Essential but Unwelcome: Central Asian Migrants in Russia

The Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow on March 22, 2024 triggered strong anti-migrant sentiment in Russian society. Since then, the nation’s authorities have been imposing stricter migration rules. But how does this impact millions of Central Asian labor migrants and their families living and working in Russia? Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia became a major destination for migrant workers from Central Asia. According to the official Russian statistics, there are currently almost four million citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan living in Russia, along with approximately 670,000 illegal migrants. Rosstat (the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation) reports that 260,400 migrants arrived in Russia from January to July this year, with 60% (about 156,200) coming from Central Asian countries. The majority of them are citizens of Tajikistan. In 2023, over one million Tajiks have moved to Russia in search of work. With a large community of its citizens in Russia, the Tajik government seems to be working to not only improve their legal status in the Russian Federation, but also to coordinate some of their actions, particularly in the field of culture. On April 9, in Dushanbe, a meeting took place between Tajikistan’s Minister of Labor, Migration, and Employment of the Population, Solekhi Kholmakhmadzoda, and leaders and activists of the Tajik diaspora living in Russia. Tajikistan initiated the summit after Russia began testing migrant children on their knowledge of the Russian language before admitting them to school. Starting April 1, a law came into effect that prevents Russian schools from enrolling migrant children who do not speak Russian or are in Russia illegally. This measure is just the tip of the iceberg in the Kremlin’s plans to regulate the migrant issue in the country. Alexey Nechaev, the leader of the New People party – one of the handful of the so-called systemic opposition parties in Russia – said on March 19 that “artificial intelligence should be made a new tool for monitoring migrants… It is unfair that Russian citizens are digitized from head to toe, while migrants continue to live with paper documents without any problems,” Nechaev stressed, pointing out that monitoring migrants’ activities through AI could “help keep a closer eye on what foreigners are doing and make it easier to track illegal money flows.” Last year, the Liberal Democratic Party – another ‘systemic opposition’ group – proposed restricting the rights of migrant workers to bring their families into Russia. This initiative raised concerns in neighboring Kazakhstan. The ambassador of the largest Central Asian nation expressed unease to Moscow about such ambitions, referring to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the foundation of which, as he highlighted, is based on ensuring the four freedoms – the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. Russian reports, however, claim that, as a result of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s membership in the EAEU, their citizens living in Russia have a much better status than those from other Central Asian states. Despite that, on April 14, Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry summoned Russia’s ambassador to demand answers over reports that Moscow police used violence against Kyrgyz nationals during a raid on a bathhouse. Such a move represents a humiliation for the Kremlin, considering Kyrgyzstan’s heavily dependence on Russia, especially in terms of remittances from Kyrgyz labor migrants living in the Russian Federation. But given the ongoing war in Ukraine and Russia’s isolation from the West, Moscow is not in a position to jeopardize its relations with Bishkek over the migrant issue. That, however, does not mean Russia will stop quietly passing laws that could, at least to a certain extent, change the status of Kyrgyz, and other Central Asian migrants in the Russian Federation. According to State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, the Russian Parliament has initiated and passed 15 laws related to combating illegal migration since 2024. In his view, “It is important that these laws are now effectively enforced.” Nevertheless, the Kremlin must strike a delicate balance between the growing anti-migrant sentiment in the country and its ambitions to preserve the remnants of its influence in Central Asia. That is why, despite 66% of Russians supporting a ban on wearing niqabs in public places – a measure already implemented in most Central Asian countries – Moscow has remained silent on the issue. Moreover, the Kremlin is under pressure to stop, or at least significantly reduce, the influx of Central Asian migrants. To strike a balance, the authorities in Russia’s Tatarstan region – the fourth most popular destination for labor workers from Central Asia – reportedly aim to attract young female workers from Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Research Associate at Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Yulia Florinskaya, however, has claimed that in the coming years the number of foreign workers in Russia will remain the same, with the majority still being citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Currently, she argues, no other country can compete with them in terms of the number of labor migrants coming to Russia. Moscow needs migrants to help address the labor shortage, as Russia lacked around 4.8 million workers in 2023. Still, according to a Human Rights Watch report, Central Asian labor migrants in Russia experience “increased xenophobic harassment and violence,” with the Russian Defense Ministry continuing to forcibly recruit them to fight in Ukraine. It is, therefore, no surprise that the number of migrants in Russia declined by 18% in 2024 as compared to 2023. Migration – be it from Central Asia or other parts of the world – remains both a necessity and a challenge for Russia. As pressure mounts from within, in the coming months and years the Kremlin will have a hard time navigating a complex balancing act between anti-migrant sentiment at home, the country’s economic needs, and its geopolitical interests in Central Asia.

U.S. Cancels $2.5 Million Civic Engagement Grant for Uzbekistan

The U.S. State Department has canceled a $2.5 million grant intended to support civic engagement programs in Uzbekistan. The decision comes as part of a broader review of foreign aid expenditures initiated by U.S. Senator Marco Rubio and the Department of Government Efficiency. The Uzbekistan program was one of 139 foreign aid grants, totaling $215 million, that were recently scrapped. Other canceled initiatives include $5.2 million for a media diversity project in the United Kingdom, $2 million for newsroom sustainability efforts in Moldova, and nearly $1 million for women’s organizations in Mauritania. Additional cuts affected projects focused on disinformation, media freedom, and gender equity in Europe, Brazil, and North Africa. Continued U.S.-Uzbekistan Engagement Despite the funding cut, bilateral ties between the United States and Uzbekistan continue to strengthen. A draft of Uzbekistan’s 2025 government program, currently open for public discussion, outlines plans to deepen cooperation with Washington. These include a proposed high-level visit to the U.S. and the inaugural round of the Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue, scheduled to take place in Tashkent. In March 2025, Uzbekistan's Ambassador to the U.S., Furkat Sidikov, also hosted a Congressional Breakfast, which focused on trade, investment, and U.S.-Uzbekistan relations. Over 300 American companies are currently operating in Uzbekistan Uzbekistan recently hosted the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, though the prospects of a U.S.-Central Asia C5+1 summit in 2025 remain uncertain. Daniel Runde, a senior official at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has emphasized the importance of a strong U.S.-Uzbek partnership. Runde noted that Uzbekistan plays a critical role in maintaining stability in Central Asia and in balancing the regional influence of Russia and China.

