Tajikistan
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team is covering the Kurultai elections and what they mean for Kazakhstan. Special guest: Central Asia journalist Paul Bartlett.
Kyrgyzstan Hosts SCO Summit as Bloc Marks 25 Years
Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's ten member states are due in Bishkek on September 1 for the final summit of Kyrgyzstan's 2025-2026 chairmanship. The meeting is expected to produce a Bishkek Declaration marking the SCO's 25th anniversary, alongside thematic statements and other decisions. For Kyrgyzstan, the gathering is more than a turn in the organization's rotating chairmanship. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in the country during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. The summit coincides with Kyrgyzstan's Independence Day and the August 31 opening of the World Nomad Games. The member-state session will bring together Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with President Sadyr Japarov as host. Chinese President Xi Jinping will also make a state visit, giving the summit a substantial bilateral program alongside the formal meetings. Kyrgyzstan's Diplomatic Week The summit comes less than three months after Kyrgyzstan was elected to the UN Security Council for 2027-2028, its first term on the body. Hosting the SCO gives Japarov an opportunity to reinforce that diplomatic profile before the Security Council term begins in January. The SCO's foreign ministers reiterated in July that Central Asia is the organization's core and backed a larger role for it in the region's security and economic development. Their statement also praised Kyrgyzstan's chairmanship and confirmed that the Council of Heads of State and SCO Plus meetings would take place in Bishkek on August 31 and September 1. What Cholpon Ata Already Settled At their July 24 meeting in Cholpon Ata, SCO foreign ministers approved the draft declaration and accompanying documents as a basis for the summit. The language is therefore largely negotiated before the leaders arrive, although the final package can still change. The ministerial statement gives a clearer indication of the political agenda, supporting a multipolar world order and rejecting unilateral sanctions. It also calls for more intra-SCO trade. Terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime remain its stated security priorities. The statement says the SCO is entering a period of institutional reform, including changes to its legal framework and cooperation procedures. A Development Bank Still Taking Shape Economic cooperation will occupy a significant part of the summit. In Tianjin last year, interested member states reached political consensus to establish an SCO Development Bank. The institution is not yet operational. At the fourth consultation meeting in Shenzhen in June, delegates discussed its key elements and the next stage of negotiations. A timetable or capital commitments announced in Bishkek would move the proposal beyond its current design stage. The bank could eventually provide another source of finance for infrastructure, but its structure and membership remain unsettled. Currency diversification will also remain part of the discussion. The 2024 Astana Declaration called for gradual growth in the use of national currencies for settlements among interested members. Sanctions on Russia and Iran have increased the political importance of that effort, although the SCO has not created a common payment system. SCO Plus, but Not a Single Bloc The SCO has two observer states and 15 dialogue partners in addition to its ten members. SCO Plus allows selected partners and international organizations to join the wider discussion, but partner status does not guarantee attendance. Invitations are coordinated among the member states. The expanded format increases the summit's reach while exposing the differences inside the organization. India and Pakistan will again sit at the same table without a bilateral meeting having been announced. Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian will arrive as conflict involving his country and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz continue to affect energy markets and regional trade. The July ministerial statement condemned military strikes on Iran and called for a political settlement. That shared wording does not mean the member states have identical interests. The declaration is therefore a better indication of what members can agree to say than of what they will actually do. What Bishkek Can Deliver Japarov is already assured a large diplomatic gathering and an anniversary declaration. More durable results could emerge from the bilateral meetings. Xi's state visit is expected to include talks on the $4.7 billion China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, now under construction after decades of discussion. New financing or cross-border arrangements for the railway would give Kyrgyzstan a concrete outcome from the week. Progress on the Development Bank or agreed reforms to SCO institutions would add weight to the multilateral package. The summit will not resolve the conflicts involving its members, but it places Bishkek at the center of Eurasian diplomacy as Kyrgyzstan closes its chairmanship. The scale of the gathering gives Japarov rare international visibility. The agreements announced in Bishkek will determine whether the summit leaves Kyrgyzstan with anything more durable than diplomatic attention.
