Russia’s Strategic Posturing and Putin’s November Visit to Kazakhstan
On November 27, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan underscored the complex geopolitical and security challenges facing the region. Hosted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana, the visit took place amidst heightened tensions following Russia’s deployment of its Oreshnik hypersonic missile in Ukraine on November 21. This escalation has reshaped the regional security environment, compelling Kazakhstan to confront potential spillover effects of the Ukraine conflict. Energy remained a central focus during the visit. Kazakhstan remains heavily reliant on oil exports through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through southern Russia. This cooperation benefits Kazakhstan economically but, by tying Kazakhstan further into Russian energy networks, it further complicates Astana's efforts to balance relations with Moscow and Western powers. Following periodic closures of the CPC route on various pretexts, Kazakhstan has resolved to diversify its energy export strategy. It has increased shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which terminates on Turkey's coast in the eastern Mediterranean. One should not be surprised if ideas about the old Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline (TCOP) project are taken out of deep storage for reanimation. The TCOP is an undersea link first discussed in the late 2000s between then-Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Nicolas Sarkozy of France. It was shelved at the time because it did not seem geoeconomically necessary. Since then, relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been complicated by the periodic CPC closures that, although they are given technical justification, appear politically motivated by Moscow to squeeze Astana. Kazakhstan's short-term solution, to increase oil shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to Baku for insertion into the BTC pipeline, simply cannot attain the volumes necessary to provide a strategic alternative to the CPC. The BTC, at present, would be able to accommodate whatever volumes Kazakhstan would be able to transit to Azerbaijan including via a prospective TCOP, for export to world markets from Ceyhan. One would suppose that bilateral discussions also covered the possible participation of Rosatom in the construction and operation of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). However, no mention of this topic was made in public statements. Kazakhstan would prefer to escape the vise-like pressure between Russia and China on this matter. That is why Tokayev has discussed participation by the French firms Orano and EDF with France's President Emmanuel Macron. It has recently been suggested that it would be technically feasible for Kazakhstan to find a group of Western companies capable of executing the project. A Western consortium would have no reason to hesitate to include Kazatomprom in an appropriate role, not excluding capacity-building. The Russia-only and China-only options for the NPP's construction would be less welcoming to such a possibility. Kazakhstan's leadership has become properly sensitive to how energy partnerships are not just economic decisions, but strategic calculations in Central Asia's volatile geopolitical landscape. Indeed, Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine has created an entirely new security situation. It has raised concerns that the military conflict may worsen, and Putin’s visit came days after that escalation. Tokayev has responded to Russia's deployment of the Oreshnik by instructing Kazakhstan’s government to enhance security measures, prioritizing critical infrastructure and border regions near Russian military facilities. Kazakhstan needs to strengthen its air and missile defenses to mitigate risks of accidental strikes or provocations. A nuclear conflict remains unlikely, but Kazakhstan must prepare for worst-case scenarios, including unintended strikes near its territory. Kazakhstan’s proximity to Russia’s military bases creates risks that call for improved civil defense and radiation preparedness. The sensitivity of the situation for Kazakhstan is only increased by its position as a non-aligned state that refused to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. It is imperative for Kazakhstan to diminish its dependence on Russian economic and security ties in order to maintain and enhance its own sovereignty. Putin’s visit also served as a platform for reinforcing Russia’s influence in Central Asia. Facing Western sanctions and growing isolation over its actions in Ukraine, Russia has sought to solidify alliances with regional partners. Kazakhstan, as Central Asia’s largest economy and a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), remains vital to Moscow’s strategy. The CSTO summit, held alongside Putin’s visit, emphasized the bloc’s role in Russia's search to impose its own version of regional stability. During the visit, both leaders emphasized the importance of stable economic ties and made commitments to accelerate the development of international transport corridors linking Central and South Asia. These projects highlight Kazakhstan’s strategic role in Russia’s efforts to pivot away from European markets. Whether this new phenomenon gives Kazakhstan actual economic leverage over Russia is open to discussion. Economic relations between the two countries remain a cornerstone of their partnership, but recent trade disputes have tested their resilience. Russia’s ban on Kazakhstan's agricultural exports and Kazakhstan’s decision not to join BRICS illustrate these tensions. Putin’s visit highlighted Russia’s determination to maintain influence in Central Asia, but it also exposed the limitations of Moscow’s approach in a region increasingly seeking to diversify its partnerships. Against the backdrop of Russia’s military escalation in Ukraine and growing regional instability, Kazakhstan faces mounting pressures to safeguard its interests while navigating the challenges of an increasingly polarized world. Kazakhstan’s diplomacy remains pragmatic, engaging Russia while pursuing ties with other global powers. As international tensions intensify, Kazakhstan’s ability to maintain this balance will be crucial for its security and sovereignty. Its response — enhancing its defenses, diversifying its economic partnerships, and asserting its diplomatic independence — will determine not just how its relationship with Russia will develop, but also its own role in shaping the evolving dynamics of Central Asia.