Afghanistan and Central Asia: Pragmatism Instead of Illusions

“When the winds of change blow, some build walls, others build windmills.” — Chinese proverb

Afghanistan remains one of the most complex and controversial spots on the map of Eurasia. After the Taliban came to power in 2021, it seemed the countries of Central Asia were faced with a choice: to distance themselves from the new regime or cautiously engage with it. However, it appears they have chosen a third path - pragmatic cooperation free from political intentions.

Today, a window of opportunity is opening for the Central Asian states to reconsider their relationship with Afghanistan, not as a buffer zone or a source of instability, but as a potential element of a new regional architecture.

At the same time, these countries are in no hurry to establish close political ties with Kabul. They avoid making declarations about "integrating" Afghanistan into Central Asia as a geopolitical region. Instead, the focus is on practical, rather than political or ideological, cooperation in areas such as transportation, trade, energy, food security, and humanitarian engagement.

This pragmatic approach is shaping a new style of regional diplomacy, which is restrained yet determined. Against this backdrop, two key questions emerge: What role can Afghanistan play in regional development scenarios, and what steps are needed to minimize risks and maximize mutual benefit?

Afghanistan After 2021: Between Stability and Dependency

Since the end of the war and the Taliban’s return to power, Afghanistan has experienced a degree of relative order. However, the country remains economically and institutionally dependent on external assistance. Historically, Afghanistan has survived through subsidies and involvement in external conflicts, from the “Great Game” to the fight against international terrorism. Today, new actors, such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, and the Arab states, are stepping onto the stage alongside Russia, the United States, and the broader West.

In the context of current geopolitical realities after the fall of its “democratic” regime, Afghanistan has found itself in a gap between the experiences of the past and a yet undetermined future. It has a unique opportunity to transcend its reputation as the “graveyard of empires” and determine its fate while simultaneously integrating into the international community. How the de facto authorities in Afghanistan handle this opportunity will not only shape the Afghan people's and the region's future but also influence the development of the entire global security paradigm.

In parallel, the countries of Central Asian are building bilateral relations with Kabul on strictly pragmatic terms: participation in infrastructure and energy projects, food supply, and humanitarian aid. All of these steps have been taken without political commitments and without recognizing the regime.

Geo-Economics and Logistics: Afghanistan as a Strategic Hub

The regional reality in Central Asia is increasingly taking on a geo-economic dimension. The region is not only an arena for the interests of external powers but also a zone for developing transport, logistics, and energy networks in which Afghanistan is playing an increasingly prominent role.

Currently, four of the six corridors under the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) pass through Afghan territory, linking it with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

Central Asian countries are paying special attention to infrastructure projects that, under favorable conditions, could reshape the region’s economic landscape. These include the Trans-Afghan railway, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, and the Central Asia-South Asia power project (CASA-1000).

What is particularly significant is that these projects are beginning to move beyond the conceptual stage.

Recently, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan officially inaugurated the 500 kV Datka–Sughd transmission line, a key component of the CASA-1000 regional project. Over the next 15 years, both countries are expected to supply Afghanistan and Pakistan with 23 billion kWh of electricity through this line, marking a major step forward in regional energy cooperation.

The Trans-Afghan Corridor is also beginning to take shape. While its eastern route (via Kabul) faces engineering and financial challenges, the western path (Torgundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak) is becoming more defined. The Afghan government recently signed five contracts with domestic companies to design a 737.5 km railway connecting Herat and Kandahar.

The “five-country corridor” initiative (China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran), which Tehran is trying to promote, also retains its potential. While it currently exists mostly on paper, the construction of a railway segment from Uzbekistan to Herat and its integration with the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway would give it practical value as part of a new Eurasian transport network.

The activity of neutral Turkmenistan in this area also deserves attention. Turkmenistan's role in the "North-South" and "East-West" logistical intersections makes it one of the key operators in Eurasian traffic, including the Afghan direction. A connection is being formed through Iranian territory, with access to the ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar.

However, Ashgabat's "flagship" project is the TAPI gas pipeline, designed to supply natural gas to countries with a total population of 1.75 billion. As President Berdimuhamedov stated, "Speaking about the TAPI gas pipeline project, I would like to emphasize its high social significance. According to experts, the construction of the pipeline and related infrastructure systems, new institutions, and enterprises will create 12,000 jobs in Afghanistan and solve several key humanitarian issues in the country."

Alongside the implementation of the TAPI project, Turkmenistan is also building power transmission lines and an optical fiber communication system along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan route. A 214-kilometer section of the pipeline has already been built in Turkmenistan. Last September, the construction of a 153-kilometer section from Serhetabad to Herat was launched. The construction is now ongoing in Afghanistan, where ten kilometers have already been built.

In addition to the countries of Central Asia, external actors are also showing interest in developing trans-Afghan routes. India, using the Iranian port of Chabahar, is seeking direct access to the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. This direction is seen by New Delhi as a strategic alternative to the China-Pakistan corridor.

Russia, in turn, links the development of Afghan logistics with the implementation of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects Russia with Iran and then, via Chabahar, to South Asia. Integrating Afghan transit into this route can provide additional flexibility and a regional dimension to the INSTC.

All this opens up opportunities for transregional connections, where Afghanistan serves not as a point of fracture, but as a connecting link between South, Central, and Western Asia.

There is a political saying: "If you’re not at the Table, you’re on the Menu." For Central Asia, participation in new corridors is not a choice but a matter of survival; either you are the route, or you are a transit territory without rights.

