Tajikistan
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at OTS cooperation, Azerbaijan President Aliyev's decision not to attend the OTS summit in Ankara, and the Middle Corridor. Special guest: Dr. Robert Cutler
Rogun Hydropower Plant Accident Sparks Conflicting Injury Reports
A water tank ruptured in a construction tunnel at Tajikistan’s Rogun Hydropower Plant on October 21, sending water rushing toward workers below. While the authorities maintain no one was injured, witnesses have reported that more than five workers were hurt. The accident occurred inside the plant’s tunnel system, Asia-Plus reported, citing Tajikistan’s industrial safety regulator. An upper tank used to collect water ruptured, damaging a second drainage tank below it. Water from both tanks then flowed into the lower section of the tunnel, where workers from the Chinese subcontracting company Sinohydro were carrying out construction work. The regulator said none of the workers suffered physical injuries. They received first aid and subsequently returned to work. A Dangerous Workplace However, Radio Ozodi, citing witnesses, reported that more than five workers were injured. The broadcaster obtained footage showing water and debris falling from the tunnel onto several people. Witnesses also said the incident occurred on October 22, a day later than the date given by authorities. During the first six months of 2026, 32 workplace accidents were recorded at industrial and mining enterprises across Tajikistan, leaving 23 people dead and 19 injured. Among those killed were two Chinese nationals and one Iranian working on the Rogun hydropower project. Eight workplace accidents were also recorded at Rogun in 2025, although officials have not disclosed the number of casualties. In November 2024, three workers were killed and another was injured when a lifting platform fell onto them. Rogun’s Role in Tajikistan’s Power Supply Located on the Vakhsh River, approximately 110 kilometers from Dushanbe, the Rogun Hydropower Plant is Tajikistan’s largest energy project. Construction began in 2017, although the original plans date back to the Soviet period. Once completed, the plant is expected to have a capacity of 3,780 megawatts, with six turbines generating 630 MW each. Its projected annual electricity output is 14.4 billion kilowatt-hours. Completion is currently scheduled for 2033. According to the World Bank, the plant's projected annual output would be equivalent to about 60% of Tajikistan's current electricity generation. It is expected to help address chronic winter electricity shortages, improve power supplies for approximately 10 million people, create more than 30,000 direct and indirect jobs, and support electricity exports to neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The project has also faced criticism over its potential impact on water supplies downstream. The environmental coalition Rivers Without Boundaries has argued that the project's environmental assessments are outdated and warned that filling the reservoir could harm communities that depend on the Amu Darya River. The World Bank's Inspection Panel recommended an investigation into the project in 2025, but the bank's board declined to approve it in November that year.
Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Border Fencing Complete in Batken, Demarcation Continues
Kyrgyzstan has completed the installation of nearly 328 kilometers of border fencing in the Batken region in the country’s southwest, where armed clashes with Tajikistan took place in 2021 and 2022. For some residents, the new boundary has also raised questions about compensation for lost homes and farmland. On October 29, the Batken regional administration confirmed completion of the fencing, two weeks after the State Border Service made the same announcement. During 2025–2026, 338.5 kilometers of patrol roads were built in the region’s Batken and Leilek districts, allowing patrols to reach previously difficult-to-access areas. The fencing covers part of the countries’ approximately 1,008-kilometer border. The two countries began installing border markers in July 2026 and are continuing this process of demarcation, alongside the preparation of formal boundary records. Three Decades of Disputes Batken lies in the densely populated Fergana Valley, which is divided among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. National borders here run close to villages and farmland, making disputes over territory particularly sensitive. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were unable to agree on the course of substantial sections of their shared border. Disputes over access to land and water were particularly frequent in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region and the neighboring Sughd region in northern Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan also had a longstanding border dispute with Uzbekistan, which the two countries settled in 2022. In April 2021 and September 2022, clashes escalated into armed conflicts involving heavy weapons. The September 2022 fighting killed more than 100 people across both sides and destroyed hundreds of homes. On the Kyrgyz side alone, more than 140,000 people were displaced. Cross-border movement was severely restricted following the 2021 violence, disrupting trade and visits between communities. Negotiations continued after the fighting, with the two countries’ security chiefs leading efforts to resolve the remaining territorial disputes. The eventual settlement involved exchanges of land, including in areas where communities had grown up close to one another. In December 2024, Bishkek and Dushanbe announced that they had reached agreement on the remaining disputed sections. The two sides completed