Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be taking a look at Tajikistan's heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, with guests Salimjon Aioub, head of RFERL's Tajik service, known locally as Ozodi, and Edward Lemon, president of the Oxus Society.
Erdoğan Visit Puts Trade, Transit, and Turkic Economic Integration at Center of Kazakhstan’s OTS Push
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Kazakhstan comes as Astana is trying to give the Organization of Turkic States a more practical economic role, linking trade, investment, transport, digital development, and business financing across the Turkic world.
The visit centered on three connected events: Erdoğan’s official visit to Astana, the sixth meeting of the Kazakhstan-Turkey High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, and the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Turkistan. Erdoğan arrived in Astana ahead of talks with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, while Turkish media reported that the agenda included transport links through the Middle Corridor, Caspian transit routes, energy security, logistics, defense industry cooperation, trade and investment.
The visit also carried strong symbolic staging. According to Akorda, Erdoğan’s aircraft was escorted by Kazakh Air Defense fighter jets after entering Kazakhstan’s airspace. At Astana airport, he was greeted by an honor guard, children waving the flags of Kazakhstan and Turkey, and military helicopters displaying the national symbols of both countries. Erdoğan later said the welcome had brought his delegation “enormous joy,” adding, “We certainly will not forget this.”
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Kazakh aircraft fly over Astana during the ceremonial welcome for Erdoğan. Image: Akorda[/caption]
The OTS summit is being hosted by Kazakhstan on May 15 in Turkistan under the theme “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” According to the organization, the summit is intended to advance cooperation on artificial intelligence, digital innovation, emerging technologies, public services, sustainable economic growth, and regional connectivity.
The digital theme reflects Kazakhstan’s effort to give the OTS a more practical economic role, beyond its cultural and diplomatic foundations. Ahead of the summit, Astana hosted a business forum on May 13 under the title “Economic Integration and Cooperation of the OTS Countries: New Opportunities in Industry, Agro-Industrial Complex, Logistics and Digitalization.” Kazakhstan’s prime minister’s office said the forum brought together state bodies, financial institutions, chambers of commerce, international organizations, and business representatives from OTS countries.
Kanat Sharlapayev, chairman of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Turkic States and of the presidium of Kazakhstan’s Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, urged Turkic countries to move toward deeper industrial and digital integration. He said the task was to create a unified digital environment, reduce the distance between producers and consumers, increase transparency, and speed up transactions.
The forum also discussed plans for joint industrial facilities and manufacturing zones along transport corridors, an idea that would push OTS cooperation beyond transit toward processing and value-added production.
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin used the forum to frame OTS cooperation as one of Kazakhstan’s foreign economic priorities. He said the OTS countries form a market of more than 170 million people and have significant industrial, transport, agricultural, and human potential. He also said the main task was to move from declarations to joint projects, new production, technology alliances, and mutual investment.
Silk Way TV reported that Murat Karimsakov, chairman of the Kazakh Chamber of International Commerce, said trade turnover among OTS countries increased by more than 36% in 2025, while direct investment from Turkic states into Kazakhstan reached nearly half a billion dollars. Karimsakov also said Turkish investment in Kazakhstan had exceeded $6 billion over the past 20 years.
The trade target remains ambitious. At the council meeting in Astana, Erdoğan said Kazakhstan and Turkey had reaffirmed their goal of raising bilateral trade turnover to $15 billion. He also emphasized the importance of implementing the action plan adopted at the 14th meeting of the Joint Economic Cooperation Commission, held in Astana on April 15. The April commission meeting had already pointed to the practical areas behind the new trade push. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan was seeking to expand agricultural exports to Turkey, with the two sides discussing trade in grain, oilseeds, livestock products, sugar, confectionery, and processed foods.
Tokayev placed the investment relationship in similar terms, stating that Turkish investment in Kazakhstan had reached $6 billion, while Kazakh investment in Turkey had approached $2.5 billion. He also described Turkey as one of Kazakhstan’s top five trading partners and said the two countries would sign a Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Expanded Strategic Partnership.
The business forum gave that political language a more practical layer. Kazakhstan’s Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs signed an agreement with the Turkic Investment Fund aimed at expanding investment cooperation and supporting joint projects. A separate memorandum was signed between the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Turkic States, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Trade Chamber, and the National Association of Cooperatives and Other Economic Communities.
