U.S. Business Push in Central Asia Moves From Dialogue to Deals
The pace of U.S. commercial engagement in Central Asia has quickened in recent weeks, with business delegations, export-finance officials, and sector-specific agreements appearing across the region. In June, a U.S. business delegation discussed investment opportunities in Turkmenistan, while Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director General of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service David L. Fogel used the Astana Mining and Metallurgy Congress to press for practical cooperation in critical minerals.
That same month, the Tashkent International Investment Forum drew John Jovanovic, president and chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and Ben Black, chief executive officer of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Kazakhstan and U.S. companies signed artificial intelligence agreements worth $10 billion, Uzbekistan agreed to reduce tariffs on a range of U.S. goods, and Kyrgyzstan’s Civil Aviation Agency held talks with U.S. Ambassador Leslie Viguerie on aviation cooperation.
Taken together, these moves suggest a change in tone. Washington’s regional agenda is increasingly being expressed through commercial missions, project finance, technology partnerships, and trade mechanisms rather than broad diplomatic declarations. The shift from diplomacy to deals is becoming visible in several capitals at once.
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Image: The Republic of Kazakhstan – the United States of America roundtable[/caption]
Against that background, a roundtable titled “The Republic of Kazakhstan - the United States of America” was held in Astana on June 30. It was organized by Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Commerce of Kazakhstan.
The U.S. delegation was led by Khush Choksy, senior vice president for international member relations at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who oversees programs in the Middle East, Türkiye, and Central Asia. The Kazakh delegation was led by Ambassador Yerzhan Kazykhan, Kazakhstan’s presidential representative for negotiations with the United States.
For Choksy, the visit continued a longer push by the U.S. Chamber. He visited Kazakhstan in 2023 and 2025, and has repeatedly described the country as a strong platform for American business. Yet trade remains modest compared with the political ambition attached to the relationship.
According to Kazakh government data, bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and the U.S. reached $3.19 billion in 2025, while USTR estimates U.S. goods trade with Kazakhstan at $5 billion. U.S. goods trade with Uzbekistan, the region’s most populous country, was just over $1 billion in 2025. The figures underline the gap between strategic interest and commercial scale.
The reasons for this are not limited to distance. Disrupted logistics, sanctions risks linked to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and instability in parts of the Middle East have complicated long-distance trade. The Jackson-Vanik amendment, adopted in 1974, also remains formally applicable to Kazakhstan despite repeated efforts in Washington to repeal it and grant the country permanent normal trade relations status.
The Astana roundtable brought together government agencies, companies, international corporations, financial institutions, and policy experts. Participants discussed investment cooperation, energy, digital transformation, infrastructure, innovation, transport, and logistics. B2B meetings were also held, along with meetings between U.S. companies and Kazakh ministries and agencies.
Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin opened the event. He outlined the conditions available to investors in the Astana Special Economic Zone and pointed to large project pipelines in mining, infrastructure, and utilities.
According to Zhumangarin, Kazakhstan’s mineral extraction and processing potential is estimated at about $95 billion. He said the national investment plan includes more than 200 projects worth around $80 billion, while modernization of utility networks could add another $25 billion.
Kazykhan framed Kazakhstan as the region’s main entry point for U.S. companies. “Today, Kazakhstan accounts for around 60% of Central Asia’s GDP,” he said. “More than 600 American companies operate in our country, and cumulative U.S. investment exceeds $100 billion.”
He pointed to Chevron and ExxonMobil in energy, Wabtec and Boeing in transport infrastructure, John Deere, Caterpillar, and Honeywell in industry, and Microsoft, Amazon, and Google in digital transformation. The examples were designed to show that U.S.-Kazakh cooperation is no longer confined to oil and gas.
Kazykhan also emphasized transport. He said 85% of Eurasian transit container traffic passes through Kazakhstan, and that the country has invested $35 billion in transport infrastructure to keep routes reliable and diversified.
AI formed another part of the push. Astana plans to host a C5+1 AI Conference on the margins of the Digital Bridge Forum in October, giving Kazakhstan a platform to promote cooperation with the United States on trusted technologies, AI infrastructure, and the digital economy.
Choksy said the U.S. Chamber would advocate for American companies in support of a bipartisan congressional initiative to repeal Jackson-Vanik fully for Kazakhstan and grant the country permanent normal trade relations status.
Recent U.S. activity in Central Asia clearly indicates a rethinking of the region’s role in international cooperation. Leaders are moving from cautious talk about the need for economic development and mutually beneficial trade to concrete, pragmatic projects. The parties are striving to increase mutual investment, exchange and develop technology, and grow mutually beneficial trade. It is precisely this mutual interest that should guarantee stable economic development and security in this part of Eurasia.
