News Roundup

New Projects, Evolving Trade: Recent News from Tajikistan That You Might Have Missed

Recent weeks in Tajikistan have seen new investment deals, changing trade dynamics, and interesting social developments. Here are some stories that you may have missed.

Energy investments pledged at Dushanbe Invest-2025

The Dushanbe Invest-2025 Forum resulted in 26 agreements worth roughly US $3.1 billion across the energy, manufacturing, and telecommunications sectors. Energy projects accounted for nearly US $2.4 billion of that total, reflecting Dushanbe’s aims to position itself as a hydropower hub for Central Asia. Officials also promoted “green investment” and developments in AI, while President Emomali Rahmon met with Qatar’s minister for foreign trade to discuss economic cooperation. These moves signal a drive to attract sustainable finance, and diversify an economy that is still reliant on remittances from Tajik guest workers in Russia.

Growing trade with Iran and Uzbekistan

Regional trade expanded significantly in October. Tajikistan and Iran reaffirmed their intention to expand industrial and trade cooperation, with mutual turnover nearing $380 million in 2024 and a target to surpass $500 million in the near future. Agreements include joint ventures in mining, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals. At the same time, trade between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan reached over $70o million in 2024 -- an almost three-fold increase from recent years. The governments of the neighboring countries are now exploring logistics corridors and simplified customs rules to further integrate their economies.

Tourism boom: International visitors up by a quarter

With increased government support, tourism has become one of Tajikistan’s most promising growth sectors. During the first nine months of 2025, the country received nearly 1.4 million foreign visitors -- a 24 percent increase compared with previous years. The influx of tourists is driven by new simplified visa rules, social media campaigns, and improved domestic air routes. Adventure travel in the Pamir Mountains and cultural tourism in ancient cities such as Khujand and Istaravshan are leading this wave.

Sharp decline in UK trade

New figures show that trade between Tajikistan and the United Kingdom fell by almost 39 percent in the four quarters ending Q2 2025, totaling just £22 million. Imports from the UK dropped 32 percent, while exports from Tajikistan plunged 62.5 percent, according to the UK trade factsheet.

Landmark border agreement ratified

In late October, Uzbekistan’s parliament approved a trilateral border-junction agreement with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, resolving a long-standing territorial issue. The agreement should ease cross-border trade and transportation, reduce tensions in remote areas, and open the door to regional infrastructure projects linking the three countries. For Tajikistan, which has some of Central Asia’s most complex borders, the agreement represents a diplomatic milestone that could translate into tangible economic gains.

Looking ahead

The last month’s events highlight that Tajikistan is cautiously re-entering international dialogue in Central Asia and beyond. Tajikistan’s leadership is using investment forums, tourism, and pragmatic diplomacy to stabilize and diversify the economy. Yet challenges remain, chiefly the country's heavy economic dependence on remittances, vulnerability to climate-related shocks, and limited industrial capacity.

C5+1

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio Plans Visit to Central Asia in 2026

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on Wednesday his intention to visit all five Central Asian countries in 2026. Rubio made the statement during a meeting with the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The visit is part of a broader diplomatic initiative by U.S. President Donald Trump's administration to strengthen ties with the resource-rich region. Today, the presidents of the five Central Asian republics, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (Kazakhstan), Sadyr Japarov (Kyrgyzstan), Emomali Rahmon (Tajikistan), Serdar Berdimuhamedov (Turkmenistan), and Shavkat Mirziyoyev (Uzbekistan), are scheduled to meet with President Trump in Washington. The summit is expected to focus on cooperation in the extraction of rare earth elements and other natural resources in Central Asia. Rubio emphasized the alignment of U.S. and Central Asian interests in promoting responsible and sustainable development of the extractive sector. “You are seeking to use the resources that God has blessed your countries with to create responsible development and diversify your economies,” he said at a reception hosted by the State Department. “I personally intend to visit in the coming year. All five [countries], so I know it would probably be a week-long trip. So we’ve got to work on that and make that happen together.” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau stated that the invitation extended to Central Asian leaders is part of President Trump’s personal initiative to deepen engagement with the region. He highlighted broad opportunities for cooperation in business, investment, and strategic partnerships. Also speaking at the reception, Republican Senator James Risch said he intends to introduce legislation to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War-era law that restricts U.S. trade with non-market economies.

Middle Powers

Which Central Asian States Qualify as Middle Powers in 2025?