Kazakh Deputy PM Zhumangarin: Our Industries Come Before Sanctions
Kazakhstan has clarified its position on sanctions against Russia imposed as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Primarily, Kazakhstan will not support measures that could negatively impact its economy. Speaking to Russian state media outlet Tass, Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin underscored that Kazakhstan will not act as a conduit for circumventing sanctions, as doing so could severely affect its domestic industries. However, he emphasized the nation's commitment to safeguarding its economic interests, particularly in sectors where products might fall under sanction restrictions. “We have explicitly stated that we will not impose restrictions on these goods, as behind them are large labor collectives and enterprises, often located in single-industry towns,” Zhumangarin explained. During Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Kazakhstan on November 27-28, he met with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The leaders issued a joint statement condemning unilateral sanctions, citing their detrimental effects on global trade, economic cooperation, and sustainable development. They reaffirmed their commitment to principles of open and non-discriminatory international trade. By maintaining a neutral stance on sanctions, Kazakhstan seeks to minimize economic risks while prioritizing the interests of its workforce and industries. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to Russia, Dauren Abayev, noted that Kazakh companies aim to avoid secondary sanctions but will continue fostering close cooperation with Russia. In an August interview with Bloomberg, Zhumangarin reiterated that Kazakhstan would not blindly adhere to sanctions against Russia but would consider international restrictions. He highlighted that while Kazakhstan aims to protect its companies from trade bans, it cannot completely disregard sanctions due to the risk of economic isolation. Furthermore, Kazakhstan's Minister of National Economy, Nurlan Baibazarov, addressed concerns in early November regarding including Kazakh companies on UK sanctions lists. He emphasized that these cases mostly involved transient firms, asserting that Kazakhstan continues to comply with international regulations.
