Russia’s Fuel Crisis Tests Kazakhstan’s Energy Resilience
Kazakhstan is being pulled into a new energy paradox. As Russia's fuel crisis deepens, the country is being discussed as a potential gasoline supplier to its largest neighbor. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is tightening controls at home, building reserves around refinery maintenance, and weighing fuel imports from China to protect its own market. On June 24, Reuters reported that Russia was in talks with Kazakhstan to import about 50,000 metric tons of AI-92 gasoline, citing four industry sources. The discussions followed refinery outages and unscheduled repairs in Russia after Ukrainian drone attacks, which had led to shutdowns at several large refineries in central Russia and cut Russian gasoline output by roughly 25% year-on-year by late June. The news was striking because Russia is normally a major exporter of petroleum products. The need to consider gasoline imports, including seaborne imports and emergency market-stabilization measures, underlines the scale of disruption in Russia's refining system. Kazakhstan's Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov said Astana had not received an official request from Moscow, but the question remains politically and economically sensitive for Kazakhstan: can it afford to send fuel abroad if its own margin of safety is narrowing? Officially, the domestic picture remains stable. Kazakhstan's government said on June 20 that national stocks of gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel exceeded 1 million tons, enough to cover current demand. It said supplies were being prioritized for filling stations, agricultural producers, and domestic airlines, and that no shortage of fuels and lubricants had been observed. Yet those assurances sit alongside a more fragile structural reality. Kazakhstan's refining system depends heavily on three large refineries: Atyrau in the west, Pavlodar in the north, and Shymkent in the south. Last year, it was reported that, after modernization, the three plants had a combined annual output of about 17 million metric tons. Such a system can function efficiently when all units are operating normally, but it leaves limited room for simultaneous shocks. One of those shocks is already present. The Atyrau Oil Refinery began scheduled preventive maintenance on June 26 under a timetable approved by the Ministry of Energy. KazMunayGas said the work includes inspections of 20 reactors, 213 storage tanks, 32 columns, and 231 heat exchangers, as well as replacement of more than 335 tons of catalysts. The refinery entered maintenance with 38,000 tons of gasoline, 31,300 tons of diesel, and 6,800 tons of jet fuel. KazMunayGas said national stocks of AI-92 gasoline and diesel covered 34 and 32 days of demand, respectively, and that the phased restart of processing units was scheduled to begin on July 10. Those figures show resilience, but not abundance. Summer brings higher consumption from agriculture, passenger travel, freight, and aviation. For the government, managing this period means monitoring refinery output, shipments, inventories, and preventing fuel from leaving the country through unauthorized channels. After a June 20 meeting, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov ordered tighter border controls; the government said vehicles are restricted from crossing the state border by road more than once per day as part of measures to curb illegal fuel movements. The clearest sign of pressure is not that Kazakhstan might be asked to supply Russia, but that Kazakhstan is also preparing to diversify its own import options. On June 25, Trade and Integration Vice Minister Zhanel Kushukova said that Kazakhstan was considering reducing import customs duties on fuel and lubricants from third countries to zero. She said the measure, under review within the Eurasian Economic Commission, was intended to stimulate supplies from third countries, with the main focus on China. Formally, this is a technical customs measure, but in practice it signals a wider shift. For years, Russian supplies were Kazakhstan's natural fallback mechanism: geographically close, commercially convenient, and operating within the Eurasian Economic Union framework. That assumption is decidedly weaker now. Russia is dealing with shortages of its own, has already restricted gasoline exports, and on June 1 banned aviation fuel exports until November 30 to stabilize its domestic market. The effects are visible across the region. Kyrgyzstan has reported disruptions in AI-95 and AI-98 gasoline supplies. The Moscow Times reported that the head of Kyrgyzstan's Association of Oil Traders, Kanatbek Eshatov, said interruptions had been recorded at some filling stations because of reduced and irregular Russian supplies and seasonal demand. Kyrgyzstan receives more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia, and from January-May 2026, it supplied more than 251,000 tons of motor gasoline, 235,150 tons of diesel, and 48,150 tons of jet fuel to the country, according to traders' estimates. When Russian supplies tighten, pressure can shift toward Kazakhstan, both through official demand and through illicit channels. Kazakhstan's Border Service of the National Security Committee said that since the start of 2026, more than 2,400 cases of illegal movement of fuels and lubricants had been prevented at checkpoints, involving more than 300 tons of seized products worth about 60 million tenge (about $120,000). Kazakhstan has also kept export restrictions in place. The country's ban on the export of gasoline, diesel, and certain petroleum products by road, including to Eurasian Economic Union states, runs from May 21 to November 21, 2026. Jet fuel presents another vulnerability. Kazakhstan may also face a shortage in July as demand rises, the Atyrau refinery undergoes maintenance, and imports from Russia fall. One possible workaround would be a swap arrangement, with Kazakhstan supplying gasoline to Russia in exchange for jet fuel. Russia’s aviation-fuel export ban complicates that option. The restriction is particularly sensitive for Central Asia because Russian jet fuel normally moves mainly by rail to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The aviation angle adds pressure because Kazakhstan’s air transport market is expanding. Air Astana has committed to a major fleet modernization program, including an agreement for up to 50 Airbus A320neo-family aircraft: 25 firm aircraft and 25 purchase options, with the first deliveries expected from 2031. More aircraft do not create an immediate fuel shock, but they underline the long-term need for a stable and diversified jet-fuel supply chain. That is why the idea of a fourth refinery is gaining urgency. In May, it was reported that Kazakhstan had begun pre-project work for a new refining complex with a planned capacity of up to ten million tons of crude oil per year. In June, Samruk-Kazyna said its subsidiary Samruk-Kazyna Ondeu had signed a contract with Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Limited to prepare a pre-feasibility study for a new oil refinery in Kazakhstan. Until recently, the assumption in Astana was that modernization of existing refineries would be enough to manage domestic demand and allow a gradual shift toward exports. The events of 2026 show how thin that margin can be. A scheduled shutdown at one domestic refinery, attacks on Russian refining infrastructure, Russian export restrictions, seasonal demand, regional shortages, and smuggling can quickly merge into a single energy-security problem. Russia's fuel crisis has therefore become a stress test for Kazakhstan's own resilience. The lesson is clear: having crude oil is not enough to guarantee stability. The priority now is refining capacity, storage, logistics, and the speed at which supplies can be redirected when regional fuel markets fracture.
