Iranian Embassy Posts on Samarkand’s Persian Heritage Spark Uzbek Protest
Uzbekistan has lodged a diplomatic protest with Iran over social media posts describing Samarkand's architecture as part of Persian civilization. The posts targeted United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio. On October 23, Uzbekistan's First Deputy Foreign Minister Bakhromjon Aloyev met with Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Ali Eskandari, who was handed a diplomatic note of protest. Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry described posts published by Iranian diplomatic missions on X as a one-sided and politicized interpretation of Samarkand's history. Tashkent demanded that the posts be removed and that similar incidents be avoided in the future. The dispute followed Rubio's visit to Samarkand on October 19, when he recorded a video in Registan Square highlighting the city's historical role in international trade. Iran's embassy in Armenia described the site where Rubio stood as part of Persian civilization. The embassy in Zimbabwe called Registan's arches a "hallmark of Iranian-Islamic civilization," accusing Rubio of seeking to destroy that heritage. Iran's embassy in Bulgaria also criticized Rubio for disparaging Persian civilization while standing in front of monuments bearing its influence. Earlier, during an October 7 speech in Athens, Rubio recalled the destruction of the Acropolis by the forces of Persian King Xerxes in 480 BCE. He also attacked Iran's current clerical rulers, accusing them of promoting a "cult of death." Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry said that the heritage of Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva, and other historic cities reflects centuries of statehood and cultural development among the Uzbek people. Tashkent objected to the use of the country's history in political disputes between other states. Samarkand has deep ties to the Persian-speaking world. Before the Arab conquest, it was one of the centers of Sogdiana, whose inhabitants spoke a language belonging to the Iranian language family. Persian later became widely used in Central Asian cities, including in literature and scholarship. In the late 14th and early 15th centuries, Samarkand was the capital of Timur's empire. Craftsmen from various regions, including Iran and the historic region of Khorasan, participated in the construction of its monumental buildings. The Registan architectural ensemble was built between the 15th and 17th centuries, combining local artistic traditions with those of the wider Islamic world. The concept of Persian civilization encompasses a cultural area much larger than modern Iran. UNESCO describes Samarkand as a crossroads of cultures, reflecting influences from successive civilizations. The Iranian embassies did not make territorial claims against Uzbekistan; their posts concerned cultural and architectural history. Samarkand's heritage has also been a subject of debate within Central Asia. During the Soviet redrawing of Central Asia's internal borders in 1924, Samarkand and Bukhara became part of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Both cities historically had substantial Persian-speaking populations, and Tajik continues to be spoken there today. Historians have also documented Soviet-era pressure on Tajik residents to register as Uzbeks, contributing to longstanding disputes over the cities' ethnic composition. The dispute occurred amid increased U.S. diplomatic engagement in Central Asia. During his visit, Rubio attended a C5+1 meeting with the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries. The talks focused on expanding economic cooperation, including investment and critical minerals. Uzbekistan is developing economic relations with Washington while maintaining an interest in cooperation with Tehran. Transportation routes through Iran provide access to Persian Gulf ports, an important consideration for landlocked Central Asian countries. In its statement on the protest, Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry also stressed the importance of bilateral relations with Iran.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at Kyrgyzstan carrying out a new round of arrests in the run-up to the country's upcoming presidential elections, including the son of a former president; new immigration and foreign-worker quotas being introduced in the country; increasingly ominous warnings from Russia's foreign minister toward the region; and a renewed outbreak of fighting along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border that is already creating serious problems on both sides. We'll also be looking at an almost unprecedented wave of resignations and replacements across the senior ranks of Central Asia's military and security establishments, as well as Kazakhstan moving to dismiss a significant portion of its Supreme Court. And then, for our main story this week, we'll be speaking with one of the region's most prominent human rights activists, fresh from a major international human rights conference, about some increasingly dire warnings for the future of rights and political freedoms across Central Asia. Special guest: Leila Nazgül Seiitbek (Freedom for Eurasia)
Ukraine Says More Than 20,400 Central Asians Signed Russian Army Contracts