Kazakhstan Seeks to Stabilize Currency as Tenge Hits Record Low
Kazakhstan’s central bank said Monday that it has spent more than $1 billion in foreign exchange interventions since mid-November in an effort to stabilize the declining currency, which has passed the threshold of 500 tenge to the U.S. dollar and hit record lows. Kazakh officials attribute the drop to the global appreciation of the dollar, a decrease in oil prices, the tumbling Russian ruble and other factors. The National Bank said it expects to spend another $800 million or $900 million in foreign currency sales in December to cover transfers from the National Fund to the state budget. It also noted that the government on Nov. 19 reinstated a requirement that “quasi-government entities” sell 50% of foreign currency revenue as a measure to balance the FX market. “On the domestic FX market, there was an increase in demand for foreign currency from economic agents and a limited supply, partly due to the exchange rate surpassing a psychological threshold,” said the bank, referring to the 500 tenge to the dollar barrier. “Amid the deterioration of several fundamental factors, to prevent destabilizing fluctuations, smooth excessive volatility in the tenge exchange rate, and ensure the supply of foreign currency, the National Bank conducted foreign exchange interventions from November 15 to November 28. The total volume of currency sales for the month amounted to USD 1,047 million,” it said. The tenge fell to a record low of 520 to the dollar on Monday, according to financial news reports. The Bloomberg news agency said the currency went as low as 530 to the dollar on Monday afternoon, amounting to a loss of more than 13% for the year so far. A significant factor affecting the tenge is the fall in the value of the ruble, which took another hit last month after new Western sanctions were imposed on Gazprombank, a Russian state-owned bank that handles energy transactions. Kazakhstan and Russia are major trading partners. On a visit to Kazakhstan last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted growing trade between the two countries and said: “Payments were and still are a problem, but we now have over 80 percent of payments made in national currencies, which, of course, makes our work in the financial sphere easier.” Russia accounts for almost 20% of Kazakhstan's foreign trade, according to Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. He said last week that Kazakhstan remains a partner of Russia during this “difficult” time, possibly a reference to geopolitical tensions and economic challenges related to Russia’s war in Ukraine. On Monday, Nurlan Baibazarov, Kazakhstan’s deputy prime minister and minister of the national economy, appealed for calm, said finances are stable and that Kazakhstan had weathered similar exchange rate fluctuations at the beginning of the war in early 2022, according to the Orda.kz news site.
Choking on Smog: Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk forced to suspend in-person schooling amid rising air pollution
The city of Ust-Kamenogorsk in eastern Kazakhstan has once again found itself at the center of an environmental scandal, with polluted air and unfavorable weather conditions causing deteriorating health among its citizens and forcing schoolchildren to move to distance learning. Smog in the city: complaints and consequences In the last week of November, unfavorable weather conditions hit Ust-Kamenogorsk, aggravating the problem of air pollution. Citizens complained of worsening health: headaches, nausea, vomiting, coughing, and fever. Children, who have to breathe polluted air on their way to school, are particularly affected. Parents have repeatedly expressed their outrage, demanding action. In response to the latest complaints, the authorities transitioned some 53,000 of the city's schoolchildren to distance learning on November 28-29. This marked the first time in the city's history that education was suspended due to the environmental situation. Weather forecasters say that the unfavorable weather conditions will continue until at least the end of November. This means that Ust-Kamenogorsk residents will continue to suffer from smog, and children will probably remain in distance learning. Environmentalists weigh in Azamat Tauyrbekov, head of the Department of Ecology for the East Kazakh region, said that environmental agencies are working hard these days, conducting air measurements throughout the city. However, inspections of enterprises are complicated by bureaucratic procedures: access to production facilities requires an official application with evidence of violation. On November 28, joint inspections took place at two large enterprises in the region: Kazzinc and an oil extraction plant. So far, the results of the inspections have not been published, but activists and citizens continue to insist on the need for more transparent controls over emissions. Citizen frustration boils over Residents of Ust-Kamenogorsk are discussing the air pollution situation on social networks, sharing their complaints and worries. In comments on the Instagram platform one can see messages such as: - "It is impossible to breathe, even at home." - "My head hurts, I feel weak, feverish, have a sore throat, watery eyes, stuffy nose." - "How is it possible to poison almost 400,000 people? We pay taxes to be destroyed?" - "There is a taste of metal and acid in my mouth." Despite the fact that the problem has become a reason for creating memes and jokes about smog, reactions such as these reveal the deep dissatisfaction and anxiety of the city's residents. People are starting to openly demand that authorities strengthen control over emissions from enterprises and take real measures to improve the environmental situation in the city.
