Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be speaking with former Kyrgyz Ambassador to the U.S. Kadyr Toktogul about what it means for Kyrgyzstan to get a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
UNDP Opinion: Central Asia – Shared Wildlife, Shared Landscapes, Shared Responsibility
As global leaders gather for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly in Samarkand, Central Asia has an opportunity to send a clear message to the world: protecting biodiversity is not only about saving species — it is about securing water, livelihoods, resilience and long-term stability for millions of people across our region.
From the glaciers of the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains to the deserts, steppes and river basins downstream, Central Asia’s ecosystems are deeply interconnected across borders. Rivers flow between countries. Wildlife migrates through shared landscapes. Mountain ecosystems regulate water systems that sustain agriculture, energy production and communities far beyond the highlands themselves.
Among the most powerful symbols of this shared natural heritage is the snow leopard — the silent guardian of Central Asia’s mountains.
The snow leopard represents far more than a rare and iconic species. Its survival reflects the health of entire ecosystems that millions of people depend upon every day. Healthy mountain landscapes help secure freshwater resources, reduce disaster risks, sustain pastures and agriculture, preserve biodiversity, and strengthen resilience to climate change across the region.
But today, these ecosystems are under growing pressure.
Climate change is accelerating glacier melting and intensifying water stress. Land degradation, unsustainable grazing, habitat fragmentation and biodiversity loss are placing increasing pressure on fragile mountain environments and rural livelihoods. Communities living closest to nature are often the first to feel the consequences — through declining water availability, degraded pastures, reduced agricultural productivity and increasing climate-related risks.
These challenges do not stop at national borders. And neither can the solutions. Only a coordinated regional response can match the scale of the challenge.
Protecting Central Asia’s mountain ecosystems requires countries to work together to conserve ecological corridors, strengthen transboundary protected areas, improve water and land governance, and invest in climate-resilient livelihoods for communities whose futures are closely tied to nature.
There are already successful examples of regional agreements. For example, a highly successful transboundary nature conservation agreement in Central Asia protects the Ustyurt Plateau and the Turan Temperate Deserts. Spanning across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this initiative has successfully safeguarded vulnerable ecosystems and migratory species like the saiga antelope and snow leopard.
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Photo: Saiga calf. Kazakhstan/UNDP Kazakhstan[/caption]
It is encouraging that transboundary cooperation has already taken shape across the region.
Across Central Asia, governments, communities and development partners are already demonstrating that conservation and development can advance together. While each country's experience is unique, the lessons are remarkably similar: when communities benefit from healthy ecosystems, nature and people both thrive.
In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard has become one of the clearest examples of how coordinated conservation efforts can help restore fragile ecosystems across borders. The species inhabits mountain systems that extend beyond national boundaries into China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, making its protection inseparable from regional cooperation.
Over the past decade, habitat countries have strengthened efforts to protect the species through national conservation strategies, expanded protected areas, and improved ecosystem monitoring. Supported by cooperation between the Government, UNDP, the Global Environment Facility, and the scientific community, large-scale monitoring and habitat conservation initiatives have generated new data on snow leopard populations and migration routes across the Tien Shan and Altai Mountain systems.
In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard population had declined to an estimated 80–100 animals by the mid-1990s, as habitat degradation, human pressure, and ecosystem fragmentation intensified across mountain landscapes. Over the years, systemic interventions, including digital monitoring, the establishment of a genetic bank, and studies of behavior and migration routes, helped support the creation of the Merke Regional Nature Park in 2026, strengthening the protection of critical habitats and ecological corridors shared across borders.
Today, the population is estimated at 152–189 snow leopards, with around 70 percent of the species’ range in Kazakhstan now falling within protected areas.
The growing snow leopard population, a symbol of the “health” of mountain ecosystems, shows that countries can create the conditions needed to conserve this rare and majestic species. It also demonstrates how biodiversity conservation in Central Asia increasingly depends on long-term regional cooperation, scientific collaboration, and shared responsibility for ecosystems that connect communities across borders.
For Kyrgyzstan, the snow leopard has become far more than a symbol of a rare species. It represents a broader commitment to safeguarding the mountain ecosystems that underpin water security, biodiversity, climate resilience, and the well-being of millions across Central Asia.
A longstanding symbol of strength, freedom, and harmony with nature, the snow leopard was officially designated a national symbol of the Kyrgyz Republic, reflecting the country’s deep connection to its mountain heritage.
As one of the world’s most mountainous countries, Kyrgyzstan views the conservation of snow leopard landscapes as both a national and regional priority. Protecting these habitats also means safeguarding forests, pastures, glaciers, snowfields, and watersheds that sustain communities and economies far beyond national borders. Recognizing their critical role in maintaining biodiversity and freshwater resources, Kyrgyzstan has established a legal basis for the protection of glaciers and snowfields and is developing mechanisms for their long-term conservation.
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Photo: UNDP Kyrgyzstan/Vlad Ushakov[/caption]
Kyrgyzstan has also used snow leopard conservation as a platform for advancing mountain resilience and regional cooperation. The country championed the UN Five Years of Action for the Development of Mountain Regions (2023–2027), supported the establishment of International Snow Leopard Day, and promotes transboundary cooperation through GSLEP, regional agreements, and joint conservation efforts among range countries.