However, Afghanistan's potential is not limited to transit. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), copper reserves at the Aynak deposit exceed 660 million tons of ore with a metal content of 1.67%, corresponding to about 11 million tons of copper. This makes it one of the largest undeveloped copper projects in the world. Iron ore reserves at Hajigak reach 2 billion tons with iron content up to 64%. Additionally, the USGS has recorded significant resources of lithium, beryllium, tantalum, and other rare earth elements, especially in the southwestern and northeastern provinces. According to their forecasts, Afghanistan could occupy a leading position in the world in terms of lithium potential.

However, despite the availability of these reserves, sectoral problems remain significant: lack of infrastructure, regulatory instability, absence of a transparent licensing distribution mechanism, and field commanders having control over mining operations. Due to these factors, the potential major industrial projects, Aynak and Hajigak, are essentially suspended. Despite this, an eventual wave of bidders is anticipated.

At the same time, smaller but more practically oriented projects are gaining momentum, including the construction of power grids and small hydropower plants, warehouses, and Afghan companies' participation in agricultural programs. This is the level of cooperation where concrete solutions can be realized.

Thus, the development of Afghanistan's infrastructure opens a window of opportunity. The country is transforming from a "buffer zone" into a geoeconomic link between Central, South, and Western Asia. At the same time, this is a space of high sensitivity: growing activity here requires coordination among the Central Asian countries to avoid duplication, enhance stability, and prevent rivalry.

Yes, Afghanistan remains a complex partner, but ignoring its geoeconomic link means losing a key element of the new Eurasian economic framework.

Of course, structural barriers remain, such as the Afghan-Pakistani conflict, lack of international recognition, and the sanctions regime. Nevertheless, the countries of Central Asia, with the support of their surrounding environment, continue to view Kabul as an important economic neighbor.

Security and Ideology: The Region's Cautious Vigilance

Despite signs of stabilization within Afghanistan, the Central Asian states maintain a cautious stance on issues of security and ideological influence from the Taliban. Of particular concern are reports of the presence in Afghanistan of militants from transnational groups with a Central Asian orientation. Although the Taliban claims to have control over the situation, most regional experts acknowledge the long-term risks involved.

There is also some unease about the development of religious infrastructure, including a network of madrasas, including those known as "jihadist madrasas." These institutions could potentially form an ideological base beyond Afghanistan's borders.

Nevertheless, the Central Asian countries have avoided alarmism, focusing on dialogue and taking a realistic approach to the assessment of threats.

Afghanistan as Part of the Regional Consensus

At the first "Central Asia - European Union" summit held in Samarkand, Afghanistan did not occupy a central position on the agenda. Nevertheless, in some speeches, the importance of a stable and engaged Afghanistan was emphasized, not so much as an object of foreign policy, but as part of the broader regional space.

In the final declaration, leaders reaffirmed their commitment to seeing Afghanistan as a "safe, stable, and prosperous state with an inclusive governance system that respects the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its citizens," including women, girls, and ethnic and religious minorities.

It is clear that the "gender issue" was included in the declaration at the initiative of the European side since the Central Asian republics have never focused on this problem. As previously reported by TCA, the emphasis on the "gender issue" is not quite what the Central Asian countries expect in the context of the Afghan resolution. For them, it is much more important to address pressing issues such as security, economic cooperation, and migration control, which directly affect stability in the region. This is why Central Asian countries prefer to focus on practical steps and avoid unnecessary politicization of issues that might complicate dialogue with the Taliban and worsen the situation in neighboring Afghanistan.

In this regard, the position of the EU and Central Asian countries on women's and girls' rights, as reflected in the Samarkand declaration, should be seen as only "generally aligned."

The declaration also established a mechanism for regular consultations on the Afghan agenda, stating: "We support the holding of regular consultations between the special representatives and envoys of Central Asian countries and the EU on issues related to Afghanistan."

These consultations will help adapt regional policy to the new reality where this is no official recognition of the Taliban, but an understanding that, de facto, they are a key link in ensuring access to humanitarian aid and preventing cross-border threats.

Earlier at the Samarkand meetings, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan emphasized in an interview with Euronews that Afghanistan remains one of the priorities of the country's foreign policy. According to him, the Uzbek approach has always been based on pragmatism and a focus on long-term goals, rather than ideological preferences. Mirziyoyev also noted that "many who disagreed with our policy on Afghanistan are now forced to acknowledge its correctness and inevitability," referring, among other things, to international partners.

These statements reflect not only Uzbekistan's position but also illustrate the overall shift in the perception of Afghanistan by the Central Asian states.

Kazakhstan has demonstrated the same approach. Since the Taliban came to power, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has consistently emphasized the need for a multilateral and balanced approach to the Afghan issue. His speeches focus on the integration of Afghanistan into regional and international processes. Kazakhstan supports the international community’s efforts, including under the UN's auspices, to stabilize the situation, provide humanitarian aid, and launch infrastructure projects. Thus, Kazakhstan is developing a concept of "positive neutrality," where Afghanistan is seen not as an isolated threat but as a potential partner and a key element of regional stability.

Against this backdrop, it becomes evident that a coordinated and pragmatic approach to the Afghan dossier has emerged in Central Asia. Even countries that previously held more rigid positions, in particular, Tajikistan, are now demonstrating increasing flexibility, both in official statements and in practical cooperation. The focus of the regional approach is gradually shifting from isolation and fears to economic ties, infrastructure, and a shared future that is in the interests of all the countries in the region.

Crossroads

Afghanistan has already become an integral factor in the stability and security of Central Asia. Pragmatic, cautious, and consistent interaction is the formula that the countries of the region are applying to their southern neighbor today.

A stable Afghanistan is not an end goal, but a condition for the long-term development and enhancement of Central Asia's independent regional position in a changing world through the strengthening of ties and reduction of threats.