Xi Jinping Heads to Bishkek as Kyrgyzstan Prepares to Host 21 Heads of State
Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek and make a state visit to Kyrgyzstan, Beijing has confirmed. The trip, which also includes a state visit to Egypt, will run from August 30 to September 3. The formal meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State is scheduled for September 1. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in Kyrgyzstan during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. Xi had long been expected to be among the leaders traveling to the Kyrgyz capital, but the formal confirmation turns attention from the guest list to the business that may be conducted around the main session. For Kyrgyzstan, the most consequential part of the visit may come in Xi's talks with President Sadyr Japarov rather than in the summit hall.
The Times of Central Asia will be reporting from Bishkek as the delegations arrive, and from the opening ceremony of the World Nomad Games on August 31. Several visiting heads of state are expected to attend the ceremony, which will bring summit diplomacy and Kyrgyzstan’s biggest cultural showcase together on the eve of the SCO meeting. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has already confirmed that he will be there.
The spectacle will be considerable, but the substance is likely to emerge in the bilateral meetings, signed agreements, and final documents released around the September 1 summit.
The State Visit and the Railway The state visit format gives Xi and Japarov a bilateral program alongside the summit. The most prominent economic issue is likely to be the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, a project discussed for decades that is now under construction across some of Kyrgyzstan's most difficult terrain. The Kyrgyz authorities put the railway’s construction cost at about $4.7 billion. China holds 51% of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Company LLC, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. Roughly half of the cost is being financed through a 35-year Chinese loan to the company. The summit could bring clearer evidence of how quickly construction is progressing. Any new financing, contracts, or cross-border arrangements would be more significant than another general statement of political support. The railway also places Kyrgyzstan inside a larger shift in regional trade. Commerce between China and the five Central Asian states passed $100 billion in 2025. Bishkek wants a larger share of that traffic and more of the value created along transit routes. Xi's visit offers Japarov an opportunity to press the case for logistics hubs, local employment and supporting roads rather than transit alone. The Documents Behind the Ceremony The SCO's national coordinators have been finalizing the outcome documents in the weeks leading up to the summit. Under Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, the SCO has emphasized regional stability and economic cooperation, alongside digital transformation, cyber threats, environmental policy, and cultural exchange. SCO decisions require consensus, which tends to soften disagreements in final communiqués. Any agreements that specify funding, deadlines, or responsibility would give the Bishkek package more weight. Bilateral Meetings Around the Summit The summit will bring several difficult relationships into the same room. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif are both due in Bishkek, although no bilateral meeting between them has been announced. Russian President Vladimir Putin has said he plans to meet Modi during the SCO gathering. Putin is also set to meet Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, with Iran’s ambassador to Moscow confirming plans for talks on the sidelines of the summit. Meanwhile, any meeting between Xi and Modi would come amid a cautious improvement in China-India relations after years of border tensions. For Japarov, the concentration of leaders creates a dense bilateral calendar alongside the SCO program. Meetings announced in the final days before the summit may prove as important as the plenary itself, particularly where they produce agreements on infrastructure, trade, energy, or financing. Bishkek Before September 1 The first major wave of officials is expected to arrive in the Kyrgyz capital on August 31. Manas International Airport will restrict scheduled passenger flights from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. that day to accommodate aircraft carrying heads of state and official delegations. Restrictions will continue from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. on September 1. The September 1 session is expected to conclude with the Bishkek Declaration and a package of accompanying documents prepared during Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship. Foreign ministers have already approved drafts of the declaration, thematic statements, and other decisions as a basis for the summit. By then, however, much of the diplomacy may already have taken place in the meetings around it.
Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter
Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights Tajikistan’s long-running problem with domestic refining. The country’s largest refinery, in the Dangara Free Economic Zone, was built with Chinese investment and commissioned in 2018. It has never reached sustained commercial operation because Tajikistan produces very little crude and has struggled to secure imported feedstock. The refinery’s first phase can process around 500,000 tons of crude a year, rising to 1.2 million tons at full capacity. Test operations began in late 2024, but volumes remained tiny. The Tajik authorities said 1,622 tons of semi-refined crude were delivered that year, producing about 800 tons of gasoline. Iran has been considered as a possible crude supplier for years. During talks in Tehran on August 15, Juma and Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad discussed supplies of crude oil, diesel, and aviation fuel for Tajikistan, as well as preferential pricing. The Transport Ministry has not said which refinery would receive the requested crude. If all 2 million tons were intended for Dangara, the volume would exceed the plant’s annual design capacity. Deliveries would therefore have to be spread over more than a year or require additional processing capacity. Securing the oil is only part of the problem, however. Any large purchase from Iran would also have to navigate financing, insurance, transport, and U.S. sanctions risk. Trump’s latest warning adds uncertainty, but that sanctions exposure predates his August 20 statement. Russia remains Tajikistan’s established fuel supplier, but recent shortages have exposed the cost of that dependence. Iran offers another source of crude and refined products, along with a southern trade route, but any major deal would bring greater logistical and sanctions complications. The request therefore looks less like a geopolitical shift than an attempt to solve an increasingly urgent energy-security problem. It remains unclear whether Iran can supply the volumes Dushanbe wants, or whether Tajikistan can move and finance them.
Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests
U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean. Iran, for its part, is interested in access to Kazakhstan’s Aktau and Kuryk ports on the Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan Has Already Hit the Sanctions Barrier In late July, Sadegh traveled to Turkmenistan, where she met President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov. The talks covered transport, energy, communications, construction, and other economic projects. That relationship has already collided with U.S. sanctions. In 2024, Turkmenistan agreed to supply Iraq with up to 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually through a swap arrangement: Turkmen gas would go to Iran, with Iran sending an equivalent volume to Iraq. U.S. sanctions on Iran eventually scuttled the plan. The precedent shows how restrictions aimed at Tehran can block a Central Asian export even when the underlying commercial deal was between Turkmenistan and a third country. Tajikistan Needs Routes and Fuel Tajikistan was another focus of Iranian outreach. On August 15, a Tajik delegation in Tehran that included Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma held talks with Iranian officials. Sadegh discussed transport and logistics cooperation with the delegation, while Tehran also encouraged Tajikistan to consider greater use of Chabahar and logistics infrastructure in Iran. A broader transport project had already emerged by then. Tajikistan, Iran, and Afghanistan agreed in July to launch a joint road corridor and created a permanent trilateral working group. The agreement was publicly reported in early August. The route could later be extended to other Central Asian countries and China. For Dushanbe, however, the most immediate issue is fuel. On August 15, Juma met Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad in Tehran. They discussed supplies of diesel and aviation fuel, Iranian crude for processing at Tajik refineries, and the possibility of preferential pricing. During the first six months of 2026, 432,800 metric tons of freight moved between the two countries, up 17.5% from a year earlier. Nearly 334,000 tons moved by rail and about 99,000 tons by road. Tajikistan has now asked Iran for a total of 2.55 million tons of crude and petroleum products, including 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel. There is a political dimension as well. During talks with the Tajik delegation, Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref proposed discussing the creation of an association of Persian-speaking countries and regions. For Tehran, linguistic and cultural ties with Tajikistan remain an additional channel for strengthening relations, although Dushanbe’s current negotiations have a largely practical focus: transport, energy, and fuel. Uzbekistan Calculates the Cost of Disruption An Uzbek delegation arrived in Tehran at almost the same time. For Tashkent, relations with Iran are particularly closely tied to transit. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Economy and Finance has estimated potential losses from disruptions to foreign trade and logistics caused by instability in the Middle East at $1 billion to $1.5 billion, equivalent to about 0.7% to 1% of GDP. In 2025, roughly 9% of Uzbekistan’s imports and 10% of its non-gold exports passed through Iran. On August 17, Uzbekistan’s First Deputy Foreign Minister Bakhromjon Aloyev met in Tehran with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Diplomacy Hamid Ghanbari. Among the main subjects were transport and transit links, improving existing routes, and increasing freight volumes between the two countries. Aloyev also met Sadegh on August 18. Those talks again focused on transport and transit, including international corridors, logistics efficiency, and conditions for increasing freight traffic. Iran’s geography gives landlocked Uzbekistan another route toward southern seaports. The Limits of Isolation Iran’s economic ties with Central Asia have not been shrinking in recent months: Kazakhstan has signed a 27-year agreement for a terminal at Iran’s largest commercial port; Tajikistan is seeking Iranian fuel and new transport routes; Uzbekistan is calculating the potential cost of disruptions to trade that passes through Iran; and Turkmenistan is continuing negotiations with Tehran on transport, energy, and wider economic cooperation. For Tehran, Central Asia offers a way to maintain and expand economic links under external pressure. For the region itself, relations with Iran rest on more pragmatic interests: ports, transit, fuel, and access to markets south of Central Asia. Trump’s latest threat therefore poses a question for Central Asian governments that is less about political support for Iran than about the economic cost of joining its isolation. For the region, pulling back from cooperation with Tehran could also mean giving up one of the few direct overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
Opinion: Tajikistan’s Digital Finance Boom Faces Its Next Challenge – Keeping Money Digital
Tajikistan’s e-wallet numbers are striking. As of June 30, 2026, 28 credit financial institutions reported 19.8 million electronic wallets, up 25.9% from a year earlier. In the first half of 2026, e-wallets were used for 14.6 million non-cash transactions worth 3.6 billion somoni. But those figures should not be read as if 19.8 million people are actively using wallets. The National Bank of Tajikistan’s published aggregate data do not state how many wallets belong to unique users or how many are active. Nor do they show how usage is distributed among them. Without that denominator, the headline figure tells us much less about actual use. Tajikistan has clearly expanded digital access. It now needs a clearer picture of usage and stronger reasons for people and businesses to keep money inside the digital system. I call this the shift from digital access to digital retention. The headline number is 19.8 million wallets out of an official population of 10.721 million as of January 1, 2026. The more useful number would be how many are meaningfully active. Do Not Confuse Registration With Usage A registered wallet is an access point, not proof of financial behavior. One person may hold several wallets, and some may sit dormant. Usage may also be concentrated among a smaller group of frequent users. Without active-wallet and unique-user data, none of those possibilities should be assumed as fact. What we can say is that non-cash activity is growing. The National Bank reports that cashless payments for goods and services made with electronic payment instruments reached 41% in the first half of 2026, 13 percentage points higher than a year earlier. It also reports 9,425 POS terminals at trade and service points and 33,620 QR codes. That 41% figure covers electronic payment instruments, including bank cards and e-wallets. It is not an e-wallet usage rate. To understand how wallets are actually being used, Tajikistan needs a clearer view of active wallets, transaction frequency, and what happens to money after it enters a digital account. Trust Is Part of the Infrastructure For many people, the move from cash to bank cards was already a significant behavioral change. They learned to trust money represented by a balance on a screen rather than notes in a hand. Wallets, QR payments and app-based financial services require another layer of trust. Users need to know where their money is and whether a payment went through. They also need a clear route when something goes wrong. Fees should be easy to understand. This is why simplicity is part of financial trust, not merely user experience. Tajikistan’s Financial Literacy Program for 2026–2030 makes the same connection at a policy level. It links financial literacy and consumer protection with public confidence as digital financial services expand. A good digital-finance service should be usable by ordinary people without making money feel harder to understand. Users should not need fintech expertise to trust the product. Merchants Need a Reason Not to Cash Out Consumers are only one part of digital circulation. Merchants also need a business reason to keep value inside the system. A merchant should not accept digital payments only because customers want it. Digital transactions should also make the business easier to run. That can mean clearer cash flow and simpler reconciliation, including payments to suppliers. That visibility can create something more valuable than payment convenience: a financial history. With appropriate consent and underwriting, transaction history can show revenue patterns and liquidity needs. It can