The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose
The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues, although market volatility and higher import and freight costs diluted the gain. The truce could therefore remove a temporary windfall for Astana while easing inflationary pressure in the region’s energy-importing economies.
The clearest longer-term opportunity may lie in trade and transit. On June 16, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin held a bilateral meeting with an Iranian delegation led by Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh.
The sides discussed the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor, expansion of port infrastructure, increasing bilateral trade volumes, and improving transport and logistics ties. By the end of 2025, cargo volumes along the North-South corridor had increased by 12% to 3.5 million tons. Rail freight between the two countries rose by 69%. Kazakhstan and Iran intend to modernize transport infrastructure to increase the corridor’s capacity to 20 million tons per year. The sides also emphasized the importance of the recently signed five-party railway agreement between China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the upcoming four-party tariff agreement between Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Iran, which is expected to create additional conditions for trade and transit growth. At the start of the military escalation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, regional economist and Logistan editor-in-chief Grigory Mikhailov had already pointed to transport and logistics opportunities for Central Asia. “There is a chance to attract investment into logistics development from major players, primarily China. For Beijing, the current situation is evidence of the need to develop alternative routes bypassing the Middle East. Options include expanding rail transit through Central Asia and Russia, as well as gradually developing the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast,” he said. De-escalation in the Middle East, even if temporary, may alter China’s plans for diversifying logistics routes, but is unlikely to cancel them altogether. This makes the pause a test of route confidence as much as diplomacy. If the ceasefire holds, Iran could regain some value as one of Central Asia’s shortest southern outlets to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. If it fails, the region’s search for alternatives will accelerate, strengthening demand for the Trans-Caspian route through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. In that sense, both peace and renewed instability could increase Central Asia’s strategic importance, but through different corridors. Another possible scenario involves Kazakhstan’s potential role in arrangements related to Iran’s nuclear program. Under the memorandum signed by Trump and Pezeshkian, Iran agreed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, but the framework sets no detailed limits on the program. The fate of Iran’s accumulated enriched-uranium stockpile is to be resolved in later talks. Washington and Tehran have publicly disputed what was agreed on inspections, although the memorandum says nuclear activities involving material and facilities would be supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said Kazakhstan had indicated its willingness to receive Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% if Washington and Tehran reached an agreement on the nuclear program. Grossi made the statement following his May 26 meeting in Astana with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Kazakhstan’s potential role rests on an established non-proliferation record: it hosted two rounds of nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty in 2013 and now hosts the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank. The bank itself is not authorized to receive or process Iran’s uranium enriched to 60%, however, meaning that any such arrangement would require separate legal documents, safeguards, financing, custody rules, and probably dedicated infrastructure. For Central Asia, the truce is less a peace dividend than a redistribution of risk. Hydrocarbon exporters could lose from weaker energy prices, while import-dependent economies could gain from lower fuel and freight costs. The region would also benefit from having more viable routes to world markets. The real question is whether banks, insurers, transport companies, and investors are willing to do business through Iran. Unless they are, the truce will remain a political pause rather than a lasting economic benefit for Central Asia.
EU Launches Platform to Mobilize Up to €2 Billion for Europe–Central Asia Connectivity
The European Commission launched a Connectivity Agenda Platform on June 23, 2026, and concluded statements of intent with international financial institutions expected to mobilize up to €2 billion ($2.3 billion) for transport, border-crossing and trade-facilitation projects across the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus.
The initiative was unveiled at a high-level ministerial meeting in Brussels, hosted by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela, and Commissioner for Sustainable Transport Apostolos Tzitzikostas.
The meeting brought together transport ministers and senior officials from EU member states, as well as representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, alongside international lenders, to advance connectivity projects under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.
The new platform is designed to coordinate investments and policy actions across transport, energy, digital connectivity, and trade. Participants also agreed to improve the operational efficiency of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, a wider framework that includes the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR, also known as the Middle Corridor.
The route links China and Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, offering an alternative to transport routes crossing Russia.
The European Commission said the expected financing would support transport infrastructure, border-crossing modernization, and trade-facilitation projects aimed at improving freight movement across the corridor.
“The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor is becoming a vital bridge between Europe and Asia,” Síkela said, adding that the investments would help make the route faster, more reliable, and better integrated.
Tzitzikostas said stronger transport links were critical for economic competitiveness and regional resilience.
The platform’s launch came during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s official visit to Brussels, where he met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
In an EU–Kazakhstan joint statement, the leaders reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Trans-Caspian corridor and pledged deeper cooperation under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.
They also highlighted the EU’s role as Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partner and agreed to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, energy, transport, digitalization, and emerging technologies.