Putin in Kazakhstan: Language Diplomacy, Treaty Fine Print and a Hack
Geopolitical tensions, finding common ground on oil and gas transportation and deliveries and Russia’s hopes of beating out rivals to build Kazakhstan´s first nuclear power plant. These were some of the big ticket themes framing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trip to the Central Asian nation last week. The Times of Central Asia looks at a few other things that happened on the sidelines: A Tale of Two Languages “Kazakhstan is practically a Russian-speaking country, which you have probably had a chance to see for yourself.” Putin was extolling close ties between Russia and Kazakhstan when he made that remark to journalists in Astana last week. But the comment also drew attention to how Kazakhstan uses the Kazakh language to express national identity and independence from a past controlled by Moscow. In November 2023, during an earlier visit by Putin to Astana, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev spoke in Kazakh rather than Russian, causing senior Russian officials to reach somewhat hurriedly for their earpieces to get the translation. While Russia and Kazakhstan share a long land border and are bound by deep economic and security ties, Tokayev’s semantic switch seemed to be a reminder that Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic and Russian imperial territory, would follow its own path. Last week, both leaders went out of their way to emphasize linguistic harmony, even if tensions sometimes emerge over Kazakhstan’s increasing promotion of the Kazakh language. There is a significant ethnic Russian minority living in Kazakhstan. “One third of schoolchildren in our country are educated in Russian. We attach special importance to this issue. It is for this reason that I proposed the creation of the International Russian Language Organization,” Tokayev said. Putin thanked Tokayev for backing the use of the Russian language, “widely and freely,” in Kazakhstan. He said there are plans to open three Russian language schools in Kazakhstan, with Russian government support. Some social media posts claimed there was a diplomatic dustup between the two leaders, showing video of Putin´s “Russian-speaking country” remark followed by Tokayev speaking in Kazakh in an apparent pushback. However, the video appears to be spliced from different events. Putin is shown standing; Tokayev is seated. Furthermore, the Kremlin transcript shows that Putin made the remark at a solo news conference. That’s What It Says, But… The treaty of a regional security group that includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia says members must provide military and other help to any member subjected to “aggression by any state or group of states.” Does that mean members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, should get behind Russia in its war against Western-backed Ukraine? After all, Putin says Russia is a target of Ukrainian and Western aggression, even if some dispute the assertion because he launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin was asked the question on Thursday after a state visit to Kazakhstan and a meeting of the regional security group in Astana. Each security group member “stands ready to act in accordance with its obligations,” Putin replied. But he recommended a pragmatic approach. “Considering that American weapons, such as the ATACMS, are targeting Russian territory, what realistically can the other countries of this organisation do to assist the Russian Federation? I mean, it is not a realistic expectation. Yet, even under these circumstances, we are likely capable of offering them as much support as we possibly can. We possess adequate resources and a safety margin to aid our allies if required,” Putin said. Just for the record, Article 4 of the CSTO says: “If one of the States Parties is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, then this will be considered as aggression against all States Parties to this Treaty. In the event of an act of aggression against any of the participating States, all other participating States will provide him with the necessary assistance, including military, and will also provide support at their disposal in exercising the right to collective defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.” President Aleksandr Lukashenko of Belarus is a close ally of Putin, who has used Belarusian territory for some Russian military operations during the war in neighboring Ukraine. Central Asian countries have tried to remain publicly neutral during the conflict. Armenia has effectively frozen its membership in the CSTO, saying it couldn’t rely on Russian help following Azerbaijan’s seizure of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh last year. Flag Swap Pro-Ukrainian hackers had their moment during Putin’s visit to Kazakhstan last week. For a while on Wednesday, an outdoor video display in Astana, the capital, stopped showing the red, blue and white Russian flag and instead treated passers-by to an image of the blue and yellow flag of Ukraine, Russia’s battlefield enemy. Kazakh authorities described the switch as a cyberattack and are investigating. Kazakhstan’s State Technical Service, said “a case of a temporary substitution of the displayed flag image was recorded on one of the LED screens. According to preliminary data, the attack was carried out from foreign IP addresses using proxy servers.” It said a criminal case had been opened and that the state service, which oversees information security, was trying to determine the source and method of the hack.