Kazakhstan’s Pax Silica Accession Bodes Well for Foreign Investment
Kazakhstan’s accession to Pax Silica is more than a diplomatic ribbon-cutting. It is an investment signal. By joining an initiative supported by the United States and built around trusted supply chains for the new artificial intelligence economy, Kazakhstan has placed itself inside one of the most important emerging conversations in global industry about who will supply the minerals, energy, computing infrastructure, data centers, talent and manufacturing capacity behind the AI boom. Kazakhstan’s official readout was explicit about that ambition. Pax Silica, it said, brings partner countries together around artificial intelligence, critical minerals, semiconductors, data centers, energy infrastructure, high-tech manufacturing, research and talent development. Kazakhstan became the first country from its region to join, with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development Zhaslan Madiyev signing the accession declaration and the AI Opportunity Partnership statement in Washington on June 25. “Behind every AI solution are energy, critical minerals, computing capacity, data centers, semiconductors, engineering talent, and secure supply chains,” Madiyev said. Pax Silica is a supply-chain coalition whereby each participant brings a piece of the AI industrial base such as chips, energy, minerals, capital, cloud infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, regulatory alignment or technical talent. Reuters has described the initiative as a U.S.-led effort to secure the supply chains behind artificial intelligence, from energy and critical minerals to high-end manufacturing and AI models. Kazakhstan’s inclusion demonstrates that the country is being viewed as a potentially significant node in the physical infrastructure of the AI economy. Why Kazakhstan Fits the Pax Silica Map Kazakhstan has existing relevance in the AI supply chain as well as the capability to expand that role. That helps explain why Kazakhstan, rather than another regional state, became the first Central Asian node to plug into Pax Silica’s trusted supply-chain architecture. The U.S. International Trade Administration says Kazakhstan has substantial reserves of rare earth elements, copper, lithium, tungsten, tantalum and other materials essential for modern technologies and the energy transition. It also notes that the country’s policy focus is shifting from raw-material exports toward value-added processing and downstream production. With regard to the energy feedstock needed to power AI data centers, Kazakhstan has been the world’s leading uranium producer since 2009 and produced about 40% of global output in 2025. Nuclear energy is returning to the strategic conversation as governments and companies look for firm, low-carbon electricity. Kazakhstan also has a proven record as a resource partner for the U.S. and the West. U.S. energy majors helped build Kazakhstan’s modern oil sector, with Chevron beginning production from a $48 billion expansion of the Tengiz oilfield in 2025. In aerospace, Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant supplies major global manufacturers, including Boeing and Airbus, and officials say titanium from Kazakhstan accounts for roughly one-fifth of the global aerospace titanium market. A New Layer in U.S.-Kazakhstan Alignment Pax Silica also follows a warming trend in U.S.-Kazakhstan relations under the Trump administration. Tokayev has already framed Kazakhstan as an active participant in several U.S.-backed initiatives, including the Abraham Accords, the Board of Peace and the TRIPP initiative, while describing the enhanced strategic partnership as stronger than ever. For investors, supply-chain confidence rests on more than geology and ambition. It relies on political alignment, financing channels, legal predictability and the perception that projects can survive geopolitical pressure. The possible opening of a permanent U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) presence in Kazakhstan would add another layer. Tokayev and DFC CEO Ben Black recently discussed cooperation in critical minerals, transport connectivity, agriculture, digitalization and artificial intelligence, as well as the possibility of a permanent DFC office in Kazakhstan. Separately, DFC said its proposed Kazakhstan telecom investment would support secure digital connectivity and that it sees substantial opportunity in infrastructure, energy, critical minerals and the Trans-Caspian Corridor. Tokayev’s Digital Agenda Meets the AI Supply Chain Pax Silica fits a policy line Tokayev has been building for years. In his first State of the Nation address in 2019, he linked Kazakhstan’s move beyond a raw-material mindset to the knowledge economy, innovation and artificial intelligence. By 2023-2024, that ambition had become a formal AI agenda, including cooperation with global companies and universities, new institutions, AI education, and digital and AI deployment across the real economy. The tangible infrastructure push gives the policy and regulatory agenda weight. Tokayev has backed supercomputing capacity, data centers and east-west fiber links, including Trans-Caspian connectivity, to position Kazakhstan as a digital corridor between Europe and Asia. The planned Data Center Valley in Ekibastuz is the clearest expression of that strategy. The complex includes a power-backed AI computing campus aimed at hyperscalers, cloud companies, and infrastructure investors. Recent NVIDIA and Firebird agreements, worth up to $10 billion, give the project concrete weight. Pax Silica therefore does not introduce a new ambition for Kazakhstan. It gives an external supply-chain framework to an agenda already in motion: AI talent, compute infrastructure, connectivity and industrial deployment. Derisking for Foreign Investors Pax Silica gives investors a policy architecture around which deals can be financed, insured, procured and justified before corporate risk committees, boards, and public-sector finance agencies. A Kazakhstan-based project in, for example, mineral processing, grid-backed data centers, secure fiber, telecom infrastructure, advanced manufacturing or mining technology can now be framed as part of a U.S.-aligned AI supply-chain buildout, rather than as a standalone bet in a complex emerging market. That changes the investment justification because boards can use a national-security rationale, DFC and export-credit agencies can use a mandate-compatible sector map, offtakers can make a stronger trusted-supply argument, and technology companies can gain greater comfort that projects are moving inside a recognized U.S.