As global power shifts toward multipolarity, Central Asia’s states are emerging as active regional players. This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. 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This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. Economic Power Economic autonomy is a defining attribute of middle-power capability, enabling states to project influence, sustain policy independence, and finance external engagement. In Central Asia, dependence on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and remittances often reflects constrained fiscal capacity and limited domestic capital formation, while diversified, resilient economies underpin strategic autonomy. Key indicators—GDP per capita, credit ratings, debt sustainability, and export diversification—illuminate the region’s economic hierarchy. Kazakhstan stands as Central Asia’s only consolidated economic middle power. Resource-backed growth, a prudent fiscal regime, and a sovereign wealth fund (the National Fund of Kazakhstan) have anchored macroeconomic stability. With a “BBB” credit rating or equivalent from major agencies, Kazakhstan demonstrates sound debt management and policy credibility. Ongoing diversification efforts under the new economic policies—from renewables to financial modernization—aim to reduce hydrocarbon dependence and deepen integration into global supply chains. Its role as a trans-Caspian logistics hub enhances both strategic and commercial influence. Uzbekistan, by contrast, is an emerging frontier market propelled by post-2017 reforms in currency liberalization, taxation, and state-enterprise restructuring. Rapid GDP growth and expanding private-sector activity mark its trajectory toward fiscal autonomy, though continued ODA inflows averaging around $1.1 billion to 1.3 billion annually, primarily from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and bilateral partners such as Japan, the United States, and the European Union, highlight its residual dependence on external concessional financing. To achieve genuine middle power status, Uzbekistan must roughly double its real economic output over the next decade, a scale of growth aligned with the shift from lower- to upper-middle-income status and the economic mass needed for regional influence. This requires not only expanding its industrial and financial base to compete as a producer, but also raising domestic purchasing power to emerge as a significant consumer market, turning its geographic position into real economic power. Turkmenistan possesses vast gas wealth but remains constrained by autarkic economic management and an overreliance on exports to China. Currency controls, limited transparency, and minimal diversification inhibit the translation of resource income into sustainable influence. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain aid- and remittance-dependent economies, with narrow industrial bases and persistent external vulnerabilities. Remittances from migrant labor account for up to half of their GDP, cushioning fiscal shortfalls but deepening reliance on Russia, China, and international lenders. Despite participation in regional initiatives, their structural dependence restricts their ability to shape economic outcomes independently. Overall, Central Asia exhibits a two-tier economic order: Kazakhstan as a mature middle power, Uzbekistan as a transitional aspirant, and the remaining states as externally conditioned economies with limited strategic leverage.

Central Asian Economic Power Comparison 

Criterion	Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
1. GDP Size & Growth (2024 nominal values-IMF & World Bank)	High – ~US $250 B; ˜ 4.2 % growth; ~US $12,700 per capita.	Medium–High – ~US $120 B; ˜ 5.6 % growth; ~US $3,300 per capita.	Medium–Low – ~US $85 B (opaque); ˜ 3 % growth (est.); ~US $4,600 per capita (likely overstated).	Low – ~US $14 B; ˜ 4.3 % growth; ~US $1,900 per capita.	Low – ~US $12 B; ˜ 7 % growth; ~US $1,200 per capita.
2. Diversification	Medium–High – Energy and resource led trade in... Corridor; diversified partners in the EU, Türkiye, and China.	Medium–Low – trade in gold, energy, textiles, ...tan and China; key partners include Russia, China, and the EU.	Low – Gas-centric, state-dominated economy w...inimal diversification and limited private sector development.	Low – Gold-dependent, remittance-driven economy with limited industrial base and modest diversification.	Low – Remittance-led, hydro- and aluminum-depe...conomy with limited diversification and weak industrial base.
3. Trade Integration	High – WTO & EAEU member; energy- and resource...iversified partners incude Russia, China, the EU, and Türkiye.	Medium–Low – non-WTO, non-EAEU; trade in gold,...es, and autos; key partners include Russia, China, and the EU.	Low – non-WTO, non-EAEU; State-controlled; exports to China & Russia dominate; weak transit role.	Medium – WTO & EAEU member; trade in gold and re-exports; high dependence on Russia and China.	Low – WTO member; limited export base; transit and remittances heavy; reliance on Russia/China.
4. Investment & FDI Attractiveness	Medium–High – Strong FDI in energy, mining, renewables; improving business climate; regional hub potential.	Medium – Reform improving climate; FDI in energy, gold, textiles, autos; privatization agenda ongoing.	Low – Opaque governance; limited private sector; low FDI beyond gas; heavy state control.	Low – Smaller market and instability; reliance on remittances; limited FDI beyond gold and services.	Low – Limited FDI; infrastructure and energy projects led by China and IFIs; weak private sector.
5. Infrastructure & Connectivity	High – Rail/road pipelines; Caspian ports; TTC leadership; good logistics performance by regional standards.	Medium – Landlocked; improving roads/rail; growing logistics with China–Europe corridors.	Medium–Low – Gas pipeline infrastructure; port of Turkmenbashi; low integration with neighbors.	Low – Limited infrastructure; mountainous constraints; reliant on crossings via Kazakhstan/China.	Low – Mountainous; limited road/rail; dependence on regional corridors; hydropower assets.
Economic Power Summary	🟩 Strong (middle power)	🟨 Reforming emerging power	🟧 Resource-dependent / narrow-based economy	🟥 Small, remittance- and aid-dependent economy	🟥 Low-income, remittance-dependent economy