The Turkic Investment Fund is central to that effort. Kazakhstan views the fund as one of the main financial mechanisms for supporting joint OTS projects. Zhumangarin said the fund was ready to allocate at least $20 million at the initial stage for co-financing projects, and that talks were underway on possible participation in financing infrastructure development at Almaty International Airport.
For Kazakhstan, the OTS connects bilateral ties with Turkey to a wider regional corridor. The organization’s members are Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Its observer states are Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, while the Economic Cooperation Organization has observer organization status.
This gives the OTS a geographic logic that is increasingly economic as well as cultural and political. It links Central Asia with Azerbaijan and Turkey across the Caspian, overlapping with Kazakhstan’s long-running effort to expand the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, often called the Middle Corridor. Azerbaijan is the pivotal Caspian link in Kazakhstan’s westward corridor to the South Caucasus and Europe, with Astana also pursuing Caspian fiber-optic and power-cable projects alongside transport cooperation.
Zhumangarin separately highlighted the importance of sustainable transport routes, including the modernization of rail and port infrastructure to expand transit and trade between East and West.
Transport and logistics remain the key test. Kazakhstan wants more reliable export and transit options across the Caspian, while Turkey wants to strengthen its role as the western gateway for goods moving between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. The business forum’s focus on logistics shows the OTS economic agenda is now being tied directly to corridor development rather than solely to identity politics or diplomatic language.
Energy is part of the same corridor question, with energy security expected to feature prominently in the discussions. Any increase in Caspian-linked exports depends not only on political will, but also on port capacity, rail connections, pipeline standards, financing, and predictable customs procedures.
The visit also carries a cultural and humanitarian layer. Qazinform, citing Akorda, reported that Kazakhstan has built a school named after Khoja Ahmed Yassawi in Turkey’s Gaziantep province, which was affected by the 2023 earthquake. The two sides also agreed to open Maarif Foundation schools in Astana and Almaty. Around 14,000 Kazakh students are currently studying in Turkey, while about 260 Turkish students are studying in Kazakhstan.
Tokayev also said the newly established Khoja Ahmed Yassawi Order would be awarded to Erdoğan in recognition of his contribution to strengthening bilateral cooperation. The award reinforces the symbolic side of the visit, particularly because the OTS summit is being held in Turkistan, a city closely associated with Yassawi’s legacy.
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Ceremonial welcome for Erdoğan in Astana. Image: Akorda[/caption]
The symbolism of the visit carries weight, but the larger question is whether the organization can turn shared identity into a working economic infrastructure. For Kazakhstan and Turkey, that means fewer declarations and more usable routes, financing tools, customs links, and projects that businesses can actually rely on.
Erdoğan’s visit does not settle that question, but it shows where Astana wants the OTS to go. The organization is being framed less as a cultural club and more as a platform for trade, transit, investment, and digital cooperation. Whether that platform can deliver will depend on what follows after the summit: signed projects, funded corridors, and simpler movement of goods across the Caspian.
Uzbekistan Startups Win Two Honors at Global Startup Awards
Uzbekistan’s startup ecosystem received international recognition this week after two projects from the country won top honors at the Global Startup Awards Grand Finale, held during the EU-Startups Summit in Valletta, Malta. The event brought together startup founders, investors, and technology leaders from more than 54 countries. The Global Startup Awards is considered one of the world’s leading platforms for recognizing innovation ecosystems, selecting finalists through regional and national competitions across multiple continents. According to organizers, Uzbek representatives won in two global categories. Rakhimakhon Nugmanova, founder of the startup Peritech, received the “Ecosystem Hero of the Year” award, while Catextra was named “Best Greentech Startup of the Year.” Speaking to Times of Central Asia, Nugmanova said the recognition carried special meaning because it reflected support from the international startup community itself. “For me, this award is very important because it means people themselves chose me,” she said. “It shows that the work we are doing to develop the ecosystem has been noticed and appreciated by the people it is meant for.” She added that representing both Uzbekistan and Central Asia on the global stage was significant at a time when the region is drawing increasing international attention. “I think people were able to feel my sincerity and my passion for this work,” Nugmanova told The Times of Central Asia. “For many years, I have worked at the intersection of education, technology, and the public sector, and I hope I am making a meaningful contribution to people’s lives, from children to adults.” The success in Malta follows the Global Startup Awards Central Asia regional final held in Tashkent during ICT Week in September 2025 with support from IT Park Uzbekistan. The event helped regional startups connect with investors and international technology networks. Catextra’s victory highlighted growing international interest in sustainable technologies developed in Uzbekistan. The platform focuses on transparency and traceability in the textile industry, helping manufacturers track every stage of their supply chains and verify compliance with international ethical and production standards. A member of the Catextra team, Amal Isamukhamedov, told The Times of Central Asia that the award demonstrated international confidence in an idea developed in Uzbekistan. “For our team, winning at the Global Startup Awards means recognition and trust from European technology structures in our Uzbek idea,” he said. “We realized that our idea can work not only in our region, but also beyond it.” According to Isamukhamedov, the platform is designed to help textile and agricultural exporters from Uzbekistan and Central Asia access higher-value markets in Europe, the United States, and Asia, where buyers increasingly demand proof of product origin and transparent supply chains. “Our platform helps local producers export faster, more cheaply, and more easily,” he said. He also credited growing state support for the startup sector, including initiatives backed by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and IT Park Uzbekistan, with helping local startups enter international markets. “Five years ago, these ideas and this political will were only beginning to form,” he said. “Now a new generation of students and founders is emerging that can compete internationally.”
