Asian Development Bank: Poverty in Tajikistan Declining, But Inequality Rising
Tajikistan is experiencing mixed socioeconomic trends. While the country’s poverty rate has declined markedly in recent years, inequality and structural economic constraints remain significant challenges. This assessment is outlined in the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) country partnership strategy for 2026-2030. According to the ADB, the share of the population living below the national poverty line fell from 30.9% in 2020 to 19.9% in 2024. However, the improvement has been driven largely by rising incomes linked to wage growth and remittances from labor migrants rather than by sustained job creation within the domestic economy. Analysts note that this development may contribute to widening inequality, particularly in rural and remote areas where access to economic opportunities remains limited. Most of Tajikistan’s population lives in southern and central regions, where economic activity is heavily dependent on agriculture. These areas face heightened social risks. Women remain among the most vulnerable groups due to restricted access to employment opportunities and higher levels of food insecurity. Despite overall progress in poverty reduction, food security challenges persist. Approximately 1.5 million people are considered vulnerable, while around 50,000 are experiencing acute food shortages. In the 2025 Global Hunger Index, Tajikistan ranked 63rd out of 123 countries, the lowest position among Central Asian states. The ADB identifies weak economic diversification as a key structural issue. Heavy reliance on agriculture leaves the country exposed to external shocks and climate-related risks. Private sector development has been slow, constrained by shortages of skilled labor, underdeveloped infrastructure, and a complex regulatory environment. Limited integration into regional and global markets further hampers growth. Infrastructure quality remains among the weakest in the region. Restricted access to transport networks and logistics services continues to hinder industrial development and trade expansion. The energy sector also faces structural challenges. Dependence on hydropower increases vulnerability to climate change, particularly through declining water availability and glacier melt. At the same time, gaps in education and vocational training contribute to persistent shortages of qualified workers. These pressures are intensified by high levels of labor migration, especially among young people. As a result, the domestic economy experiences workforce shortages in sectors that could otherwise drive long-term growth. Although agriculture remains central to livelihoods, it is increasingly exposed to climate risks and constrained by limited access to markets, financing, and modern technologies.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team examine a series of major developments across Central Asia, from the results of Kazakhstan's constitutional referendum to the announcement of new Chinese-funded border outposts and fortifications along Tajikistan's frontier. We also look at the continuing fallout from the security shake-up in Kyrgyzstan, with further arrests and resignations, as well as the increasingly strange foreign movements of Turkmenistan's senior leadership while war continues to rage just across the border in Iran, alongside Tehran's threats to strike Turkmen infrastructure. The episode then turns to the escalating conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where some of the heaviest fighting in months is raising fresh questions about border stability, regional security, and the risk of wider spillover. Finally, for our main story, we bring on a panel of experts to discuss the growing issues surrounding the Rogun Dam and its resettlement project, and how both are likely to affect the states downstream. On the show this week: - Eugene Simonov (Rivers Without Boundaries Coalition) - Mark Fodor (Coalition for Human Rights in Development)
The History of Nauryz: An Ancient Festival That Continues to Unite Central Asia
Ahead of the Nauryz holiday, The Times of Central Asia looks at the origins and enduring significance of one of the region’s oldest celebrations. More than a seasonal festival, Nauryz reflects a deep connection between people, nature, and cultural identity, a tradition that has evolved over thousands of years and remains central to life across Central Asia. Origins and Meaning
Nauryz, also known as Nowruz, is one of the world’s oldest holidays, marking the arrival of spring and the beginning of a new year. It is celebrated on the day of the spring equinox, when day and night are approximately equal and nature appears to begin a new cycle.
For many communities, the holiday symbolizes renewal, hope for prosperity, and the start of a new stage in life.
The name “Nowruz” derives from ancient Iranian words meaning “new day.” This concept lies at the heart of the celebration: the renewal of life and the symbolic rebirth of nature after winter.
With a history spanning more than 3,000 years, the holiday spread across Eurasia along the Silk Roads and became embedded in the cultural traditions of Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. [caption id="attachment_45687" align="alignnone" width="300"]
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Today, Nowruz is recognized not only as a calendar event but also as a cultural tradition that promotes values such as peace, mutual respect, and harmony with nature.
