India and Pakistan: A Central Asian Perspective on Two Military Giants
The new round of heavy clashes involving India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir – then settled by a bilateral adherence to a “full-scale ceasefire” – has also been a confrontation involving the players surrounding the two Asian giants. The involvement of some of them took place in plain sight: take the case of Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a staunch ally of Pakistan, which sent the country a military ship and a group of fighter jets. Or China, which in recent years has invested tens of billions of dollars in Pakistan under the Belt & Road Initiative, and has become by far the largest supplier of military equipment to Islamabad. Beijing immediately called on both sides to engage in diplomacy. On the Indian front, as reported by recent research on the subject, New Delhi is purchasing weapons from an increasingly varied group of countries, including Russia, France, Israel and the United States. The ceasefire saw direct involvement from Washington, which acted as mediator between the two sides. Given also its geographical proximity to the Indian subcontinent, when it comes to Central Asia it is clear that the region may be called into question in any confrontation between India and Pakistan – or that, at least, would be heavily affected by it. During the strikes carried out by India against Pakistan following the deadly attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir, the Indian media emphasized the strategic role that the military base India allegedly operates in Tajikistan could play in a possible open confrontation with Pakistan. Indian experts pointed out that the base could have given New Delhi the ability to strike Pakistan from the west, seriously compromising Islamabad's air defense capabilities. Furthermore, China was also called into question in India's alleged use of the military outpost, as New Delhi is said to be monitoring China's movements on the northern front using its presence in Tajikistan. This base is Ayni Airbase, a Soviet-era military facility located near the Tajik capital Dushanbe. The facts we know for certain point to an Indian involvement in the Tajik base which appears to have ended around 2015. In 2002, India, in collaboration with Tajikistan and Russia, financed an operation to refurbish the base, investing around $70 million in the project. Among the changes made was the lengthening of the runway, which was intended to ensure that it could be used by aircraft operated by the Indian armed forces. As also stated in the report on Central Asian armed forces drafted by the DC-based The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, after a phase in which it seemed that India would play a concrete role in the management of the base, Dushanbe subsequently backtracked, partly due to pressure from Russia. The same path was followed by New Delhi's involvement in the Farkhor airbase, initially used to reach Afghanistan by land by landing Indian cargo planes at the base, located near the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Over the years, the logistical importance of the structure gradually declined until it was finally abandoned by India. Despite the rhetoric of Indian media, New Delhi's military presence in Tajikistan is therefore essentially non-existent, unlike that of China. Since 2015, with much attention from the international media, Beijing has built two military outposts in Tajikistan and is said to already have agreements with Dushanbe for the construction of a third facility. Used purely for intelligence and anti-terrorism purposes, it is not certain that these bases will not also house personnel from the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese army, in the future. Pakistan has itself deepened its bilateral security relationship with Tajikistan in recent years. One of the most important steps was taken in 2021 with the signing of a memorandum of understanding, according to which Pakistan would begin supplying Tajikistan with domestically produced weapons. Given the absence of an Indian military outpost in Tajikistan, and more generally in the region, New Delhi nevertheless maintains significant bilateral relations on security affairs with the Central Asian republics. Proof of this can be found, for example, in the military drills that the Asian giant periodically conducts with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The longest relationship in this regard is with Bishkek: in March 2025, the twelfth edition of the joint exercises, known as Khanjar, was held, which saw the participation, as reported by the Indian Ministry of Defence, of troops from The Parachute Regiment (Special Forces) for India and the Kyrgyz Scorpion Brigade. In 2024, the eighth edition of the joint exercises between India and Kazakhstan, Kazind, was held on Indian territory, for the first time including the Air Forces and Airborne Assault Forces of Kazakhstan. A few weeks ago, in mid-April 2025, the sixth edition of Dustlik, the joint exercises held annually by New Delhi and Tashkent, took place as well. A few weeks ago, another very important step was taken but on the Pakistani side: Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev received in Astana General Asim Munir, the Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Armed Forces. During the several meetings that took place, possible collaborations in the field of defense were also discussed, including technical-military cooperation and combat and special forces training. Munir, who is usually active behind the scenes and far from the spotlight, during the recent crisis emerged as one of the most prominent figures, clearly announcing Islamabad's willingness to respond forcefully to any Indian attack. As can be seen, the security ties between India and Pakistan and the Central Asian republics are remarkable. The latter's caution on security issues and close military ties with Russia are factors that would suggest that Central Asia would be spared from a large-scale conflict between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, however, in such a case, China could be called upon to support its ally Pakistan. As we have seen, Beijing has a significant military presence in Tajikistan, a factor that should not be underestimated when considering the possible repercussions in Central Asia of the instability in the subcontinent. That said, what is certain is that an open conflict could destabilize the entire area, from Afghanistan to the Central Asian republics, and its impact would be felt on several fronts.
