What Do Former Presidents Do? From Akayev to Nazarbayev, the Fates of Central Asia’s Ex-Leaders
Central Asia has produced remarkably few former presidents who simply retired from public life. In Kyrgyzstan, former leaders have been driven from office, prosecuted, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev has followed a different path, largely withdrawing from public view after losing much of his political influence. Elsewhere, some of the region’s founding presidents died in office, leaving no post-presidential career to examine. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined how political succession has developed across the region. The fate of leaders after they leave office reveals another side of that political tradition. The architect of Kyrgyzstan’s early post-Soviet political model was its first president, Askar Akayev, who remained in office until 2005. Akayev introduced democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, but gradually tightened the pressure on his opponents as his presidency progressed. His rule was badly shaken by the Aksy shootings in 2002, which followed the prosecution of opposition lawmaker Azimbek Beknazarov and a territorial dispute with China. Akayev’s government had agreed to transfer disputed border territory to China, a decision fiercely criticized by the opposition. In March 2002, demonstrators in southern Kyrgyzstan demanded Akayev’s impeachment. Security forces opened fire during the unrest, killing several people. The shootings became one of the defining political crises of his presidency. In a 2003 referendum, Akayev significantly strengthened presidential powers at parliament’s expense. Economic hardship, unemployment, widespread corruption, and allegations of fraud in the 2005 parliamentary elections eventually helped trigger the Tulip Revolution in March of that year. Akayev had to flee, with rumors at the time claiming that he was smuggled out in the trunk of an official car, wrapped in a carpet. Criminal cases involving corruption were opened against him and members of his family in Kyrgyzstan. The authorities repeatedly sought his extradition from Russia, but were unsuccessful. After leaving Kyrgyzstan, Akayev lived in Moscow and taught at Moscow State University. In 2006, he became a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In August 2021, Akayev reappeared in Bishkek. He unexpectedly flew into the country and was immediately questioned as part of the criminal investigation into corruption surrounding the Kumtor gold mine. Afterward, he said he had come to Bishkek for a week and was prepared to assist investigators. “I came to speak honestly and sincerely about how we built Kumtor, why we built it, and what mistakes may have been made. The investigation will continue,” he said. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the criminal prosecution of Akayev had been terminated because the statute of limitations had expired. Tajikistan’s former president Rahmon Nabiyev was also forced from power. The former Soviet politician lost power amid the country’s civil war in 1992. He died at his home in Khujand the following year, at the age of 62, reportedly from a heart attack. According to his wife, Nabiyev spent his final months in Khujand in conditions resembling house arrest and received a pension of just five rubles. While Tajikistan did not repeat the experiment of violently removing a ruler, Kyrgyzstan saw another overthrow just five years after the Tulip Revolution. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who had succeeded Akayev as president, was forced to flee, this time not to Moscow but to Minsk. Kazakhstan helped broker Bakiyev’s departure from Kyrgyzstan, as part of international mediation involving Russia, the United States, and the OSCE. Bakiyev was subsequently handed down a series of prison sentences in absentia. In February 2013, a Kyrgyz court convicted him of abuse of office and sentenced him to 24 years. In April 2014, a Bishkek court sentenced Bakiyev in absentia to 25 years in prison for plotting the attempted murder of British businessman Sean Daley. In 2014, the Bishkek Garrison Military Court also sentenced him to life imprisonment over the killing of protesters in Bishkek on April 7, 2010. The Supreme Court reduced that sentence to 30 years in 2016. In 2023, Bishkek’s Pervomaisky District Court sentenced Bakiyev to another 10 years in prison on corruption charges related to the Kumtor gold mine. Taking his previous sentence into account, the court set his final punishment at 30 years in a maximum-security prison, with confiscation of property and a three-year ban on holding public office. The former Kyrgyz president received Belarusian citizenship, as did members of his family. His wife, Nazgul Tolomusheva, died in January 2023. Minsk has repeatedly rejected Kyrgyzstan’s requests for Bakiyev’s extradition. In 2022, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office sent its Belarusian counterpart four extradition requests, along with a request that Bakiyev’s Kyrgyz court sentences be enforced in Belarus. The Belarusian authorities refused to extradite him, citing the risk of political persecution in Kyrgyzstan. In 2025, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko effectively put an end to speculation about whether Bakiyev might be extradited to Kyrgyzstan. “Bakiyev is living well. Fine. We’re not going to let him go back to you. I told him: ‘No more trips, that’s enough! Live in Belarus.’ He’s doing fine. I sometimes visit him when he invites me. So we won’t hand him over to you,” Lukashenko said during a visit to Bishkek. The next elected Kyrgyz president after Bakiyev, Almazbek Atambayev, is also living abroad. In 2024, he and his son were photographed on the Barcelona metro in Spain. Atambayev served as president of Kyrgyzstan from 2011 to 2017. In 2019, he was stripped of presidential immunity amid criminal investigations. Law enforcement officers eventually stormed Atambayev’s residence in the village of Koi-Tash to arrest him after his supporters resisted an initial operation. Several criminal cases were brought against Atambayev. In June 2020, a Bishkek court sentenced him to more than 11 years in prison in connection with the illegal release of crime boss Aziz Batukayev. That conviction was later overturned, and Atambayev was released in February 2023 and allowed to travel abroad for medical treatment. He subsequently settled in Spain. His legal troubles, however, did not end there. In June 2025, a Bishkek court sentenced Atambayev in absentia to 11 years and six months in prison on charges including corruption and organizing mass unrest related to the 2019 events in Koi-Tash. His successor as president and former party ally, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, whose presidency saw the prosecution of Atambayev, remains in Kyrgyzstan and retains the status of a former president. But his future has not always appeared entirely secure. In 2023, members of parliament raised the possibility of stripping him of that status. Such a move would remove his immunity from prosecution and the privileges provided to a former president, including accommodation at a state residence, state protection, transportation, government communications, and free medical care for him and his family. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan provide fewer examples of conventional post-presidential life. Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, died in office in September 2016, so he never became a retired national leader. Turkmenistan’s first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, likewise died while still in power in December 2006. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow presents a different case. He stepped down as president in 2022, when his son Serdar became president, but did not withdraw from political life. He remains chairman of the Halk Maslahaty and is officially described as the National Leader of the Turkmen people. His position is therefore very different from that of a former president who has retired from public affairs. Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, initially left office under very different circumstances. When he resigned in 2019, he retained considerable influence as chairman of the ruling Nur Otan party, lifetime chairman of the Security Council, and holder of the special title of Elbasy, or Leader of the Nation. The capital was renamed Nur-Sultan in his honor immediately after his resignation. That position changed sharply after the unrest of January 2022. Nazarbayev’s remaining political influence was progressively dismantled, while many of the symbols and legal privileges associated with his rule were removed. The capital reverted to Astana later that year, references to his status as Leader of the Nation were removed from the Constitution, and the law granting the first president special privileges and protections was subsequently repealed. The Times of Central Asia has described 2022 as the beginning of the end of Nazarbayev’s remaining rule and influence. Nazarbayev now rarely appears in public, although occasional meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin continue to attract attention. Despite the dismantling of Nazarbayev’s former political position, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has continued to acknowledge his historical role in the formation of independent Kazakhstan. In an interview in January 2025, Tokayev said that Nazarbayev himself initiated the meetings with Putin and that the Russian leader could hardly refuse him. “Nursultan Abishevich initiates these meetings; they are extremely important to him. We should not forget that, as a former chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, a party leader, and later president of sovereign Kazakhstan, he is morally and politically closely connected with the Kremlin. After all, he spent so much time on business trips to Moscow, at congresses and plenums, and on working and official visits,” Tokayev explained. As for the former president’s place of residence, his spokesman, Aidos Ukibay, has repeatedly said that Nazarbayev permanently resides in Kazakhstan. Astana residents may see him again on August 23 at the polling station where the former president is registered. Kazakhstan is holding an election to its new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, on that date. Nazarbayev has continued to appear publicly to vote in elections and referendums in recent years. Across Central Asia, former presidents have followed very different paths. Kyrgyzstan has seen exile, prosecution, and repeated battles over the legal status of former leaders. Tajikistan’s early post-Soviet experience ended with a president forced from power during civil war. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan produced fewer conventional former presidents because their founding leaders died in office, while Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow remains politically prominent despite leaving the presidency. Nazarbayev represents another model, having left office without facing the exile or criminal prosecution experienced by several former Kyrgyz leaders.