More than 20,400 Central Asian citizens have signed contracts with Russia’s armed forces since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, according to the Ukrainian government’s “I Want to Live” project. The new figures come as families in Kazakhstan secure the return of young men who say they went to Russia for civilian work and were forced into military service. The project’s October figures identify 8,207 Uzbek citizens and 5,308 Tajiks, together accounting for about two-thirds of the regional total. Kazakhstan accounts for 3,819. A further 2,219 are from Kyrgyzstan, and 884 from Turkmenistan. The count covers identified contract signers as of October 1, rather than the number currently fighting, and excludes ethnic Central Asians with Russian citizenship. The figures have not been independently verified. “I Want to Live” is a Ukrainian state project that helps Russian servicemen surrender. For some Kazakh families, the immediate struggle has been to get their sons out of the Russian army. Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. As TCA reported, he and other young Kazakh men later appeared in appeals for help, with some wearing Russian uniforms in or near the combat zone. On October 7, relatives went to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry in Astana to demand help bringing the men home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied them, said he knew of at least 21 cases. Families said their relatives had accepted civilian jobs before being pressured to sign military contracts. Keldibek has now returned to Kazakhstan. His sister told RFE/RL’s Kazakh service that he arrived in Shymkent on the evening of October 21. She said others were still waiting to return. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry had earlier asked Moscow to help repatriate the men and opened a hotline for their families. Their accounts fit a pattern documented by the International Federation for Human Rights. Its April study found that migrants in Russia had been offered military contracts as an alternative to detention or deportation. Others were recruited abroad with promises of civilian work, only to find themselves sent to the front. “Many of these men knew in some capacity what they were signing up for. But some were also deceived or coerced,” FIDH President Alexis Deswaef said. The war has also drawn Central Asians to Ukraine’s defense. TCA’s earlier reporting on both sides described volunteers who regarded Ukraine as home and saw Russia’s invasion as a threat to their families. Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin joined Ukraine’s armed forces in 2021 after settling there. In a 2022 interview, he told Ukrainska Pravda: “I had two children in Ukraine, and for the first time I started to think that they might be in danger.” Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency has warned citizens that offers of work or help with immigration papers can lead to recruitment into armed conflicts. It has also reminded them that joining foreign armed forces can bring criminal liability at home. For other families, there has been no homecoming. Kiril Nysanbaev went to Russia for work after completing his military service in Kazakhstan. His twin sister, Kamilla, told RFE/RL that he called from a detention center in Chelyabinsk and said officers had beaten him and forced him to sign a military contract. He was later killed in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. His family learned of his death months afterwards. Kamilla said the family buried him in Russia after Kazakh police warned that bringing his body home would trigger an investigation against them. “I warn them to avoid going to Russia,” Kamilla said.
U.S. Promotes Small Nuclear Reactors in Uzbekistan
The United States is promoting small modular nuclear reactors in Uzbekistan as Tashkent develops its nuclear power sector with Russia. Secretary of State Marco Rubio promoted the technology during his October 19 visit to Samarkand, linking it to rising energy demand. “We’re introducing U.S. small modular reactors and modernizing the Uzbek electric grid and gas distribution network,” Rubio told the U.S.-Uzbekistan Business and Investment Council. He said the cooperation would help the government keep pace with growing energy demand. Rubio did not name a reactor supplier or announce financing or a construction schedule for an American plant. Uzbekistan’s interest predates Rubio’s visit. In November 2025, the country expressed interest in studying designs from Holtec, GE Hitachi, and NuScale, according to the World Nuclear Association. Tashkent has pursued those discussions alongside its current nuclear partnership with Russia. Small modular reactors generally have an electrical capacity of up to 300 megawatts per unit, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Factories can manufacture their components and assemble them on site. Utilities can add smaller units in stages as demand increases. For Uzbekistan, nuclear power forms part of an effort to expand electricity supply as domestic gas production declines. Once a net gas exporter, the country became a net importer in 2023. Gas output fell 16.3% year-on-year in January-August 2026, increasing pressure on supplies. The World Nuclear Association puts natural gas at 76% of Uzbekistan’s electricity output in 2023. Reducing the amount burned in power stations could ease import needs and leave more available for industry, including petrochemicals. Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom is developing Uzbekistan’s first nuclear complex in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region. The design combines two large Russian VVER-1000 reactors with two smaller RITM-200N units, providing about 2.1 gigawatts of capacity. The smaller reactors are each rated at 55 megawatts. Presidents Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Vladimir Putin launched the project by video link in June, accompanied by a concrete pouring ceremony. The development has expanded substantially since the countries agreed in 2024 to build a plant consisting of six small reactors. The published schedule envisages a technical launch of the first small unit in late 2029, with the larger units following in the 2030s. Nuclear generation is therefore several years away. Uzbekistan must also improve the networks that deliver electricity to homes and businesses. Following a nationwide referendum on the issue, Kazakhstan is also investing in nuclear power. Its planned Balkhash plant, near Ulken on Lake Balkhash, will use Russian technology. A nuclear agreement signed in May envisages two VVER-1200 reactors with a combined capacity of about 2.4 gigawatts. Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency put the project’s cost at approximately $16.5 billion, including security and supporting infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s strategy calls for at least three nuclear power plants by 2050. China National Nuclear Corporation has been selected to lead the second project. The country is the world’s largest uranium producer, but developing power stations also requires foreign reactor technology and expertise. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have begun cooperating on nuclear safety. Officials met in Tashkent in August to discuss environmental monitoring and potential cross-border effects, with Uzbekistan also proposing a regional center to train nuclear specialists. The nuclear discussions form part of Washington’s push for closer commercial ties with Central Asia. Rubio’s Samarkand visit included talks with Mirziyoyev and a C5+1 ministerial meeting with all five Central Asian countries. The gathering followed the November 2025 White House summit with the region’s presidents. Speaking to reporters in Samarkand, Rubio acknowledged Washington’s limited engagement with the region in the past. “Central Asia has just not gotten the level of attention from our policymakers over the last 20 years that it deserves, but that’s changing,” he said. The C5+1 format grew from a proposal advanced by Kazakhstan, formally launching in 2015, when then-Secretary of State John Kerry attended its inaugural ministerial meeting in Samarkand. Recent discussions have placed greater emphasis on critical minerals and investment in regional infrastructure. At this month’s meeting, the governments backed more mineral processing within Central Asia and further development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, also known as the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan announced 54 agreements and prospective initiatives worth about $12 billion during Rubio’s visit. The package spans several industries, with energy infrastructure and critical minerals among its priorities. The announcement did not specify how much of the total had secured financing. The two countries also launched an Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue, while Uzbekistan signed the U.S.-led Artemis Accords on peaceful space exploration. At the business council, Mirziyoyev proposed a joint program for trade and technological cooperation through 2035. For Uzbekistan, considering American reactors broadens its options as electricity demand grows and domestic gas production declines. Rosatom’s existing project remains central to its nuclear plans, while talks with U.S. suppliers could widen its choice of reactor designs and partners.
Central Asia’s Afghan Engagement Faces Persistent Security Risks
Central Asian countries are expanding their trade with Kabul despite concerns about armed groups operating from Afghanistan. Russia has renewed warnings about militants seeking to infiltrate the region and is advocating cooperation with the Taliban authorities to contain them. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are interested in trade, energy, and transport projects connecting the region with South Asia. Tajikistan has traditionally taken a more critical position toward the Taliban and places particular emphasis on securing its lengthy border with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia and China are seeking guarantees from the Afghan authorities against the activities of armed organizations that threaten their security. Speaking on October 16 at a joint conference of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said extremist organizations maintained a significant presence in Afghan provinces bordering Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Lavrov, militants intend to use Afghan territory to expand their activities into Central Asia and Russia. Lavrov identified Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State terrorist organization, also known as ISIS-K, as the main threat, citing Russian security agencies. The group opposes the Taliban, carries out attacks in Afghanistan, and has struck beyond its borders. The name Khorasan refers to a historical region encompassing parts of present-day Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia. ISIS-K’s reach extends beyond Afghanistan’s border regions through propaganda, recruitment, and cross-border networks. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, people from Central Asia have been implicated in ISIS-K activities beyond the region itself, including within migrant communities. Lavrov claimed that militants in northern Afghanistan included ethnic Uyghurs, alongside fighters from Central Asia and the North Caucasus. His reference to Uyghurs echoes Beijing’s security concerns over Xinjiang, where China has used counterterrorism policies to justify sweeping repression. A 2022 UN assessment found that arbitrary detention and restrictions on the rights of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups could constitute crimes against humanity. The TASS report provided no evidence supporting his claims about the fighters’ origins. Lavrov also called for joint action against weapons and drug trafficking through Central Asia. The Taliban as a Security Partner Lavrov urged engagement with the Taliban authorities, who returned to power during the U.S. military withdrawal in August 2021. Russia formally recognized their government in July 2025. Moscow argues that the Taliban’s control of Afghan territory makes them responsible for security within the country, and is seeking international support for Kabul’s efforts to improve regional security. While relying on the Taliban to contain armed groups, Moscow is simultaneously questioning their ability to do so. ISIS-K has attacked Taliban officials, giving Kabul a direct reason to confront the organization. That conflict, however, offers no assurance that the Taliban will act against other armed groups operating in Afghanistan. China also favors working with Kabul on security, with concerns extending to the safety of Chinese nationals and regional trade routes. Two attacks launched from Afghan territory killed five Chinese nationals in Tajikistan in November 2025, prompting Beijing to urge its citizens to leave the border area. At the UN Security Council’s September meeting on Afghanistan, Beijing called for action against ISIS-K and al-Qaeda. It also named the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP is waging an armed insurgency against the Pakistani government and operates along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Speaking at the summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Baku on October 15, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged Kabul to take concrete measures to eliminate terrorist groups operating on Afghan territory. He also called for closer regional coordination on Afghanistan and humanitarian and development assistance for its people. Terrorist Groups and Armed Opposition The UN recorded an 11% year-on-year increase in safety and security incidents in Afghanistan between May 1 and July 31, 2026. During that period, armed opponents of the Taliban claimed 88 attacks across 21 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The UN verified 55 of those incidents. The figures for armed opposition attacks should not be conflated with international terrorist activity. Afghan opposition movements include Ahmad Massoud’s National Resistance Front and the Afghanistan Freedom Front, associated with former army chief of staff Yasin Zia. Their stated aim is to challenge the Taliban within Afghanistan, rather than launch attacks beyond its borders. Internationally, there is also disagreement over the Taliban’s role in sheltering armed groups. Russia and China have called on Kabul to suppress terrorist activity, while the United States has accused the Taliban of providing sanctuary to terrorist organizations. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid has denied links between the government and al-Qaeda. The Taliban’s ties to armed groups remain an obstacle to wider diplomatic recognition. Speaking at the October 15–16 Moscow conference, SCO Deputy Secretary-General Ahmad Saidmurodzoda said the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group’s work had been suspended. The group was established in 2005 to facilitate dialogue with Kabul. Saidmurodzoda described conditions in Afghanistan as broadly under control, but warned that the situation could deteriorate sharply. The SCO is developing an Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and a Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats in Tashkent. Its membership includes China, Russia, and every Central Asian country except Turkmenistan. Unlike the CSTO, the SCO does not require members to defend one another militarily. What Is at Stake for Central Asia? As winter approaches, Afghanistan is facing a worsening humanitarian crisis. A joint forecast issued on October 15 by the UN World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization projects acute food insecurity for 19.2 million Afghans between November 2026 and April 2027. That represents 38% of the population. Five million people could face emergency levels of hunger. The UN agencies identify unemployment and declining international assistance as drivers of the crisis. More than 1.2 million Afghans have been forced to return from Iran and Pakistan so far in 2026, increasing pressure on communities already struggling to support their residents. Border closures have further disrupted trade. Moscow has highlighted the decline in opiate production as evidence that engagement with Kabul can produce results. Citing the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Lavrov said production had fallen by approximately 90% since 2022. Existing drug stockpiles and trafficking networks, however, continue to pose a problem. Afghanistan’s conflict with Pakistan is compounding these pressures. Islamabad has accused the Taliban of sheltering TTP militants and has carried out strikes on Afghan territory. Kabul denies providing sanctuary. Clashes along the border have interrupted trade and restricted travel, further straining the Afghan economy. For Central Asian countries seeking access to South Asian markets through Afghanistan, those disruptions threaten the reliability of the routes they are developing.
