Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Out Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be covering recent and pending extraditions of Central Asians from EU countries.

Afghanistan

Central Asia Builds a Regional Track for Engagement with Afghanistan

The United States and Europe may have stepped back from Afghanistan, but the country’s instability still affects migration, security, trade, and humanitarian pressures far beyond its borders. Given their proximity, Central Asian states cannot and have not disengaged, and their efforts to keep Kabul connected to regional diplomacy and commerce serve interests that are also shared by the West. On June 16, the Center for Strategic Studies of Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened the first Afghanistan-Central Asia Think Tank Forum in Kabul, bringing together leaders and senior representatives from strategic research institutions across the region. Held under the theme "The Strategic Role of Think Tanks in Advancing Regional Cooperation," the forum included delegations from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan alongside their Afghan counterparts. [caption id="attachment_52266" align="aligncenter" width="1080"] Image: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan[/caption] In his keynote address, Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi observed that the international order stands at a delicate crossroads, divided by competing narratives and opposing camps: “Given the developments and challenges in the global structure, the current international order finds itself at a sensitive juncture in history — a period marked, on the one hand, by various illusions and contradictory narratives, and, on the other, by efforts toward cooperation and multilateralism.” In essence, Muttaqi was advocating for an international order that allows Afghanistan and its neighbors to chart their own courses while engaging constructively with willing partners. Speaking to those in his immediate region, he drew attention to shared challenges, among them climate change, water shortages, economic headwinds, and conflict spillover, and asserted that “There is no doubt that, in order to make more effective and constructive decisions and to develop indigenous narratives for our region and shared future, specialists and researchers from academic and intellectual institutions must draft practical and comprehensive roadmaps for future cooperation across various fields.” Muttaqi underscored to participants the growing recognition that regional states stand to gain more through practical cooperation than through isolation or unilateral approaches. He reaffirmed Afghanistan's commitment to advancing the research-based proposals discussed at the April Consultative Dialogue in Kabul to help inform regional political and economic decision-making. His remarks reflected a view that broad-based economic development and good-neighborly relations are mutually reinforcing foundations of societal stability within a shared civilizational context—a perspective widely shared across the Central Asian republics. That is why, for example, he highlighted the need to follow through on economic and connectivity opportunities, citing projects such as CASA-1000, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission project (TAP-500), the Lapis Lazuli Route, and the Afghan-Trans railway. These initiatives are in various stages of development, some having been stalled for decades. Javlon Vakhabov, former Uzbek ambassador to the United States and currently Director of the International Institute for Central Asia (IICA) in Tashkent, travelled to Kabul for the Forum. In his address, he summed up the mood of the participants: “In this emerging Greater Central Asia, Afghanistan is not a periphery. It is the southern gateway of our region, linking Central Asia with South Asia, the Indian Ocean and West Asia. Therefore, Afghanistan’s stability and economic recovery are directly connected with the future development of Central Asia.” After the Forum, he told The Times of Central Asia that "Afghanistan should be regarded not as a periphery, but as a full-fledged participant and co-author of regional processes. The stability and economic recovery of Afghanistan are directly linked to the future development of Central Asia as a whole." In other words, Uzbekistan's ambition – and that of the region as a whole – extends beyond transport and energy links. It seeks an integrated Central and South Asian economic and political space in which regional states—not external powers—set the agenda. Akramjon Nematov, the First Deputy Director of Uzbekistan’s Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan (ISRS), who also attended the Forum, stressed that Central Asia today has evolved into a consolidated region with its own development strategy based on constructive relations with neighboring countries, mutual trust, and economic cooperation, which results in strengthened regional agency. Central Asia, he continued with optimism, has demonstrated that even the most complex regional issues can be resolved through dialogue, compromise, and respect for mutual interests. Termez Dialogue Prelude to Afghanistan-Central Asia Think Tank Forum On June 4, the Termez Dialogue 2026 in Tashkent, which The Times of Central Asia attended, set the stage for the Afghanistan-Central Asia Think Tank Forum. When Afghanistan’s Minister of Industry and Commerce, Nooruddin Azizi, addressed the participants on June 4, he cast Afghanistan as an indispensable bridge transforming connectivity between Central and South Asia. Appearing virtually before senior government officials, regional experts, and international organizations, Azizi articulated a vision of Afghanistan not as a problem to be managed but as an artery linking the region's major civilizations, markets, and peoples. "The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, Azizi said, “reconfirms its commitment to strengthening economic and trade cooperation, and declares its full readiness to work with neighboring countries and international partners for the development of trade, transit, investment and economic connectivity." The Termez Dialogue — organized under the theme "Peace, Connectivity, Resilience: Shaping the Foundation for Shared Prosperity" — has emerged as one of the primary multilateral fora for advancing a Eurasian integration agenda. Established in 2025 to give practical effect to UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/76/295, the platform brings together governments, international organizations, business communities, and academic institutions to translate political intent into concrete infrastructure and trade outcomes. Azizi told participants: “We must look for ways to facilitate the expansion of trade, transit, investment and economic cooperation among the countries of the region." The statement was more than diplomatic courtesy — it reflected a concrete reading of the regional map. Because Afghanistan is the single country that straddles Central Asia and South Asia, all overland connections from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India require crossing Afghanistan—unless they traverse through Iran by way of Turkmenistan. According to Azizi, “Afghan transport projects, as some of the most important regional connectivity initiatives, play a significant role in linking the railway networks of Central and South Asia by promoting trade, facilitating transit, reducing transportation costs, and strengthening regional economic cooperation. The initiative’s second phase would connect Afghanistan with Tajikistan via the Shir Khan Bandar–Nizhny Pyanj route, Uzbekistan via Termez/Ayritom–Hairatan, and Turkmenistan via Aqina–Imam Nazar, while extending westward through Iran and onwards to South Asia via Iran’s Bandar Abbas Port.” [English translation slightly edited for clarity; Original in Afghan.] Azizi linked the ideas of free trade, sustainable economic development, and shared interests as interconnected elements that will, taken together, help maintain regional stability. "Sustainable development and shared prosperity can be achieved," he said, "when trade barriers are reduced, transit infrastructure is strengthened, and conditions are provided for broader participation of the private sector." Afghanistan's delegation at Termez Dialogue also included Zaker Jalaly and Ghuncha Gul Arman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), which conducts research on regional developments and cross-border strategic policy. Beyond advancing diplomatic and economic cooperation between Central and South Asia, CSS is tasked with building contacts with Western businesses. More fundamentally, Azizi sees the need to stick to practical economic objectives. "Shared economic interests can serve as a solid foundation," he said. "We must have peace, mutual trust, and regional stability," underscoring Kabul's awareness that no investment bank, logistics company, or trading house will commit capital to corridors running through unstable territory. Azizi closed with a direct appeal to the room: "I take this opportunity to invite investors, financial institutions and friendly countries to invest in Afghanistan's infrastructure, industry, trade and transit sector — because the future prosperity and stability of the region lie in closer cooperation and collective utilization of our shared capacities." Eurasia Does Not Need New Fault Lines—It Needs New Bridges of Trust. Summing up the mood across the region, Eldor Aripov, ISRS’s director, said: “Afghanistan's peaceful development and gradual integration into regional economic and connectivity initiatives are essential for restoring the country's historic role as a bridge between Central and South Asia. Practical cooperation based on mutual interests can contribute to greater regional stability and shared prosperity." The Afghanistan–Central Asia Think Tank Forum and the Termez Dialogue 2026 reflect the region's growing diplomatic engagement with Kabul. For the first time in decades, connectivity extends beyond infrastructure to encompass dialogue and shared purpose. Grounded in mutual respect and pragmatism, this emerging diplomatic architecture strengthens regional ownership and cooperation, laying the foundations for lasting peace, sustainable development, and a more integrated Eurasia.