Why Central Asia Growth Forecasts Differ So Sharply
How fast can Central Asia continue to grow? The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) give markedly different answers. The contrast is sharpest in Kyrgyzstan, where the EDB expects another year of double-digit growth, while the IMF sees a much more pronounced slowdown. Both institutions are looking at the same countries and have access to broadly the same set of macroeconomic data. Their forecasts, however, reflect different assessments of how much of Central Asia’s recent momentum can be sustained. The EDB expects strong investment to keep growth high, while the IMF is more cautious about how long the recent pace of expansion can continue. The EDB is itself a regional development institution. It was established by Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006, with Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan later becoming shareholders. Uzbekistan joined the bank in 2025. The EDB is headquartered in Almaty. The comparison covers the four Central Asian states that are EDB members; Turkmenistan is not included. Its latest forecast for Central Asia is optimistic. In 2026, the EDB expects growth of 10.2% in Kyrgyzstan, 8.3% in Tajikistan, 7.9% in Uzbekistan, and 5.5% in Kazakhstan. The region’s economy as a whole is expected to grow by more than 6.5%, with its combined GDP exceeding $600 billion for the first time. The IMF gives lower figures. Its latest available country projections put 2026 growth at 4.6% for Kazakhstan, 6.8% for Uzbekistan, 6.1% for Kyrgyzstan, and 6.0% for Tajikistan. These projections were published at different times rather than as a single set of four country forecasts. The largest gap is in Kyrgyzstan, where the forecasts differ by 4.1 percentage points, but there are nevertheless modest percentage point gaps between the forecasts for Tajikistan (2.3), Uzbekistan (1.1), and Kazakhstan (0.9). These differences are large enough to raise the question: why the difference in expectations? Part of the answer lies in how the institutions assess the effect of a more uncertain global economy. The IMF expects the world economy to grow by 3% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027. Its July update said the conflict in the Middle East was weighing particularly heavily on energy importers and warned that renewed conflict or financial-market disruption could weaken the outlook. For the four countries, this means different things. Kazakhstan exports oil and benefits from high prices, although it also depends on the condition of export routes and external demand. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan import a significant share of their fuel, while their economies are closely linked to migrant remittances. Uzbekistan has a larger domestic market and its own resource base. Kazakhstan illustrates the logic of the IMF forecast particularly well. Its GDP grew by 6.5% in 2025, one of its strongest performances in recent years. The Fund does not expect that surge to be repeated. Oil production is expected to stabilize after last year’s increase, with growth slowing to 4.6% in 2026, according to the IMF forecast. This does not mean that the Fund attributes everything to oil. Domestic demand remains strong, while construction and manufacturing helped offset weaker oil production in the first months of 2026. Its caution is more about how long the economy can maintain such growth rates without adding to inflationary pressures. The picture is similar in Uzbekistan. After growth of 7.7% in 2025, the IMF expects 6.8% this year. Consumption and investment remain strong and reforms are continuing, but the Fund has warned that continued strong demand could create overheating pressures. The EDB takes a more optimistic view of the same investment upswing. For Kazakhstan, it forecasts growth of 5.5% not only in 2026 but also over the following two years. It expects expanding manufacturing output to be one of the main drivers, with construction and transport also remaining strong. This logic is even more evident in Kyrgyzstan. Here, the two forecasts diverge particularly sharply. The EDB expects major investment in industry, energy, and housing construction to keep growth at 10.2%. The IMF expects growth to slow to 6.1% as the exceptional boost from re-export trade begins to fade, although large infrastructure projects should continue to support activity. In Uzbekistan, the EDB expects stronger investment and industrial output to push growth to 7.9%, while in Tajikistan it expects strong consumer and investment activity to support growth of 8.3%. The forecasts therefore reflect different judgments about the durability of Central Asia’s recent expansion. The EDB places greater weight on investment now under way and its ability to sustain domestic growth. The IMF sees more scope for unusually rapid recent growth to moderate as some temporary drivers fade and policymakers respond to inflation. The World Bank also expects some cooling across Central Asia. In April, it forecast that Central Asia’s average growth would slow to 4.9% in 2026-2027, in part as oil production in Kazakhstan stabilizes. This makes the picture more interesting than a simple disagreement between the IMF and the EDB. Two global institutions expect some cooling after several strong years, while the regional bank believes Central Asia can maintain faster growth for longer because of developments within the region itself. Recent experience also shows how quickly such forecasts can change. In October 2024, the IMF expected Kazakhstan’s economy to grow by 3.5% that year and by 4.6% in 2025. By January 2025, the Fund estimated 2024 growth at 3.9% and raised its 2025 forecast to 5%. Kazakhstan ultimately grew by 5% in 2024 and 6.5% in 2025. The EDB also underestimated the pace of growth. In June 2023, the bank forecast 4.4% growth for Kazakhstan in 2024. The actual result was 5%. Investment is now doing more of the work across much of the region, including major infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan and expanding industrial capacity in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The EDB believes this will be enough to sustain rapid growth. The IMF and the World Bank leave more room for the possibility that the past few years will prove to have been the peak of a cycle rather than a new normal. For more analysis of the economic trends shaping the region, visit The Times of Central Asia’s newly launched Central Asia Balance Sheet.
