Uzbekistan World Cup Ends With Reality Check After DR Congo Defeat
For an hour in Atlanta, it looked as though Uzbekistan's World Cup story might yet have an improbable final chapter, but a flurry of goals in the final 25 minutes saw Fabio Cannavaro's side handed another harsh reality check.
The White Wolves threw away a first-half lead to lose 3-1 to the Democratic Republic of Congo on Saturday, exiting their first World Cup with three defeats from three games and conceding 11 goals – more than any team at the tournament apart from Tunisia and Iraq. Meanwhile, Congo advanced to the knockout stage for the first time in their history, returning to Atlanta to face England on Wednesday.
The meeting between two nations making only their second and first World Cup appearances respectively offered a study in contrasting approaches to building a national team. Around 85% of the Congolese squad was born outside the country, mainly in France, Belgium and England, whereas Uzbekistan's entire 26-man squad is homegrown.
The Congolese have been one of the surprise packages of this tournament, and were unlucky not to get more than one point from the opening two games. They came here wearing red rather than their usual cobalt blue, knowing that a win would see them through to the next round. Uzbekistan needed an improbably large victory to progress and were playing largely for pride.
But it was the Uzbeks who made a lightning start. Eldor Shomurodov had the ball in the net almost straight from the kick-off, only for it to be ruled out for offside.
The Başakşehir man, who finished top scorer in the Turkish league last season, had endured a quiet tournament until this game, cutting a very lonely figure against Colombia and Portugal. He was sharp here, though, elegantly chipping over a hopelessly marooned Lionel Mpasi to make it 1-0, the first time Uzbekistan had led a game all tournament.
Shomurodov spurned a chance to double the lead early in the second half, once again attempting to chip the goalkeeper when a simpler finish might have sufficed.
That second effort was largely against the run of play. After such a bright start, Uzbekistan retreated deeper and deeper into their own half as momentum built for Congo. The White Wolves were fortunate to reach the interval ahead after Nathanaël Mbuku had a superb equaliser ruled out following a VAR review for a foul in the build-up, a soft decision that prompted widespread criticism.
Congo missed several good chances in the second half, and with half an hour to go, Uzbekistan might have felt it was their day. Once again however, they demonstrated their capacity for self-destruction at the back. In the 68th minute, an innocuous, hopeful ball was tossed into the Uzbek box. The team's poster boy, Abdukodir Khusanov attempted to clear it but instead caught the outstretched leg of Yoane Wissa, leaving the referee little choice but to point to the spot. Wissa converted without fuss.
Once the dam broke, Uzbekistan capitulated. Ten minutes later, substitute Fiston Mayele deftly flicked home after Meschack Elia's effort was deflected into his path. A low, long-range effort from Wissa finished the game off in stoppage time, sparking wild Congolese celebrations.
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For Uzbekistan, this tournament has exposed the gap that still exists between dominating at youth level in Asia and competing against seasoned international sides. For a side built on solidity and coached by one of the greatest defenders of his generation, shipping so many goals was not how they would have hoped their World Cup debut would end.
In his post-match press conference, Cannavaro said he was happy with the intensity of the first half performance, but “after the break we suffered too much and did not work together”. He described the team’s reversion to playing long balls as a reason for their fatigue. “If we don’t control the ball … you lose energy, you lose confidence,” he said.
Several of the Uzbek journalists in the room were critical of Cannavaro and the side, causing him to hint that expectations had been rather inflated. “I told you this before,” Cannavaro told one journalist, “people who thought we could beat Congo or Colombia, they made a mistake. The World Cup is brutal. You’re coming up against the best players in the world … Congo have many players who are playing in the best five leagues in Europe. We have one.”
“We need to understand the level of Uzbekistan’s football,” he said. “We need to continue investing money in academies, this is the only way to try to ensure that Uzbekistan keep arriving at the world cup over the next 20-30 years.”
