Rubio to Lead Major U.S. Business Delegation to Uzbekistan for C5+1 Talks
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio will lead a delegation including executives from more than 100 American companies to Uzbekistan in October. The visit will bring a substantial business contingent to talks with Central Asia’s foreign ministers in Samarkand. Sergio Gor, the U.S. special envoy for South and Central Asia, announced the visit in a statement published by the U.S. Embassy in India. Gor said the talks would focus on “deepening regional economic connectivity, enhancing energy security,” alongside cooperation on shared regional priorities. The delegation is expected in mid-October, alongside a C5+1 ministerial meeting. The C5+1 format brings together the United States and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Bringing executives from more than 100 companies gives Rubio’s visit a substantial commercial component. The delegation’s composition should indicate which sectors Washington is ready to back following last year’s C5+1 agreements. In November 2025, Rubio announced his intention to visit all five Central Asian countries in 2026. Speaking ahead of the Washington C5+1 summit, he suggested such a tour could take a week. The Samarkand announcement gives a destination and timeframe for his regional engagement, although it does not establish an itinerary covering all five states. President Donald Trump hosted the five Central Asian presidents in Washington on November 6, 2025. Commercial agreements featured prominently in the summit, reflecting a greater focus on investment within the C5+1 framework. The U.S. Commerce Department said the “Deal Zone” business event held alongside the November 2025 C5+1 summit featured more than $25 billion in announced commercial deals. Air Astana’s agreement covered up to 15 Boeing 787-9 aircraft, comprising five firm orders, five options, and five purchase rights. Tajikistan’s Somon Air announced plans to acquire up to four Dreamliners and ten 737 MAX jets. Uzbekistan Airways finalized an order for eight additional Boeing 787-9 aircraft during the summit. Boeing said the purchase brought the airline’s total order to 22 Dreamliners, converting options from an earlier agreement into firm orders. In mining, Cove Capital and Kazakhstan’s Tau-Ken Samruk agreed to develop the Severny Katpar and Verkhne Kairakty tungsten deposits. The projected $1.1 billion investment includes two processing plants and a metallurgical facility. Kazakhstan’s technology announcements included a memorandum for $2 billion in advanced AI-chip procurement, involving NVIDIA, Freedom Holding, and the country’s digital ministry. Critical minerals cooperation has also advanced since the Washington summit. During a February 4 visit to the U.S. capital, Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov attended a ministerial meeting devoted to the sector and held talks with Rubio. Saidov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau signed a memorandum on mineral supplies, covering the mining and processing of critical minerals and rare earths. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry said the country was seeking foreign technology and investment to develop the industry, with an emphasis on value-added production. For Tashkent, the unresolved question is how much mineral processing American investors will finance inside Uzbekistan. October’s talks could clarify whether February’s memorandum will lead to domestic processing facilities, allowing the country to retain more of the value of its mineral exports.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be covering Turkmenistan's changing foreign policy and the preservation of stability at home. Special guest: Luca Anceschi, Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow and the author of several books on Central Asian politics and foreign policy.
At the UN, Mirziyoyeva Champions “Human Dignity” as Central Asia Seeks a Greater Voice
Uzbekistan called for a more effective United Nations and sought support for its Security Council candidacy during the General Assembly’s September 23 debate. Delivering the national address, presidential administration chief Saida Mirziyoyeva urged countries to work together despite deepening international divisions.
“Our choice is human dignity,” said Mirziyoyeva. “Openness does not mean weakness.”
Speaking in Uzbek at the Assembly’s 81st session in New York, she argued that a country’s strength should be judged by its ability to protect people’s rights and interests. The message offered a basis for cooperation beyond competing geopolitical camps, with particular emphasis on young people’s opportunities to study and shape their futures.
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Image: Saida Mirziyoyeva/Telegram[/caption]
A Larger Role at the UN
Mirziyoyeva sought support for Uzbekistan’s candidacy for a nonpermanent Security Council seat in 2035–2036. She also highlighted the country’s forthcoming chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2027, presenting it as an opportunity to widen dialogue during a period of international tension.
