Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode This Sunday with Eduards Stiprais, EU Special Representative for Central Asia
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team is joined by the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Eduards Stiprais, to discuss connectivity, critical minerals, and what's unique about the EU's engagement with Central Asia.
Disability Inclusion Is Emerging as Central Asia’s Next Social Frontier
More than 1.3 billion people worldwide live with some form of disability, yet disability remains one of the least visible dimensions of social and economic life. In Central Asia, that invisibility is especially pronounced. As governments focus on infrastructure, growth, and modernization, far less attention is paid to whether people with disabilities are becoming more present in schools, workplaces, and public life, or whether they remain largely confined to families and institutions beyond the reach of public discussion. Across the region, cities are expanding, labor mobility is increasing, and younger generations are more connected to global ideas through study and migration. These shifts are often treated as shorthand for progress. At the same time, people with disabilities consistently face lower educational attainment and weaker labor market outcomes, making inclusion a practical test of whether development reaches beyond headline indicators into everyday life. Disability policy across much of Central Asia has long centered on legal classification, benefit eligibility, and institutional care. Long-term institutionalization is associated with reduced autonomy and poorer social outcomes, yet institutions remain a common default, reinforcing the idea that disability is primarily an administrative or medical issue rather than a social one shaped by access and expectations. In practice, families remain the primary providers of care throughout the region. In Kyrgyzstan, around 200,000 people are officially registered as living with disabilities, and outside major cities, most daily support is provided by family members due to limited community-based services. In Turkmenistan, public disability data remain sparse, and undercounting is widely acknowledged, leaving extended families as the central source of long-term care. In Tajikistan, official estimates place the number of people living with disabilities between 150,000 and 200,000, with caregiving overwhelmingly home-based due to constrained public resources. Family-based care provides continuity and belonging, but it also carries an economic cost. Caregivers are more likely to reduce paid employment and experience long-term income loss, a burden that falls disproportionately on women and shapes household economic outcomes. This reliance on family support is often contrasted unfavorably with wealthier countries, but the comparison is more complicated. In the United States, more than one in four adults lives with a disability, and people with disabilities report significantly higher rates of loneliness and depression despite extensive legal protections and formal services. By contrast, strong family networks are associated with lower levels of severe social isolation, even in settings with fewer public resources. In recent years, small but notable shifts have begun to appear. Local organizations across the region are experimenting with community-based rehabilitation, inclusive education, and supported employment models that move beyond institutional care. These efforts remain fragmented and under-resourced, but they reflect a growing recognition that disability policy is about protection and participation. As Central Asian governments seek to retain talent, expand their labor force, and project social modernization, inclusion is increasingly intersecting with economic and demographic realities rather than remaining a niche social issue. Institutional care remains common across Central Asia, yet community-based rehabilitation is consistently linked to better social participation and quality of life. Families are increasingly questioning whether institutions should be the default response when local support could preserve relationships and autonomy. Disability inclusion will not define Central Asia’s future on its own. It does, however, offer a clear measure of whether modernization is reflected not only in infrastructure and growth, but in who is visible, connected, and able to participate in everyday life.
Central Asia Trade with China Tops Record $100 Billion in 2025
Trade between China and Central Asia increased to a record of more than $100 billion in 2025, despite challenges to global economic growth, the Chinese government said on Monday. Citing data from China’s General Administration of Customs, Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said the trade structure with the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had improved and that more high-end products were entering the Chinese market from the region. “As global economic growth remains sluggish and the international trading system faces serious challenges, the economic and trade cooperation between China and Central Asian countries has withstood external headwinds, and the trade volume surpassed US$100 billion,” Guo said. He attributed the increasing cooperation in part to a China-Central Asia summit in Astana, Kazakhstan last year that was attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping and the five Central Asian leaders. China’s Belt and Road initiatives, which include the development of trade routes that pass through Central Asia and link up with Europe, are also making progress, according to the Chinese official. Total trade between China and Central Asia was $106.3 billion in 2025, an increase of 12 percent over the previous year, China’s state-run Xinhua news agency reported. Chinese exports such as machinery, electronics and high-tech goods were $71.2 billion, an increase of 11 percent over the previous year. Imports from Central Asia amounted to $35.1 billion, a rise of 14 percent from 2024. China is involved in major projects in Central Asia, including the extraction of minerals used for “clean” technology, equipment manufacturing and the modernization of agriculture. China imports oil and natural gas as well as a growing number of other products from the region. Russia was once the main trading partner of Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union, but China has the lead position now. The United States is also seeking to develop more trade with resource-rich Central Asia, which is diversifying its international partnerships.