CSTO Leaders Tackle Regional Security, Nuclear Energy, and Afghan Border Concerns
Astana hosted a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), gathering heads of member states to discuss pressing regional and international issues. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev chaired the session of the CSTO Collective Security Council. Attendees included Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and CSTO Secretary-General Imangali Tasmagambetov. In his address, President Tokayev highlighted the CSTO’s pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability in Eurasia. “Amid modern challenges, the CSTO consistently demonstrates its relevance as a guarantor of security for all member states. Our coordinated actions, mutual trust, and support strengthen our collective ability to tackle complex and large-scale tasks. The CSTO is not merely a military partnership but a unique mechanism that unites our efforts and resources to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Tokayev stated. CSTO’s Response to Kazakhstan’s 2022 Crisis Tokayev reflected on the CSTO’s rapid deployment in January 2022, when Kazakhstan faced unrest over rising gas prices, which escalated into violent confrontations. Within 24 hours, CSTO forces were deployed to stabilize the situation. Russian troops secured strategic facilities in Almaty, while Kazakh forces restored order, marking a critical demonstration of the organization’s operational capability. Putin Unveils "Oreshnik" Missile System Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed ongoing tensions with Ukraine, signaling the potential use of the Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile system in response to Western-supplied long-range missiles targeting Russian territory. According to Putin, the Oreshnik has the destructive power of nuclear weapons, and can penetrate heavily fortified targets. “The temperature of the striking elements reaches 4,000 degrees. At the explosion's epicenter, everything is reduced to elementary particles, essentially turning to dust,” he explained. Putin also announced that serial production of the missile had begun, with several units ready for deployment. Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Power Project Discussions also turned to Kazakhstan’s plans to build its first nuclear power plant. Tokayev has proposed an international consortium, and Putin expressed Russia's willingness to participate through Rosatom, emphasizing its extensive experience with international collaborations. “Rosatom is ready to work with specialists from other countries,” Putin remarked, leaving the door open for multilateral cooperation. Armenia’s Absence and CSTO’s Future Noticeably absent from the summit was Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, following Armenia’s decision to freeze its CSTO membership earlier this year. Yerevan cited concerns over its sovereignty as the reason for the suspension. Secretary-General Tasmagambetov remained optimistic about Armenia’s return, calling it a valued ally. “This is the decision of an independent and sovereign state, which no country or organization can influence. Nevertheless, we view Armenia as an ally and hope it will return to full participation in the CSTO in the foreseeable future,” Tasmagambetov stated. Key Summit Outcomes During the session, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) also reflected on Kazakhstan's presidency in 2024, highlighting significant milestones achieved under its leadership. President Tokayev reported that approximately 60 activities were conducted within the CSTO's statutory areas of cooperation during Kazakhstan’s presidency. This included advancing coordinated approaches to key international issues in collaboration with member states, as noted by political analyst Marat Shibutov. One of the most notable achievements of the summit was the adoption of a pivotal document over a decade in the making - a targeted interstate program for the development of the Tajik-Afghan border. Shibutov emphasized that this program will facilitate a collaborative approach among CSTO member states to enhance border security, thereby bolstering the stability of the entire Central Asian region. Political scientist Daniyar Ashimbayev also highlighted an important remark by Russian Security Council Secretary, Sergei Shoigu, ahead of the summit. Shoigu is said to have commented that Russia’s “nuclear umbrella” extends to protecting all CSTO allies. The CSTO countries also underscored the importance of addressing the Afghan situation. On the one hand, they acknowledged the need for economic integration and interconnection with Afghanistan, viewing this as a means to foster regional peace and stability. On the other, the formal adoption of the targeted program for the Tajik-Afghan border represents a decisive step toward enhancing collective security measures.