She backed the secretary-general’s UN80 reform initiative and an expanded Security Council, arguing that the organization needed greater capacity to prevent conflict and implement its decisions. Her appeal was for international rules that apply consistently, rather than changing with the interests of powerful states.
That concern also ran through Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov’s address, although he focused on unilateral sanctions and their impact on developing countries. The two speeches approached the issue differently, but both sought stronger multilateral protections for states with limited influence over the restrictions and conflicts affecting them.
Kyrgyzstan has already secured its first Security Council seat for 2027–2028, giving Bishkek a vote on the sanctions and security decisions Japarov criticized.
Afghanistan and Regional Cooperation
Mirziyoyeva pointed to improving relations among neighboring Central Asian states as evidence that political will can help resolve longstanding disputes. She said disagreements over borders and water had increasingly given way to cooperation, with countries coming to see one another as partners.
She applied the same argument to Afghanistan, warning against treating the country solely as a source of danger or abandoning its people to their difficulties. Her emphasis was on giving Afghans the prospect of peaceful development.
Kazakhstan’s UN agenda also extends to Afghanistan through the regional Sustainable Development Goals center in Almaty, established to serve Central Asia and Afghanistan. Alongside its longstanding nuclear disarmament priorities, Kazakhstan is promoting cooperation on water security and has proposed an international water organization within the UN system.
Measuring Progress in People’s Lives
Mirziyoyeva linked her foreign policy message to Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms, citing economic growth and wider access to education. She said the economy had expanded from $50 billion to $147 billion over a decade and that poverty had fallen to 4%, presenting the figures as evidence of improvements in living standards.
“The true value of reforms is reflected in people’s lives. Especially in children’s lives,” she said.
She outlined forthcoming discussions with the UN Population Fund on demographic stability and human capital, and an international gathering in Samarkand in October focused on children’s well-being. She also cited stronger penalties for domestic violence and support for women’s entrepreneurship as elements of the government’s reform program.
Her account of technological change followed the same theme. She called for artificial intelligence to be developed with safeguards for human rights and accountability, placing improvements to people’s lives at the center of its use.
Water, Climate and Access to Markets
The Aral Sea provided the speech’s clearest warning about the consequences of policy failure. Mirziyoyeva described its destruction as the result of decades of damaging decisions and pointed to planting on the dried seabed and water-saving technologies as part of Uzbekistan’s response. She reiterated the goal of raising renewables’ share of electricity generation to 54% by 2030.
Water diplomacy remains a wider regional priority. Tajikistan is preparing to host the 2028 UN Water Conference in Dushanbe, while Japarov has proposed a UN-backed fund to preserve Issyk-Kul, with a promised $10 million Kyrgyz contribution.
Turkmenistan, meanwhile, has been elected to chair the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries for 2027–2028. The bureau’s composition was scheduled for endorsement at a September 24 ministerial meeting in New York. Its priorities include transport and energy connectivity, issues that bear directly on Central Asia’s ability to reach overseas markets.
Mirziyoyeva’s appeal reflected a concern shared across Central Asia: countries exposed to conflicts beyond their borders want a greater say in how those conflicts are addressed. Winning a Security Council seat would give Tashkent a direct role in those decisions.
Central Asia at the UN: Iran Threats and Sanctions Disputes
U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to “annihilate” Iran brought the vulnerability of Central Asia’s southern trade routes into focus as the UN General Assembly’s general debate opened in New York. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov challenged unilateral sanctions, while diplomacy over Ukraine raised the prospect of a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure.
For landlocked Central Asia, these developments carry consequences far beyond the speeches. Iranian ports provide access to overseas markets, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely heavily on fuel from Russian refineries, and restrictions on international payments can complicate commerce even where transport links remain intact.