Connection to the Spring Equinox
Nauryz is traditionally celebrated during the spring equinox, which usually falls on March 20 or 21, when the Sun crosses the celestial equator and daylight and nighttime hours are nearly equal.
Since ancient times, this moment has symbolized the awakening of nature and the beginning of a new agricultural year.
Historical sources indicate that different communities once observed various dates in March, often guided by natural signs. Over time, however, the astronomical equinox, commonly observed on March 21, became the most widely accepted date.
Medieval scholars paid close attention to this phenomenon. In the 11th and 12th centuries, astronomers such as Omar Khayyam refined calendar calculations to align the start of the year more precisely with the equinox.
Alongside scientific knowledge, traditional methods were also used to forecast harvests and weather conditions, including observing seed germination or measuring the length of shadows before the holiday.
Today, Nauryz is officially celebrated on March 21 in countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while UNESCO also recognizes Nowruz as marking the first day of spring.
Rituals and Traditions
For centuries, Nauryz has been marked by rituals symbolizing renewal, fertility, and prosperity. Among both nomadic and settled communities, it has traditionally been celebrated with public festivities, games, and family gatherings.
Common customs include ritual cleansing with water, exchanging gifts, and offering food to neighbors and guests. The altybakan swing is widely regarded as a symbol of spring and joy. In some regions, the ancient practice of jumping over fire has been preserved as a purification ritual.
Food plays a central role in the celebration. Although culinary traditions vary by country, they share a common symbolism of abundance and new life.
In Kazakhstan, the main festive dish is Nauryz kozhe, a soup prepared from seven ingredients representing prosperity and well-being. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, sumalak, a sweet dish made from sprouted wheat, is a key symbol of the holiday.
Sumalak is traditionally prepared collectively, often overnight, with participants taking turns stirring the pot and making wishes. It is believed to bring prosperity and fertility.
Festive tables also feature dishes such as plov, herb-filled samsa, and manty dumplings.
Celebrations are typically accompanied by traditional games and competitions, including horse racing, wrestling, equestrian contests, and street performances. People gather around a shared dastarkhan, sing songs, visit relatives, and exchange wishes for health, peace, and prosperity.
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From Suppression to Revival
During the Soviet period, large-scale public celebrations of Nauryz were restricted, and many traditions were preserved mainly within families and local communities. From the late 1980s onward, however, the holiday began to experience a revival.
Following the independence of Central Asian states, Nauryz was officially recognized as a public holiday across the region.
Today, it is widely celebrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, with festivals, fairs, and public events held in major cities.
Its international recognition underscores its cultural significance. In 2009, Nowruz was inscribed on UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, and since 2010 March 21 has been observed as the International Day of Nowruz.
Nauryz remains one of the most enduring cultural traditions in Central Asia, with its meaning preserved across generations.
Its emphasis on renewal and hospitality continues to bring communities together across borders and remains a familiar part of life across the region.
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan Send Humanitarian Aid to Iran
Tajikistan is sending a convoy of 110 trucks carrying humanitarian aid to Iran, which has been targeted by heavy U.S. and Israeli air strikes in a war that started on February 28. The dispatch of aid follows similar deliveries by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Central Asian countries are aiming for neutrality in the Mideast war, maintaining ties with the Iranian government even as they profess support for Gulf Arab states that have been targeted by Iranian drones and missiles. Iran’s relationships with countries to the east range from the close cultural affinity that it enjoys with Tajikistan to sometimes tense interactions with Azerbaijan, which has a military partnership with Israel. The trucks from Tajikistan left for Iran on Wednesday and “will soon arrive in the friendly and brotherly country,” Tajikistan’s government said, without providing details about how the aid will be distributed. The convoy would likely travel through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to reach the northeastern Iranian border. The aid “comprises 3,610 tons of cargo, including 45 tons of medicines, a large volume of sanitary and hygienic products, children's clothing, various food products, household items, bedding, tents, building materials, and other necessary supplies,” Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon posted a photo on social media that showed a long line of aid trucks on a highway. Turkmenistan, which shares a border with Iran, has said it sent humanitarian aid, mainly for distribution to children. It appeared to allude to the war, saying that “supporting and assisting close neighbors in difficult times is a noble tradition of the Turkmen people, rooted in ancient times.” Uzbekistan has sent trucks carrying flour, rice, sugar, pasta, sunflower oil, canned goods and medical supplies to Iran. Azerbaijan, which borders northwest Iran, has also dispatched truckloads of humanitarian aid to Iran, according to Ali Alizada, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Iran. Azerbaijan previously said it was evacuating staff from its embassy in Tehran as well as its consulate in the Iranian city of Tabriz, after accusing Iran of drone attacks on its territory.