U.S. Expands Visa Bond Policy for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan
The United States has expanded a visa bond policy that increases the upfront cost of short-term travel for citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and dozens of other countries. Under the policy, applicants for B-1 and B-2 business and tourism visas may be required to post bonds of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000. The State Department set out the latest rules and the country list on its visa bond policy page. The program now covers nationals from 38 countries. In Central Asia, it was applied to Turkmenistan on January 1, and is scheduled to extend to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan starting from January 21. The bond is refundable when travelers follow visa terms and leave on time, but it can tie up large sums for the duration of a trip and may put U.S. travel beyond reach for many applicants. Turkmenistan, where emigration is tightly controlled, sees low numbers of its citizens entering the United States. Department of Homeland Security data for Fiscal Year 2024 indicates that the total number of Turkmen nationals issued B-1/B-2 visas to the U.S. was 1,759. Tajikistan, meanwhile, saw 1,772 visas granted, and Kyrgyzstan 9,625. By way of comparison, Saudi Arabia saw over 54,000 visas granted. The expansion has already triggered public pushback in Kyrgyzstan. In a post on X on Thursday, Edil Baisalov, the deputy chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet of Ministers and a prominent ally of President Sadyr Japarov, urged the Kyrgyz authorities to review visa-free access for U.S. citizens. Kyrgyzstan currently allows U.S. travelers to enter without a visa for stays of up to 30 days. “I believe that we should initiate a review of our visa-free regime for U.S. citizens following the new visa requirements announced yesterday by the State Department, under which Kyrgyz citizens are required to pay a visa deposit of up to $15,000 when submitting visa applications,” Baisalov wrote. “Visa policy is a matter of parity and mutual respect. If such high barriers are introduced for our citizens, we cannot pretend that nothing has happened.” Baisalov did not specify precisely what changes Kyrgyzstan might pursue, and any escalation risks provoking a dispute with a far stronger partner. The remarks also come as Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian governments seek closer engagement with President Donald Trump’s administration while managing competing pressures from Russia and China. The measure is a setback for Kyrgyz efforts to ease travel barriers with the United States. Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Zheenbek Kulubaev raised visa issues with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau during a meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September. So far, Tajikistan has not matched Kyrgyzstan’s public stance, with no prominent statement appearing on Tajik government channels addressing the bond requirement or signaling reciprocity. Discussion has instead focused on what the new U.S. rules mean for applicants, the implementation timeline, and the bond amounts that may be set at the interview stage. For Turkmenistan, the requirement adds another hurdle to an already narrow path to U.S. travel. The country’s internal controls and the difficulty of obtaining U.S. visitor visas mean the new deposits will likely concentrate travel among an even smaller group of applicants with significant accessible funds. The bond policy also creates logistical constraints for those required to post deposits. Bonded travelers must enter the United States through designated airports rather than any international gateway. The designated airports are Boston Logan, John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, Washington Dulles, Newark, Atlanta, Chicago O’Hare, and Los Angeles, along with Toronto Pearson and Montréal–Trudeau in Canada. The visa bond program has expanded rapidly, with the list of countries subject to visa bonds growing from 13 to 38 as part of a wider tightening around immigration and visa compliance, including steps aimed at deterring overstays. In Fiscal Year 2024, Mexico recorded 52,083 B-1/B-2 overstays, Venezuela 19,041, and Haiti 15,981, compared with 643 for Kyrgyzstan, 140 for Tajikistan, and 320 for Turkmenistan, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. Although the three Central Asian countries affected send relatively few visitors to the United States, their inclusion reflects a focus on overstay rates by percentage rather than raw overstay numbers. For applicants, the requirement adds uncertainty late in the process. The bond is imposed only after an applicant is found otherwise eligible, but it can still function as a practical barrier. In economies where access to dollars is limited and household savings are constrained, securing a large refundable deposit at short notice may prove impossible. Even when returned, a bond can tie up funds for months and add financial strain to travel that already carries substantial costs. As the January 21 implementation date approaches for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the visa bond policy is likely to remain a point of diplomatic tension, even as its most direct consequences are felt by travelers weighing whether U.S. travel remains financially viable.