Kyrgyzstan’s experience demonstrates how conserving one iconic species can unite countries around a shared agenda for mountain resilience, biodiversity conservation, water security, and sustainable development.
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Photo: Snow leopard’s habitat/UNDP Tajikistan[/caption]
High in the mountains of Tajikistan, people have lived alongside snow leopards for generations. But for many years, life was becoming harder for both. Shrinking pastures and disappearing wildlife pushed communities and predators into conflict. When snow leopards attacked livestock, families suffered. And when wild prey disappeared, the future of the snow leopard became uncertain.
Today, there is hope.
According to the 2025 edition of Tajikistan’s national Red Book, the country’s snow leopard population has grown to around 500 individuals — nearly double the estimated 250 recorded in 2017. Behind these numbers is a powerful lesson: protecting nature only works when local people are part of the solution.
A conservation project led by UNDP and funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) helped mountain communities enhance their livelihoods while protecting wildlife. Women in remote villages were trained in wildlife monitoring and ecotourism, gaining new opportunities while helping monitor and protect nature.
Altogether, 450 people from remote mountain areas, including protected area rangers and community members, strengthened their skills in smart patrolling and wildlife monitoring through project-supported trainings. These enhanced capacities improved wildlife tracking and threat detection, contributing to reduced illegal hunting and tree cutting.
The project also introduced a simple but effective solution to reduce conflict between people and snow leopards. Communities received hay to feed livestock for just 20 extra days in spring, allowing mountain pastures to recover and wild prey to return. With more food in the wild, snow leopards were less likely to attack farm animals.
Most importantly, communities were trusted to lead. Through small grants and local initiatives, they supported restoration of degraded pastures and forests, adoption of sustainable livestock practices, and reduced pressure on fragile mountain ecosystems, helping conserve iconic species while strengthening local livelihoods.
The story of the snow leopard in Tajikistan shows that when communities are empowered, nature can recover too.
Importantly, conservation success was not driven by communities alone. It was also enabled by stronger institutions, enhanced protected area management, expanded wildlife monitoring, and closer cooperation among scientists and conservation agencies. At the same time, while biodiversity frameworks are in place, their implementation depends on the capacities of staff at national and subnational levels. Continued education, skills development, awareness raising and, overall, investment in people remain essential to sustaining conservation efforts.
The return of the snow leopard reflects the recovery of entire mountain ecosystems.
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Photo: UNDP Turkmenistan / Dovlet Rejepov[/caption]
In Turkmenistan, in the Aral Sea Basin, communities are restoring degraded pastures and adopting more sustainable land management practices to improve productivity while reducing pressure on fragile ecosystems. These efforts are helping rural households strengthen resilience to climate change while supporting biodiversity conservation.
Environmental degradation has had significant social and economic consequences, particularly for women and vulnerable households that depend heavily on natural resources for livelihoods and food security. As climate-related pressures such as declining agricultural productivity, degraded grazing lands and increasing water stress intensify, strengthening women’s participation in sustainable resource management and local decision-making is becoming increasingly important.
Across affected landscapes, practical efforts are helping reduce pressure on natural resources while supporting livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. Communities are increasingly engaged in identifying solutions that strengthen resilience, improve resource management, and promote inclusive participation in sustainable local development.
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Photo: UNDP Uzbekistan[/caption]
In Uzbekistan, community-led solutions in biodiversity-rich landscapes are demonstrating how ecosystem protection can go hand in hand with improving everyday life. Among many locally driven initiatives, families like Gulnoza Nuriddinova’s benefited from practical measures such as fencing, which helped protect household gardens and crops from wildlife intrusion and uncontrolled grazing, improving food security and reducing economic losses. For families like Sharofat Fayziddinova’s, access to piped water within the village transformed daily life by eliminating the need for frequent journeys to remote water sources, saving time and effort while improving living conditions.
While these were individual solutions tailored to local needs, together they helped reduce pressure on sensitive natural areas, lower the risk of human-wildlife encounters, and strengthen the relationship between communities and the ecosystems on which they depend. They reflect an important lesson: conservation efforts are most effective when communities benefit directly from environmental protection and become active partners in safeguarding nature.
For people living in mountain and rural areas, biodiversity is not an abstract concept. It is directly connected to water access, food security, incomes, health and resilience. The experiences of communities across Central Asia show that conservation is most effective when it improves people's lives while protecting the ecosystems on which they depend.
Healthy mountain ecosystems help regulate river systems that sustain economies and populations across borders. Degraded forests, pastures and watersheds increase erosion, water insecurity and disaster risks for entire regions downstream. Protecting nature is therefore also an investment in regional stability, economic resilience and human security.
The region has already demonstrated growing cooperation on climate action, biodiversity protection and sustainable natural resource management. Countries are expanding protected areas, strengthening environmental governance and investing in ecosystem restoration. Regional dialogue and collaboration are increasing.
But much more is needed to match the scale of today’s environmental challenges.
If Central Asia is to safeguard its shared natural heritage, three priorities deserve greater attention: investment in transboundary ecological corridors; stronger cooperation on water, land and biodiversity governance; and expanded support for communities whose livelihoods depend directly on healthy ecosystems.
The GEF Assembly provides an important opportunity to strengthen this momentum.
As Resident Representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Central Asia, we believe that with the leadership of the five Central Asian countries, the region can become a global example of how biodiversity conservation, climate resilience and sustainable development can advance together across borders.
