperation with Central Asia, the role of the Middle Corridor, energy transit challenges in the Caspian region, Kyiv’s expectations for international support, and a possible path toward ending the war.
Trade and Economic Prospects in Central Asia TCA: Mr. Ambassador, what are the prospects for deepening trade and economic partnerships between Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and wider Central Asia? Which sectors offer the greatest potential for cooperation? Ambassador Mayko: Deepening trade and economic ties between Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian countries is not merely a prospect; it is a necessity dictated by global economic trends. Kazakhstan leads the region economically, with a GDP exceeding $300 billion. It is on a trajectory to join the G20 within 5 to 10 years. The United States, recognizing this potential, has invited Kazakhstan to the upcoming G20 meeting in the U.S., demonstrating Kazakhstan’s rising global significance. Ukraine and Kazakhstan’s economies are complementary. Ukraine brings experience in agricultural technology, mechanical engineering, IT, and processing, while Kazakhstan contributes resource strength, industrial capacity, and logistics. Promising areas for cooperation include agro-industrial development, from crop production to digitalized processing; industrial cooperation through equipment supply and joint production; logistics and infrastructure aimed at strengthening transport corridors; and energy and IT projects focused on efficiency and network modernization. We are already transitioning from theory to action. A major business delegation from Ukraine will visit Kazakhstan this year. We also anticipate another meeting of the Joint Ukrainian-Kazakh Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, which is crucial for removing barriers and initiating new projects. Ukraine’s presence in Kazakhstan’s economy has historically been significant. If not for the war and resulting transport disruptions, I believe our mutual trade could have reached $10 billion. Ukrainian machinery still accounts for a substantial portion of Kazakhstan’s industrial base, especially in regions such as Karaganda, Aktau, and Pavlodar, though much of this equipment now requires modernization. Another promising area is mineral resource development. Ukraine has the scientific and practical base to contribute meaningfully to this sector. Turkmenistan’s earlier collaboration with Ukrainian firms in revitalizing depleted wells illustrates our potential. Wells deemed exhausted by older technologies yielded hundreds of thousands of tons of oil under Ukrainian management. This successful model can be applied in Kazakhstan, one of the EU’s top three oil suppliers. Transport Infrastructure and the Middle Corridor TCA: How is cooperation in the transport sector developing, especially regarding the Middle Corridor? Are there any potential plans for joint infrastructure projects? Ambassador Mayko: Russia’s full-scale aggression disrupted Ukraine’s previous logistics routes. Today, we prioritize alternatives like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, the “Middle Corridor”, as a strategic interest. Our current multimodal route passes through Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan before crossing the Caspian Sea. However, delivery remains costly and time-consuming. A 20-ton shipment to Almaty, for example, costs $11,000-$15,000 and takes around a month, largely due to ferry bottlenecks across the Caspian. We see strong potential in joint Ukrainian-Kazakh railway and maritime projects to reduce costs and improve reliability. A key goal is to integrate Ukraine’s Black Sea ports into the Middle Corridor. Recent port-level agreements, including those involving the Belgorod-Dnestrovsky Sea Trade Port, aim to establish formal cooperation with Kazakh counterparts. Ukrzaliznytsia JSC is actively engaging with railway administrations in Central Asia and the South Caucasus to implement a bilateral agreement focused on practical logistics solutions. Additionally, we support establishing a container hub in Aktau’s SEZ to enhance the corridor’s overall capacity. The Middle Corridor is a vital instrument for boosting trade and reinforcing Kazakhstan’s role as a regional transit leader. Energy Sector Cooperation and Route Diversification TCA: How does Ukraine view its energy cooperation with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries? Are there plans to diversify supply routes? Ambassador Mayko: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are vital energy partners for Ukraine, both for oil and gas. Our cooperation continues at an enterprise level, with Ukrainian manufacturers providing equipment for Kazakh energy companies. Despite wartime challenges, Ukrainian companies have resumed direct engagement with partners in the Mangystau region. Ukrainian expertise is helping modernize critical systems without reliance on intermediaries or counterfeit parts. Energy exports are another area of focus. Kazakhstan has emerged as a top-three oil supplier to the EU, accounting for 11.5% of EU imports in 2024, and demand is growing. Ukraine also seeks Kazakh oil, provided transportation avoids the Russian Federation. Practical steps are underway in Aktau and Kuryk to improve tanker capacity and rail links. Promising routes include Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa, as well as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. We invite Kazakh