History has repeatedly tried to turn this region into a battleground for external interests, the so-called "Great Game." However, at the current moment, Central Asia has the opportunity to not just react to the plans of outside powers but to implement its own. Afghanistan, no matter how complex and contradictory it may be, can become part of this shift, not as a threat but as an opportunity. It all depends on by who and how the future of the region is managed.

Thus, Central Asia is not a battleground; it is a crossroads, and crossroads have their own rules.

Central Asia: An Arena of Geopolitical Attraction

Though 2025 is not yet at its halfway point, Central Asia has already emerged as one of the primary stages of global diplomatic engagement. Rich in natural resources and strategically positioned between global powers, the region has attracted increasing interest from the European Union, China, Russia, and others. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and their neighbors are asserting greater agency, pursuing multi-vector foreign policies, and striving to capitalize on evolving geopolitical dynamics. EU-Central Asia: A New Chapter Amid regular annual meetings, a landmark event this year was the inaugural EU-Central Asia Summit, held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on April 3-4. Leaders of all five Central Asian states met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Discussions centered on infrastructure development, including the Trans-Caspian route, digitalization, energy security, and water resource management. The summit concluded with a pledge to sign an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. This meeting was facilitated by a reconfiguration of global alliances. U.S. President Donald Trump's new tariff policies and the evolving relationship between Washington and Moscow have led European leaders, unwilling to restore ties with Russia, to seek new partnerships. Central Asia, with its strategic position and investment potential, is increasingly appealing. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the region’s economic leaders, are particularly eager to attract foreign capital. The EU represents a possible source, though Russian analysts remain skeptical about Europe’s ability to dislodge Russian and Chinese influence. For instance, Mikhail Neizhmakov of the Russian Agency for Political and Economic Communications noted that while von der Leyen spoke of a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package, China is the largest exporter of investment in the Eurasian region, with accumulated direct investment of $58.6 billion at the end of the first half of 2024, according to the Eurasian Development Bank. Security Discourse and Russian Narratives In addition to the EU summit, the region hosted other key diplomatic events, such as the Digital Forum in Almaty earlier this year, which was attended by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. Another major gathering was the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers, held on April 11, also in Almaty. Ministers approved a 2025 consultation plan and adopted joint statements on regional security, humanitarian cooperation, and opposition to unilateral sanctions. Kazakhstan: A Regional Diplomatic Hub Kazakhstan has so far distinguished itself as Central Asia’s foremost diplomatic player in 2025, hosting high-level visits and spearheading regional engagement. In January, Prime Minister Mishustin visited Astana and Almaty. February saw King Abdullah II of Jordan meet with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to discuss investment and humanitarian cooperation. In March, President Tokayev welcomed his Slovenian counterpart, Nataša Pirc Musar, who expressed interest in expanding bilateral trade. French President Emmanuel Macron is also preparing to visit Kazakhstan later this year, reinforcing France’s strategic interest in the region. In June, meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to attend the second Central Asia-China Summit in Astana, where trade and investment will top the agenda. Navigating a New Geopolitical Order Today, Central Asia represents a vital intersection of East and West. The region’s intensifying foreign policy engagements reflect both a reaction to global instability and a proactive push to craft a resilient development model, one based on diversified partnerships and strengthened regional collaboration. Leaders in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan continue to demonstrate pragmatic, flexible diplomacy, seeking to avoid overreliance on any single global power while bolstering their regional and international influence. In a world increasingly defined by geopolitical turbulence, Central Asia is steadily transitioning from a passive periphery to an active player on the global stage.

Central Asia Creates a Rift in the Turkic World Over Cyprus

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the five Central Asian republics have been performing a very complex balancing act. In some cases, this dynamic has forced them to make difficult decisions from a geopolitical point of view. This is the case with what has happened in recent weeks regarding diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, a member of the European Union since 2004. Between December 2024 and the end of March 2025, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have each appointed diplomatic representatives in the Republic of Cyprus. Kazakhstan has decided to open its own embassy in Cyprus directly, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have accredited their respective ambassadors in Italy as diplomatic representatives for the Eastern Mediterranean Island also. Looking at the calendar, it doesn't seem to be a coincidence that these decisions were taken in the weeks leading up to the first historic summit between the European Union and Central Asia at the level of heads of state and government. The fourth point of the official joint declaration issued at the end of the meeting clarifies the matter: the text clearly states the support of the parties involved - the European Union and Central Asia - for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). These two resolutions make it clear that the only recognized authority on the island is that of the Republic of Cyprus. In recent years, there has been no shortage of explicit references to the Cyprus issue in relations between the European Union and Central Asia. This was the case, for example, in September 2023: during a conference in Brussels, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were warned against officially accepting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TNRT) as an observer member of the Ankara-led Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Dietmar Krissler, head of the European External Action Service's Central Asia desk, spoke of the possible “negative effects” for the Central Asian members if they were to ratify TRNT's access to the Organization as an observer. Returning to the summit held in Samarkand at the beginning of April, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced during the discussions that €12 billion would be invested in Central Asia in various sectors. By also using the prospect of these investments, the European Union's diplomatic pressure on the Central Asian republics over Cyprus has been successful. As BBC Türkçe reports, this is not just a formal declaration of intent: in the official joint statement, future cooperation is in fact closely linked to compliance with the principles contained in the two UN resolutions, a very clear position. From Turkey's point of view, however, the picture is quite different. Turkey is the only country in the world to officially recognize the TRNC, which became a self-proclaimed independent entity in 1984 after Turkey invaded part of the island in 1974. Over the years, Ankara’s pressure has succeeded in preventing relations between the Central Asian republics and the Republic of Cyprus from going as far as the appointment of official diplomatic representatives. But now the situation has changed. The move by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan is particularly significant from another point of view: The three countries, with Turkmenistan only as an observer, are part of the abovementioned Organization of Turkic States, of which the TRNC has also been an observer since 2022. From the Turkish perspective, therefore, the position adopted by Astana, Tashkent, and Ashgabat can be interpreted as a betrayal of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's efforts on the pan-Turkic front, one of his key foreign policy doctrines. At the latest meeting in November last year, the Turkish President called on the Organization's member states to give more support to the TRNC. The occasion was the summit in Kyrgyzstan, which was also attended by the president of the self-proclaimed entity, Ersin Tatar. This year, the summit of the OTS will be held in Azerbaijan, and it will be interesting to see how the issue of the appointment of Ambassadors from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the Republic of Cyprus will be handled. So far, the Turkish authorities have made no official statement on the move by the three Central Asian republics. Although the OTS has made progress in terms of economic integration among its members through initiatives such as the launch of the Turkic Investment Fund, repercussions cannot be ruled out. During an interview on Turkish television, the TRNC Minister of Transport, Erhan Arıklı, clearly stated that he expects Turkey to take effective countermeasures. The Turkish press has highlighted the nature of the decision as a real diplomatic slap in the face for President Erdoğan and also emphasized the concurrence with the announcement of European investment in Central Asia. The message to the country's public is that countries formally allied to Turkey have sold the unity of the Turkish world to Brussels. The Cyprus issue shows how difficult it can be for Central Asian republics to maneuver in the current international context. The pressure exerted by the European Union and Turkey also highlights the diplomatic importance of the region. This is true not only for Russia, which is facing international isolation following its invasion of Ukraine. It is a situation that offers opportunities but also contains risks. The main opportunity is the possibility of using this increased diplomatic relevance on various fronts to obtain concessions, as in the case of European investments related to critical sectors such as minerals and regional logistics. On the other hand, the main risk is the inability to maintain a balance between the different demands of the various partners of the Central Asian republics. This is a key match for the geopolitical and diplomatic relevance of Central Asia, a match for which cooperation between the regional republics, to be perceived as a united bloc, becomes even more fundamental