Iran and Access to the Sea
Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, Trump presented a choice between reaching an agreement with Tehran and carrying out his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” He also predicted that an agreement could follow the U.S. midterm elections, while defending U.S. military action against Iran.
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Image: UN[/caption]
That framing leaves Central Asian countries facing costs regardless of their position on Tehran. Iran provides overland connections to ports serving the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Damage to Iranian infrastructure can therefore disrupt trade between Central Asia and countries that are not parties to the conflict.
Uzbekistan’s exposure illustrates the distinction. According to its Ministry of Economy and Finance, goods worth $3.9 billion entered Uzbekistan through Iran in 2025. That represented about 9% of total imports, including approximately $1 billion in technological equipment. Uzbek exports transiting Iran were worth another $1.4 billion.
Those figures measure transit, not simply purchases from Iranian suppliers. Pressure intended to isolate Tehran can also obstruct Uzbekistan’s access to equipment and customers elsewhere.
Kazakhstan has also sought a larger southern outlet. A 27-year agreement provides for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade says the project would expand access to Gulf markets and destinations in Asia and East Africa.
The risks differ by port. Bandar Abbas faces the Strait of Hormuz, while Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Both depend on Iranian infrastructure and remain exposed to the wider conflict and sanctions environment. Developing alternative routes does not make these southern connections dispensable.
Nor is exposure uniform. Kazakh officials have emphasized the limited existing role of Persian Gulf shipments in the country’s logistics. For Astana, the threat concerns future diversification as well as current trade. For Uzbekistan, the transit figures show a substantial flow already at risk.
Tajikistan, meanwhile, has sought 2.55 million tons of Iranian crude oil and fuel following shortages in Russian supplies. Its search for an alternative leaves Dushanbe exposed to two conflicts, with attacks on Russian refineries disrupting its established supplier, and the conflict involving Iran threatening a potential replacement.
Japarov Challenges Sanctions
In his General Assembly address, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov argued that unilateral sanctions harm smaller developing states and can become instruments of political pressure.
“The right to impose sanctions against a particular state should, in our view, belong exclusively to the United Nations,” he said, calling for advance scrutiny of sanctions and regular reviews of their consequences.
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Image: Kyrgyz presidential service[/caption]
Japarov also thanked Trump for cutting funding to nongovernmental organizations, claiming the move had reduced interference in developing countries.
The issue of sanctions carried into his September 22 meeting with European Council President António Costa. According to the Kyrgyz presidential administration’s account, Japarov expressed concern over restrictions despite regular exchanges with European officials. He cited a May 2026 order for 50 companies to cease activity after the authorities identified heightened sanctions risks.
His message combined opposition to unilateral restrictions with an effort to demonstrate that Bishkek was responding to compliance concerns.
Japarov’s remarks followed his U.S. business meetings. Those talks concerned access to international finance and railway equipment, highlighting the practical relationships Bishkek wants to expand while contesting Western sanctions policy.
Japarov also proposed a UN-backed fund to preserve Issyk-Kul, saying Kyrgyzstan was ready to contribute $10 million from its budget. He linked the initiative to climate pressures on the lake.
Ukraine’s Energy Offer
Separately, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said after meeting Trump that Kyiv was ready for an energy ceasefire if Russia reciprocated. The offer concerned halting attacks on energy facilities. It did not establish that Moscow had accepted the terms or that a functioning ceasefire would come into place.
Any sustained reduction in refinery attacks could ease one source of uncertainty for Central Asian fuel importers. Russian diesel deliveries recovered sharply in August after a summer slump. Kyrgyzstan received more than 72,000 tons, against 4,400 tons in July. Tajikistan’s deliveries rose from 16,000 to more than 56,000 tons.
However, the rebound did not remove their dependence on Russian supply decisions. A ceasefire covering energy infrastructure could reduce physical disruption, but would not itself guarantee export volumes or lower prices.