Kurultai Election Campaign Takes Shape in Parliament’s Final Budget Debate
Kazakhstan's outgoing parliament spent one of its final sessions debating the government's management of the 2025 budget, in what often resembled a dress rehearsal for the country's first Kurultai election campaign.
On July 1, Kazakhstan’s new constitution will enter into force, replacing the current Senate and Mazhilis with a single-chamber Kurultai. The new legislature will have 145 deputies elected through party lists, and elections are expected in August.No current deputy will transfer automatically into the new chamber. Those who want to remain in national politics will need a place on a party list and a fresh mandate. That gave the June 26 session an unusual political significance: would any outgoing deputies use the budget debate to make a final public break with the government?
Some did put pointed questions to Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and Finance Minister Madi Takiyev as parliament reviewed and approved the reports of the government and the Supreme Audit Chamber on the execution of the republican budget for 2025.
Finance Minister Madi Takiyev presented the figures in optimistic terms. According to him, Kazakhstan’s economy grew by 6.5% in 2025, while GDP increased by $14.7 billion in dollar terms. Meanwhile, public debt remains low at around 22.8% of GDP, or approximately $74.5 billion.
Deputies asked Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov why, despite GDP growth of 6.5%, Kazakh citizens’ incomes had declined.
Bektenov referred to high inflation, which has been eating into household incomes.
“Last year, inflation peaked in September at 12.9%. Now, as a result of measures taken by the government, the National Bank and other interested agencies, inflation over the first five months of this year has declined to 10.4%,” the prime minister said.
He recalled that the government had adopted a separate plan to raise household incomes. According to the government, the average monthly wage reached 442,000 tenge, about $910.
He said there were already sectors, such as agriculture and transport, where real incomes had increased.
Mazhilis deputy Azat Peruashev, who recently stepped down after 15 years as chairman of the Ak Zhol party but still heads its parliamentary faction, focused on the National Fund. He said the government had failed to keep an earlier promise to reduce withdrawals.
“When approving the draft budget for 2024-2026, the government announced a plan to reduce withdrawals from the National Fund starting in 2025. In fact, the volume of funds received from the National Fund in 2025 remained high, at approximately $10.8 billion,” he said.
The National Fund is one of the most politically sensitive parts of Kazakhstan’s public finances. Built largely from oil and gas revenue and managed through the National Bank, it is meant to serve two functions: to help stabilize the budget when commodity revenue falls, and to preserve part of the country’s resource wealth for future generations. Heavy withdrawals therefore carry a political cost. They can help cover current spending, but they also reduce the savings Kazakhstan has accumulated from its oil wealth, making the size of annual transfers a perennial political argument.Peruashev also criticized what he described as the existing imbalance in budget policy. According to him, social spending in 2025 increased to approximately $20.6 billion, while spending on the real sector of the economy amounted to only about $4.5 billion.
“The government spends five times more on non-recoverable needs than on creating future sources of income. In our view, the ratio should be the opposite,” the deputy said.
He also noted that the government does not reflect all areas of its activity in the national budget.
“New major investment projects based on higher value-added processing are being implemented in the regions and are capable of changing the structure and technological level of the national economy. However, these billions in public funds are directed outside the budget and parliament, through the Samruk-Kazyna fund, on the basis of independent government decisions. Thus, parallel economies have effectively emerged: one is the economy that passes through the budget, and the other is the economy that the government forms without discussion in parliament,” Peruashev said, while nevertheless calling on deputies to support the reports of the government and the Supreme Audit Chamber.
Other deputies used the session less to challenge the 2025 accounts than to set out themes for the coming campaign.