Opinion: A New Southern Gate – How the EU-Armenia Summit Unlocks a Critical Branch for the Middle Corridor
For the first time in its history, the European Union held a full summit with Armenia. The meeting, which took place in Yerevan on 4–5 May 2026, was not merely a diplomatic milestone for Armenia. It also sent a signal to governments thousands of kilometers away in Central Asia that the trade route linking Asia to Europe through the South Caucasus is becoming more real, and more politically backed, than ever before.
The centerpiece of the summit saw the signing of a “Connectivity Partnership” between Brussels and Yerevan. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, described Armenia as "uniquely positioned" to connect Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Under the EU's Global Gateway program, investments in Armenia are expected to reach €2.5 billion. A further €3 billion is earmarked specifically for the Middle Corridor – the trade route that runs from China across Central Asia, over the Caspian Sea, through the South Caucasus, and into Europe.
“We will support your integration into key transport networks like the Trans-Caspian Corridor. It is a route that is also of strategic importance for Europe, given the growing flows of trade between our two regions,” von der Leyen stated.
A Route That Is Already Moving Fast
The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has grown at a pace that few predicted. Cargo volumes rose 70 percent in the first nine months of 2024 alone, reaching 3.4 million tons. By the end of that year, the total had climbed to 4.1 million tons – up from just 350,000 tons in 2021. The World Bank projects that the route could handle up to 11 million tonnes a year by 2030.
It's important to maintain some perspective. These numbers are small fry when compared to the billions of tons of trade that moves between Europe and Asia by sea. However, the Middle Corridor does offer important diversification, particularly given the spillover effects of wars in the Middle East and piracy in the Red Sea.
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Image: Trans Caspian International Transport Route and it’s southern part, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway project. Source: middlecorridor.com[/caption]
Where Uzbekistan Stands
For Uzbekistan, the Middle Corridor is both an opportunity and a work in progress. In January 2025, President Mirziyoyev signed a decree to upgrade road and rail connectivity, and in September 2024, Tashkent co-founded the Eurasian Transport Route Association alongside Austria, Azerbaijan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. In December 2024, Uzbekistan sent its first block train all the way to Brazil – through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and the Georgian port of Poti – proving the route is operationally viable.
But costs remain a challenge. Shipping a 40-foot container via the Middle Corridor currently costs between $3,500 and $4,500, compared to $2,800–$3,200 on the Northern Corridor through Russia. Europe, meanwhile, accounts for only around 3 percent of Uzbekistan's exports and 13 percent of its imports — a share that Tashkent wants to grow significantly.
The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway — a $8 billion, 573-kilometre project whose joint construction company was established in July 2024 — is the most consequential single piece of infrastructure in play. Once complete, it will give Uzbekistan an alternative means to access China by rail, bypassing Kazakhstan. As a 2025 analysis by Trends Research noted, the CKU will reduce transit time between China and Europe and lower export costs for the Fergana Valley — Uzbekistan's industrial heartland.
Where Armenia Fits In
For three decades, Yerevan has been cut off from regional logistics networks after Azerbaijan and Turkey closed their borders in the early 1990s. The EU summit this week marks the clearest signal yet that this isolation is ending.
Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, speaking at an EU connectivity ministerial in Luxembourg last October, framed the stakes directly: "Being at the crossroads, Armenia can play a crucial role in the chain connecting Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia." He also echoed von der Leyen's earlier assessment that opening Armenia's borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey would be, in the Commission President's words, a "game-changer" for the entire corridor.
Such an endeavor is likely to be contingent on the Armenian elections, which take place on June 7. Current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is bidding to earn himself a two-thirds majority in the country’s parliament, which will enable him to change the constitution to remove Armenia's claims on the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has made this a prerequisite for any final agreement on opening the TRIPP route through Armenia.
But he has his work cut out to achieve this. Russia has acted in its traditional role of spoiler, funneling money to various opposition parties in order to try to keep Armenia within its orbit.
Should Pashinyan prevail, the combined southern route, combining the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and the TRIPP corridor through Armenia, could allow cargo to be transported from Kashgar to European markets in about 10-14 days – about 900 kilometers shorter than the existing northern routes – which could reduce land costs per container by 20-30 percent compared to current prices.
It's a prize that many in Central Asia are quietly hoping for.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
ADB Annual Meeting in Samarkand Unveils Major Energy, Climate, and Development Initiatives
The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) 59th Annual Meeting concluded in the historic Uzbek city of Samarkand after four days of discussions focused on energy connectivity, climate financing, and economic resilience across Asia and the Pacific. Held from May 3 to 6, the gathering brought together government officials, development institutions, economists, and private sector representatives at a time of growing geopolitical and economic uncertainty. It marked the second time Uzbekistan has hosted the ADB Annual Meeting, following the 43rd edition in Tashkent in 2010.
A central announcement at the meeting was the unveiling of a broader $70 billion regional infrastructure program aimed at accelerating energy and digital connectivity across Asia and the Pacific.
The initiative is structured around two major pillars: a $50 billion Pan-Asia Power Grid Initiative focused on cross-border electricity systems, and a $20 billion digital connectivity component aimed at strengthening broadband and data infrastructure across the region.
Together, these programmes are intended to reduce energy costs, improve reliability, and deepen regional economic integration.
The Pan-Asia Power Grid Initiative (PAGI)
In his address to delegates, ADB President Masato Kanda noted that PAGI seeks to support more interconnected and resilient infrastructure systems. "To survive and thrive in this new era, we must build deeply connected and resilient systems," he said, adding that stronger regional grids and digital networks can help countries manage rising energy demand whilst also accelerating the transition to cleaner power sources. The initiative seeks to integrate around 20 gigawatts of renewable energy capacity and the develop enough transmission infrastructure to expand electricity access for up to 200 million people. ADB officials said the bank would use its role as a regional convener to bring together governments, regulators, and private investors to overcome barriers that often slow regional infrastructure projects. The bank pointed to earlier success stories, including the Bangladesh-India power grid interconnection and the Monsoon Wind Power Project in Laos, as examples of cross-border cooperation supported through blended finance mechanisms. [caption id="attachment_37211" align="aligncenter" width="1536"]
Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption]
Climate and Food Security Concerns
Climate and environmental financing also featured prominently during the Samarkand meetings. On May 5, the ADB announced that the German government had joined the bank’s Nature Solutions Finance Hub with €5.5 million ($6.5 million) in grant co-financing, some of which has been earmarked for sorely needed watershed rehabilitation in Uzbekistan.
The discussions also reflected growing concern over global food security and supply chain vulnerabilities linked to the ongoing war in Iran.
Qingfeng Zhang, Senior Director of ADB’s Agriculture, Food, Nature, and Rural Development Sector Office, warned that disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz were increasing the cost of everything from energy to insurance, freight to fertilizer – placing additional pressure on food systems across Asia and the Pacific, including Central Asia.
Unlike the shock caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which directly disrupted grain and fertilizer exports, Zhang said the current crisis was affecting agriculture primarily through higher operating and transportation costs.
The Strait of Hormuz handles roughly one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade and around one-third of fertilizer exports. Rising costs, Zhang said, are already affecting farmers’ planting decisions across the region.
Uzbekistan's Role
In his address to participants, the host, Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, took the opportunity to reel off a series of figures trumpeting Uzbekistan's economic success story of recent years. The president claimed the country had attracted $150 billion in foreign investment, tripled exports of goods and services, and expanded the size of the economy from $50 billion to $147 billion since he took power in 2016.