Diplomatic & Regional Influence Kazakhstan remains the most diplomatically influential state in Central Asia, pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy that balances relations with Russia, China, the United States, the European Union, and the Islamic world. Astana positions itself as a regional stabilizer and neutral convener, hosting high-profile platforms such as the Astana International Forum and the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, and serving as a venue for Russia–Ukraine and Syria peace talks. Through leadership in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Kazakhstan has become the region’s diplomatic anchor and a bridge between Europe and Asia. Additionally, it has emerged as a pan-Asian educational hub, using world-class universities and international partnerships to extend its soft-power reach across the continent. Uzbekistan, under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has become a rising diplomatic power, advancing a reformist foreign policy centered on economic integration, water and energy diplomacy, and regional cooperation. Tashkent’s emphasis on intra-Central Asian summits and Afghanistan engagement has made it a leading advocate of pragmatic regionalism. Its expanding soft-power diplomacy—through cultural, educational, and developmental initiatives—complements Kazakhstan’s leadership, forming a cooperative dual-core in regional diplomacy. Turkmenistan, adhering to its policy of positive neutrality, engages selectively through energy and transit diplomacy, leveraging hydrocarbon exports and pipeline routes to maintain relevance with China, Iran, and the Caspian states. Its diplomacy remains transactional and limited to issue-specific cooperation, avoiding deep institutional commitments. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan actively participate in multilateral frameworks such as the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but wield limited diplomatic influence due to domestic challenges and reliance on external partners. Kyrgyzstan’s civic diplomacy and Tajikistan’s water security advocacy provide niche influence, though persistent border disputes and political volatility constrain their broader regional roles.

Central Asian Diplomatic Influence Comparison

Criterion	Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
1. Multilateral Engagement	High – Active in UN, SCO, CICA; hosted OSCE summit; mediates between Russia/West; TTC leadership.	Medium–High – Active in SCO, OTS (Türkic states), engaging with EU; regional convenings in Samarkand/Tashkent.	Low – “Positive Neutrality”; limited multilateral role; UN messaging but little practical engagement.	Medium – Engages in CSTO, EAEU, SCO; limited convening power; reliant on Russian security umbrella.	Medium – Active in CSTO, SCO; focus on security/development; limited convening power.
2. Regional Leadership & Convening	High – Hosts TTC, Astana diplomacy; key energy transit and policy hub; space/cosmodrome legacy.	Medium–High – Regional initiatives under Mirziyoyev; summits with neighbors; reform image boosts soft power.	Low – Limited regional convening; border/trade frictions; minimal soft power.	Low – Limited convening capacity; domestic politics distract; occasional bilateral diplomacy.	Low – Narrow security focus; reliance on Russia/CSTO; limited convening role.
3. External Partnerships	High – Balances Russia, China, West, Türkiye; invests in EU energy security; US partnership.	Medium–High – Strengthening ties with EU/US/Japan; deepening China; pragmatic Russia ties.	Medium–Low – China energy dependence; limited beyond gas; cautious with Russia/Iran.	Medium–Low – Reliant on Russia; China loans; limited Western ties.	Medium–Low – Reliant on Russia for security; China for infrastructure; modest Western engagement.
4. Soft Power & Global Perception	Medium–High – Education exchanges, Expo legacy, cultural diplomacy; image of pragmatic stability.	Medium – Reform branding improves image; tourism/culture growing; human rights concerns persist.	Low – Insular state; limited exchanges; weak international image.	Medium–Low – Civil society visibility but political instability; modest culture/tourism appeal.	Low – Security/state control image; limited cultural reach; tourism potential underused.
5. Conflict Mediation/Border Management	Medium–High – Hosted Syria talks; manages multi-vector diplomacy; stable borders.	Medium – Increased mediation attempts; improving border agreements with neighbors.	Low – Minimal role; unresolved border friction episodically.	Low – Periodic border clashes (esp. with Tajikistan); limited mediation capacity.	Low – Border tensions with Kyrgyzstan; limited mediation capacity.
Overall Standing	🟩 Strong	🟨 Emerging	🟧 Limited	🟥 Weak	🟥 Weak