The future of the snow leopard, like the future of Central Asia’s shared mountain ecosystems, depends on continued cooperation across borders.
At this moment, we call for stronger partnerships and greater investment in transboundary biodiversity conservation across Central Asia — investment that protects ecosystems while creating opportunity, resilience and hope for the people who call these mountains home.
The snow leopard does not recognize national borders. Neither do rivers, droughts, dust storms or climate impacts. Our response cannot stop at borders either. By investing together in nature, Central Asia can strengthen resilience, create opportunity and protect the ecosystems that sustain future generations.
Kazakhstan’s August Elections: Who Will Enter the New Parliament?
On July 1, Kazakhstan’s new Constitution will come into force, triggering the dissolution of the current bicameral parliament. According to political observers, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is expected to sign a decree in early July calling elections to a new unicameral legislature, to be known as the Kurultai. No date has yet been formally announced, but analysts expect the vote to take place in the second half of August, most likely on either August 16 or August 23. On June 1, Kazakhstan officially registered a new political party, Adilet, meaning “Justice,” led by Aybek Dadebay, the former head of Tokayev’s presidential administration. As a result, eight political parties are now officially registered ahead of the election campaign, six of which are currently represented in the lower house of parliament. So far, however, none of the parties has shown significant signs of gearing up for the campaign. “Kazakhstan’s political parties know perfectly well that parliamentary elections will take place in the second half of August, that they will be conducted under a proportional representation system, and that skipping the election is not advisable because it could affect party financing,” political analyst Gaziz Abishev wrote on his Telegram channel. “They could already be actively working to revive their party brands and promote the public figures who will become the faces of the campaign. Yet the passivity is obvious.” In his view, internal party, inter-party, and broader elite-level processes are currently underway, suggesting that some form of political transformation is taking place behind the scenes. The emergence of Adilet appears to have influenced the calculations of Kazakhstan’s political class. The arrival of a second openly pro-presidential party introduces a significant element of uncertainty into a system long dominated by Amanat. Amanat traces its roots to former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s political machine. Originally known as Otan, or “Fatherland,” it became Nur Otan in 2006 before being rebranded as Amanat following the January 2022 unrest. Former presidential candidate Amirzhan Kosanov believes the creation of Adilet reflects Tokayev’s desire to create political competition within the ruling elite while presenting it internationally as evidence of political pluralism. “Given the executive branch’s influence over election commissions and the largely artificial nature of the party system, the campaign beginning in July will most likely resemble a controlled competition between two principal actors: the ruling Amanat party and the new Adilet party,” Kosanov argued. For critics of the system, the upcoming elections increasingly resemble a contest between two pro-presidential forces. Organizationally, Amanat remains a formidable political machine. It inherited from the Nur Otan era an extensive nationwide network of regional branches and primary organizations embedded in large workplaces and institutions. Adilet, meanwhile, has already secured backing from a wide range of business associations, professional groups, technology organizations, creative-industry bodies, and civic initiatives. Its political council also includes senior executives from some of Kazakhstan’s largest companies, including Qarmet, Kazakhtelecom, and Allur Auto. Despite this, few analysts believe Kazakhstan is moving toward an American-style two-party system. Amanat and Adilet share broadly similar political positions and do not appear to have significant ideological differences. Instead, many observers see Adilet as reminiscent of the Asar party, created in 2003 by Dariga Nazarbayeva, the daughter of Kazakhstan’s first president. At the time, Asar attracted part of Otan’s electorate and created uncertainty among officials unsure whether to remain loyal to Nazarbayev or align themselves with his daughter, who was widely viewed as a potential successor. That experiment ended in 2006, when Asar was absorbed into Otan, bringing the brief period of divided loyalties to a close. Adilet, however, appears to have a somewhat different purpose. Many analysts believe it could ultimately absorb some of the smaller parties that are unlikely to clear the electoral threshold and gain representation in the new parliament. Political analyst Talgat Kaliyev argues that Adilet is unlikely to overtake Amanat, but its presence could prevent the ruling party from securing the overwhelming majority it has traditionally enjoyed. “That majority may be relatively narrow,” Kaliyev wrote. “The gap between the old and the new party is unlikely to exceed 10 percentage points. Under this scenario, Amanat would receive slightly more than 40%, Adilet a few percentage points less, while the remaining 20% would go to Auyl, which is firmly positioned in third place.” When Kaliyev published that forecast on May 27, the People’s Democratic Patriotic Party Auyl was not widely viewed as the leading contender for third place. Most observers expected that role to belong to the Ak Zhol Democratic Party, which presents itself as a constructive opposition force and an advocate for national business interests. That perception may have changed following remarks made by Tokayev during a recent meeting on the development of Alatau City. “Some individuals who dislike and hold our country in contempt, and unfortunately there are members of parliament among them, call our legal measures ‘Penaltystan’ or ‘Aiyppulstan,’” the president said. The term “Penaltystan” was first popularized in 2024 by Azat Peruashev, the leader of Ak Zhol and head of its parliamentary faction in the Mazhilis. Following Tokayev’s criticism, Peruashev publicly distanced himself from the phrase. “I regret using that term,” he told journalists in parliament. “Parliamentarians should speak in official language. We drew our conclusions a year ago and continue working in a normal manner.” With only a few months remaining before the election, a tentative picture of Kazakhstan’s future parliamentary landscape is beginning to emerge. Based on current trends, many analysts believe that three parties, Amanat, Adilet, and Auyl, are the most likely to secure representation in the new Kurultai. The remaining five parties, including Ak Zhol, may face a harder choice: seek accommodation with stronger political forces or risk exclusion from the new legislature altogether.