participation in rebuilding and constructing oil refineries in Ukraine, with the goal of refining Kazakh oil domestically for local use and EU export. Deep drilling is a shared priority. Ukraine has drilled 24 wells beyond 6 km depth in the Poltava region, a model that may interest Kazakhstan. We are open to partnerships between JSC NC KazMunayGas and JSC Ukrgazvydobuvannya to jointly explore and develop hydrocarbon reserves. Ukraine also offers strong potential in shipbuilding. Collaboration between Kazmortransflot and Ukrainian firms like the Nikolaev Shipyard and Smart Maritime Group could boost fleet repair and construction capacity. Ukrainian companies such as NPIK Neftegazstroizolyatsiya and Neftegazhim Service LLC can also assist in oil pipeline modernization across the Caspian region. On Security and Attacks on Oil Infrastructure TCA: How do you respond to reports of attacks on tankers transporting Kazakh oil and oil linked to Western companies, including U.S. firms? Have these events impacted bilateral relations? Ambassador Mayko: Ukraine has never targeted Kazakhstan’s economy or infrastructure. We value Kazakhstan’s consistent support for our sovereignty and territorial integrity and aim to ensure secure energy supplies via the Black Sea. Ukrainian strikes are strictly directed at Russian military-linked targets. For example, we target refineries supplying fuel to the Russian military, not civilian infrastructure. Ukraine never considered Kazakh facilities as legitimate targets. The recent incident involving Greek tankers chartered by KazMunayGas illustrates this. These vessels, with active transponders and transparent routes, were not damaged. Simultaneously, two Russian “shadow fleet” tankers near Novorossiysk were severely hit by long-range Ukrainian drones. In contrast, the Greek tankers were reportedly attacked by short-range FPV drones, suggesting the launch did not originate from Ukraine but from waters near Novorossiysk. Following discussions with Ukrainian military officials, I can confirm: Kazakhstan is not, and will not be, a target for Ukrainian strikes. This is the unified position of Ukraine’s political and military leadership. International Support and the Path to Peace TCA: How do you assess current relations with the U.S. and the EU? How are internal political dynamics affecting support for Ukraine? Ambassador Mayko: Ukraine continues to receive strong support from the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Turkey, and others. This support, military, financial, and humanitarian, is essential to our resistance. During this winter’s attacks on our energy infrastructure, assistance has remained steady. We are receiving equipment, satellite communications, intelligence, and humanitarian aid. Starlink disconnections for Russian forces are a notable development. New sanctions, including the EU’s 20th package, target Russia’s shadow fleet and financial system. Given these developments, concerns about waning support are unfounded. The U.S. and Europe have been steadfast allies throughout the war. Without their backing, Ukraine’s situation would be significantly worse. We remain engaged in negotiations with Russia, supported by our European partners. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has signaled a willingness to make compromises, but not unilaterally. Security guarantees must be reciprocal. Russia continues shifting its terms, especially around post-war military presence. Ukraine will not voluntarily cede its territory. These lands are home to citizens who do not wish to live under occupation. They include key industrial assets and mineral resources. While Russian civil society remains largely passive, even the Kremlin must recognize its domestic limits. I believe those limits are fast approaching. That’s why I remain convinced: the war will end this year. I truly believe in that.
A Stranger Among His Own: Rejected by Russia, Kazakh Comedian Nurlan Saburov Faces Cold Reception at Home
Kazakh comedian Nurlan Saburov has become the third stand-up performer to be officially barred from entering Russia, this time with a 50-year entry ban. The decision, reportedly issued on national security grounds, follows years of mounting controversy surrounding the artist, who has struggled to reconcile his dual identity as a Kazakhstani citizen and a celebrity shaped by Russian showbusiness. From Stepnogorsk to Moscow Spotlight Born in 1991 in Stepnogorsk (Akmola region, Kazakhstan), Saburov’s career took off through KVN, the long-running Soviet-era improv competition, after enrolling at Ural Federal University in Yekaterinburg. In 2014, he relocated to Moscow with his family to pursue a career in the booming Russian stand-up scene, eventually gaining national fame through television appearances. However, that rise has since been marred by a series of political and legal controversies. Neutrality in the Spotlight and Its Consequences Saburov's troubles began in April 2022, when he was confronted during a U.S. tour by a protester covered in red paint, a symbolic act referencing the war in Ukraine. His offhand joke referencing menstruation drew global backlash, leading to an American tour cancellation and public outrage. Attempts to declare a neutral stance on the war in Ukraine only deepened public criticism. By May 2025, he faced his first major setback at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport, where he was fined for immigration violations but allowed to leave without a