Tajikistan
Avaza Summit Highlights East–West and North–South Trade Routes
On October 8, the presidents of five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan gathered in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast, to discuss closer economic and political cooperation. Hosted by Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the annual Consultative Meeting included Azerbaijan as a full participant for the first time, extending the forum across the Caspian to the South Caucasus. The six leaders adopted a joint statement recognizing East–West and North–South transport corridors as priorities for regional development. The summit highlighted the region's growing importance in Eurasian trade and international supply chains. Beyond expanding transport networks, the leaders proposed closer industrial cooperation and cross-border investment, seeking to capitalize on their geographic advantages while preserving flexibility in their international economic relationships. Transport Corridors in Multiple Directions Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov said, "I believe it is now important to intensify negotiations and practical steps toward establishing transport and logistics connectivity along the East–West and North–South routes." He added, "The Central Asia–Caspian Sea–South Caucasus–Europe corridor should play a key role here." He also emphasized that cooperation among Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as Caspian states could help integrate the wider Central Asian region and other countries into these transport networks. Turkmenistan remained prepared to make its Caspian infrastructure available for mutually beneficial projects. Its port at Turkmenbashi and rail connections toward Iran give it a practical role in both East–West and North–South trade. The Turkmen president's emphasis on North–South connectivity also reflects ongoing transport cooperation with Russia. In May 2026, Turkmenistan reported that Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran were working on an agreement to improve freight movement along the corridor's eastern branch. Turkmen officials also outlined preferential railway tariffs and container services linking Turkmenbashi with Russia's Olya port. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also highlighted growing demand for the Middle Corridor, while emphasizing the continued importance of the North–South route. "For Kazakhstan, the North–South route in cooperation with Russia remains particularly relevant," Tokayev said. The statement is consistent with Kazakhstan's longstanding multivector foreign policy, which seeks to maintain established trade connections while expanding access to alternative transport routes. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy, occupies a strategic position at the intersection of major East–West and North–South transport routes. For the region’s landlocked economies, a wider choice of reliable routes can improve access to markets and reduce dependence on individual transit connections. Expanding the Middle Corridor Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized investments on both shores of the Caspian, noting that transit cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor increased by more than 10% in 2025 and by almost 20% during the first eight months of 2026. Azerbaijan has invested in ports, railways, highways and other infrastructure to facilitate trade between Central Asia and international markets. It also serves as a transit route for Kazakh and Turkmen oil exports, giving the country a growing role in connecting Central Asian producers with markets to the west. Tokayev proposed exploring the integration of the Middle Corridor with the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a planned transport link through Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave and onward routes toward Turkey. On the eastern side of the Caspian, Kazakhstan is expanding its domestic railway network, including the Moyynty–Kyzylzhar and Bakhty–Ayagoz projects, to strengthen connections between China, the Caspian Sea and western markets. A World Bank report released in September 2026 estimated that infrastructure investment combined with improvements in transport efficiency could quadruple cargo volumes along the Trans-Caspian corridor by 2040. Connecting the Wider Region Farther east, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov highlighted the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, intended to strengthen regional transit capacity and create additional connections between Chinese and international markets. Reliable routes, competitive transport costs and predictable transit conditions, he argued, were essential to economic cooperation. For Uzbekistan, the challenge extends beyond individual railway projects to the integration of regional transport networks. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for closer coordination of infrastructure development, with new railway and road connections accompanied by manufacturing facilities, logistics centers and industrial zones. He proposed accelerating the establishment of a regional Council for Infrastructure Development to coordinate major projects. Uzbekistan borders every other Central Asian country as well as Afghanistan, giving it an important role in connecting regional corridors with markets farther south. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon focused on the practical obstacles facing cross-border freight. He emphasized developing multimodal transport routes while removing administrative and infrastructure barriers, including through simpler transit procedures and greater digitalization of freight operations. Trade and Industry Along the Corridors Tokayev said intraregional trade stood at approximately $13 billion in 2025, representing only about 8% of the participating countries' combined foreign trade. He proposed raising that figure to at least $20 billion and connecting industrial and logistics centers into regional production chains. Mirziyoyev advanced the concept of "six economies – one product," encouraging companies from different countries to participate in shared manufacturing processes. Aliyev called for greater use of Azerbaijan's joint investment funds with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to establish manufacturing facilities and expand exports. Berdimuhamedov also proposed closer industrial cooperation, including export-oriented agricultural-processing facilities. From Routes to Results Tokayev cautioned that more than 200 regional initiatives had been proposed since 2018, but only a small proportion had been implemented. He called for a review of existing commitments and greater attention to practical results. That record raises questions for the transport projects discussed at Avaza. New railway lines and proposed international connections will require financing, sustained freight demand, efficient border crossings and coordination among the countries through which they pass. With Azerbaijan assuming the chairmanship in 2027, the six-country format faces a familiar challenge. The region has no shortage of proposed transport corridors. The harder task is making them commercially viable.
Farewell to Russia: An Interview with Joe Luc Barnes on Central Asia’s Changing Role
In Moscow, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Joe Luc Barnes met residents who distrusted their government but believed its assurances that war was not coming. The shock that followed opens his book, Farewell to Russia: A Journey Through the Former USSR.
Barnes, a journalist, editor and contributor to The Times of Central Asia, has visited all 15 former Soviet republics since February 2022. His book explores how people have built their lives since independence, and how deeply Russia remains woven into them.
Speaking to TCA, Barnes recalls meeting rural residents in Central Asia who were more supportive of Russia than their urban, Russian-speaking counterparts. He also reflects on why Russia remains a destination for young people seeking opportunities, despite the discrimination many face there.
TCA: At the start of the book, you describe Muscovites’ conviction that Russia would not invade Ukraine. What sustained that certainty, and how did people respond when events shattered it?