Independent Audit Raises Concerns Over Financial Reporting at Tajikistan’s Rogun Hydropower Plant
An independent audit of Tajikistan’s flagship Rogun Hydropower Plant (HPP) has flagged serious financial reporting concerns, including a possible understatement of the company’s share capital. The findings, cited by Asia-Plus from the auditor’s conclusion, point to broader risks in the management of one of Central Asia’s most ambitious infrastructure projects. The audit, covering Rogun’s 2024 financial statements, was conducted by Baker Tilly Tajikistan, a registered member of the international Baker Tilly network. The auditors issued a qualified opinion, meaning they were unable to fully confirm the accuracy of the company’s accounts and highlighted several material issues. The audited report has been published on the official Rogun HPP website. Among the key concerns, auditors stated they had not been involved in scheduled or annual inventories of cash, fixed assets, or other inventories as of December 31, 2024. This limited their ability to verify the existence and condition of parts of the company’s assets through alternative procedures, raising the risk of potential misstatements in the financial records. The audit also noted that Rogun’s fixed assets had not been revalued in recent years, despite signs that their book value may significantly differ from their fair market value. Under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), such assets are required to be revalued periodically. The failure to do so may distort the company’s true financial position. A particularly striking finding involved discrepancies in the company’s reported share capital. Rogun’s financial statements list share capital at 40.03 billion somoni, while the Unified State Register of Legal Entities records it at 45 billion somoni. The difference, 4.97 billion somoni, or approximately $540 million, may indicate that the company has understated its equity. According to the audit, Rogun’s management did not provide adequate documentation to support the lower figure. As of the end of 2024, Rogun reported total assets of 49.48 billion somoni, up from the previous year. The bulk, 35.33 billion somoni, was classified as construction in progress, reflecting the plant’s ongoing development phase. The book value of fixed assets stood at 9.28 billion somoni, with most 2024 expenditures directed toward equipment and construction work. The company reported 2024 revenues of 258.4 million somoni, primarily from electricity sales. However, operating costs exceeded income, totaling 367.4 million somoni, resulting in a net loss of 277.3 million somoni. This marks a modest improvement over 2023, when the net loss was 332.8 million somoni. The auditors described these losses as systemic, emphasizing that the plant has not yet reached full operational capacity. Despite the loss, Rogun HPP generated a positive operating cash flow of more than 3.2 billion somoni in 2024. This was largely attributed to increased liabilities from founders and settlements with state institutions. Baker Tilly stressed that the company’s continued operation depends heavily on sustained government support, which is regularly allocated through Tajikistan’s state budget. The auditors also issued a warning over material uncertainty regarding the company’s ability to continue as a going concern. However, Rogun’s management maintains that the project is a strategic national asset, vital to Tajikistan’s long-term energy security and plans for future electricity exports. With an installed capacity of 3,780 megawatts, Rogun is expected to become the largest hydropower plant in Central Asia. Once fully operational, it is projected to generate over 14.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually. The final turbine is scheduled for commissioning in 2029.
