Kazakhstan’s Regional Ecological Summit 2026: What It Is and Why It Matters
Kazakhstan’s Regional Ecological Summit 2026 in Astana on April 22-24 is aiming to turn Central Asia’s environmental strain into a regional political agenda. Organized in partnership with the United Nations, the summit is built around the theme, “Shared Vision for a Resilient Future.” Its stated purpose is to bring together governments, international organizations, lenders, businesses, researchers, and civil society to push for joint and practical responses to climate and ecological pressures across the region. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev first proposed hosting a regional climate summit in Kazakhstan under UN auspices during his 2023 speech at the 78th session of the UN General Assembly. By 2026, that idea had broadened into a wider environmental summit covering climate transition, adaptation, food security, natural resource management, air pollution, waste, finance, and environmental skills. The official key thematic directions show that this is no longer a narrowly framed climate conference. It is being presented as a broader Central Asian platform for ecological cooperation. In Central Asia, ecological stress now shapes core state concerns, from farming and energy to public health and cross-border cooperation. That gives the Astana summit a broader role than a standard environment conference. That shift reflects real regional pressures. Central Asia faces chronic water stress, glacier retreat, desertification, air pollution, and growing strain on ecosystems. The summit’s organizers say the meeting is meant to produce joint solutions rather than another round of abstract pledges. The UN in Kazakhstan says the summit is expected to advance shared regional responses and identify green financing needs, while a second UN page states that one planned outcome is a Joint Declaration by the heads of state of Central Asia, alongside a 2026-2030 Programme of Action developed with the United Nations. Tokayev’s own language explains the summit’s pitch. On August 5, 2025, speaking at the Third United Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries in Awaza, Turkmenistan, he said, “Many developing countries without access to the sea are facing water scarcity, glacier melt, desertification, and other extreme weather events. Addressing these challenges requires coordinated regional efforts and strong international support. At the same time, I believe that measures to combat climate change must remain balanced and inclusive, and respond to the legitimate development needs of countries. To strengthen our joint efforts in addressing climate change, I invite you to the Regional Ecological Summit, which will be held in Astana in partnership with the United Nations.” The wording shows how Kazakhstan wants to frame the event. Central Asia’s environmental problems cross borders, but the response, in Tokayev’s view, must also accommodate growth, infrastructure, and development. That is why the summit is being presented not just as a climate gathering, but as a forum linking ecological policy, investment, technology, and state planning. The EXPO component is part of that design. Government and investment-promotion pages say the parallel exhibition will focus on green technologies, ESG tools, and practical climate solutions, linking diplomacy to project finance and implementation. The summit’s speaker list underlines its international reach. The official RES 2026 page includes Junhua Li, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Inger Andersen, Tatiana Molcean, and OSCE Secretary General Feridun Sinirlioğlu, alongside regional ministers and other senior officials. The scale is also substantial. Astana says the summit is expected to bring together around 1,500 participants from governments, international organizations, development institutions, business, and civil society. The UN says that eighteen agencies are co-organizing 25 sessions and five workshops. That gives the summit far broader institutional backing than a standard conference circuit event. For Kazakhstan, the summit is also a foreign-policy signal. Astana is trying to present itself as a convening center for regional coordination on water, climate adaptation, environmental finance, and sustainable development. For Central Asia, the bigger question is whether the summit produces durable mechanisms after the speeches end. If the declaration and action program move forward, RES 2026 could become a framework for regional coordination on issues that already cross borders and cannot be managed by a single state alone.