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Chongara and Tash-Tobo: The Villages That Changed Countries Without Moving
About 2,500 people in Chongara and Tash-Tobo now live under Kyrgyz jurisdiction. The transfer reduces the number of Uzbek enclaves in Kyrgyzstan and clears the way for a much shorter road across the Batken Region. For Umitbek, the change first appeared online. Chongara, his home village, passed from Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Region into Kyrgyzstan when the legal border moved. “We are welcoming the decision with joy,” Umitbek told Azattyk. “Ninety-nine percent of our village is Kyrgyz.” Umitbek already holds a Kyrgyz passport, while many neighbors have Uzbek documents. Some households include citizens of both countries. The village has Kyrgyz and Uzbek schools, and families have chosen between them. Kyrgyz presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov announced the transfer on June 23. “Now registration procedures will be conducted in these villages, after which their residents will be granted Kyrgyz citizenship,” Alagozov said. He did not give a timetable for the process. Kyrgyzstan transferred plots of equal area to Uzbekistan as part of the settlement. Public announcement did not identify those plots or state their total size. The two governments also conducted a separate exchange involving 236 hectares. That land will support a road between the villages of Sai and Tayan, and shorten the journey between Aidarken and Batken from 225 kilometers to 55, or about 76% of the present route. Officials have yet to publish a construction date or budget. A Century Inside Another Republic Chongara and Tash-Tobo were Uzbek exclaves, pieces of Uzbekistan completely surrounded by Kyrgyz territory. Their unusual status grew from Soviet boundary decisions made a century ago. Chongara’s administrative link to the Uzbek Republic dates to territorial decisions around Sokh in 1925. Tash-Tobo was also assigned to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic that year. A parity commission confirmed its enclave status in 1955. These lines served as internal administrative boundaries during the Soviet period. Villages that had shared roads, water systems and family links found themselves divided by customs posts and citizenship rules. Uzbekistan previously had four exclaves inside Kyrgyzstan: Sokh, Shakhimardan, Chongara, and Tash-Tobo. Following the latest transfer, only Sokh and Shakhimardan remain under Uzbek jurisdiction. Sokh is the largest and most complicated. It lies within Kyrgyzstan, but has a largely ethnic Tajik population. Roads around the enclave have long shaped travel through the western Batken Region. A Settlement Built Over Two Decades Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan began formal border negotiations in 2000. Progress remained slow while relations between the two governments were strained. The process accelerated after Shavkat Mirziyoyev became Uzbekistan’s president in 2016. A 2017 agreement settled about 1,170 kilometers of the roughly 1,378-kilometer frontier. The remaining sections involved land, roads, and water infrastructure. The two foreign ministers signed a further border treaty in Bishkek on November 3, 2022, which covered sections left outside the 2017 settlement. On January 27, 2023, Mirziyoyev and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov exchanged ratification instruments during a state visit to Bishkek. The legal delimitation fixed the agreed line on maps. Physical demarcation then placed that line on the ground. The 2022 package also covered the Kempir-Abad reservoir, known in Uzbekistan as the Andijan reservoir. The agreement triggered protests in Kyrgyzstan and led to the arrest of activists and opposition figures. The dispute showed how closely border agreements remain tied to land, water, and public trust. Border specialist Salamat Alamanov said governments may exchange equal areas of land when both states consent, and that a revised boundary should pass through legislation, parliamentary approval, and presidential signature. The June 23 announcement did not describe those legal steps, and left the location of the Kyrgyz land transferred to Uzbekistan undisclosed. A Shrinking Map of Enclaves The latest exchange follows an earlier change involving Barak, Kyrgyzstan’s former exclave inside Uzbekistan. Under the 2022 settlement, Kyrgyzstan transferred Barak to Uzbekistan and received 208 hectares near Kara-Suu in Osh Region. Barak residents moved to a new settlement in Kyrgyzstan in April 2024. Together, the Barak and Chongara transfers simplify one of the Ferghana Valley’s most fragmented borders, removing three small detached territories from the regional map. The changes also form part of a wider border settlement across the valley. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed their border agreement on March 13, 2025, after decades of disputes and deadly clashes. Later that month, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement defining their shared border junction in Khujand. The summit also produced a declaration on friendship and regional cooperation. Together with the Kyrgyz-Uzbek settlement, those agreements have reduced several sources of potential conflict in the densely populated Ferghana Valley. For Chongara and Tash-Tobo, the immediate work is administrative. Registration comes first; residents who still carry Uzbek documents can then receive Kyrgyz citizenship.
The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose
The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues, although market volatility and higher import and freight costs diluted the gain. The truce could therefore remove a temporary windfall for Astana while easing inflationary pressure in the region’s energy-importing economies.
The clearest longer-term opportunity may lie in trade and transit. On June 16, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin held a bilateral meeting with an Iranian delegation led by Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh.