Speaking at the Kazakhstan-EU roundtable in Brussels, Tokayev said Kazakhstan was investing heavily in infrastructure to position itself as a regional logistics hub connecting Europe, Central Asia, China, the Caucasus, and the Middle East.
According to Tokayev, cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor have risen fivefold over the past six years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.1 million tons annually, with Kazakhstan targeting a capacity of 10 million tons.
He said Kazakhstan has invested more than $35 billion in transport and logistics infrastructure over the past 15 years, with the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk serving as major transit gateways.
Tokayev also welcomed logistics agreements worth nearly $1 billion signed on June 23 by the Development Bank of Kazakhstan: one with the European Investment Bank, and a separate agreement with a banking syndicate including Commerzbank, JPMorgan Chase, and Standard Chartered, backed by guarantees from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
A day earlier, Kazakhstan and European partners announced four transport-related agreements worth a combined $462 million to further strengthen connectivity along the Middle Corridor.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers a major political merger in Kazakhstan, new counter-terrorism raids in southern Kyrgyzstan, a shock resignation inside the Kyrgyz government, security and military forces being placed on high alert across the country, and Uzbekistan making its historic debut at the FIFA World Cup, as the rest of Central Asia reacts to a rare bit of good regional news. Before then turning to our main story this week, where a major new European Union report has examined foreign information manipulation, narrative shaping, and how Russia and China are trying to influence the media and messaging ecosystem across Central Asia.
Special guest: Samuel Doveri Vesterbye (Managing Director of the European Neighbourhood Council)
U.S.-Iran Framework Could Reopen Central Asia’s Southern Route
The United States and Iran said on June 15 that they had reached a framework to end their war, halt the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports, and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The sides said a memorandum of understanding could be signed on June 19 in Switzerland. The exact terms were not immediately known, with Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief left for later talks. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said the pact called for “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” Trump posted, on Truth Social, “Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” Brent crude fell by more than 4% in early trading, and Asian stock markets advanced. Reuters later said shippers remained cautious after one LNG tanker passed through Hormuz on June 15. A reopened strait would not restore normal traffic immediately, with freight flows depending on mine clearance, insurance rules, port inspections, and shipping guidance for vessels entering the area. Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian state to publicly welcome the latest announcement. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev praised the political will of the parties, saying they had helped “restore trust and mutually acceptable solutions.” Azerbaijan also issued a supporting statement praising Pakistan’s mediation and saying further talks could support “lasting peace and stability.” Central Asian governments had previously welcomed the U.S.-Iran ceasefire in April, with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan calling for de-escalation and diplomacy. For Central Asia, oil prices are only part of the story. The larger question is whether de-escalation can reopen practical access to southern trade routes, ports, and markets beyond the Caspian. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the region has paid closer attention to alternatives to routes through Russia. Iran offers one of its shortest paths to the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, Türkiye, and India. But sanctions, banking risk, war insurance, and U.S. policy shifts have kept that path fragile. Chabahar is the clearest example. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year contract with Iran to develop and operate the port on the Gulf of Oman. India’s shipping minister, Sarbananda Sonowal, called Chabahar “a vital trade artery connecting India with Afghanistan and Central Asian Countries.” The port allows Indian cargo to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia without crossing Pakistan, and gives Central Asian exporters another route toward India and the Indian Ocean. The sanctions picture remains uncertain. On October 30, 2025, Washington granted India a six-month waiver that allowed operations at Chabahar to continue. No public replacement had been announced by June 15. The new framework could make another waiver easier to justify, but banks and insurers will wait for signed text, U.S. guidance, and proof that Hormuz and Iranian ports are safe. Reuters cited a senior Iranian official who said the draft framework included no new U.S. sanctions before a final deal, a temporary oil sanctions waiver, and the release of $25 billion in frozen Iranian assets. The same source said Iran would refrain from further enrichment and negotiate uranium arrangements during a 60-day period. A U.S. official said the agreement would ultimately lead to dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, while the Iranian side said enriched uranium could be diluted inside Iran. Kazakhstan illustrates why Central Asia will move carefully. The Times of Central Asia reported in April that Astana had frozen several projects with Iran because of the war, including grain and food-trade plans. Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Issetov said, “many of our projects with Iran have been frozen due to the country being in a state of war.” He added that Kazakhstan was not facing major losses because trade volumes were small. Kazakh data shows exports to Iran standing at $239.3 million and imports at $191 million in 2025, equal to about 0.3% of Kazakhstan’s total foreign trade turnover. Around 90% of Kazakhstan’s exports to Iran consisted of wheat and barley. However, the logistics argument is stronger than the trade numbers. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran already have a rail link into northern Iran, which plays a central role in plans for multimodal corridors to the Persian Gulf. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had also announced plans for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port, part of the Bandar Abbas port complex. The southern corridor reaches beyond Kazakhstan. The Sarakhs railway terminal on the Turkmenistan-Iran border is meant to speed container traffic along China-Central Asia-Iran-Türkiye-Europe and Gulf routes. Beijing and Tehran have agreed to electrify the 1,000-kilometer section from Sarakhs to Razi on the Turkish border, with the project expected to triple freight capacity to 15 million tons a year. In January 2025, Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Russia signed a roadmap to raise capacity on the eastern route of the North-South corridor to 20 million tons by 2030, including up to 6 million tons by rail. Turkmenistan adds an energy dimension to the corridor question. Ashgabat’s planned gas swaps through Iran exposed its export diversification plans to sanctions and conflict risk. A Turkmenistan-Iraq swap through Iran stalled after Washington declined to approve it, while Turkmen gas deliveries to Türkiye through Iran were reported to have paused. TCA had earlier warned that the swap deals could become collateral damage from any conflict involving Iran. Uzbekistan has the strongest strategic reason to watch Chabahar and the southern route. In a TCA interview, ISRS Director Eldor Aripov said: “For a double-landlocked country, every new route is not merely an economic advantage but an element of national resilience.” Chabahar, the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Afghan route, and Gulf links all serve the same goal: more pathways for exporters and fewer chokepoints. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also have a stake. Both are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026. These volumes are modest, but they add weight to any route that cuts time or expands market choice. Kazakhstan also has a separate nuclear-diplomacy role. TCA has previously examined whether Astana could support a future Iran arrangement through its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank at Ulba holds 90 metric tons of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride, though it is not designed to receive or downblend Iranian highly-enriched material. As it stands, the limits are clear: the framework has not yet been signed, its nuclear clauses remain disputed, and sanctions relief still depends on U.S. decisions and compliance rules. Israel is not part of the talks and has said it will keep forces on land it currently holds in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. Chabahar still sits within an environment that can quickly change. If the memorandum is signed and implemented, Central Asia would gain a more credible southern option. That would not reorder regional trade in one week. But it could lower risk premiums around Iran, revive suspended projects, strengthen the case for Chabahar, and give Central Asia more room in talks with India, the Gulf, China, Russia, and Europe. For a landlocked region, even a partial opening gives exporters one more route to the sea.
Iran and Tajikistan Seek Closer Economic, Security Ties
Tajikistan and Iran have moved to deepen a relationship steeped in close cultural ties, holding talks on trade, security and the environment last week even as conflict in the Middle East weighs heavily on Iran. Sherali Kabir, Tajikistan’s industry and new technologies minister, and his Iranian counterpart Seyed Mohammad Atabak agreed that industrial cooperation between their two countries had entered “a qualitatively new stage,” the Tajik ministry said after they met on the sidelines of a gathering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a regional forum that includes Russia and China. At the meeting on June 5 in Kyrgyzstan, the two men talked about “the establishment of textile clusters based on Tajik cotton raw materials and Iranian technologies; joint projects in metallurgy and mineral processing; the production of agricultural machinery; pharmaceuticals and biotechnology; construction materials; as well as the chemical industry and coal processing,” according to the ministry. They also reviewed a plan to open a joint industrial park in Tajikistan and the application of digital technologies and artificial intelligence in industrial management. Earlier this year, the two countries said they planned to increase bilateral trade to $1 billion, which would roughly double the current annual amount. Tajik officials said trade had increased in the first quarter of this year, and the government sent a convoy of more than 100 trucks carrying what it said was humanitarian aid to Iran in March. On Monday, Iran and Israel appeared to be de-escalating after carrying out airstrikes on each other as a regional ceasefire came under strain. However, Tajikistan has not publicly taken a side in the war and instead called for a diplomatic solution. It is also working to deepen trade and other ties with the United States, which is seeking access to critical minerals and energy resources in Central Asia. The U.S. joined Israel in launching airstrikes on targets across Iran in February. In a separate meeting in Bishkek on June 5, the internal affairs ministers of Tajikistan and Iran discussed ways to counter transnational organized crime and build cooperation between their law enforcement agencies. The two countries, which don’t share a border, have long been concerned about instability and militant threats from Afghanistan, which shares a long border with both countries. According to state-run Iranian media, Interior Minister Ramazon Rahimzoda of Tajikistan also praised Iran during the encounter with counterpart Eskandar Momeni, saying it had shown resilience against “superpowers” in what the minister described as a testament to its technological skills and leadership. In another meeting last week, Shina Ansari, Iranian vice president and head of the environment department, and Bahadur Shiralizadeh, Tajikistan’s environment minister, talked on the sidelines of a Global Environment Facility forum in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. They discussed endangered species protection and pollutant monitoring, and Shiralizadeh said Tajikistan would welcome Iranian specialists on biodiversity, Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency reported. Iranian experts are involved in major hydropower projects in Tajikistan, which sees the technology as a way to alleviate energy shortages and reduce pollution from the use of fossil fuels.