a draft description of the border alignment and signed the corresponding protocol. In February 2025, negotiators also reached preliminary agreements on road use and access to water infrastructure, two longstanding sources of friction between border communities. On March 13, 2025, Presidents Sadyr Japarov and Emomali Rahmon signed a state border treaty in Bishkek, alongside agreements covering road access and water and energy facilities. That same day, the Kyzyl-Bel–Guliston and Kairagach–Madaniyat international border crossings reopened after being closed for nearly four years. Tajik entrepreneurs were able to return to markets in the Batken region. On March 31, 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on the junction of their three national borders as well as the Khujand Declaration on Eternal Friendship. Compensation Claims Remain Former Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Tokon Mamytov said in comments to the state news agency Kabar on April 29, 2025, that installing border fencing would help reduce the risk of renewed clashes and restore economic ties. "It is important to emphasize that borders are not an 'Iron Curtain,' but a tool for organizing interaction," Mamytov said. But the agreement has created difficulties for some residents whose property was affected by changes to the border. During Japarov’s October visit, residents of the Batken region raised compensation concerns. A representative of the village of Zhany-Dostuk spoke on behalf of 73 families. According to her, some compensation had been paid, but disputes remained over the amounts and the allocation of housing. Japarov instructed officials to resolve the complaints, provide housing to people who had lost their homes, and allocate replacement land plots. Authorities said most compensation had already been paid, although the number of families still awaiting replacement housing or land was not specified. Trade After the Border Reopened Trade between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan reached $33.1 million in 2025, compared with $12.2 million a year earlier, according to Tajikistan’s official statistics cited by Asia-Plus. Bishkek and Dushanbe aim to increase bilateral trade to $500 million by 2030. As of March 2026, however, border markets in the Kyrgyz village of Arka and Tajikistan’s Khistevarz had not yet resumed regular cross-border trading, the news outlet reported. The restoration of transit through Kyrgyzstan is also important for Tajikistan. Before the border closure, some freight from Kazakhstan and China passed through Kyrgyz territory, and part of that traffic has now resumed.
Opinion: Why Agriculture Cannot Afford to Overlook Women Farmers
Imagine a team where only half the players receive training, equipment and support. That team cannot perform at its full potential. The same is true in agriculture. Women farmers are essential across Europe and Central Asia. They grow food, raise livestock, run farms and sustain rural economies. They work the same land as men, share responsibility for farms and support their families, yet too often their work is treated as secondary, invisible or merely “helping”. As a result, they may not have the same access to the training, resources and opportunities needed to make their hard work more productive. When women cannot fulfil their potential as farmers, agriculture cannot fulfil its potential either. The International Year of the Woman Farmer 2026 brings renewed global attention to women’s essential contribution to agriculture. As part of the Year, FAO’s “100 Women Heroes in Agrifood Systems and Rural Development” initiative is honouring twenty‑five women from across the region for their achievements, innovation, resilience and leadership. But beyond these individual success stories lies a reality that can’t be overlooked. Countless women do the same indispensable work every day without equal recognition, resources or opportunities. The cost of these inequalities is also economic. FAO estimates that closing gender gaps in farm productivity and wages could generate nearly USD 1 trillion in global gains and reduce food insecurity for up to 45 million people. Across Europe and Central Asia, there has been considerable progress in strengthening the legal and policy frameworks that promote equal opportunities for women and men, but these need translating into real improvements in rural women’s lives. In agriculture and rural development, persistent gender gaps limit women’s productivity and fulfilment of potential as individuals and farmers. Social expectations and discriminatory practices reinforce these barriers, shaping who is seen as a farmer, who makes decisions and who controls income and productive resources. Even when women play a central role in farming, their work is often undervalued, unpaid or simply invisible. They lack essential support to grow farms and businesses, and young women are often discouraged from farming as a viable career or taking on farm management. Closing these gaps requires sector‑specific policies and actions that explicitly recognize women as farmers and entrepreneurs. For example, governments can ensure that agricultural statistics systematically capture women’s contributions; enable women’s registration as farmers in their own right; and guarantee that extension and rural advisory services reach women as well as men. Such measures will strengthen women’s access to land, finance, inputs, technology, knowledge and markets – while sending a clear institutional signal that women should be recognized as farmers. The next challenge is to ensure that recognition translates into policies, institutions and services that respond to women farmers’ realities, needs and aspirations. This is particularly important