Uzbekistan Announces $12 Billion in Agreements During Marco Rubio’s Visit
Uzbekistan has announced 54 agreements covering trade, investment, and technological cooperation during U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Samarkand. The agreements are worth a total of $12 billion, according to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade. The agreements were announced at the second meeting of the Uzbekistan–U.S. Business and Investment Council on October 19. Rubio also met President Shavkat Mirziyoyev that day. The ministry said the agreements cover transport and energy infrastructure, critical minerals, finance, digital technologies, agriculture, healthcare, and education. Rubio’s visit coincided with a C5+1 ministerial meeting, bringing together the United States and the five Central Asian countries. The Uzbek ministry stated that more than 400 business representatives participated in the program, including over 100 from the United States, 100 from other Central Asian countries, and 200 from Uzbekistan. It did not specify how much of the announced $12 billion has secured financing and how much remains at the planning stage. Several international companies were named in the agreements announced during the visit. According to the announced arrangements, cooperation with Wabtec is focused on localizing the production of railway equipment and components. Agreements involving ReElement Technologies, Traxys, and Trafigura cover mineral exploration, development, technological cooperation, and supplies. Other announced projects involve satellite communications with Amazon Leo, medical technologies with GE HealthCare, and agricultural efficiency with Valmont Industries. Speaking to reporters in Samarkand on October 19, Rubio said the visit was expected to produce concrete commercial results. “I think we’ll have some concrete deals to announce, meaning companies that are going to be doing business here that are being welcomed here and that are excited about doing business here,” Rubio said. He emphasized that the agreements should be viewed as the beginning of a broader economic relationship. “I also think that’s just the foundation that we intend to build on. We want to do more. This is not the end. This is the beginning,” he said. In their joint statement, the C5+1 governments supported expanding mineral processing and higher-value production within Central Asia. They also backed further development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route and closer regional economic integration. The visit also marked the launch of the Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue and Uzbekistan’s signing of the Artemis Accords on peaceful space exploration. From Investment Announcements to Projects In an interview with The Times of Central Asia (TCA), political analyst Abduvali Soyibnazarov described Rubio’s visit and the C5+1 meeting as a potentially important stage in Washington’s relations with Central Asia. Recalling the first C5+1 ministerial meeting, attended by then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in Samarkand in November 2015, Soyibnazarov said the agenda has changed considerably over the past decade, with investment, critical minerals, advanced technologies, and new trade routes moving to the forefront. The analyst argued that Uzbekistan’s main measure of success should not be the number of memorandums signed, but how many projects ultimately secure financing and move forward. Uzbekistan’s investment minister, Laziz Kudratov, put the country’s portfolio of commercial agreements with the United States at $35 billion in a September interview. He said projects worth $7 billion had been implemented and completed. It is unclear whether the $12 billion announced during Rubio’s visit forms part of that existing portfolio. Critical Minerals and Industrial Development Critical mineral extraction and processing have emerged as major areas of potential cooperation between the United States and Uzbekistan. The minerals talks build on a bilateral memorandum on critical minerals supply chains signed in February, covering both mining and processing. Washington is seeking to diversify supplies of materials used in advanced technologies and reduce its dependence on China. For Uzbekistan, Soyibnazarov said, the challenge is to use American commercial interest not only to increase mineral exports, but to develop domestic processing industries. The analyst pointed to Uzbekistan’s $4.2 billion national program for critical minerals development in 2026–2030, which aims to expand processing capacity within the country. In Soyibnazarov’s assessment, investment in processing plants, laboratories, and finished-product manufacturing could help Uzbekistan capture more value from its mineral resources, strengthen its industrial base, and create skilled jobs. Economist Norpulat Daniyarov told TCA that U.S. interest in Central Asia extends beyond mineral extraction. “The United States is prioritizing Central Asia’s critical minerals and logistics sectors,” Daniyarov said. “In Uzbekistan, financial sector development will also be important, while energy presents significant opportunities for U.S. companies in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.” Daniyarov stated that critical minerals are important to Washington not only because of their commercial value, but because they are essential to artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and other advanced technologies. Finance and New Trade Routes Financial cooperation is another major component of the announced agreements. Arrangements involving Franklin Templeton, Oppenheimer & Co., Citigroup, and BlackRock are intended to help Uzbek companies access international capital markets, attract institutional investors, and finance infrastructure projects. BlackRock is also helping develop the structure of the Tashkent International Financial Centre. Daniyarov said Uzbekistan needs both foreign investment and technical expertise to modernize its banking sector. The economist also highlighted transport infrastructure. In his assessment, Russia’s war in Ukraine, sanctions affecting Russia and Iran, and efforts to diversify trade routes have increased the importance of alternative overland connections. “The United States and the European Union need reliable land trade routes to Asia that bypass Russia,” Daniyarov said. Uzbekistan, however, relies on several transit routes, including connections through Iran. Consequently, Tashkent’s and Washington’s logistics interests do not always fully coincide. Changes in sanctions and transit conditions can affect shipping costs and access to international markets. One alternative is the Middle Corridor, which connects Central Asia across the Caspian Sea to the South Caucasus and Europe. Further development of this route could expand Uzbekistan’s transport options and reduce dependence on a limited number of transit partners. Balancing U.S., Chinese, and Russian Interests Daniyarov believes that an expanded U.S. economic presence could give Central Asian countries greater opportunities to diversify their international partnerships. Russia remains an important trade and economic partner for the region, while China has significantly expanded its presence over the past 10 to 15 years through investment, infrastructure projects, and the Belt and Road Initiative. Daniyarov argued that Central Asian governments should use growing U.S. interest to attract capital into sectors beyond raw material extraction. “Central Asian countries should seize this opportunity to attract U.S. investment, particularly in artificial intelligence, data centers, advanced technologies, energy and financial sector development,” he said. The economist also proposed greater coordination between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in attracting investment in rare earth and other critical minerals. “If countries compete individually to export raw materials, the region may lose leverage and capture only limited value,” Daniyarov warned. In his view, a coordinated approach could strengthen Central Asian countries’ negotiating positions when seeking technology transfers and investment in mineral processing, artificial intelligence, and data centers. Jackson-Vanik and the Trade Relationship Rubio’s visit also renewed attention to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War-era U.S. trade restriction that remains formally applicable to Uzbekistan. Repealing the amendment would help establish permanent normal trade relations between the two countries. The decision, however, rests with the U.S. Congress. During the press conference in Samarkand, reporters asked Rubio why the amendment had not yet been repealed. “You’ll have to ask Congress,” he responded. “We are in favor of repealing it.” Rubio stated that he had supported its repeal during his confirmation hearing and said the administration had asked lawmakers to act. “Congress just hasn’t gotten around to it, but we hope that they will,” he added. Commenting on the issue for TCA, Soyibnazarov emphasized that repealing Jackson-Vanik cannot be achieved through a single diplomatic visit. He argued that Uzbekistan should seek a clear political commitment from the U.S. administration to make repeal a legislative priority. The amendment also has implications for Uzbekistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Although bilateral WTO accession negotiations with Washington have been completed, a separate decision by U.S. lawmakers remains necessary to establish permanent normal trade relations. Technology Partnerships and Strategic Choices Soyibnazarov believes that expanding cooperation with Washington presents Tashkent with the challenge of maintaining independence in its choice of technological partners. He cited the China-linked World Artificial Intelligence Conference Organization and the U.S.-backed Pax Silica initiative as examples of competing technology frameworks. In his assessment, Uzbekistan should preserve its opportunities to cooperate with both sides without committing exclusively to one partner. Similar considerations apply to nuclear energy, transport infrastructure, and relations with Iran. Rubio, for his part, presented U.S.-Uzbek cooperation primarily as an opportunity for economic development rather than an element of confrontation with other countries. “There is so much positive going on in our bilateral relationship, and really at the cornerstone of it is, if you think about it, it’s a relationship that’s defined not by challenges, not by conflicts, but by opportunity,” the secretary of state said. At the business council meeting, Mirziyoyev proposed a comprehensive action plan to implement the projects and a joint program for trade, investment, and technological cooperation through 2035.