The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules
In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days before being officially confirmed. Mirziyoyev, then prime minister, was appointed chairman of the state funeral commission. Under the constitution, Senate Chairman Nigmatilla Yuldashev should have become acting president, but he stood aside and parliament appointed Mirziyoyev instead. During his presidency, Mirziyoyev has transformed Uzbekistan's economy, opened the country to foreign investment, and pursued a far more active foreign policy. Yet the political system has retained its strongly presidential character. The appointment of his daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, as Head of the Presidential Administration in June 2025 has fuelled renewed speculation about possible future succession scenarios, even though the authorities have never publicly discussed the issue. Tajikistan arrived at its current political model by a different route. Emomali Rahmon emerged as the country's leader during the civil war after becoming Chairman of the Supreme Council following the resignation of President Rahmon Nabiyev. When the presidency was restored in 1994, Rahmon assumed the office and has remained there ever since. For years, political analysts and representatives of the Tajik opposition have regarded Rahmon's eldest son, Rustam Emomali – Chairman of the National Assembly and Mayor of Dushanbe – as the most likely successor. Under Article 71 of Tajikistan's Constitution, the president's duties pass to the Chairman of the Majlisi Milli in the event of death, resignation, or incapacity until a newly elected president takes office. Kazakhstan long appeared to be the exception. In March 2019, First President Nursultan Nazarbayev unexpectedly resigned, and under the Constitution the presidency passed to Senate Speaker Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Nazarbayev later acknowledged that he had viewed Tokayev as his preferred successor well before the formal transfer of power. The January 2022 unrest marked a turning point in Kazakhstan's political development. After the crisis, Tokayev significantly strengthened his position, while the reforms that followed eventually culminated in a new Constitution, approved in March 2026 and in force from July 1, which created a vice presidency and further reshaped the architecture of the state. Whether the current model represents another stage in its evolution remains to be seen. In July 2026, the Constitutional Court ruled that Tokayev may seek another presidential term under the new constitutional order, although he has not announced that he will do so. Kyrgyzstan occupies a unique place in this story. President Sadyr Japarov came to power in the aftermath of yet another political upheaval following the disputed parliamentary elections of October 2020. The protests that swept the country led to his release from prison and propelled him to the presidency. One of the central figures behind those events was Kamchybek Tashiyev, who became one of the most influential figures in Kyrgyz politics. Japarov is already the sixth president in Kyrgyzstan's history as an independent state. The 2017 handover from Almazbek Atambayev to Sooronbay Jeenbekov was the country's first peaceful transfer from one elected president to another. Kyrgyzstan has nevertheless experienced repeated presidential upheavals, including revolutions in 2005, 2010, and 2020. For years, Western observers described Kyrgyzstan as Central Asia's "island of democracy." Yet repeated political crises have gradually changed the country's trajectory. The current leadership has steadily strengthened presidential authority, tightened control over political life, and made little secret of its determination to prevent a repeat of past upheavals. The presidential election scheduled for January 2027 is expected to show how firmly that strategy has taken hold. Thirty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has developed its own approach to political succession. It is not a single model. In some countries, continuity increasingly revolves around political families; in others, carefully prepared successors inherit power through established institutions. Kazakhstan has followed a different course, combining constitutional procedures with political reform, while Kyrgyzstan continues to search for a formula capable of delivering stability without repeating the turbulence that has defined much of its modern history. The region's systems differ in form, but they share one objective: ensuring that political transitions remain as controlled and predictable as possible. Perhaps the greatest irony is that Kyrgyzstan – the only Central Asian state where power has repeatedly changed hands through popular protest – is now moving closer to the governance model long associated with its neighbors. How far that transformation will go may become clearer after the presidential election in January 2027.
Dombra Dispute and Niqab Bans Fuel Religious Debate in Central Asia
Standing before a court in Aktobe in June, 35-year-old Azat Konys apologized to “the entire Kazakh people” for insulting one of the country’s most cherished cultural symbols. Two months earlier, during a TikTok livestream, he had declared the dombra forbidden under Islam, compared the two-stringed instrument to part of the devil’s anatomy and called clerics from Kazakhstan’s official Islamic authority “dogs of hell.”
Konys asked the court not to imprison him. The judge instead sentenced him to three years and six months for inciting religious and national hatred.
The controversy began when Konys cited the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, the dominant legal tradition among Muslims in Kazakhstan, to argue that the dombra and other stringed instruments, including the guitar and balalaika, were haram, meaning forbidden under Islamic law. The remarks caused particular anger because the dombra is more than a musical instrument in Kazakhstan: it has accompanied oral poetry and storytelling for generations and is officially celebrated as a symbol of cultural heritage and national identity. Police identified Konys after clips from the livestream circulated on social media and detained him in April. The case is an unusually stark example of how online religious disputes are spilling into legal and political life across Central Asia. Arguments that might once have remained within mosques or religious communities are now spreading through social media, forcing governments and official Islamic authorities alike to decide where religious expression ends and attacks on national culture begin. A more recent controversy arose in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan Region, where a 66-year-old guest at a toi, a traditional wedding feast, called for stricter adherence to Islamic law. He urged the organizers to separate men and women and remove music and alcohol from the celebration, while describing musicians as “heralds of Satan.” The video spread rapidly on social media, prompting nationwide debate.The man was detained and placed in a temporary detention facility for incitement of religious and social hatred. In a statement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said that freedom of expression does not extend to statements that degrade the dignity of others or could provoke religious or social hostility.