Recent Stories From Tajikistan That You May Have Missed
Hydropower strain returns as rationing tightens
A dry autumn has translated into a difficult start to winter for Tajikistan’s electricity system, with renewed restrictions tied to low reservoir levels. A recent Reuters report on rationing described a drop in water levels feeding the country’s hydropower fleet, with the reservoir at Nurek, the backbone of generation, reported to be substantially below the same point last year. The measures announced go beyond household inconvenience: restrictions have been accompanied by reduced lighting and tighter electricity allocations for public institutions, while officials explore imports and balancing arrangements with neighbors.Rogun’s mitigation narrative hardens as oversight grows
The Rogun hydropower project remains the long-term answer Dushanbe puts forward for these seasonal crunches, and also the project that draws the most intense international scrutiny. The Times of Central Asia’s coverage of Rogun’s environmental planning highlighted a shift in framing: a “no net loss” biodiversity approach, built around compensatory habitat restoration exceeding the estimated footprint of land losses. That messaging is designed to reassure lenders and stakeholders that the dam’s scale will be matched by formal safeguards, and to keep financing pathways open at a time when environmental and social governance has become central to major infrastructure underwriting. But “no net loss” is also an invitation for closer measurement, and criticism has increasingly focused on whether offsets can meaningfully address river-system impacts, not only terrestrial habitat. Advocacy briefs circulating around Rogun argue that aquatic biodiversity mitigation and downstream ecological risk remain the hardest pieces to quantify and enforce, especially on long timelines where implementation phases stretch years beyond core construction. In other words, Rogun’s external story is evolving: it is no longer only about generating electricity and exporting surplus. It is also about whether international standards can be applied credibly to a project of this size — and whether promised safeguards hold up under cross-border water politics and long-term monitoring.A border-security story triggers a rare media confrontation
If energy is the long-term strategic theme, border security remains the most sensitive. That sensitivity spilled into public view after a Reuters dispatch on alleged Tajik–Russian border talks suggested Dushanbe was considering deeper cooperation with Moscow and the CSTO for monitoring the Afghan frontier. Tajikistan’s response was unusually direct. In a sharply worded statement reported by Eurasianet’s account of the dispute, the Foreign Ministry said the report “does not correspond to reality” and insisted the border situation was under national control. Shortly afterwards, The Times of Central Asia’s report on Reuters withdrawing the story underscored how rare it is for a major international outlet to retract a piece following an official denial in the region. For Western governments, the episode illustrates how the Afghan border remains a geopolitical pressure valve, and how carefully Dushanbe manages the optics of any foreign military footprint, particularly at a time when Russia’s regional role is politically charged and China’s security profile is rising.Land degradation moves from “environmental” to “economic risk”
Finally, an issue that has long sat in the “environment” column is now being described increasingly as a macroeconomic threat: land degradation and food security. The Times of Central Asia’s summary of FAO-linked findings drew attention to estimates that a very large share of arable land is already degraded, driven by erosion, salinization and nutrient loss. International analysis has pushed the point further. In The Diplomat’s deep dive on Tajikistan’s food-security constraints, the argument is that fragmentation of farmland, limited mechanization and underinvestment in irrigation and soil management are combining with climate stress to reduce resilience, in a country where household economics, migration decisions and political stability are closely tied to rural livelihoods. Broader UN messaging, including FAO’s work on land and soils, frames the same dynamic globally: degraded land reduces yields and amplifies vulnerability to drought and extreme weather. Together, these four developments capture Tajikistan’s current trajectory: hydropower remains both the country’s strength and its exposure; Rogun is increasingly a test case for international infrastructure standards; the Afghan border remains politically combustible; and land degradation is becoming an economic headline rather than a background environmental warning.
Deadly Clashes and Gold Mines Fuel Tensions on the Tajik-Afghan Border
Along a short strip of the Tajik-Afghan border, there has been a lot of activity in recent months, including the most serious incidents of cross-border violence in decades. Most of this activity has involved Tajikistan’s Shamsiddin Shohin district, a sparsely inhabited area where the population ekes out a living farming and herding in the foothills of the Pamir Mountains. Why the situation changed so suddenly is not entirely clear, but it is clear that the district is now the hot spot along the Tajik-Afghan frontier.
A Dubious Post-Independence Reputation
The Shamsiddin Shohin district is in Tajikistan’s southwestern Khatlon region. The district is located near the place where Afghan territory starts to make its northern-most protrusion. The elevation across most of the district is between 1,500-2,000 meters.