Global Internet Freedom Rankings: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan Far Ahead of Eurasian Neighbors
The 2026 Global Internet Freedom Rankings, published this week by the research agency Cloudwards, have revealed that the five countries of Central Asia have significantly less internet censorship than all of their Eurasian neighbors. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s online environments emerge as particularly encouraging cases. Cloudwards defines internet censorship as the banning or restricting of online content or services, such as social media platforms, VPN apps, and certain political or religious messaging. It also covers the more welcome deletion of harmful content. Censorship can be done by governments, or initiated by a country’s internet service providers and other businesses. The internet freedom rankings do not measure state censorship per se. Cloudwards' research scored 171 countries on a scale of 0-100, rating their overall levels of internet censorship using five key criteria: torrenting availability; adult content accessibility; social media platforms; access to varied political and religious content; and VPN regulations. Eleven nations returned the highest score of 92, including New Zealand, Belgium and Timor Leste. While North Korea scored 0, the next four worst countries for internet censorship – each scoring just 4 – all border Central Asia: China, Pakistan, Iran and Russia. Tajikistan’s score of 56, while only middling in the global context, means that its internet is subject to significantly less interference than almost anywhere in the wider Eurasia region. The Times of Central Asia reported last year that the country has repealed a law that allowed citizens to be prosecuted for ‘liking’ posts on social media that are critical of the government. The only Eurasian country to rival Tajikistan is its northern neighbor Kyrgyzstan, which has the second freest internet in Central Asia, scoring 52 in Cloudwards' ranking. For comparison, 52 is also the overall score given to the United Kingdom and Brazil. Kazakhstan scored 36 – above Singapore and South Korea, which both received a mark of 32. Uzbekistan scored 24. While Turkmenistan’s mark of 16 places it firmly among the world’s worst countries for internet censorship, this is nonetheless higher than countries including India and Turkey (both 12). Turkmen netizens still experience fewer restrictions than internet users in the aforementioned China, Pakistan, Iran and Russia. The authors of the Cloudwards report, British editors Kit Copson and Sandra Pattison, commented: "The reasons behind online censorship range from protecting people targeted by hate speech to quelling political dissent. In especially restrictive locations, censorship and internet monitoring are tools commonly to control narratives." They added: "The consequences for breaching government-imposed censorship laws depend on the country. They could include fines or even arrest or imprisonment for those in highly restrictive locations."