Victory Day in Central Asia: Honoring Sacrifice Amid Shifting Narratives
For the countries of Central Asia, Victory Day holds a deep significance. Although debates over the nature of the May 9 commemorations have intensified in recent years, the importance of the holiday remains unchallenged.
A War That Touched Every Family
Attitudes toward the celebration marking the defeat of Nazi Germany are largely shaped by each nation's level of participation in the war effort. Kazakhstan mobilized over 1.2 million people, nearly 20% of its pre-war population of 6.5 million. Of these, more than 600,000 perished at the front, with an additional 300,000 dying in the rear due to malnutrition, forced labor, and inadequate medical care.
With a similar sized population, Uzbekistan sent approximately 1.95 million people to the front - or one in every three residents. Around 400,000 Uzbeks did not return home. Over 500 Kazakhstani and more than 300 Uzbekistani soldiers were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
[caption id="attachment_31602" align="aligncenter" width="2560"]
Eternal flame and Crying Mother Monument, Tashkent; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption]
Kyrgyzstan, home to just 1.5 million people at the time, sent over 363,000 to the front. Approximately 100,000 perished, and 73 received the Hero of the Soviet Union medal. Tajikistan mobilized more than 300,000 troops, with over 100,000 never returning. Fifty-five Tajiks received Hero of the Soviet Union honors. Turkmenistan, with a population of 1.3 million, sent around 200,000 soldiers and officers; 16 received Hero status.
Central Asian soldiers played vital roles in major battles, including the defense of Moscow. They helped liberate territories across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The region also contributed 20-30% of its horse population, then a central component of local economies, for military use.
The war profoundly reshaped Central Asia. Thousands of Soviet enterprises were relocated to the region, fueling industrialization. Millions of refugees from Nazi-occupied zones found sanctuary in Central Asian republics. Many children were taken in by local families and raised as their own.
Today, many in Central Asia feel that outsiders fail to grasp the weight of Victory Day. While countries like the UK, U.S., Italy, and France recorded wartime deaths of 380,000, 417,000, 479,000, and 665,000 respectively, the USSR suffered over 26 million losses. German losses are estimated at 8.4 million.
Celebrating Amid Controversy
Recent years have brought a shift in how Victory Day is perceived in Central Asia. Symbols such as the Guards ribbon, criticized for echoing imperial Russian motifs, have sparked debate. Some argue that the holiday reflects colonial oppression, as the peoples of Soviet Asia were conscripted into a foreign war. These debates have grown louder since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, with some now viewing the May 9 celebrations as a tool of Russian influence in the region. Nonetheless, Central Asian leaders have rejected efforts to "cancel" Victory Day, reaffirming its deep personal and national resonance.
Efforts to distinguish the celebration from Russian state narratives are evident. Many events now emphasize patriotism rather than Soviet nostalgia. On May 7, Kazakhstan held its first military parade in Astana in seven years, marking both Defender of the Fatherland Day and the 80th anniversary of Victory Day. In Almaty, a procession called Batyrlarğa Tağzym ("Let's Bow to the Heroes") will honor Kazakhstani front-line soldiers. This event mirrors Russia’s "Immortal Regiment" but is positioned within a distinct national context.
Veterans will be honored across the region through concerts, shows, community festivals, and financial support. Kazakhstan plans to name over 500 streets after World War II veterans, according to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
Military parades took place on May 8 in Bishkek and Dushanbe. In Tashkent and other Uzbek cities, major festivities are planned. Uzbekistan is leading the region in veteran support, providing $10,000 to each of the 82 surviving war veterans, one of whom is 114 years old. Kazakhstan will grant $9,686.90 to its 111 veterans. Kyrgyzstan’s 32 remaining veterans will receive $1,140 each. In Tajikistan, 17 veterans will receive $4,810, with those in Dushanbe getting an additional $2,000 from the city administration.