Excitement Mounts After Trio of Central Asian Countries Launch Joint Bid to Host 2031 AFC Cup

On February 24, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan officially submitted a joint bid to host the 2031 AFC Asian Football Cup. If selected, the 2031 tournament would be the first top-level football event hosted in Central Asia. Central Asian Football Association (CAFA) President Rustam Emomali – the eldest son of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon - displayed his enthusiasm following the bid. “Our Central Asian region has never hosted the final part of the Asian Cup. I think the time has come. Our region is represented by very strong teams, and I am confident that together with the fraternal countries, we will host the final part of the Asian Cup at the highest level,” he stated. Whilst a joint bid amongst Central Asia countries has stoked excitement for many in the region, they currently face strong competition to host the event. The UAE, Kuwait, Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea have all signaled their intention to bid to be the tournament’s next host. Whilst none of the three Central Asian nations have hosted a top-level football tournament, Uzbekistan has experience with similar events after hosting the AFC U-20 and U-23 tournaments and the Futsal World Cup in 2024. However, after attending the Futsal World Cup, Uzbek fan Farrukh Irnazarov is nervous that the authorities may not promote the event aggressively enough. “When Uzbekistan hosts an event like this, they’re very serious about it. However, unfortunately their biggest concern is security. [The Futsal World Cup] wasn’t heavily publicized, and many people weren’t aware we were hosting it,” he told The Times of Central Asia. To be considered for the bid, all three countries will need to complete stadium renovations by the time the AFC committee makes its decision in 2026. Uzbekistan is the most prepared of the three, with stadiums already at international tournament capacity in Tashkent, Namangan, Fergana, and Qarshi. A stadium with a minimum capacity of 50,000 seats is required for the final, and Bishkek has already volunteered. Tashkent and Dushanbe are also revamping their respective stadiums, as the host nations must have two cities with 40,000-seat stadiums for the semi-finals in the tournament. [caption id="attachment_30647" align="aligncenter" width="2048"] The Dolon Omurzakov Stadium in Bishkek; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] What is the AFC Asian Cup? The AFC Asian Cup is an Asian (plus Australia) football competition that has been held every four years since 1956. The previous tournament was held in 2023 in Qatar, which saw the host nation become champions. The tournament started with just four teams: South Korea, Israel, South Vietnam, and Hong Kong, playing a round-robin style tournament before expanding to 24 teams in 2019. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have already qualified for the next tournament in Saudi Arabia in 2027, whilst Tajikistan and Turkmenistan need to win their group in the final round of qualification to participate. However, for the 2031 tournament, if Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan see their bid accepted, all three teams will qualify automatically. Central Asia’s best tournament result came with a fourth-place finish by Uzbekistan in 2011. All three teams are hoping for similar success twenty years later. [caption id="attachment_30644" align="aligncenter" width="640"] Image: Sherzod Ibragimov[/caption] Impacts of Hosting the Tournament If the Central Asia trio see their bid accepted, this could lead to significant long-term recognition and progress for Central Asian football. The investment in modernized stadiums could significantly benefit Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik football moving forward. However, according to Aidana Otorbaeva, the vice-president of the Kyrgyz women’s football association and a former Kyrgyz national team player, these investments wouldn’t just support the top level of men’s football. “Co-hosting the Asian Championship can bring even more investment and recognition to our favorite sport, football, but particularly women’s and youth football as well. For my academy, we struggle to provide enough coaches, stadiums or even fields to accommodate the demand for the sport. Investments have led to some small stadiums being built across the country, but it’s still not enough,” Otorbaeva told TCA. Hosting any international tournament brings substantial media coverage and recognition, and therefore leads to sponsorships, partnerships, and foreign investment. Sherzod Ibragimov, Uzbekistan’s U-17 National Team Head Coach, has another view about the sustainability of funding in Central Asian football. “The attention of foreign investors on [Central Asia], where football is developing, will increase, and in the future, there will be no need for government investment,” he told TCA Central Asia could also see increased opportunities to host international friendly matches, especially with more modernized stadiums, featuring teams across Asia or even Europe. Tourism could also see a big boost. When the United Arab Emirates hosted the tournament in 2019, they saw an influx in tourism revenue through hotels, restaurants, and retail outlets. Hosting the event could lead to similar long-term gains in tourist revenues. Many are already thrilled about the possibility of this continental tournament coming to the region, including Tajik U-17 National Team Head Coach Marco Ragini. “When I saw the joint bid for 2031, I really thought this will be the right time to bring change to football in Central Asia. It will be a good time and opportunity to have a spotlight on Central Asian football,” Ragini told TCA.