The sides discussed the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor, expansion of port infrastructure, increasing bilateral trade volumes, and improving transport and logistics ties. By the end of 2025, cargo volumes along the North-South corridor had increased by 12% to 3.5 million tons. Rail freight between the two countries rose by 69%. Kazakhstan and Iran intend to modernize transport infrastructure to increase the corridor’s capacity to 20 million tons per year. The sides also emphasized the importance of the recently signed five-party railway agreement between China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the upcoming four-party tariff agreement between Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Iran, which is expected to create additional conditions for trade and transit growth. At the start of the military escalation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, regional economist and Logistan editor-in-chief Grigory Mikhailov had already pointed to transport and logistics opportunities for Central Asia. “There is a chance to attract investment into logistics development from major players, primarily China. For Beijing, the current situation is evidence of the need to develop alternative routes bypassing the Middle East. Options include expanding rail transit through Central Asia and Russia, as well as gradually developing the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast,” he said. De-escalation in the Middle East, even if temporary, may alter China’s plans for diversifying logistics routes, but is unlikely to cancel them altogether. This makes the pause a test of route confidence as much as diplomacy. If the ceasefire holds, Iran could regain some value as one of Central Asia’s shortest southern outlets to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. If it fails, the region’s search for alternatives will accelerate, strengthening demand for the Trans-Caspian route through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. In that sense, both peace and renewed instability could increase Central Asia’s strategic importance, but through different corridors. Another possible scenario involves Kazakhstan’s potential role in arrangements related to Iran’s nuclear program. Under the memorandum signed by Trump and Pezeshkian, Iran agreed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, but the framework sets no detailed limits on the program. The fate of Iran’s accumulated enriched-uranium stockpile is to be resolved in later talks. Washington and Tehran have publicly disputed what was agreed on inspections, although the memorandum says nuclear activities involving material and facilities would be supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said Kazakhstan had indicated its willingness to receive Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% if Washington and Tehran reached an agreement on the nuclear program. Grossi made the statement following his May 26 meeting in Astana with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Kazakhstan’s potential role rests on an established non-proliferation record: it hosted two rounds of nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty in 2013 and now hosts the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank. The bank itself is not authorized to receive or process Iran’s uranium enriched to 60%, however, meaning that any such arrangement would require separate legal documents, safeguards, financing, custody rules, and probably dedicated infrastructure. For Central Asia, the truce is less a peace dividend than a redistribution of risk. Hydrocarbon exporters could lose from weaker energy prices, while import-dependent economies could gain from lower fuel and freight costs. The region would also benefit from having more viable routes to world markets. The real question is whether banks, insurers, transport companies, and investors are willing to do business through Iran. Unless they are, the truce will remain a political pause rather than a lasting economic benefit for Central Asia.
Rail Reform and Regional Corridors Put Uzbekistan at the Center of Central Asia’s Logistics Map
At the Tashkent International Investment Forum, officials and transport executives discussed railway reform and new corridor projects, with private investment as a main point.
World Bank Senior Transport Specialist Mansur Bustoni described rail as “essential” for Uzbekistan, which depends on land routes for access to seaports and export markets. The World Bank wants to help turn Uzbekistan Railways from a state monopoly into “a commercial bankable enterprise,” he told the forum.
Uzbekistan Railways has about 4,700 route kilometers, according to Bustoni. The system carries around 60 million tons of freight and 15 million passengers a year and contributes about 8% of GDP. Much of that freight is linked to exports.
The World Bank is supporting 44 activities across seven reform programs. Bustoni listed legal separation inside Uzbekistan Railways, financial reform, operational efficiency, and investment planning among the main areas. Each activity has been ranked by priority, he added.
Tariff reform was one of Bustoni’s main topics. He called the proposed change “not a price hike.” The aim is to replace ad hoc increases with rules-based pricing. Cost-reflective tariffs would give the railway company more predictable revenue and reduce state cross-subsidies.
Bustoni also cited capital-market plans. Uzbekistan’s infrastructure company is part of the National Investment Fund of the Republic of Uzbekistan (UzNIF), which he described as a $2.4 billion fund managed by Franklin Templeton, with a planned dual listing in London and Tashkent. The railway sector recorded a roughly $188 million net loss in 2023, reached break-even in 2024, and is expected to post a positive $138 million result in 2025, he added.
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Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) Secretary General Jasurbek Choriyev linked corridor development to Uzbekistan’s national priorities. He cited double-digit growth in passenger air traffic over five years and 15 million tourists last year, attributing the figures to national data and analysts at Airports Council International and the World Bank.
Uzbekistan’s aircraft fleet has expanded to more than 100 planes from about 40 to 50 in recent years. A target of 188 aircraft by 2030 could be reached earlier, Choriyev noted. Uzbek airlines are also carrying more freight on the China-Europe route, driven in part by e-commerce.
Choriyev described rail as the backbone of national connectivity, carrying about 90% of internal and external traffic. He pointed to the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Iran railway and gave 2030 as the expected completion date, with 2028 or 2029 possible. He also cited the Trans-Afghan corridor as a route to Pakistan. About 52% of Uzbekistan’s rail network is electrified, with a target of 70% by 2030.
Innokenty Ivanov, a principal consultant at Freshfields, said Uzbekistan’s railway reform is creating legal routes for private investment through market mechanisms and public-private partnerships. The reform covers the reorganization of Uzbekistan Railways as a holding company and a legal framework for private investment and independent operation.
Ivanov compared the process with Germany, where railway reform led to long-term contracts between the government and the infrastructure company. Financing tied to measurable targets gives investors more certainty than annual budget decisions, he said.