In contrast, Russian veterans will receive less than $1,000 each.
[caption id="attachment_31603" align="aligncenter" width="1280"]
The Turkmen Rifles march in Red Square, Moscow; image: Telegram @ejpredbot[/caption]
Against the backdrop of ongoing conflicts and shifting alliances, all five Central Asian leaders attended this year’s Victory Day parade on Moscow’s Red Square, which speaks volumes about the region’s delicate relationship with Russia. In Moscow, Vladimir Putin vowed that the Russian army would always stand up to “nazism," a narrative previously used by Russia to justify its invasion of Ukraine. In one of a number of growing examples of Central Asia's agency, however, Kazakhstan's President Tokayev has voiced his support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity
Victory Day Diplomacy: Central Asia’s Balancing Act and Putin’s Diminished Spotlight
Every year, Moscow’s Red Square transforms into a stage for one of Russia's most celebrated traditions: Victory Day, an event which marks the Soviet Union’s triumph over Nazi Germany in World War II. Yet, as tanks roll through the cobblestone streets and military bands echo under the Kremlin walls, the occasion feels more heavily laden with geopolitical undertones than historical reminiscence these days. Against the backdrop of ongoing conflicts and shifting alliances, the presence of Central Asian leaders at this year’s event speaks to the region’s delicate relationship with the Russian Federation. But the question remains: amidst the pomp and circumstance, is there much for Vladimir Putin to celebrate? Central Asia’s Careful Balancing Act The attendance of Central Asian leaders at the Victory Day parade is a striking show of diplomatic choreography. On the surface, their presence will underscore the shared historical legacy of the Soviet era, when the sacrifices of the Central Asian republics contributed to the Allied victory in the Second World War. However, a more pragmatic lens reveals a balancing act that defines the region’s foreign policy. The region finds itself at the crossroads of global powers vying for influence in Central Asia. While Moscow leans on historical ties and cultural commonalities to retain its sway, Beijing’s economic clout continues to reshape the region’s trade networks and infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, as the inaugural EU-Central Asia Summit attests to, the European Union is eager to expand its reach, whilst hungry for Rare Earth Elements in which the region is rich, the U.S. is waiting in the wings. For Central Asian leaders, participating in Victory Day celebrations signals a nod to Russia’s historic role but also keeps the door open for economic and security cooperation. Amidst the shifting architecture of global politics, their diplomatic strategy remains one of pragmatism, seeking benefits from multiple partners while avoiding any over-alignment. What Does Russia Gain from the Optics? The presence of 29 leaders from across the globe – including Chinese President Xi Jinping - offers Moscow valuable optics at a time when its international relationships face significant strain. Last year, only nine attended. Isolated by Western sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine and with much of the world’s media painting Russia as cut off from the global stage, the impression of a united front with Central Asia helps the Kremlin portray the opposite. Victory Day, therefore, becomes a geopolitical tool, with the attendance of Central Asian leaders enabling Putin to send a message of shared unity within Russia’s historical sphere of influence. It tells both domestic and international audiences that Moscow retains significant allies, reinforcing the image of resilience despite ongoing challenges. How Much Does Moscow Truly Celebrate? The Victory Day parade is an event that is watched by an estimated three-quarters of the Russian public, drumming up patriotism as the state seeks to become the custodian of collective memory. Behind the spectacle, however, signs of disquiet are proving hard to ignore. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has disrupted trade and migration flows central to its ties. The war has also starkly exposed the limits of Moscow’s power. Sanctions have weakened its economy, leaving Central Asia less dependent on Russian investments. Meanwhile, China continues to rise as the dominant force in the region’s economic development, chipping away at Russia’s influence. Even as Central Asian leaders attend events in Moscow, therefore, they tread with caution. Kazakhstan, for example, has refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories. President Tokayev has voiced his support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, making it clear that sovereignty and territorial integrity are also paramount concern for Kazakhstan. This serves to illustrate how the purported unity displayed at Victory Day parades