Central Asia Came to Antalya With a Clearer Voice and a Wider Agenda
The Antalya Diplomacy Forum, from April 17 to 19, brought together heads of state, foreign ministers, and senior officials at a tense moment in international politics. The official theme, “Mapping Tomorrow, Managing Uncertainties,” reflected the backdrop: war in the Middle East, pressure on trade, and growing doubts about the strength of international institutions. Central Asia did not dominate the gathering, but the region was visible across the program and in the meetings around it. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was the highest-profile regional figure in attendance, while Kyrgyzstan sent Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev, Turkmenistan sent Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and Tajikistan sent Deputy Foreign Minister Farrukh Sharifzoda. Uzbekistan was also active through Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov in meetings held during the forum dates. The strongest Central Asian intervention came from Tokayev. Speaking at a panel session, he said the United Nations remains indispensable, but also made clear that its present structure is failing to keep up with current crises. “We must honestly acknowledge that the Security Council is the central element in the reform of the United Nations,” he said. He also warned that many key negotiations now take place outside the UN system, in separate capitals and closed rooms, rather than through the institution that was built for that purpose. Tokayev framed the problem in practical terms rather than abstract ones. He said global leaders must approach peace and security “with a strong sense of responsibility,” adding that “we must act more responsibly and exercise restraint.” Tokayev also said Kazakhstan calls on all countries involved in the Iran conflict to cease hostilities while keeping the focus on the core issue of nuclear proliferation. His language matched the line Astana has tried to hold for years: avoid escalation, preserve room for dialogue, and keep diplomatic channels open. Tokayev went further when he turned to the role of what he called “middle powers,” naming Kazakhstan and Türkiye among the states that, in his view, show a high degree of responsibility in both diplomacy and practice. He said it would “not be an exaggeration to say that today middle powers often demonstrate a greater degree of responsibility than major powers represented in the Security Council, which, regrettably, often obstruct the resolution of key global issues.” That was one of the sharper lines delivered at the summit. It also showed how Kazakhstan now wants to place itself in the world: not as a passive actor caught between larger powers, but as a state that can help steady an increasingly unstable system. Türkiye was central to that framing. At the start of his remarks, Tokayev praised President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s role in the region and said Kazakhstan was looking forward to Erdoğan’s state visit next month. That also reflects a broader trend of closer coordination between Kazakhstan and Türkiye, including in the Trans-Caspian transport route (Middle Corridor) and shifting Caspian dynamics. Uzbekistan approached the summit in Antalya differently. Tashkent did not have a presidential intervention on the main stage, but it used the gathering for a dense round of practical diplomacy. Foreign Minister Saidov took part in an informal meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Turkic States, where officials discussed transport, energy, green transformation, digitalization, innovation, and the “OTS Plus” format. In a separate move, Uzbekistan and Rwanda signed a joint communiqué establishing diplomatic relations. Saidov also held meetings with counterparts from Turkmenistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Lithuania. That combination says a lot about Uzbekistan’s current diplomatic style: active, outward-looking, and practical. Antalya gave Tashkent a chance to deepen Turkic cooperation, widen its network, and leave with formal bilateral results. The Rwanda agreement did not change the strategic map, but it showed how Uzbekistan now uses multilateral gatherings to expand its diplomatic footprint in small, steady steps. Kyrgyzstan placed the regional angle at the center of its presence. According to the national news agency, Kabar, Kulubaev joined talks with the Central Asian delegations and Türkiye on the region’s changing role in global affairs, its advantages, current security risks, and the prospects for deeper integration. He also participated in the OTS foreign ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of the summit. The language emerging from those discussions presented Central Asia not as a fragmented space, but as a region with shared opportunities and shared exposure to risk. Turkmenistan arrived with its emphasis firmly on infrastructure and energy. Meredov said that construction of all gas transport infrastructure for the Turkmen section of the TAPI pipeline had been “fully completed, covering more than 200 kilometers,” and that work in Afghanistan now extends over more than 150 kilometers. The wider question remains as to whether TAPI is still struggling to become more than a partial project. Meredov also met Saidov on the sidelines to discuss bilateral and multilateral plans for the year ahead. Tajikistan was less visible than its neighbors, but it was present. Sharifzoda attended the forum and held a meeting with the adviser to the prime minister of Bangladesh on April 18, targeting bilateral contacts rather than headline speeches. No dramatic Central Asian breakthrough came out of Antalya. There was no new regional pact and no sweeping declaration from the five republics. But the forum still showed something important. Kazakhstan drew the most attention through Tokayev’s call for UN reform, preventive diplomacy, and a stronger role for middle powers. Uzbekistan used the gathering for practical diplomacy and new bilateral steps. Kyrgyzstan joined discussions that framed Central Asia as a region with growing weight in global affairs. Turkmenistan kept the focus on transit and energy. Tajikistan maintained bilateral contacts. Taken together, those appearances showed a region that is becoming more coordinated, more outward-looking, and more confident in using major international forums to advance its interests.