also show how regularly a business pays suppliers. That can help lenders assess working-capital and supply-chain finance. Transaction data does not eliminate credit risk. But it can turn a digital payment into the start of a broader financial relationship rather than the end of a transaction. For a merchant, the reason to remain digital becomes stronger when the digital balance can help run and finance the business. Make Staying Digital Useful Discouraging cash withdrawals will not keep money digital. People and businesses will do that only if the next digital action is more useful. For consumers, that may mean being able to pay, transfer or save money without cashing out. For merchants, it may mean using digital balances to pay suppliers or support working capital. Digital income can move into a payment and become merchant revenue. From there, it can go to a supplier or another financial service. Each useful step gives people and businesses less reason to cash out. The same logic applies to government payments. Taxes and utility bills create recurring financial interactions, as do other public-service fees. Digitizing a payment to government is useful, but the wider gain comes when money can remain digital before and after that transaction. A Wider Role for Payment Agents Tajikistan already has a human distribution layer. As of June 30, 2026, financial institutions reported 1,564 bank payment agents and 51 sub-agents. Under current rules, agents can accept and disburse cash, provide electronic means of payment, and identify customers for specified services. The National Bank says its main activities are cash-in/cash-out services through self-service terminals and issuing payment cards. That role can go further. Where rules and provider models allow, agents can explain digital services and help people activate products or solve basic problems. In remote areas, or among customers with lower digital confidence, that human contact can make later self-service easier. In some cases, the route to self-service starts with a person behind a counter. Change the Dashboard If the policy objective is deeper digital usage, wallet registrations should no longer dominate the dashboard. I would add at least four measures: monthly active wallets, transactions per active wallet, merchant digital turnover, and the time or number of transactions before value is withdrawn as cash. Two broader measures would also help. The first is digital retention: the share of each 100 somoni entering a wallet or digital account that remains digital through payments, transfers, savings, or other financial services before cash-out. The second is digital circulation: how far value can move from a consumer to a merchant, then to a supplier or another economic activity without leaving the digital ecosystem. These are proposed metrics, not statistics currently published by the National Bank. Their purpose is to shift attention from how many access points have been created to how useful the ecosystem has become. The Number to Watch Is Usage Digital payments have grown quickly in Tajikistan. E-wallet registrations and transaction value are up, and the country has more POS terminals and QR acceptance points. Cashless payments also account for a larger share of payments for goods and services. But infrastructure can only take the system so far. Consumers need trust, and merchants need a clear economic benefit. Financial institutions need products that turn digital activity into useful financial services. Agents and public services can help people become comfortable using them. Tajikistan also needs better visibility into usage itself. A total of 19.8 million registered wallets is impressive, but registrations alone cannot show whether the system is becoming part of everyday financial life. What those wallets are doing is the part that now needs to be measured. Success should eventually mean that staying digital is easier and more useful than returning to cash, without sacrificing safety. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Give Conflicting Accounts of Four-Country Blackout
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have given differing accounts of what triggered the August 14 blackout that cut electricity across swathes of Central Asia. Three days later, the initiating event remains unresolved, and the times released by the two sides do not fit neatly into the same sequence.
Kazakhstan’s national grid operator KEGOC says two hydrogenerators at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant, with a combined capacity of 600 MW, disconnected at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time. KEGOC said the sudden loss of generation overloaded the North-East-South transit corridor, separating southern Kazakhstan from the rest of the national grid and the interconnected systems of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. A special commission is investigating the causes.
Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s National Electric Grid has given a different chronology. It said that at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time, an external disconnection occurred on a high-voltage line linking the northern and southern parts of Kazakhstan’s power system. The Central Asian network then split into an isolated section, and Kyrgyzstan temporarily operated separately while automatic protection systems worked to protect equipment.