Strategic & Security Capacity Kazakhstan maintains one of Central Asia’s most capable and institutionally coherent armed forces, supported by growing resource revenues and increased defence spending, and a sustained modernization agenda. Building on a multi-branch defense structure, Astana emphasizes air defense systems, drones, and improved mobility, alongside emerging cyber and technological capabilities. Its vast territory and proximity to both Russia and China compel a careful balance between obligations under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and selective cooperation with Western institutions such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace. While Kazakhstan’s armed forces remain integrated with Russian systems, their participation in UN peacekeeping missions, investment in defense-industry development, and involvement in regional counterterrorism initiatives underscore its role as a stabilizing actor and pragmatic security partner in Central Asia. Uzbekistan maintains one of Central Asia’s most capable military forces, underpinned by a defense doctrine that emphasizes sovereignty, independence, and non-alignment. The 2018 update to its defense doctrine affirms a focus on territorial defense, self-reliance, and refusal to host foreign military bases. While continuing bilateral defense cooperation with Russia through a strategic partnership program for 2026–2030, Tashkent has simultaneously expanded military ties with China and South Korea to modernize equipment and training. Its strategic proximity to Afghanistan reinforces a focus on border security, counter-terrorism, and regional dialogue, while its multi-vector foreign and defense policy reflects a pragmatic effort to balance great-power influence rather than align exclusively with any bloc. Turkmenistan, by contrast, grounds its security policy in its constitutionally enshrined and UN-recognized status of permanent neutrality, first formalized by the 1995 UN General Assembly resolution and reaffirmed in its Constitutional Law on Permanent Neutrality (1996). Despite maintaining one of Central Asia’s largest nominal troop numbers—estimated at roughly 40,000 personnel—its armed forces remain undertrained and reliant on Soviet-era equipment and are primarily defensive, focused on securing borders and protecting energy infrastructure. Eschewing formal alliances, Ashgabat avoids formal military alliances, preferring bilateral consultations with neighboring states and selective security cooperation with major powers—chiefly Russia and China, and to a lesser extent the United States—focused on counter-terrorism, border security, and regional stability. Geographically situated between Afghanistan and Iran, Turkmenistan holds latent strategic value as a buffer state, yet its insular foreign policy and limited interoperability constrain its broader regional influence. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess modest, resource-constrained armed forces that remain heavily dependent on external security guarantees, primarily from Russia and, to a lesser extent, China. As members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), both host major Russian military installations—Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan—which anchor their defense postures. Their militaries are chiefly oriented toward border control, internal stability, and counter-narcotics operations, with limited capacity for sustained conventional warfare. Repeated border clashes—particularly in the Ferghana Valley—highlight weak command structures and fragile interoperability. While Russia remains the principal security guarantor, China’s growing provision of training, surveillance technology, and equipment signals a gradual but notable expansion of Beijing’s influence across Central Asia’s southern tier.

Central Asian Military Capability and Strategic Posture (≈ 2024)

Criterion	Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
Active Military Personnel (normalized per 1,000 pop.)	~40–45,000 active; ~30,000 reserves; largest professionalized force; growing modernization.	~65,000 active; ~35,000 reserves; large conscription-based manpower pool.	~36,000 active; limited reserves; internal security–focused.	~13,000 active; ~10,000 reserves; small and under-equipped.	~9,000–10,000 active; ~7,000 paramilitaries; focused on counterterrorism and border defense.
Defense Expenditure (2024 est.) (% GDP / per capita)	~1.0% of GDP (~$1.8–2.0B); ~95 USD per capita; stable budget supporting modernization.	~1.3% of GDP (~$1.5B); ~70 USD per capita; increasing budget with reform momentum.	~3% of GDP (~$1.4B); ~140 USD per capita; opaque allocations, regime security priority.	~1.5% of GDP (~$200M); ~30 USD per capita; aid-dependent.	~1.6% of GDP (~$250M); ~35 USD per capita; reliant on external assistance.
Force Modernization & Technology	Modern armor and aviation (Su-30SM, MiG-31), UAV adoption, integrated air defense; domestic upgrades.	Active modernization of T-72B3 and Mi-35 fleet; UAV adoption; growing C4ISR efforts.	Limited modernization of aging Soviet platforms; niche air defense and naval assets (Caspian).	Outdated Soviet arms, weak maintenance, minimal C4ISR; incremental upgrades.	Very limited modernization; reliant on Russian equipment and support.
Defense Industry & Autonomy	Developing defense industry (repair/upgrade; some assembly); growing autonomy via partnerships.	Limited but expanding repair/maintenance capacity; exploring domestic production.	Minimal industry beyond procurement; dependence on imports.	No significant industry; relies on external support/aid.	No defense industry; entirely reliant on Russian/foreign support.
Alliances & Security Architecture	CSTO interlocutor; multi-vector ties with Türkiye/China/US; regional exercises; border security strength.	Non-CSTO; bilateral ties with Russia/Türkiye/US; growing SCO role; autonomous posture.	Neutrality; limited alliances; selective security cooperation.	CSTO member; hosts Russian base (Kant); reliance on Russian security.	CSTO member; hosts Russia’s 201st base (Dushanbe); reliance on external security guarantees.
Operational Readiness & Training	Regular exercises; professional NCO development; better readiness than peers.	Training reforms; conscription-based but improving readiness.	Limited readiness; focus on regime security; constrained training.	Low readiness and morale; dependent on Russian support.	Readiness limited to border operations; Russian mentorship crucial.
Internal Security & Paramilitaries	Robust internal troops and border service; lessons from 2022 unrest applied.	Large internal forces; policing and border control capacity growing.	Strong internal security apparatus; regime protection priority.	Dependent on Russian support for border management; limited capacity.	Dependent on Russian and CSTO mentorship for internal security.
Cyber & Information Security	Developing cyber units; information control capacity; regional leader.	Nascent cyber capabilities; growing digital defense focus.	Minimal cyber capabilities.	Minimal cyber capabilities.	Negligible cyber capacity; reliance on external partners.
Geostrategic Leverage / Access	Controls key Eurasian corridors; Caspian naval presence; strategic air transit hub between Europe and Asia.	Central position linking Afghanistan, China, and the Caucasus; major logistics and trade hub in SCO framework.	Energy-transit corridor with neutrality policy that limits external leverage.	Limited regional influence; dependent on CSTO presence and foreign aid.	Border with Afghanistan gives tactical importance but strategic vulnerability.
Overall Strategic Standing (Security Power Profile)	Strong Regional Security Actor – Balanced and professionalized force with multi-vector partnerships and credible deterrence.	Emerging Regional Power – Rapidly modernizing, increasingly autonomous, and integrated with multiple partners.	Stable but Insular – Energy-rich and inward-oriented; limited projection and partnerships.	Weak and Dependent – Small, under-resourced; reliant on Russia for defense and training.	Weak and Vulnerable – Security dominated by external actors; minimal autonomy.