Internet Restrictions

A Signal from Uzbekistan: How Turkmen Border Villages Reach the Outside World

In Diýýar, a village in northern Turkmenistan close enough to catch Uzbekistan’s mobile signal, a foreign SIM card inserted into a small Wi-Fi router can turn a barely functioning 2G connection into usable home internet. In early July, police reportedly entered around ten households in the village, identified Uzbek-connected routers, and confiscated the SIM cards. Similar inspections have been under way across close to 60 settlements in Dashoguz Province, according to Radio Azatlyk, the Turkmen Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The campaign covers parts of Shabat and Görogly districts, including Kirov, Diýýar, Bedirkent, Aýlak, and Nyýazow, in areas where Uzbek mobile signals cross the border. The Internet Across the Border What the authorities are removing is more than a foreign phone number. Residents told Radio Azatlyk that Turkmen Telecom internet is either unavailable or extremely slow in several border villages. TMCell, the mobile brand operated by the state-owned Altyn Asyr network, often provides only 2G service, while home Wi-Fi is unavailable. Households able to obtain an Uzbek SIM card use networks such as Ucell and Uztelecom, placing the card in a router that supplies internet throughout the home. Residents said YouTube and Instagram become accessible through these connections, although TikTok and many foreign websites still require a VPN. One resident described the Uzbek service as “300 times” faster than the Turkmen alternative, a personal estimate rather than a measured comparison. The cards arrive through an informal chain of traders and other residents who regularly cross into Uzbekistan. A Dashoguz source said they sell for around 200 manats and that sellers also help buyers complete the registration. The arrangement depends on geography, personal contacts, and a signal strong enough to reach across the frontier. One local source said many people from Dashoguz work abroad, including in Russia, Poland, and Germany. For households with relatives overseas, a usable connection can provide a direct link beyond the village. It also opens independent news sites and social platforms that remain blocked or unreliable on Turkmen networks. Residents confronted by police sometimes say they use the internet only to pass the time, reportedly hoping to avoid a fine. A Signal Treated as Suspicion The reported consequences vary. Some first-time offenders receive a warning, particularly when they cannot afford a penalty. Others are threatened with fines of up to 50,000 manats or imprisonment. That amount is about $14,300 at Turkmenistan’s official exchange rate and roughly $2,500 using the widely reported informal rate. Residents said officers described the use of foreign telecommunications services as possible espionage on behalf of another country. The reports cite no court case or published provision under which simply possessing an Uzbek SIM card constitutes espionage. The threat itself, however, raises the stakes around an ordinary household connection. Police and security officers reportedly do not use specialist equipment to locate the routers. Local sources said they rely instead on informants in villages, schools, and local administrations. They allegedly gather information through schoolchildren as well. Residents who travel regularly to Uzbekistan, including small traders, are said to appear first on lists of suspected users. The authorities have given no public explanation for the campaign. Radio Azatlyk said the Dashoguz provincial administration, police, and the mobile operator did not respond to requests for comment. A source familiar with local law enforcement linked the raids to the details of a murder-suicide in Görogly district appearing online, in which a father was reported to have killed six children before taking his own life. The source said officials suspected that news of the tragedy had reached independent outlets through an Uzbek SIM card. The authorities have not confirmed that explanation. From Uzbek SIM Cards to Starlink This is not the first attempt to close an alternative route to the internet. In July 2024, Podrobno.uz reported raids targeting Uzbek SIM cards in northern and eastern Turkmenistan. The cards were said to be brought across the border by regular travelers and sold through informal dealers. That report put the average price of a usable mobile number at around $450, far above the 200-manat figure cited in the latest account. The difference may reflect a volatile underground market or different costs for cards, registration, and equipment, but neither figure can be independently verified. In April 2026, law enforcement agencies also began nationwide Starlink raids to identify and dismantle satellite equipment. Homes, offices, commercial buildings, and rooftops were searched. Users said the service had gained popularity after connectivity deteriorated in February. Starlink reportedly delivered speeds above 200 Mbps, while Turkmen Telecom packages for the general public offered a maximum of 6 Mbps. The equipment and installation cost between $1,000 and $1,500, putting it beyond the reach of most households. A More Digital State, Under Tight Control The crackdown is unfolding as Turkmenistan promotes a far more ambitious digital future. Its public-services portal advertises more than 500 functions, Arkadag has launched a 5G network, and the government has approved a Digital Economy Development Concept for 2026-2028. A recent TCA review found 3.53 million internet users in October 2025, equivalent to 46.1% of the population. Uzbekistan’s rate was estimated at 89%. These national plans sit uneasily beside the experience of a Dashoguz household searching for a signal from across the border. Digital public services, mobile banking, and online payments require reliable access, yet Human Rights Watch says internet use remains tightly controlled and independent media is unavailable inside the country. The timing also carries a diplomatic contrast. On July 14, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed an information security agreement during Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov’s visit to Ashgabat. The two governments also discussed cross-border cooperation and closer economic ties. No evidence links that agreement to the raids, which residents said began earlier in July. The police may be able to confiscate a card or router, but the demand for a workable connection remains. Residents have turned to VPNs, Uzbek mobile towers, and satellite terminals as each previous route became blocked or dangerous. In Diýýar and neighboring villages, access to the outside world can depend on whether a signal reaches the house and whether someone reports it.