From Culture to Critical Minerals: C5+1 Opens Busy U.S. Week in Central Asia
The United States and Central Asia moved another part of the C5+1 agenda into a working-level form on June 5, when culture officials from the five Central Asian states and Washington met in Tashkent. The meeting came just days before a separate C5+1 critical minerals session in Astana, giving the week a wider agenda: cultural heritage, public diplomacy, mining, investment, and supply chains are now moving forward in the same regional format.
The Tashkent meeting brought together Uzbekistan's Minister of Culture Ozodbek Nazarbekov, Kazakhstan's Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balayeva, Kyrgyzstan's Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy Mirbek Mambetaliev, Tajikistan's Minister of Culture Matluba Sattoriyon, Turkmenistan's Deputy Minister of Culture Gurbanmurad Miradaliev, and Sarah Rogers, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The agenda covered cultural and humanitarian cooperation, joint cultural projects, creative exchanges, and the protection and promotion of cultural heritage.
Participants discussed a permanent C5+1 Working Group on Culture, a C5+1 Culture and Innovation Forum, closer cooperation in the creative industries, and more places for Central Asian cultural professionals in U.S. education and exchange programs. Uzbekistan also proposed joint English for Culture centers with U.S. partners at cultural education institutions.
In practical terms, that could mean joint training for museum staff, touring exhibitions, film and music exchanges, English-language programs for curators and cultural managers, and U.S.-backed workshops for people working in heritage, tourism, and the creative industries. For Uzbekistan, the proposed centers would give the agenda a physical base inside cultural education institutions rather than leaving it at the level of declarations.
The meeting ended with a protocol, which reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the cultural heritage agenda adopted after the Washington summit in November 2025. The International Institute for Central Asia said it covered cooperation through joint events and festivals in art, literature, theater, cinema, and music. Kazakhstan's side also tied the discussion to museum partnerships, digitization of heritage, professional exchanges, tourism routes, and digital projects.
The Tashkent talks grew out of the C5+1 leaders’ meeting in Washington, where culture joined a wider list of priorities. That summit marked ten years of U.S. engagement with the region through the format, which began in 2015 and has since expanded from foreign-minister meetings to expert groups and presidential-level summits. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the November 2025 summit shifted the format from broad diplomacy toward deliverable agreements, with critical minerals, aviation, supply chains, and business ties among the main areas of focus.
Culture fits into that agenda, as Central Asian governments see heritage, tourism, film, music, museums, and the creative industries as economic sectors as well as identity markers. For the United States, public diplomacy gives Washington a way to stay active in the region outside security and energy talks. It also gives the C5+1 a soft-power layer, using language programs, museum links, heritage projects, and creative exchanges to build influence without framing the relationship only around security or resources.
Heritage protection has a security side as well. Trafficking in cultural property often overlaps with border management, customs work, and law enforcement. Digital records, shared museum practices, and professional training can help countries document sites and objects before they are damaged, stolen, or moved abroad. Turkmenistan's coverage of the meeting noted attention to museums, research centers, digitization, and the U.S. Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation, which has supported restoration and preservation projects in the region.
A current example is the Sher-Dor Madrasah in Samarkand, where Rogers, Uzbekistan Art and Culture Development Foundation Chairperson Gayane Umerova, and U.S. Ambassador Jonathan Henick marked the completion of the first phase of an AFCP-backed façade restoration project on June 3. The same event also produced a five-year cooperation roadmap between the foundation and the U.S. Embassy covering culture and heritage preservation.
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The Sher-Dor Madrassa; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption]
The American calendar goes beyond culture. Rogers is on a May 27-June 10 regional trip with stops including Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In Tashkent, she also met Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov for talks on education, culture, information exchange, and public diplomacy. That placed the C5+1 culture meeting inside a larger set of bilateral and regional conversations.
The next stop for the format is Astana. The current AMM 2026 program lists C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue activity on June 10, immediately before the Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress on June 11-12, which will bring Kazakhstan’s critical minerals sector, investment agenda, and role in global supply chains into sharper focus. The official program includes panels on investment conditions, taxation, transport and logistics, copper as a strategic metal, and the move from mineral resources to investment projects.
The program also lists B2B and B2G meetings, as well as a June 13 industrial tour to a Qarmet enterprise, giving the congress a direct business-development and site-visit component.
Those panels point to the kind of work investors usually need before projects move forward: clearer tax terms, transport routes for getting ore and processed metals to market, bankable project lists, and agreements on where processing will take place. Copper is a useful example because it links mining directly to power grids, electric vehicles, data centers, and other parts of the global energy transition.