Other Regional Initiatives
Uzbekistan’s delegation, led by presidential administration chief Saida Mirziyoyeva, pursued commercial discussions alongside the UN proceedings. Her September 23 meeting with Google Vice President Karan Bhatia included talks on introducing YouTube monetization in Uzbekistan.
Mirziyoyeva is due to deliver Uzbekistan’s national address on September 23.
New partnerships can widen Central Asia’s options, but they cannot quickly replace Iranian transit routes or Russian fuel supplies. Decisions made in New York could therefore affect whether Central Asian countries can keep trade moving and secure reliable fuel supplies.
Opinion: Weaponizing Faith – The Cold War Roots of Central Asia’s Security Dilemma
Central Asia’s contemporary security dilemma is partly rooted in Cold War strategies that transformed Muslim identity into a factor of geopolitical competition. Washington viewed Soviet Central Asia’s Muslim populations as a potential pressure point against Moscow. The Soviet Union itself mobilized Central Asian Muslim personnel during its intervention in Afghanistan. These policies did not alone create later radical movements, but they contributed to a regional environment where existing grievances, ideological narratives, and transnational networks could be redirected and intensified.
The origins of Washington’s interest in Soviet Muslim populations as a strategic factor emerged during the final years of the Cold War. In 1977, the Nationalities Working Group, an interagency task force within the National Security Council, was established to examine vulnerabilities among the Soviet Union’s non-Russian nationalities. Declassified U.S. records show that American officials studied ethnic, cultural, and religious identities as possible sources of pressure against Moscow.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, this approach became part of Washington’s broader effort to weaken Soviet influence. Through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the United States provided assistance to Afghan resistance organizations, while Saudi Arabia contributed significant financial support. Pakistan’s military government under General Zia-ul-Haq favored Islamist factions among Afghan resistance groups, helping connect military assistance with religious mobilization against Soviet forces. During his visit to the Khyber Pass in early February 1980, U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski addressed Afghan resistance fighters, declaring: "That land over there is yours. You will go back to it one day because your cause is right and God is on your side." The remarks reflected how the anti-Soviet struggle was framed not only in geopolitical terms but also through religious language and symbolism.
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Soviet T-62 tank leaving Afghanistan; image: U.S. Department of Defense.[/caption]
The Afghan conflict was also fought through education and information campaigns. Between 1986 and 1992, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funded an approximately $50 million educational program through the University of Nebraska–Omaha’s Center for Afghanistan Studies for Afghan refugees and schools. Research has shown that some textbooks incorporated violent imagery, references to weapons and combat, and themes glorifying holy war and the duty of martyrdom. Produced for wartime Afghanistan, these materials reflected, and arguably helped sustain, a militarized ideological environment. Islamic religious life in Central Asia had its own deeper roots. Despite Soviet restrictions, religious learning survived through underground hujra networks and unofficial scholarship. Figures such as Muhammadjon Hindustoniy-Rustamov, born in the Fergana Valley and later one of Soviet Central Asia’s most influential unofficial Islamic scholars, shaped generations of students even as Afghanistan became an arena of international rivalry during the 1980s.
Moscow also used Central Asian Muslim identity for strategic purposes. The 154th Separate Spetsnaz Detachment, known as the “Muslim Battalion,” was composed largely of Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen soldiers from the Soviet Turkestan Military District. The unit participated in Operation Storm-333 in December 1979, the Soviet operation that killed Afghan President Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal. The selection of Central Asian Muslim personnel reflected Moscow’s belief that ethnic and linguistic familiarity could provide operational advantages in Afghanistan. Recruiting soldiers for their ethnic and linguistic familiarity differed from supporting religiously framed resistance. Nevertheless, both approaches show how the rival powers used Muslim identity for strategic purposes.
The Soviet collapse did not end the consequences of Cold War policies. Instead, the 1990s revealed how Afghan-related networks interacted with Central Asia’s political transitions. Newly independent states faced economic crises, weak institutions, political tensions, and the challenge of managing religious resurgence and emerging political-religious movements after decades of Soviet restrictions. Regional movements were shaped by local grievances, identity debates, and domestic political conditions, while the Afghan conflict expanded cross-border networks and security challenges.