Water in Central Asia: Between Reality and Alarmism
The Regional Ecological Summit 2026 will take place in Astana on April 22-24. The event is intended to elevate Central Asia’s water and environmental agenda to the level of systemic solutions. Alongside preparations for the summit, however, an increasingly alarmist narrative is gaining traction among some experts. In this framing, water resources in Central Asia are presented as being in crisis, with predictions of shortages, threats to food security, and even potential conflict. Phrases such as “there is not enough water,” “the harvest is at risk,” and “the region is on the brink” are used with growing frequency. Such assessments are typically based on generalized and dramatized claims that fail to differentiate between countries or specific river basins. This creates the impression of a single, simultaneous crisis, whereas in reality the situation is far more complex. Yes, there is a problem, but it is not sudden or one-dimensional. Water scarcity in Central Asia is real. However, it must be interpreted accurately and objectively. According to expert estimates, up to 40% of water in the region is lost through deteriorating irrigation infrastructure, while more than 80% of water consumption is accounted for by agriculture. Current practice supports these figures. In southern Kazakhstan, seasonal water supply restrictions are regularly imposed. This year, for example, the government approved consumption limits for southern regions due to an expected shortage during the growing season. Uzbekistan has said, in joining the World Bank’s Water Forward initiative, that it aims to introduce water-saving technologies across its 4.1 million hectares of irrigated land and reduce irrigation losses by 25%. Equally important are developments in upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. According to a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the region exhibits a structural interdependence between water and energy. More than 80% of electricity in these countries is generated by hydropower, meaning water resources are used simultaneously for energy production and irrigation. This creates systemic interdependencies. At the same time, coordination of water releases and electricity generation remains suboptimal, and the absence of long-term regulatory mechanisms has already led to water shortages during certain summer periods. This is a key point: the issue is not so much an absolute lack of water, but the complexity of coordination between upstream and downstream countries, as well as between sectors within individual states. In other words, water shortages in Central Asia are often driven less by natural conditions than by how water is distributed and managed. Particular attention in alarmist narratives is given to Afghanistan and the Kushtepa Canal. Estimates commonly suggest that the Qosh Tepa Canal could eventually divert around 6-10 km³ of water per year from the Amu Darya, although projections vary and depend on how fully the canal is completed and operated. While the canal is not yet fully operational, regional officials already treat it as a serious medium-term risk, with the precise scale of future withdrawals still under discussion. Countries in the region, especially Uzbekistan, have been pursuing dialogue with Afghanistan over the canal and its future water withdrawals. In this context, portraying Afghanistan as a “source of crisis” reflects a combination of politicization and premature alarmism. In a similar vein, some analyses increasingly link water issues in Central Asia to developments surrounding Iran. The logic typically presented is as follows: instability around Iran leads to disruption of transport routes, which drives up food prices, increases pressure on domestic resources, and ultimately worsens water shortages. While superficially plausible, this reasoning oversimplifies the situation. First, Central Asian countries have limited dependence on food imports via Iranian routes. A substantial share of trade is conducted through intra-regional exchanges, northern corridors, and alternative logistics channels. Second, even when prices rise, the impact is generally indirect, affecting the cost of goods rather than the physical availability of water. Overall, this line of reasoning illustrates how external factors are layered onto an existing issue, water scarcity, to amplify its perceived severity. At the same time, institutional mechanisms in the region are evolving. The Central Asian Interstate Commission for Water Coordination remains active, infrastructure modernization projects are ongoing, and policy coordination is gradually strengthening. The Regional Ecological Summit 2026 is part of this broader process. The initiative, proposed by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, was conceived not as a one-off event but as a long-term platform. Its purpose is not only to identify problems, but to develop coordinated approaches and practical