China-Uzbekistan Economic Ties Expand as U.S. Seeks New Deals
Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Uzbekistan on October 17–18, just ahead of United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who arrived in Samarkand on October 18 with a delegation of American business leaders seeking new contracts. While China already has a substantial presence in Uzbek manufacturing and energy, Washington is seeking to expand American involvement in critical minerals and technology. The visits highlight the growing competition between the world's two largest economies for influence in Central Asia. On October 17, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev received Li Qiang. According to the Uzbek presidential administration, the portfolio of joint projects backed by firm agreements has reached nearly $60 billion. More than 6,000 joint ventures with Chinese participation have been established in Uzbekistan. China is Uzbekistan's largest trading partner. Bilateral trade totaled approximately $16–18 billion in 2025, according to Chinese and Uzbek figures. China accounted for 23% of Uzbekistan's total foreign trade turnover in January–August 2026. Railway Through Kyrgyzstan Construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway was another topic of discussion. Work officially began in December 2024. The route will cross mountainous areas of Kyrgyzstan and connect the railway networks of China and Uzbekistan. The 304-kilometer section through Kyrgyzstan alone is estimated to cost $4.7 billion and will require 50 bridges and 29 tunnels. Uzbekistan is landlocked, making the cost and timing of its international freight shipments heavily dependent on transit conditions in neighboring countries. The railway through Kyrgyzstan will provide an additional route, reducing reliance on transit through Kazakhstan and potentially shortening journeys between China and Uzbekistan. Beijing considers the railway part of its efforts to develop overland connections under the Belt and Road Initiative. Rubio Arrives with American Business Delegation On October 19, Rubio attended talks in Samarkand under the C5+1 format, bringing together the U.S. and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Rubio said nearly 300 American businesses were represented in Samarkand. Companies were discussing agreements potentially worth billions of dollars, with concrete announcements expected following the meetings. Among Washington's priorities are critical minerals used in advanced technologies, including electronics and batteries. The U.S. is seeking new sources of raw materials and opportunities to process them outside China. Beijing holds a dominant position in processing several of these materials, and American companies are interested in alternative suppliers. Uzbekistan's mineral deposits include copper and uranium. For Tashkent, an important question is whether American investment will bring new processing facilities and jobs or concentrate mainly on extracting and exporting raw materials. Speaking to reporters in Samarkand, Rubio said the U.S. was not asking Central Asian countries to end cooperation with other partners. Washington intends to compete for contracts and investment projects. Chinese Enterprises and American Contracts The gap between China and the U.S. is particularly stark in trade. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, American goods trade with Uzbekistan totaled just $1.05 billion in 2025, less than one-fifteenth of the value of Uzbekistan's trade with China. Including services, U.S.–Uzbek trade reached approximately $1.7 billion. Economic cooperation with the U.S. is developing through major investment projects, equipment supplies, financing, and technological partnerships. In November 2025, during the C5+1 summit in Washington, Uzbekistan and the U.S. announced commercial agreements and contracts worth approximately $34.5 billion. President Donald Trump also spoke of planned Uzbek purchases and investments in the U.S. exceeding $100 billion over ten years. Those announcements suggest considerable ambitions, but the trade figures show how far Washington remains behind Beijing. Uzbekistan has long sought to maintain economic relationships with Western countries alongside its ties to China and Russia. Greater American investment would give Tashkent more options, but China's commanding share of Uzbek trade illustrates how difficult it would be to reduce its dependence on Beijing. Moreover, American and Chinese interests increasingly clash in sectors such as critical minerals and advanced technology. Washington wants to reduce its dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains, while Beijing is expanding its own manufacturing and technological presence in Uzbekistan. Tashkent may welcome investment from both sides, but their competing priorities could complicate its efforts to work with them simultaneously. Li Qiang's visit demonstrated the depth of China's existing economic ties with Uzbekistan. Rubio's challenge is to turn Washington's promises of investment into a commercial presence capable of narrowing the gap.