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Destroyed Afghan village; image: Todd Huffman.[/caption]
The Tajik civil war (1992–1997) demonstrated Central Asia’s vulnerability to instability linked with Afghanistan. The Tavildara region became a key area for armed groups, while the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) emerged from domestic opposition, regional instability, and access to Afghan-based networks. The IMU was therefore not simply an external phenomenon but a product of local and regional dynamics intensified by post-Soviet conditions. Journalist Ahmed Rashid reported in The New Yorker that Russian transport helicopters airlifted IMU leader Juma Namangani and 300 men from Tavildara to the Afghan border in January 2001. His account illustrated the complexity of regional security politics surrounding a group that Tashkent viewed as a serious threat.
The September 11 attacks produced another major reversal in Washington’s relationship with Central Asia. The United States returned to the region, this time not as a rival seeking to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities, but as a security partner working with newly independent Central Asian states against militant organizations connected to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan became a key partner because President Islam Karimov viewed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) as a direct threat to state security. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld played a crucial role in developing Washington’s post-9/11 security partnerships in Central Asia. Uzbekistan granted the United States access to the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) air base, which became a major logistics hub for Operation Enduring Freedom, while Uzbek intelligence cooperation contributed to efforts against IMU networks operating from Afghanistan.
The partnership contained a fundamental contradiction. Washington cooperated with a government whose domestic policies toward political and religious groups attracted international criticism, while Tashkent viewed strict security measures as necessary to prevent militant threats. This history continues to shape regional policy, as Central Asian governments remain concerned about instability from Afghanistan while also remaining cautious about external powers pursuing security partnerships primarily for strategic objectives.
Muslim societies were not passive instruments of foreign powers. Many Muslims who opposed Soviet influence acted according to their own political, national, and religious convictions. The deeper problem was that great power competition redirected existing grievances and identities toward strategic objectives, creating networks, narratives, and security dilemmas whose consequences continued long after the original geopolitical struggle ended.
Central Asia’s later security challenges cannot be attributed to a single foreign policy, ideology, or historical event. They emerged from the interaction of external intervention, domestic political choices, institutional weaknesses, and unresolved regional conflicts. Sustainable stability therefore depends not on renewed identity-based competition, but on strengthening institutions capable of addressing social and political challenges without turning religion or identity into tools of rivalry. Uzbekistan’s post-2016 reforms under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, including changes in religious policy and security practices, reflect an effort to move beyond the previous approach of treating religious activity primarily through a security framework.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Russian Diesel Returns, but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Remain Exposed
Russia sharply increased diesel supplies to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in August after a summer slump in Russian fuel exports strained both countries’ markets and pushed prices higher. But the August rebound underscored a weakness already exposed over the summer: disruptions at Russian refineries can quickly ripple through fuel markets across both countries. In August, Kyrgyzstan received more than 72,000 tons of Russian diesel, up from just 4,400 tons in July. Supplies to Tajikistan rose from 16,000 tons to more than 56,000 tons, around 3.5 times the July level. Overall, Russia exported more than 370,000 tons of diesel to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia in August, more than double the July volume. Kazakhstan received around 28,000 tons after no deliveries in July, while Mongolia imported about 215,000 tons. Russia's diesel production recovered to around 170,000 tons per day in August, but Moscow maintained restrictions on exports to protect its domestic market, with exceptions for countries covered by intergovernmental agreements. The summer disruption showed that such arrangements do not insulate Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from falling production at Russian refineries. Kyrgyzstan Starts to Diversify Kyrgyzstan consumes around 1.6 million tons of petroleum products a year and receives the overwhelming majority of its imports from Russia. The summer