Governance Governance across Central Asia remains state-centred, focused on stability, modernization, and administrative control. While political pluralism is limited, regimes seek legitimacy through performance and competence. Effective governance broadens opportunity and gives citizens a stake in national progress, making stability self-reinforcing. It also defines middle power identity: the capacity to maintain order, deliver policy, and project predictability builds credibility abroad. Kazakhstan’s political course under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev combines traditional values, national identity, and institutional modernization. Tokayev has brought the country away from personalized rule toward a system more firmly based on institutions and the rule of law. The “Fair and Just Kazakhstan” agenda focuses on efficient governance, social equity, and disciplined state management. The 2022 constitutional amendments establishing a single, non-renewable seven-year presidential term, formalized succession rules, and reinforced policy continuity. Efforts to streamline bureaucracy and reduce overlap, together with limited decentralization measures, have aimed to make the government leaner and more responsive while maintaining stability. These adjustments have strengthened institutional reliability, the basis of Kazakhstan’s credibility abroad. Its determination for a predictable policy and controlled reform, combined with social cohesion, gives the state the steadiness and diplomatic flexibility typical of a middle power positioned between competing spheres of influence. Uzbekistan’s governance under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has centered on consolidating state capacity through controlled modernization and strategic engagement. His leadership has sought to strengthen national coherence by reforming administration, opening markets, and reinvigorating regional diplomacy. These efforts have enhanced the state’s functionality and visibility abroad, projecting an image of renewal and competence. Yet decision-making remains concentrated in the presidency, where personal authority drives policy and coordination. This concentration allows swift action and clear direction—traits that reinforce Uzbekistan’s short-term effectiveness as an emerging regional actor—but it also constrains the development of resilient institutions that underpin middle power credibility. The durability of Uzbekistan’s influence will depend on its ability to institutionalize governance beyond individual leadership, ensuring that modernization translates into predictable policy and sustainable legitimacy. In that balance between control and institutionalization lies the test of its middle power maturity. By contrast, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan retain distinctive governance trajectories shaped by domestic conditions, each reflecting a different path toward or away from middle power credibility. Turkmenistan’s neutrality policy reinforces and insulates decision-making from external pressure, yet the same isolation constrains institutional development and limits the state’s engagement capacity. Kyrgyzstan’s pluralistic politics sustain a vibrant civil society and open debate—attributes that enhance soft-power appeal—but persistent volatility and leadership turnover weaken policy continuity and credibility. Tajikistan prioritizes centralized control to preserve stability, drawing on Persian cultural heritage to sustain trans-border identity linkages. While this approach reinforces internal cohesion, it limits institutional openness and constrains Tajikistan’s potential to evolve into a more adaptive and outward-oriented middle power.

Overall Middle Power Ranking (2025)

Rank	Country	Status	Summary
1	Kazakhstan	Established regional middle power	Economic anchor, active diplomacy, strategic balance
2	Uzbekistan	Emerging middle power	Reform momentum, growing influence, high aid dependence
3	Turkmenistan	Resource-based niche power	Energy leverage, limited diplomacy
4	Kyrgyzstan	Fragile capacity	Small economy, security reliance, limited influence
5	Tajikistan	Low capacity	Aid dependence, border focus, minimal soft power

Takeaway In 2025, Central Asia’s geopolitical landscape reflects a clear hierarchy of middle power maturity. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing economic resilience, diplomatic versatility, and institutional stability to exert sustained regional influence. Uzbekistan has emerged as a credible aspirant, propelled by reforms and strategic outreach, but must deepen institutional capacity and economic diversification to achieve full middle power status. The remaining republics—Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—retain limited influence, constrained by economic dependence, insular governance, or security reliance on external patrons. Together, these dynamics underscore a gradual but significant evolution: Central Asia is no longer a passive periphery of great power politics, but a region where select states—led by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—are beginning to shape the terms of regional order and engagement on their own.