The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), the country’s main official Muslim body, later issued its own response. It stated that Islam does not prohibit music in itself and stressed that publicly insulting artists or women is inconsistent with Islamic ethics.
Another controversy centered on Nauryz, the spring equinox holiday celebrated throughout Central Asia and across much of the Turkic and Iranian cultural world. In March, a blogger in the Almaty Region described the holiday as “non-Muslim” and argued that it should not be celebrated. Police opened a criminal case against him on suspicion of inciting religious hatred.
Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently warned of legal liability for statements attacking Nauryz and other national traditions. The SAMK, meanwhile, publicly celebrated Nauryz as a national holiday promoting social harmony and charitable acts. The debate soon spread beyond social media into politics and the entertainment industry. Producer and television presenter Bayan Alaguzova said religious content online was eroding Kazakh traditions and called on the National Security Committee to act against what she described as religious fanaticism. First Vice Minister of Culture and Information Kanat Iskakov responded that Kazakh law does not define “religious propaganda,” although extremist content and material that incites hatred can already be prosecuted. [caption id="attachment_53481" align="aligncenter" width="2560"]
Almaty’s Central Mosque. Credit: Joe Luc Barnes/TCA[/caption]
Policing Religious Dress
The struggle over religion’s place in public life is also being written into laws governing how people dress across the region.
Kazakhstan prohibited clothing that prevents facial identification in public places in July 2025. The restriction covers clothing that fully conceals the face, but does not apply to hijabs or other religious head coverings that leave the face visible.
Tajikistan has gone considerably further and has sought to regulate religious appearance for years. In 2015, police in the southern Khatlon Region said nearly 13,000 men had been shaved because their beards were considered excessively long, while authorities also pressured women to abandon hijabs in favor of state-approved Tajik styles.
President Rahmon made the policy explicit during a meeting with religious leaders in March 2024. Faith, he said, should be carried in the heart, “not in a hijab, not in a big turban, not in a long beard”.
Three months later, he signed legislation prohibiting the sale and public wearing of clothing that authorities regard as alien to the country’s national culture.
In August 2025, when local officials and police in the Sughd Region carried out raids and "awareness campaigns" reminding residents of the legislation. The campaign underlined that the restrictions extend beyond face coverings and leave officials to determine which forms of clothing are sufficiently consistent with Tajik national culture.In Kyrgyzstan, the government has introduced restrictions covering face-concealing clothing. After a new law on religion took effect on February 1, 2025, police began holding what authorities called “preventive conversations” with women wearing the niqab in public.
The government later clarified that the restrictions do not apply to the traditional Muslim headscarf, only garments that completely conceal a person’s face and make identification impossible.
Uzbekistan introduced a similar identification-based restriction in October 2023. The law imposes fines on people whose faces are concealed in public to the extent that they cannot be identified, subject to limited exceptions. It does not prohibit the hijab or other head coverings that leave the face visible.
Taken together, the cases show some religious activists challenging national customs in the name of Islam, while secular governments assert the power to determine how faith may be expressed in public. The distinction between protecting national culture and policing personal belief is becoming an increasingly public and legal contest across Central Asia.
Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws
Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law.
Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data.
The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices.
Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage.
The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it.
The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent.
Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies.One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left them alone together, where the man fatally stabbed her. The killing provoked nationwide outrage. More than twenty police officers faced disciplinary measures, several lost their jobs, and the perpetrator was sentenced to twenty years in prison.
The case did not prove exceptional. In April 2021, 27-year-old Aizada Kanatbekova was abducted in broad daylight in Bishkek by a group led by a man who intended to force her to marry him. A witness alerted police, who also had access to security-camera footage, but Aizada was found strangled to death two days later. In September 2024, a Bishkek court upheld the acquittal of the former city police chief on negligence charges connected to the case.
Human rights organizations argue that the problem extends beyond criminal penalties. According to Human Rights Watch, women who survive abduction frequently face pressure from relatives and local communities to withdraw complaints or agree to the marriage. As a result, many kidnappings never lead to criminal investigations, leaving official statistics to capture only a fraction of the cases.
Kazakhstan has faced a different legal challenge. Rather than debating the severity of punishment, public discussion focused for years on the structure of the law itself.