is complicated. While maintaining relations with Russia remains important, Central Asian countries do not want to be drawn into Moscow’s geopolitical confrontations. Central Asia’s Ascendant Voice In the so-called ‘New Great Game,’ Central Asian nations find themselves in a stronger position than before. Their ability to engage both Russia and China while also exploring relationships with the U.S., Turkey, and the European Union, grants them leverage. Leaders in the region are increasingly pushing back when their sovereignty is questioned, as seen in Kazakhstan’s refusal to accede to all of Russia’s demands related to sanctions enforcement and its cautious neutrality over the Ukraine war. A bold stance was also taken by Uzbekistan in its summoning of the Russian Ambassador over annexation comments made by the far right in Moscow. The Real Takeaway from Victory Day For Central Asia, Victory Day celebrations in Moscow are less about solidarity with Russia and more about safeguarding their interests. By attending, leaders strike a delicate balance, acknowledging a shared history without endorsing Moscow’s current actions on the world stage. This calculated diplomacy allows them to ensure stability in their relationships with Russia while continuing to expand alliances with other global powers. For Vladimir Putin, this cautious allegiance may not be a cause for celebration, but it is much needed. Russia’s influence in Central Asia has not completely waned, even if the region’s priorities have shifted. So, while Moscow puts on its grand spectacle, the broader narrative reveals a world where former Soviet republics are increasingly finding their voice, even as they stand in Red Square.
Central Asian Perspectives Take Center Stage in Milan
A pale Milanese dawn draped the city in shifting greys, as visitors crossed the threshold into the space of Fondazione Elpis, a foundation created to promote dialogue with emerging geographies and young artists.
This time, it was Central Asian artists who were in the spotlight, claiming a shared history fractured by Soviet rule and global currents. The show YOU ARE HERE: Central Asia redraws a regional map, allowing artists to redraw the borders of their belonging beyond nation-states. At the same time, it invites each visitor to relate to the works by locating its place within these stitched, erased, and reconfigured narratives.
Curators Dilda Ramazan and Aida Sulova orchestrated twenty-seven artists into a living constellation: from Munara Abdukakharova’s rolled patchwork, its golden hammer-and-sickle motifs softened by the hand-stitched curves of Kyrgyz kurak korpe, to Vyacheslav Akhunov’s furious erasures of scraped notes, the show reassembled in unexpected patterns stories of resilience, resistance, and reimagined belonging.
YOU ARE HERE not only reframed Central Asia for a European audience but asserted that the region’s histories are neither static nor singular, they are stitched, erased, reconfigured, and claimed anew by the very people who live them.
The Times of Central Asia spoke with Kazakh curator, Dilda Ramazan.
[caption id="attachment_31541" align="aligncenter" width="2560"]
"YOU ARE HERE. Central Asia", installation view, primo piano, Fondazione Elpis, Milano © Fabrizio Vatieri Studio[/caption]
TCA: Can you tell us about the genesis of the show?
The show emerged after the invitation of the Fondazione Elpis, whose founder, Marina Nissim, became interested in the region and its artists after seeing one of the Central Asian pavilions at the Venice Biennale.
By presenting the complex Central Asian landscape to a European public who might not know it very well, we wanted to give artists the platform for free expression without framing the region from the stereotypical perspective, as is often the case in the Western context. We wanted the artists to reflect on the idea of space and belonging through the idea of locating oneself.
TCA: Do you feel there is a growing awareness of Central Asia in Europe?
Yes, I can feel and see it, but it is a natural process one should expect within the logic of globalization. The exhibition addressed the impact of Soviet and post-Soviet transitions on the cultural identities of Central Asian nations by showcasing artists of several generations. Some of them had a direct experience of living under the Soviet regime, so again the artists spoke for themselves and the region’s past through their works.
[caption id="attachment_31542" align="aligncenter" width="2560"]
Emil Tilekov, Traces and Shadows, 2024 © Fabrizio Vatieri Studio[/caption]
TCA: How is the theme of migration explored in the exhibition, particularly concerning its economic and emotional implications for Central Asian communities?
Migration was one of the key aspects evoked in the show because it is still an experience lived by the artists and/or their relatives and families. Two Kyrgyz artists, for example, raised this issue in their projects.