Joe Luc Barnes: I think it was mainly down to people not wanting to believe it. The amazing thing is that Muscovites (and Russians at large, in my experience) are fully aware that their government is full of crooks whom they wouldn’t trust with anything, but simultaneously most of them are in lockstep with the Kremlin’s foreign policy position.
The war started just as Russia was trying to get the country vaccinated against Covid. In the end, the government struggled to persuade even 50% of people to have a single dose of the vaccine, but meanwhile those same people were sure the Kremlin was telling the truth when it said that its soldiers were massing on Ukraine’s borders as part of “routine exercises”.
When the war did begin and that illusion collapsed, the main reaction was shock. For the first few days, there was a kind of numbness over the city. Many people had friends or relatives in Ukraine; others were stunned that something they had been denying had actually come to pass. Many in their 20s or 30s were disgusted with their government and began to look for a way out of the country. But people were generally focused on looking after themselves – worrying about things like finances, getting money out of their bank accounts, things like that.
I think there was also a belief among many that it would be a short war. When I left Russia in March 2022, I don’t think I, or anyone around me, expected the war to still be raging four and a half years later.
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Lenin still stands in Bishkek, though not on his original plinth. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption]
TCA: Your title suggests a departure from Russia. Where in Central Asia did that feel most real, and where did everyday life complicate the idea?
Joe Luc Barnes: I think in urban Central Asia, you can often feel like you’re in a Russian city. People speak Russian, you get around using Yandex Taxi, your mobile provider is Beeline, and architecturally you still have the Soviet apartment blocks, trolleybuses and street underpasses. Over 70% of the books in bookshops in Tashkent, Bishkek and Almaty are in Russian, and there are Russian chains from Sportmaster to Dodo Pizza, Myata Lounge to Black Star Burger. Even Harat’s “Irish” Pub comes from Irkutsk (it is indeed a long way to Tipperary!).
However, that is partly a reflection of my own lifestyle. If you spend your time in bars and coffee shops, you’re inevitably going to encounter a more Russian or European lifestyle. Spend more time in the bazaar, the chaihana or the mosque, and obviously the situation looks very different. In rural Central Asia, this is even more the case. You can go to mountain communities in Kyrgyzstan and meet traditional herdsmen, or go to villages in Uzbekistan, and it can feel as if the Soviet Union never happened.
But Central Asia wouldn’t be fun without its ironies – the funny thing is that rural people I encountered were often more supportive of Russia than their urban, Russian-speaking counterparts. Funny old world.
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Soviet-era mosaics, like this one in Petropavl, are still a common sight in many Central Asian cities. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption]
TCA: When younger people spoke about their futures, where did they imagine building their lives? What did those conversations reveal about Russia’s place in their world?
Joe Luc Barnes: In Tajikistan, I was asked to give a talk to a hall of students about the potential to study in England. It was awkward as, in Britain, we tend to see foreign students as a cash cow to prop up a university sector which otherwise haemorrhages money. Evidently, in Tajikistan, the poorest of all the former Soviet republics, there weren’t many people able to stump up $50,000 a year for an education. So I talked about scholarship options – and there is a brilliant scholarship programme offered by the British government called Chevening, but it is very competitive.
Anyway, I went round the room and about 70% of people had one or both parents working abroad – mainly in Russia, some in Qatar or Turkey. One statistic that blew me away about Tajikistan is that remittances from Tajiks working abroad have accounted for almost half of the country's GDP in recent years.
Generally, among young people there was a desire to get out if they could. This goes for almost every country – I met Azeris living in Luxembourg or Poland; Belarusians moving to Britain or the US; and Russians leaving for anywhere they could. Even in relatively rich nations like Kazakhstan or the Baltic states, there are still many people looking to leave.
However, you are right to bring up Russia. It is still the unrivalled hub for migration from Central Asia. University in Russia is cheap and high-quality, and there are also fewer language barriers. People who go there for work argue that at least Russia offers them good jobs, good wages and the chance to build a life – it’s not as if Europe or America is handing out hundreds of thousands of visas to Uzbeks, after all.
However, everyone from Central Asia and the Caucasus, even people from Moldova, would mention the racism they experienced in Russia – from difficulties at customs and being racially profiled by police to landlords with a “Slavs only” tenant policy and schoolteachers who abuse kids for having a “foreign” surname. By all accounts, it’s a universal experience.
The war in Ukraine, plus the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in 2024 have led to a surge in nationalism as well as a crackdown on Central Asian migrants. In some ways this has made Russia less attractive, but it has also put a squeeze on the labour supply, which means that in many cases wages are higher in Russia than they were before. So people continue to go there despite all the apparent downsides.
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A crowd of Kyrgyz stand in front of a portrait of the country's most famous author, Chingiz Aitmatov. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption]
TCA: Travel writing about Central Asia often dwells on Soviet remnants or Silk Road history. What did you encounter that belonged unmistakably to the present?
Joe Luc Barnes: One massive divide you see across the former USSR is demographic. The five Central Asian republics, plus Azerbaijan, have seen enormous growth in their populations – an increase of almost 60% since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. This is reflected in the culture, I think: there’s a disorder, but also a virility and positivity. When I tell someone from Central Asia that I’m childless at the age of 35, they look at me like I belong to some weird cult!
This population growth has physical consequences – go to any Central Asian city and you will see construction everywhere, the economy booming, but also horrendous smog smothering the skies in winter. Every country is desperately struggling to keep up with its swelling citizenry, and they are all heavily reliant on China to supply infrastructure. Everything from new road bridges and railways to electric vehicles and buses, 5G infrastructure and mobile phones is being imported en masse from Beijing.
One thing China can’t provide, though, is water. And that looks increasingly like it might be the key issue of the 21st century in the region. Temperatures are rising, glaciers are melting, the population and its demands are growing, and there’s only so much water to go around. That’s definitely one to watch over the next decade or so.