Kazakhstan has strong reasons to host this event as it seeks more processing inside the country, more foreign capital, and better access to high-value industrial chains. The AMM organizers say the congress will place Central Asia's role in global supply chains of strategic resources at the center of the discussions. The exhibition plans participation from companies and groups from Kazakhstan, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, the United States, and others.
The scale is already significant. The International Trade Administration says Kazakhstan accounted for 39% of global uranium production and 48.8% of global natural uranium exports, while hard minerals and metals made up 18% of the country’s exports by value in 2024. Refined copper exports alone generated $2 billion that year, with zinc exports at $788 million and silver at $588 million.
Kazakhstan is also trying to turn early-stage rare earth potential into bankable projects. In 2025, Kazakh officials announced the discovery of the Zhana Kazakhstan rare earth deposit, with estimated resources of more than 20 million metric tons and containing neodymium, cerium, lanthanum, and yttrium, though Reuters reported that no developer or timeline had yet been specified.
For Washington, critical minerals have become one of the strongest economic reasons to keep the C5+1 format moving. The United States wants supply chains that are less vulnerable to political pressure, export controls, and transport bottlenecks. Central Asian governments want technology, finance, new routes to markets, and a larger share of the value from their own resources. The format also suits the region’s multi-vector approach: it gives all six governments involved a common forum, while each Central Asian state keeps working bilaterally with other partners.
Kazakhstan enters the critical minerals race with an advantage many countries lack: an industrial base already in place. The country has substantial mining, smelting, and metallurgical capacity, active geological exploration, growing technical and laboratory infrastructure, and long-running partnerships with international energy and mining companies, including Chevron’s presence through Tengizchevroil since 1993. The next step is to expand domestic processing, attract more investment in critical minerals, and capture more of the value chain inside the country. For U.S. companies, that means looking beyond access to raw materials and assessing where refining, logistics, equipment supply, geological services, environmental technologies, and long-term offtake agreements could fit.
The sequence building up to Astana shows how the format is changing. Leaders set broad priorities in Washington last November. Ministers and sector officials are now turning those priorities into practical areas of work. Culture may produce working groups, exchanges, festivals, and digitization projects, while minerals may produce project lists, roundtables, investment contacts, and long-term purchase talks.
That does not mean all proposals will become funded programs, but it does show that the C5+1 is becoming more regular and more specific. For Central Asia and the United States, that is the point. After the meetings, the real measure will be whether funded programs, signed contracts, and regular work continue after the summit photos have faded.
For more on the Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress and Exhibition 2026, see our special coverage.
Megaprojects Instead of Quotas: How Central Asia’s Water Diplomacy Is Changing
Central Asia’s water politics are moving beyond Soviet-era quotas. As glaciers in the Tien Shan retreat and climate pressure increases, river management has become a question of energy security, food production, and regional stability. The Soviet-era system of river-water allocation has reached its limits, forcing Central Asian states to look beyond traditional negotiations and toward joint ownership of strategic water infrastructure. Even as regional governments learn to cooperate more closely, a new challenge is emerging on Central Asia’s southern frontier, one that could disrupt the region’s hydrological balance. The Illusion of Control Formally, Central Asia’s water resources are governed through a network of interstate institutions. The principal mechanisms are the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). On paper, the system appears effective. Twice a year, ahead of the spring-summer irrigation season and the autumn-winter period, representatives of the region’s countries meet to approve water-withdrawal quotas from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. At the end of 2025, for example, officials meeting in Ashgabat agreed on water allocations for 2026, setting total withdrawals from the Amu Darya at nearly 55.4 billion cubic meters. This framework has helped prevent open interstate conflicts by providing a permanent forum for dialogue. However, its foundation remains the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which essentially preserved a Soviet-era quota system designed for a single centrally planned state rather than a group of independent countries with competing interests. The greatest weakness of the system is the absence of any meaningful enforcement mechanism. If one country exceeds its agreed allocation during a drought year, there are no legal or economic penalties. Disputes are instead resolved through emergency negotiations between ministries or, in some cases, direct interventions by heads of state. A system dependent on political goodwill and personal relationships is increasingly fragile in an era of climate stress. Turning Water Disputes Into Joint Investments As the quota system shows signs of strain, Central Asian countries have begun experimenting with a more pragmatic approach: shared ownership of infrastructure. The central paradox of the Syr Darya basin is that upstream and downstream countries need water at different times of the year. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the river’s headwaters, require releases in the winter to generate electricity and heat their cities. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, need that same water in summer to irrigate millions of hectares of farmland. Winter releases often flow downstream when demand is low, while shortages emerge during the peak agricultural season. The proposed solution is the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant on Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn River, a project now estimated to cost around $4.2 billion. What makes the project unusual is its ownership structure. Under a 2024 agreement, Kyrgyzstan will hold a 34% stake, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will each own 33%. By investing billions of dollars in infrastructure located outside their territory, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are effectively purchasing seats at the decision-making table. As shareholders, they gain a direct role in determining reservoir operations, helping ensure water is stored during winter and released according to agricultural needs in summer. For Kyrgyzstan, the project promises greater energy independence. For downstream states, it offers more predictable water management. In that sense, economic incentives may prove more reliable than traditional intergovernmental agreements. The Qosh Tepa Canal and the Domino Effect While Central Asian states are developing new models of cooperation on the Syr Darya, a potentially far greater challenge is emerging in the Amu Darya basin. The Taliban authorities in Afghanistan are pressing ahead with construction of the massive Qosh Tepa Canal in the country’s north. Stretching 285 kilometers and measuring roughly 100 meters in width, the canal could divert as much as 25% to 30% of the Amu Darya’s total flow, according to some estimates. The problem is not only the scale of the project, but its construction methods. Because Afghanistan remains largely isolated from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the canal is being financed primarily through domestic revenues. To reduce costs, large sections are being excavated through sandy terrain without concrete lining, increasing the risk of substantial water losses through seepage. At first glance, Kazakhstan may appear distant from the issue, with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan likely to bear the immediate impact. Yet because Central Asia’s hydrological system functions as an interconnected network, the consequences could ripple across the region. Faced with reduced water availability from the Amu Darya, Uzbekistan could seek to compensate by increasing withdrawals from the Syr Darya basin. Kazakh political figure Azamatkhan Amirtayev has warned that this could reduce water flows into Kazakhstan by as much as 30% to 40%. The effects could fall hardest on rice farmers in Kazakhstan’s Kyzylorda Region, agricultural producers in Turkistan Region, and the fragile recovery of the North Aral Sea. Searching for a New Framework Afghanistan presents a particularly difficult challenge because it lies outside the existing regional water-management framework. Kabul has not signed the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and is not bound by ICWC allocation quotas. Recognizing the risks, Uzbekistan, likely to be the first country directly affected, offered assistance to Afghanistan in the spring of 2026, proposing support for engineering work and concrete lining of the Qosh Tepa Canal to reduce water losses and improve efficiency. Today, Central Asia’s water-security architecture is being pulled in two directions. The region is moving toward a more pragmatic model, with stability built through joint investment and shared ownership of strategic infrastructure. Yet it remains vulnerable to external shocks that lie beyond its control. The shift from quotas to investment-driven cooperation also creates a new challenge: ensuring that multibillion-dollar agreements are respected and enforced. For that reason, Kazakhstan has proposed creating a Specialized International Water Organization under the auspices of the United Nations. As water management becomes more closely tied to infrastructure finance and regional security, Kazakhstan argues that a neutral international body could help strengthen cooperation over this most vital resource.
UNDP Opinion: Central Asia – Shared Wildlife, Shared Landscapes, Shared Responsibility
As global leaders gather for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly in Samarkand, Central Asia has an opportunity to send a clear message to the world: protecting biodiversity is not only about saving species — it is about securing water, livelihoods, resilience and long-term stability for millions of people across our region.
From the glaciers of the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains to the deserts, steppes and river basins downstream, Central Asia’s ecosystems are deeply interconnected across borders. Rivers flow between countries. Wildlife migrates through shared landscapes. Mountain ecosystems regulate water systems that sustain agriculture, energy production and communities far beyond the highlands themselves.
Among the most powerful symbols of this shared natural heritage is the snow leopard — the silent guardian of Central Asia’s mountains.
The snow leopard represents far more than a rare and iconic species. Its survival reflects the health of entire ecosystems that millions of people depend upon every day. Healthy mountain landscapes help secure freshwater resources, reduce disaster risks, sustain pastures and agriculture, preserve biodiversity, and strengthen resilience to climate change across the region.
But today, these ecosystems are under growing pressure.
Climate change is accelerating glacier melting and intensifying water stress. Land degradation, unsustainable grazing, habitat fragmentation and biodiversity loss are placing increasing pressure on fragile mountain environments and rural livelihoods. Communities living closest to nature are often the first to feel the consequences — through declining water availability, degraded pastures, reduced agricultural productivity and increasing climate-related risks.
These challenges do not stop at national borders. And neither can the solutions. Only a coordinated regional response can match the scale of the challenge.
Protecting Central Asia’s mountain ecosystems requires countries to work together to conserve ecological corridors, strengthen transboundary protected areas, improve water and land governance, and invest in climate-resilient livelihoods for communities whose futures are closely tied to nature.