in Europe and Central Asia, where rural areas face the growing pressures of climate change, water scarcity, increasing strain on natural resources, ageing populations and young people leaving rural areas. These pressures do not affect everyone equally. When women have less access to agricultural training – including climate‑smart practices – or inputs such as drought‑resistant seeds, their ability to adapt is constrained. They might have fewer options to respond and bear a disproportionate share of the consequences, from reduced yields and income to heavier workloads. This is where practical action matters most. And in parts of the region, we are already seeing what it can achieve. In Türkiye, I saw firsthand what happens when women receive the right support. Women's cooperatives have helped them earn income and gain recognition for work that was previously unpaid and often invisible. When the 2023 earthquake devastated parts of the country, many of these cooperatives were among the first to rebuild – drawing on networks, skills and collective capacity that were already in place. Further east in Central Asia, the contexts vary but the underlying dynamic is familiar. I saw this in Tajikistan’s remote mountainous villages, where women are left to manage farms and families when men migrate for work. Yet despite these pressures, with the right support, women are reviving traditional crops, keeping bees and growing produce in small greenhouses – creating income where opportunity is scarce and gradually changing how their work is perceived. In both cases, it was the support that made the difference: training, cooperatives and producer groups, access to markets, and – fundamentally – recognition that these women are farmers, not helpers. These are not isolated successes. They show what is possible when systems work for women farmers. When women are recognized as farmers in their own right, are registered as agricultural producers and have equal access to resources, services and opportunities, the benefits extend beyond individual women. Farms can become more productive, household incomes can grow and rural communities can become more resilient. Registration can also make it easier for women to access credit, agricultural support, knowledge and markets, and strengthen their voice in decisions affecting their farms and communities. None of this means creating parallel systems for women. It means fixing the existing systems that do not fully account for women’s realities and contributions to agriculture. This requires tackling discriminatory practices, challenging assumptions about who is a farmer and encouraging positive changes in attitudes and behaviours. It also requires institutions to look beyond women’s formal inclusion and ask whether they can actually access and benefit from available services and resources. Women are already doing the work. The next step is to match that reality with recognition, fair access, practical opportunities and the support needed to succeed. When we do that, women farmers benefit – but so too do households, farms, agriculture, rural economies and society as a whole. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
CSTO in No Hurry to Help Tajikistan
The authorities in Tajikistan have been ringing the alarm bells over events in neighboring Afghanistan for more than three decades. The Tajik government did so again after violence broke out along a small section of the Tajik-Afghan border in the last months of 2025, and specifically called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for assistance. The CSTO has responded, but the promised aid has yet to arrive as Tajikistan continues to seek stronger border defenses. The Perennial Border Problem There had been unrest in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, long before Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, and the instability along Tajikistan’s approximately 1,360-kilometer border with Afghanistan has continued ever since. Most of the border area is mountainous and sparsely inhabited, making it ideal for narcotics and weapons smuggling. Weapons smuggling was a huge problem during Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, when weapons were being brought back and forth across the Afghan frontier to fuel civil conflicts in both countries. From the first day of Tajikistan’s independence until June 2005, Russian border guards helped keep watch on Tajikistan’s Afghan frontier. At least several hundred Russian and Tajik border guards, and Tajik and Afghan smugglers and militants have been killed along the Tajik-Afghan border in the last 35 years. Many countries worried about Tajikistan’s border problems with Afghanistan. Neighbors such as China, the other Central Asian states, and not so far away, Russia did not want narcotics or militants from Afghanistan reaching their countries. In the mid- and late-1990s, the Taliban push through Afghanistan to the Central Asian border increased these neighbors’ concerns. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the United States and its allies used facilities in Central Asia to support troops in Afghanistan. All these countries, and more, contributed to Tajikistan’s border defenses in some way, either by simply donating housing materials or winter uniforms, or providing security monitoring equipment and weaponry. It has never been enough to totally stem the border problems, but the security aid Tajikistan received is far more than the country could ever have allocated for that purpose from its state coffers. Emomali Rahmon was Tajikistan’s president in the late 1990s when the Taliban first seized power in Afghanistan. Rahmon viewed the Taliban as a threat, and Tajikistan’s policies toward the Afghan militant group reflected that. Rahmon’s opinion of the Taliban did not change when they regained power in 2021, and despite the other Central Asian states establishing a dialogue and trade ties with the Taliban, Tajikistan has been slow to engage the returned rulers of Afghanistan. In June 2024, Rahmon’s eldest son and heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, told a meeting of the CSTO’s Parliamentary Assembly Council that “Afghanistan has once again become a breeding ground for terrorism.” Emomali said more than 1,000 radical madrassahs had been established in Afghanistan, some in areas close to Tajikistan’s border, and that these religious schools were also preparing suicide bombers. A Turbulent End to 2025 In late August 2025, Tajik border guards in the Shamsiddin Shohin district reportedly exchanged gunfire with Taliban fighters on the other side of the Pyanj River that separates the two countries. At least one Taliban fighter was killed and four others wounded. The cause of the shootout was never clear, though suspicions were that it was related to gold-mining operations, legal and illegal, that are being carried out on both sides of the river. This incident was particularly notable because, after the shooting stopped, a group of Tajik border guards crossed into Afghanistan for talks with local officials and Taliban fighters. There were reports of another gun battle happening between Tajik border guards and Taliban troops in late October, not far from where the August shooting occurred. Reports mentioned casualties on both sides, but did not give any figures or provide any details as to the cause. Then in November, on the Tajik side of the border, five Chinese workers were killed and four others wounded in two separate attacks from the Afghan side. The first attack on November 26 included a commercial drone with explosives hitting a gold-mining site in the Shamsiddin Shohin district that killed three Chinese workers and wounded two others. The second occurred in the Darvaz district, which neighbors the Shamsiddin Shohin district to the east. Gunfire from the Afghan side of the border on November 30 killed two Chinese road workers and wounded two others. It caused China to temporarily withdraw its workers from the Tajik border area and prompted the Tajik government to call on the CSTO for help. Threat Assessment Tajikistan is a CSTO member along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Rahmon met in Dushanbe with CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov on April 10, 2026, where he emphasized the need to implement CSTO decisions on responding to security threats. The organization had already approved a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border in November 2024. In June, the CSTO appeared ready to accelerate assistance to Tajikistan. Viktor Vasilyev, the chairman of the CSTO Permanent Council, said the organization was particularly concerned about gunfire from the Afghan side of the border being directed into Tajikistan. “Despite steps taken by Russia and several Central Asian states to establish contact with the authorities in Kabul, the security situation remains complex,” Vasilyev said. However, Vasilyev also devoted much attention to other CSTO matters, such as increasing indications that Armenia would suspend its membership in the organization, tensions between Belarus and Ukraine, and NATO maneuvers. In late August, Masadykov told TASS in an interview that the first shipment of armaments and military equipment would arrive in Tajikistan in the autumn. On October 21, Masadykov said the first stage of sending military assistance to Tajikistan, which he explained involved customers in Tajikistan selecting suppliers and agreeing on order amounts, was complete. The second stage was already underway, with the first shipments of weapons and equipment expected to arrive in Tajikistan before the end of the year. Masadykov also mentioned the military shipment being sent to Tajikistan would “in no way” be a threat to Afghanistan or its people. He didn’t detail which weapons or military equipment Tajikistan will soon receive, but the pace of assistance may be a disappointment to the Tajik government. The Tajik authorities have long been seeking stronger defenses to deter people on the Afghan side of the border from launching attacks or trying to illegally cross into Tajikistan. There were several more incidents along the Tajik-Afghan border in December 2025 and January 2026, and some border guards were killed. For the Tajik government, accustomed to receiving substantial security aid in response to its concerns, this is probably more than a temporary letdown. The CSTO is a Russian-led organization, and Russia is currently the only country that officially recognizes the Taliban government in Afghanistan. While Russia might be the only country to give official recognition to the Taliban, others are at least doing business with the current government in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee released figures on October 21 that show Afghanistan is Uzbekistan’s third largest export market, behind Russia and China. The Tajik authorities continue to look at Afghanistan as a security problem, and it is, but perhaps not as much as it has been in the past. Other governments appear less concerned about threats from Afghanistan, and the pace of CSTO military assistance could be a sign that Tajikistan’s worries about its southern neighbor are not shared to the same extent by the international community. The CSTO might continue to hype the potential threat from Afghanistan to help justify its own existence, but the next time Dushanbe needs to strengthen its Afghan border, it might fall more heavily on Tajikistan itself to do whatever needs to be done.