TCA: How did you judge what people felt safe telling you, particularly in places where criticism carries risks? Were there stories you decided you could not publish?
Joe Luc Barnes: There were some countries that I went to – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan especially – where I would keep a lower profile. Many of the more authoritarian countries require a specific visa for journalism, which restricts what you can do. However, things like travel writing and vlogging occupy an interesting legal grey area – you’re basically at the mercy of officialdom over how they decide to perceive it. So, in those countries, I didn’t thrust the fact that I was writing a book into people’s faces.
In terms of deciding what I couldn’t publish, the priority is to keep your sources safe and not needlessly expose someone to retribution for the sake of an anecdote in a travel book. There are ways of telling a story without invading people’s privacy.
However, in most places, I think there was a genuine delight that a foreigner was taking an interest in their country – it’s not as if Kyrgyzstan often makes it onto the CNN news bulletin, so generally I found that people were really keen to recount their experiences.
After all, it is a travel book; there’s a lot you can learn about a place simply by discussing people’s life stories.
TCA: As Farewell to Russia reaches American readers, which place in Central Asia would you choose to introduce potential visitors to the region, and why?
Joe Luc Barnes: In terms of ease for a visitor, it has to be Uzbekistan. It’s now visa-free for US citizens and is the only country with a direct flight to the United States (there’s a daily service from Tashkent to New York). The tourism infrastructure is the most advanced in the region – high-speed trains whizz you between cities; it has all the old Silk Road towns; there’s the Soviet history in Tashkent; and there are loads of hotels. It’s also very cheap.
Uzbekistan is also the most representative country in the region. It has half the region’s population and is the only Central Asian country to border all the others. And in terms of contemporary issues – from the disappeared Aral Sea and cotton monoculture to a hugely contentious debate about the role of women in society – it has loads of issues for researchers to get their teeth into. There’s also a fascinating cultural battle between Islam and worldly authority, the latter embodied by a modernising, technocratic government still staffed by communist apparatchiks.
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Joe Luc Barnes’s Farewell to Russia: A Journey Through the Former USSR[/caption]
Joe Luc Barnes’s Farewell to Russia: A Journey Through the Former USSR was released in the U.S. by Pegasus Books on October 6, 2026.
German Spy Scandal Puts Central Asian and Caucasus Espionage Cases in Focus
The arrest of former German intelligence chief August Hanning has drawn attention to Azerbaijan. German journalists reported that he allegedly had contacts with Azerbaijan's intelligence service. Baku rejected the allegations, while German prosecutors have not confirmed any Azerbaijani involvement. In recent years, citizens of Central Asia and the South Caucasus have repeatedly been implicated in espionage and treason cases. The accused and suspects include former intelligence chiefs, military personnel, officials, scientists, and foreign nationals. Some have received lengthy prison sentences, while others remain under investigation. In many cases, information about alleged foreign intelligence connections is limited to media reports. German Scandal and Ties to Baku On October 6, 2026, the German authorities detained 80-year-old August Hanning, who headed the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) from 1998 to 2005. Former BND employee Manfred D. was also taken into custody. Hanning is suspected of attempted treason, obtaining state secrets, and acting on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. Manfred D. is suspected of assisting in the alleged offenses. Both were placed in pretrial detention on October 7. According to federal prosecutors, in the spring of 2010, Hanning reached an agreement with his former subordinate to obtain intelligence documents in exchange for money. By June 2022, Manfred D. had allegedly provided him with approximately 2,000 documents, including classified materials. By then, Hanning was working as a private consultant and, investigators believe, used the information for commercial purposes. According to German media reports, the documents included materials on Iran's nuclear program, Russia's armed forces, and information received from partner intelligence agencies. Investigators also allege that Hanning prepared an analytical memorandum for an officer of a foreign intelligence service. It remains unknown whether the intended recipient received it. Der Spiegel reported alleged contacts between Hanning and a representative of Azerbaijani intelligence. The investigative outlet CORRECTIV examined his longstanding ties to Baku, including his participation in the German-Azerbaijani Forum. German prosecutors have not identified the foreign intelligence service involved in the investigation. Azerbaijan rejected reports of its involvement and warned of damage to relations with Berlin. An Azerbaijani official also claimed that German intelligence representatives had assured Baku that the investigation was unrelated to Azerbaijan, although this has not been publicly confirmed by the German authorities. The classified documents were discovered during a separate investigation. In September 2025, police searched Hanning's premises in connection with the alleged abduction of the children of German businesswoman Christina Block from Denmark. The discovery led to a separate criminal investigation opened in May 2026. Hanning's lawyer acknowledged that his client possessed confidential documents, but rejected allegations he had passed on information to Germany's detriment or received payment for doing so. Kazakhstan’s Espionage and State Secrets Cases In Kazakhstan, one of the best-known treason cases of recent times involved the prosecution of China expert Konstantin Syroyezhkin, who worked for many years at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the president. Syroyezhkin was detained in February 2019 and sentenced to ten years in prison in October. The trial was held behind closed doors. Media reports alleged he had passed information to China, but the National Security Committee (KNB) did not publicly identify a foreign state or intelligence service. Syroyezhkin was released on parole in April 2024 and received a presidential pardon that September, lifting the restrictions associated with his parole. In 2022, the KNB announced verdicts in three other cases. Marat Shaikhutdinov, a former first deputy secretary of the Security Council, received seven years for unlawfully collecting and disclosing state secrets; Leonid Skakovsky was sentenced to eleven years and three months for treason, while Oleg Zhdan received eleven years for espionage. The details remain classified. In the summer of 2026, Uzbek citizen Ikboljon Koraboyev, a professor of international relations at Maqsut Narikbayev University, was detained in Astana, suspected of espionage under Article 176 of Kazakhstan's Criminal Code. The article concerns the collection or transfer of classified information to a foreign state or intelligence service. Koraboyev's relatives told the BBC's Uzbek service that investigators had accused him of passing information to an employee of Uzbekistan's consulate. The KNB has not publicly confirmed the allegation or disclosed details of the investigation, although it said Uzbekistan had been officially notified of his detention. Kazakh citizens have also figured in investigations abroad. In April 2026, Kazakh citizen Sergei K. was detained in Berlin. German prosecutors suspect him of cooperating with Russian intelligence. According to investigators, beginning in May 2025, he collected information about military assistance to Ukraine, German defense industry companies, and developers of drones and robotics. He is also accused of photographing military convoys, identifying potential sabotage targets, and attempting to recruit new participants. Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry confirmed his detention. Uzbekistan: Trials of Former Military Officers and Experts In 2019–2020, Uzbekistan held a series of closed trials on treason charges. The defendants included former employees of defense agencies and state research institutions. Media outlets linked some cases to alleged work for Russia. In May 2020, Rafik Saifulin, former director of the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the president of Uzbekistan, was sentenced to twelve years in prison. According to RFE/RL sources, prosecutors alleged that he had passed state secrets to Russia. Saifulin partially admitted his guilt, but maintained that the materials involved were analytical reports rather than classified documents. In July of the same year, Akbar Yarbabayev, former head of a department of the Armed Forces' Joint Staff, received eleven years and six months for treason. His wife, Elena, was also convicted and given a six-year suspended sentence, with a three-year probationary period. Media reports alleged that the couple had cooperated with Russian intelligence, but the authorities did not identify a foreign intelligence client. Iranian Intelligence: From Israel to the Caspian In June 2026, Israeli intelligence agencies detained Behruz Sobirgon, a Tajikistan-born Russian passport holder whom Israeli reports also described as a Tajik citizen. He was suspected of working for Iran. According to the Israeli police, he had been in contact with an Iranian handler since January, photographed the port of Haifa, collected information about locations where Iranian missiles had struck, and attempted to recruit others to carry out assignments. In early July, prosecutors announced plans to indict him and sought to keep him in detention pending legal proceedings. In Azerbaijan, alleged Iranian intelligence activities have been the subject of several criminal proceedings. In 2024, Zahir Askerov, a former captain in the Caspian Sea Oil Fleet, was sentenced to 16 years for treason. According to Azerbaijan's State Security Service, he was recruited while studying religion in the Iranian city of Qom. Investigators alleged that Askerov passed on information about naval exercises, foreign companies, and cargo destined for oil platforms. In January 2025, an appeals court upheld the verdict. In November 2022, Azerbaijani intelligence agencies announced the detention of five citizens suspected of collecting information for Iran about the military, purchases of Turkish and Israeli drones, and energy infrastructure. Interest in such facilities can be explained by Azerbaijan's military cooperation with Israel and Turkey, as well as the importance of Caspian oil and gas infrastructure. Azerbaijan borders Iran, and relations between the two countries have repeatedly deteriorated over security issues. The Ryan Case and Relations with France In December 2023, Azerbaijan arrested French businessman Martin Ryan on suspicion of spying for France's foreign intelligence service, the DGSE. He was sentenced to ten years in prison in March 2026, despite denying that he had knowingly engaged in espionage. France rejected the charges and condemned Ryan's detention as arbitrary. Paris linked Azerbaijan's treatment of French nationals to deteriorating relations between the countries following Baku's military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 and France's support for Armenia. Ryan was pardoned and released in September 2026, a day after the EU removed Uzbek-born Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov from its sanctions list following pressure from France. Three European diplomats told Reuters that Paris believed Azerbaijan had used the detention to press for the sanctions to be lifted, an allegation Baku denied. In espionage cases, publicity itself can become an instrument of state policy. Some investigations receive extensive coverage, accompanied by statements from intelligence agencies and diplomatic protests. Others take place behind closed doors, without journalists having access to evidence or even the identity of the country allegedly receiving classified information. As a result, the public often learns much more about the sentence than about the crime itself.
They Went to Russia for Work and Ended Up at War: How Central Asians Enter the Russian Military
Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. Relatives of other young Kazakh men say they had taken jobs at a sausage factory and a poultry farm. But according to reports aired in early October on Kazakhstan’s KTK television channel, the men later ended up in or near the combat zone in Ukraine. Some appeared in videos wearing Russian military uniforms and asked Kazakhstan to help bring them home.
On October 7, relatives of Kazakh citizens who had reportedly ended up in Russia’s military visited the Foreign Ministry in Astana to seek help bringing them home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied the families, said his list had grown from eight to 21 people as more relatives contacted him.
The same day, ministry spokesperson Zhanbolat Ussenov said officials were checking appeals and would send Russia a list of citizens after verification. Negotiations over their return were underway, he said. Exactly how the men ended up in the Russian military remains unclear. One family said their relative had already been wounded, while KTK reported that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the military contracts have not been independently established. For now, much of what is known comes from the men themselves and their relatives. Their stories raise a broader question that neither Moscow nor the capitals of Central Asia have fully answered: how many people from the region have ended up in the Russian military, and under what circumstances did they get there? Nearly 13,000, According to a Ukrainian Database Russia does not publish comprehensive statistics on foreign contract soldiers. Central Asian governments have only fragmented data from criminal cases, consular appeals, and reports from relatives. The most detailed country-by-country breakdown comes from the Ukrainian government project I Want to Live. By May 2026, the project said it had identified 12,919 citizens of the five Central Asian states who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense: 4,955 citizens of Uzbekistan, 3,489 of Tajikistan, 2,420 of Kazakhstan, 1,474 of Kyrgyzstan, and 581 of Turkmenistan. These figures cannot be regarded as complete or independently verified. I Want to Live operates within Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Ukraine is a party to the war. In addition, 12,919 is a cumulative figure, not the number of Central Asians currently at the front. Some may have been killed or captured, completed their service, returned home, or obtained Russian citizenship. Another major estimate comes from the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Truth Hounds, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. Their report estimates that Russia recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries after February 2022. More than 10,000 of them, according to the study, came from Central Asia. The study is based on open sources, consultations with Ukrainian authorities and experts, and interviews with 16 prisoners of war and former Russian servicemen. There are no comparable publicly available Russian statistics, meaning it is impossible to establish the actual number of Central Asian citizens who have passed through the Russian military since 2022. [caption id="attachment_57949" align="aligncenter" width="1380"]
A Russian military recruitment poster advertises annual earnings of 5 million rubles for contract soldiers; image: TCA[/caption]
A Military Contract Instead of Immigration Problems
Foreign nationals are legally permitted to enlist in the Russian military. In Moscow, applications are accepted at locations including the Sakharovo migration center, where migrants also go to deal with registration, work permits, and other documents.