The district is about 2,300 square kilometers and has a population of some 60,000. Shuroobad, population roughly 11,000, is the district capital, and the entire district was once called Shuroobad. It was renamed Shamsiddin Shohin in 2016 to honor the Tajik poet and satirist of the late 19th century, who was born in the area.
Tajikistan and Afghanistan are divided by the Pyanj River, which further downstream merges with other rivers to become the Amu Darya, known to the Greeks as the Oxus, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers.
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The road to Shuroobad; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption]
The Tajik-Afghan frontier is about 1,360 kilometers. Some 70 kilometers is the southern border of the Shamsiddin Shohin district, but it is the first area, traveling downstream, where the current of the Pyanj River slows significantly.
In the first years after the Bolshevik Revolution broke out, many Tajiks fled through what is now the Shamsiddin Shohin district into Afghanistan. Some seventy years later, thousands of Tajiks again fled through the district into Afghanistan when the newly independent state of Tajikistan was engulfed by civil war.
The United Tajik Opposition (UTO), the group fighting against the Tajik government during the 1992-1997 civil war, made frequent use of the Shamsiddin Shohin area to bring weapons from Afghanistan. UTO fighters had safe havens in Afghanistan, and they often made their way through this district, retreating south of the border and returning via the district once they were rested and resupplied.
There are only a few roads in the Shamsiddin Shohi district. The European Union funded the construction of the Friendship Bridge, which was completed in 2017, and connects the district to Afghanistan. It has often been closed by the Tajik authorities due to security concerns emanating from the Afghan side of the border.
Anyone crossing illegally from Afghanistan into the Shamsiddin Shohin district could easily hide in the rugged hills and abundance of caves in the area, making it ideal for smugglers and other intruders. Aside from a few small villages along the banks, there are no settlements for 20 to 30 kilometers north of the river.
Border posts were built during the time Tajikistan was a Soviet republic. Russian border guards remained in Tajikistan after the collapse of the USSR, and fortified these outposts as they increasingly came under attack from smugglers and UTO fighters crossing from Afghanistan.
Foreign governments funded the construction of new border guard posts along the Afghan frontier after the last Russian border guards departed in 2005. China, for example, financed the construction of the Gulhan border guard post in the Shamsiddin Shohin district in 2016.
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A burnt-out bus in the Pyanj River between Tajikistan and Afghanistan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption]
New People, New Business
Illegal narcotics, weapons, precious and semi-precious stones, and a variety of contraband goods have been regularly smuggled from Afghanistan through Tajikistan since not long after Tajikistan became independent. It didn’t matter who the government in Afghanistan was. The Shamsiddin Shohin district is one of the more popular places along the Tajik-Afghan border for smugglers.
However, almost all of the recent violence along the Tajik-Afghan frontier is happening in the Shamsiddin Shohin district and Afghan territory on the other side of the river, and smuggling does not seem to be the main reason.
Not long after the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, agreements were signed with Chinese companies to develop Afghan gas and oil fields, and mineral deposits, notably gold. About three years ago, Chinese and Afghans started working at several sites in Afghanistan’s northern Badakhshan Province that borders Tajikistan.
In February 2023, the Tajik-Chinese company Zarafshan announced the discovery of new gold deposits, one of the most promising of which was in the Shamsiddin Shohin district. Zarafshan subsidiary Shohin SM started work shortly after that announcement.
In November 2024, armed men from Afghanistan crossed into Tajikistan and attacked the Shohin SM gold-mining camp, killing one Chinese worker and wounding at least four other workers, three of whom were also Chinese (the fourth was Tajik). The Tajik authorities blamed the attack on drug smugglers who wandered too close to the gold-mining camp and were seen by camp security guards.
In May 2025, the Tajik authorities apprehended a group of Chinese and Afghans who had crossed from Afghanistan on excavators into the Shamsiddin Shohin district. Tajik officials alleged the group intended to launder money, though the head of the district, Zafar Gulzoda, said the group was searching for gold scrap on the Tajik side of the Pyanj River.