SCO Economic Ambitions Outpace Agreement
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) renewed calls for a development bank at its October 20 heads of government meeting in Dushanbe, but the institution remains under negotiation more than a year after members reached political agreement on its creation. Participants adopted a joint communiqué and decisions on economic cooperation, including joint manufacturing and transportation. Financing those ambitions remains a central challenge. Members backed the bank at their September 2025 summit in Tianjin. A year later, the Bishkek summit ended without a founding agreement or capital commitments, and no launch date was set. The SCO brings together ten countries whose economic priorities differ sharply. China and India are among the world's largest economies, while Russia and Iran face Western sanctions. For Central Asian members, the organization offers another route to investment, but agreement on shared goals has yet to produce a common financing institution. Different Priorities Tajik Prime Minister Kohir Rasulzoda reported that SCO countries accounted for 70% of Tajikistan's foreign trade turnover in January–August 2026. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment from member states amounted to just $350 million for the whole of 2025. "These figures demonstrate the enormous untapped potential of our investment cooperation, which significantly lags behind the dynamics of trade relations," Rasulzoda said. Iran has different concerns. First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref called for wider use of national currencies in trade, alongside export insurance and investment protection. Tehran has long sought to reduce its foreign trade dependence on Western financial infrastructure. Sanctions make this an urgent priority, but Iran's interests in international settlements differ considerably from those of India or China, for example. Beijing and New Delhi conduct extensive trade with Western countries, so a single financial model for all SCO members is unlikely to satisfy everyone. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin encouraged joint manufacturing projects using Russia's special economic zones and investment protection agreements. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, is seeking investors for the Tamchy special investment and financial territory, established in July 2025 in the Issyk-Kul region. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev invited SCO partners to develop joint projects there. Financing the Bank A development bank could provide a common source of funding for such projects. In Dushanbe, Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin renewed calls to accelerate its establishment. "We consider it fundamentally important that this institution become a multilateral development bank with a unique mandate, providing access to long-term investment financing without political conditions," he said. Kyrgyzstan also supported establishing the bank. Amangeldiev urged members to draw on existing financing channels, including the SCO Interbank Consortium, while negotiations continue. Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov confirmed Astana's willingness to host the bank's headquarters. Bishkek had already put forward its candidacy at the September summit. Choosing a headquarters is only part of the task. Members must agree on their financial contributions and how the bank will operate, including who decides which projects receive loans. China has far greater financial resources than most of its SCO partners, giving it the potential to become the bank's principal source of capital. Its role in funding the institution would make the distribution of voting power particularly important. For smaller members, the terms would determine how far the bank broadens their financing options. Central Asian governments have reasons to seek a wider choice of lenders. China is already a major source of investment and credit, while Russia remains important for trade and labor migration. The region is also developing economic ties with partners outside the SCO. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are cultivating relations with the European Union and the U.S., as well as Turkey, the Gulf states, and international financial institutions. An SCO bank would enter a region where governments already have competing offers and their own investment priorities. Why the SCO Is Not Becoming an Economic Union The difficulty of establishing the bank reflects the limits of the SCO as an economic institution. Over a quarter of a century, it has built an extensive system of meetings and agreements, but it has no single market or common customs territory. The organization emerged out of security cooperation. Unlike the European Union, its members have not transferred authority over economic policy to supranational institutions. All major decisions are made by consensus. This principle allows every member's position to be taken into account, including those of smaller states. But serious disagreements can also stall decisions. Political tensions also persist among SCO members. India and Pakistan have a long history of conflict, while India and China have unresolved border disputes. Sanctions on Russia and Iran affect their foreign trade and banking operations, while Central Asian countries are pursuing their own multi-vector foreign policies. Joint projects can still proceed without agreement across the entire organization. A railway or industrial facility needs an arrangement among the participating countries and their financiers, rather than approval from every SCO member. Such arrangements can deliver investment, but they leave the SCO primarily as a forum for negotiations. A development bank would give it a more direct role in financing projects across its membership. For now, political support for the bank has yet to translate into an agreed institution. How much members will contribute, and what influence those contributions will confer, remain central questions.