This was the case in the video by Chingiz Aidarov, who worked as a migrant in Moscow, and a performative piece by Jazgul Madazimova, who produced a new artwork specifically for the show at Fondazione Elpis, reminiscing about her mother's labor migration to Russia.
Alexei Rumyantsev, a Tajik artist, presented his installation in the shape of a brick wall with ikat, traditional Central Asian fabrics, which also evoked rather poetically the representation of Central Asian migrant labor as a basis for some foundations of other places.
[caption id="attachment_31534" align="aligncenter" width="2560"]
Alexey Rumyantsev, The Wall, 2024 © Fabrizio Vatieri Studio[/caption]
TCA: How did the exhibition challenge Western-centric perspectives in art by presenting alternative narratives from Central Asia?
I think the exhibition tried to do so by highlighting artist's experiences without expecting anything from them. All of the selected participants were given carte blanche so that they could talk about whatever they decided was important to share. We, as curators, didn’t have any specific agenda to keep up with; we just followed and trusted the artists.
TCA: How did you choose the artists for the show?
We proceeded via a semi-open call. This means that we addressed a call to a restricted number of artists, not publicly. After, we made our selection from what we received from them as proposals.
TCA: Let’s talk about specific artworks; how does Vyacheslav Akhunov's technique of erasing texts and images, and Ester Sheynfeld's collection of the resulting dust in Petri dishes, serve as a metaphor for the deconstruction and preservation of memory?
Vyacheslav Akhunov’s and Ester Sheynfeld’s projects [have a] dialogue with each other. As assistant and teacher, it was important for them to preserve this complementary character of their practices. Akhunov comes to erase his notes, directly and violently, alluding to the process of rewriting history in the region, whereas Sheynfeld is here to preserve and inherit from previous generations. So, despite the loss, which was fabricated and created rather artificially, knowledge could still be saved in Central Asia.
[caption id="attachment_31536" align="aligncenter" width="2560"]
Vyacheslav Akhunov and Ester Sheynfeld, The Disappearance, 2024 / Dust, 2024 © Fabrizio Vatieri Studio[/caption]
TCA: What is the significance of the materials used in Aika Akhmetova's Rage Fantasies, and how do they reflect on consumer culture and personal identity?
Aika Akhmetova’s installation was made from materials found in the region. The key element is the Soviet-era blue mailbox, which can still be seen in many of the cities in Central Asia. Part of the architecture of the entrance in any residential building, those mailboxes are rarely in use today since the systems were modernized in Central Asia after the USSR collapsed. But still, they remain, offering the possibility of a different appropriation as a space of communication for teenagers in love or neighbors’ chit-chat. Thus, they become territories of one’s free expression, not really private nor fully public.
[caption id="attachment_31537" align="aligncenter" width="2560"]
Aika Akhmetova, Rage Fantasies (dettaglio), 2023, Installazione site specific © Fabrizio Vatieri Studio[/caption]
TCA: How does Saodat Ismailova's Her Five Lives explore the multifaceted experiences of women in Central Asia through its narrative and visual elements?
Saodat Ismailova’s piece centers on female experiences by hijacking the perspective from the male gaze of directors to that of the presence of women who starred in the films. It shows the evolution of heroines, how they were portrayed in the cinema, and how that portrayal evolved under different historical periods.
TCA: What is the conceptual significance of Yerbossyn Meldibekov's use of aluminum basins in his installation NKVD, and how does it relate to Soviet-era surveillance?
The idea behind using aluminum basins was related to the material's pliability and plasticity — it easily changes shape under pressure. This was important to provide the installation with a specific visual effect, that of the Central Asian mountain peak that got renamed multiple times under the influence of different political regimes that were present in the region during the last century. Another meaning of using a basin was important for Meldibekov to highlight the object’s initial function. As a washing basin, it showed that history itself could be washed away by those in power.
[caption id="attachment_31538" align="aligncenter" width="2560"]
Yerbossyn Meldibekov, NKVD, 2020-2021, installazione, 4 bacinelle di alluminio, dimensioni variabili © Fabrizio Vatieri Studio[/caption]
TCA: How does the Qizlar collective's use of Telegram for video performances challenge traditional notions of artistic space and audience engagement?