Opinion: The Remittance Economy’s Promise: How Migration Could Support Women Entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan
Migration has become a major socio-economic process, substantially affecting Uzbekistan’s economic development and quality of life. The primary destination countries for labor migrants from Uzbekistan have been Russia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey, as well as certain European and Asian countries. Remittances from migrants have become a major source of foreign currency inflows and a key form of economic support for households. Over time, they have raised economic activity and contributed to greater currency stability. In 2025, remittance inflows to Uzbekistan rose 28% compared to 2024, reaching $18.9 billion. Despite the positive growth of Uzbekistan’s economy, the country still faces limited employment opportunities. Although the unemployment rate dropped to 4.9% in the third quarter of 2025, a noticeable improvement, around 760,000 people remained unemployed and were looking for work. In 2025, the official average monthly salary in Uzbekistan was 6,376,700 soums (about $530 at the year-end exchange rate). This remains relatively low, pushing many working-age people to seek work abroad. When people picture remittances flowing into Central Asia, they usually imagine one scenario: the father who has gone abroad, sending his family in Uzbekistan “survival money” for rent, groceries, and school fees. In some small districts of Uzbekistan, however, this picture is starting to look different. That same money can now also become a source of opportunity: a sewing machine, a voucher for educational courses, or a business plan with a woman’s name on it. A Policy Shift Begins While remittances have substantially improved the living standards of recipient households and have become a crucial source of foreign currency for Uzbekistan, their effect on women is more complex. For some families, money sent home from abroad has been considered “out of the system.” These funds regularly supported family budgets, but financial institutions did not always recognize them as income. Recipients could lack the documented income or credit history needed to qualify for a loan, even when their families had received remittances for many years. However, a pilot program launched in March 2026 by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the European Union in cooperation with Hamkorbank, one of Uzbekistan’s leading banks, aims to change the picture. According to IFAD, the program’s credit scoring model uses remittances to assess a borrower’s ability to repay a loan. This approach could be transformational for rural women who struggle to access credit directly. It could enable rural borrowers to access formal loans, invest in small businesses, and build a credit history. Alongside the financial support, 900 rural residents, at least 50% of whom will be women, will have access to business and financial literacy training. In addition, 100 participants will receive enterprise mentoring to help them run or scale up their businesses. Faces Behind the Numbers Women face many obstacles in accessing credit, finding employment, and launching a business. According to the World Bank, they own nearly a third of registered micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in Uzbekistan but receive only about 14% of loans to those businesses. This may be due to limited collateral or a lack of business training. Additionally, UN Women estimated in 2023 that women globally spend 2.8 more hours per day than men on unpaid care and domestic work, which leaves them less time to run a business. If remittances count as proof of income, many women could access credit without a formal job. For several years, Aziza, a woman from western Uzbekistan whose husband works abroad, has been sewing clothes by hand for her neighbors, using money from remittances. She recently heard about the new program from friends. “I did not even know that remittance income could count toward getting a loan. Previously, I faced many challenges trying to qualify for a loan. Hopefully, through this new remittance-based scoring model, I will finally be able to.” If she eventually becomes eligible for a loan, she intends to rent a small space and buy new equipment for her sewing business. In eastern Uzbekistan, Madina responded positively to the news about the financial literacy training, saying: “I finally feel like I am starting to take more responsibility for the transactions, having a sense of control and being able to use the money in the right direction.” She hopes the training will teach her to make more informed financial decisions and boost her confidence in managing money. Finally, Karima, from southern Uzbekistan, runs a small bakery and learned about the program through people in her community. “Many people have started talking about this program after being denied loans by financial institutions because they had no bank record or formal credit history,” she says. She is now eager to apply and see what other opportunities it offers. If it works out, she hopes to take out a loan to hire additional help and expand her bakery. From Remittances to Supporting Women Similar programs can help Uzbekistan turn remittances into sustainable local businesses and jobs, but only if they offer more than loans. Women who have struggled to access credit also need practical support with collateral and training in budgeting. For families that rely on money from abroad, earning an income locally could be a step toward financial independence. However, a business financed through remittances could prolong dependence on migration unless it can eventually sustain itself. Programs should therefore support women in reaching a wider customer base so their businesses can grow and hire more employees, contributing to the country’s economic development. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
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