Serik Yegizbayev, a Mazhilis deputy from the Auyl party who recently stepped down as its chairman, said the current system of state support for farmers is too complex and should be reformed. He also called for a specialized agricultural bank to provide direct financing to producers.
Askhat Rakhimzhanov, a representative of the National Social Democratic Party faction, said his party’s deputies did not support the government’s report and called for an increase in the minimum wage.
Both the government, which will resign its powers before the newly elected Kurultai convenes, and the deputies themselves are already operating as temporary officeholders, aware that existing problems will be dealt with by entirely different people – or by the same people in new roles.
For that reason, the exchanges never became a full confrontation. Deputies criticized inflation, real incomes, National Fund withdrawals and off-budget spending, but most stopped short of rejecting the report. Instead, the joint parliamentary session often resembled an early campaign platform for Kazakhstan's next political era.
UKTMP Eyes Expanded U.S. Presence as Kazakhstan’s Titanium Champion Seeks New Markets
ASTANA — On June 11, Sylvain Gehler, Chairman of the Board of the Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant (UKTMP), and Assem Mamutova, the company’s CEO, spoke with The Times of Central Asia during the Astana Mining and Metallurgy Congress (AMM). He outlined their plans to strengthen the company’s international footprint, with the United States emerging as a priority market.
During the meeting, Gehler highlighted UKTMP’s ambition to further solidify its position as a leading aerospace-grade titanium supplier, building on six decades of operations and what Kazakh officials describe as roughly one-fifth of the global aerospace titanium market. “The combination of Kazakhstan’s resource base, UKTMP’s decades of experience, and the increasing importance of secure supply chains creates a strong platform for future growth. We are committed to remaining a trusted partner for aerospace customers around the world,” Gehler said.
UKTMP, based in eastern Kazakhstan, is among the world’s largest vertically integrated titanium producers, controlling the entire production chain from raw materials to finished products. The company’s products are used in aviation, medicine, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and nuclear industries. Among its international partners are Boeing, Airbus, Safran, General Electric, and other leading manufacturers.
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UKTMP -Titanium sponge at the end of the distillation process[/caption]
Gehler emphasized that “delivering consistent, high-quality titanium products reflects our commitment to rigorous standards and positions us to meet rising demand for resilient, transparent supply chains while expanding in key markets.”
The company’s long-term development plans and initiatives aim at reinforcing Kazakhstan’s standing in the global titanium industry. According to Gehler, “UKTMP’s investment program through 2033 includes 25 projects worth more than $520 million, including construction of a new titanium sponge facility that would significantly expand production capacity.” Currently, UKTMP has 30 types of titanium alloys.
Titanium and its alloys combine a high melting point, high electrical resistivity, exceptional strength-to-weight ratio, corrosion resistance in air and seawater, and non-magnetic behavior. It is also lightweight—its specific gravity is approximately 56% that of steel—biologically inert, and readily formed under pressure, making titanium a versatile structural material widely used in advanced industries.
United States Demand for Titanium
The American aerospace and defense sectors rely heavily on titanium, while disruptions to traditional supply chains following sanctions on Russia have heightened interest in alternative suppliers. Kazakhstan has emerged as one of the countries helping fill that gap.
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Source: USGS[/caption]
Industry analysts note that the United States currently lacks domestic titanium sponge production and remains dependent on imports. In 2025 through July, Japan supplied 73% of U.S. titanium sponge imports, while Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia each supplied 13%. This strategic reliance underpins the favorable treatment the U.S. currently gives to Kazakh titanium, since heavy supply restrictions would adversely impact the U.S. aerospace and defense industries. This has not always been the case.
For UKTMP, deeper access to the U.S. market represents not only a commercial opportunity but the makings of a strategic partnership. Increasing sales to American customers would further anchor Kazakhstan within Western aerospace and other supply chains at a time when demand for high-grade titanium continues to rise.
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USGS, UKTMP and Industry Sources[/caption]
Tariff Issues and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
To ensure economic resilience on processed critical minerals, the Trump Administration has repeatedly used Section 232 tariffs to protect against threats to national security and to strengthen manufacturing sectors critical to national and economic security.
In antidumping and countervailing-duty proceedings initiated in 2017, the U.S. Commerce Department examined whether Kazakh titanium sponge producers received unfair subsidies or sold products below fair value. Commerce ultimately retained the longstanding 15% import duty dating back to the Soviet era. At the time, Titanium Metals Corporation (TIMET), a U.S.-based titanium producer and the leading U.S. integrated titanium manufacturer, was still producing titanium sponge in the United States. TIMET no longer produces titanium sponge – the primary raw material used to make titanium metal products.
In March 2019, the White House initiated a Section 232 review of titanium sponge imports after a TIMET petition, assessing national security implications for a key defense and aerospace material. The investigation found that imports threatened to impair national security, with the U.S. then importing roughly two-thirds of the sponge metal it required, largely from Japan.