Former Kazakh Nuclear Engineer Helps Federal Agents Bust $20 Million Fentanyl Operation
A routine vehicle delivery across the United States turned into a federal drug operation after a former Kazakh nuclear industry engineer spotted warning signs in the behavior of a customer.
Serik Jaxybayev, who now works in logistics in the United States, was transporting a vehicle from Los Angeles to Minneapolis in March 2026 when the intended recipient gave him cause for alarm. According to Jaxybayev, the customer repeatedly demanded location updates, and then insisted on meeting in a parking lot rather than at the address provided for delivery.
Instead of ignoring his suspicions, Jaxybayev contacted Trooper Cody Parr of the Kansas Highway Patrol and asked for the vehicle to be stopped and inspected as he passed through Kansas.
That decision led to the discovery of a hidden cache of fentanyl with an estimated street value of about $20 million, according to a March 25 letter of appreciation sent to Jaxybayev by the Kansas Highway Patrol. The letter thanked him for his assistance and bravery, and said the operation had involved state and federal agents, including the FBI and the DEA.
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From Nuclear Engineer to Long-Haul Driver
Jaxybayev previously spent 21 years working for Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s national atomic company. He holds a degree from Tomsk Polytechnic University, one of Russia’s best-known engineering universities, and moved to the United States in July 2023.
He later obtained approval under the U.S. EB-1 immigration category, which is used for people with extraordinary ability, outstanding professors or researchers, and certain multinational executives or managers. He received his green card in October 2024.
While rebuilding his career in the U.S., Jaxybayev obtained a commercial driver’s license in the summer of 2024, and began working for Spark Prime Logistics.
“I contribute to the U.S. economy,” Jaxybayev told The Times of Central Asia. “Last year, I paid around $13,000 in taxes. In the future, I want to return to working in the nuclear industry.”
“My Suspicions Were Immediate”
The delivery initially appeared routine. But Jaxybayev said the customer’s behavior changed as the truck approached its destination. The recipient was nervous, called repeatedly, and pressed for precise updates on the truck’s location.
The request to meet away from the stated delivery address made him especially uneasy.
“My suspicions were immediate,” Jaxybayev told TCA.
He contacted Parr, an officer with the Kansas Highway Patrol, and asked whether law enforcement could inspect the vehicle. Parr agreed to meet him as he passed through Kansas.
A Controlled Delivery
When officers stopped and inspected the vehicle, they found fentanyl hidden inside it. Jaxybayev then continued the journey under instructions from law enforcement so that agents could move against the wider criminal organization.
A letter of appreciation from the Kansas Highway Patrol praised Jaxybayev’s “fearlessness and courage in keeping America safe,” and stated that his actions “potentially saved hundreds of lives on the street, or thousands had the suspects chosen to use it for terrorism purposes. Your bravery in assisting State and Federal agents in taking down this criminal organization is highly recognized.”
The DEA describes fentanyl as a powerful synthetic opioid that is widely mixed into illicit drugs and counterfeit pills, creating a high risk of fatal overdose because users may not know what they are taking.
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A March 25 letter from the Kansas Highway Patrol thanking Serik Jaxybayev for his assistance in the operation.[/caption]
A Sense of Duty
Speaking to TCA, Jaxybayev said he did not see his actions as heroic, and that he simply believed he had a responsibility to act once he realized the delivery could be dangerous.
“I am glad I did the right thing,” he said.
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Law-enforcement mementos given to Serik Jaxybayev after the operation.[/caption]
The case also marks an unusual turn in Jaxybayev’s own story: from Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector to long-haul driver in the United States, and then into the middle of a federal drug bust.
For now, he says his long-term goal remains unchanged. He wants to return to work in the nuclear field. But for several days in March, his attention to detail on the road helped stop a major fentanyl shipment before it could reach its destination.