Škoda Group’s Roman Sorkin called Uzbekistan a “next home base” for the company and discussed plans to localize assembly and supply-chain activity. The company plans to work with Tashkent Transport University to open a “Škoda Academy.”
Sorkin urged fast-growing cities to plan for barrier-free transport before demand rises further. Low-floor vehicles and universal accessibility can make public transport easier to use, he said. He also called for clear technical standards to avoid higher costs and delays, citing TSI 1520 and interoperability standards.
Aleksey Skatin of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) told the forum that the bank had opened an office in Tashkent a month earlier and was already active as a non-sovereign lender in the region. Uzbekistan sits on the East-West and North-South transport axes, he said, while logistics projects need linked transport networks and storage capacity.
The EDB has collected 400 logistics projects in Central Asia, Skatin noted. Six of the top ten transport and logistics projects in its database are connected to Uzbekistan. The Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railway could shorten access from China to Europe by about 1,000 kilometers and raise container traffic to five times its current level by 2030, he said. The Trans-Afghan railway could also cut the distance to Pakistan by about 1,000 kilometers and open access to maritime ports.
Warehouse capacity remains limited, Skatin added. Uzbekistan has slightly less than 1 million square meters of warehouse space, while demand could grow seven to nine times. Rail corridors need storage and distribution capacity to work effectively.
Petr Novotný of Škoda Group also described Uzbekistan as an attractive transport market. The company wants to sell vehicles and build a local role in training and production. New systems need careful integration to avoid extra costs, he added.
In a special interview during the forum, Bustoni cited “vivid interest” from foreign banks and private capital in Uzbekistan’s regional connectivity projects. The Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railway would give the country its shortest route to China. The Trans-Afghan railway would connect Uzbekistan to Pakistani ports, while the Middle Corridor would improve access to European markets and diversify routes.
The World Bank is helping Uzbekistan prepare several road projects, according to Bustoni. He named the Tashkent-Andijon toll road, which would shorten travel time to the Fergana Valley, and the M41 road project in Surkhandarya, which would help move goods from Tajikistan and southern Uzbekistan toward Afghanistan.
Bustoni identified the absence of the “last mile” in the railway network as Central Asia’s main connectivity gap. Rail lines need road links to complete final delivery, he said. Rail carries about 30% to 40% of goods in Uzbekistan and remains one of the cheapest ways to move them.
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EU Launches Platform to Mobilize Up to €2 Billion for Europe–Central Asia Connectivity
The European Commission launched a Connectivity Agenda Platform on June 23, 2026, and concluded statements of intent with international financial institutions expected to mobilize up to €2 billion ($2.3 billion) for transport, border-crossing and trade-facilitation projects across the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus.
The initiative was unveiled at a high-level ministerial meeting in Brussels, hosted by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela, and Commissioner for Sustainable Transport Apostolos Tzitzikostas.
The meeting brought together transport ministers and senior officials from EU member states, as well as representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, alongside international lenders, to advance connectivity projects under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.
The new platform is designed to coordinate investments and policy actions across transport, energy, digital connectivity, and trade. Participants also agreed to improve the operational efficiency of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, a wider framework that includes the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR, also known as the Middle Corridor.
The route links China and Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, offering an alternative to transport routes crossing Russia.
The European Commission said the expected financing would support transport infrastructure, border-crossing modernization, and trade-facilitation projects aimed at improving freight movement across the corridor.
“The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor is becoming a vital bridge between Europe and Asia,” Síkela said, adding that the investments would help make the route faster, more reliable, and better integrated.
Tzitzikostas said stronger transport links were critical for economic competitiveness and regional resilience.
The platform’s launch came during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s official visit to Brussels, where he met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
In an EU–Kazakhstan joint statement, the leaders reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Trans-Caspian corridor and pledged deeper cooperation under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.
They also highlighted the EU’s role as Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partner and agreed to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, energy, transport, digitalization, and emerging technologies.
Speaking at the Kazakhstan-EU roundtable in Brussels, Tokayev said Kazakhstan was investing heavily in infrastructure to position itself as a regional logistics hub connecting Europe, Central Asia, China, the Caucasus, and the Middle East.
According to Tokayev, cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor have risen fivefold over the past six years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.1 million tons annually, with Kazakhstan targeting a capacity of 10 million tons.
He said Kazakhstan has invested more than $35 billion in transport and logistics infrastructure over the past 15 years, with the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk serving as major transit gateways.
Tokayev also welcomed logistics agreements worth nearly $1 billion signed on June 23 by the Development Bank of Kazakhstan: one with the European Investment Bank, and a separate agreement with a banking syndicate including Commerzbank, JPMorgan Chase, and Standard Chartered, backed by guarantees from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
A day earlier, Kazakhstan and European partners announced four transport-related agreements worth a combined $462 million to further strengthen connectivity along the Middle Corridor.