Growing Trade Disputes Test the Eurasian Economic Union
Trade disputes within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are as old as its creation. Restrictions on the import and export of certain goods have long been common practice. However, analysts increasingly warn that tensions have reached a point at which the organization risks losing its core function, ensuring the free movement of goods across borders and maintaining simplified conditions for migrant workers. Mounting Restrictions The EAEU currently comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Economic integration among several post-Soviet states began in 2000 with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), formed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2006, but suspended its participation in 2008. The foundation of this organization was the Customs Union agreement, intended to abolish customs duties among member states. The structure of the integration project has since evolved. The EAEU treaty was signed in 2014 and entered into force on January 1, 2015. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did not join, while Armenia became a member in 2015. More than two decades after the first integration agreements, however, many of the bloc’s original promises remain only partially fulfilled. Experts have long argued that protectionist measures remain widespread within the bloc and that full freedom of movement for all categories of goods, including strategic products, has not been achieved. They also point to pronounced economic asymmetry: Russia accounts for approximately 85–87% of the union’s combined GDP, whereas Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 9–10%. Russia’s significantly larger population and political influence have further reinforced perceptions of structural imbalance. Moscow is now preparing new regulatory measures affecting its partners. From April 1, 2026, a national system for confirming the arrival of goods will be introduced for road imports from EAEU countries. According to the Russian authorities, shifting key control procedures to the pre-border stage is intended to improve transparency in the administration of indirect taxes. Previously, such checks were conducted after goods entered the country through desk and field audits. At the same time, Russia has intensified selective customs controls on its borders with Kazakhstan and Belarus, officially citing efforts to combat counterfeit goods. Particular scrutiny is being applied to product labelling and accompanying documentation. Controls were tightened last summer, when mobile checkpoints were established along the Kazakh-Russian border, followed by the inspections of vehicles leaving Belarus in the autumn. Full-scale checkpoints are now operating on the Kazakh-Russian border, while a simplified regime linked to the Union State and EAEU agreements continues to apply on the Belarusian-Russian border. Logistics industry representatives report that stricter controls on the Kazakh border have significantly increased transit delivery times. Carriers often face lengthy delays at checkpoints even when their documentation is in order. According to Alexandra Pokumeiko, head of a freight-forwarding department, the changes have created uncertainty in delivery schedules along Belarus-Russia transport corridors and on transit routes through Russia to Kazakhstan. The growing number of administrative restrictions has begun to spill into specific sectors of the economy, triggering retaliatory measures between member states. Escalating Tensions in the Automotive Sector A new dispute has emerged between Kazakhstan and Russia over vehicle recycling fees. On March 10, Kazakhstan announced plans to raise the scrap fee on Russian-made cars, describing the move as a reciprocal response to measures introduced by Moscow. Although the relevant order is yet to be formally signed, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry and Construction, Yersayin Nagaspayev, has stated that the increase would mirror Moscow’s policy. Within Russia, recycling fees on vehicles imported from Kazakhstan have reportedly risen tenfold and are set to increase further under a progressive scale through 2029-2030. Astana argues that the reciprocal step is necessary to support its domestic automotive industry. Nagaspayev emphasised that the value of Russian passenger vehicles accounts for only around 3.7% of Kazakhstan’s car imports, suggesting limited market impact and no expectation of sharp price increases. Meanwhile, Russian media outlets have reported that since spring 2024, more than 30,000 Hyundai, Kia, and Skoda vehicles assembled in Kazakhstan have entered the Russian market within the EAEU framework. Debate Over the Union’s Future The dispute has revived debate in Kazakhstan about the country’s economic gains from EAEU membership and speculation about the bloc’s long-term viability. Olzhas Zhorayev, an expert at the Association for Analysis and Management of Public Policy, argues that the institutional structure of the Eurasian Economic Commission complicates the promotion of national interests. According to him, the multinational composition of the bloc's leadership positions sometimes makes dispute resolution difficult and contributes to perceptions that Eurasian integration remains largely declarative. Zhorayev also highlights concerns about the preparedness of some national officials working within integration bodies, suggesting that a limited understanding of economic conditions may reduce the effectiveness of their representation. Economist Arman Beisembayev takes a more critical view, arguing that Kazakhstan derives limited economic benefit from its membership in the union. Beisembayev points to a significant trade imbalance with Russia, noting that Kazakhstan imports substantially more from its northern neighbour than it exports. At the same time, he notes that Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on Russian supplies in sectors such as food and pharmaceuticals. Labour Migration Disputes Russia has also tightened legislation governing labour migration. In January, Kyrgyzstan filed a case with the EAEU Court, arguing that Russia’s refusal to provide compulsory medical insurance to the families of migrant workers violates union agreements guaranteeing access to social protection. In March, however, the court’s Grand Chamber clarified that member states are not required to automatically extend compulsory medical insurance coverage to migrants’ family members. The ruling emphasised the distinction within EAEU agreements between social security provisions and access to medical assistance. Armenia’s Strategic Dilemma Armenia’s shifting foreign policy priorities add another layer of uncertainty to the union’s future. The country’s leadership has repeatedly signalled hesitation between deepening integration with the EAEU amid moves aimed at potentially strengthening ties with the European Union. In the summer of 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan joined an EAEU forum via video link rather than attending in person, prompting speculation in regional media about Yerevan’s commitment to the bloc. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko later suggested that Armenia may have its own reasons for adopting a more critical stance toward the organization. Simultaneous membership in both the EAEU and the European Union is not feasible, meaning Armenia may eventually face a strategic choice. Rising Tensions Ahead of Key Meetings Internal disputes are likely to influence discussions at the upcoming EAEU summit of heads of state in May, as well as during the Russian president’s planned state visit to Kazakhstan, scheduled to coincide with the event. Kazakhstan assumed the rotating chairmanship of the EAEU from January 1, 2026. Recent trade disputes suggest that Astana intends to pursue a more assertive position within the organization rather than simply aligning with Moscow’s policy preferences.