On February 27, 2020, President Trump, in his Memorandum on the Effects of Titanium Sponge Imports on National Security, agreed with the U.S. Commerce Department’s determination that titanium sponge imports posed a national security concern but declined to impose Section 232 tariffs or quotas. Instead, Trump established a working group comprising the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and other national security agencies to identify ways to strengthen the domestic titanium supply chain without disrupting aerospace and defense firms reliant on imported sponge.
Within industry circles around 2020–2021, many aerospace and defense stakeholders argued that Japanese and Kazakh titanium sponge came from trusted allies, China’s expanding production posed the real strategic risk, and that restricting Kazakh imports could weaken U.S. supply chains by limiting access to reliable non-Chinese material.
The Biden Administration
After taking office in 2021, the Biden administration published the Report on the Effect of Imports of Titanium Sponge on the National Security: An Investigation Conducted Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended. The Trump-era titanium working group then largely dropped out of public view, while U.S. critical minerals policy shifted toward broader supply chain resilience, stockpiles, and industrial support rather than targeted titanium tariff measures.
US-Kazakhstan Trade Issues
Nevertheless, industry observers point to several possible avenues for overcoming import uncertainties and trade-related barriers. While the United States may still seek to reinvigorate titanium mining, processing, and production in the first instance, the United States and Kazakhstan, for example, could pursue sector-specific agreements to formalize Kazakhstan’s status as a trusted supplier of titanium and other critical minerals.
Another avenue would be to deepen downstream cooperation with U.S. firms through joint ventures, long-term supply contracts, and/or increased investment in value-added titanium products. Such arrangements could reinforce the case that Kazakh titanium directly supports American industrial and national security priorities.
Greater alignment in regulatory frameworks and certification processes could streamline access to U.S. markets and lessen the administrative costs faced by exporters.
According to Gehler, “reactivating the federal titanium working group created during President Trump’s first term could help reassess tariffs and other trade restrictions on Kazakh titanium sponge and ingot.”
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UTKMP Melting Workshop[/caption]
Overall Direction
For Kazakhstan, the implications reach well beyond a single commodity. Astana increasingly regards critical minerals as a cornerstone of the country’s economic diversification agenda. At this year’s AMM gathering, government officials underscored Kazakhstan’s role as a supplier of various strategic materials, with titanium featuring especially prominently.
As global competition for critical minerals intensifies, UKTMP is counting on its established reputation, long-standing aerospace ties, and Kazakhstan’s expanding role in global supply chains to create new opportunities. For Gehler and Mamutova, expanding access to the U.S. market is not just about exports but about securing Kazakhstan’s role in next-generation industrial partnerships while strengthening U.S. supply chains.
Gehler concluded: “UKTMP is actively seeking to expand its commercial footprint in the United States, reflecting our long-term commitment to deeper industrial and supply chain partnerships in the American market. As we advance these efforts, we are encouraged by the prospect of a tariff and tax environment that supports critical minerals and greater trade efficiency, reduces administrative compliance costs, and enhances the competitiveness of Kazakh exports.”
A broader U.S. trade-policy date could come on July 24, 2026, when the temporary import surcharge imposed under Section 122, under “Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems,” is set to expire.
Whether Washington extends the measure, replaces it, or allows it to expire remains to be seen. The measure is not titanium-specific, but it could affect the titanium trade unless exemptions apply.
The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose
The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues, although market volatility and higher import and freight costs diluted the gain. The truce could therefore remove a temporary windfall for Astana while easing inflationary pressure in the region’s energy-importing economies.
The clearest longer-term opportunity may lie in trade and transit. On June 16, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin held a bilateral meeting with an Iranian delegation led by Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh.
The sides discussed the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor, expansion of port infrastructure, increasing bilateral trade volumes, and improving transport and logistics ties. By the end of 2025, cargo volumes along the North-South corridor had increased by 12% to 3.5 million tons. Rail freight between the two countries rose by 69%. Kazakhstan and Iran intend to modernize transport infrastructure to increase the corridor’s capacity to 20 million tons per year. The sides also emphasized the importance of the recently signed five-party railway agreement between China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the upcoming four-party tariff agreement between Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Iran, which is expected to create additional conditions for trade and transit growth. At the start of the military escalation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, regional economist and Logistan editor-in-chief Grigory Mikhailov had already pointed to transport and logistics opportunities for Central Asia. “There is a chance to attract investment into logistics development from major players, primarily China. For Beijing, the current situation is evidence of the need to develop alternative routes bypassing the Middle East. Options include expanding rail transit through Central Asia and Russia, as well as gradually developing the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast,” he said. De-escalation in the Middle East, even if temporary, may alter China’s plans for diversifying logistics routes, but is unlikely to cancel them altogether. This makes the pause a test of route confidence as much as diplomacy. If the ceasefire holds, Iran could regain some value as one of Central Asia’s shortest southern outlets to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. If it fails, the region’s search for alternatives will accelerate, strengthening demand for the Trans-Caspian route through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. In that sense, both peace and renewed instability could increase Central Asia’s strategic importance, but through different corridors. Another possible scenario involves Kazakhstan’s potential role in arrangements related to Iran’s nuclear program. Under the memorandum signed by Trump and Pezeshkian, Iran agreed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, but the framework sets no detailed limits on the program. The fate of Iran’s accumulated enriched-uranium stockpile is to be resolved in later talks. Washington and Tehran have publicly disputed what was agreed on inspections, although the memorandum says nuclear activities involving material and facilities would be supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said Kazakhstan had indicated its willingness to receive Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% if Washington and Tehran reached an agreement on the nuclear program. Grossi made the statement following his May 26 meeting in Astana with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Kazakhstan’s potential role rests on an established non-proliferation record: it hosted two rounds of nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty in 2013 and now hosts the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank. The bank itself is not authorized to receive or process Iran’s uranium enriched to 60%, however, meaning that any such arrangement would require separate legal documents, safeguards, financing, custody rules, and probably dedicated infrastructure. For Central Asia, the truce is less a peace dividend than a redistribution of risk. Hydrocarbon exporters could lose from weaker energy prices, while import-dependent economies could gain from lower fuel and freight costs. The region would also benefit from having more viable routes to world markets. The real question is whether banks, insurers, transport companies, and investors are willing to do business through Iran. Unless they are, the truce will remain a political pause rather than a lasting economic benefit for Central Asia.