Middle Corridor

Daines’s Tour Signals an Emerging U.S. Caspian Corridor Strategy

Senator Steve Daines’s July 7–9 visit to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan brought three bilateral relationships into a single, compressed Caspian itinerary. In Baku, he met President Ilham Aliyev and senior economic and foreign-policy officials; in Astana, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and representatives of government and business; and in Ashgabat, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Although official accounts treated each stop separately, the sequence suggests a regional pattern whose significance exceeds any single announcement. Daines had already supplied the clearest public articulation of the governing logic in his June 11 speech to the Caspian Policy Center’s Trans-Caspian Forum. There he joined Central Asia and the South Caucasus in a discussion about westward connectivity, investment, and supply-chain diversification. Daines identified critical minerals, energy, telecommunications, and physical and digital infrastructure as fields for public and private investment, while calling for TRIPP, a Caspian gas interconnector, and a continuous route from Central Asia to Western markets that avoids Russia and Iran. Together, these sectors give the proposed route both commercial and strategic content, though not the form of a single named program. Read against the June speech, Daines’s itinerary marks an emerging corridor-centered effort aligned with the Trump administration’s broader Caspian engagement, even without a formal declaration of purpose. Azerbaijan Anchors the Corridor’s Western Connections Baku gives the corridor logic its strongest institutional and bilateral footing. Aliyev and Daines discussed Azerbaijan’s geopolitical role, regional peace, and TRIPP’s importance for transport connectivity. Separate meetings with Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Economy Minister Mikayil Jabbarov extended the agenda to economic cooperation. With SOCAR President Rovshan Najaf, Jabbarov and Daines took up the Middle Corridor, energy, transport, digital development, and critical-mineral extraction and processing. Across the meetings, political, commercial, and technical portfolios converged around Azerbaijan’s place at the corridor’s western Caspian egress. The U.S.–Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership Charter, signed in February, places the Middle Corridor alongside energy, trade, transit, digital connectivity, and critical-mineral movement. It identifies Azerbaijan as an energy, transport, trade, and logistics hub for the Caspian region. Working groups regularize cooperation on trade, energy, connectivity, digital development, and security. The charter also calls for project lists and implementation roadmaps within three months of signing and for meetings at least once a year. In June, the first Azerbaijan-U.S. Economic Dialogue began translating that direction into an operational agenda. Government, financial institutions, and private-sector participants met on regional connectivity and transit, energy security, investment, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure. The agenda connected the Middle Corridor and TRIPP with logistics, the Southern Gas Corridor, critical mineral supply chains, transport and energy investment, and the Alat Free Economic Zone. Closing documents covered digital infrastructure, technology transfer, and industrial solutions. The workstreams are clear, but the consolidated project portfolio and its financing have yet to take public form. Azerbaijan’s role also rests on physical infrastructure already in use. The established Middle Corridor crosses Kazakhstan and the Caspian before passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia, then onward toward Türkiye or Europe via the Black Sea. At Alat, 70 kilometers south of Baku, the port handled 7.6 million tons of cargo in 2024. Its annual capacity is 15 million tons and 100,000 TEU; the planned second phase would raise those figures to 25 million tons and 500,000 TEU. Westward links already carry some oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline has transported gas to Europe since the end of 2020. TRIPP would add a route through southern Armenia toward Nakhchivan and the existing Azerbaijan-Georgia-Türkiye network. The immediate policy challenge is to expand operating routes and complete unfinished connections within a system already carrying traffic. Kazakhstan Anchors the Corridor’s Eastern Caspian Reach Astana has demonstrated how the regional framework outlined in Baku connects with Central Asia’s largest economy, a major source of Middle Corridor freight, and an expanding critical minerals base. Tokayev and Daines discussed expanding trade and investment, implementing earlier bilateral agreements, deepening the strategic partnership, and repealing Jackson–Vanik restrictions. The U.S. Embassy recorded an American Chamber of Commerce breakfast attended by representatives of Exxon, Caterpillar, and Apple, together with meetings involving the foreign affairs, industry and construction, and energy authorities. Its account referred to supply chains, trade, and energy innovation. As Central Asia’s largest economy and the principal source of Middle Corridor freight, Kazakhstan is not simply one link in the route. It is an indispensable co-shaper of any commercially viable Trans-Caspian strategy. That role is already visible in Caspian freight flows, port expansion, and investable mineral projects. A U.S. trade mission visited Aktau in 2025 to examine Trans-Caspian opportunities. Kazakhstani authorities reported Middle Corridor freight of 4.5 million tons in 2024, while government plans would raise container-handling capacity from 80,000 to 300,000 TEU by 2029 and reduce route times from 18 to 10 days. A separate package of U.S.-Kazakhstan agreements included a $1.1 billion tungsten venture with domestic processing, possible U.S. Ex-Im support of $900 million, and priority U.S. access to output. Together, these plans and projects give the Middle Corridor’s eastern side both freight scale and mineral stakes. They also provide relevant context for Daines’s visit, even where the official readouts did not enumerate every project. Turkmenistan Adds Energy Optionality In Ashgabat, the same themes appeared in a bilateral relationship whose institutional architecture remains less formalized. Daines met President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Official accounts ranged across trade, energy, transport, investment, logistics, advanced technology, regional connectivity, and the Turkmenistan-U.S. Business Council; the readout of the meeting with Gurbanguly also cited work with Boeing, GE, John Deere, and Case. The only pipeline named in the public accounts was TAPI, the long-planned route through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. The short Caspian interconnector that Daines has advocated elsewhere did not appear on the documented July agenda. Turkmenistan’s gas reserves nevertheless leave open another export direction across the Caspian. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates proved reserves at over 11 trillion cubic meters and identifies China as the dominant destination for pipeline exports, including 34 billion cubic meters in 2022. Daines has placed a connection to European-bound pipelines within his regional program, and Turkmenistan’s leaders have endorsed Trans-Caspian export diversification. Yet no agreed intergovernmental project, financing structure, or timetable establishes the interconnector as work in progress. A Caspian Strategy Taking Shape The three countries contribute complementary strengths: Kazakhstan provides economic scale, freight volumes, and mineral potential; Turkmenistan adds energy optionality; and Azerbaijan supplies the western Caspian hub, established onward infrastructure, and the most developed U.S. institutional framework. None of these roles is exclusive. Kazakhstan also produces energy, Azerbaijan also supplies it, and Turkmenistan also operates transport infrastructure. Their distinct but overlapping functions give the three bilateral relationships regional weight. The emerging approach is best understood as a diversification of the three countries’ geoeconomic options, not an attempt to sever them from Russia or China. Additional routes and partners can widen their sovereign room for maneuver, reduce concentrated exposure, and connect regional resources and production to more investors and markets. That logic is compatible with Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy and with the broader regional preference for practical, non-exclusive partnerships. The Middle Corridor’s strategic value lies not in immediately redrawing regional alignments but in gradually expanding commercial and strategic autonomy. Regional stability acquires a commercial meaning here: infrastructure and investment require politically usable routes, predictable transit arrangements, and sustained cooperation across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. Daines’s tour gave visible momentum to an emerging U.S. strategy for connecting Central Asia and the South Caucasus, consistent with the Trump administration’s emphasis on commercially grounded partnerships. Its institutional and financial architecture remains incomplete, but the direction is increasingly clear. There is no single three-country framework. The relationships are advancing through bilateral charters, dialogues, commercial agreements, and high-level visits. For now, the common direction appears in the sequence and convergence of U.S. initiatives rather than in a unifying institution. Project selection, financing, and delivery remain the proper tests of Washington’s effort. A durable regional structure will emerge from those results rather than from a declaration alone.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev Sees Azerbaijan and Central Asia’s Interests Converging