Then in August 2025, Tajik border guards stationed in Shamsiddin Shohin exchanged fire with Taliban fighters on the other side of the river. The Tajik border guards did not suffer any casualties, but one Taliban fighter was killed and four others wounded. The head of the local Tajik border guards led a small detachment of troops across the border into Afghanistan for talks with local Taliban officials and the head of the local mining operation.
In late October, there were reports that Tajik border guards and the Taliban were again involved in a firefight in the same area as the shooting in August. A report from an Afghan media outlet said there were casualties on both sides, but Tajik and Taliban officials never commented on the incident.
The reason for the second exchange of fire was reportedly construction work at a Chinese-Afghan gold mining site that had altered the course of the Pyanj River and sent more water to the Tajik bank, sparking concerns about flooding in the Shamsiddin Shohin district. The Tajik authorities have complained about this several times.
Then, on November 26, three Chinese workers at the Shohin SM gold mining camp were killed and two wounded in an attack that combined gunfire and the use of a drone armed with a grenade. On the last day of November, two Chinese roadworkers were shot dead and three wounded in Tajikistan’s Darvaz district, the next district east of Shamsiddin Shohin. The shots came from the Afghan side of the river.
On December 24, Tajik border guards in Shamsiddin Shohin were again involved in a shootout, this time with an armed group that came across the river from Afghanistan. Two Tajik border guards and three of the attackers were killed in the clash. The Tajik authorities said the armed group were terrorists who attacked the Tajik border guard post in the area.
No other place along the Tajik-Afghan border has seen the sort of violence that is becoming routine in the Shamsiddin Shohin district. The alleged “smuggler” attack on the gold mining camp in November 2024, and then a series of attacks and exchanges of fire since late August 2025.
Chinese gold mining, smuggling, and terrorists are combining to make the Shamsiddin Shohin district the hot spot of Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan.
2025: The Year Central Asia Stepped Onto the Global Stage
For much of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia occupied a peripheral place in global affairs. It mattered to its immediate neighbors, but rarely shaped wider debates. In 2025, that changed in visible ways. The region became harder to ignore, largely not because of ideology or alignments, but because of assets that the world increasingly needs: energy, minerals, transit routes, and political access across Eurasia. One of the clearest signs came in April, when the European Union and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Samarkand for their first summit at the head-of-state level. The meeting concluded with a joint declaration upgrading relations to a strategic partnership, with a focus on transport connectivity, energy security, and critical raw materials. The document marked a shift in how Brussels views Central Asia, moving beyond development assistance toward geopolitical cooperation, as outlined in the official EU–Central Asia summit joint declaration. European interest is rooted in necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced EU governments to rethink energy imports, supply chains, and overland trade routes. Central Asia sits astride the most viable alternatives that bypass Russian territory. It also holds resources essential to Europe’s green transition, including uranium and a range of industrial metals. The region’s leaders spent much of the year framing their diplomacy around these tangible advantages, rather than abstract political alignments. The United States followed a similar track. Through the C5+1 format, Washington deepened engagement with all five Central Asian states, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation and supply-chain resilience. A key element has been the Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to connect Central Asian producers with Western markets. This initiative formed part of a broader U.S. effort to diversify access to strategic materials and reduce dependence on Russia and China. Russia remained a central but changing presence in Central Asia throughout 2025. Economic ties, labor migration, and shared infrastructure ensured that Moscow continued to matter across the region. At the same time, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine constrained its ability to act as the dominant external power it once was. Central Asian governments maintained pragmatic relations with Moscow, but they increasingly treated Russia as one partner among several rather than the default reference point. Trade continued, security cooperation persisted, and political dialogue remained active, yet the balance shifted toward hedging rather than dependence. Uranium sits at the center of this shift, with the United States having banned imports of certain Russian uranium products under federal law, with waivers set to expire no earlier than January 1, 2028. As Washington restructures its nuclear fuel supply chain, Central Asia’s role has grown sharply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Kazakhstan supplied 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. reactor operators, while Uzbekistan accounted for about 9%. Canada and Australia remain major suppliers, but the Central Asian share is now strategic rather than marginal. That economic weight translated into political visibility. In December, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend the U.S.