EU Launches Platform to Mobilize Up to €2 Billion for Europe–Central Asia Connectivity
The European Commission launched a Connectivity Agenda Platform on June 23, 2026, and concluded statements of intent with international financial institutions expected to mobilize up to €2 billion ($2.3 billion) for transport, border-crossing and trade-facilitation projects across the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus.
The initiative was unveiled at a high-level ministerial meeting in Brussels, hosted by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela, and Commissioner for Sustainable Transport Apostolos Tzitzikostas.
The meeting brought together transport ministers and senior officials from EU member states, as well as representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, alongside international lenders, to advance connectivity projects under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.
The new platform is designed to coordinate investments and policy actions across transport, energy, digital connectivity, and trade. Participants also agreed to improve the operational efficiency of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, a wider framework that includes the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR, also known as the Middle Corridor.
The route links China and Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, offering an alternative to transport routes crossing Russia.
The European Commission said the expected financing would support transport infrastructure, border-crossing modernization, and trade-facilitation projects aimed at improving freight movement across the corridor.
“The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor is becoming a vital bridge between Europe and Asia,” Síkela said, adding that the investments would help make the route faster, more reliable, and better integrated.
Tzitzikostas said stronger transport links were critical for economic competitiveness and regional resilience.
The platform’s launch came during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s official visit to Brussels, where he met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
In an EU–Kazakhstan joint statement, the leaders reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Trans-Caspian corridor and pledged deeper cooperation under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.
They also highlighted the EU’s role as Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partner and agreed to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, energy, transport, digitalization, and emerging technologies.
Speaking at the Kazakhstan-EU roundtable in Brussels, Tokayev said Kazakhstan was investing heavily in infrastructure to position itself as a regional logistics hub connecting Europe, Central Asia, China, the Caucasus, and the Middle East.
According to Tokayev, cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor have risen fivefold over the past six years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.1 million tons annually, with Kazakhstan targeting a capacity of 10 million tons.
He said Kazakhstan has invested more than $35 billion in transport and logistics infrastructure over the past 15 years, with the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk serving as major transit gateways.
Tokayev also welcomed logistics agreements worth nearly $1 billion signed on June 23 by the Development Bank of Kazakhstan: one with the European Investment Bank, and a separate agreement with a banking syndicate including Commerzbank, JPMorgan Chase, and Standard Chartered, backed by guarantees from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
A day earlier, Kazakhstan and European partners announced four transport-related agreements worth a combined $462 million to further strengthen connectivity along the Middle Corridor.