The Shusha Global Media Forum, an annual gathering held in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region and conceived as a platform for journalists and media representatives from dozens of countries across Europe and beyond, including the United States, acquired broader regional significance last year because of its consequences for several Russian participants.

Last year’s forum attracted widespread attention in Russia after two prominent Russian participants faced repercussions at home. Mikhail Gusman, then first deputy director general of the state news agency TASS, was dismissed shortly after attending the event and praising Azerbaijan, although no official reason was given. The following month, pro-Kremlin political analyst Sergei Markov was designated a “foreign agent” after facing criticism for his favorable comments about Azerbaijan. It was therefore unsurprising that this year’s forum attracted close attention from media outlets around the world.

Beyond the forum’s Russia-related significance, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev’s remarks pointed to a broader regional shift. Azerbaijan increasingly sees its political and economic interests converging with those of Central Asia, particularly through the Middle Corridor, cross-Caspian energy links, and infrastructure cooperation.

According to official figures, approximately 160 journalists, experts, and public officials from 53 countries attended the event. The forum brought together representatives of around 30 international news agencies, more than 60 leading media organizations, and roughly 10 international organizations and companies.

Former TASS executive Mikhail Gusman attended the fourth Shusha Global Media Forum and highlighted its growing international profile.

“There are very few, if any, media platforms in the world that bring together representatives of media organizations from every region to exchange views and engage in dialogue. That is precisely why the importance of this forum cannot be overstated,” he said.

As in previous years, President Aliyev opened the forum and spent nearly three hours answering questions from journalists representing a wide range of countries. Given the latest deterioration in relations between Baku and Moscow, many observers were watching to see whether questions would prompt unusually sharp comments about Russia.

The organizers did not shy away from potentially sensitive questions. Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Gordon, who has been designated an extremist in Russia, was once again invited to the forum and made full use of the opportunity. Gordon noted Ukrainian drone and missile strikes deep inside Russia before asking Aliyev what counsel he would offer Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin.