-led supply-chain lane. Since Pax Silica is explicitly aimed at securing AI supply chains from energy and critical minerals to high-end manufacturing and AI models, Kazakhstan’s membership can move projects into a more financeable industrial-security category. Such projects still face execution and geopolitical risk, but they are easier to justify and syndicate after due diligence. That financing logic also depends on Kazakhstan’s sovereign room to maneuver. In Central Asia, investors underwrite more than geology and power access. They also underwrite contracts and whether a project can remain commercially viable in a pressured neighborhood. Kazakhstan’s advantage is that it has the scale, resource base, Western investment record and diplomatic range to support U.S.-aligned supply-chain projects without being captive to any single external power. From a supply chain security perspective, Kazakhstan can offer minerals, energy, and infrastructure inside a host-state environment sturdy enough for long-term investment and independent enough to keep Western-facing projects viable. The Test Is Execution Pax Silica reinforces a case already being made in mining and energy circles that Kazakhstan has the raw materials and industrial base to move up the global value chain, helped by its geopolitical positioning. S&P Global Energy/Platts’ Wesley Monteiro recently told The Times of Central Asia that Kazakhstan has a credible path from mining’s second tier toward the global top tier. Pax Silica adds a new layer to that argument by placing Kazakhstan inside a curated supply-chain architecture for the next industrial economy. Washington has already opened part of the lane. Pax Silica gives Kazakhstan a formal policy rationale for supply-chain projects. DFC engagement adds a potential financing and insurance channel, and the U.S.-Kazakhstan agenda gives firms a clearer reason to examine projects in minerals, connectivity, data infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing. Accession does not make any project bankable by itself, but it supports an investment case that already exists by placing Kazakhstan’s resources, energy base and digital ambitions inside a U.S.-aligned supply-chain framework. That bodes well for the next phase of foreign direct investment. Kazakhstan already has a proven investment record. Pax Silica sharpens the case by tying its minerals, energy, geography, and digital infrastructure to the AI supply-chain economy. In a region drawing more attention from Washington, Beijing, Europe, and the Gulf, this gives Kazakhstan a more coherent claim to the next wave of industrial investment.
Russia’s Fuel Crisis Tests Kazakhstan’s Energy Resilience
Kazakhstan is being pulled into a new energy paradox. As Russia's fuel crisis deepens, the country is being discussed as a potential gasoline supplier to its largest neighbor. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is tightening controls at home, building reserves around refinery maintenance, and weighing fuel imports from China to protect its own market. On June 24, Reuters reported that Russia was in talks with Kazakhstan to import about 50,000 metric tons of AI-92 gasoline, citing four industry sources. The discussions followed refinery outages and unscheduled repairs in Russia after Ukrainian drone attacks, which had led to shutdowns at several large refineries in central Russia and cut Russian gasoline output by roughly 25% year-on-year by late June. The news was striking because Russia is normally a major exporter of petroleum products. The need to consider gasoline imports, including seaborne imports and emergency market-stabilization measures, underlines the scale of disruption in Russia's refining system. Kazakhstan's Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov said Astana had not received an official request from Moscow, but the question remains politically and economically sensitive for Kazakhstan: can it afford to send fuel abroad if its own margin of safety is narrowing? Officially, the domestic picture remains stable. Kazakhstan's government said on June 20 that national stocks of gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel exceeded 1 million tons, enough to cover current demand. It said supplies were being prioritized for filling stations, agricultural producers, and domestic airlines, and that no shortage of fuels and lubricants had been observed. Yet those assurances sit alongside a more fragile structural reality. Kazakhstan's refining system depends heavily on three large refineries: Atyrau in the west, Pavlodar in the north, and Shymkent in the south. Last year, it was reported that, after modernization, the three plants had a combined annual output of about 17 million metric tons. Such a system can function efficiently when all units are operating normally, but it leaves limited room for simultaneous shocks. One of those shocks is already present. The Atyrau Oil Refinery began scheduled preventive maintenance on June 26 under a timetable approved by the Ministry of Energy. KazMunayGas said the work includes inspections of 20 reactors, 213 storage tanks, 32 columns, and 231 heat exchangers, as well as replacement of more than 335 tons of catalysts. The refinery entered maintenance with 38,000 tons of gasoline, 31,300 tons of diesel, and 6,800 tons of jet fuel. KazMunayGas said national stocks of AI-92 gasoline and diesel covered 34 and 32 days of demand, respectively, and that the phased restart of processing units was scheduled to begin on July 10. Those figures show resilience, but not abundance. Summer brings higher consumption from agriculture, passenger travel, freight, and aviation. For the government, managing this period means monitoring refinery output, shipments, inventories, and preventing fuel from leaving the country through unauthorized channels. After a June 20 meeting, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov ordered tighter border controls; the government said vehicles are restricted from crossing the state border by road more than once per day as part of measures to curb illegal fuel movements. The clearest sign of pressure is not that Kazakhstan might be asked to supply Russia, but that Kazakhstan is also preparing to diversify its own import options. On June 25, Trade and Integration Vice Minister Zhanel Kushukova said that Kazakhstan was considering reducing import customs duties on fuel and lubricants from third countries to zero. She said the measure, under review within the Eurasian Economic Commission, was intended to stimulate supplies from third countries, with the main focus