Gas Crunch in Uzbekistan: Industry Falters as Demand Surges

In the first two months of 2025, Uzbekistan's natural gas production declined by 4.2% compared to the same period in 2024, continuing a troubling trend that has seen output fall from 61.59 billion cubic meters in 2018 to 44.59 billion cubic meters in 2024. This persistent decrease raises concerns about the nation’s energy security and economic stability. Once among Central Asia’s energy success stories, Uzbekistan became a net importer of natural gas in 2023, a symbolic turning point for a country whose identity was long intertwined with hydrocarbon abundance. The extent of the strain was demonstrated in December 2024, when gas stations around the country were forced to close during a cold snap as heating systems across the country kicked into action. This led drivers of methane-powered cars, which are common in the country given that it costs about $15 to fill the tank as opposed to $40-50 in a gasoline-powered vehicle, into a desperate hunt for places to fill up. Kilometer-long queues formed, and drivers ferociously competed to be first to the pump. Such scenes have become a familiar sight in the Uzbek winter as gas production has fallen. “Uzbekistan’s gas production is already quite mature,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy told The Times of Central Asia. “The existing fields are entering a phase of decline. The reserve-to-production ratio was around 18 years based on 2020 data, and the situation is unlikely to be much better now.” Put simply, the country is running out of easy gas. Despite repeated efforts to locate new reserves, particularly in the under-explored Ustyurt region, exploration has so far failed to yield significant breakthroughs. Even if discoveries are made, the timeline to bring new fields online would mean little impact before 2030, at best. In parallel, demand for gas has remained stubbornly high. Corbeau noted that “the country’s energy mix and electricity generation are very dependent on natural gas. And Uzbekistan is one of the countries with the lowest wholesale gas prices in the world.” Those prices have long distorted both domestic consumption and investor interest, keeping demand high while choking off potential upstream capital. [caption id="attachment_30630" align="aligncenter" width="1209"] Image: Wholesale Gas Price Survey 2024 Edition. International Gas Union. https://www.datocms-assets.com/[/caption] This sentiment is echoed by Irina Mironova, Senior Energy Analyst at the New Energy Advancement Hub. “Domestic production is declining faster than consumption,” she said, “and domestic gas pricing is not market-based. It remains below the price of imported gas, which undermines the investment appeal of upstream projects for foreign investors.” The government has undertaken some measures to control demand over the past year, raising the tariffs for electricity and gas by 52.5% and 71% respectively, hitting consumers in the pocket in an attempt to alter the wasteful use of scant resources. On the supply side, the government has declared a bold ambition to raise production to 62 billion cubic meters annually under its Uzbekistan–2030 development strategy, but observers remain skeptical. “They’ve tried to facilitate exploration, especially in the Ustyurt region,” says Corbeau. “But even if results are positive, it’s unclear if significant production can be up and running by 2030.” In 2019, Uzbek state television announced that British oil major BP and Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR would lead exploration into the potential of gas reserves in the Ustyurt Plateau in the far west of the country. BP abandoned the project in 2021, with Tashkent blaming the company’s new focus on low-carbon projects. SOCAR retained an interested and signed a strategic partnership with Uzbekneftegaz in 2024, but six years on from BP’s initial interest, the two companies are still at the “initial exploration” stage, suggesting BP’s concerns may have been more than simply environmental. Return of the Mack Right now, Uzbekistan is looking to imports to bridge the gap. The timing is auspicious: Russia’s Gazprom, once focused almost entirely on Europe, has redirected its gaze to Central Asia in the wake of Western sanctions and lost market share. In November 2022, Moscow proposed a “gas union” with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, offering Russian supply to compensate for the region’s faltering output. [caption id="attachment_30629" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] Uzbekistan’s energy sector is increasingly propped up by Russian gas imports; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] The Soviet era Central Asia–Center pipeline, once used to transport gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, has now been engineered to run in reverse. Exports to Uzbekistan in the year to October 2024 exceeded five billion cubic meters. But are these offers strategic, even predatory? Not quite, says Corbeau. “Russia stepped in because both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan each had pipeline export commitments to China – 10 bcm per year each – that they failed to deliver.” She explained that Russia saw an opportunity to fill that gap, sending gas to these two countries, who could then continue to export their own gas on to China. For Russia, it was “a good way to reach China, without building additional infrastructure.” Mironova agrees that Russia’s motives are largely economic, not geostrategic. “Gazprom is likely to maximize the sales price under current market conditions. Given that Uzbekistan has some level of domestic production, it offers opportunities to integrate local output and optimize costs. If there were a viable opportunity for production expansion, I believe Gazprom would seek involvement rather than attempt to undercut local production.” That said, Gazprom’s own challenges make it an unreliable savior. The company’s finances have been battered by the collapse in European sales. As Mironova noted, “Following the reduction of gas exports to Europe in 2022 – and especially given Gazprom’s financial difficulties in 2024 – the company’s investment capabilities have been significantly reduced. Uzbekistan is unlikely to be a priority.” Other sources In the long run, Tashkent is seeking to diversify. In December, the government announced that twelve modern thermal power plants will be installed by 2027, with almost $5 billion of investment in public private partnerships with companies from France, Germany and Japan. Meanwhile, Russia’s Rosatom has begun work on a small-scale nuclear power plant near the picturesque Tuzkan Lake. “Uzbekistan aims to derive 54% of its electricity from renewables by 2030,” said Mironova. While current capacity is measly – wind and solar comprised less than 1% of its energy needs in 2023 – the country has made some recent steps forward. The country is currently constructing a series of renewable energy projects worth around $13 billion. Posters across Tashkent have declared “2025 is the Year of Environmental Protection and the Green Economy”, echoing Mirziyoyev’s announcement in January. Two major wind energy projects in the Bukhara region, built by Chinese and Saudi investors, should have come online by 2026. [caption id="attachment_30628" align="aligncenter" width="1433"] Environmental declarations are displayed across the city; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] Meanwhile, in a country which averages 320 sunny days per year, solar has huge potential. A top-down order in January from Energy Minister Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov stipulated that 50% of all roofs in the nation will have solar panels installed on them, although specific details were lacking. Electric cars are now increasingly populating the streets of Tashkent, with the Chinese firm BYD opening its first factory outside China in Mirziyoyev’s hometown of Jizzakh. At the recent EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the European Union made climate and energy one of its four key pillars of cooperation with Central Asia. Given Tashkent’s recent push toward regional leadership and Central Asia’s more general push toward economic integration, it also stands to benefit from hydroelectric projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Still, the road to an energy-secure Uzbekistan is bumpy and potholed. Grid infrastructure remains underdeveloped, and familiar allegations of corruption in procurement remain a concern. With the country’s economy and population both booming, demand will continue to surge. As a result, natural gas will likely remain a cornerstone of the energy mix for years to come, leaving the country in a race against time to develop alternatives.