“What advice would you give Putin today, when, in my view, he no longer has any good options left?” Gordon asked.

Aliyev avoided an overtly confrontational response, stating that Ukraine should “never agree to occupation” and that the war “must be stopped—and stopped immediately.”

Aliyev’s exchange with journalists and analysts from Europe and the United States painted a clear picture of Azerbaijan’s worldview and the role it sees for itself internationally. That perspective remains heavily shaped by the three-decade conflict between Baku and Yerevan over Karabakh.

According to Aliyev, the United States, France, and Russia all sought to preserve the status quo during that period. He described those decades as a “time of war,” arguing that Azerbaijani society itself became deeply influenced by that prolonged conflict.

When the Second Karabakh War began in 2020, Aliyev recalled, the United States, France, and Russia were “calling from all sides” and pressing Azerbaijan to stop. He said the victory strengthened Azerbaijan’s international standing and argued that the end of active conflict improved conditions for development and investment.

Nevertheless, Aliyev suggested that longstanding grievances remain. Relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament remain strained, while Baku continues to seek the repeal of Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act, adopted by Congress in 1992 under what Aliyev described as the influence of the Armenian lobby.

In this context, Aliyev praised U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration, saying they had fundamentally changed Washington’s approach both to the region and to Azerbaijan. According to Aliyev, Trump waived Section 907 restrictions, supported the proposed Zangezur Corridor, which Baku says would connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through southern Armenia, and helped create the framework for an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement.

Aliyev struck a markedly different tone when discussing Türkiye and the Central Asian republics, particularly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Speaking about Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Aliyev said their “personal friendship” had elevated bilateral relations and highlighted Uzbekistan’s role in rebuilding Karabakh.

“The President of Uzbekistan was the first to assist us in rebuilding Karabakh. A beautiful and large school named after Mirzo Ulugbek was built in the city of Fuzuli, and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and I officially inaugurated it together. After that, other brotherly countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan—also offered their gifts. But the very first assistance came from Uzbekistan,” Aliyev said.

The Azerbaijani president also highlighted the importance of his close working relationship with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in strengthening bilateral cooperation. He thanked Kazakhstan for its contribution to Karabakh’s reconstruction and said that the close partnership between the two leaders has helped advance joint transport, energy, and digital infrastructure projects.

These include the development of the Middle Corridor, the construction of electricity and fiber-optic cables across the Caspian Sea, and the transportation of Kazakh oil through Azerbaijan.

The reasons behind Aliyev’s warm approach toward Central Asia became clear during his remarks. Although Azerbaijan geographically belongs to the South Caucasus, he noted that it has joined the Consultative Council of Central Asian leaders as a full member after previously attending its summits as an honorary guest. The expanded “C6” format brings Azerbaijan into the region’s principal leaders’ forum.

Aliyev framed the relationship in still broader terms, saying Central Asia and Azerbaijan were “uniting into a single economic and political space.”

Azerbaijan is therefore consolidating its position as the western Caspian hub of the Middle Corridor rather than joining the route from outside. Baku is positioning itself as a bridge between East and West, a role that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also actively pursued.

Closer coordination with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could give the corridor greater economic and political coherence, while Azerbaijan’s alliance with Türkiye extends Ankara’s influence across transport, energy, and digital projects spanning the Caspian.

Strategic Partnership

Uzbekistan and Belarus Establish Strategic Partnership in Minsk

Uzbekistan and Belarus have established a strategic partnership following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's official visit to Minsk, where the two governments signed a broad package of economic, labor, scientific, and cultural agreements. According to the Uzbek presidential press service, Mirziyoyev visited Minsk on July 8-9 at the invitation of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. He was welcomed with an official ceremony at the Palace of Independence before the two leaders held both one-on-one and expanded talks with their delegations. The visit marked a notable milestone in a relationship that has expanded steadily in recent years. Diplomatic relations between Uzbekistan and Belarus were established on January 21, 1993, but Uzbekistan opened its first embassy in Minsk only in March 2018. Before that, the Uzbek Embassy in Russia also covered Belarus. The relationship is developing while Belarus remains under extensive European Union sanctions over human rights abuses and its support for Russia's war against Ukraine. Speaking after the talks, Mirziyoyev said the visit had become “a historic event in the development of Uzbek-Belarusian relations.” He said the newly signed declaration “marks the beginning of a new chapter in strengthening interstate cooperation” and demonstrates both countries’ commitment to long-term partnership. The leaders highlighted the rapid growth in economic ties. According to the Uzbek side, bilateral trade has nearly tripled over the past five years and approached $1 billion by the end of 2025, while trade during the first months of 2026 rose by another 30%. Official figures differ according to methodology. The Uzbek side said bilateral trade approached $1 billion in 2025, while Belarusian trade figures put goods trade at almost $855 million and services at $207.9 million. Belarusian state news agency BelTA also said around 230 enterprises with Belarusian capital are registered in Uzbekistan and that Belarus had a positive trade balance of more than $517 million. Both presidents said the target of $2 billion in annual trade is achievable by 2030. To support that goal, the two governments adopted a 2026-2030 action plan covering trade, economic, social, and humanitarian cooperation. The plan includes measures to expand collaboration in agriculture, mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, electrical engineering, microelectronics, textiles, furniture production, and other manufacturing sectors. One of the most significant areas discussed was nuclear energy. The Uzbek presidential press service said the parties agreed to draw on Belarusian experience in the construction of Uzbekistan’s first nuclear power plant and related infrastructure. Belarus operates the Russian-financed Ostrovets plant, whose two VVER-1200 units were built by Atomstroyexport. Uzbekistan’s own project is being developed with Russia’s Rosatom and is planned to combine two VVER-1000 reactors with two smaller RITM-200N units. Political analyst Mukhtor Nazirov said the declaration represented a qualitative change and could create opportunities for investment, technology transfer, and industrial cooperation. He described nuclear cooperation as “one of the most important components of the strategic partnership,” arguing that it required a particularly high level of trust. Labor migration also emerged as a major theme. During the talks, Lukashenko invited Uzbek citizens, especially families, to move to Belarus to live and work, citing the country's labor shortage. He said agricultural employers could provide housing and that incoming families would have access to education and healthcare on the same terms as Belarusians. The two governments signed an agreement on the organized recruitment and employment of Uzbek citizens for temporary work in Belarus. The formal mechanism provides for Uzbekistan's Migration Agency to select candidates, coordinate draft employment contracts, and provide pre-departure orientation. Belarusian employers will approve candidates, obtain permits where needed, and sign employment contracts. Beyond economics and labor, the visit produced a large package of additional agreements. These included programs for cooperation between the foreign ministries, culture ministries, emergency services, and tourism authorities; a roadmap for cooperation in the agro-industrial sector; agreements on forestry and light industry; and memorandums covering social protection, finance, scientific research, and strategic studies. The parties also agreed to organize joint tourism, medical, and education forums later this year and to continue expanding exchanges in culture, healthcare, and education. Mirziyoyev thanked Lukashenko for the initiative to create an Alley of Uzbek-Belarusian Friendship in Minsk. Regional cooperation was another focus. The leaders praised the results of the third Forum of Regions of Uzbekistan and Belarus, held in Minsk on the eve of the summit, which brought together around 230 Uzbek entrepreneurs and produced a substantial package of trade contracts and investment agreements. On the international stage, both countries reaffirmed their intention to support one another within organizations including the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Non-Aligned Movement. At the conclusion of the talks, Mirziyoyev invited Lukashenko to pay an official visit to Uzbekistan. Both sides expressed their confidence that the agreements signed during the summit would deepen the strategic partnership and support the long-term development of both countries.