Tokayev’s Brussels Visit Brings Aviation Pact, Visa Progress and $12 Billion Business Package
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev left Brussels with a broader package than the transport announcements that opened his two-day visit on June 22-23. Kazakhstan and the European Union signed an aviation agreement, completed talks at negotiators’ level on easier short-stay visas, backed new road and mineral projects, and endorsed an Air Astana aircraft order worth €7.145 billion. Tokayev also said the business program produced commercial agreements and memoranda worth more than $12 billion. Tokayev met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on June 23. Their joint statement placed connectivity, energy security and resilient supply chains at the center of the relationship. Von der Leyen called Kazakhstan “a global gateway” and said the EU was ready to turn it into “a pathway for jobs, business opportunities and common prosperity.” Negotiators completed talks on Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements, opening the way for internal approval procedures. The visa agreement would simplify applications for short stays in the EU, though the agreement would not create visa-free travel and has not yet entered into force. The two sides also signed a Horizontal Aviation Agreement after negotiations lasting more than two decades. Once internal procedures are complete, any eligible EU airline will be able to operate between Kazakhstan and 17 member states that already have air service arrangements with Astana. Existing rules generally reserve those rights for airlines owned or controlled by nationals of the country concerned. EU Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas said the pact would bring “our people and economies closer together.” A separate agreement covered up to 50 Airbus A320neo and A321neo aircraft for Air Astana. The joint statement valued the order at €7.145 billion. That transaction formed the largest named item within the more than $12 billion in commercial agreements and memoranda announced during the visit. Tokayev presented the total as evidence of European business confidence in Kazakhstan. Transport and connectivity remained the backbone of the trip. Before the leaders met, Kazakhstan and its European partners unveiled four Middle Corridor agreements worth a combined $462 million. They included airport digitalization work with SITA, an EBRD-backed loan for the 234-kilometer Aktobe-Ulgaisyn road, a KTZ Express project at Romania's Port of Midia, and cooperation with A.P. Moller-Maersk on container traffic across the Trans-Caspian route. The leaders welcomed a European Investment Bank framework agreement of up to €150 million for Kazakh roads along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. An EBRD memorandum will support an internationally accredited chemical-analytical laboratory for critical raw materials. Other documents cover intelligent transport systems, the E-Zholdary road platform and a minerals and metals center of excellence. Brussels also encouraged the EIB to open an office in Astana. These projects connect the visit to the EU's effort to build a reliable route between Central Asia and Europe through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye. Tokayev said annual freight volumes had risen from 800,000 tons to 4.1 million tons over six years. Kazakhstan aims to raise the corridor’s capacity to 10 million tons, but ports, railways, border procedures and cargo coordination are still limiting its speed and capacity. Tokayev said the country has invested more than $35 billion in transport and logistics infrastructure over the past 15 years, with Costa calling Kazakhstan a “key link in ensuring transport connectivity” between Europe and Asia. Critical minerals were the second major economic pillar. The EU and Kazakhstan signed a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen in 2022. A 2025-2026 roadmap covers exploration, processing, recycling, research and skills. In Brussels, the leaders committed to advance that work and highlighted Kazakhstan's role as an oil and uranium supplier. Kazakhstan is ready to supply 21 of the 34 materials on the EU's critical raw materials list. Tokayev said Kazakhstan supplied nearly 13% of the EU’s crude oil imports in 2025, while Kazakhstan produced about 40% of the world's uranium in 2025. They also called for stronger cooperation in renewable energy and civil nuclear power. The trade relationship remains large but narrow. EU goods trade with Kazakhstan reached €41.4 billion in 2025. Imports from Kazakhstan totaled €30.8 billion, but fuel and mining products made up 92% of this figure. Machinery, transport equipment and chemicals led European exports. Tokayev told the business roundtable that the EU accounts for almost half of the foreign direct investment attracted to Kazakhstan, and that about 4,000 European companies operate in the country. “Today, the European Union is our largest trade and investment partner,” Tokayev said. He listed Airbus, Alstom, Air Liquide, Polpharma and Škoda among the established investors, alongside newer entrants including Maersk, Inditex, and Damen Shipyards. The institutional base has been in place for a decade. Kazakhstan and the EU signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 2015, which entered into force in March 2020. It covers 29 policy areas, including trade, energy, transport, climate, research, justice and human rights. The relationship gained a regional layer at the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand in April 2025, when the two regions upgraded ties to a strategic partnership and the EU announced a €12 billion Global Gateway package. Education and technology also produced agreements in Brussels. Kazakh institutions signed partnerships with KU Leuven, the SIM² Institute and Astana Hub on critical minerals, industrial digitalization, and artificial intelligence. A separate agreement with Ghent University provides for a mirror laboratory in Kazakhstan focused on mathematics, AI, modeling, and engineering computing. Tokayev's meeting with Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever added a bilateral track. Belgium ranks among Kazakhstan's ten largest investors, with about $15 billion invested over two decades. Trade exceeded $580 million in 2025, and more than 110 companies with Belgian capital operate in Kazakhstan. The leaders discussed logistics, minerals, petrochemicals, agriculture, finance and AI, and prepared for King Philippe's first state visit to Kazakhstan. The Brussels statement also recorded continuing talks on sanctions and welcomed dialogue on human rights, the rule of law and anti-corruption measures. The EU acknowledged Kazakhstan's new constitution, approved in a March 2026 referendum. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful settlement of disputes under the UN Charter. Several results still require formal action. The aviation pact and visa agreements must pass internal procedures before taking effect. Loans must become physical works, and minerals cooperation must produce laboratories, processing capacity and investable projects. The visit nevertheless moved a wide agenda into signed agreements and named financing.