A military contract offers more than a salary. Foreign servicemen can use a simplified procedure to obtain Russian citizenship. A separate law that took effect on July 7, 2026, also bars authorities from imposing deportation and several other immigration sanctions against certain serving and former foreign contract soldiers.
For a migrant without a secure legal status, the choice can be driven by material considerations: money, legal status in Russia, and the possibility of obtaining a Russian passport.
There is another route into the military: through Russian prisons.
The case of a 27-year-old Uzbek citizen reached court after he returned home. In 2023, he went to Russia for work and was sentenced there to 12 years in prison on drug charges. The man claimed that heroin had been planted on him and that his confession was obtained after he was abused.
In prison, he was offered release, money, and Russian citizenship in exchange for signing a military contract. He accepted in December 2025, was sent to war, was wounded, fled from a hospital, and returned to Uzbekistan. In September, an Uzbek court sentenced him to three years and one month in prison for mercenary activity and joining the armed forces of a foreign state.
In Kyrgyzstan, Deputy Labor Minister Bakyt Darmankul uulu has also spoken about Kyrgyz citizens in Russian prisons who were offered the option of military service instead of continuing to serve their sentences.
“They may receive such an offer… But no one is forcing them,” he said. According to Darmankul, Kyrgyz representatives speak with prisoners to determine whether they are being pressured.
A Security Guard Job Can End at the Front
In September, Amnesty International described cases involving citizens of African, Latin American, and Asian countries. Recruitment methods it documented included misleading online advertisements for civilian jobs in construction, security, logistics, and IT, promises of non-combat work, high payments, and Russian citizenship.
Amnesty concluded that in many of the cases it examined, the practices met the definition of human trafficking under the UN Palermo Protocol. The finding does not apply to every foreign recruit.
The Times of Central Asia examined recruitment websites targeting citizens of all five Central Asian states. Military Contract offers help with documents, travel, and signing a military contract. Work Crew Agency advertises pay, housing, relocation, and roles including drivers and construction specialists. Both websites explicitly state that the positions involve military service.
An August investigation published by EUvsDisinfo, a project of the European External Action Service, identified at least 35 recruitment websites operating in up to 40 languages. It traced them to four recruitment brands, including Work Crew Agency.
According to the investigation, the other three brands shared WhatsApp contact details linked to a Russia-registered organization located at the same address as a volunteer battalion training center in Bashkortostan. Researchers also linked one Work Crew Agency domain to Russian military blogger Roman Saponkov, who has documented ties to the Wagner Group.
These findings provide context for the recruitment websites but do not establish how individual recruits were treated. TCA has not established a connection between Military Contract and the network described by EUvsDisinfo, or independently verified either website’s formal relationship with the Russian Ministry of Defense.
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Russian-language job advertisements offer armed security and anti-drone roles, with some stating that no experience is required: AVITO marketplace[/caption]
A Contract Abroad Can Mean Prison at Home
A Russian military contract may be legal under Russian law while still leading to criminal prosecution when a person returns home. All five Central Asian states have criminal provisions covering mercenary activity, participation by their citizens in armed conflicts abroad, or service in foreign armed formations. The wording of the laws and their application by courts vary from country to country.
In Kazakhstan, Article 172 of the Criminal Code provides for five to nine years in prison for a citizen’s intentional unlawful participation in an armed conflict or hostilities abroad when the act does not constitute mercenary activity. Mercenary activity is covered separately under Article 170.
In January 2025, an Almaty resident was sentenced to five years in prison for participating in hostilities outside Kazakhstan.
By late 2025, Uzbekistan had opened 338 criminal cases under its mercenary provision since 2022. This figure should not be treated as a statistic exclusively covering the Russia-Ukraine war. Uzbekistan’s State Security Service referred more broadly to citizens participating in conflicts abroad, including in foreign military, extremist, and terrorist formations.
In May, Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency warned citizens about cases in which migrant workers were being drawn into armed conflicts. The agency mentioned offers of “work,” “legal assistance,” and “rapid processing of entry permits.”
Kyrgyzstan also provides criminal liability for certain forms of participation by its citizens in armed conflicts abroad. In January, Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev acknowledged that fear of criminal prosecution makes it difficult to determine the scale of the problem.
“Many do not know and are afraid to talk,” he said. According to the minister, authorities sometimes learn that a citizen took part in the war only after that person has been killed.
Tajikistan is a special case because of its dual-citizenship agreement with Russia. Prosecutor General Habibullo Vohidzoda said in February that Dushanbe does not open criminal cases against Tajik citizens who also hold Russian passports for serving in the Russian military. Tajik laws apply to citizens who do not hold Russian citizenship.
Turkmenistan’s criminal law also provides penalties for mercenary activity, but there is very little public information on the application of these provisions to people involved in the Russia-Ukraine war.