on China. Formally, this is a technical customs measure, but in practice it signals a wider shift. For years, Russian supplies were Kazakhstan's natural fallback mechanism: geographically close, commercially convenient, and operating within the Eurasian Economic Union framework. That assumption is decidedly weaker now. Russia is dealing with shortages of its own, has already restricted gasoline exports, and on June 1 banned aviation fuel exports until November 30 to stabilize its domestic market. The effects are visible across the region. Kyrgyzstan has reported disruptions in AI-95 and AI-98 gasoline supplies. The Moscow Times reported that the head of Kyrgyzstan's Association of Oil Traders, Kanatbek Eshatov, said interruptions had been recorded at some filling stations because of reduced and irregular Russian supplies and seasonal demand. Kyrgyzstan receives more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia, and from January-May 2026, it supplied more than 251,000 tons of motor gasoline, 235,150 tons of diesel, and 48,150 tons of jet fuel to the country, according to traders' estimates. When Russian supplies tighten, pressure can shift toward Kazakhstan, both through official demand and through illicit channels. Kazakhstan's Border Service of the National Security Committee said that since the start of 2026, more than 2,400 cases of illegal movement of fuels and lubricants had been prevented at checkpoints, involving more than 300 tons of seized products worth about 60 million tenge (about $120,000). Kazakhstan has also kept export restrictions in place. The country's ban on the export of gasoline, diesel, and certain petroleum products by road, including to Eurasian Economic Union states, runs from May 21 to November 21, 2026. Jet fuel presents another vulnerability. Kazakhstan may also face a shortage in July as demand rises, the Atyrau refinery undergoes maintenance, and imports from Russia fall. One possible workaround would be a swap arrangement, with Kazakhstan supplying gasoline to Russia in exchange for jet fuel. Russia’s aviation-fuel export ban complicates that option. The restriction is particularly sensitive for Central Asia because Russian jet fuel normally moves mainly by rail to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The aviation angle adds pressure because Kazakhstan’s air transport market is expanding. Air Astana has committed to a major fleet modernization program, including an agreement for up to 50 Airbus A320neo-family aircraft: 25 firm aircraft and 25 purchase options, with the first deliveries expected from 2031. More aircraft do not create an immediate fuel shock, but they underline the long-term need for a stable and diversified jet-fuel supply chain. That is why the idea of a fourth refinery is gaining urgency. In May, it was reported that Kazakhstan had begun pre-project work for a new refining complex with a planned capacity of up to ten million tons of crude oil per year. In June, Samruk-Kazyna said its subsidiary Samruk-Kazyna Ondeu had signed a contract with Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Limited to prepare a pre-feasibility study for a new oil refinery in Kazakhstan. Until recently, the assumption in Astana was that modernization of existing refineries would be enough to manage domestic demand and allow a gradual shift toward exports. The events of 2026 show how thin that margin can be. A scheduled shutdown at one domestic refinery, attacks on Russian refining infrastructure, Russian export restrictions, seasonal demand, regional shortages, and smuggling can quickly merge into a single energy-security problem. Russia's fuel crisis has therefore become a stress test for Kazakhstan's own resilience. The lesson is clear: having crude oil is not enough to guarantee stability. The priority now is refining capacity, storage, logistics, and the speed at which supplies can be redirected when regional fuel markets fracture.
Kurultai Election Campaign Takes Shape in Parliament’s Final Budget Debate
Kazakhstan's outgoing parliament spent one of its final sessions debating the government's management of the 2025 budget, in what often resembled a dress rehearsal for the country's first Kurultai election campaign.
On July 1, Kazakhstan’s new constitution will enter into force, replacing the current Senate and Mazhilis with a single-chamber Kurultai. The new legislature will have 145 deputies elected through party lists, and elections are expected in August.No current deputy will transfer automatically into the new chamber. Those who want to remain in national politics will need a place on a party list and a fresh mandate. That gave the June 26 session an unusual political significance: would any outgoing deputies use the budget debate to make a final public break with the government?
Some did put pointed questions to Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and Finance Minister Madi Takiyev as parliament reviewed and approved the reports of the government and the Supreme Audit Chamber on the execution of the republican budget for 2025.
Finance Minister Madi Takiyev presented the figures in optimistic terms. According to him, Kazakhstan’s economy grew by 6.5% in 2025, while GDP increased by $14.7 billion in dollar terms. Meanwhile, public debt remains low at around 22.8% of GDP, or approximately $74.5 billion.
Deputies asked Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov why, despite GDP growth of 6.5%, Kazakh citizens’ incomes had declined.
Bektenov referred to high inflation, which has been eating into household incomes.
“Last year, inflation peaked in September at 12.9%. Now, as a result of measures taken by the government, the National Bank and other interested agencies, inflation over the first five months of this year has declined to 10.4%,” the prime minister said.
He recalled that the government had adopted a separate plan to raise household incomes. According to the government, the average monthly wage reached 442,000 tenge, about $910.
He said there were already sectors, such as agriculture and transport, where real incomes had increased.
Mazhilis deputy Azat Peruashev, who recently stepped down after 15 years as chairman of the Ak Zhol party but still heads its parliamentary faction, focused on the National Fund. He said the government had failed to keep an earlier promise to reduce withdrawals.
“When approving the draft budget for 2024-2026, the government announced a plan to reduce withdrawals from the National Fund starting in 2025. In fact, the volume of funds received from the National Fund in 2025 remained high, at approximately $10.8 billion,” he said.