The Ruthless History of the Great Game in Central Asia

In the so-called New Great Game, Central Asia is no longer a mere backdrop; with its strategic location, massive oil and gas reserves, and newfound deposits of critical raw materials, it’s a key player. In stark contrast to events in the 19^th century, this time, Central Asia finds itself courted by four great powers - China, the EU, the U.S., and Russia - instead of caught in the crosshairs of conquest. The region finds itself with agency. However, the original Great Game was anything but fair play. Comprising vast steppes, nomadic horsemen, descendants of Genghis Khan’s Great Horde, and a lone nation of Persians, during the 19th century, the once-thriving Silk Road states became entangled in a high-stakes battle of expansion and espionage between Britain and Russia. Afghanistan became the buffer zone, while the rest of the region fell under Russian control, vanishing behind what became known as the “Iron Curtain” for almost a century. The term “Great Game” was first coined by British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly in the 19th century, during his travels through the fiercely contested region between the Caucasus and the Khyber. He used it in a letter to describe the geopolitical chessboard unfolding before him. While Conolly introduced the idea, it was Rudyard Kipling who made it famous in his 1904 novel Kim, depicting the contest as the epic power clash between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire over India. Conolly’s reports impressed both Calcutta and London, highlighting Afghanistan’s strategic importance. Britain pledged to win over Afghan leaders — through diplomacy, if possible, and by force, if necessary. The Afghan rulers found themselves caught in a barrage of imperial ambition, as the British and Russian Empires played on their vulnerabilities to serve their own strategic goals. Former Ambassador Sergio Romano summed it up perfectly in I Luoghi della Storia: "The Afghans spent much of the 19th century locked in a diplomatic and military chess match with the great powers — the infamous 'Great Game,' where the key move was turning the Russians against the Brits and the Brits against the Russians." The Great Game can be said to have been initiated on January 12, 1830, when Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board of Control for India, instructed Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General, to create a new trade route to the Emirate of Bukhara. Britain aimed to dominate Afghanistan, turning it into a protectorate, while using the Ottoman Empire, Persian Empire, Khanate of Khiva, and Emirate of Bukhara as buffer states. This strategy was designed to safeguard India and key British sea trade routes, blocking Russia from accessing the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean. Russia countered by proposing Afghanistan as a neutral zone. The ensuing conflicts included the disastrous First Anglo-Afghan War (1838), the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845), the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848), the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878), and Russia’s annexation of Kokand. At the start of the Central Asian power struggle, both Britain and Russia had scant knowledge of the region's people, terrain, or climate. The Great Game revolved around gathering intelligence, charting routes, identifying the families controlling the land, and mapping uncharted territories. Undercover agents produced maps while monitoring Russian troop movements, just as the Russians kept tabs on British activities. The contest was as much about information as it was about influence. [caption id="attachment_30572" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] Stoddart and Connolly; image: Davide Mauro[/caption] The mastermind behind the phrase and policy of the Great Game, Arthur Conolly, along with his colleague Charles Stoddard, stood at the heart of high-stakes intelligence efforts that ignited intense and dramatic events. Taking power in Bukhara in 1827, Emir Nasrullah Khan cemented his reputation as the most ruthless of the Mangit Khans. His reign was marked by bloodshed, including the execution of twenty-eight close family members, among them three of his daughters, whom he killed to preserve their virginity. Nasrullah showed no hesitation in eliminating dissent, famously splitting a courtier in half with an axe over a minor irritation. Enforcing Sharia law with brutal zeal, having his men randomly quiz citizens on Quranic verses and meting out merciless punishments for mistakes, he sank further into infamy by encouraging impoverished families to sell their children to satisfy his depraved desires. [caption id="attachment_30573" align="aligncenter" width="591"] Nasrullah Khan[/caption] During the height of the Great Game, Colonel Charles Stoddart entered the court of the Bukharan Emir. His mission was both clear and ambitious. First, he sought to convince the Emir to release Russian slaves, cutting off the Tsar’s excuse for annexing Bukhara. Second, he aimed to secure a treaty of friendship with Britain. The secrecy surrounding the Bukharan court was legendary. However, Alexander Burnes — an explorer and cousin of poet Robert Burns — had documented one crucial detail: only Muslims were permitted to ride horses within the city walls. Stoddart sealed his fate with his arrogance and missteps. Staying mounted on his horse, bringing no gifts, and refusing to bow, he struck out at an attendant trying to prompt his deference. Adding insult to injury, his letter of introduction lacked the Queen’s signature. To make matters worse, Nasrullah had just received a damning dispatch from the Emir of Herat, accusing Stoddart of espionage and calling for his execution. What followed was a grim descent into the Emirate’s infamous dungeon, the Bug Pit — a diseased cesspool riddled with scorpions, rats, and specially bred vermin that thrived in the city’s filth. [caption id="attachment_30574" align="aligncenter" width="1920"] The Bug