Qizlar installation’s idea was to demonstrate that physical location is no longer important in our highly digitalized world of social networks and applications. The artists wanted to make everyone see how they always manage to keep their presence together as a collective even if they are far away from each other. Artistic space, as they show us, is any space produced by artistic gesture. Very much the same applies to Central Asia: it can be anywhere Central Asians are.
[caption id="attachment_31539" align="aligncenter" width="2139"]
Qizlar, In the Circle of My Heart, 2024 © Fabrizio Vatieri Studio[/caption]
TCA: Finally, can you please tell me about the reception to the show, and how do you hope the show has impacted the knowledge of Central Asia and its contemporary art scene internationally?
I’m happy with how the show went because it was greatly supported by our diaspora in Europe and Central Asians who traveled abroad to see it. I also want to believe that it managed to bring Central Asia closer to Europeans, showing them that we’re not different from them, only that we went through some other experiences in the past. On a very personal level, I learned a lot by doing this project, and I could not be happier to have worked with the amazing team at the Fondazione Elpis.
Tajikistan Has the Harshest Fines Relative to Income in Central Asia
Tajikistan ranks first among Central Asian countries in the ratio of maximum fines to average salaries, a disparity that has sparked growing dissatisfaction among the population. Structure and Scale of Fines Fines in Tajikistan fall into two categories: administrative and criminal. Administrative fines apply to less serious infractions, such as traffic violations, breaches of sanitary rules, and disorderly conduct. Criminal fines, by contrast, target serious offenses including fraud, tax evasion, and property crimes. Administrative penalties are more common and tend to disproportionately impact ordinary citizens. As of January 1, 2025, the minimum administrative fine for individuals and sole proprietors is 75 Tajikistani somoni (TJS), or approximately $7.20. For government officials, the minimum fine is 225 TJS ($21), and for legal entities it is 750 TJS ($72). The upper threshold for administrative fines is capped at $780 for individuals, $1,400 for officials, $2,120 for entrepreneurs, and $7,200 for legal entities. Regional Comparisons Compared to its neighbors, Tajikistan's fine-to-salary ratio is starkly higher. In Kazakhstan, the maximum fine for individuals is roughly $1,537, or about 80.5% of the average monthly salary ($851 as of January 2025). In Kyrgyzstan, the maximum individual fine of approximately $229 represents just 50.9% of the average salary ($450). In Uzbekistan, where the maximum individual fine is limited to $145, it amounts to about 35% of the average salary of $414. In contrast, the maximum administrative fine in Tajikistan for individuals exceeds the country’s average monthly income by more than 2.8 times, placing it at the bottom of the regional ranking in terms of fairness and affordability. Calls for Reform Experts have proposed that Tajikistan consider adopting a proportional system of fines based on the offender’s income. Such systems, already implemented in various European countries, aim to ensure that penalties are equitable across income groups. In Finland, traffic fines are linked to annual income; in Sweden and Norway, they depend on monthly earnings. Other countries, including Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and France, also tailor financial penalties to income. Estonia and Latvia have initiated similar reforms, signaling a broader European trend. Adopting such a model in Tajikistan could improve perceptions of justice and encourage compliance with laws, particularly among higher-income groups. However, experts caution that successful implementation would require sweeping legal reforms, along with mechanisms to accurately monitor and verify income levels.
Central Asia’s Green Energy Dream: Too Big to Achieve?