The National Fund is one of the most politically sensitive parts of Kazakhstan’s public finances. Built largely from oil and gas revenue and managed through the National Bank, it is meant to serve two functions: to help stabilize the budget when commodity revenue falls, and to preserve part of the country’s resource wealth for future generations. Heavy withdrawals therefore carry a political cost. They can help cover current spending, but they also reduce the savings Kazakhstan has accumulated from its oil wealth, making the size of annual transfers a perennial political argument.Peruashev also criticized what he described as the existing imbalance in budget policy. According to him, social spending in 2025 increased to approximately $20.6 billion, while spending on the real sector of the economy amounted to only about $4.5 billion.
“The government spends five times more on non-recoverable needs than on creating future sources of income. In our view, the ratio should be the opposite,” the deputy said.
He also noted that the government does not reflect all areas of its activity in the national budget.
“New major investment projects based on higher value-added processing are being implemented in the regions and are capable of changing the structure and technological level of the national economy. However, these billions in public funds are directed outside the budget and parliament, through the Samruk-Kazyna fund, on the basis of independent government decisions. Thus, parallel economies have effectively emerged: one is the economy that passes through the budget, and the other is the economy that the government forms without discussion in parliament,” Peruashev said, while nevertheless calling on deputies to support the reports of the government and the Supreme Audit Chamber.
Other deputies used the session less to challenge the 2025 accounts than to set out themes for the coming campaign.
Serik Yegizbayev, a Mazhilis deputy from the Auyl party who recently stepped down as its chairman, said the current system of state support for farmers is too complex and should be reformed. He also called for a specialized agricultural bank to provide direct financing to producers.
Askhat Rakhimzhanov, a representative of the National Social Democratic Party faction, said his party’s deputies did not support the government’s report and called for an increase in the minimum wage.
Both the government, which will resign its powers before the newly elected Kurultai convenes, and the deputies themselves are already operating as temporary officeholders, aware that existing problems will be dealt with by entirely different people – or by the same people in new roles.
For that reason, the exchanges never became a full confrontation. Deputies criticized inflation, real incomes, National Fund withdrawals and off-budget spending, but most stopped short of rejecting the report. Instead, the joint parliamentary session often resembled an early campaign platform for Kazakhstan's next political era.
UKTMP Eyes Expanded U.S. Presence as Kazakhstan’s Titanium Champion Seeks New Markets
ASTANA — On June 11, Sylvain Gehler, Chairman of the Board of the Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant (UKTMP), and Assem Mamutova, the company’s CEO, spoke with The Times of Central Asia during the Astana Mining and Metallurgy Congress (AMM). He outlined their plans to strengthen the company’s international footprint, with the United States emerging as a priority market.
During the meeting, Gehler highlighted UKTMP’s ambition to further solidify its position as a leading aerospace-grade titanium supplier, building on six decades of operations and what Kazakh officials describe as roughly one-fifth of the global aerospace titanium market. “The combination of Kazakhstan’s resource base, UKTMP’s decades of experience, and the increasing importance of secure supply chains creates a strong platform for future growth. We are committed to remaining a trusted partner for aerospace customers around the world,” Gehler said.
UKTMP, based in eastern Kazakhstan, is among the world’s largest vertically integrated titanium producers, controlling the entire production chain from raw materials to finished products. The company’s products are used in aviation, medicine, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and nuclear industries. Among its international partners are Boeing, Airbus, Safran, General Electric, and other leading manufacturers.
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UKTMP -Titanium sponge at the end of the distillation process[/caption]
Gehler emphasized that “delivering consistent, high-quality titanium products reflects our commitment to rigorous standards and positions us to meet rising demand for resilient, transparent supply chains while expanding in key markets.”
The company’s long-term development plans and initiatives aim at reinforcing Kazakhstan’s standing in the global titanium industry. According to Gehler, “UKTMP’s investment program through 2033 includes 25 projects worth more than $520 million, including construction of a new titanium sponge facility that would significantly expand production capacity.” Currently, UKTMP has 30 types of titanium alloys.
Titanium and its alloys combine a high melting point, high electrical resistivity, exceptional strength-to-weight ratio, corrosion resistance in air and seawater, and non-magnetic behavior. It is also lightweight—its specific gravity is approximately 56% that of steel—biologically inert, and readily formed under pressure, making titanium a versatile structural material widely used in advanced industries.
United States Demand for Titanium
The American aerospace and defense sectors rely heavily on titanium, while disruptions to traditional supply chains following sanctions on Russia have heightened interest in alternative suppliers. Kazakhstan has emerged as one of the countries helping fill that gap.
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Source: USGS[/caption]
Industry analysts note that the United States currently lacks domestic titanium sponge production and remains dependent on imports. In 2025 through July, Japan supplied 73% of U.S. titanium sponge imports, while Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia each supplied 13%. This strategic reliance underpins the favorable treatment the U.S. currently gives to Kazakh titanium, since heavy supply restrictions would adversely impact the U.S. aerospace and defense industries. This has not always been the case.
For UKTMP, deeper access to the U.S. market represents not only a commercial opportunity but the makings of a strategic partnership. Increasing sales to American customers would further anchor Kazakhstan within Western aerospace and other supply chains at a time when demand for high-grade titanium continues to rise.