Kazakhstan and European Partners Announce $462 Million Middle Corridor Agreements in Brussels
Kazakhstan and its European partners unveiled four transport deals worth a combined $462 million on June 22, giving President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Belgium a concrete outcome on Eurasian connectivity. The package was presented at the business conference “Strengthening EU-Kazakhstan Connectivity: Perspectives and Strategic Potential of the Middle Corridor.” The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, is a multimodal transport corridor linking China and Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, offering an alternative to routes that pass through Russia. The conference was organized by Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, Kazakhstan’s national railway operator, and brought together representatives of the European Commission, the European Parliament, international financial institutions, and major European transport and logistics companies, including DHL Global Forwarding, Alstom, DB Cargo, HHLA International, Rhenus Logistics, Hellmann Worldwide Logistics, Ahlers Logistics, and A.P. Moller-Maersk. The conference focused on strategic development priorities for the Middle Corridor, including increasing the capacity of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, modernizing railway, port, and terminal infrastructure, digitalizing logistics processes, and developing sustainable supply chains across Eurasia. The four documents, presented as a $462 million package, aim to strengthen transport connectivity between Europe and Asia and further develop the Trans-Caspian route. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport and SITA, a global provider of information and telecommunications solutions for the aviation industry, signed a memorandum of cooperation on the digitalization of state airports, including biometric identification. National road operator QazAvtoZhol and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development signed a loan agreement for the Aktobe-Ulgaisyn road project. The Aktobe-Ulgaisyn project covers a 234-kilometer section of the Western Europe-Western China corridor and is intended to improve regional and transit connectivity. KTZ Express, a subsidiary of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, signed an agreement with Midia Marine Terminal for a joint project in Romania’s Port of Midia. The project aims to expand Black Sea route infrastructure and improve cargo handling efficiency. In addition, KTZ Express and A.P. Moller-Maersk agreed to cooperate on container shipping along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route and to attract additional cargo volumes to the route. Speaking at the conference, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Issetov stressed that the route has evolved far beyond a traditional transit corridor and is increasingly becoming a major geo-economic project serving the interests of both Central Asia and Europe. He said that amid shifting global supply chains and growing demand for reliable and diversified transport routes, Kazakhstan continues to advocate for open, resilient, and mutually beneficial connectivity between East and West. Particular attention was given to the complementarity between the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route and the European Union’s Global Gateway initiative. Under this strategy, the Trans-Caspian corridor has become a priority for strengthening sustainable connectivity between Europe and Central Asia, with Kazakhstan playing a central role as a major Eurasian transport hub. At the Third National Workshop of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor Coordination Platform in Astana on June 3, EU Ambassador to Kazakhstan Aleška Simkić said: “Through our €30 million Trans-Caspian Transport support program and other projects, the European Union supports the modernization of facilities in the Port of Aktau and preparations for the complex modernization of the Beyneu-Sekseul road, while facilitating the approximation and digitalization of cross-border procedures.” In recent years, freight volumes along the Trans-Caspian corridor have increased by more than 3.5 times, while transport times between China and Europe have been significantly reduced due to infrastructure upgrades and improvements in logistics processes. According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, the European Union remains Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partner. In 2025, bilateral trade reached $45.1 billion, while cumulative gross inflows of foreign direct investment from EU member states exceeded $200 billion.
Central Asia’s Nuclear Push: Uzbekistan Starts Construction as Kazakhstan Plans at Least Three Plants
Uzbekistan has poured concrete for its first nuclear power plant, while Kazakhstan has signed a $16.5 billion agreement for a two-reactor facility near Lake Balkhash and approved a site for a second plant. Kazakhstan's long-term strategy calls for at least three nuclear power plants by 2050, with a fourth possible. Both governments are presenting nuclear power as a way to meet rapidly growing electricity demand and strengthen energy security. Yet the projects are advancing at different speeds and are reviving questions over water use, cross-border safety, financing, and long-term reliance on Russian technology and credit. Uzbekistan Moves Into Construction On June 4, 2026, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin launched construction by video link. Rafael Mariano Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, also took part. The first nuclear-grade concrete was poured overnight from June 4 to June 5 for the foundation slab of the first RITM-200N small modular reactor unit in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region. Uzatom subsequently classified the site as a nuclear power plant under construction. The facility is one plant with four planned reactor units: two large VVER-1000 units and two smaller RITM-200N units, each rated at 55 MW. Together, they would provide more than 2.1 GW of installed capacity. The present configuration is the latest version of a project that began with a 2017 peaceful-use agreement and a 2018 plan for two large reactors. In 2024, the focus shifted to six small reactors, before the design changed again in 2025 to the mixed large-and-small format now under construction. Uzbek and Russian projections put annual generation at about 17 billion kWh, or roughly 15% of future national demand. The current schedule envisages the first small unit reaching criticality in late 2029, with the large reactors expected to be commissioned in 2033 and 2035, although Uzatom has said final dates depend on outstanding contract arrangements. The project's stated base price is $9.5 billion, and Tashkent is seeking loans for most of the cost. Those financing terms, along with the final allocation of construction and operating risk, remain central to the project's viability. Water and Cross-Border Concerns The plant will stand near Lake Tuzkon in the Aydar-Arnasay lake system, about 40 