-hosted G20 summit in 2026. While guest invitations do not confer membership, they offer access to senior leaders and investors at a critical moment in global supply-chain restructuring. This move is part of a broader U.S. effort to expand engagement with Central Asia. The region’s growing global presence was also reflected beyond diplomacy, from Uzbekistan’s qualification for the 2026 football World Cup to increased international media attention on Central Asian economies, reform agendas, societies, and infrastructure projects. Investment trends reinforced the political signals. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported record investment in Central Asia – including Mongolia - committing nearly €2.26 billion across 121 projects, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan receiving the largest shares. The EBRD described the surge as driven by infrastructure, energy, and private-sector development. Mongolia’s growing inclusion reflects a wider regional pull, with Ulaanbaatar stepping up engagement with its Central Asian neighbors through trade, transport cooperation, and multilateral investment initiatives. Energy security was not limited to nuclear fuel. Hydropower returned to the regional agenda in 2025, especially in discussions around Kyrgyzstan’s long-delayed Kambarata-1 project. The dam, with a planned capacity of 1,860 megawatts, is seen as critical for stabilizing electricity supply across parts of Central Asia. It was reported that the EBRD could consider lending up to $1.5 billion for the project, underscoring how regional infrastructure is now tied to international financing and diplomacy. Regional cooperation among the five Central Asian states also deepened, with leaders increasingly coordinating on water management, energy sharing, and cross-border transport rather than addressing these issues in isolation. Security concerns also shaped the year. Violence along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, including attacks near sites employing Chinese nationals, exposed the region’s vulnerability to instability spilling over from Afghanistan. The incidents prompted warnings from Beijing and renewed scrutiny of border security in Central Asia. The Times of Central Asia has reported on the situation as part of a wider examination of how insecurity affects foreign investment and regional stability. China’s role in Central Asia stayed substantial and highly visible. Beijing remained the region’s largest single trading partner and a key investor in infrastructure, mining, and energy projects. In 2025, however, Chinese engagement also faced sharper scrutiny, with the risks that accompany China’s deep economic footprint increasingly highlighted. For Central Asian governments, the challenge was to preserve Chinese investment while asserting greater control over security and diversification. The result was not a retreat from China, but a more cautious and negotiated engagement. Despite these risks, Central Asian governments resisted pressure to align exclusively with any single power. Instead, they pursued a strategy of increasing diversification. The EU, the United States, China, and Russia all remained engaged, but none dominated the region’s external agenda. Ties with Azerbaijan also deepened in 2025, driven by shared interests in transport, energy, and westward connectivity. Baku emerged as a key partner in linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus and onward to European markets, particularly through Caspian transit routes. This cooperation increasingly took shape within the C6+1 framework, which brings Azerbaijan together with the five Central Asian states to coordinate infrastructure planning, trade facilitation, and regional connectivity. This underscored a growing recognition that Central Asia’s global role depends not only on internal links, but on reliable Western gateways. Turkmenistan, traditionally cautious in its diplomacy, also expanded engagement around energy exports and transport links across the Caspian, reinforcing its role in regional connectivity. Japan played a quieter but increasingly consistent role in Central Asia in 2025. Tokyo focused on economic cooperation, infrastructure financing, and technical assistance, often emphasizing transparency and long-term sustainability. Japanese engagement carried less geopolitical weight than that of larger powers, but it offered Central Asian states another option for diversification. Japan’s steady presence reinforced the region’s ability to widen its external partnerships without triggering strategic friction. This approach gave Central Asian states greater leverage and reduced their exposure to shifts in any one relationship. Whilst 2025 may not have been a decisive turning point, it was a clear step. The region did not suddenly acquire global influence, but it increasingly demonstrated why it matters on a global stage. Strategic documents, investment flows, and energy data all point to the same conclusion: Central Asia entered the year as a subject of geopolitical discussion, and ended it as a participant. Whether that momentum continues will depend on execution. Summits must continue to turn into contracts, and contracts into infrastructure and industry. For now, the direction is unmistakable. In 2025, Central Asia stepped onto the global stage not by seeking attention, but by offering what the world increasingly needs.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