There are already successful examples of regional agreements. For example, a highly successful transboundary nature conservation agreement in Central Asia protects the Ustyurt Plateau and the Turan Temperate Deserts. Spanning across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this initiative has successfully safeguarded vulnerable ecosystems and migratory species like the saiga antelope and snow leopard.
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Photo: Saiga calf. Kazakhstan/UNDP Kazakhstan[/caption]
It is encouraging that transboundary cooperation has already taken shape across the region.
Across Central Asia, governments, communities and development partners are already demonstrating that conservation and development can advance together. While each country's experience is unique, the lessons are remarkably similar: when communities benefit from healthy ecosystems, nature and people both thrive.
In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard has become one of the clearest examples of how coordinated conservation efforts can help restore fragile ecosystems across borders. The species inhabits mountain systems that extend beyond national boundaries into China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, making its protection inseparable from regional cooperation.
Over the past decade, habitat countries have strengthened efforts to protect the species through national conservation strategies, expanded protected areas, and improved ecosystem monitoring. Supported by cooperation between the Government, UNDP, the Global Environment Facility, and the scientific community, large-scale monitoring and habitat conservation initiatives have generated new data on snow leopard populations and migration routes across the Tien Shan and Altai Mountain systems.
In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard population had declined to an estimated 80–100 animals by the mid-1990s, as habitat degradation, human pressure, and ecosystem fragmentation intensified across mountain landscapes. Over the years, systemic interventions, including digital monitoring, the establishment of a genetic bank, and studies of behavior and migration routes, helped support the creation of the Merke Regional Nature Park in 2026, strengthening the protection of critical habitats and ecological corridors shared across borders.
Today, the population is estimated at 152–189 snow leopards, with around 70 percent of the species’ range in Kazakhstan now falling within protected areas.
The growing snow leopard population, a symbol of the “health” of mountain ecosystems, shows that countries can create the conditions needed to conserve this rare and majestic species. It also demonstrates how biodiversity conservation in Central Asia increasingly depends on long-term regional cooperation, scientific collaboration, and shared responsibility for ecosystems that connect communities across borders.
For Kyrgyzstan, the snow leopard has become far more than a symbol of a rare species. It represents a broader commitment to safeguarding the mountain ecosystems that underpin water security, biodiversity, climate resilience, and the well-being of millions across Central Asia.
A longstanding symbol of strength, freedom, and harmony with nature, the snow leopard was officially designated a national symbol of the Kyrgyz Republic, reflecting the country’s deep connection to its mountain heritage.
As one of the world’s most mountainous countries, Kyrgyzstan views the conservation of snow leopard landscapes as both a national and regional priority. Protecting these habitats also means safeguarding forests, pastures, glaciers, snowfields, and watersheds that sustain communities and economies far beyond national borders. Recognizing their critical role in maintaining biodiversity and freshwater resources, Kyrgyzstan has established a legal basis for the protection of glaciers and snowfields and is developing mechanisms for their long-term conservation.
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Photo: UNDP Kyrgyzstan/Vlad Ushakov[/caption]
Kyrgyzstan has also used snow leopard conservation as a platform for advancing mountain resilience and regional cooperation. The country championed the UN Five Years of Action for the Development of Mountain Regions (2023–2027), supported the establishment of International Snow Leopard Day, and promotes transboundary cooperation through GSLEP, regional agreements, and joint conservation efforts among range countries.
Kyrgyzstan’s experience demonstrates how conserving one iconic species can unite countries around a shared agenda for mountain resilience, biodiversity conservation, water security, and sustainable development.
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Photo: Snow leopard’s habitat/UNDP Tajikistan[/caption]
High in the mountains of Tajikistan, people have lived alongside snow leopards for generations. But for many years, life was becoming harder for both. Shrinking pastures and disappearing wildlife pushed communities and predators into conflict. When snow leopards attacked livestock, families suffered. And when wild prey disappeared, the future of the snow leopard became uncertain.
Today, there is hope.
According to the 2025 edition of Tajikistan’s national Red Book, the country’s snow leopard population has grown to around 500 individuals — nearly double the estimated 250 recorded in 2017. Behind these numbers is a powerful lesson: protecting nature only works when local people are part of the solution.
A conservation project led by UNDP and funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) helped mountain communities enhance their livelihoods while protecting wildlife. Women in remote villages were trained in wildlife monitoring and ecotourism, gaining new opportunities while helping monitor and protect nature.
Altogether, 450 people from remote mountain areas, including protected area rangers and community members, strengthened their skills in smart patrolling and wildlife monitoring through project-supported trainings. These enhanced capacities improved wildlife tracking and threat detection, contributing to reduced illegal hunting and tree cutting.