Taken together, these disputes highlight growing contradictions within the EAEU. While the union was designed to remove barriers to trade and labor mobility, member states have increasingly resorted to unilateral restrictions when national economic interests are at stake. The result is a system that formally promotes integration but frequently operates through ad-hoc controls, exemptions, and retaliatory measures.
Whether the EAEU can reconcile these tensions remains uncertain. For countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the union still offers access to a large regional market and simplified migration rules, but recurring trade conflicts and regulatory asymmetries continue to fuel debate about how much members are willing to sacrifice for integration. As the bloc approaches another summit, the question is less about whether disagreements exist and more about how far they can escalate before the mechanisms of the union itself begin to erode.
China to Fund Construction of Nine Border Facilities in Tajikistan Near Afghanistan
China will finance the construction of nine border facilities in Tajikistan’s frontier regions with Afghanistan, according to a project approved by Tajik lawmakers earlier this month. The plan was reviewed and adopted during a March 4 session of the Majlisi Namoyandagon, the lower house of Tajikistan’s parliament, Asia-Plus reported. The construction project, valued at more than 550 million Tajikistani somoni (approximately $57,425,000), will be fully funded by the Chinese government. In turn, Tajikistan will exempt the project from taxes, customs duties, and other mandatory payments. According to Muradali Rajabzoda, first deputy chairman of Tajikistan’s State Committee for National Security, the initiative is intended to strengthen the logistical and technical capabilities of the country’s border forces. Speaking during the parliamentary session, Rajabzoda said the project would be implemented in three phases, with exchange letters already signed to launch the second stage. The total construction area of the facilities is expected to reach 17,109 square meters. Rajabzoda said the Chinese government would provide the financing “on a grant basis,” meaning the funds will not need to be repaid. Although authorities have not disclosed the precise locations of the planned installations, they confirmed that the facilities will be built in Tajikistan’s border regions with Afghanistan. According to Bahriddin Ziyoi, a member of the parliamentary committee on law enforcement, defense, and security, the Chinese side will also carry out research and design work related to the project. In addition to financing construction, China is expected to supply equipment, building materials, and engineering specialists. Chinese engineers will travel to Tajikistan to install and configure technical systems at the sites. The project will also include office and residential furnishings, computers, and other equipment necessary for operating the facilities. Infrastructure development will form another component of the plan. China will assist in building access roads to the border facilities and installing water supply, drainage systems, and electricity connections. Funding from Beijing is expected to begin after internal procedures in China are completed. Tajik authorities say the exchange letters governing the project were approved by the government in November 2025 and later submitted to parliament following consultations with relevant ministries and agencies. Officials also stated that the documents underwent an anti-corruption review and no risks were identified. The new facilities follow earlier cooperation between the two countries. According to Tajik security officials, 12 border installations were constructed in 2017-2018 in Tajikistan’s frontier areas with Afghanistan with financial support from China. Security cooperation between the two countries has previously drawn international attention. In 2024, the British newspaper The Telegraph reported that China had built a secret military base in Tajikistan, citing satellite imagery and describing a facility in mountainous terrain where Chinese and Tajik forces allegedly conducted joint exercises. Tajik authorities have repeatedly rejected those claims. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that reports about a Chinese military base on Tajik territory “do not correspond to reality,” adding that the issue has not been part of bilateral discussions between the two countries. China and Tajikistan have expanded security cooperation over the past decade, particularly along the Afghan border. In 2016, the two countries signed a security agreement aimed at strengthening coordination against regional threats following political changes in Afghanistan. Officials say the partnership includes bilateral mechanisms as well as cooperation through international organisations.