A Mercenary and a Foreign Serviceman Are Not the Same Thing
The word “mercenary” requires caution. A foreign passport and payment for military service do not by themselves make someone a mercenary under international humanitarian law. Article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions sets out several conditions that must all be met for a person to fall under that definition.
National criminal codes use their own definitions. A person charged with mercenary activity at home therefore does not necessarily have the same status under international law.
The circumstances under which a contract was signed are equally important. Someone who knowingly chose military service for financial compensation and a migrant who says they were deceived while applying for a civilian job may both face investigation after returning home, even though they reached the war by very different routes.
The Syrian Experience
Central Asian governments have experience bringing citizens home from foreign conflicts. Following the collapse of ISIS’s territorial control in Syria and Iraq, Kazakhstan’s Zhusan and Uzbekistan’s Mehr operations formed part of a wider regional effort to repatriate and reintegrate citizens, many of them women and children.
The circumstances differ substantially from recruitment into Russia’s military. But those operations offer a practical precedent for organizing returns. Bringing citizens home leaves authorities to assess their individual conduct and determine whether prosecution is warranted. A Subject Few Want to Discuss The participation of Central Asians in the Russia-Ukraine war remains an extremely sensitive subject across the region. TCA approached regional specialists for comment, but some declined to discuss the issue. It would be an exaggeration to describe the subject as taboo, but caution is evident even in statements made by officials. Governments in the region tend to discuss criminal liability, consular assistance, and individual cases rather than publicly assessing Russia’s practices in recruiting foreign nationals. The reasons are largely practical. Russia remains one of the main labor markets for people from Central Asia. For Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, labor migration is linked to substantial remittance flows. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union alongside Russia, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan belong to the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Governments across the region prohibit their citizens from certain forms of participation in foreign wars. The video appeals from Kazakh citizens now present the authorities with a problem. If these men return, officials will have to establish not only where they fought but how they got there: whether they knowingly signed military contracts, chose service while in prison, used it as a route to Russian citizenship, or traveled to Russia expecting civilian employment. The circumstances of their recruitment will be central to how the authorities handle their return.
Reports of Suspected Plague in Russia Prompt Central Asian Health Checks
Reports surrounding the death of an employee at an anti-plague research institute in Russia’s Irkutsk region have prompted health authorities across Central Asia to tighten sanitary controls and review preparedness measures. Russian officials have not confirmed that the employee contracted plague or that a laboratory accident occurred. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have nevertheless announced additional checks or heightened readiness in response. Officials across the region say there is no cause for alarm, but the response reflects the sensitivity that remains around cross-border infectious disease threats after the COVID-19 pandemic. What Is Known Russian authorities have released few details, but reports say an employee at the anti-plague institute in Shelekhov, near Irkutsk, accidentally broke a test tube containing live bacteria. That employee, a female aged 27 or 28, was hospitalized on September 29, but she died on October 2. The hospital where she was treated was reportedly placed under quarantine, and nearly 200 people who might have come into contact with her are under medical observation. There are also reports that four more hospitals are under quarantine, with some 100 people hospitalized as a precaution. Russian officials deny these reports and say health specialists are on the ground in the area investigating and have urged the public to wait for an official assessment of the situation and not spread rumors. The Response in Central Asia Kazakhstan shares a 7,800-kilometer border with Russia; the distance from far northeastern Kazakhstan to Irkutsk is more than 1,500 kilometers. While that is comforting, the distance from Kazakhstan to Wuhan, China, is some 3,600 kilometers, and the coronavirus that originated in Wuhan in 2019 eventually reached Kazakhstan and everywhere else in the world. On October 5, Kazakhstan’s Health Ministry said it was aware of the reports from Irkutsk, was following the situation closely, and had ordered closer checks at border crossings and other entry points. “Sanitary and quarantine controls are being conducted at state border crossing points,” a Health Ministry statement said, “No individuals with elevated temperatures, signs of illness, or suspected highly dangerous infections have been detected across any mode of transport.” The Health Ministry said the chances of plague, or “pneumonia of undetermined etiology” crossing Kazakhstan’s borders were low. Kyrgyzstan’s Health Ministry also said it had ordered close checks of people entering the country in response to reports about the situation in Irkutsk. “Specialists monitor individuals, vehicles, and cargo crossing the border to prevent the importation and spread of infectious diseases, including highly dangerous infections,” the Health Ministry said. The same measures are being implemented in Tajikistan. Said Davlatzoda, the head of the Health Ministry’s Department of Sanitary-Epidemiological Safety, Emergency Situations and Emergency Medical Care, said orders went out that every person crossing into Tajikistan must have their body temperature measured. Workers from the department have been instructed to ask people arriving whether they are experiencing symptoms such as nausea and vomiting, headache, weakness, and muscle and joint pain. Personnel from the Sanitary-Epidemiological Safety Department have also been told to wear disposable hazmat clothing when manning border entry points. Uzbekistan’s Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare and Public Health said it had strengthened the readiness of relevant services “to prevent the introduction and spread of highly dangerous infectious diseases within the country.” However, the committee also said there has been no confirmation of the possible contagion, and the exact suspected disease has not been named by any Russian health officials. The committee also pointed out that the World Health Organization was monitoring the situation and called on Uzbekistan’s citizens not to rely on unverified reports. Turkmenistan has not said anything about the reports of plague in the Irkutsk area or about the authorities introducing any special measures. This is to be expected from Turkmenistan, remembering that the authorities there continue to claim to this day that the country never had any cases of COVID. A Looming Influx of Russians? Reports of a possible problem with the plague in Irkutsk come just weeks after Russia held parliamentary elections. There have been rumors for months that Russian President Vladimir Putin would announce another mobilization for the armed forces sometime after those elections to bolster forces invading Ukraine. The last time the Russian authorities declared a general mobilization in 2022, more than one million Russian citizens crossed into Central Asia in less than a year. The vast majority continued on to a third country, but while many countries in the West have barred Russian citizens from entry due to the war in Ukraine, Central Asia remains accessible for Russians. The announcement of another mass mobilization would likely send hundreds of thousands more Russians fleeing through Central Asia, and local health officials would have their hands full trying to check everyone crossing their borders.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at Kyrgyzstan unveiling plans that would require religious bloggers to be licensed and subjected to greater state oversight; further changes to the country's regional security leadership; one of the Central Asian states launching its first satellite into space; and a new round of CSTO military exercises in Russia that could have some troubling implications for the region. We'll also be looking at Turkmenistan marking 35 years of independence with a massive military parade showcasing a range of new weapons systems, as well as a week of blackouts hitting one of Central Asia's key cities. From there, we turn to our main story this week, where we'll be joined by two experts from the World Bank to discuss a major new report examining some of the biggest economic bottlenecks facing Central Asia, where those constraints are emerging, and what governments across the region will need to do to overcome them. Special guests: - Muneeza Alam (World Bank) - Luis Blancas (World Bank)
Central Asia and Azerbaijan Head to Avaza for First Formal Summit
On Thursday, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov is due to receive Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Sadyr Japarov, Emomali Rahmon, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and Ilham Aliyev in a place built to impress visitors.