Although most Central Asian nations are heavily dependent on fossil fuel production and exports, they are aiming to significantly increase the use of renewable energy, hoping to eventually become crucial suppliers of so-called green electricity to Europe. Achieving such an ambitious goal will be easier said than done, given that developing the green energy sector in the region requires massive investment. What Central Asian states – struggling to attract long-term private capital into clean energy projects – need is financing for projects that modernize power networks, improve grid stability, and enable cross-border electricity flows. These upgrades are essential for large-scale renewable energy deployment and regional trade in power. Most actors in Central Asia seem to have taken major steps in this direction. In November 2024, at the COP29 climate conference held in Baku, Kazakhstan signed several deals worth nearly $3.7 billion with international companies and development institutions to support green energy projects. Neighboring Uzbekistan, according to reports, has attracted more than €22 billion ($23.9) in foreign investment in renewable energy, while Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan – which is aiming to generate all its electricity from green energy sources by 2032 – have developed strategies to help increase their renewable potential. But to turn their goals into reality, all these nations will need funding – whether from oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, China, the European Union, or various international financial institutions. Presently, the development of the Caspian Green Energy Corridor – which aims to supply green electricity from Central Asia to Azerbaijan and further to Europe – remains the region’s most ambitious project. According to Yevgeniy Zhukov, the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Director General for Central and West Asia, this initiative is a strategic priority for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. “While the prospect of exporting green electricity to Europe is part of the long-term vision, the core goal of the initiative is to accelerate green growth within the region,” Zhukov told The Times of Central Asia. Together with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the ADB is funding a feasibility study for this proposed transmission corridor. The study will assess the technical and economic viability of such a system, along with the environmental and regulatory requirements. In the meantime, the ABD is expected to continue funding other green energy projects in the region. The financial entity, according to Zhukov, invested $250 million in Uzbekistan in 2023 to support renewable energy development and comprehensive power sector reforms, while in other Central Asian countries, it remains “firmly committed to driving the green energy transition.” “For instance, in Tajikistan we are exploring the potential to co-finance the Rogun Hydropower Project alongside the World Bank and other international partners. In Kyrgyzstan, our focus has been on supporting foundational reforms in the energy sector, including strengthening the policy and regulatory environment to attract private investment in renewables. In Turkmenistan, we’ve launched a total of $1.75 million technical assistance initiative to help lay the groundwork for future renewable energy development,” Zhukov stressed, pointing out that these efforts are part of a broader dialogue to support the Central Asian countries’ long-term clean energy ambitions and explore pathways for regional cooperation. In other words, this multilateral development bank, headquartered in the Philippines, is working closely with Central Asian governments to support the transition to cleaner, more sustainable energy systems. As such, the ADB seems to be particularly active in Kazakhstan, where it is helping the authorities “ensure inclusive economic growth, strengthen governance, and address the impacts of climate change.” “To help Kazakhstan achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 and contribute to global climate change mitigation, ADB is supporting the country through various initiatives. They include financing the construction of solar power plants, modernizing a coal-based heat and power plant in Almaty, expanding the high-voltage transmission network in southern Kazakhstan to integrate large-scale renewable energy, and providing advisory support on heat legislation,” Zhukov told TCA, adding that the Bank’s focus in the region’s largest country is to “support the shift from coal to cleaner energy for power, combined heat and power, and heat only boilers.” It is no secret that despite being a major consumer of coal, Kazakhstan is seeking to gradually shut down some of its coal power plants and replace them with renewable or other low-carbon energy sources. Neighboring Kyrgyzstan is also aiming to phase out coal and is therefore looking to ADB for technical assistance in identifying and preparing a pipeline of viable clean energy projects. But the path toward a green energy transition in Central Asia is not without challenges. Key obstacles include an outdated energy infrastructure, regulatory uncertainty, limited regional integration, and competition for investment with more mature renewable markets. Thus, even though Central Asian countries have strong potential to go green, making it happen will take a steady effort, cooperation, as well as continued support from foreign actors seeking to strengthen their presence in this strategically important region.