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia @ The Times of Central Asia – New Episode Now Available

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. In the new episode, available from Sunday, November 2, the team will take a deep dive into what is happening with Central Asian-Azerbaijani relations. In recent years, ties between the countries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan have grown much stronger. There are many good reasons for this and for believing this partnership will continue to expand. Join us to learn more.

Human Trafficking

Tajikistan Improves Ranking in U.S. Human Trafficking Report

Tajikistan has improved its standing in the U.S. State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, moving up from the Tier 2 Watch List to Tier 2. This designation means the country still does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking under U.S. legislation, but is making significant efforts to comply. According to the report, released on the State Department’s official website, Tajikistan’s progress reflects expanded anti-trafficking efforts in 2024. Authorities initiated 57 criminal cases related to human trafficking, down slightly from 60 in 2023 but the number of identified victims surged from 47 to 272. Of these, 238 were victims of forced labor, and 34 were victims of sexual exploitation. In the first half of 2025 alone, Tajik law enforcement registered 39 new cases, including five involving the sale of children. Tajikistan’s shift to Tier 2 signals a positive trajectory. However, the report notes persistent shortcomings. Authorities, for instance, often fail to clearly distinguish between labor exploitation and sexual violence, frequently conflating these with irregular migration or illegal adoption cases. Despite an official ban, the report highlights that schoolchildren and university students in Tajikistan continue to be mobilized for cotton harvesting under the guise of “hashar” or community work days. The TIP Report also raises concerns about coercive recruitment tactics used in military conscription, though it does not elaborate on specific methods. Refugees and stateless individuals are another focus of concern. According to the report, some citizens of Afghanistan and Bangladesh have been subjected to forced labor at construction sites in Tajikistan. U.S. estimates indicate that more than 12,000 refugees and asylum seekers live in the country, the majority of whom are Afghan nationals. Tajikistan’s Criminal Code criminalizes human trafficking-related offenses such as kidnapping, trafficking in persons, the sale of minors, and the use of children in the production of pornography. It also covers crimes such as organizing illegal migration, forging documents, and misusing official seals and stamps. While the U.S. report acknowledges improvements in victim identification and data collection, it emphasizes that Tajikistan must strengthen victim protection measures, improve transparency in investigations and expand its prevention strategies to continue advancing in the global anti-trafficking effort.

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

Opinion: A Trump Visit to Central Asia Would Deliver Results and Anchor a Corridor Strategy