World Cup: Ronaldo Makes History as Portugal Rout Uzbekistan 5-0
The Group K match between Uzbekistan and Portugal in Houston turned into a record-breaking night for Cristiano Ronaldo, as the European side coasted to a 5-0 victory. Portugal and Uzbekistan had both made unconvincing starts to the tournament. Uzbekistan, playing at the World Cup finals for the first time, lost 3-1 to Colombia. Portugal, meanwhile, dominated their match against DR Congo but failed to hold on to their lead and drew 1-1. They were in no mood to drop more points against the World Cup debutants. Before the match, Portugal head coach Roberto Martinez made it clear that he did not regard his team’s opening result as a setback. “After the draw with DR Congo, nothing changed for us: there are three matches in the group stage, and the first one is part of the process,” the Portugal coach said. Uzbekistan head coach Fabio Cannavaro, for his part, said his players would try to minimize the mistakes that led to their defeat against Colombia. “Our only way to achieve a positive result is through tactics, discipline, and hard work on the pitch,” Cannavaro said. In practice, however, Cannavaro’s tactics did not work, and it was a case of “Houston, we have a problem” as Portugal pinned their opponents back from the kick-off. It took only six minutes for Ronaldo to score the first goal against Uzbekistan, finishing a cross into the penalty area. With that goal, Ronaldo became the second-oldest goalscorer in World Cup history, behind Cameroon’s Roger Milla, who scored his final World Cup goal at the age of 42. The Portugal captain, 41, became the first player to score at six World Cups and moved past Eusebio as Portugal’s all-time leading World Cup scorer. Ten minutes later, Portugal doubled their lead with a cleverly worked free kick. At first, it looked as though Ronaldo was taking an age to prepare to shoot, but Nuno Mendes instead struck the ball, catching Uzbekistan goalkeeper Abduvohid Nematov by surprise. After that, Uzbekistan became slightly more active in attack. Midway through the first half, Azizjon Ganiev tried his luck from long range, sending the ball into the top corner of Portugal’s goal. But Uzbekistan’s celebrations did not last long: after a VAR review, the referee disallowed the goal for a foul by Abbosbek Fayzullaev on João Cancelo in the build-up. Portugal then quickly took the game beyond Uzbekistan’s reach, and near the end of the first half Bruno Fernandes delivered a precise pass to Ronaldo, who was left unmarked in the penalty area and calmly shot into the bottom corner. Portugal eased the pace slightly in the second half but still managed to score twice more. Portugal’s fourth came on the hour, when a Bruno Fernandes corner was diverted in for an Abduvohid Nematov own goal. Late in the match, substitute Rafael Leao picked up a loose ball near the edge of the penalty area and, without hesitation, struck a powerful and accurate shot into the top corner to make it 5-0. “This was the response we got to the draw with DR Congo. Sometimes you need a match like the one against DR Congo in order to progress in the tournament. Today we saw a team with the same attitude and commitment, but more mature, because this was no longer the opening match. I am very pleased with the result,” FIFA’s official website quoted Martinez as saying after the match. “I have nothing to blame my team for: the difference between our teams was enormous. If you concede in the first ten minutes against a team like Portugal, it becomes very difficult,” Cannavaro said. In the other second-round match in the group, Colombia defeated DR Congo 1-0 and moved to the top of the table with six points. Portugal are second with four points, DR Congo are third with one point, while Uzbekistan remain without a point. A total of 32 teams will advance to the World Cup knockout stage: the 24 teams finishing first and second in their groups, plus the eight best third-placed teams. In Group K, only Colombia have so far guaranteed a place in the knockout stage, as they can no longer finish lower than second regardless of the outcome of their match against Portugal on June 28. Uzbekistan must beat DR Congo in their final group match, scheduled for June 28 Central Asia time, to finish third and remain in contention for a knockout-stage place. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Uzbekistan are the first Central Asian team to qualify for the World Cup finals.