Transport Infrastructure

Can Uzbekistan Challenge Kazakhstan as Leading Central Asia Logistics Hub?

Recent developments suggest that Uzbekistan is seeking to strengthen its position in regional logistics, potentially challenging Kazakhstan’s role as Central Asia’s principal transit hub. As geopolitical tensions increase, alternative transport routes are becoming increasingly important, and Central Asia stands out as a relatively stable region. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are investing heavily in expanding their transport infrastructure.

The key question, however, is how practical and commercially viable these new projects will prove to be. Which country will ultimately be able to offer faster, cheaper, and more reliable transport corridors?

Uzbekistan’s Plans

In early July, Uzbekistan presented proposals for expanding its transport and logistics infrastructure, as officials sought to make greater use of what they described as the country’s underdeveloped transit potential.

Officials noted that Uzbekistan occupies a strategic position connecting East and West. The country hosts approximately 4,000 kilometers (2,485 miles) of international transit corridors and has a railway network stretching 4,700 kilometers (2,920 miles).

Modern logistics centers and “dry ports” are being developed in Tashkent, Navoi, and Namangan. Navoi Airport already serves as an important cargo hub on Eurasian air routes. Authorities believe that construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, together with the proposed Trans-Afghan Railway, could further strengthen Uzbekistan’s position within both regional and international transport networks.

Project planners argue that, once completed, these corridors will make Uzbekistan a key segment of the shortest overland route between the Pacific Ocean and Europe. They estimate that cargo transit times could be reduced to eight days, roughly three times faster than many traditional routes. That said, the statement provided no methodology or precise endpoints for the estimate; existing China-Europe rail services generally take considerably longer.

Officials also say access to Pakistan’s ports of Karachi and Gwadar would provide Uzbekistan with a gateway to the Indian Ocean and a shorter route to South Asian markets with a combined population of around 2 billion people. Gwadar is not yet connected to Pakistan’s main railway network, however, meaning that substantial additional infrastructure would be required.

Significant Shortcomings

Uzbek officials estimate that annual trade between China and Europe amounts to approximately $800 billion, while cargo volumes total between 120 million and 150 million metric tons each year.

The government estimates that attracting an additional 15-20 million tons of international transit cargo annually could generate $400-600 million in revenue, draw around $3 billion into logistics facilities, and create approximately 50,000 permanent jobs.

The presidential administration also said this could add 1.5-2 percentage points to annual economic growth, given that Uzbekistan currently captures only 1-2% of China-Europe freight – it did not explain how either figure was calculated.

Although transit cargo volumes reached 15.3 million tons in 2025, an increase of 54% compared with 2021, officials believe the country’s existing infrastructure could support significantly higher volumes.

At present, however, many border crossings lack sufficient capacity to process international freight efficiently.

Uzbekistan currently operates 27 logistics centers that meet international standards, with a combined handling capacity of 27.2 million tons. Yet only one of them qualifies as a top-tier facility. Class A automated warehouse capacity covers only 10-15% of current demand, while modern refrigerated storage and customs warehouses remain in short supply.

Logistics infrastructure is also concentrated primarily in and around Tashkent. Containerization rates remain relatively low, government information systems are not yet fully integrated with private logistics operators, and the sector’s overall level of digitalization continues to lag behind.

Kazakhstan’s Offer

Like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan is a landlocked country. Over the past several years, however, it has developed into one of the principal transit hubs linking Asia and Europe. Freight traffic along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or Middle Corridor, has increased almost sixfold since 2020, while total transit cargo reached 36.9 million metric tons in 2025. Even so, analysts continue to question whether the country can turn these gains into a lasting competitive advantage.

Kazakhstan is crossed by four major international transport corridors that form an extensive east-west and north-south network.