mechanisms for cooperation. Discussions are also underway regarding a potential meeting of the heads of state of the founding members of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea alongside the summit, which could further strengthen the regional agenda. Another Kazakhstani initiative, the proposal to establish an International Water Organization under UN auspices, also reflects this thinking. While still conceptual, it underscores an important principle: when the consequences of water projects extend beyond national borders, regulatory mechanisms must also be international. Ultimately, the water issue in Central Asia is not a sudden crisis, but a long-term governance challenge. The evidence shows that much of the deficit is linked to inefficiency and losses, while the impact of new factors, including Afghanistan, is gradual. At the same time, the C5 countries already possess coordination mechanisms and are working to improve them. It is this process, not alarmism, that will shape the region’s water dynamics in the years ahead.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be covering the arrest of 19 anti-China protesters in Kazakhstan, the announcement of the date for Kazakhstan's upcoming parliamentary elections, major diplomatic moves unfolding between Central Asia and the United States in Washington, and some very quiet diplomacy taking place in Florida between presidents' daughters. We'll also be looking at Uzbek workers finally being granted the right to strike, major expansions at two of Central Asia's biggest gas projects, a mystery disease spreading through the region that has already claimed more than 90,000 animal lives, and the continued expansion of the regional railway network, which could finally see Kyrgyzstan better connected to its largest trading partner. Special guest, Almaty-based journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Chris Rickleton.
Water Stress: Will the Summer of 2026 Become a Turning Point for Central Asia?
The summer of 2026 is projected to be a critical and potentially decisive period for Central Asia in the context of water stress. The region is entering the growing season with significantly lower water reserves in its main river basins, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, compared to previous years. The combined impact of climate change and rising consumption is expected to exacerbate irrigation shortages, threatening crop yields and food security. A Region Under Pressure: Water as a Strategic Factor For Kazakhstan, water is taking on an increasing strategic importance in 2026. The southern regions, Kyzylorda, Turkestan, and Zhambyl, have already entered a phase of persistent low water availability. Estimates suggest that the irrigation deficit could reach up to 1 billion cubic meters. The situation in the Syr Darya basin remains critical. Inflows are expected to fall 3.2 billion cubic meters below normal, and by the start of the growing season, total water volume may reach only 1-2 billion cubic meters, far below demand. The Shardara Reservoir, a key regional storage facility, is currently at roughly half of its design capacity. Uzbekistan faces an even more vulnerable position due to its high population density and large agricultural sector. The flow of the Amu Darya is projected to fall to 65% of its historical norm, putting food stability at risk. Tashkent is accelerating investments in canal reconstruction, as water losses during transport reach up to 40%. Against this backdrop, tensions between upstream and downstream countries could become more pronounced. Kyrgyzstan, acting as the region’s “water tower,” faces a difficult trade-off between energy security and its obligations to downstream neighbors. Low accumulation levels in the Toktogul Reservoir have constrained hydropower generation, leading to winter energy shortages and reduced summer water releases, precisely when Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan require them for irrigation. This cyclical dependency turns each growing season into a complex round of “water-for-electricity” negotiations, with diminishing room for maneuver. Tajikistan faces a similar situation in the Amu Darya basin. The Nurek Hydropower Plant is operating under strict conservation principles as reservoir levels remain several meters below previous norms. For Dushanbe, the priority remains fulfilling the Rogun project, which, under low-water conditions, raises justified concerns among downstream states. These tensions are compounded by the accelerated melting of Pamir glaciers, which currently increases water flows but poses a long-term risk of severe depletion. Turkmenistan is also expected to experience acute water stress in 2026. In the Ahal and Mary regions, pasture degradation and limited irrigation are reducing livestock numbers and grain yields. The government is investing in dredging the Karakum Canal and constructing small desalination plants, but these measures only partially offset declining