On November 6, Washington will host the C5+1 leaders’ summit, marking the format’s 10th anniversary and signaling a rare alignment of political attention and regional appetite for concrete outcomes. The date is confirmed by regional and U.S.-focused reporting, with Kazakhstan’s presidency and multiple outlets noting heads-of-state attendance in the U.S. capital. This timing is decisive. Russia’s bandwidth is constrained by the war in Ukraine, China’s trade weight in Central Asia has grown, and European demand for secure inputs and routes has intensified. All these developments together create a window where a visible United States presence can meaningfully alter the deal flow. A visit sequenced off the November C5+1 will attach U.S. political attention to minerals, corridors, and standards that regional governments already prioritize, confirming the conversion of the summit's symbolism into leverage. Washington already has the instruments but has lacked a synchronized presence. Development finance, export credit, and C5+1 working groups exist, yet announcements have too often outpaced commissioning. A targeted tour could unveil named offtakes, corridor slot guarantees, and training compacts. This would move from the dialogue to bankable packages if paired with financing envelopes, posted schedules, and third-party verification. Deals, dates, and delivery would make operational signals clear to partners and competitors alike. Strategic Rationale and Operating Concept The United States has three clear goals. These are to diversify critical minerals away from single-point dependency on China, de-risk trans-Eurasian routes that connect Asian manufacturing to European demand, and reinforce the sovereignty of the states in the region without pressuring them to choose sides in great-power competition over other issues. These imperatives already guide the national-security strategies of Central Asian governments, which implement them according to multi-vector doctrines. A presidential visit that treats minerals, corridors, and standards as a single package would show that Washington is prepared to move forward on the same problem set that the region has defined for itself. The ways to do that are through finance-first diplomacy and an end-to-end corridor approach, including the Caspian crossing. Finance-first diplomacy pairs every political announcement with insurance, offtake letters, and term sheets (short non-binding summaries of key commercial and legal terms for a proposed deal). These signal the intention to convert declarations into commissioning. An end-to-end corridor approach accepts the physical reality that Central Asian outputs move west through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and across the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan functioning as the hinge that makes Europe reachable at scale. Each element of the “minerals–corridors–standards” triad reinforces the others when the whole is pursued as a single program. Reliable customs and traceability raise corridor credibility, which raises project bankability, which in turn attracts the private capital required for mineral processing. The instrumentalities for this already exist. The C5+1 framework can be tasked to track deliverables; the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can cover risk and long-term debt; aid and technical programs of the Department of State and Commerce can align standards, procurement integrity, and traceable supply chains; U.S. universities and labs can underwrite training and testing capacity for mine safety, metallurgy, and standards verification. None of this requires new rules or authority. What is required is prioritization, sequencing, and deadlines that bind announcements to engineering calendars and audited milestones. Country Platforms The origin, midstream, and offtake of commodities need to be planned as one system for the corridor to work. That means production and processing in Central Asia, reliable port–rail handoffs at the Caspian, and predictable westbound movement through the South Caucasus. When these elements are treated as a single integrated program, they reinforce one another rather than compete for attention. Kazakhstan is the region’s capacity center. Its resource base includes copper, uranium, and promising rare-earth prospects. The Caspian ports at Aktau and Kuryk provide the sea link, while ongoing rail upgrades will move more freight more reliably and on time. Recent purchases of freight wagons and locomotives show new investment in hard infrastructure, while customs systems are being digitized and sailing times are becoming more predictable, lowering the risk of delay. A United States package that provides modular processing plants, financing for port equipment, and publicly posted operating schedules would give European buyers clearer delivery expectations and turn declared political intent into realized shipments. Uzbekistan's national policy has focused on processing by adding value at home, from pilot concentrators to modernizing existing plants. Training pipelines in metallurgy, mine safety, and maintenance can be matched with investor terms that reward in-country processing rather than raw exports. Logistics nodes around Navoi and key east–west rail spurs can support higher volumes if yard operations and customs move to tighter timetables. A practical package would link processing modules, workforce training, and predictable train paths so that output can move on schedule. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan call for targeted steps rather than large all-at-once programs. In Kyrgyzstan, near-term reliability can improve through selective mine rehabilitation and basic logistics for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In Tajikistan, pairing hydropower with small minerals-processing pilots can lower operating costs if governance and offtake are transparent. In Turkmenistan, the focus should be on increasing the dependability of usable trans-Caspian crossings by securing practical operating rights and steady sailing schedules from Turkmenbashi. Each case should be scoped narrowly, measured against simple performance metrics, and financed on a proof-of-concept basis before scaling. Thematic Tracks There are three thematic tracks: critical minerals, corridors and logistics, and standards and compliance. The critical minerals track should begin with refreshed geological mapping and environmental baselines, and size modular processing pilots to grid and water constraints. More value can be kept in the region by tying offtake agreements to local processing rather than unprocessed exports, and building verification in from the start through chain-of-custody records, site-level ESG monitoring, and independent assay capacity at accredited laboratories. The corridors and logistics track will seek to increase ferry frequency across the Caspian and regularize schedules by funding port equipment and posting reliable rail–port timetables for shippers. Train paths and berths should be reservable and predictable, and published with enough lead time for commercial planning. Insurance and reinsurance should be organized around service-level agreements that reduce delay risks and lower the cost of moving goods. The standards and compliance track should expand single-window customs and recognized operator programs. Basic traceability should be implemented so border agencies can clear compliant cargo faster. Procurement integrity and audit trails must align with widely used standards to reduce disputes and rework. These measures should be paired with training for customs, port operations, and mine-site safety so practice matches policy at the point of execution. Practical Partners Central Asia is no longer looking for declarations but for practical measures from practical partners. The United States can answer that ask with five integrated elements. These are: (1) a shortlist of deliverables that matter on the ground, (2) purchase agreements for key minerals, (3) reserved capacity on the trans-Caspian segment, (4) a simple standards plan, and (5) the financing and oversight that launch construction. These are the clear operational signals for which Central Asian partners are looking, and their implementation would anchor the U.S. presence in the region. The November C5+1 window is an opportunity to move to execution. Delivery of a handful of concrete items with posted timelines and third-party checks will reset expectations of what U.S. engagement means. If delivered in the region by the president, the echo will resound for years to come.   The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