Pit; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] The British, the Turkish Sultans, and the rulers of Khiva and Kokand all demanded Stoddart’s release; even the Russians joined in — but none of it worked. When British forces captured Kabul in July 1839, the Emir, gripped by fear of invasion, issued Stoddart a brutal ultimatum: convert to Islam or die. Battered, desperate, and out of options, Stoddart gave in. After being bathed and circumcised, he moved into the chief of police’s home, gaining a sliver of freedom. He began praying at the Kalon Mosque and even managed to sneak letters back home to Norwich. “This Ameer is mad,” he wrote to his family. With the British showing no intention of advancing on Bukhara and his letter to Queen Victoria left unanswered, Nasrullah subjected Stoddart to a year of imprisonment in and out of the dreaded Bug Pit on a whim. Captain Arthur Conolly, a fervent Evangelical Christian, was the most incensed by Stoddart’s treatment. Fueled by a vision of uniting the region under the British flag, abolishing slavery, and "civilizing" the locals, Conolly believed he could outmaneuver Russian influence by persuading local rulers to align with Britain. At thirty-three and nursing a broken heart after being jilted, he channeled his zeal into this ambitious mission. With Stoddart’s cause boosting his appeal, Conolly dismissed Burnes' sharp remark that only the “wand of a Prospero” could unify Central Asia. His bold plan ultimately won approval from his cousin, William MacNaughton, the British envoy in Kabul. Tragically, a year later, MacNaughton stood by as Alexander Burnes, Britain’s foremost expert on the region, was brutally torn apart. MacNaughton met an equally gruesome end, his torso displayed on a meat hook in the heart of Kabul, while his severed limbs and head were paraded triumphantly through the streets. In September 1840, Conolly set out for Khiva. Although he was well received, he left without assurances and was firmly cautioned against visiting Bukhara. Moving onward to Kokand, he found hospitality but no treaty and yet another warning to steer clear of Bukhara. During this time, he received letters from Stoddart, who wrote, “the favor of the Ameer is increased towards me these days. I believe you will be well treated here.” Conolly reached Bukhara in November 1841, nearly three years after Stoddart had been imprisoned. Nasrullah’s spies had been shadowing his every move for weeks, intrigued by his visits to their fiercest enemies. Despite this, the infamous Butcher of Bukhara played it safe, greeting Conolly warmly and pressing him for the Queen’s long-awaited reply. Conolly reassured him that the message would arrive soon, speaking with the authority of the sovereign’s representative. While Stoddart and Conolly endured house arrest, a long-awaited message arrived — not from the Queen, but from Lord Palmerston. It confirmed the Emir’s correspondence had been received and passed not to the Queen but to the Governor General of India. This insult enraged Nasrullah, and tensions escalated further when another message from Herat accused Captain “Khan Ali” of espionage. Conolly soon found himself thrown into the infamous Bug Pit, tasting its horrors for the first time. Stoddart, meanwhile, had likely lost track of how many times he’d been imprisoned. [caption id="attachment_30575" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] The Zindon, where Stoddart and Conolly were imprisoned; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] The Governor General of India finally wrote to demand the release of Stoddart and Conolly, referring to them as "private travelers" — diplomatic code for agents the British refused to acknowledge. Paired with the humiliating British retreat in Afghanistan, this convinced Nasrullah that he could act without consequence. Fresh from crushing the Khanate of Kokand, brimming from the violence of his triumph, Nasrullah hauled his captives Stoddart and Conolly to the Registan on June 24, 1842, four agonizing years into their imprisonment. Forced to dig their own graves in front of a captivated crowd, the starving, mutilated officers — scarred and with flesh chewed from their bones — clung to each other, sobbing. Drummers pounded a somber dirge as their hands were tied, and they were shoved to their knees. Stoddart, a convert to Islam, likely earned the grim privilege of having his throat slit. Conolly, however, was given a final taunt. He was promised mercy if he converted to Islam by Nasrullah’s executioner, the so-called "Shadow of God." He rejected the offer with resolve, exclaiming, “Colonel Stoddart has been a Muslim for three years, and you have killed him. I will not become one, and I am ready to die.” His head was severed moments later. The pair's bodies were dumped into an unmarked grave beneath the Registan. With no news of the doomed officers forthcoming, their friends gathered funds and dispatched Joseph Wolff, a peculiar clergyman, to uncover their fate. Arriving in Bukhara in 1845, Wolff narrowly escaped their fate not by wit or force but by sheer absurdity. His full canonical robes amused the Emir so thoroughly that Nasrullah spared his life, even inviting his "musical band of Hindoos" to serenade Wolff with "God Save the Queen." Nasrullah Khan would rule undisturbed for another 15 years, meeting his end not by the sword but peacefully in his sleep. The Great Game drew to a close in the early 20th century, brought on by pivotal international shifts. The Russian Empire, drained by the costly Russo-Japanese War (1904–1906), lacked the resources to sustain its Central Asian ambitions. Tsar Nicholas II faced mounting financial and military constraints, halting Russian momentum. The Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907, marked the official end of a nearly a century-long rivalry. With Afghanistan secured as a British protectorate, it brought respite to the geopolitical chess game between the two empires. The Great Game ended without a victor, leaving behind shattered economies, silenced political movements, countless lost lives, and a chilling legacy.