Kazakhstan Amnesty Bill Could Free 1,500 Inmates, Excludes Violent Offenders
Kazakhstan’s Mazhilis, the lower house of parliament, has approved in its first reading a draft amnesty law tied to the adoption of the country’s new Constitution. The measure could affect approximately 16,500 people, including around 1,500 inmates who could be released from prisons and other detention facilities. The initiative is notable for its scale and because it combines criminal and administrative amnesty measures for the first time in Kazakhstan’s history. According to lawmakers, the administrative component alone could affect around one million unpaid fines. The proposal has sparked public debate over whether individuals involved in high-profile criminal cases could benefit from the measure. Some lawmakers have also argued that journalists and bloggers convicted under controversial legislation should be included. Who Will Benefit? According to Snezhanna Imasheva, chair of the Mazhilis Committee on Legislation and Judicial and Legal Reform, individuals convicted of minor offenses and criminal misdemeanors would be eligible for full release from punishment. For offenses classified as medium severity, a different approach would apply. Individuals who caused no damage, or who have fully compensated victims, could qualify for complete release. Others could receive reductions in the remaining portions of their sentences. Among the most common offenses covered by the amnesty are theft, livestock theft, and embezzlement or misappropriation of entrusted property. Certain economic crimes may also qualify for partial sentence reductions. In some cases, individuals convicted of fraud could receive reduced sentences, provided the offenses do not involve corruption, particularly large-scale damages, or other exclusions specified in the legislation. Imasheva said that approximately one million unpaid administrative fines totaling nearly $33 million could be written off. The measure would apply to fines for offenses committed before midnight on March 17, 2026, shortly after Kazakhstan’s new Constitution was adopted in a nationwide referendum. Who Will Not Be Released? The draft law excludes crimes against life and health, corruption offenses, terrorism, and extremism. Those convicted of murder, assisting suicide, intentional infliction of serious, moderate, or minor bodily harm, assault, torture, stalking, HIV transmission, and sexual offenses will not be eligible for amnesty. Those convicted of murder, assisting suicide, intentional infliction of bodily harm, assault, torture, stalking, HIV transmission, and sexual offenses will not be eligible for amnesty. The measure also excludes recently criminalized offenses such as acting as a financial “dropper” in fraud schemes and bride kidnapping. High-Profile Convicts Remain Excluded Former minister of national economy Kuandyk Bishimbayev, who was convicted in May 2024 of murdering his common-law wife, Saltanat Nukenova, will neither be released nor receive a sentence reduction. His convictions for murder committed with extreme cruelty and torture fall among the offenses excluded from the amnesty. Another widely publicized defendant, Perizat Kairat, will also be ineligible. Kairat, the founder of the charity Biz Birgemiz Qazaqstan 2030, was convicted in a high-profile fraud case involving funds raised for flood victims and other charitable causes. Lawmakers said her conviction for large-scale fraud falls under offenses excluded from the amnesty. In July 2025, Kairat was sentenced to ten years in prison, while her mother, Gaini Alashbayeva, received seven years. Lawmaker Calls for Journalists and Bloggers to Be Included Mazhilis deputy Rinat Zaitov has urged lawmakers to extend the amnesty to individuals prosecuted for comments posted on social media. According to Zaitov, parliament has an opportunity to use the amnesty to improve Kazakhstan’s international reputation. He specifically called for relief for individuals prosecuted under Article 274 of Kazakhstan’s Criminal Code, which criminalizes the dissemination of what authorities classify as knowingly false information. “We have people who are being prosecuted for comments on social media,” Zaitov said. “I appeal to all my colleagues to help ensure that those charged under Article 274 are included in the amnesty.” The provision has repeatedly been used in recent years against journalists and media outlets. In December 2025, authorities detained Amir Kasenov, editor-in-chief of the KazTAG news agency. Journalist Botagoz Omarova was also investigated under the same article in March this year. However, reports later indicated that the case against Omarova had been dropped. First Combined Criminal and Administrative Amnesty Amnesties have been carried out periodically in Kazakhstan, but this marks the first time a criminal amnesty has been combined with a broad administrative amnesty. In total, the legislation covers 250 categories of administrative offenses. Serious violations that pose risks to public safety have been excluded. For example, fines for running red lights or significant speeding violations will not be canceled. If adopted in its current form, the amnesty would become one of the largest legal relief measures in Kazakhstan’s post-independence history while maintaining strict exclusions for violent crimes, corruption, terrorism, and other offenses considered particularly dangerous to society.
Washington Links TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik Repeal in Push Toward Central Asia
A notable strategic shift is taking place in U.S. foreign policy, one that could have a long-term impact on the economic architecture of Eurasia. After decades in which Central Asia and the South Caucasus were viewed largely through the lens of security, counterterrorism, and competition with Russia and China, Washington is increasingly emphasizing trade, investment, transport routes, and access to critical minerals. One of the clearest signs of this shift came during a recent hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Senator Steve Daines and Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the implementation of the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) framework, as well as the need to remove the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. At first glance, these may appear to be separate issues: the peace process in the South Caucasus and Cold War-era trade legislation. In reality, however, they are closely connected. Together, they point to a broader U.S. effort to link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Western markets through trade, transport, and investment. In recent years, Republican Senator Steve Daines of Montana has emerged as one of the most active advocates of expanding America’s presence in Central Asia. As co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus and one of the leading proponents of legislative efforts to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions, Daines has consistently argued for stronger trade and investment ties between the United States and the countries of the region. During the hearing, Daines placed particular emphasis on the importance of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, describing it as one of the most underappreciated diplomatic efforts of recent years. According to the senator, resolving the conflict could open the door to a large-scale economic transformation of the wider region. Particularly noteworthy was his reference to a geopolitical concept associated with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In Daines’ formulation, Central Asia represents the “bottle,” while Azerbaijan serves as its “cork.” Opening transport routes through the South Caucasus, he argued, would allow flows of oil, gas, critical minerals, and other resources to move toward Western markets rather than toward Russia, China, or Iran. Daines said this approach helped address some of the most difficult issues in the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement process and laid the foundation for what he called a “landmark agreement” after nearly four decades of conflict. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described TRIPP as an initiative capable of fundamentally transforming Armenia’s economic role in the region. According to Rubio, the framework not only addresses the issue of transport access, which had long been a source of disagreement between Baku and Yerevan, but also creates an opportunity for Armenia to become a major trade and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia. Rubio described TRIPP as central to the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement framework, emphasizing that the project could generate substantial investment flows and attract U.S. companies to infrastructure and transport projects across the region. Washington’s argument is that trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure can give the political settlement a stronger economic base. Unlike many previous peace initiatives, TRIPP is built around tangible economic incentives: trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure development. It is within this broader strategy that the question of repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment acquires new significance. The amendment was adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1974 as a means of pressuring the Soviet Union and other non-market economies that restricted freedom of emigration. The law denied such countries most-favored-nation trade status and imposed additional trade restrictions. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union more than three decades ago, the amendment formally remains in effect for several post-Soviet states, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. Although most of these countries receive annual waivers and effectively enjoy normal trade relations with the United States, the legislation itself remains on the books. At the hearing, Daines described Jackson-Vanik as one of the principal irritants in U.S. relations with both Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia. The senator argued that the restrictions have long since lost their original relevance and continue to impede the development of economic ties. Rubio’s response when asked about the Jackson-Vanik amendment was unequivocal. “It's a detriment. We'd like to see it removed,” the Secretary of State said. Kazakhstan’s ambassador to the United States, Magzhan Ilyassov, welcomed the exchange. “U.S.-Kazakhstan relations are at new heights and your engagement with Central Asia has played a pivotal role in that progress,” Magzhan Ilyassov said on X. He said that removing the “relic” of the Jackson-Vanik amendment would support “the new chapter in the partnership.” For many American policymakers, the issue has long ceased to be merely a trade matter. Today, Jackson-Vanik is increasingly viewed as a symbolic reminder that U.S. policy toward Central Asia still relies in part on instruments inherited from the Cold War era. For business, the issue is certainty. Major investment projects in mining, energy, transport infrastructure, and manufacturing are planned over decades. If normal trade relations depend on annual waivers, companies face an added layer of political and regulatory risk. This is why Congress regularly sees initiatives aimed at granting Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states permanent normal trade relations status. In recent years, such initiatives have attracted support from both Republicans and Democrats. That leaves Washington with a policy contradiction: it is encouraging American companies to invest billions of dollars in the region while maintaining legislative restrictions adopted more than half a century ago for an entirely different geopolitical era. The principal driver of growing U.S. interest in the region remains the desire to diversify global supply chains and reduce dependence on China. Today, Beijing occupies a dominant position in the production and processing of rare earth elements that are essential for batteries, semiconductors, defense products, and technologies associated with the energy transition. According to available estimates, approximately 170 rare earth deposits have been identified across the region. Kazakhstan possesses substantial reserves of tungsten, uranium, and other strategic metals, while Uzbekistan is actively attracting foreign investors to projects involving the extraction and processing of mineral resources. At the C5+1 Summit in Washington in November 2025, Kazakhstan signed agreements with American companies worth approximately $17 billion in aviation, digital technologies, and critical minerals. Uzbekistan also concluded major commercial agreements in the aviation and energy sectors. These projects suggest that Washington increasingly views Central Asia not as a temporary foreign policy priority, but as a long-term component of its economic security strategy. Despite growing U.S. engagement, competition in the region remains intense. China remains Central Asia’s largest single-country trading partner, while the EU is also one of the region’s main trade and investment partners. In 2025, trade between China and the countries of the region reached $106.3 billion. By comparison, trade between the United States and Kazakhstan, Washington’s largest partner in Central Asia, stands at approximately $5.5 billion. Moreover, governments in the region have increasingly pursued multi-vector foreign policies and have shown little interest in choosing openly between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. This means that attitudes in Central Asia and the South Caucasus depend far less on high-profile political statements than on the ability to offer real investment, technology, financing, and infrastructure solutions. The hearing featuring Daines and Rubio was therefore a revealing moment in understanding how Washington’s view of Eurasia is evolving. In that sense, TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik repeal now sit in the same policy frame. One is meant to open new trade and logistics routes. The other would remove a Cold War-era barrier that still complicates American business engagement across the region.