ban. Then, on February 6, 2026, upon arrival at Vnukovo airport from Dubai, Saburov was detained and issued an official notice of a 50-year ban from entering Russia. The document cited violations of tax and migration law, with authorities alleging he attempted to legalize his earnings through intermediaries while refusing to apply for Russian citizenship. “In 2024 alone, Nurlan Saburov declared more than 50 million rubles [$645,000] in income while ignoring tax and migration rules,” Russian law enforcement sources told RIA Novosti. He was initially scheduled for deportation to Dubai but instead chose to fly to Almaty, Kazakhstan. Uneasy Return to Kazakhstan Speculation quickly emerged about whether Saburov would settle permanently in Almaty, where he co-hosts a successful YouTube talk show alongside three Russian hosts. The program, previously hosted on YouTube, now runs on VK, Russia’s state-backed video platform, and frequently features Russian celebrities. Relocating the production to Kazakhstan could, some argued, benefit the country’s cultural profile and tourism appeal. However, Saburov was met with public hostility. A video from 2025 resurfaced online showing him donating 10 enduro motorcycles to fighters from the Wagner Group’s Istra unit, a controversial paramilitary force implicated in operations in Ukraine. In response, Almaty-based activist Marat Turymbetov submitted a formal complaint to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Kazakhstan, calling for an investigation into possible violations of Article 170 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits financing illegal armed groups. “I believe the authorities will investigate and bring this individual to justice,” Turymbetov stated in a social media post, citing possible mercenary activity. Other Kazakhstani citizens, particularly those who support Ukraine, joined Turymbetov’s call for legal action. Saburov Responds Despite the backlash, Saburov has not distanced himself from Russia. In a statement on Instagram, he thanked Russian audiences and signaled plans to contest the ban: “Time will put everything in its place. My career began 15 years ago in Yekaterinburg and later in Moscow. I’ve performed in many Russian cities and was always met with warmth. I’m grateful to the country that allowed me to grow as an artist and reach a multinational audience,” Saburov wrote, adding that his lawyers would “deal with all relevant authorities”. As legal and public scrutiny continues in both Russia and Kazakhstan, Saburov now finds himself without a stage, caught between two countries no longer willing to claim him as their own.
Life After Relocation: Kazakhstani Inna Baitukenova on the U.S., Blogging, and Building a Business
Kazakh producer and screenwriter Inna Baitukenova, known for projects such as Satash, the documentary Oleg: The Story of Oleg Vidov, and the television series Ana Zhuregi and Taitalas, has opened a new chapter in her professional life since relocating to the U.S. A lawyer by education, she now works as a blogger and is developing her own beauty business in the American market. She spoke with The Times of Central Asia about adapting to life abroad, navigating the U.S. blogging scene, and the challenges and rewards of launching a business as a Kazakhstani immigrant. TCA: Inna, how long have you been living in the U.S.? Inna: My husband and I first came here as tourists in 2018. During that trip, my husband, journalist and film director Tolegen Baitukenov, met an American producer interested in making a documentary exploring potential familial ties between Native Americans and Kazakhs. He signed a contract, and we returned to Kazakhstan. In 2019, he presented the project at the Kazakh pavilion at the Cannes Film Festival. Interest was high, so we decided to change our status from tourists to working residents. We officially moved to the U.S. in 2019. We've now been living here for seven years. TCA: Did you and your husband come on talent visas? Inna: Yes. Initially, we came without our children, just to see how it felt. We liked it, returned home, and began applying for work visas. It wasn’t easy; we even had to obtain approval from the Directors Guild of America. TCA: How long did it take you to adapt? When did you begin to feel at home? Inna: I think we’re still adapting. But the first time I really felt at home was in 2022, after moving from Los Angeles to Orange County. It's a suburb about 90 minutes from LA. I was driving around, and suddenly everything felt familiar: the streets, the houses. That’s when I realized I felt a sense of home. The early days were very tough, but day by day, it got easier. We got used to the environment, improved our English, and started understanding how daily life works here, from utility payments to taxes. At first, we were converting all prices into tenge. When Tolegen started his company in 2019, everything was a challenge; there wasn’t even ChatGPT back then to ask questions. We were googling everything: how to get a license, register a business, and secure a trade name. When I started my own beauty studio in May 2025, I already knew how to rent an office and obtain all the necessary permits. TCA: You seem to have found your footing once you landed a good blogging contract. You now work with major brands, right? Inna: Yes, but blogging wasn't my goal. It happened by accident. I used to keep an Instagram account as a hobby back in Kazakhstan and never thought of it as a platform for making