Climate Change

Central Asia Faces Billions in Climate Adaptation Costs, UNEP Warns

Central Asia ranks among the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world and will require tens of billions of dollars to adapt to the accelerating effects of global warming, according to a new report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The report identifies Central Asia as one of the fastest-warming areas globally. However, current adaptation funding remains drastically insufficient to meet the growing threat. A Region Under Threat Developing countries worldwide, including those in Central Asia, will need up to $310 billion annually by 2035 to adapt to climate change. UNEP highlights the region’s specific challenges: rapidly melting glaciers, widespread soil degradation, worsening water scarcity, and increasing aridity, all of which endanger food security and energy sustainability. “If we don't start investing in adaptation now, we will face increasing costs every year,” said UNEP Executive Director Inger Andersen. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are particularly exposed, with more than 70% of their populations employed in agriculture, which depends heavily on mountain rivers fed by glacial runoff. According to UNEP, glacier volumes in the region have shrunk by over 30% in the past decade. The changing flow of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers threatens not only agriculture but also the hydropower sectors in both countries. Diminished access to water could lead to socio-economic instability in vulnerable communities. Funding Gap Widens UNEP estimates that developing countries in Europe and Central Asia need roughly $51 billion annually for adaptation. Yet, only a fraction of that figure is currently being met. Tajikistan, for example, has outlined total climate financing needs of $8 billion by 2030 and $17 billion by 2050. In Uzbekistan, the cost of modernizing irrigation and water management systems alone is expected to approach $10 billion by 2030. UNEP has urged governments in the region to accelerate the updating of national adaptation plans, many of which have not been revised in over a decade, and to enhance cooperation in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins. Priority areas include investment in irrigation infrastructure, early warning systems, and flood control. From Glaciers to Farms In response to UNEP’s findings, international organizations have begun to fund targeted adaptation initiatives. The Green Climate Fund, for instance, has approved $250 million for the From Glaciers to Farms program, spearheaded by the Asian Development Bank. The project aims to strengthen agricultural and water resilience in glacier-dependent countries in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and parts of South Asia. It covers four major river basins: the Naryn and Panj in Central Asia, the Kura in the South Caucasus, and the Swat in Pakistan, benefiting approximately 13 million people. Funding will support the development of irrigation networks, reservoir construction, glacier monitoring, and early warning systems. The program also places a strong emphasis on empowering women entrepreneurs in agriculture and improving the financial sustainability of rural communities.

Regional Cooperation

How the Ferghana Valley Might Become Central Asia’s Laboratory of Peace

On October 15-16, in the heart of the Ferghana valley, which for decades has been associated with border conflicts, mistrust, and unresolved issues, the heads of Ferghana (Uzbekistan), Batken (Kyrgyzstan), and Sughd (Tajikistan) gathered to discuss the further peaceful development of the region. The forum brought together not just officials but also experts, diplomats, civil society, and international organization representatives from Central Asia, Europe, and other regions. The first Ferghana Peace Forum, entitled “Ferghana Valley: Joining Forces for Peace and Progress”, was not simply another gathering behind closed doors but a table where everyone was offered a seat. The valley, with territory of roughly 20,000-22,000 km² shared by three countries, was one of the main routes for the ancient Silk Road. It embodies diverse cultures and fertile lands, but also, until recently, the unresolved problems and deep contradictions of Central Asia. Complex issues, including water management, border demarcation, and conflicting national narratives. People's connections were severed by visa regimes and land mines. It was, until recently, impossible to imagine today's reality where people are crossing borders without long lines or bureaucratic barriers. The Khujand Declaration, signed in early 2025 by the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, paved the way for the forum. The document marked a historic shift, reflecting the countries' desire for dialogue, open borders, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange. However, it remained only a vision without an implementation mechanism that would turn the declaration into sustainable interaction. The Ferghana Peace Forum promises to fill this gap by becoming the first peacebuilding platform designed specifically for the territory, and managed by the three countries themselves with support from external organisations, rather than by external intermediaries or actors. The Forum's founding communiqué defines its goal as creating a permanent platform for building trust, developing a common development strategy, attracting investment, and forming a new political climate in Central Asia. It is a rare occasion when Central Asian countries organize inclusive platforms for open discussions and the participation of civil society, academia, and business. With more than  300 participants, including officials from the UN, EU, and OSCE, as well as leading international NGOs, the forum promises to become a truly historical event. As one of the Forum participants noted, “If peace is possible in Ferghana, it is possible anywhere in Central Asia, and perhaps anywhere in the world.” Discussions were focused on the practical implementation of regional cooperation. Participants addressed issues that have long fueled tensions in the valley: border procedures, joint water management, trade facilitation, labor migration, and crisis prevention. At the same time, the platform created a space for exploring new areas of cooperation, such as digitalization, education, renewable energy, and tourism. There was a shared understanding that peace cannot be sustainable without economic opportunities and social integration. The timing of the forum could not have been better. With the flow of current geopolitical events, Central Asian countries have a narrow window of opportunity to strengthen the internal cooperation and to institutionalize it, while Russia is distracted by Ukraine, and China needs a stable neighborhood for the Belt and Road initiative. The latest trend of considering Central Asian countries together in formats such as CA+Europe, C5+1, or CA+China shows that the region is entering a new stage of integrational processes. However, the road ahead will not be easy. The first Ferghana Peace Forum signals a rare moment of political will and regional activism. The valley that once symbolized division is now being reimagined as a valley of peace. If this initiative is successful, the Ferghana model could lay the foundation for a new era of cooperation in Central Asia, based not on external influence or geopolitical competition, but on the common interests and aspirations of its peoples.