The one-hour difference between the countries’ clocks makes the discrepancy clearer. Kazakhstan has used UTC+5 nationwide since 2024, while Kyrgyzstan uses UTC+6. That puts Kyrgyzstan’s reported line disconnection at 2:34 p.m. Kazakhstan time, three minutes before KEGOC’s stated 2:37 p.m. Toktogul shutdown. The two times may describe different stages of a fast-moving cascade, but they do not establish the same starting point.
A third timestamp complicates the sequence. Alatau Zharyq Company said three 500 kV KEGOC transmission lines shut down at 2:38 p.m., and that those lines triggered automatic load-shedding and frequency protection in Almaty and the surrounding region. Taken together, the public statements leave a sequence of 2:34 p.m., 2:37 p.m., and 2:38 p.m. that investigators will need to reconcile.
TCA reporters in Almaty and Bishkek experienced power cuts, while local media reported outages in Dushanbe, Khujand, and southern parts of Uzbekistan.
In Kazakhstan, the disturbance affected consumers in the Zhambyl, Turkistan, Kyzylorda, Zhetysu, and Almaty regions, with further restrictions in Karaganda, Ulytau, and Abai. KEGOC said supplies were restored across the affected regions later that afternoon.
The four-country impact reflects how tightly the systems are connected. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan operate in parallel through the Central Asian power system. Cross-border links allow operators to share electricity and reserve capacity, but also mean that a sudden loss of generation or a major transmission line can be felt beyond one national grid before protection systems isolate the disturbance.
Central Asia has been here before. In January 2022, a major blackout hit southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The event also involved a sharp imbalance on the regional network and the separation of Kazakhstan’s northern and southern grids. Its precise starting point was disputed in the immediate aftermath.
The regional grid dates to the Soviet period. Uzbekistan later withdrew from the old electricity ring, leaving Tajikistan largely isolated for years. Regional links have since been rebuilt; Tajikistan began reconnecting to the unified system in 2024. An Asian Development Bank project is adding a 22-kilometer, 500 kV line between the Sughd substation in northern Tajikistan and New Syrdarya in Uzbekistan to strengthen cross-border capacity.
The push for integration is now much stronger. In January, the World Bank approved the ten-year Regional Electricity Market Interconnectivity and Trade program, or REMIT, intended to create Central Asia’s first formal regional electricity market. The World Bank puts total indicative financing at $1.018 billion over three phases. Cross-border electricity trade currently amounts to about 3% of regional demand. By the end of the program, the bank wants annual trade to reach at least 15,000 GWh and transmission capacity to more than triple to 16 GW.
That expansion is being planned while electricity use is rising sharply. A recent Times of Central Asia analysis of summer demand found that Uzbekistan’s system reached a record load of 14.2 GW on July 20, while Kyrgyzstan recorded an 18% year-on-year rise in consumption on July 19. Almaty also experienced local network faults during extreme heat.
No operator has linked the August 14 failure directly to heat or record demand, but it came during a summer of sharply rising electricity use, as governments also prepare to move more power across national borders.
Investigators now have to establish which piece of equipment failed first, how the disturbance spread through the interconnected system, and whether protection systems worked as intended.
Central Asia plans to move far more electricity across these borders in the coming decade. The August 14 blackout illustrates how much will depend on coordination between national grid operators as those cross-border flows increase. For now, Astana’s account begins at Toktogul, while Bishkek’s begins on the Kazakh transmission network.