Amu Darya flows. An additional destabilizing factor is Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal project. By summer 2026, its impact on the Amu Darya basin is expected to become physically noticeable. Estimates state that unregulated water withdrawals could reduce downstream flows by 15-25%. Afghanistan’s absence from regional water-sharing agreements creates a legal vacuum that existing mechanisms cannot address. As a result, Central Asia is approaching a threshold where traditional water management systems, largely reactive and based on Soviet-era quotas, are no longer effective. The creation of a unified water-energy strategy is therefore shifting from an option to a necessity. Without transparent digital monitoring at hydrological stations and the coordinated management of glaciers and reservoirs, the risk of localized water disputes in 2026 could reach its highest level in decades. The Aral Sea: An Indicator of Crisis The condition of the Aral Sea remains the clearest indicator of regional water stress. In 2025, the projected inflow to the Aral Sea region was 975 million cubic meters, while actual inflow measured at the Karateren hydropost was only 589 million cubic meters, 386 million cubic meters below projections. The Northern (Small) Aral Sea, often cited as a partial recovery success, faces a serious test. Despite the Kokaral Dam, critically low Syr Darya inflows, less than 50 m³/s at the peak of the summer, cannot compensate for intense evaporation. By August, some experts expect water levels to fall by 50-70 cm, leading to shoreline retreat and increased salinity, threatening fisheries in Saryshyganak Bay. The Southern (Large) Aral Sea in Uzbekistan continues its seemingly irreversible decline, fragmenting into hypersaline water bodies. The summer of 2026 is expected to be unusually hot, increasing the likelihood of severe salt storms from the dried seabed, now known as the Aralkum Desert. High-end projections suggest the possibility of 10-12 major dust events capable of transporting toxic salts and pesticide residues hundreds of kilometers, affecting not only Karakalpakstan but also Khorezm and even the foothills of the Tien Shan. Public health impacts are already severe. The Aral region is experiencing rising rates of eye and respiratory diseases, as well as anemia and cancer. Since the 1960s, coronary heart disease has increased 18-fold, pneumonia 19-fold, and chronic bronchitis 30-fold. Poor drinking water quality has contributed to a 4.2-fold rise in kidney stone disease in rural Karakalpakstan. According to researchers, up to 46.4% of respiratory diseases in children and 38.9% in adults are linked to sulfate air pollution from dust storms. The main large-scale mitigation measure remains afforestation of the dried seabed. By mid-2026, saxaul and other halophyte plantings in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are expected to cover 1.7-2 million hectares. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources is also developing a forest nursery on the seabed with an annual capacity of 1.5 million seedlings. These “green shields” help stabilize sand and salt, but their survival depends on groundwater levels, which are also declining. Water Diplomacy and “Digital Trust” At the same time, 2025-2026 has marked a shift toward more pragmatic regional cooperation. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have signed agreements on water-energy exchange, whereby electricity is supplied in return for increased water releases during the growing season. Parallel efforts are underway to introduce automated monitoring systems. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have begun installing digital measurement points along the Syr Darya to improve transparency and reduce disputes over water allocation. A key upcoming event is the Regional Ecological Summit (RES), which will take place in Astana from April 22–24. The agenda includes joint programs for the Aral Sea basin, reforms to the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), sustainable management of transboundary water resources, and the introduction of digital water accounting systems. Further progress is also expected on President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal to establish an International Water Organization within the UN, reflecting the growing importance of water governance amid global warming. From Crisis to Management The summer of 2026 may prove to be a turning point for Central Asia. The convergence of drought cycles with infrastructural and institutional weaknesses is making water the region’s primary risk factor. Addressing this challenge will require a shift from reactive responses to systemic management. Key priorities include transparent allocation mechanisms, digital monitoring, infrastructure modernization, and alignment of long-term environmental and water-energy strategies. Without such measures, water could become not only scarce but a source of broader regional instability.