While many of these statements were factually incorrect or overblown – the last time Uzbekistan's GDP was as low as $50 billion was in 2010 – Mirziyoyev was right about the country's positive direction. He added that Uzbekistan aims to expand its economy to more than $240 billion by 2030, fully eliminate poverty, and transition toward innovation-driven growth.
The ADB has taken note and become one of Uzbekistan’s largest development partners, with the joint portfolio of completed and ongoing projects approaching $16 billion.
A new addition to that portfolio will be the 300-megawatt Bash 2 Wind Power Project in Uzbekistan’s Bukhara Region. The ADB signed a $116 million financing package with ACWA Power to support the construction of 39 wind turbines with capacities of up to eight megawatts each, whilst connecting them to the national grid.
The financing package includes $50 million from ADB’s ordinary capital resources, as well as money from commercial leaders and infrastructure investment funds.
Uzbek journalist and Doctor of Science Beruniy Alimov said the new cooperation priorities between Uzbekistan and ADB reflected the country’s ambition to become a more open and innovation-oriented economy integrated into global markets.
The bank’s next Annual Meeting will take place in Nagoya, Japan, from May 2-5, 2027, coinciding with the institution’s 60th anniversary.
No Tanks on Red Square as Moscow’s Victory Day Pull Fades in Central Asia
Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9 is set to be more restrained this year, with tanks, armored vehicles, and missile systems absent from Red Square for the first time in nearly two decades. The Russian Defense Ministry cited the “current operational situation,” while the Kremlin blamed what it called Ukrainian “terrorist activity.” Russia also reported drone attacks aimed at Moscow in the days before the ceremony, and security around President Vladimir Putin has been tightened. The reduced scale of the parade carries a resonance beyond Russia. Victory Day remains one of the most emotionally charged dates in the post-Soviet calendar, including in Central Asia, where families still remember relatives who fought, died, or labored during World War II. But across the region, the holiday has increasingly been placed inside national calendars rather than left as part of Russia’s political script. The contrast with last year is sharp. In 2025, Moscow marked the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat with its largest Victory Day parade since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Chinese troops marched on Red Square, Xi Jinping sat beside Putin, and foreign leaders attended from across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet space. Tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, drones, and other military hardware rolled through the square. This year’s guest list is more limited. The Kremlin’s initial list of foreign delegations included leaders and senior figures from Belarus, Laos, Malaysia, Slovakia, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. Attendance has also been hard to read. Earlier reports said Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov were expected in Moscow, while the Kremlin’s initial published list of foreign guests did not include any Central Asian presidents. On May 8, however, Kazakh and Uzbek media reported that Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev were traveling to Moscow for Victory Day events. The late confirmations complicate the picture, but they do not restore the full regional show of unity seen in the last two years, when all five Central Asian presidents were present at the Moscow parade. It does suggest, however, that Moscow’s political ownership of the date is less automatic than it once was. Victory Day, which commemorates the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in what Russia calls the Great Patriotic War, has long been one of the main rituals of modern Russian power. It draws large television audiences, fills public space with military symbolism, and presents the Kremlin as the guardian of a sacred national memory. The holiday speaks of sacrifice and family loss, but also of nationalism and state control over history. Putin has used that language repeatedly. On May 9, 2024, after appearing on Red Square in snowfall, he said Russia was going through a “difficult, milestone period,” and warned: “We will not allow anyone to threaten us. Our strategic forces are always in combat readiness.” In 2025, he used the 80th anniversary parade to link Soviet wartime memory to Russia’s current war, saying that “truth and justice” were on Moscow’s side. In Central Asia, the Soviet past has been handled more cautiously. Streets have been renamed, statues have been moved, and monuments to Soviet leaders have often lost their central place. In Kazakhstan, Lenin statues still exist, especially in regions with large ethnic Russian populations, but their number has fallen sharply since independence. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that, as of 2017, 159 Lenin statues remained in Kazakhstan, while 341 had been demolished since the fall of the Soviet Union. The debate has continued elsewhere in the region: in 2025, the removal of a 23-meter-tall Lenin monument in Osh, once the tallest in Central Asia, prompted public discussion in Kyrgyzstan and criticism from Russian media. In Russia, the movement has often run in the opposite direction. In Volgograd, formerly Stalingrad, a new bust of Josef Stalin was unveiled in 2023 ahead of the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. In Moscow, a recreated Stalin monument returned to the Taganskaya metro station in 2025. These gestures do not simply restore old symbols. They place Stalin back inside a state-approved story of wartime victory, strength, and sacrifice, while keeping the terror of his rule in the background. The legal framework has moved in the same direction. Russia’s 2020 constitutional amendments state that the Russian Federation honors the memory of defenders of the Fatherland and protects historical truth. They also state that diminishing the significance of the people’s heroism in defending the Fatherland is not permitted, giving the state a