Ukraine Says More Than 20,400 Central Asians Signed Russian Army Contracts
More than 20,400 Central Asian citizens have signed contracts with Russia’s armed forces since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, according to the Ukrainian government’s “I Want to Live” project. The new figures come as families in Kazakhstan secure the return of young men who say they went to Russia for civilian work and were forced into military service. The project’s October figures identify 8,207 Uzbek citizens and 5,308 Tajiks, together accounting for about two-thirds of the regional total. Kazakhstan accounts for 3,819. A further 2,219 are from Kyrgyzstan, and 884 from Turkmenistan. The count covers identified contract signers as of October 1, rather than the number currently fighting, and excludes ethnic Central Asians with Russian citizenship. The figures have not been independently verified. “I Want to Live” is a Ukrainian state project that helps Russian servicemen surrender. For some Kazakh families, the immediate struggle has been to get their sons out of the Russian army. Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. As TCA reported, he and other young Kazakh men later appeared in appeals for help, with some wearing Russian uniforms in or near the combat zone. On October 7, relatives went to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry in Astana to demand help bringing the men home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied them, said he knew of at least 21 cases. Families said their relatives had accepted civilian jobs before being pressured to sign military contracts. Keldibek has now returned to Kazakhstan. His sister told RFE/RL’s Kazakh service that he arrived in Shymkent on the evening of October 21. She said others were still waiting to return. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry had earlier asked Moscow to help repatriate the men and opened a hotline for their families. Their accounts fit a pattern documented by the International Federation for Human Rights. Its April study found that migrants in Russia had been offered military contracts as an alternative to detention or deportation. Others were recruited abroad with promises of civilian work, only to find themselves sent to the front. “Many of these men knew in some capacity what they were signing up for. But some were also deceived or coerced,” FIDH President Alexis Deswaef said. The war has also drawn Central Asians to Ukraine’s defense. TCA’s earlier reporting on both sides described volunteers who regarded Ukraine as home and saw Russia’s invasion as a threat to their families. Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin joined Ukraine’s armed forces in 2021 after settling there. In a 2022 interview, he told Ukrainska Pravda: “I had two children in Ukraine, and for the first time I started to think that they might be in danger.” Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency has warned citizens that offers of work or help with immigration papers can lead to recruitment into armed conflicts. It has also reminded them that joining foreign armed forces can bring criminal liability at home. For other families, there has been no homecoming. Kiril Nysanbaev went to Russia for work after completing his military service in Kazakhstan. His twin sister, Kamilla, told RFE/RL that he called from a detention center in Chelyabinsk and said officers had beaten him and forced him to sign a military contract. He was later killed in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. His family learned of his death months afterwards. Kamilla said the family buried him in Russia after Kazakh police warned that bringing his body home would trigger an investigation against them. “I warn them to avoid going to Russia,” Kamilla said.