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USGS, UKTMP and Industry Sources[/caption]
Tariff Issues and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
To ensure economic resilience on processed critical minerals, the Trump Administration has repeatedly used Section 232 tariffs to protect against threats to national security and to strengthen manufacturing sectors critical to national and economic security.
In antidumping and countervailing-duty proceedings initiated in 2017, the U.S. Commerce Department examined whether Kazakh titanium sponge producers received unfair subsidies or sold products below fair value. Commerce ultimately retained the longstanding 15% import duty dating back to the Soviet era. At the time, Titanium Metals Corporation (TIMET), a U.S.-based titanium producer and the leading U.S. integrated titanium manufacturer, was still producing titanium sponge in the United States. TIMET no longer produces titanium sponge – the primary raw material used to make titanium metal products.
In March 2019, the White House initiated a Section 232 review of titanium sponge imports after a TIMET petition, assessing national security implications for a key defense and aerospace material. The investigation found that imports threatened to impair national security, with the U.S. then importing roughly two-thirds of the sponge metal it required, largely from Japan.
On February 27, 2020, President Trump, in his Memorandum on the Effects of Titanium Sponge Imports on National Security, agreed with the U.S. Commerce Department’s determination that titanium sponge imports posed a national security concern but declined to impose Section 232 tariffs or quotas. Instead, Trump established a working group comprising the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and other national security agencies to identify ways to strengthen the domestic titanium supply chain without disrupting aerospace and defense firms reliant on imported sponge.
Within industry circles around 2020–2021, many aerospace and defense stakeholders argued that Japanese and Kazakh titanium sponge came from trusted allies, China’s expanding production posed the real strategic risk, and that restricting Kazakh imports could weaken U.S. supply chains by limiting access to reliable non-Chinese material.
The Biden Administration
After taking office in 2021, the Biden administration published the Report on the Effect of Imports of Titanium Sponge on the National Security: An Investigation Conducted Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended. The Trump-era titanium working group then largely dropped out of public view, while U.S. critical minerals policy shifted toward broader supply chain resilience, stockpiles, and industrial support rather than targeted titanium tariff measures.
US-Kazakhstan Trade Issues
Nevertheless, industry observers point to several possible avenues for overcoming import uncertainties and trade-related barriers. While the United States may still seek to reinvigorate titanium mining, processing, and production in the first instance, the United States and Kazakhstan, for example, could pursue sector-specific agreements to formalize Kazakhstan’s status as a trusted supplier of titanium and other critical minerals.
Another avenue would be to deepen downstream cooperation with U.S. firms through joint ventures, long-term supply contracts, and/or increased investment in value-added titanium products. Such arrangements could reinforce the case that Kazakh titanium directly supports American industrial and national security priorities.
Greater alignment in regulatory frameworks and certification processes could streamline access to U.S. markets and lessen the administrative costs faced by exporters.
According to Gehler, “reactivating the federal titanium working group created during President Trump’s first term could help reassess tariffs and other trade restrictions on Kazakh titanium sponge and ingot.”
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UTKMP Melting Workshop[/caption]
Overall Direction
For Kazakhstan, the implications reach well beyond a single commodity. Astana increasingly regards critical minerals as a cornerstone of the country’s economic diversification agenda. At this year’s AMM gathering, government officials underscored Kazakhstan’s role as a supplier of various strategic materials, with titanium featuring especially prominently.
As global competition for critical minerals intensifies, UKTMP is counting on its established reputation, long-standing aerospace ties, and Kazakhstan’s expanding role in global supply chains to create new opportunities. For Gehler and Mamutova, expanding access to the U.S. market is not just about exports but about securing Kazakhstan’s role in next-generation industrial partnerships while strengthening U.S. supply chains.
Gehler concluded: “UKTMP is actively seeking to expand its commercial footprint in the United States, reflecting our long-term commitment to deeper industrial and supply chain partnerships in the American market. As we advance these efforts, we are encouraged by the prospect of a tariff and tax environment that supports critical minerals and greater trade efficiency, reduces administrative compliance costs, and enhances the competitiveness of Kazakh exports.”
A broader U.S. trade-policy date could come on July 24, 2026, when the temporary import surcharge imposed under Section 122, under “Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems,” is set to expire.
Whether Washington extends the measure, replaces it, or allows it to expire remains to be seen. The measure is not titanium-specific, but it could affect the titanium trade unless exemptions apply.
The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose
The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues, although market volatility and higher import and freight costs diluted the gain. The truce could therefore remove a temporary windfall for Astana while easing inflationary pressure in the region’s energy-importing economies.
The clearest longer-term opportunity may lie in trade and transit. On June 16, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin held a bilateral meeting with an Iranian delegation led by Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh.