kilometers from Kazakhstan's border. That proximity has made what is formally an Uzbek project a regional issue. Residents and environmental advocates in southern Kazakhstan have raised concerns about accident preparedness, radioactive waste, and possible pressure on already stressed water systems. Aiman Tleulesova, national coordinator of the Central Asian Regional Water Network, has argued that reactor cooling could require greater discharges into Lake Tuzkon and additional withdrawals linked to the Syr Darya system. In her assessment, that could intensify competition for irrigation water in Kazakhstan's Turkestan and Kyzylorda regions. These are concerns raised by specialists and campaigners, rather than established measurements of the completed plant's impact, but they require a quantified response because water scarcity is already a recurring regional problem. Uzbekistan held public hearings on the environmental impact assessment in December 2025. The State Ecological Expertise Center said the assessment complied with national requirements and IAEA standards, and that participants received answers on water, agriculture, radiation safety, health monitoring, and compensation. Uzatom has also pursued Hungarian dry-cooling technology intended for water-scarce locations, which could reduce water withdrawals compared with conventional wet cooling. However, the published hearing summary does not state the plant's expected annual water demand or explain whether Kazakhstan participated in a project-specific transboundary consultation. The two countries already cooperate on Syr Darya monitoring and automated measuring stations, but the nuclear project will need its own transparent mechanism for sharing water-use data, emergency plans, and environmental monitoring results. Kazakhstan's Return to Nuclear Power Kazakhstan's path has been more politically visible. In the October 6, 2024 referendum, 71.12% of participating voters supported construction of a nuclear power plant, with turnout of 63.66%. The vote gave the government a mandate to proceed, despite the country's unusually sensitive nuclear history. Between 1949 and 1989, the Soviet Union carried out 456 nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk site, which was formally closed in 1991. Kazakhstan also previously generated nuclear electricity at the BN-350 fast reactor in Aktau, which shut down in 1999. The new program is therefore a return to civilian nuclear generation and the construction of the country's first new large commercial plant in the post-Soviet period, rather than its first nuclear facility of any kind. Kazakhstan officially broke ground near the village of Ulken in August 2025, launching engineering and site-survey work on the shore of Lake Balkhash. That ceremony marked the official start of the construction process, but not yet the full civil construction of the reactor buildings. The commercial framework became clearer on May 28, 2026, when Kazakhstan and Russia signed the agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant. The project will use two VVER-1200 Generation III+ reactors with a combined capacity of about 2.4 GW. Almasadam Satkaliyev, the head of Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy Agency, put the cost at about $16.5 billion, including roughly $2 billion for security and infrastructure. Russia is expected to provide export credit. Active construction is planned to begin in 2027, with the first reactor scheduled for commissioning in early 2034. At Least Three Plants Kazakhstan is planning beyond Ulken. In January 2026, the government approved the Zhambyl district of the Almaty region as the site of a second plant, adjacent to the first project area. China National Nuclear Corporation has been selected to lead the second project and is also expected to lead a third plant. Final designs, costs, and the detailed siting arrangements for the later projects remain under development. The national nuclear strategy says at least three plants should be operating by 2050, while leaving open the possibility of a fourth. The multi-supplier approach also reflects Kazakhstan's effort to avoid placing its entire nuclear program with one foreign partner. The energy case is substantial. According to Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company, the country generated 123.1 billion kWh in 2025 but consumed 124.6 billion kWh; the 1.5 billion kWh gap was covered by supplies from Russia. Thermal plants produced 74.4% of generation, gas-turbine plants 11%, hydropower 8.5%, and wind, solar, and biogas 6.1%. Demand rose particularly quickly in the western and southern zones. Kazakhstan is the world's largest uranium producer, but domestic uranium reserves do not by themselves create energy independence. The first plant will still depend on foreign reactor technology, export financing, specialist services, and long-term supply arrangements. Nuclear power may reduce exposure to electricity shortages and aging thermal capacity; the government objective is energy security rather than complete independence. Sanctions and Delivery Risk Given that Rosatom leads the first nuclear projects in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, sanctions and related banking or supply restrictions are a legitimate delivery risk. In February 2026, the United Kingdom sanctioned three Rosatom subsidiaries associated with overseas projects. Rosatom itself was not sanctioned in that package and said its international work would continue. Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy Agency said none of the sanctioned entities was involved in its project and that work remained on schedule. The experience of Turkey's Akkuyu plant nevertheless shows how restrictions can affect a Rosatom-led project indirectly. In that instance, Siemens Energy withheld key components because export licenses had not been issued, prompting Rosatom to seek replacements from China and contributing to a delay. The project later required additional Russian financing while its first unit, originally expected to start in 2023, is now expected to begin supplying power in 2026 Akkuyu shows how supply chains, payments, and replacement equipment can become points of vulnerability in a Rosatom-led project, though it does not mean the Kazakh or Uzbek plants will face the same delays. The key question will be whether contracts provide for alternative suppliers, secure financing channels, and sufficient localization without weakening quality control or independent oversight. The regional picture is therefore uneven. Uzbekistan has moved first into the construction phase, but its mixed-reactor project still faces financing, water-disclosure, and schedule tests. Kazakhstan has the larger long-term buildout, but its first plant remains in engineering and preconstruction before the active phase planned for 2027. In both countries, public confidence will depend as much on transparent water data, cross-border consultation, financing terms, and credible safety regulation as on the reactors themselves.
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Kazakhstan to Host 2027 Table Tennis World Championships