The Taliban’s Road Reaches China, but the Border is Closed
After several years of slow progress, the road connecting Afghanistan to China is finally ready. On October 4, Taliban officials inaugurated the 121-kilometer road through Afghanistan’s remote and arid northeastern Wakhan Corridor. China, however, has not been too keen on the project, and, according to one report, when the Taliban reached the Chinese border, the way was barred, with Chinese border guards ordering the Taliban to leave the area. The Hard Road The Wakhan Corridor was part of ancient trade routes through Asia, but was clearly only used by hardy merchants. The area is one of the most isolated regions on the planet. Nearly all of it is 4,000 meters or more above sea level, mostly bare stone mountains with some grass and a few trees and bushes growing on hillsides and in the valleys. The Wakhan Corridor officially appeared on maps as part of Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century. It was a buffer zone agreed to by representatives of the British and Russian empires. Today, the far eastern section of the Wakhan Corridor is the only place where Afghanistan directly borders China. That 74-kilometer border was easy to ignore due to the remoteness of the area, but not long after the Chinese revolution in 1949, officials in Beijing still ordered it closed. The harsh climate and rugged mountains make most of the corridor virtually unhabitable, but that did not stop some from believing a modern trade route could be opened through Wakhan that would connect Afghanistan to China. Dirt roads reached a few of the larger settlements in the western part of the corridor, villages of, at most, several hundred people. The Taliban just finished building a gravel road and four bridges that finally make it all the way to the Chinese border. By itself, this is far from sufficient to qualify as a legitimate trade route. There is no infrastructure to serve traffic through the region, no petrol stations, no accommodation, no places to buy food or drink, and temperatures are well below freezing for at least half the year. China’s Big Objection The bigger obstacle is that China has no strong interest in opening this route, and in fact, would prefer the Afghan border to remain closed. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is still present in Afghanistan. ETIM is comprised mainly of ethnic Uyghurs from China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the same Chinese region that borders Afghanistan. ETIM’s goal is to topple Chinese rule in Xinjiang. ETIM fighters have been in Afghanistan for at least 25 years, and were allies of the Taliban during the years foreign troops were in Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province is active in northern Afghanistan, and that group has also made specific threats against the Chinese government. The Taliban have promised that they will not allow any group to use Afghan territory to plot or carry out attacks on neighboring countries. However, the Wakhan Corridor is part of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province, and the Taliban have been battling several groups there this year. None of those groups are connected with ETIM, but the current unstable situation in Badakhshan probably raises concerns in China about security along its Afghan border. These security concerns extend to Tajikistan, which borders the Wakhan Corridor to the north. Elsewhere along the Tajik-Afghan frontier, two attacks from Afghan territory killed five Chinese nationals in November 2025. Chinese workers later returned under armed protection to work on a highway project in eastern Tajikistan. The violence has shown that threats from Afghanistan can also affect Chinese projects in neighboring Central Asia. The Chinese Response China has never shown much public support for the road through the Wakhan Corridor. China started construction of a road to its border with Afghanistan in 2009 or 2010 in order to be able to reinforce its border guards there, but it is unclear whether that road ever reached the border. The proposed crossing point at the Afghan-Chinese border is the Wakhjir Pass, with an elevation of about 4,920 meters. One indication of China’s views on the project was the absence of any Chinese official at the Afghan inauguration ceremony for the road on October 4, despite the Taliban having extended an invitation. Then, a video was posted on October 20 that purports to show the Afghan-Chinese border, where there is a long strip of two barbed fences running up a hillside with a guard tower in the distance. The video also shows monitoring equipment placed along the border. Most interesting is the claim in the video, subsequently picked up by the Afghanistan International media outlet, that when Taliban fighters recently approached the border, Chinese border guards warned them to leave the area immediately. It is not clear when the video was recorded, and neither government has mentioned the alleged encounter. If this incident did occur, it would not be surprising. The South China Morning Post reported nearly three years ago that if the Afghan road was built through the Wakhan Corridor, it was likely “Beijing [would] be cautious about giving its war-torn neighbor full access to its land border because of security concerns over terrorists and separatist militants.” So, a gravel road is completed on the Afghan side of the border, leading to a mountain pass at an elevation of nearly 5,000 meters, where two fences still bar passage to the Chinese side, where there is no connecting road.
Short Stories from the Region