Kazakhstan, with China’s Help, Plans to Export Green Energy to Europe
Although Kazakhstan is a major producer of all fossil fuels – coal, crude oil, and natural gas – it also has the capacity to secure its energy future by prioritizing renewable energy. Fully aware of that, the European Union – one of the former Soviet republic’s most significant trade partners – aims to strengthen its energy ties with Astana, hoping to begin importing not only “green electricity” from the Central Asian nation, but also green hydrogen. On November 25, at Nazarbayev University in Astana, the “Energy in Transition – Powering Tomorrow” traveling exhibition was held, and one of the major topics discussed by energy experts was green hydrogen – hydrogen produced using renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power. It is unlikely a pure coincidence that the German Federal Foreign Office initiated the event. Over the past few years, Germany has shown interest in the development of the Kazakh green hydrogen sector. The most prominent green hydrogen project in Kazakhstan is currently being developed by Hyrasia One, a subsidiary of the German-Swedish energy company, Svevind. In 2021, the company announced its plans for €50 billion ($55 billion) green hydrogen project in the Mangystau Region in western Kazakhstan. It is expected that Hyrasia One will begin the production of green hydrogen in 2030, and the power plant will reach full capacity by 2032. Meanwhile, the authorities in Astana will need to find a way to export this form of renewable energy to Europe, a major energy market for Kazakhstan. Although Astana and Brussels signed a strategic partnership on the production of green hydrogen in November 2022, several challenges remain in the implementation of the deal. Issues such as the high cost, water scarcity in the largest Central Asian state (with water being the key component of green hydrogen production), and a lack of transport infrastructure, are significant barriers to exporting hydrogen from Kazakhstan to Europe. Using Russian gas pipeline systems for transportation of the Kazakh green hydrogen to Europe is not an option given current geopolitical circumstances. To resolve this transportation issue, the Kazakh authorities and their European partners could build hydrogen pipelines across the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Turkey to reach southern European countries. The problem is that building such a pipeline infrastructure is very expensive, and it remains uncertain who would be willing to fund such a project. That, however, does not mean that Kazakhstan cannot become Europe’s major green hydrogen supplier. What Astana would have to do, according to experts, is to convert the green hydrogen into green ammonia and then export it to Europe via the Middle Corridor – running through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. On the Black Sea coast, ammonia would be loaded onto ships and transported past the Bosphorus to EU members such as Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. From there, it would be sent further north, where green hydrogen would eventually be extracted from the ammonia. This is a rather complex process, and it is unclear how feasible and profitable would be. That is why, at least at for now, the export of “green electricity” from Kazakhstan to Europe seems to be a more realistic option. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has described Kazakhstan as a “frontrunner in Central Asia for developing clean energy innovation policies”, pointing out that it has the resources to “attract significant foreign direct investment in areas like renewable energy.” Indeed, China has already started investing in the Kazakh solar and wind energy sectors, helping the country increase green energy production. More importantly, on November 13, during the 29th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) in Baku, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Almasadam Satkaliyev signed multiple agreements with various international companies worth nearly $3.7 billion to advance green energy initiatives in the Central Asian nation. Also, on November 18, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic partnership agreement for green energy development and transmission. These deals are not just about business. They represent an opportunity for Central Asian countries to consolidate their role on the world stage, strengthen ties with Europe, and create a sustainable future for their citizens. The agreement between Astana, Baku, and Tashkent provides for the joint construction of a clean energy cable beneath the Caspian Sea for exporting renewable energy to European markets. In other words, with the help of Chinese and other investors, Kazakhstan, as well as Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, will produce electricity from renewable sources, and then export it to the EU. That seems to be Astana and Brussels ultimate goal at this point. In order to achieve it, however, Kazakhstan will have to work hard not only on creating the Caspian-Black Sea-Europe Green Energy Corridor – connecting it with Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and further with European nations – but on increasing green electricity production. Presently, coal is by far the largest source of electricity production in Kazakhstan, amounting to 57 percent of total electricity generation, with natural gas providing another 29 percent. The Central Asian nation is rich in renewable energy resources, having a strong wind potential in the north, and solar in the south of the country. If it manages to use these resources properly, Kazakhstan has the opportunity not only to become a reliable supplier of green electricity – and potentially green hydrogen – to Europe, but also to reach carbon neutrality by 2060, a goal Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev set in 2020.