disruption pushed Bishkek to look for additional sources. The authorities discussed purchases from Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Belarusian deliveries began arriving in July, while China also sent an initial batch of fuel. In August, Kyrgyz officials opened talks with China’s Sinopec over further supplies. Another option is to refine more crude oil domestically. In August, 35,000 tons of crude were shipped through Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan for processing at local refineries. The new route gives Bishkek another way to source feedstock while reducing its dependence on finished gasoline and diesel from Russian refineries. The 72,000 tons of Russian diesel delivered in August largely offset July’s collapse rather than establishing a new level of supply. Tajikistan's Options Tajikistan is even more dependent. In the first half of 2026, the country imported 599,500 tons of petroleum products worth $494.7 million. Russia accounted for 91.1% of those supplies. Diesel imports totaled 300,200 tons. The reduction in supplies became visible on the streets of Dushanbe over the summer. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others limited purchases to 20 liters per vehicle. By late July, prices at some stations had reached 17–18 somoni (about $1.90) per liter. As of August 31, the average price was around 16.5 somoni, compared with approximately 11 somoni in early June. Dushanbe responded by increasing purchases from neighboring countries. In July, imports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan roughly tripled to 34,000 tons. But average monthly imports of these fuels from all suppliers in the first half of the year were around 97,000 tons. Neighboring suppliers can cover part of the shortfall, but for now they cannot quickly replace Russian volumes. In July, the presidents of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan discussed increasing supplies of Kazakh petroleum products to the Tajik market. In August, Dushanbe also turned to Tehran. Tajikistan requested possible supplies of 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of jet fuel, although no contractual details emerged. The wider impact of strikes on Russian refining has also drawn attention in Washington. On September 13, U.S. President Donald Trump called on Volodymyr Zelensky to halt strikes on Russian oil refining, saying reduced supplies of Russian diesel were contributing to shortages on the global market. “Don’t hit the diesel fuel. It’s hurting the whole world,” Trump said. For Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the consequences of the disruptions had already become apparent over the summer. The August surge does not signal sustained growth in Russian exports: between January and August, Russia supplied around 2.5 million tons of diesel to Central Asia and Afghanistan, compared with 2.6 million tons during the same period a year earlier. On September 20, Gazprom Neft’s Moscow refinery halted crude processing after a drone attack caused fires at its two primary processing units. According to Reuters, repairs could take several weeks. In 2024, the refinery processed 11.6 million tons of crude and produced around 3.2 million tons of diesel. Kyrgyzstan is expanding the geography of its fuel purchases and domestic refining, while Tajikistan is looking to neighboring countries and Iran for additional supplies. But August showed the limits of those alternatives. After the July slump, pressure on both markets has been eased primarily by the return of Russian diesel. Backup supply routes have emerged. A source capable of replacing Russian fuel on a comparable scale has not.
Central Asia at the UN: Saida Mirziyoyeva to Represent Uzbekistan
Saida Mirziyoyeva, the head of Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration and daughter of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, is expected to deliver the country’s address at the UN General Assembly’s general debate in New York. Her appearance comes as Central Asian delegations seek support for regional development and prepare for a larger role in UN diplomacy. On September 22, Gazeta reported that Mirziyoyeva would represent Uzbekistan in the debate. Her father delivered the country’s address last year. The report did not specify the proposals she would present. Mirziyoyeva met UN Secretary-General António Guterres on September 21. Her public account described discussions on cooperation with the UN, but provided no detailed negotiating agenda. The assignment follows her appointment as administration chief in June 2025, when the president restored a post abolished two years earlier. She had previously served as his assistant. This month, Mirziyoyev also appointed her to head the planned Tashkent International Financial Centre, which aims to attract private capital through tax incentives and a legal framework drawing on English common law principles. Mirziyoyeva’s UN appearance adds a major diplomatic assignment to her domestic responsibilities. She has addressed UN events before, including a water conference in 2023. Delivering Uzbekistan’s national statement in the General Assembly would give her a broader platform to present