The Western Europe-Western China highway stretches 8,445 kilometers (5,247 miles), of which 2,787 kilometers (1,732 miles) run through Kazakhstan. The route links Russia’s Volga region with the Chinese port of Lianyungang, creating a land-based alternative to traditional maritime routes around Eurasia.

Kazakhstan is crossed by several major international transport corridors that form an extensive east-west and north-south network. The country has long benefited from its geographic position and has spent more than a decade expanding its transport infrastructure. Analysts argue, however, that roads and railways alone cannot guarantee competitive transit. Freight operators also require predictable tariffs, efficient customs procedures, and reliable border crossings.

One corridor has gained particular momentum in recent years: the Middle Corridor.

Its rapid growth has largely been driven by geopolitical developments. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Western sanctions against Moscow, and efforts by international businesses to diversify supply chains have significantly increased Kazakhstan’s importance as a transit country.

In 2025, Kazakhstan handled 36.9 million metric tons of transit cargo, 6.6% more than in 2024. Across the transport sector as a whole, including domestic and international freight, railways carried 320 million tons, an increase of 5.5%, while maritime transport handled 8 million tons, up 7%.

According to analysts, Kazakhstan is increasingly combining global transit flows with regional logistics, although it has yet to fully realize its potential. It still needs faster customs procedures, more predictable pricing, and better coordination with neighboring countries.

Without these reforms, analysts warn, Kazakhstan risks remaining merely a transit territory while much of the added economic value is captured elsewhere.

The evolution of the Middle Corridor illustrates both the opportunities and the remaining challenges.

In 2020, only about 800,000 tons of cargo moved along the Trans-Caspian route. By 2024, that figure had increased to 4.5 million tons.

Only a few years ago, the corridor was regarded as a niche alternative. Following the outbreak of war in Ukraine, however, the route connecting China with Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey has become the principal established China-Europe corridor that avoids Russian territory.

Obstacles Facing Uzbekistan’s Routes

Geopolitical upheaval is making the Middle Corridor increasingly important. The World Bank estimates that investment and operational reforms could halve transit times and increase traffic across the Caspian to 11 million tons by 2030, approximately three times the 2021 level. It nevertheless expects the route to remain primarily regional, with transcontinental freight accounting for less than 40% of its traffic.

Uzbekistan’s proposed alternative routes face obstacles of their own.

Official construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway began in December 2024. In an interview with Exclusive.kz, Kyrgyz economist Murat Musuraliyev questioned whether the railway would attract significant volumes of transcontinental freight. He argued that its most natural market would be cargo destined for southern Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and eastern Turkmenistan.

Musuraliyev pointed to the difficult terrain and the additional border procedures involved in extending the route farther west. The line through Kyrgyzstan requires extensive tunneling and bridge construction, particularly around the high-altitude Torugart Pass. He described the established route through Kazakhstan as more competitive because Chinese freight can pass directly into Kazakhstan before reaching the Caspian. By contrast, cargo using a southern route could encounter several additional borders, depending on its destination. Musuraliyev estimated that each crossing could add another day to the journey.

The outlook for the route through Afghanistan also remains uncertain.

The Trans-Afghan railway has yet to move beyond planning and feasibility work. Its implementation faces major challenges, including financing and the need to construct extensive new infrastructure across Afghanistan. Security conditions and the international status of the Taliban government could further complicate investment.

Competition Benefits the Region

The growing competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is positive for Kazakhstan’s economy, according to Kazakh political analyst Dosym Satpayev.

Investors are attracted by the region’s stability. Satpayev recalled that in the 1990s, some analysts compared Central Asian countries with Afghanistan or the Balkans.

Since 2018, the region’s heads of state have held regular consultative meetings. In Satpayev’s view, this development is connected to changes in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy.

Following the death of Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, and the rise to power of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the country opened itself more fully to external engagement.

“This is also an advantage for Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan has become an economic competitor for us. It is important for the region to have such a strong economic player nearby,” Satpayev said in an interview on the YouTube channel of Armanzhan Baitassov.

He also believes that the conflict in the Middle East is increasing interest in overland transport routes, especially the Middle Corridor. According to Satpayev, around 80% of the relevant transit passes through Kazakhstan, with goods transported by rail from China and then transferred to ships at the Port of Aktau.

Healthy competition is therefore beginning to emerge in the region and could accelerate the full implementation of alternative transport routes.

For now, Kazakhstan retains the stronger position. Its railway network already carries Chinese freight to the Caspian, while Uzbekistan’s most ambitious routes remain under construction or at the feasibility stage. Uzbekistan could eventually draw more traffic southward, but its proposed eight-day journey between the Pacific and Europe remains a highly ambitious projection.

Water Management

UN: Uzbekistan Makes Major Progress in Reducing Water Stress, but Challenges Remain

Uzbekistan has recorded one of the world’s fastest reductions in water stress in recent years, according to a new United Nations case study on the country’s water-management policies. The study points to efforts to conserve water, modernize irrigation, and expand regional cooperation. It also warns that Uzbekistan remains under pressure from climate change and rising water demand, while environmental damage linked to the Aral Sea disaster continues to affect the country.

The study, prepared by UN-Water, examines how Uzbekistan managed to reduce water withdrawals while maintaining agricultural production and economic development. The report describes the country’s experience as particularly relevant for other water-stressed regions and countries seeking practical solutions to increasing pressure on freshwater resources.

Water has long been one of Uzbekistan’s most strategic resources. Much of the country consists of arid and semi-arid landscapes, while agriculture remains heavily dependent on irrigation. The challenge has become even more urgent as climate change affects water availability across Central Asia.

According to the UN report, Uzbekistan’s level of water stress increased steadily until 2017. Since then, the country has undertaken large-scale reforms aimed at reducing water consumption and introducing more efficient technologies. These efforts have produced measurable results.