Kazakhstan’s Middle Power Moment: From Balancer to Regional Organizer
In “What Is the Status of Middle Powers?”, Michel Duclos of the Institut Montaigne presents Kazakhstan as a test case for whether middle powers can still influence outcomes in an era of intensifying great power rivalry. Writing after the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana, which brought together nine heads of state around President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Duclos notes that Kazakhstan “plays a leadership role” among states navigating pressures between China and Russia. He also argues that Tokayev, drawing on his experience as a former senior UN official, is seeking to elevate Kazakhstan into an intermediate power on multilateral issues. That is a useful lens for understanding Tokayev’s foreign policy. Rather than treating Kazakhstan’s position between larger powers as a liability, he has sought to turn geography, energy resources, logistics, diplomatic reliability, and convening power into regional agency. The result is an emerging model of middle power leadership rooted not in confrontation, but in coordination, credibility, and practical cooperation. That assessment places Tokayev’s foreign policy in a broader category than traditional balancing. Kazakhstan’s importance does not rest only on its raw assets — uranium, oil, minerals, logistics, or its position along Central Asian land routes. It also rests on how Astana uses those assets: as a convening state, a reliable partner, and a practical organizer of regional cooperation. Under Tokayev, multi-vector diplomacy has become less a defensive posture than an operating strategy, aimed at keeping Kazakhstan open to multiple partners while building platforms others have reason to use. In that sense, Kazakhstan is being presented not simply as a state located between great powers, but as one increasingly able to give structure to the space between them. Moving from “balancer” to “regional organizer” is only possible if Kazakhstan turns geography, resources, and diplomacy into practical systems others have reason to use. The clearest operational evidence of this shift is transport. Kazakhstan’s geography has often been described as a constraint. It is landlocked, vast, and positioned between larger powers. But the growth of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, allows Astana to recast that geography as a strategic advantage. In the first quarter of 2026, 125 container trains transited Kazakhstan via the Middle Corridor, a 34.4% increase from the same period in 2025. The Times of Central Asia also reported that freight volumes along the route through Kazakhstan have grown more than fivefold over seven years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.5 million tons annually. These figures show that Kazakhstan is not simply selling potential; it is building operational value into the corridor. This is where the idea of Kazakhstan as a regional organizer becomes concrete. A balancing state tries to avoid overdependence on any single power. An organizing state builds systems that others have a reason to use. If Kazakhstan can make the Middle Corridor faster, more predictable, more digitalized, and more commercially reliable, it is not merely balancing Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye, and the South Caucasus. It is creating connective tissue between them. World Bank analysis suggests that infrastructure investment and efficiency improvements could help reduce Middle Corridor transit times and increase trade flows by 2030. Projects such as the Mointy-Kyzylzhar rail link are part of that broader effort. Kazakhstan’s convening role is also visible in areas such as environmental diplomacy. The Regional Ecological Summit in Astana is one recent example of this pattern. Under Tokayev, Kazakhstan is trying to turn shared regional vulnerabilities — water scarcity, climate stress, pollution, and resource management — into platforms for cooperation. The summit is another sign of Astana’s broader method: convene partners, define practical agendas, and position Kazakhstan as useful to regional diplomacy. The same pattern is visible in Kazakhstan’s broader diplomatic architecture. The Astana International Forum gives the country a platform for convening governments, international organizations, investors, and policy experts around global and regional challenges. CICA’s institutional presence in Astana reinforces Kazakhstan’s role as a host for Asian security dialogue. Kazakhstan has also offered a neutral ground for difficult negotiations, including the Almaty rounds of Iran nuclear diplomacy, the Astana format on Syria, and Armenia-Azerbaijan talks. Its role in hosting the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank adds a further nonproliferation dimension. None of these examples should be overstated, but together they show a consistent method: Kazakhstan uses its neutrality, geography, and diplomatic credibility to create platforms others are willing to use. Yet the challenges are significant. The first test is implementation. Central Asia has seen many ambitious declarations, but fewer durable institutions. Kazakhstan, however, can point to more than potential: it has concrete transport operations, rising corridor volumes, and major infrastructure investments already underway. Still, Caspian shipping capacity remains a bottleneck. Kazakhstan is moving to build new vessels, yet the corridor’s success depends on synchronized rail, port, maritime, customs, and tariff systems across several countries, not Kazakhstan alone. Astana’s emerging role should therefore be judged by delivery, not only by ambition — and its strongest claim is that it is increasingly able to connect the two. The second challenge is regional trust. Kazakhstan can convene, but it cannot impose. Water diplomacy illustrates the problem. Upstream states such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan want recognition and financing for the water systems and glaciers that supply the region. Downstream states need predictable flows for agriculture, energy, and social stability. Turning this into a cooperative system requires more than speeches; it requires data-sharing, compensation mechanisms, financing, and rules that all sides see as legitimate. Recent regional water-allocation agreements show that cooperation is possible, but also that it must be constantly maintained. The third challenge is geopolitical pressure. Kazakhstan’s strength lies not only in multi-vector diplomacy, but also in the assets that give it leverage: it is Central Asia’s economic heavyweight, an important supplier of non-Russian oil to European markets, and the world’s leading uranium producer. It has also become a practical Eurasian business base, offering a Russian-language and bilingual operating environment for companies managing regional operations outside Russia. These assets make Astana more valuable to outside powers, but they also make its choices more contested. As competition between Russia, China, the United States, Europe, Türkiye, and the Gulf states intensifies, critical minerals, sanctions compliance, oil routes, nuclear energy, corporate relocation, and transport corridors are becoming politicized. The task, therefore, is not simply to attract partners, but to keep partnerships plural, practical, and consistent with Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. Kazakhstan’s regional role will also depend on continued institutional reform at home. International confidence in Astana’s leadership will be stronger if its external reliability is matched by predictable governance, rule-of-law progress, and openness to public scrutiny. So, is Kazakhstan moving from balancer to regional organizer? Yes, but the transition is incomplete. Duclos’s framework helps explain why Kazakhstan has become one of the more interesting middle power cases: Astana is not only managing pressure from larger powers; it is trying to organize regional responses to problems that no single great power can solve. Its Middle Corridor investments, ecological diplomacy, water proposals, and strategic partnerships all point in that direction. But the measure of success will not be in how many summits Kazakhstan hosts or how often it is praised as a middle power. The real measure will be whether Astana can turn convening power into institutions, infrastructure, financing, and shared regional rules. If it can, Kazakhstan will no longer be seen simply as a state between Russia and China. It will be seen as one of the states helping to shape what lies between them.