Opinion: The Amu Darya Stress Test – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Politics of Agricultural Adaptation
Central Asia’s water crisis is usually discussed as a problem of rivers, reservoirs, and diplomacy. But in 2026, the Amu Darya is also becoming something else: a test of state adaptation. The river basin entered the irrigation season under acute pressure. According to data cited by Kabar, the flow of the Amu Darya stood at only 66.8% of its normal level as of February 11, compared with 101.8% a year earlier. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the river’s flow could fall to around 65% of its historical norm, raising risks for food security and agriculture across downstream states. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal is advancing. The canal, one of the Taliban government’s most ambitious infrastructure projects, is designed to divert water from the Amu Darya to irrigate large areas of northern Afghanistan. Carnegie Politika has estimated that, once fully operational by 2028, it could take up to 10 cubic kilometers of water annually from the river. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the implications are direct. Both rely heavily on Amu Darya water. Both inherited agricultural systems shaped by Soviet-era irrigation, cotton production, and centralized planning, and both are now facing a combination of climate stress, upstream extraction, and aging water infrastructure. Yet their responses are increasingly different. The emerging contrast is not simply between two agricultural policies; it is between two institutional logics: adaptation and control. Uzbekistan’s Adjustment Strategy Uzbekistan is one of the most exposed countries in the region. Its population is large, its agriculture remains water-intensive, and some of its most vulnerable regions, including Khorezm and Karakalpakstan, sit near the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. For decades, the old model relied on large-scale irrigation, cotton, rice, and the assumption that water would continue to move through the regional system much as it had before. That assumption is now weakening. Tashkent’s response remains costly and far from complete. Uzbekistan still faces serious water losses, degraded land, salinization, and uneven implementation of reform. But the direction of travel is visible: the state is trying to reduce exposure by changing crops, infrastructure, and diplomatic behavior. Rice is one example. Traditional flooded rice cultivation is extremely water-intensive, and water shortages have already pushed some Uzbek rice farmers away from traditional Amu Darya regions toward areas with more stable access to water. Uzbekistan has also begun experimenting with less water-intensive methods. In Karakalpakstan, UNDP has supported the introduction of upland rice, which can reduce water consumption by up to 40% compared with traditional rice cultivation. Separately, Uzbekistan has announced plans to expand resource-efficient rice cultivation, including drip irrigation and drought-resilient rice varieties. The state is no longer treating the old water-intensive model as untouchable. In 2026, Uzbekistan allocated significant public financing for water-saving technologies. Government-linked reporting has described plans to expand drip irrigation, sprinkler systems, and laser land leveling across hundreds of thousands of hectares, with a broader target of expanding water-saving technologies to 3.5 million hectares by 2028. Laser leveling may sound technical, but its use reflects a shift from simply demanding more water to trying to extract more value from each unit of water already available. Uzbekistan is also trying to broaden its agricultural export base, including through legumes such as mung beans, though this remains a partial adjustment rather than a replacement for cotton or rice. The most important adjustment, however, may be diplomatic. On Qosh-Tepa, Tashkent has chosen a pragmatic line. Instead of treating Afghanistan’s canal as a hostile act, Uzbekistan has pursued dialogue with Kabul. Rivers without Boundaries reported in March 2026 that Tashkent had offered technical assistance in the design and concreting of the canal bed. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Uzbekistan has offered several times to help with the canal’s construction amid concerns about safety and workmanship. The logic is practical: if Afghanistan is going to take water from the Amu Darya, downstream states have an interest in reducing losses from seepage and poor engineering. This is a difficult position. Uzbekistan cannot stop Afghanistan from pursuing agricultural development, but it also cannot ignore the impact on its own farmers. The result is a strategy of technical diplomacy: reduce the damage, keep channels open, and avoid turning water into an immediate confrontation. Turkmenistan’s Cotton-Command Problem Turkmenistan faces many of the same structural pressures, but its response appears more rigid. The country depends heavily on the Karakum Canal, one of the largest irrigation systems in the world. Built in the Soviet period to carry Amu Darya water across the desert, it remains central to Turkmen agriculture. But it is also associated with high water losses, salinization, and the persistence of water-intensive cotton production in an arid environment. Unlike Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan has shown limited public signs of rethinking the cotton-command model. Turkmenistan has announced water and agricultural measures, including instructions for the 2026 cotton crop, but these measures appear aimed more at preserving production targets than changing the crop model. Cotton remains deeply embedded in the state system. Production targets and centralized procurement continue to shape the sector, but water stress makes this model more costly each year. When water is abundant, a rigid quota system can hide inefficiency. When water declines, the pressure moves downward, onto farmers and public-sector workers. The Cotton Campaign reported in May 2026 that state-imposed forced labor remains widespread and systematic in Turkmenistan’s cotton sector. According to the coalition, the government reversed modest previous steps to reduce mobilization and again relied on public-sector employees, including teachers, students, doctors, and workers in state organizations, to pick cotton or pay for replacement laborers. The pressure is now international as well as domestic. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that in June 2026, the International Labour Organization (ILO) again called on Turkmenistan to dismantle its state-imposed cotton quota system and submit a progress report by September 1. This is not only a human rights issue. It is also a signal of institutional stress. A system that adapts changes incentives, crops, and technologies. A system that cannot adapt often intensifies pressure on the population to preserve output targets. In Turkmenistan’s case, cotton has become more than a crop. it has become a measure of the state’s ability to enforce a plan even as environmental conditions continue to deteriorate. Water scarcity also increases the discretionary power of local irrigation officials. When access to irrigation becomes uncertain, the ability to decide which field receives water and when becomes a form of leverage. The contrast with Uzbekistan is not absolute. Uzbekistan is still facing its own uneven reforms and social costs. The difference is in the direction of adaptation. Tashkent is trying to modify the agricultural system, while Ashgabat appears more focused on preserving the existing one. Qosh-Tepa as a Regime-Level Shock The Qosh-Tepa Canal sharpens this divide. For Afghanistan, the project is a national development priority. It promises food production and state-building in the north. No regional policy can deny Afghanistan’s need for water. For downstream Central Asia, however, Qosh-Tepa changes the old equation. Soviet-era water arrangements largely excluded Afghanistan; now Kabul is turning its geographic position into infrastructure. That creates a new reality for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan: less water may arrive downstream, with the old allocation system no longer fitting the basin. The states most exposed to this shift have two basic options. They can adapt their agricultural systems to a lower-water future by investing in efficiency, changing crop structures, negotiating with Afghanistan, and reducing dependence on the most water-intensive production models. Or they can try to preserve the old model through administrative force and quotas. Uzbekistan is moving toward the first path. Turkmenistan remains closer to the second. Agriculture as a Test of State Capacity The Amu Darya crisis shows that climate pressure does not affect all states in the same way. The same river shock can produce different political outcomes depending on institutional flexibility. A flexible system does not avoid pain. Uzbekistan’s adaptation will create winners and losers. Rice farmers may move, crop patterns may shift, and the local authorities may struggle to implement national water-saving programs. Technical diplomacy with Afghanistan may produce only partial results. But adaptation at least allows the state to recognize scarcity and change behavior, whereas a rigid system suppresses feedback. It treats lower water availability as a problem to be overcome by command. That can preserve the appearance of stability in the short term, but it tends to accumulate stress beneath the surface. This is why the Amu Darya is no longer only a water-security issue. It is an agricultural and institutional stress test. The question is not simply which country has more water; it is which system can change with the water regime. In the coming years, the most important indicators may not be found in reservoir levels or diplomatic statements. They will also appear in rice fields, cotton quotas, irrigation schedules, crop substitutions, and the social pressure placed on rural communities. Uzbekistan is trying to turn scarcity into a forced modernization of its farming system. Turkmenistan is trying to preserve an older command model under worsening environmental conditions. The river is the same. The institutional responses are not. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Central Asia’s Nuclear Push: Uzbekistan Starts Construction as Kazakhstan Plans at Least Three Plants
Uzbekistan has poured concrete for its first nuclear power plant, while Kazakhstan has signed a $16.5 billion agreement for a two-reactor facility near Lake Balkhash and approved a site for a second plant. Kazakhstan's long-term strategy calls for at least three nuclear power plants by 2050, with a fourth possible. Both governments are presenting nuclear power as a way to meet rapidly growing electricity demand and strengthen energy security. Yet the projects are advancing at different speeds and are reviving questions over water use, cross-border safety, financing, and long-term reliance on Russian technology and credit. Uzbekistan Moves Into Construction On June 4, 2026, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin launched construction by video link. Rafael Mariano Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, also took part. The first nuclear-grade concrete was poured overnight from June 4 to June 5 for the foundation slab of the first RITM-200N small modular reactor unit in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region. Uzatom subsequently classified the site as a nuclear power plant under construction. The facility is one plant with four planned reactor units: two large VVER-1000 units and two smaller RITM-200N units, each rated at 55 MW. Together, they would provide more than 2.1 GW of installed capacity. The present configuration is the latest version of a project that began with a 2017 peaceful-use agreement and a 2018 plan for two large reactors. In 2024, the focus shifted to six small reactors, before the design changed again in 2025 to the mixed large-and-small format now under construction. Uzbek and Russian projections put annual generation at about 17 billion kWh, or roughly 15% of future national demand. The current schedule envisages the first small unit reaching criticality in late 2029, with the large reactors expected to be commissioned in 2033 and 2035, although Uzatom has said final dates depend on outstanding contract arrangements. The project's stated base price is $9.5 billion, and Tashkent is seeking loans for most of the cost. Those financing terms, along with the final allocation of construction and operating risk, remain central to the project's viability. Water and Cross-Border Concerns The plant will stand near Lake Tuzkon in the Aydar-Arnasay lake system, about 40 kilometers from Kazakhstan's border. That proximity has made what is formally an Uzbek project a regional issue. Residents and environmental advocates in southern Kazakhstan have raised concerns about accident preparedness, radioactive waste, and possible pressure on already stressed water systems. Aiman Tleulesova, national coordinator of the Central Asian Regional Water Network, has argued that reactor cooling could require greater discharges into