Russia Seeks Transfer of 200 Tajik Women Prisoners After Dushanbe Approval
Russia’s human rights commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova has received a positive response from Emomali Rahmon regarding the possible transfer of around 200 Tajik women currently serving sentences in Russian prisons, according to TASS. Moskalkova said she had written to the Tajik president requesting that the women be allowed to continue serving their sentences in Tajikistan on humanitarian grounds. “In each case, we must carefully weigh issues of justice, mercy, and humanism,” she said in an interview with TASS. She noted that while most cases confirm that crimes were committed, the severity of punishment should not always be maximal. “Sometimes leniency helps a person reform, repent, and change for the better. That is why we try in each case to find arguments that could support leniency, especially for women,” she said. According to Moskalkova, foreign women prisoners face additional challenges, including limited access to family visits and difficulties receiving parcels from relatives. These factors were among the reasons behind her appeal to Tajik authorities. She also pointed to broader policy developments in Russia’s penal system, citing improvements in detention conditions under the country’s penal reform strategy through 2030. Moskalkova highlighted recent legislation limiting pretrial detention for women with young children who have committed non-violent offenses. In addition, she said she has repeatedly asked courts to grant deferrals of sentences for women with children under the age of 14, thanking the judiciary for what she described as “understanding and positive decisions” in such cases. Earlier this month, Moskalkova said Russia was prepared to facilitate the transfer of more than 3,000 Uzbek nationals convicted in Russia to serve their sentences in Uzbekistan. However, she noted that the process remains stalled due to legal constraints, including Uzbekistan’s failure to ratify the 1998 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.
Why Strong Economic Growth in Central Asia Masks Underlying Risks
Central Asian countries are significantly outperforming the global average in GDP growth, largely due to differing economic models across the region. However, rapid expansion does not remove deep structural vulnerabilities. As early as March, data showed that the combined economies of Central Asian countries grew by nearly 7% in 2025 compared to the previous year. The World Bank estimates regional growth at 6.2%, while the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) places it at 6.6%. These calculations include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; Turkmenistan is excluded due to limited statistical transparency. By comparison, growth rates in advanced economies are much lower. The EDB expects around 1.6% growth in the U.S. and approximately 1.1% in the eurozone in 2026, while China’s economy is projected to expand by about 4.6%. Nevertheless, experts note that the region’s economic outlook remains complicated by high inflation, income inequality, and continued dependence on external factors. Investment activity and domestic demand have been the key drivers of growth, according to the EDB. Kazakhstan recorded its highest growth in 13 years (6.5%), with industry leading the expansion: mining grew by 9.4% and manufacturing by 6.4%. In 2026, the non-resource sector is expected to play a greater role. Kyrgyzstan has led the region in GDP growth for the third consecutive year: GDP grew by 11.1% in 2025 and by 9% in January 2026. In Uzbekistan, GDP increased by 7.7% in 2025 (up from 6.7% a year earlier), supported by investment, trade, services, and construction. Tajikistan’s GDP rose by 8.4% in 2025, matching the previous year’s performance. Growth continues to be driven by expanding industrial production and strong domestic demand. Early 2026 data suggest this momentum is holding. Uzbekistan’s Record In April, the World Bank highlighted Uzbekistan’s resilience to external challenges and strong growth dynamics. According to its updated report, the country’s 2025 GDP growth was revised upward by 1.5 percentage points to 7.7%. The outlook is 6.4% for 2026 and 6.7% for 2027. Key drivers include high global gold prices, investment inflows, expanded lending, and ongoing structural reforms. Rising household incomes have also played an important role, supported by remittances, which increased by 37% last year to reach $18.9 billion. By the end of 2025, Uzbekistan ranked among the fastest-growing economies in developing countries in Europe and Central Asia, alongside Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The region as a whole is experiencing its highest growth rates in 14 years. At the same time, analysts point to persistent structural constraints, including a large public sector and the dominance of state-owned enterprises, which hinder private sector development. External risks, including geopolitical instability and potential disruptions in energy and fertilizer supplies, remain significant. In 2025, Uzbekistan’s GDP exceeded €133 billion, compared to approximately €56 billion nine years earlier. Over the same period, GDP per capita rose from about €1,750 to around €3,220, nearly doubling average income levels. Investment in fixed capital increased by more than 15% year-on-year in 2025, while export value grew by over 33%. Persistently high global gold prices played a major role: export revenues from gold sales rose by more than 70%. According to President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, around five million people gained a stable source of income in 2025, and 1.5 million were lifted out of poverty. Consumer indicators also improved, with annual housing purchases reaching approximately 270,000 units and car sales hitting one million units. However, the World Bank warns that the next stage of growth may prove more challenging. “Since 2017, Uzbekistan has been