constitutional basis for policing how World War II and Soviet victory are discussed. That message depends on a selective version of the past. The clearest example is the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. The public agreement was a nonaggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, while its secret protocol divided parts of Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence and paved the way for the partition of Poland. The Soviet Union denied the secret protocol for decades and acknowledged it only during glasnost, when the Congress of People’s Deputies condemned the pact in 1989. This history sits uneasily beside the official mythology of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Union suffered catastrophic losses after Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. Around 27 million Soviet citizens died in the war. The Red Army’s role in defeating Nazi Germany was immense. But the years between 1939 and 1941 complicate the clean story of victimhood and liberation that the Kremlin now prefers to tell. Other chapters also disturb the narrative. Soviet repression did not pause for wartime memory. The NKVD enforced brutal discipline, deportations scarred entire peoples, and Soviet prisoners of war who survived German captivity often faced suspicion on return. Some Soviet citizens collaborated with Nazi Germany, while others fought in the Red Army, served in partisan units, or worked to exhaustion behind the front. The history was never as simple as the parade version suggests. Central Asia knows this complexity well. Men from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan fought and died in the Red Army. Families across the region still keep photographs, medals, and stories from the war. Victory Day, therefore, retains real emotional force. But these independent states have spent more than three decades placing that memory inside their own state narratives. Kazakhstan still marks May 9 as Victory Day, but large military parades are not the center of the commemoration. Uzbekistan has recast the date as the Day of Remembrance and Honor. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Victory Day remains visible, but it sits alongside post-Soviet state holidays and domestic memory. Turkmenistan observes the date within a calendar dominated by neutrality, independence, and national cultural symbols. Across the region, Soviet victory is preserved, but it is increasingly being separated from Moscow’s claim to speak for the whole post-Soviet past. That is why this year’s Moscow parade carries more than ceremonial interest. For years, Red Square projected the idea of Russian strength, continuity, and command over the post-Soviet memory of World War II. In 2026, the absence of armored vehicles and missile systems will project caution. The Kremlin will still have flags, speeches, uniforms, and flyovers, but the missing hardware will be hard to ignore. A parade without tanks does not end the ritual. It exposes its strain. Putin can still speak about victory, sacrifice, and historical truth, and he can still present Russia’s war in Ukraine as a continuation of an older struggle. But Victory Day will arrive this year with no victory in sight, and with some of the symbols of power that once filled Red Square kept away from the square itself.
Syrian Security Forces Detain Uzbek Fighters During Operation in Idlib
Syrian security forces have detained a group of Uzbek fighters during a security operation in the country’s northwest, according to two Syrian security officials cited by Reuters. The arrests followed unrest in Idlib province after the authorities attempted to detain an Uzbek militant accused of opening fire in Idlib city. According to Reuters, the incident escalated when armed Uzbek fighters gathered outside a government security facility demanding the release of the suspect. The protests later triggered a broader security sweep in several parts of the countryside, including the towns of Kafriya and al-Foua. Locals and Syrian officials said security forces deployed military convoys and reinforcements to the area, where sporadic gunfire was heard during the operation. It remains unclear how many Uzbek fighters were detained. The Syrian Interior Ministry did not immediately comment on the reports. The latest incident highlights ongoing tensions between Syria’s Islamist-led authorities and foreign militants who traveled to the country during the civil war that began in 2011. Many foreign fighters, including Uzbeks, fought alongside factions linked to current Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa before he formally severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2016. Reuters previously reported, citing a Syrian security source, that around 1,500 Uzbek fighters were believed to be living in Syria, some accompanied by their families. The Syrian government has attempted to integrate thousands of foreign fighters into the country’s newly reorganized military structures following the December 2024 ouster of former President Bashar al-Assad. Some foreign militants have assumed senior state roles, including a Jordanian commander of the Republican Guard and an Australian head of a newly established sovereign fund. Others, however, have resisted joining state institutions, creating continuing security concerns for Damascus. The recent operation marks the second major confrontation in Idlib involving foreign militants in recent months. Last year, Syrian government raids targeting foreign fighters near the Turkish border drew in Uzbek militants after clashes erupted around a compound linked to French jihadist Omar Diaby, also known as Omar Omsen. At the time, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War said Syrian transitional authorities were conducting “a low-level effort to target foreign fighters in Syria who have not integrated into the Ministry of Defense.” The institute reported that Uzbek militants had deployed to reinforce foreign fighters during clashes in Harem, a city near the Turkish border. The same report stated that Syrian authorities had arrested two prominent Uzbek foreign fighters in August 2025, contributing to growing dissatisfaction among Central Asian militant groups operating in Syria.