Central Asia Faces an Arc of Instability to the South
Until a few weeks ago, looking south from Central Asia, observers of the region saw nothing but opportunities for connectivity. Admittedly, Iran on one side and the area between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other have never been known for their stability. However, the current situation sees two serious conflicts on the southern border of Central Asia, which risk representing an arc of instability that will be difficult to overcome. While the global energy implications of the ongoing war in the Middle East, which began following the joint attack by the United States and Israel on Iran, are likely to be felt for months to come, the greatest risk for the Central Asian region is related to connectivity. This could also compromise significant efforts made in this regard by regional governments. Consider, for example, the recent trip to Pakistan by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, which focused on the possibility of building a railway from Pakistani ports to Kazakh territory via Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. For much of the past decade, Central Asian governments have invested heavily in opening southern trade routes to global markets. Railways through Afghanistan, port access through Iran, and new logistics corridors to Pakistan were meant to reduce dependence on northern routes and expand the region’s economic options. The sudden emergence of conflicts along the southern frontier now raises questions about how secure those connections will be. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Peter Frankopan, author and Professor of Global History at Oxford University, about the potential implications of the two wars on Central Asia’s southern border. According to him, the main risk is not related to connectivity, but to contagion: “The key issue is about the safety of civilians and the protection of infrastructure in Central Asia,” he told TCA. “In times like these, nothing can be ruled out. With Iran lashing out at neighbors and realizing that attacks on oil, gas and more give it leverage, it is not hard to see what might come next. Second, of course, are threats to national economies. Wars create winners and losers. One can see a boom for some people in Central Asian states, but plenty of pressures, especially on inflation.” Indeed, the economic repercussions of the Middle East conflict are already being felt in the region, particularly in Turkmenistan, which maintains some of the closest trade ties with Iran and shares a long border with the country. Frankopan does not see any particular differences in terms of the danger to Central Asia posed by what is happening in Iran and between Pakistan and Afghanistan: “Clearly, instability in Afghanistan is an immediate concern, but it is not related to Iran and will have its own velocity and rhythms. But the risks of expanding violence and terrorism, of refugees, of narcotics and other illicit trafficking are real - and may well get worse.” Regarding connectivity, one of the topics that Central Asian governments pay the most attention to, according to Frankopan, the current situation should not be considered an insurmountable obstacle: “This is simply testimony to turbulence as competing ideas of the present and future jostle and take shape. A few weeks ago, everyone was talking about middle corridors and a new golden era of exchange; now they are talking about breakdowns and dislocation. Both of those cannot be right - or wrong. People, states, and businesses cooperate when they want or need to, and when it suits all sides. Like all relationships, it works as long as it works, but it can all suddenly stop. The question now is who wants to collaborate and work together, why, and about what.” Another aspect that could potentially jeopardize the difficult balancing act of the Central Asian republics, particularly Kazakhstan, should not be overlooked: increasingly narrow political margins. Consider, on the one hand, the fact that Uzbekistan has recently collaborated with India and Iran on a project such as the International North–South Transport Corridor, which has - or perhaps it would be more accurate to say “had” - a very important hub in the port of Chabahar, a collaboration that the current close relationship between the U.S. administration led by Donald Trump could make very costly to maintain. On the other hand, the increasingly close relations between Kazakhstan and Israel could prove difficult to maintain in light of the increasingly assertive regional policies of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Regarding this dimension, and with particular reference to Kazakhstan, Frankopan adopts a longer-term perspective, stepping back from the constant flow of news coming from the frontline. “Tokayev is a shrewd operator, and one who evaluates risk carefully. I don’t know how he is assessing the current situation, but I would pay close attention to it and think his analysis would be worth listening to. Kazakhstan has to balance multiple competing interests and pressures. Some of us think that experience helps in these circumstances; if you take a historian’s view, those run deep. So, balance and risk management are everything.” In recent years, Central Asia has demonstrated great resilience and the ability to adapt quickly to an ever-changing international landscape. Although the situation on its southern border is becoming increasingly alarming, it remains possible that the pragmatism of regional leaders in international relations will once again prevail.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