In 2017, Uzbekistan’s freshwater withdrawals reached 169% of its total renewable freshwater resources. By 2021, that figure had fallen to 122%. Although still above sustainable levels and considerably higher than the regional average of 69%, the reduction of 47 percentage points within four years represents one of the most significant improvements recorded globally under Sustainable Development Goal 6, which focuses on clean water and sanitation.

Data cited by the report show that total freshwater withdrawals declined from 58.9 billion cubic meters in 2017 to 42.5 billion cubic meters in 2021. Most of the reduction came from agriculture, where irrigation withdrawals fell from 53.7 billion cubic meters to 38.5 billion cubic meters during the same period.

The UN attributes much of this progress to strong political commitment. According to the report, water management has become a national priority supported at the highest levels of government.

UN-Water notes that water-efficiency goals have been incorporated into several development programs. These include the 2017-2021 Action Strategy and the New Uzbekistan Development Strategy for 2022-2026. The goals also appear in the Uzbekistan-2030 strategy.

Among the government’s targets are the introduction of water-saving technologies such as drip irrigation, sprinkler irrigation, and laser land leveling across all cultivated land by 2030. Authorities also aim to save up to 15 billion cubic meters of water annually, reduce irrigation losses by 25%, and fully digitize the management of 200,000 water intake points.

The report identifies the expansion of water-saving technologies as one of the most important factors behind the country’s progress. Uzbekistan has combined financial incentives, soft loans, and subsidies with training programs for farmers and water specialists. According to UN-Water, this approach has helped reduce investment risks and encouraged wider adoption of modern irrigation systems.

These measures are especially important because agriculture remains Uzbekistan’s largest water user. According to data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations cited in the report, agriculture accounts for about 92% of all water withdrawals. Municipal use accounts for about 5%. Industry accounts for around 3%.

The scale of water consumption remains substantial. Freshwater withdrawals amount to roughly 42.9 billion cubic meters annually, equivalent to nearly 3,500 liters per person per day. The report describes this figure as exceptionally high for a country experiencing water stress and argues that continued conservation measures remain essential.

The challenge is closely linked to one of the world’s most severe environmental disasters, the disappearance of the Aral Sea.

The report recalls that the Aral Sea was once among the largest inland bodies of water on Earth. Decades of excessive water withdrawals for irrigation dramatically reduced its size, leaving behind the Aralkum Desert across the former seabed. The consequences continue to affect public health, ecosystems, and economic development throughout the region.

UN-Water notes that the environmental impacts remain visible today. Water-related ecosystems are under growing pressure, while river flows have declined significantly.

According to data from the UN Environment Programme, river flow in Uzbekistan decreased by more than 10% between 2017 and 2021 compared to the 2000-2019 baseline. During the same period, the extent of permanent surface water declined by more than 20%.

Reduced water availability also affects water quality. As rivers and lakes contain less water, pollutants and sediments become more concentrated. The report warns that increasing turbidity can damage irrigation systems, reduce reservoir capacity, and lower hydropower generation.

Water management in Uzbekistan is further complicated by geography. All of the country’s major river basins are transboundary, meaning they cross national borders and depend on cooperation with neighboring states.

The Amu Darya, Syr Darya, Zarafshan, and Chirchiq rivers all originate partially or entirely outside Uzbekistan. The country also shares important groundwater resources with neighboring countries.

As a downstream nation, Uzbekistan depends heavily on water originating in upstream states. This reality has made regional cooperation a key component of national water policy.

The report highlights major improvements in relations between Uzbekistan and its neighbors over the past decade. Joint commissions and working groups have been established with neighboring countries, while cooperation has expanded in areas ranging from hydropower development to groundwater management and irrigation infrastructure.

Uzbekistan participates actively in regional institutions such as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea and the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination. The headquarters of several regional water organizations, including the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basin Water Organizations, are located in Uzbekistan and receive financial support from the country.

The report points to Uzbekistan’s growing role in international water diplomacy. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the only two Central Asian countries that are parties to both the UN Water Convention and the UN Watercourses Convention. Uzbekistan has also joined the Protocol on Water and Health.

One issue receiving increasing attention is Afghanistan’s construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal.

The canal, being built upstream from the Amu Darya since 2022, is expected to divert a significant amount of water from the river system. According to the report, the project has increased pressure on Uzbekistan to accelerate water conservation measures.

Rather than pursuing confrontation, however, Uzbekistan has sought cooperation with Afghanistan. UN-Water notes that Tashkent is working with Afghan authorities to promote more efficient and sustainable use of shared water resources despite the absence of formal regional water agreements involving Afghanistan.

The report also highlights progress in drinking water and sanitation services. According to 2024 data from UNICEF and the World Health Organization, 98.6% of Uzbekistan’s urban population has access to safely managed drinking water. In rural areas, the figure stands at 77.7%.

Overall, 98% of the population uses improved drinking water services. About 80.9% of water is supplied through centralized systems, while the remainder comes from non-centralized sources. Sanitation coverage has also expanded. Safely managed sanitation services now reach approximately 75% of the population. Interestingly, the report notes that rural areas perform better than urban areas in this category, with coverage reaching 86% compared to 63% in cities.

Despite this progress, the report says Uzbekistan still withdraws more water than can be replenished sustainably. Climate change and population growth are likely to add further pressure. Agricultural demand and environmental damage will also require continued reforms and investment in the years ahead.

UN-Water presents Uzbekistan as an example of how sustained policy support and technological upgrades can reduce water stress under difficult conditions. The report also points to the role of financing and international cooperation in carrying out those reforms.

For a country in one of the world’s most water-stressed regions, the experience has relevance beyond Uzbekistan. It offers a practical case for Central Asia and for other regions facing growing pressure on freshwater resources.