Thursday’s meeting will be the first formal consultative summit since Azerbaijan joined the format as a full participant in November 2025. The six presidents have already met once in the new configuration, at an informal gathering in Cholpon Ata on July 31, where they signed a declaration covering closer cooperation on transport, energy, trade, and security.
Construction of Avaza began in late 2007, as Turkmenistan sought to create a national showcase on its Caspian coast. The resort’s hotels and sanatoria sit among parks and entertainment complexes, while eleven road and foot bridges span a seven-kilometer artificial canal. According to official figures, its hotels and recreation facilities can accommodate more than 10,000 vacationers. State institutions send employees there for summer holidays, echoing the Soviet tradition of workplace-organized vacations. These holidays help fill a resort where the seasonal rhythms differ sharply from everyday life in neighboring Turkmenbashi.
Officially, Avaza is a district of Turkmenbashi, a city of around 90,000 residents located 580 kilometers west of Ashgabat across the Karakum Desert. The working city's economy is built around oil refining, the port, and transport. The Turkmenbashi International Seaport traces its history to 1896 and was rebuilt on a large scale before reopening in its current form in 2018. The Turkmenbashi refinery complex was founded in 1943 and remains one of the country's main oil-processing centers. The city itself was known as Krasnovodsk until 1993, when it was renamed Turkmenbashi after the title used by then-President Saparmurat Niyazov.
The sea that was supposed to be Avaza's main attraction is now retreating from it. In 2024, one visitor told RFE/RL that the shoreline was 25-30 meters farther away than when his family had swum there three years earlier. A correspondent found hotels creating new beach areas farther out, while dredging was underway near the port. By September 2026, shallower water was forcing some ferries to carry lighter loads and pushing ports around the sea into costly dredging and berth work. The effects are already visible along the coast where the leaders will meet.
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The Avaza resort on Turkmenistan’s Caspian coast, where the five Central Asian presidents and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev are due to meet on October 8.[/caption]
Turkmenistan is also hosting Caspian-focused meetings around the leaders' gathering, while the October 8 agenda includes climate, water, trade, energy, transport, and regional security.
At the November 2025 summit in Tashkent, the five Central Asian presidents unanimously approved Azerbaijan’s admission as a full participant, extending the grouping across the Caspian into the South Caucasus. Aliyev has been careful to mark the change. At the informal meeting in Cholpon Ata on July 31, he said: "I previously participated as a guest of honor, but today I am taking part as a full member of the team."
The format dates to 2018 and was deliberately light on bureaucracy. The presidents met regularly, but without building a powerful permanent intraregional institution. That may now be changing. In Tashkent last November, Mirziyoyev proposed turning the meetings into a "Community of Central Asia", supported by a rotating secretariat and stronger national coordinators.
The argument was raised again in Baku last week at the CAMCA Regional Forum, where Sodiq Safoev, first deputy chairman of Uzbekistan's Senate, said the time had come for something "more" than a consultative meeting. Avaza will be the first formal leaders' meeting since that call was renewed.
Azerbaijan’s inclusion brings both shores of the Caspian into the same regional forum. From Turkmenbashi, freight crosses to Azerbaijan before continuing through the South Caucasus toward Türkiye and Europe. Along this section of the Middle Corridor, unreliable sailing schedules and customs delays can hold up cargo even where port and rail capacity are available.
Turkmenistan has begun expanding its cargo fleet. The domestically built Gadamly, which can carry 240 standard containers, arrived at Baku port in May. A second vessel, Manzil, is scheduled to enter service before the end of 2026.
On September 28, a World Bank report said targeted investment and better integration could more than triple trade volumes along the Trans-Caspian route and halve transit times by 2040. It estimated that at least $25 billion in physical infrastructure and about $30 billion in supporting investments will be needed. The bank also called for a single digital corridor system and closer coordination between rail and shipping operators. Cutting transit times is a priority for the corridor’s operators. Nurgul Zhakupova, secretary general of the TITR association, told The Times of Central Asia that this requires “the consistent modernization of all key links along the route.”
Life in nearby Turkmenbashi has not always matched the resort’s polished image. In August 2023, hundreds of people protested outside city hall over shortages of subsidized flour and cooking oil, a rare public protest in tightly controlled Turkmenistan. Later that autumn, residents told RFE/RL that state shops were stocked more generously during the summer resort season, with basic foods becoming scarce again after holidaymakers left.