government policy. What is On the Agenda The general debate runs from September 22 to 26 and resumes on September 28. It is the centerpiece of the General Assembly’s high-level week, when world leaders address the UN and hold bilateral talks on the sidelines. The gathering is based at UN headquarters in New York, with additional events around the city. This year’s theme is “Restoring trust, managing transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all.” Practical discussions include reforming the organization and financing development. The European Council’s published priorities call for a more effective, cost-efficient UN and stronger international peace and security mechanisms. The week also brings diplomacy over the war in Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelenskiy is due to meet U.S. President Donald Trump in New York to press for a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure, Reuters reported. Those talks take place amid continuing strikes on power facilities and refineries. The week’s program includes separate meetings on climate action and a just transition on September 23, according to Kazakhstan Today. Pandemic prevention and preparedness will be discussed on September 25. Central Asia in New York The region’s countries are attending at different political levels. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov is in New York after visiting Utah. His announced program combines participation in the UN gathering with meetings with national leaders and U.S. businesses. On September 21, Japarov met financial services group StoneX. The meeting produced memoranda involving Kyrgyzstan’s Finance Ministry and Eldik Bank, following discussions about precious metals trading and access to international financial services. Kyrgyzstan is also preparing for its 2027–2028 Security Council term. In a recent interview with The Times of Central Asia, Shumkarbek Adilbek uulu, director of the National Institute for Strategic Initiatives, described efforts to secure financing for mountainous states facing climate pressures. Kazakhstan’s delegation is headed by Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi. His program includes an address to the General Assembly and a meeting with Guterres. Central Asian foreign ministers are also scheduled to hold consultations, including discussions on the priorities of the UN Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry announced that Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin’s delegation arrived in New York on September 20. Turkmenistan has published its priorities for the session. Its proposals include a transport corridor under UN auspices connecting South and Central Asia with Europe through the Caspian Sea. It also wants an international code governing the peaceful use of AI in diplomacy, and is planning work toward a Security Council candidacy for 2031–2032.
Tajikistan’s Islamic Opposition Changes Leader After 20 Years
The Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan (formerly the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan) has elected a new chairman after longtime leader Muhiddin Kabiri decided to step down. The IRP has been one of the most influential groups in Tajikistan since the country became independent in late 1991. The organization subsequently became the principal target of a sustained government crackdown, which culminated in its activities being banned in Tajikistan and pressure being applied to members who fled the country. The New Leader Members of the IRP’s Supreme Presidium met in Vilnius, Lithuania, on September 19 to choose from three candidates: Abubakr Nuri, Abdukodir Shehov, and Islomiddin Saidov. Sixty-four percent of members voted for Saidov, the group's first deputy chairman. In late August 2026, the IRPT changed its name to simply the Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan. Saidov, who made that announcement, explained to the Tajik opposition’s Azda TV that the removal of the word “Party” and the change of the organization’s symbols were part of internal reforms. The leadership change appears to be another part of those reforms, although Kabiri said he had wanted to step down as the group’s leader for some time. Edward Lemon, president of the Washington-based Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, has followed events in Tajikistan for some two decades. He has lived in the country and speaks Tajik. He met Saidov and describes him as a moderate, much like Kabiri. Saidov is from Nurobod in the Rasht Valley, and, according to Lemon, is a cleric “who takes a firm stance on issues of authoritarianism and Islamic rights.” Saidov takes over Tajikistan’s largest opposition group, but one that has been embattled for years and forced to conduct its work far from the borders of Tajikistan. There Since the Start The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was formed in the final years when Tajikistan was a Soviet republic, after Mihail Gorbachev’s perestroika policy was implemented. Following independence in 1991, the IRPT spearheaded the opposition to the government that eventually took over and was led by Rahmon Nabiyev, a former leader of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic who was ousted in Gorbachev’s anti-corruption campaign in the mid-1980s. When civil war broke out in the spring of 1992, the IRPT joined forces with the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the Pamiri organization La’li Badakhshan to fight government forces. The IRPT was the backbone of this unlikely alliance. When the Tajik Peace Accord ended the war in June 1997, then-IRPT leader Said Abdullo Nuri signed on behalf of the opposition. The peace deal legalized all three opposition groups, making the IRPT the first, and to date only, Islamic party to be registered in any Central Asian country since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The agreement also stipulated that the opposition would receive 30% of positions in the government, from local to ministerial posts. Marginalized and Ousted The arrangement lasted only a few years before Emomali Rahmon, who had come to power during the civil war, gradually began removing former opposition members from state posts. Nuri died on August 9, 2006, and at the start of September his first deputy, Kabiri, was chosen to lead the IRPT. Kabiri spent the next decade fending off pressure from Rahmon’s government. IRPT members were assaulted, and state media picked away at the party’s image. Despite this constant and growing pressure, the IRPT held on to two seats in parliament until the 2015 elections, when the IRPT officially received only 1.5% of the vote. The result was disputed against a backdrop of serious concerns about the conduct of the election. The party had some 40,000 registered members, making it the second-largest party in the country after President Rahmon’s ruling People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan. The defeat in elections was only the start of the IRPT’s troubles. In September 2015, Tajik Deputy Defense Minister Abdulhalim Nazarzoda allegedly attempted a coup. Government forces quickly chased Nazarzoda and a handful of poorly armed supporters into the nearby mountains and eliminated them. The government quickly, and without any compelling evidence, connected the IRPT to the plot. Within a few weeks, the party’s activities were banned, most of the leaders who remained in the country were arrested, and before the end of October, Tajikistan’s Supreme Court declared the IRPT an extremist group. Kabiri was outside the country, living in Europe, when the Nazarzoda fiasco occurred. The Tajik authorities contacted Interpol and had warrants issued for the arrest of Kabiri and other Tajik opposition figures. Interpol removed Kabiri from the Red Notice list in 2018, and later did the same for other IRPT members in Europe. The Tajik authorities also exerted pressure on some of Kabiri’s relatives. In January 2016, his 95-year-old father was taken off a plane bound for Istanbul, where the elder Kabiri intended to go for medical treatment. In early 2018, Kabiri’s three-year-old grandson was prevented from leaving Tajikistan to receive treatment for cancer for many months. International pressure finally forced the Tajik authorities to relent and allow the child to leave the country. In February 2018, Kabiri was tried in absentia, behind closed doors, in Tajikistan’s Supreme Court. In October that year, he was convicted and given what was described as a lengthy prison sentence. What charges Kabiri was convicted on, and the exact length of his sentence were not made public. The Future for the Opposition in Exile Referring to his two decades as leader, Kabiri told RFE/RL’s Tajik Service, “Twenty years is not a short period,” adding, “I personally believe that there should always be rotation and renewal in the leadership of countries, governments, and political parties.” Kabiri said he would remain active in the IRT’s decision-making process. However, officially, the era of Islomiddin Saidov as IRT leader has started, and he and his organization face daunting challenges. They have been unable to work openly in Tajikistan for more than a decade, and it is extremely difficult to get messages from the Tajik opposition into Tajikistan. The authorities closely monitor internet activity. In May 2018, Vakhsh resident Alijon Sharipov was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison for liking and sharing IRPT videos he accessed on the internet. President Rahmon turns 74 in October and has periodically disappeared from public view, most recently for more than two weeks in early 2026. Rahmon has long appeared to be preparing his eldest son, Rustam, 38, as a successor, elevating him to senior posts including mayor of Dushanbe and speaker of the upper house of parliament. However, reports have suggested there is no consensus within Rahmon’s extended family over Rustam succeeding him. The Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan once enjoyed significant popularity inside Tajikistan, and while its registered members numbered only some 40,000, its supporters were likely in the hundreds of thousands. Nearly all of these people are still in Tajikistan. If a future transfer of power in Tajikistan creates political uncertainty, the IRT could have an opportunity to regain relevance inside the country.
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