Parents of Imprisoned Tajik Journalist Rukhshona Khakimova Urge Rahmon to Intervene
The parents of Rukhshona Khakimova, a Tajik journalist sentenced in February 2025 to eight years in prison on charges of treason, have issued an open letter to President Emomali Rahmon, urging him to reconsider their daughter’s case and facilitate her release. Family Appeals for Clemency A copy of the letter, signed by Khakimova’s parents, Zokir Khakimov and Makhsuda Sharopova, was published on social media on May 3. In the letter, the couple described their daughter’s upbringing in a family of educators committed to national values, patriotism, and humanism. Khakimov, a former school director in Kanibadam, and Sharopova, a retired teacher, emphasized their daughter’s achievements. “Our daughter graduated from school and university with honors, received a presidential scholarship, and always worked honestly and within the law,” they wrote. “We can say with complete confidence that Rukhshona could not have committed treason.” They appealed to Rahmon to intervene, especially considering that Khakimova is the mother of two young children. “We respectfully request and implore you, as the supreme leader of the nation, to take steps for her release,” the letter states. Background on the Charges Khakimova, 31, was convicted under Article 305, Part 2, Paragraph “c” of Tajikistan’s Criminal Code, “treason using her official position.” She was sentenced to eight years in prison following a closed trial. Human rights groups claim the charges were linked to her journalistic investigation into China’s influence in Tajikistan. Complicating the case is the fact that Khakimova is reportedly the niece of an opposition figure sentenced to 18 years for attempting a coup. Prior to her arrest, she had been placed under house arrest, her documents were confiscated, and on February 5, she was detained in the courtroom immediately following the verdict. An appellate court upheld the decision. Subsequently, about 230,000 somoni, savings intended for purchasing a home, were withdrawn from her bank account. On April 22, she was transferred from a pre-trial detention center in Dushanbe to a women’s correctional facility in Nurek. Public and International Reaction Khakimova’s sentencing has sparked condemnation both domestically and abroad. Journalists and human rights advocates described the case as emblematic of worsening conditions for press freedom in Tajikistan. Activists claim she faced repeated threats prior to her arrest. Earlier this year, a group of women and civil society activists also submitted a letter to Rahmon requesting leniency. International organizations including Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, and The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders have called for her immediate release. Despite multiple appeals, Tajik authorities have yet to respond, and the sentence remains in effect.
Drone Attacks Intensify Security Worries Over Moscow Anniversary Event
Concerns about the security of dignitaries are circulating ahead of Russia’s plans for May 9 celebrations in Moscow of the 80th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, an event that leaders from Central Asia are expected to attend as the Russo-Ukrainian war continues. The unease relates to Ukraine’s growing capacity in drone warfare, a dominant feature of the battlefield after years of war between Ukrainian troops and invading Russian forces. On Sunday, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said air defense forces in the urban area of Podolsk, on the outskirts of Moscow, “repelled an attack” by four drones flying toward the capital. “According to preliminary data, there is no damage or casualties at the site of the fall of the debris. Emergency services specialists are working at the scene,” Sobyanin said on Telegram. Overnight, Ukrainian drones targeted Moscow again, disrupting operations at four of the city's airports. Sobyanin announced on Telegram that at least 19 Ukrainian drones were intercepted. Although no significant damage or injuries were immediately reported, debris from the intercepted drones landed on a major highway. On April 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin unilaterally declared a three-day ceasefire in the war with Ukraine from May 8 – 11 to coincide with the celebrations of victory in the Great Patriotic War, as the Soviet experience in World War II is called. But Ukraine rejected the proposal, saying it seems mainly designed to create a safe environment for its guests in Moscow and that a U.S-backed plan for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire would instead represent a serious step toward peace. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said Ukraine isn’t responsible for anyone’s safety on Russian territory on the day of the anniversary celebrations. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, has warned of massive retaliation if Ukraine strikes Moscow during the May 9 event, saying on Telegram that “in the event of a real provocation on Victory Day, no one can guarantee that May 10 will come in Kyiv.” An analyst who tracks drone technology, Russian military weapons development and related issues said Russia’s concern about the May 9 parade stems from Ukraine’s growing expertise in drones. “Ukrainian long-range drones can already strike across the entire [of] Russia's European (west of Urals) territory,” Samuel Bendett, a researcher at the Center for Naval Analyses, said on X. The city of Sevastopol in Russia-controlled Crimea won’t hold a Victory Day parade for security reasons, said city Gov. Mikhail Razvozhayev, according to Russia’s state-run news agency TASS. Sevastopol hasn’t held a parade in the last couple of years because of similar concerns. In 2014, Russian forces occupied and annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, where Ukraine has conducted periodic attacks with drones and other weapons since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The Kremlin says Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Russia at Putin’s invitation on May 7-10 and will attend the Victory Day celebrations. Russian state media have reported that the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States, or CIS, will also attend. The CIS, a regional group that was set up as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, includes the Central Asian countries that were Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. On May 3, Putin and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan discussed trade and other issues including the treatment of Uzbek migrants in Russia. A Kremlin readout of the conversation said Mirziyoyev had confirmed he “would take part in the anniversary events to be held in Moscow;” the Uzbek presidency didn’t mention the May 9 celebrations in its summary of the talk.
Sunkar Podcast
Repatriating Islamic State Fighters and Families: Balancing Security and Humanity