considered one of the global leaders in economic reform. Future growth should be based on a strong private sector, accession to the World Trade Organization, and genuinely level playing conditions. Reducing state involvement where private companies can operate more efficiently will help attract investment and create better-quality jobs,” said World Bank economist Pinar Yasar. Inflation Holds Kazakhstan Back Kazakhstan remains the largest economy in Central Asia. The oil sector continues to drive growth, while manufacturing, particularly machinery and metallurgy, is gaining momentum, with new plants opening across the country. “This is primarily due to the stronger-than-expected impact of unlocking investment potential. In addition, industrial production is growing rapidly this year, largely thanks to government measures aimed at economic diversification,” said Aigul Berdigulova, senior analyst at the EDB’s Macroeconomic Analysis Center. However, inflation stood at around 12.3% last year, eroding purchasing power. Elevated interest rates continue to constrain household consumption. Kazakhstan’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil and gas, which account for up to 20-25% of GDP, more than 50% of exports, and a significant share of budget revenues. While this structure supports stability during periods of high commodity prices, it leaves the economy vulnerable to external shocks. According to Qazaq Expert Club analyst Saida Tleuleyeva, diversification potential lies primarily in developing processing industries, particularly petrochemicals. Even partial progress could increase value added by two to three times. Raising manufacturing’s share from 13-14% to 18-20% of GDP could significantly boost output and nearly double non-resource exports from $10-12 billion to over $20 billion. Transport and logistics are another key area. Development of the Trans-Caspian corridor is already increasing cargo volumes, with capacity nearing 5 million tons and plans to expand to 10 million. With sufficient investment, this route could become a stable source of foreign currency earnings. Significant potential also remains in the agro-industrial sector, given Kazakhstan’s vast land resources. Mechanical engineering is another underdeveloped area, as much of the equipment used in the extractive sector is still imported. Kyrgyzstan: Construction Boom and Mortgages In Kyrgyzstan, construction has been a major growth driver, expanding by 29%. This was fueled by a state mortgage program (“My Home 2021-2026”), which enabled large-scale housing development in Bishkek and other regions. This, in turn, stimulated related industries such as cement, brick, and finishing materials production. Investment in fixed capital rose by 18.2%, driven largely by domestic investors and public spending on infrastructure, including hydropower, roads, mining, and processing industries. Foreign investment increased by 17.5%. Amid economic growth, the average monthly nominal wage rose by 19.2%. Even after accounting for inflation, real incomes increased by 12% over six months, supporting strong consumer demand. Inflation remains above 8%. Analysts note that part of the economic upswing is linked to the reorientation of trade and logistics flows following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. “For economies with chronic underinvestment, high growth rates often reflect a catch-up phase rather than a structural breakthrough. In such economies, growth of around 6% typically indicates convergence, whereas in developed countries, 1.5-2% is already considered high,” said Kubat Rakhimov, an infrastructure development expert. He added that GDP growth alone is not sufficient to assess living standards; more meaningful indicators include real disposable income and labor productivity. Tajikistan: Growth Across Key Sectors Tajikistan’s GDP grew by 8.4% in 2025, driven in part by high gold prices, its main export commodity. Significant investments were made in infrastructure, particularly the Rogun hydropower plant. Rising remittances from labor migrants have further supported domestic demand. For the second consecutive year, the economy expanded by 8.4%, reaching nearly $18 billion by the end of 2025. All three key sectors, accounting for about 70% of the economy, are growing: agriculture (23% of GDP), industry (22%), and trade (14%). Agricultural output increased by 9.5% year-on-year in 2025, with growth across major segments. Crop production, which generates two-thirds of sector revenue, recorded higher yields for all major crops. Turkmenistan: Limited Transparency Turkmenistan remains one of the most closed economies in the world, and available data is largely based on official statements and indirect estimates. In February, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov reported GDP growth of 6.3% in 2025. According to official figures, industrial output grew by 1.8%, trade by 9.6%, and agriculture by 7%. Investment increased by 6%, and around 7,000 jobs were created. Earlier, the country’s minister of finance and economy reported that GDP exceeded $68.7 billion in 2024. Persistent Risks Behind Strong Growth Despite strong headline growth, World Bank data highlights significant income disparities across the region. GDP per capita in Kazakhstan stands at around $14,154, compared to approximately $3,162 in Uzbekistan and about $2,420 in Kyrgyzstan. In the U.S., that figure exceeds $84,000. Experts warn that the current levels of Central Asian economic growth remain vulnerable to external shocks, including a slowdown in China, shifts in global demand for hydrocarbons and metals, and geopolitical instability. Analysts also forecast a cooling period as early as 2027, with GDP growth potentially slowing to 4-5%. For now, the region faces a critical challenge: converting rapid growth into sustainable productivity gains, rising real incomes, and stronger institutions. Only then can strong GDP figures translate into lasting improvements in living standards.
Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia
In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells raw materials to China, but it also wants Chinese capital, technology, and industrial capacity at home. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, has become the fastest-moving part of the regional story. Over the past decade, Chinese FDI in Uzbekistan grew by $10.4 billion, lifting the country’s share of China’s Central Asian investment portfolio from 1% to 16%. Bilateral trade has also kept rising, with both sides setting a target of $20 billion. As of January 1, 2026, Uzbekistan had 5,044 companies with Chinese capital. That figure had risen to 5,257 by March 16, 2026. Uzbekistan wants more factories, more processing, and more export-oriented production, and Chinese firms have become central to that push. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan show a different pattern. Their economies are smaller and their bargaining power is weaker, but Chinese trade and investment are still deeply embedded in key sectors. In Kyrgyzstan, China held the largest share of foreign trade in 2025. Accumulated Chinese FDI in the Kyrgyz economy reached $2.1 billion at the end of 2025. In Tajikistan, the accumulated volume of Chinese investment had reached nearly $4 billion by early 2025, and about 70% of that total was direct capital. In both countries, Chinese money has gone into mining, infrastructure, energy, and border development. That gives Beijing more weight than the headline numbers suggest. Turkmenistan remains a special case because gas still dominates the relationship. Chinese capital is present, and Turkmenistan is one of the three countries that make up about 90% of China’s Central Asian FDI stock. However, the commercial picture is much more concentrated than in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. Trade turnover between China and Turkmenistan reached $10.6 billion in 2024, up 11% from 2023, but this growth is still built chiefly on one commodity. That leaves Turkmenistan more exposed to a single-channel relationship than its neighbors to the east and north. Trade and investment measure different kinds of power. Trade can rise quickly when Chinese goods are cheap, routes are open, and Central Asian markets need machinery, electronics, and consumer goods. Investment moves more slowly because it depends on politics, regulation, and returns. So even if Central Asia remains a modest part of China’s global capital map, parts of the region can still become deeply tied to Chinese demand, finance, equipment, and project delivery. This is why the old Belt and Road image of limitless Chinese spending no longer fits. Beijing’s overseas capital has become more disciplined, and the region has become more demanding. Central Asian governments want local jobs, more processing at home, and projects tied to energy security, manufacturing, and transport resilience. China wants secure supplies, export markets, and reliable overland routes across Eurasia. The overlap is strong, but not unlimited. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are both deepening links with other partners at the same time, including Europe, the United States, and the Gulf states. They want Chinese capital, but not exclusivity. That multi-vector outlook is now central to the region’s economic policies. In Central Asia, China’s presence can no longer be measured by the old Belt and Road spectacle. It is better read in the projects themselves: a cement plant on the edge of a village, a dry port at a border, a logistics complex taking shape outside Tashkent. The material footprint is real. It is just more focused, strategic, and more politically negotiated than the slogans once suggested.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