What Do Former Presidents Do? From Akayev to Nazarbayev, the Fates of Central Asia’s Ex-Leaders
Central Asia has produced remarkably few former presidents who simply retired from public life. In Kyrgyzstan, former leaders have been driven from office, prosecuted, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev has followed a different path, largely withdrawing from public view after losing much of his political influence. Elsewhere, some of the region’s founding presidents died in office, leaving no post-presidential career to examine. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined how political succession has developed across the region. The fate of leaders after they leave office reveals another side of that political tradition. The architect of Kyrgyzstan’s early post-Soviet political model was its first president, Askar Akayev, who remained in office until 2005. Akayev introduced democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, but gradually tightened the pressure on his opponents as his presidency progressed. His rule was badly shaken by the Aksy shootings in 2002, which followed the prosecution of opposition lawmaker Azimbek Beknazarov and a territorial dispute with China. Akayev’s government had agreed to transfer disputed border territory to China, a decision fiercely criticized by the opposition. In March 2002, demonstrators in southern Kyrgyzstan demanded Akayev’s impeachment. Security forces opened fire during the unrest, killing several people. The shootings became one of the defining political crises of his presidency. In a 2003 referendum, Akayev significantly strengthened presidential powers at parliament’s expense. Economic hardship, unemployment, widespread corruption, and allegations of fraud in the 2005 parliamentary elections eventually helped trigger the Tulip Revolution in March of that year. Akayev had to flee, with rumors at the time claiming that he was smuggled out in the trunk of an official car, wrapped in a carpet. Criminal cases involving corruption were opened against him and members of his family in Kyrgyzstan. The authorities repeatedly sought his extradition from Russia, but were unsuccessful. After leaving Kyrgyzstan, Akayev lived in Moscow and taught at Moscow State University. In 2006, he became a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In August 2021, Akayev reappeared in Bishkek. He unexpectedly flew into the country and was immediately questioned as part of the criminal investigation into corruption surrounding the Kumtor gold mine. Afterward, he said he had come to Bishkek for a week and was prepared to assist investigators. “I came to speak honestly and sincerely about how we built Kumtor, why we built it, and what mistakes may have been made. The investigation will continue,” he said. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the criminal prosecution of Akayev had been terminated because the statute of limitations had expired. Tajikistan’s former president Rahmon Nabiyev was also forced from power. The former Soviet politician lost power amid the country’s civil war in 1992. He died at his home in Khujand the following year, at the age of 62, reportedly from a heart attack. According to his wife, Nabiyev spent his final months in Khujand in conditions resembling house arrest and received a pension of just five rubles. While Tajikistan did not repeat the experiment of violently removing a ruler, Kyrgyzstan saw another overthrow just five years after the Tulip Revolution. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who had succeeded Akayev as president, was forced to flee, this time not to Moscow but to Minsk. Kazakhstan helped broker Bakiyev’s departure from Kyrgyzstan, as part of international mediation involving Russia, the United States, and the OSCE. Bakiyev was subsequently handed down a series of prison sentences in absentia. In February 2013, a Kyrgyz court convicted him of abuse of office and sentenced him to 24 years. In April 2014, a Bishkek court sentenced Bakiyev in absentia to 25 years in prison for plotting the attempted murder of British businessman Sean Daley. In 2014, the Bishkek Garrison Military Court also sentenced him to life imprisonment over the killing of protesters in Bishkek on April 7, 2010. The Supreme Court reduced that sentence to 30 years in 2016. In 2023, Bishkek’s Pervomaisky District Court sentenced Bakiyev to another 10 years in prison on corruption charges related to the Kumtor gold mine. Taking his previous sentence into account, the court set his final punishment at 30 years in a maximum-security prison, with confiscation of property and a three-year ban on holding public office. The former Kyrgyz president received Belarusian citizenship, as did members of his family. His wife, Nazgul Tolomusheva, died in January 2023. Minsk has repeatedly rejected Kyrgyzstan’s requests for Bakiyev’s extradition. In 2022, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office sent its Belarusian counterpart four extradition requests, along with a request that Bakiyev’s Kyrgyz court sentences be enforced in Belarus. The Belarusian authorities refused to extradite him, citing the risk of political persecution in Kyrgyzstan. In 2025, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko effectively put an end to speculation about whether Bakiyev might be extradited to Kyrgyzstan. “Bakiyev is living well. Fine. We’re not going to let him go back to you. I told him: ‘No more trips, that’s enough! Live in Belarus.’ He’s doing fine. I sometimes visit him when he invites me. So we won’t hand him over to you,” Lukashenko said during a visit to Bishkek. The next elected Kyrgyz president after Bakiyev, Almazbek Atambayev, is also living abroad. In 2024, he and his son were photographed on the Barcelona metro in Spain. Atambayev served as president of Kyrgyzstan from 2011 to 2017. In 2019, he was stripped of presidential immunity amid criminal investigations. Law enforcement officers eventually stormed Atambayev’s residence in the village of Koi-Tash to arrest him after his supporters resisted an initial operation. Several criminal cases were brought against Atambayev. In June 2020, a Bishkek court sentenced him to more than 11 years in prison in connection with the illegal release of crime boss Aziz Batukayev. That conviction was later overturned, and Atambayev was released in February 2023 and allowed to travel abroad for medical treatment. He subsequently settled in Spain. His legal troubles, however, did not end there. In June 2025, a Bishkek court sentenced Atambayev in absentia to 11 years and six months in prison on charges including corruption and organizing mass unrest related to the 2019 events in Koi-Tash. His successor as president and former party ally, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, whose presidency saw the prosecution of Atambayev, remains in Kyrgyzstan and retains the status of a former president. But his future has not always appeared entirely secure. In 2023, members of parliament raised the possibility of stripping him of that status. Such a move would remove his immunity from prosecution and the privileges provided to a former president, including accommodation at a state residence, state protection, transportation, government communications, and free medical care for him and his family. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan provide fewer examples of conventional post-presidential life. Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, died in office in September 2016, so he never became a retired national leader. Turkmenistan’s first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, likewise died while still in power in December 2006. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow presents a different case. He stepped down as president in 2022, when his son Serdar became president, but did not withdraw from political life. He remains chairman of the Halk Maslahaty and is officially described as the National Leader of the Turkmen people. His position is therefore very different from that of a former president who has retired from public affairs. Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, initially left office under very different circumstances. When he resigned in 2019, he retained considerable influence as chairman of the ruling Nur Otan party, lifetime chairman of the Security Council, and holder of the special title of Elbasy, or Leader of the Nation. The capital was renamed Nur-Sultan in his honor immediately after his resignation. That position changed sharply after the unrest of January 2022. Nazarbayev’s remaining political influence was progressively dismantled, while many of the symbols and legal privileges associated with his rule were removed. The capital reverted to Astana later that year, references to his status as Leader of the Nation were removed from the Constitution, and the law granting the first president special privileges and protections was subsequently repealed. The Times of Central Asia has described 2022 as the beginning of the end of Nazarbayev’s remaining rule and influence. Nazarbayev now rarely appears in public, although occasional meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin continue to attract attention. Despite the dismantling of Nazarbayev’s former political position, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has continued to acknowledge his historical role in the formation of independent Kazakhstan. In an interview in January 2025, Tokayev said that Nazarbayev himself initiated the meetings with Putin and that the Russian leader could hardly refuse him. “Nursultan Abishevich initiates these meetings; they are extremely important to him. We should not forget that, as a former chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, a party leader, and later president of sovereign Kazakhstan, he is morally and politically closely connected with the Kremlin. After all, he spent so much time on business trips to Moscow, at congresses and plenums, and on working and official visits,” Tokayev explained. As for the former president’s place of residence, his spokesman, Aidos Ukibay, has repeatedly said that Nazarbayev permanently resides in Kazakhstan. Astana residents may see him again on August 23 at the polling station where the former president is registered. Kazakhstan is holding an election to its new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, on that date. Nazarbayev has continued to appear publicly to vote in elections and referendums in recent years. Across Central Asia, former presidents have followed very different paths. Kyrgyzstan has seen exile, prosecution, and repeated battles over the legal status of former leaders. Tajikistan’s early post-Soviet experience ended with a president forced from power during civil war. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan produced fewer conventional former presidents because their founding leaders died in office, while Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow remains politically prominent despite leaving the presidency. Nazarbayev represents another model, having left office without facing the exile or criminal prosecution experienced by several former Kyrgyz leaders.
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