Until September 2025, a person who abducted a woman could avoid criminal liability by voluntarily releasing the victim. In practice, that provision frequently allowed criminal proceedings to be terminated before reaching court. According to International IDEA, approximately 95% of criminal cases involving the abduction of women for forced marriage were closed on those grounds during the previous five years. The figure became one of the principal arguments for legislative reform.
Following a lengthy public debate, Kazakhstan amended its Criminal Code. The exemption from liability for voluntarily releasing a victim was removed, a separate offense of coercion into marriage was introduced, and penalties for abduction were strengthened.
The amendments took effect on September 16, 2025. By early November, the Interior Ministry said police had opened seven cases and detained 15 people. Convictions followed in 2026. In one case, three men abducted a 19-year-old woman in Taraz after she repeatedly refused to marry the man who organized the kidnapping. In May, all three received three-year sentences. These early prosecutions show that the law is being used, although it remains too soon to assess whether it has reduced the prevalence of bride kidnapping.
In Uzbekistan, bride kidnapping can begin with something as ordinary as accepting a lift home. One woman told Kun.uz that a man offered to drive her back, then took her instead to an unfamiliar house. When she tried to leave, an older woman blocked the doorway and warned that stepping over her would bring lifelong unhappiness. She stayed and married the man.
Uzbek law treats such cases as a crime. Article 136 prohibits abducting a woman for marriage, forcing her to marry or remain married, or preventing her from marrying someone of her choice. The maximum sentence is three years in prison. Yet cases continue to surface. In 2021, a 21-year-old woman in the Tashkent region escaped after being taken to a man’s home and pressured to marry him, prompting police to open a criminal investigation. The situation in Tajikistan remains less well documented. Human rights organizations report that many women avoid contacting law enforcement because they fear social stigma or pressure from relatives. Official statistics therefore reflect only a small proportion of cases, making it difficult to estimate the true scale of the problem. Even less information is available for Turkmenistan. Independent research is almost nonexistent, while the country's closed political environment severely limits journalists' and international organizations' ability to investigate such cases. In these circumstances, the absence of official data reflects a lack of information rather than evidence that the practice does not exist. Experience across Central Asia suggests that legislation alone is not enough. Even where criminal penalties have been strengthened or laws rewritten, many cases never reach the police. As long as social pressure, fear of public condemnation, and family expectations discourage women from reporting abductions, official statistics will continue to reveal only part of the picture.
U.S. Makes Visa Bond Program Permanent, Raises Maximum to $20,000
The United States has made its Visa Bond Program permanent, raising the maximum refundable deposit to $20,000 for certain business and tourist visa applicants from 50 countries, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.
The final rule took effect on August 3, replacing a 12-month pilot launched in August 2025. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain outside the program. The requirement applies to B-1 business visas, B-2 tourist visas and combined B-1/B-2 visas. Applicants from covered countries who are otherwise eligible for a visa must generally post a bond of $10,000, $15,000 or $20,000, with the amount determined by a consular officer. Officers are expected to set most bonds at $15,000. The amount may be reduced to $10,000 when an applicant’s circumstances justify a lower deposit or increased to $20,000 when officials believe a larger bond is needed to ensure that the traveler leaves the country on time. The bond is returned when the traveler complies with the terms of the visa and leaves the United States within the permitted period. It can also be refunded if the visa holder does not travel before the visa expires or is denied admission at the border. No interest is paid on the deposit, and posting a bond does not guarantee that a visa will be issued. Travelers who post a bond must enter and ultimately leave the United States through commercial airports, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection preclearance locations abroad. They cannot use land or sea crossings for their initial entry or final departure. Turkmenistan has been covered by the policy since January 1, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were added on January 21. The Times of Central Asia reported the regional expansion at the time. The broader list includes 50 countries, 30 of them in Africa, as well as countries in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The current program began as a pilot on August 20, 2025, initially covering Malawi and Zambia. Under the pilot, bonds were set at $5,000, $10,000 or $15,000. The permanent version removes the $5,000 option and increases the maximum deposit by $5,000. The $20,000 maximum will be adjusted for inflation beginning on October 1, 2027, and every seven years thereafter. An earlier visa bond pilot was announced in 2020 during Donald Trump’s first administration, but it was not implemented because international travel had fallen sharply during the Covid-19 pandemic. The State Department said the policy is intended to address visa overstays, inadequate information sharing, weaknesses in identity and criminal-record verification, and concerns over screening and the security of travel documents. Countries can be added to the list on a rolling basis, while removals can take effect immediately. According to the department, the 50 countries currently covered recorded 45,488 overstays during the 2024 fiscal year. Fewer than 50 overstays were recorded during the first ten months of the pilot, while visa issuance to nationals of the listed countries fell by 83% compared with the same period a year earlier. The department said some eligible applicants appeared to have abandoned their applications rather than pay the bond. U.S. officials describe the bonds as a means of encouraging compliance with immigration law. Immigration advocates argue that deposits reaching $20,000 will discourage legitimate travel and place the heaviest burden on applicants from lower-income countries.For Central Asia, the policy creates a clear distinction within the region. Citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan may face a substantial additional financial requirement when applying for U.S. tourist and business visas.