The sides discussed the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor, expansion of port infrastructure, increasing bilateral trade volumes, and improving transport and logistics ties. By the end of 2025, cargo volumes along the North-South corridor had increased by 12% to 3.5 million tons. Rail freight between the two countries rose by 69%. Kazakhstan and Iran intend to modernize transport infrastructure to increase the corridor’s capacity to 20 million tons per year. The sides also emphasized the importance of the recently signed five-party railway agreement between China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the upcoming four-party tariff agreement between Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Iran, which is expected to create additional conditions for trade and transit growth. At the start of the military escalation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, regional economist and Logistan editor-in-chief Grigory Mikhailov had already pointed to transport and logistics opportunities for Central Asia. “There is a chance to attract investment into logistics development from major players, primarily China. For Beijing, the current situation is evidence of the need to develop alternative routes bypassing the Middle East. Options include expanding rail transit through Central Asia and Russia, as well as gradually developing the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast,” he said. De-escalation in the Middle East, even if temporary, may alter China’s plans for diversifying logistics routes, but is unlikely to cancel them altogether. This makes the pause a test of route confidence as much as diplomacy. If the ceasefire holds, Iran could regain some value as one of Central Asia’s shortest southern outlets to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. If it fails, the region’s search for alternatives will accelerate, strengthening demand for the Trans-Caspian route through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. In that sense, both peace and renewed instability could increase Central Asia’s strategic importance, but through different corridors. Another possible scenario involves Kazakhstan’s potential role in arrangements related to Iran’s nuclear program. Under the memorandum signed by Trump and Pezeshkian, Iran agreed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, but the framework sets no detailed limits on the program. The fate of Iran’s accumulated enriched-uranium stockpile is to be resolved in later talks. Washington and Tehran have publicly disputed what was agreed on inspections, although the memorandum says nuclear activities involving material and facilities would be supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said Kazakhstan had indicated its willingness to receive Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% if Washington and Tehran reached an agreement on the nuclear program. Grossi made the statement following his May 26 meeting in Astana with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Kazakhstan’s potential role rests on an established non-proliferation record: it hosted two rounds of nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty in 2013 and now hosts the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank. The bank itself is not authorized to receive or process Iran’s uranium enriched to 60%, however, meaning that any such arrangement would require separate legal documents, safeguards, financing, custody rules, and probably dedicated infrastructure. For Central Asia, the truce is less a peace dividend than a redistribution of risk. Hydrocarbon exporters could lose from weaker energy prices, while import-dependent economies could gain from lower fuel and freight costs. The region would also benefit from having more viable routes to world markets. The real question is whether banks, insurers, transport companies, and investors are willing to do business through Iran. Unless they are, the truce will remain a political pause rather than a lasting economic benefit for Central Asia.
EU Launches Platform to Mobilize Up to €2 Billion for Europe–Central Asia Connectivity
The European Commission launched a Connectivity Agenda Platform on June 23, 2026, and concluded statements of intent with international financial institutions expected to mobilize up to €2 billion ($2.3 billion) for transport, border-crossing and trade-facilitation projects across the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus.
The initiative was unveiled at a high-level ministerial meeting in Brussels, hosted by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela, and Commissioner for Sustainable Transport Apostolos Tzitzikostas.
The meeting brought together transport ministers and senior officials from EU member states, as well as representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, alongside international lenders, to advance connectivity projects under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.
The new platform is designed to coordinate investments and policy actions across transport, energy, digital connectivity, and trade. Participants also agreed to improve the operational efficiency of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, a wider framework that includes the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR, also known as the Middle Corridor.
The route links China and Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, offering an alternative to transport routes crossing Russia.
The European Commission said the expected financing would support transport infrastructure, border-crossing modernization, and trade-facilitation projects aimed at improving freight movement across the corridor.
“The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor is becoming a vital bridge between Europe and Asia,” Síkela said, adding that the investments would help make the route faster, more reliable, and better integrated.
Tzitzikostas said stronger transport links were critical for economic competitiveness and regional resilience.
The platform’s launch came during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s official visit to Brussels, where he met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
In an EU–Kazakhstan joint statement, the leaders reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Trans-Caspian corridor and pledged deeper cooperation under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.
They also highlighted the EU’s role as Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partner and agreed to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, energy, transport, digitalization, and emerging technologies.
Speaking at the Kazakhstan-EU roundtable in Brussels, Tokayev said Kazakhstan was investing heavily in infrastructure to position itself as a regional logistics hub connecting Europe, Central Asia, China, the Caucasus, and the Middle East.
According to Tokayev, cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor have risen fivefold over the past six years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.1 million tons annually, with Kazakhstan targeting a capacity of 10 million tons.
He said Kazakhstan has invested more than $35 billion in transport and logistics infrastructure over the past 15 years, with the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk serving as major transit gateways.
Tokayev also welcomed logistics agreements worth nearly $1 billion signed on June 23 by the Development Bank of Kazakhstan: one with the European Investment Bank, and a separate agreement with a banking syndicate including Commerzbank, JPMorgan Chase, and Standard Chartered, backed by guarantees from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
A day earlier, Kazakhstan and European partners announced four transport-related agreements worth a combined $462 million to further strengthen connectivity along the Middle Corridor.