The project also introduced a simple but effective solution to reduce conflict between people and snow leopards. Communities received hay to feed livestock for just 20 extra days in spring, allowing mountain pastures to recover and wild prey to return. With more food in the wild, snow leopards were less likely to attack farm animals.
Most importantly, communities were trusted to lead. Through small grants and local initiatives, they supported restoration of degraded pastures and forests, adoption of sustainable livestock practices, and reduced pressure on fragile mountain ecosystems, helping conserve iconic species while strengthening local livelihoods.
The story of the snow leopard in Tajikistan shows that when communities are empowered, nature can recover too.
Importantly, conservation success was not driven by communities alone. It was also enabled by stronger institutions, enhanced protected area management, expanded wildlife monitoring, and closer cooperation among scientists and conservation agencies. At the same time, while biodiversity frameworks are in place, their implementation depends on the capacities of staff at national and subnational levels. Continued education, skills development, awareness raising and, overall, investment in people remain essential to sustaining conservation efforts.
The return of the snow leopard reflects the recovery of entire mountain ecosystems.
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Photo: UNDP Turkmenistan / Dovlet Rejepov[/caption]
In Turkmenistan, in the Aral Sea Basin, communities are restoring degraded pastures and adopting more sustainable land management practices to improve productivity while reducing pressure on fragile ecosystems. These efforts are helping rural households strengthen resilience to climate change while supporting biodiversity conservation.
Environmental degradation has had significant social and economic consequences, particularly for women and vulnerable households that depend heavily on natural resources for livelihoods and food security. As climate-related pressures such as declining agricultural productivity, degraded grazing lands and increasing water stress intensify, strengthening women’s participation in sustainable resource management and local decision-making is becoming increasingly important.
Across affected landscapes, practical efforts are helping reduce pressure on natural resources while supporting livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. Communities are increasingly engaged in identifying solutions that strengthen resilience, improve resource management, and promote inclusive participation in sustainable local development.
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Photo: UNDP Uzbekistan[/caption]
In Uzbekistan, community-led solutions in biodiversity-rich landscapes are demonstrating how ecosystem protection can go hand in hand with improving everyday life. Among many locally driven initiatives, families like Gulnoza Nuriddinova’s benefited from practical measures such as fencing, which helped protect household gardens and crops from wildlife intrusion and uncontrolled grazing, improving food security and reducing economic losses. For families like Sharofat Fayziddinova’s, access to piped water within the village transformed daily life by eliminating the need for frequent journeys to remote water sources, saving time and effort while improving living conditions.
While these were individual solutions tailored to local needs, together they helped reduce pressure on sensitive natural areas, lower the risk of human-wildlife encounters, and strengthen the relationship between communities and the ecosystems on which they depend. They reflect an important lesson: conservation efforts are most effective when communities benefit directly from environmental protection and become active partners in safeguarding nature.
For people living in mountain and rural areas, biodiversity is not an abstract concept. It is directly connected to water access, food security, incomes, health and resilience. The experiences of communities across Central Asia show that conservation is most effective when it improves people's lives while protecting the ecosystems on which they depend.
Healthy mountain ecosystems help regulate river systems that sustain economies and populations across borders. Degraded forests, pastures and watersheds increase erosion, water insecurity and disaster risks for entire regions downstream. Protecting nature is therefore also an investment in regional stability, economic resilience and human security.
The region has already demonstrated growing cooperation on climate action, biodiversity protection and sustainable natural resource management. Countries are expanding protected areas, strengthening environmental governance and investing in ecosystem restoration. Regional dialogue and collaboration are increasing.
But much more is needed to match the scale of today’s environmental challenges.
If Central Asia is to safeguard its shared natural heritage, three priorities deserve greater attention: investment in transboundary ecological corridors; stronger cooperation on water, land and biodiversity governance; and expanded support for communities whose livelihoods depend directly on healthy ecosystems.
The GEF Assembly provides an important opportunity to strengthen this momentum.
As Resident Representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Central Asia, we believe that with the leadership of the five Central Asian countries, the region can become a global example of how biodiversity conservation, climate resilience and sustainable development can advance together across borders.
The future of the snow leopard, like the future of Central Asia’s shared mountain ecosystems, depends on continued cooperation across borders.
At this moment, we call for stronger partnerships and greater investment in transboundary biodiversity conservation across Central Asia — investment that protects ecosystems while creating opportunity, resilience and hope for the people who call these mountains home.
The snow leopard does not recognize national borders. Neither do rivers, droughts, dust storms or climate impacts. Our response cannot stop at borders either. By investing together in nature, Central Asia can strengthen resilience, create opportunity and protect the ecosystems that sustain future generations.
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