Kazakhstan remains outside the bond program, but access to U.S. visa appointments varies sharply by city. State Department figures updated on July 21 listed the next available B-1/B-2 appointment at under half a month in Almaty and 2.5 months in Astana.
Uzbekistan also remains outside the program, leaving Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as the only Central Asian countries currently subject to the bond requirement.
Central Asia and Azerbaijan: What the Region’s Leaders Agreed at Issyk-Kul
The Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, briefly became Central Asia’s political capital as it hosted a series of high-level meetings, including bilateral talks between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Only a few years ago, such a format would have seemed unlikely. Today, however, regional leaders are discussing joint railway projects, energy security, transport corridors, investment, and foreign-policy coordination rather than managing old disputes. The agreements reached in Cholpon-Ata suggest that the consultative format is gradually evolving from a platform for political dialogue into a mechanism for practical regional cooperation. From Conflict to Alliance Ahead of the informal multilateral meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held bilateral talks that set the tone for the broader regional meeting. Relations between the two countries now stand in sharp contrast to the situation sixteen years ago. Following the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, relations between Bishkek and Tashkent entered one of their most difficult periods since independence. The agenda between the two neighbors has since changed dramatically. Speaking in Cholpon-Ata, Mirziyoyev said relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had reached “a historic peak.” Bilateral trade has increased almost tenfold in recent years, reaching $1.2 billion last year. The two countries now have around 450 joint ventures, operate a joint Development Fund to support cooperative projects, and have established 15 air routes and five bus services linking their cities. Mirziyoyev described the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway as one of the most important joint initiatives between the two countries, arguing that the project would reshape transport links across Eurasia. “This railway will fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape. Those who understand what it took to make this happen know what a major achievement it is,” Mirziyoyev said. The talks concluded with the signing of a Treaty on Allied Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two sides also exchanged several bilateral documents, including agreements covering sections of their common border and the joint use of the Chashma spring. A Broader Regional Agenda While the Japarov-Mirziyoyev talks focused primarily on bilateral relations, the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan broadened the discussion to regional integration, transport connectivity, energy security, and foreign-policy coordination. Opening the meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said one of the clearest results of closer regional cooperation had been the Central Asian countries’ growing support for one another on the international stage. As an example, he cited the region’s joint support for Kyrgyzstan’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term. Japarov also revived the idea of introducing a single tourist visa for foreign visitors traveling across Central Asia, proposing that the region’s foreign ministries intensify consultations on the initiative. Azerbaijan’s participation as a full member gave the meeting additional significance. Baku joined the consultative format as a full participant in November 2025, reflecting the growing importance of trans-Caspian connectivity and the increasingly close economic ties linking the South Caucasus with Central Asia. During his state visit to Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that the two countries had signed a package of bilateral agreements, including a Treaty on Allied Relations, elevating cooperation to a new level. The sides also agreed to increase the capital of the Kyrgyz-Azerbaijani Development Fund from $100 million to $200 million. According to Aliyev, the fund has already financed several projects, some of which are now operational, while considerable scope remains for further investment cooperation. Mirziyoyev argued that Central Asia should now be viewed within a broader geopolitical framework. In his view, a region that was once fragmented is gradually consolidating around a shared development agenda, while Azerbaijan’s participation extends that process beyond Central Asia itself. “A historic opportunity is opening before us to create a common space for development linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Afghanistan. We must seize this moment to build lasting ties and good-neighborly relations in the heart of Eurasia,” Mirziyoyev said. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also emphasized the institutional dimension of regional cooperation. He described the current period as the most successful in Central Asia’s modern history and proposed developing an implementation roadmap for the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the 21st Century, which had previously been signed by the region’s leaders. Transport and Energy Take Center Stage Beyond political coordination, the leaders devoted considerable attention to practical projects aimed at strengthening regional connectivity and reducing Central Asia’s vulnerability to external economic pressures. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon proposed exploring the construction of a large regional oil refinery equipped with modern technologies. He argued that continued volatility in global and regional energy markets had highlighted the importance of energy security as one of the key conditions for sustainable economic development. “Given today’s realities, we should jointly consider this extremely important issue,” Rahmon said. The proposal comes amid continued turbulence in regional fuel markets. In summer 2026, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan experienced fuel shortages and price increases as Russian exports fell, exposing the region’s dependence on external suppliers and lending additional weight to calls for expanding domestic refining capacity. Transport connectivity was another dominant theme. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, highlighted by Japarov and Mirziyoyev during their bilateral talks, was repeatedly presented as a project capable of reshaping trade flows across Eurasia. Together with the continued development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, it is expected to strengthen Central Asia’s role as a major transit region linking Asia and Europe. As the principal gateway across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan has become an essential link between Central Asia and European markets. Transport infrastructure is increasingly emerging as one of the strongest drivers of cooperation between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The Next Meeting Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov announced that the eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan is scheduled for October 8, 2026, in the Avaza National Tourist Zone on Turkmenistan’s Caspian coast. According to Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan has already circulated a draft agenda covering five priority areas: regional security; deeper cooperation between Central Asia and Azerbaijan; energy and transport connectivity; joint efforts to address environmental challenges, climate adaptation, water resource management, and the restoration of the Aral Sea; and expanded cooperation in education, science, culture, and youth exchanges. From Political Dialogue to Regional Integration The informal meeting concluded with the adoption of the Cholpon-Ata Declaration, reaffirming the participating countries’ commitment to expanding cooperation in economic development, transport, energy, security, and humanitarian exchanges. According to Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, the document reflects the level of trust that has developed among the region’s states and their shared determination to deepen cooperation further. Yet the meeting’s significance extends beyond the documents signed. Sixteen years ago, relations between some Central Asian neighbors were overshadowed by border disputes, political tensions, and mutual distrust. At Cholpon-Ata, by contrast, discussions centered on railway construction, transport corridors, energy security, investment mechanisms, and the coordination of regional policies. The meeting also highlighted the changing geography of regional cooperation. Azerbaijan, once viewed primarily as an external partner, is becoming an integral participant in Central Asia’s broader economic agenda. Together with the continued development of the Middle Corridor, this is gradually linking Central Asia and the South Caucasus into a wider economic space built around shared transport, trade, and infrastructure interests. The consultative format has evolved as well. What began as a forum for rebuilding political dialogue is increasingly becoming a mechanism for coordinating practical regional initiatives. Judging by the agreements reached at Issyk-Kul, the emphasis is shifting from declarations of intent toward projects capable of reshaping Central Asia’s economic geography over the coming years.
Italy Commits $150 Million to Tajikistans Rogun Hydropower Plant
The World Bank Group and Italy’s state-controlled development bank, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), have signed a co-financing agreement to support construction of Tajikistan’s Rogun Hydropower Plant, CDP and the World Bank’s office in Tajikistan said. The signing ceremony took place at Tajikistan’s Ministry of Finance in Dushanbe. Under the agreement, the Italian Climate Fund will provide $150 million for the project. The funds will be managed by CDP on behalf of Italy’s Ministry of Environment and Energy Security. CDP said the financing would support construction work on the right bank of the Rogun Dam. The Rogun Hydropower Plant is being financed by a consortium of 12 international development partners led by the World Bank Group, with CDP among its members. According to the World Bank, the project is expected to strengthen Tajikistan’s energy security while supporting the development of a cleaner energy market across Central Asia. The World Bank has already approved $650 million in grant financing for the project through the International Development Association (IDA). Located on the Vakhsh River, the Rogun Hydropower Plant is the centerpiece of the Vakhsh hydropower cascade. The project originated during the Soviet period, although construction of the current scheme was formally launched in 2017. Once completed, currently scheduled for 2033, the facility is projected to have an installed capacity of 3,780 MW. The World Bank estimates the plant will generate 14,400 gigawatt-hours of renewable electricity each year, equivalent to about 60% of Tajikistan’s current electricity production. The bank says the project will help reduce the country’s chronic winter electricity shortages, provide more reliable electricity for around 10 million people, create over 30,000 direct and indirect jobs, and enable electricity exports to neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Despite the new financing, the project continues to face criticism from environmental groups. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the World Bank’s Inspection Panel registered a complaint filed by the environmental coalition Rivers Without Boundaries on behalf of downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The coalition argued that the project’s environmental and social assessments were outdated and warned that filling the Rogun reservoir could reduce water flows to the Amu Darya delta, accelerate desertification, increase soil salinity, and affect livelihoods downstream. In June 2025, the World Bank’s Inspection Panel recommended a full investigation. However, in November 2025, the Board of Executive Directors declined to authorize one, saying the complaint did not meet the mechanism’s technical eligibility criteria. Environmental groups criticized the decision. The World Bank has maintained that the project complies with its environmental and social safeguard framework, citing updated assessments, public consultations, and ongoing monitoring.
Short Stories from the Region