money. But I’ve always loved cosmetology and beauty. One day, I began posting about the products I use, unboxings, and reviews. I tagged an American brand in a post, and to my surprise, they reached out offering to send me a gift. They told me I could choose anything I wanted from their site. It was a huge surprise. They sent me almost a year's worth of cosmetics, probably worth over $1,000. As a woman, and especially an immigrant, I can say it was an amazing gift. Cosmetics aren't a necessity, but they're always a pleasure. TCA: When did you start working with bigger names like Prada and Shiseido? Inna: A little later. One of my first major clients was LPG France, a top cosmetics and beauty tech brand. A marketing agency contacted me by email. I was skeptical at first, worried it might be a scam, but it turned out that email is a standard business channel in the U.S. They commissioned two reels and several stories, and also gave me a course of treatments, body, and anti-cellulite programs. I remember when they asked for my rate, I had to Google how much bloggers charge for posts, reels, or stories. I quoted an average rate, and we reached an agreement. Even though I was a beginner, we took it seriously and filmed professional content with Tolegen’s help. I eventually took a course at UCLA on influence marketing to understand the U.S. market, how much brands spend, and what niches exist. For me, beauty is the most profitable niche, followed by fashion, food, e-commerce, and home goods. My account also appeals to a broad audience; it's family-focused. I have a husband and three children: a college student, a schoolgirl, and little Tanya, who’s 3 1/2 years old. TCA: Can a Kazakhstani blogger succeed in the U.S. market? Inna: Yes, but brands are primarily interested in a U.S. audience. That’s why I had to switch to English. It’s not easy; some followers in Kazakhstan prefer Kazakh or Russian, but my Instagram has grown to around 126,000 followers, and more and more are American. Advertisers also care about TikTok, Threads, and other platforms; they often ask for cross-posting, so presence across multiple channels is a plus. TCA: In Kazakhstan, bloggers are often more popular than artists. What about in America? Inna: Here, too, whatever your field, blogging is an advantage. That’s why everyone blogs here, from plastic surgeons to musicians. When I opened my beauty studio, I realized that blogging is essential for promotion. TCA: Is it true that most things in the U.S. are handled through agencies or intermediaries? Inna: Often, yes, but I work independently. I haven’t signed with any agency. The only time I worked through one was with LPG France. Even then, I didn’t have a direct contract with the brand; the agency did. TCA: Is there a lot of competition among bloggers? Inna: Tremendous competition. And income is highly unstable. During holidays like Christmas, New Year, or Black Friday, when brands allocate large budgets, income can be good. But there are dry spells too; you can go months without work. It's not reliable as a main source of income. TCA: Could a Kazakhstani blogger work remotely in the U.S. market? Inna: It's possible, but difficult. Brands need to ship products, and international logistics can be tricky. Deadlines are strict. You also need U.S. registration, bank accounts, documentation, and a social security number. TCA: After seven years in the U.S., are you financially stable? Inna: We’ve made good progress. We live comfortably in a nice area. But we’re still growing. Tolegen has a production company, and I have my studio. I even went back to school to get a cosmetology license. I was recently offered a position at a Beverly Hills clinic by the owner, a doctor. That job means a lot; it's a new professional level. Eventually, I want to pursue a medical degree and continue in this field. Blogging is a passion project with some nice perks. TCA: You’re in Los Angeles, the heart of the film industry. Have you thought of returning to film? Inna: I have, and I still dream of it. We haven’t given up, we keep writing. Tolegen recently won a screenwriting contest with a short film. We still love everything about cinema, film festivals, and discussions. We even run through scripts on the go. But right now, it’s more of a hobby. It’s not monetized yet. TCA: Why is that? Is it hard to break into the industry? Inna: That’s part of it. Early on, the pay is low, and the work is demanding: 4 a.m. call times, long shoots in all kinds of weather. I have a small child, and I’m just not ready for that kind of schedule. Many famous people started out doing tough jobs. Brad Pitt worked as an entertainer, but I can’t do that at this point in life. TCA: Is Los Angeles really the city of stars? Inna: Absolutely. When we first arrived, we walked around like wide-eyed kids. You’d see Anne Hathaway one day, Janet Jackson the next. Celebrities are especially common in Beverly Hills and West Hollywood. TCA: Do you miss Kazakhstan? Inna: Of course. I miss the people: my parents, my little brother, and my friends. We stay in touch, but nothing replaces being together in person. I also miss the food, kazy, irimshik, and zhen. Sometimes we meet someone here, an African American woman or a Mexican, and she reminds us of a Kazakh apashka or tateshka (a familiar, older auntie or grandma-type figure). It’s such a warm, familiar feeling. We even say, “What a nice tateshka,” and that means a lot.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