Tokayev’s Brussels Visit Brings Aviation Pact, Visa Progress and $12 Billion Business Package
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev left Brussels with a broader package than the transport announcements that opened his two-day visit on June 22-23. Kazakhstan and the European Union signed an aviation agreement, completed talks at negotiators’ level on easier short-stay visas, backed new road and mineral projects, and endorsed an Air Astana aircraft order worth €7.145 billion. Tokayev also said the business program produced commercial agreements and memoranda worth more than $12 billion. Tokayev met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on June 23. Their joint statement placed connectivity, energy security and resilient supply chains at the center of the relationship. Von der Leyen called Kazakhstan “a global gateway” and said the EU was ready to turn it into “a pathway for jobs, business opportunities and common prosperity.” Negotiators completed talks on Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements, opening the way for internal approval procedures. The visa agreement would simplify applications for short stays in the EU, though the agreement would not create visa-free travel and has not yet entered into force. The two sides also signed a Horizontal Aviation Agreement after negotiations lasting more than two decades. Once internal procedures are complete, any eligible EU airline will be able to operate between Kazakhstan and 17 member states that already have air service arrangements with Astana. Existing rules generally reserve those rights for airlines owned or controlled by nationals of the country concerned. EU Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas said the pact would bring “our people and economies closer together.” A separate agreement covered up to 50 Airbus A320neo and A321neo aircraft for Air Astana. The joint statement valued the order at €7.145 billion. That transaction formed the largest named item within the more than $12 billion in commercial agreements and memoranda announced during the visit. Tokayev presented the total as evidence of European business confidence in Kazakhstan. Transport and connectivity remained the backbone of the trip. Before the leaders met, Kazakhstan and its European partners unveiled four Middle Corridor agreements worth a combined $462 million. They included airport digitalization work with SITA, an EBRD-backed loan for the 234-kilometer Aktobe-Ulgaisyn road, a KTZ Express project at Romania's Port of Midia, and cooperation with A.P. Moller-Maersk on container traffic across the Trans-Caspian route. The leaders welcomed a European Investment Bank framework agreement of up to €150 million for Kazakh roads along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. An EBRD memorandum will support an internationally accredited chemical-analytical laboratory for critical raw materials. Other documents cover intelligent transport systems, the E-Zholdary road platform and a minerals and metals center of excellence. Brussels also encouraged the EIB to open an office in Astana. These projects connect the visit to the EU's effort to build a reliable route between Central Asia and Europe through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye. Tokayev said annual freight volumes had risen from 800,000 tons to 4.1 million tons over six years. Kazakhstan aims to raise the corridor’s capacity to 10 million tons, but ports, railways, border procedures and cargo coordination are still limiting its speed and capacity. Tokayev said the country has invested more than $35 billion in transport and logistics infrastructure over the past 15 years, with Costa calling Kazakhstan a “key link in ensuring transport connectivity” between Europe and Asia. Critical minerals were the second major economic pillar. The EU and Kazakhstan signed a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen in 2022. A 2025-2026 roadmap covers exploration, processing, recycling, research and skills. In Brussels, the leaders committed to advance that work and highlighted Kazakhstan's role as an oil and uranium supplier. Kazakhstan is ready to supply 21 of the 34 materials on the EU's critical raw materials list. Tokayev said Kazakhstan supplied nearly 13% of the EU’s crude oil imports in 2025, while Kazakhstan produced about 40% of the world's uranium in 2025. They also called for stronger cooperation in renewable energy and civil nuclear power. The trade relationship remains large but narrow. EU goods trade with Kazakhstan reached €41.4 billion in 2025. Imports from Kazakhstan totaled €30.8 billion, but fuel and mining products made up 92% of this figure. Machinery, transport equipment and chemicals led European exports. Tokayev told the business roundtable that the EU accounts for almost half of the foreign direct investment attracted to Kazakhstan, and that about 4,000 European companies operate in the country. “Today, the European Union is our largest trade and investment partner,” Tokayev said. He listed Airbus, Alstom, Air Liquide, Polpharma and Škoda among the established investors, alongside newer entrants including Maersk, Inditex, and Damen Shipyards. The institutional base has been in place for a decade. Kazakhstan and the EU signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 2015, which entered into force in March 2020. It covers 29 policy areas, including trade, energy, transport, climate, research, justice and human rights. The relationship gained a regional layer at the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand in April 2025, when the two regions upgraded ties to a strategic partnership and the EU announced a €12 billion Global Gateway package. Education and technology also produced agreements in Brussels. Kazakh institutions signed partnerships with KU Leuven, the SIM² Institute and Astana Hub on critical minerals, industrial digitalization, and artificial intelligence. A separate agreement with Ghent University provides for a mirror laboratory in Kazakhstan focused on mathematics, AI, modeling, and engineering computing. Tokayev's meeting with Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever added a bilateral track. Belgium ranks among Kazakhstan's ten largest investors, with about $15 billion invested over two decades. Trade exceeded $580 million in 2025, and more than 110 companies with Belgian capital operate in Kazakhstan. The leaders discussed logistics, minerals, petrochemicals, agriculture, finance and AI, and prepared for King Philippe's first state visit to Kazakhstan. The Brussels statement also recorded continuing talks on sanctions and welcomed dialogue on human rights, the rule of law and anti-corruption measures. The EU acknowledged Kazakhstan's new constitution, approved in a March 2026 referendum. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful settlement of disputes under the UN Charter. Several results still require formal action. The aviation pact and visa agreements must pass internal procedures before taking effect. Loans must become physical works, and minerals cooperation must produce laboratories, processing capacity and investable projects. The visit nevertheless moved a wide agenda into signed agreements and named financing.
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