In 2024, Turkmenbashi’s markets were artificially stocked before a visit by the U.S. ambassador, according to Radio Azatlyk, with residents told not to discuss shortages with outsiders. A Human Rights Watch assessment for 2025 said high prices and shortages of some staples remained a national problem.
Avaza has previously operated as a controlled space. During the 2021 holiday season, the authorities required vaccination and COVID testing for visitors and staffed a round-the-clock checkpoint at Avaza’s entrance, even as Turkmenistan maintained it had recorded no coronavirus cases. When Avaza hosted the UN conference on landlocked developing countries in 2025, security and transport control were explicit priorities. No detailed security plan for this week's meetings has been published.
The diplomatic traffic will not stop after Thursday. Avaza will host the CIS Council of Heads of State on October 9. Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed his participation in a September 22 telephone call with Berdimuhamedov, and is also due to attend a Caspian environmental summit. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is also expected to attend the CIS summit as a special guest, according to Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei, with further meetings planned during his visit.
The back-to-back meetings will bring an overlapping cast of leaders to Avaza under two different regional formats. On Thursday, Aliyev will sit with them as a full participant in a grouping that did not formally include Azerbaijan before last November. On Friday, Putin will join them for the older CIS framework. By bringing Azerbaijan into their own regional forum, Central Asian governments are taking a greater role in shaping relationships beyond the region.
How Central Asian Small Businesses Are Earning More From Local Products
For Ikhtiyor Alimov, finding foreign buyers was only part of the challenge. His dried-fruit business in northern Tajikistan also needed enough equipment to fill its orders.
Alimov founded Mevai Zarrin in Isfara with eight workers and handmade machinery. Its processing capacity eventually reached 200 kilograms a day, but manual production limited further growth. With the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the company upgraded its equipment and packaging. It can now process 600–650 kilograms daily, according to the organization’s account of its development.
“We were able to reduce our product waste by 20%,” Alimov said in UNDP’s regional account of the program.
Across Central Asia, small producers face similar difficulties. Processing a harvest before selling it can increase producers’ earnings, but expansion requires investment that many family businesses struggle to afford.
The Finland-funded Aid for Trade initiative, implemented by the UNDP, is closing after more than 15 years of work across Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. UNDP and Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of the Economy presented results in Bishkek on September 24, discussing which forms of support should continue beyond 2026.
In Tajikistan, UNDP reported that the initiative helped create 147 jobs, including 90 for women since 2022.
At Mevai Zarrin, support depended partly on buying fruit from local farmers and connecting producers in southern Tajikistan with processors in the north. The company signed contracts with ten farming households in Khatlon, securing supplies while giving growers another outlet for their harvests.
Pooling smaller harvests can make deliveries large enough for a processor to buy. For farmers, those arrangements offer a route beyond nearby markets without requiring each household to become an exporter. Mevai Zarrin also obtained FSSC 22000 food safety certification to help it pursue new customers. In UNDP’s September profile, Alimov said the company had sent samples to prospective buyers in Germany and was awaiting their response.
Processing the Harvest
In Uzbekistan’s Andijan region, Dildora Nurmatova’s family business, ErElDi, has increased its profits by processing peanuts. Nurmatova began investigating the crop during her agricultural studies. By 2024, her enterprise was harvesting five metric tons from one hectare. According to UNDP’s regional retrospective, selling processed snacks rather than raw peanuts tripled her profits.
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Dildora Nurmatova in her peanut field in Uzbekistan’s Andijan region. Image: Elyor Nemat, UNDP Uzbekistan[/caption]
Aid for Trade supplied processing and packaging equipment, alongside a separate workshop and a three-phase electricity connection. Business advice helped the family develop products and organize production.
The company supplies packaged peanuts to Andijan’s wholesale market. Lower-grade kernels go into milled products for bakeries and ice-cream producers, giving the family a market for material that cannot be sold as premium snacks.
ErElDi’s customers are close to home. The family can earn more from its harvest by doing the processing itself, before it considers the costs of finding buyers abroad.
In Kyrgyzstan, UNDP reported that the project contributed to 837 new jobs, including 548 for women, and supported export contracts worth $17.1 million since 2022.
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Beekeepers inspect a honeycomb at the Issyk-Kul honey cooperative in Kyrgyzstan’s Tyup district. Image: UNDP Kyrgyzstan/Danil Usmanov[/caption]
Cooperation has also helped some Kyrgyz producers increase their output. Nine beekeepers formed the Issyk-Kul Honey Cooperative in 2023. UNDP reported in September that annual production doubled from 15 to 30 metric tons within a year after support that included equipment and improved practices.
Separately, Bishkek-based Dary Tyan-Shanya worked with the program in 2024–2025 to document production processes and obtain ISO 22000 food safety certification. UNDP says the company now exports honey to more than 30 countries. Reliable supplies from other producers are part of sustaining that business.
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Emma Savitskaya of Kyrgyz honey exporter Dary Tyan-Shanya displays a jar of honey. Image: UNDP Kyrgyzstan/Danil Usmanov[/caption]
Connecting Producers With Buyers
For craft producers around Issyk-Kul, access to customers can begin with a local shop. Albina Alimova’s EthnoMir business in Karakol connects artisans with tourists and tour operators. Alimova helped the Tengri Wool group concentrate on products buyers wanted and to improve consistency. The group now sells through local tourism businesses, including her shop.
“They need a channel to market, and I need strong, good, sustainable products in my shop,” she said.
For small craft groups, a regular retail customer can make production easier to plan. Alimova, in turn, needs suppliers who can deliver consistent products in sufficient quantities when tourists arrive.
For Mevai Zarrin, expansion has also created work in Isfara. The company now employs 15 people, including 14 women, compared with eight when Alimov started. Its upgraded equipment allows it to process apples, pears, and quince alongside the apricots and plums on which the business was built.
Short Stories from the Region