Central Asia in the Crosshairs: Experts Warn of Intensifying Global Information Wars
The shift toward a multipolar world is unlikely to spark a nuclear conflict, but it is setting the stage for a global information war, according to Kazakh experts. They predict that Central Asia will soon become the focal point of this confrontation. At a roundtable in Astana titled "Humanitarian Aspects of Information Security and Soft Power as Factors of Sustainable Development and National Consolidation of Kazakhstan," participants discussed how Kazakhstan could address these challenges while leveraging "soft power" to its advantage. The Information Warfront Yerzhan Bagdatov, director of the information agency Toppress.kz, stated that Kazakhstan has long been a hotspot for hybrid warfare between Russia and the West. This is evident not only in sanctions threatening secondary effects on Kazakh enterprises, but also in external information campaigns targeting the country. “The methods of information warfare - sabotage, provocations - are already evident in Kazakhstan. A Third World Information War, though unlikely to involve nuclear weapons, could still result in casualties, economic losses, and damage to infrastructure,” said Bagdatov. Bagdatov noted that media, social networks, and mobile apps have become primary tools in this warfare. Across the globe, specialized information operation centers are deploying these tactics, including in Central Asia. Kazakhstan has experienced attempts to stoke inter-ethnic tensions, undermine trust in monetary policy, and spread misinformation about health policies, including vaccination. Bagdatov emphasized the urgent need to combat these tactics through better public awareness and “information hygiene.” He pointed to Russia’s example, where an institute under the Academy of Sciences counters information attacks. He suggested Kazakhstan could expand fact-checking efforts, such as those by stopfake.kz, into a regional network to address cross-border misinformation. Building Resilience Through Digital Hygiene Alexander Drogovoz, deputy director of the Alexei Kosygin Institute of International Education in Russia, advocated for a unified approach among Central Asian nations. This includes creating regional communication platforms to reduce reliance on Western platforms that frequently block or ban content from countries like Russia. Drogovoz also highlighted the need to combat online anonymity, citing Italy's law enforcement measures to identify anonymous users and prosecute illegal online activity. “Authorities must treat online crimes with the same seriousness as real-world offenses,” he stated. Galym Baituk, chairman of Manash Kozybaev North Kazakhstan University, underscored Kazakhstan’s unique position at the crossroads of civilizations, making it particularly vulnerable to misinformation and propaganda. He called for the development of national digital platforms to promote the Kazakhstani agenda and state-supported education programs to help citizens distinguish facts from manipulation. Turning Challenges Into Opportunities Despite the threats, Aidar Kurmashev of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KISI) argued that the situation offers Kazakhstan new opportunities to assert itself as a regional leader in "soft power." Kurmashev emphasized the growing importance of middle powers, such as Kazakhstan, in a multipolar world. Drawing on the experiences of countries like South Korea and Turkey, he suggested that Kazakhstan could foster coalitions to address global challenges while strengthening its regional position. Another opportunity lies in engaging with the Kazakh diaspora. Kurmashev proposed studying the needs of Kazakhs abroad and increasing the number of diplomatic attachés focused on diaspora affairs, following the examples of Armenia and Poland. Kurmashev also stressed the importance of "scientific and educational diplomacy." By participating in international research initiatives and establishing scientific consortia, Kazakhstan could attract talent, develop cutting-edge technologies, and enhance its global image. Cultural Diplomacy: A Soft Power Tool As an example of Kazakhstan’s potential in cultural diplomacy, Kurmashev cited singer Dimash Kudaibergen, whose blend of Kazakh traditions with modern music has gained international acclaim. “Building a sustainable ‘cultural wave’ around such figures could significantly boost Kazakhstan’s global cultural profile,” he said. Kazakhstan’s ability to navigate these challenges will determine its success in becoming not just a target of global information warfare but an active player capable of shaping the region’s narrative.
Sunkar Podcast
Kazakhstan’s Return to Nuclear Power