Lake Tuzkon and additional withdrawals linked to the Syr Darya system. In her assessment, that could intensify competition for irrigation water in Kazakhstan's Turkestan and Kyzylorda regions. These are concerns raised by specialists and campaigners, rather than established measurements of the completed plant's impact, but they require a quantified response because water scarcity is already a recurring regional problem. Uzbekistan held public hearings on the environmental impact assessment in December 2025. The State Ecological Expertise Center said the assessment complied with national requirements and IAEA standards, and that participants received answers on water, agriculture, radiation safety, health monitoring, and compensation. Uzatom has also pursued Hungarian dry-cooling technology intended for water-scarce locations, which could reduce water withdrawals compared with conventional wet cooling. However, the published hearing summary does not state the plant's expected annual water demand or explain whether Kazakhstan participated in a project-specific transboundary consultation. The two countries already cooperate on Syr Darya monitoring and automated measuring stations, but the nuclear project will need its own transparent mechanism for sharing water-use data, emergency plans, and environmental monitoring results. Kazakhstan's Return to Nuclear Power Kazakhstan's path has been more politically visible. In the October 6, 2024 referendum, 71.12% of participating voters supported construction of a nuclear power plant, with turnout of 63.66%. The vote gave the government a mandate to proceed, despite the country's unusually sensitive nuclear history. Between 1949 and 1989, the Soviet Union carried out 456 nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk site, which was formally closed in 1991. Kazakhstan also previously generated nuclear electricity at the BN-350 fast reactor in Aktau, which shut down in 1999. The new program is therefore a return to civilian nuclear generation and the construction of the country's first new large commercial plant in the post-Soviet period, rather than its first nuclear facility of any kind. Kazakhstan officially broke ground near the village of Ulken in August 2025, launching engineering and site-survey work on the shore of Lake Balkhash. That ceremony marked the official start of the construction process, but not yet the full civil construction of the reactor buildings. The commercial framework became clearer on May 28, 2026, when Kazakhstan and Russia signed the agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant. The project will use two VVER-1200 Generation III+ reactors with a combined capacity of about 2.4 GW. Almasadam Satkaliyev, the head of Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy Agency, put the cost at about $16.5 billion, including roughly $2 billion for security and infrastructure. Russia is expected to provide export credit. Active construction is planned to begin in 2027, with the first reactor scheduled for commissioning in early 2034. At Least Three Plants Kazakhstan is planning beyond Ulken. In January 2026, the government approved the Zhambyl district of the Almaty region as the site of a second plant, adjacent to the first project area. China National Nuclear Corporation has been selected to lead the second project and is also expected to lead a third plant. Final designs, costs, and the detailed siting arrangements for the later projects remain under development. The national nuclear strategy says at least three plants should be operating by 2050, while leaving open the possibility of a fourth. The multi-supplier approach also reflects Kazakhstan's effort to avoid placing its entire nuclear program with one foreign partner. The energy case is substantial. According to Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company, the country generated 123.1 billion kWh in 2025 but consumed 124.6 billion kWh; the 1.5 billion kWh gap was covered by supplies from Russia. Thermal plants produced 74.4% of generation, gas-turbine plants 11%, hydropower 8.5%, and wind, solar, and biogas 6.1%. Demand rose particularly quickly in the western and southern zones. Kazakhstan is the world's largest uranium producer, but domestic uranium reserves do not by themselves create energy independence. The first plant will still depend on foreign reactor technology, export financing, specialist services, and long-term supply arrangements. Nuclear power may reduce exposure to electricity shortages and aging thermal capacity; the government objective is energy security rather than complete independence. Sanctions and Delivery Risk Given that Rosatom leads the first nuclear projects in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, sanctions and related banking or supply restrictions are a legitimate delivery risk. In February 2026, the United Kingdom sanctioned three Rosatom subsidiaries associated with overseas projects. Rosatom itself was not sanctioned in that package and said its international work would continue. Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy Agency said none of the sanctioned entities was involved in its project and that work remained on schedule. The experience of Turkey's Akkuyu plant nevertheless shows how restrictions can affect a Rosatom-led project indirectly. In that instance, Siemens Energy withheld key components because export licenses had not been issued, prompting Rosatom to seek replacements from China and contributing to a delay. The project later required additional Russian financing while its first unit, originally expected to start in 2023, is now expected to begin supplying power in 2026 Akkuyu shows how supply chains, payments, and replacement equipment can become points of vulnerability in a Rosatom-led project, though it does not mean the Kazakh or Uzbek plants will face the same delays. The key question will be whether contracts provide for alternative suppliers, secure financing channels, and sufficient localization without weakening quality control or independent oversight. The regional picture is therefore uneven. Uzbekistan has moved first into the construction phase, but its mixed-reactor project still faces financing, water-disclosure, and schedule tests. Kazakhstan has the larger long-term buildout, but its first plant remains in engineering and preconstruction before the active phase planned for 2027. In both countries, public confidence will depend as much on transparent water data, cross-border consultation, financing terms, and credible safety regulation as on the reactors themselves.
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