Why the Caspian Is Becoming Eurasia’s New Energy Crossroads
Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East are accelerating the emergence of a new Eurasian energy architecture, with the Caspian region increasingly at its center. In international politics, moments when several global crises simultaneously create opportunities for new centers of influence are rare. Today, a vast area stretching from Central Asia to the South Caucasus is experiencing just such a moment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped Europe’s approach to energy security. Tensions in the Middle East have also raised questions about the reliability of traditional energy supply routes. Meanwhile, the global energy transition is driving demand for both clean-energy sources and alternative transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the Caspian region is no longer viewed as a peripheral economic space. It is increasingly emerging as a critical hub in Eurasia’s evolving energy system. Baku Energy Week 2026 shows how far this shift has come, highlighting Azerbaijan’s transformation from a traditional oil and gas producer into a strategic connector linking Central Asia, Türkiye, Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. One of the forum’s most significant political signals came in the form of a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to participants. His remarks went beyond a routine diplomatic greeting and reflected a broader shift toward a more pragmatic view of global energy policy. Trump described the United States as a strong supporter of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas industry and said the U.S.-Azerbaijan energy partnership would become more important in the years ahead. For much of the past decade, Western energy strategies appeared increasingly focused on rapid decarbonization and climate objectives. However, rising energy prices, Europe’s energy crisis, and growing global electricity demand have prompted policymakers to reassess those priorities. Trump openly reaffirmed support for the oil and gas sector and emphasized that the United States remains a long-standing energy partner of Azerbaijan. More importantly, Washington appears to recognize Baku’s strategic role in global energy security. The Trump administration increasingly views energy security as an element of geopolitical competition and is prepared to support projects that diversify supplies of hydrocarbons and critical raw materials. Speaking at the opening of Baku Energy Week, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said Trump’s policies had helped return energy policy to “normality.” Aliyev also noted that the oil and gas industry had faced sustained pressure from advocates of a rapid energy transition. It was therefore no coincidence that Azerbaijan signed a series of agreements during the forum with major American companies, including Chevron, JPMorgan, Oracle, and Comstock Resources. Particularly noteworthy was a cooperation agreement covering critical minerals and rare earth elements. For Washington, access to these resources is increasingly a matter not only of energy policy but also of technological and national security amid intensifying competition with China. In effect, Washington is beginning to view Azerbaijan as an important platform in a changing Eurasian energy map. While Washington is signaling renewed political backing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains one of the principal architects of the region’s practical integration. Over the past two decades, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have built one of the world’s most successful energy partnerships. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, TANAP, and the Southern Gas Corridor have collectively reshaped Eurasia’s energy geography. At Baku Energy Week, Turkish officials highlighted plans for an “electricity version of TANAP,” involving Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bulgaria, and other Southeast European countries. The concept reflects Ankara’s ambition to expand its energy role beyond oil and gas into electricity transmission and green-energy corridors. For Ankara, this vision extends beyond energy. Türkiye is steadily developing a broader geoeconomic strategy in which Azerbaijan serves as a gateway to Central Asian resources. What is emerging is a new economic axis stretching from Ankara to Baku, Astana, and Tashkent. For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, these developments could prove transformative. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of the region’s export infrastructure has remained oriented toward Russia. The new geopolitical environment is encouraging governments to pursue alternative routes and partnerships. Particular attention is now focused on the Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are working on a subsea electricity cable across the Caspian Sea that would enable exports of Central Asian electricity to Europe via the South Caucasus. The first phase of the feasibility study, backed by the Asian Development Bank and led by CESI, was launched in January 2026. It is assessing the technical, economic, regulatory, and environmental viability of the proposed interconnection. The project is still at the feasibility-study stage, with capacity, routing, financing, and regulatory issues yet to be finalized. For Kazakhstan, the project would also complement growing oil exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route and help reduce dependence on traditional export channels. The most complex element of the emerging regional architecture remains Armenia. Following the 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent decline of Russian influence in the South Caucasus, Yerevan faces a difficult strategic choice. Armenia is seeking deeper ties with the European Union and the United States, but many of the region’s major infrastructure and energy projects are increasingly developing around the Azerbaijan-Türkiye-Central Asia axis. The question of transport integration through Armenia’s Syunik Province has become particularly significant. For Azerbaijan and Türkiye, a route through Syunik is viewed as a logical extension of the Middle Corridor connecting China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. For Armenia, the issue remains highly sensitive and closely tied to sovereignty and national security concerns. Participation could give Armenia access to one of the region’s most important economic initiatives. Domestic sensitivities over the route have contributed to friction between Yerevan and its partners in both the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia’s westward tilt has also sharpened tensions with Moscow. For Russia, these developments present both challenges and opportunities. The Kremlin recognizes that the war in Ukraine has reduced its ability to control regional transport and energy flows. As the Russian economy adapts to sanctions and new trade realities, Central Asian countries are increasingly diversifying their external economic relationships. In the 19th century, the great powers competed for influence in Central Asia in what became known as the “Great Game.” Today, a new version appears to be emerging, but this time, the competition is not primarily over territory. Instead, it revolves around energy corridors, digital infrastructure, rare earth minerals, green-energy projects, and transport networks. The United States is seeking to strengthen alternative energy routes beyond the influence of Russia and China. Türkiye is building a geoeconomic axis linking the Mediterranean to Central Asia. Europe is searching for new guarantees of energy security. China depends on reliable overland routes to keep the Belt and Road Initiative moving across Eurasia. At the center of this evolving geopolitical landscape stands the Caspian region. Its role is no longer limited to oil and gas. As energy exports, electricity transmission, critical minerals, and overland trade routes converge, the Caspian is becoming one of Eurasia’s most important strategic crossroads.
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