Uzbekistan’s Gas Output Falls by 15% as Imports Rise
Uzbekistan’s natural gas production fell by 15% in the first quarter of 2026, adding pressure to an energy system already strained by rising demand, aging infrastructure, and lower hydrocarbon output. The country produced 9.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas in January-March, down from 11.3 billion in the same period last year. The figures are based on data from Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee, which also listed declines in oil, coal, and gas condensate production. Oil output fell to 157,300 tons in the first quarter, compared with 160,800 tons in the same period last year. Coal production declined from 1.2 million tons to 1.1 million tons, while gas condensate output fell even more sharply, dropping from 296,600 tons to 242,300 tons. Motor gasoline production rose to 313,200 tons, while diesel output increased to 280,900 tons. The latest data reflect a longer shift in Uzbekistan’s energy balance. Uzbekistan was long a net gas exporter, supported by large Soviet-era fields, a broad domestic gas network, and access to the Central Asia-China pipeline system. That position has weakened as older fields have declined and domestic use has grown. Uzbekistan now has to cover demand from households, power plants, industry, and transport while trying to modernize the sector. That task is getting harder. The country’s permanent population reached 38.2 million people as of January 1, 2026, according to official statistics, leading to more strain on the grid. Imports have risen sharply to meet these needs. Uzbekistan spent $360.5 million on natural gas imports in the first quarter of 2026, a 2.2-fold increase from the same period last year. Meanwhile, gas export revenues fell to $36.7 million, down from $94.3 million a year earlier. That shift has regional weight. Uzbekistan imports gas from Russia and Turkmenistan. Russian gas reaches Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan, using a Soviet-era pipeline route that once moved gas in the opposite direction. Uzbekistan began receiving Russian gas in 2023, as Moscow sought new markets after losing much of its European gas business. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russian gas exports to Uzbekistan rose by about 30% in 2025, reaching more than 7 billion cubic meters through the Central Asia-Center pipeline system. Tashkent and Moscow have since discussed larger energy supplies. In April, Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin agreed to increase deliveries of Russian oil and gas to Uzbekistan. The talks also covered wider cooperation in energy, industry, transport, and agriculture. More imports can help Uzbekistan avoid shortages, especially in winter, while supporting power generation and reducing pressure on households. But they also bring new costs, with higher imports weighing on the trade balance and increasing reliance on outside suppliers. That is a sensitive issue for a country trying to expand its domestic industry and keep energy prices stable. The government is trying to slow the production decline. Uzbekneftegaz has said that exploration work added 2 billion cubic meters of gas reserves and 40,000 tons of liquid hydrocarbon reserves in the first quarter. The company plans to drill and commission 22 new wells in the second quarter and repair 31 existing wells, according to reporting by Kun.uz. Those steps may help stabilize supply, but they do not address the wider problem. New wells can offset part of the decline from older fields, and repairs can raise daily output, but the national trend still points downward, and the system needs heavy investment in production, storage, pipelines, and distribution. Aging infrastructure is another pressure point. In March, the World Bank approved support for gas network improvements in Uzbekistan, stating that the country’s gas infrastructure had deteriorated because of underinvestment in maintenance and repairs. Without upgrades, gas losses could reach 1.75 billion cubic meters by 2030, cutting revenue by $228 million. Network repairs are less visible than new power plants, but they can free up large volumes of gas without new extraction. Tashkent is also trying to reduce the role of gas in electricity generation. The government has moved quickly on solar, wind, hydropower, battery storage, and grid projects. TCA previously reported on Uzbekistan’s wider renewable-energy buildout, including green-energy output reaching 9 billion kilowatt-hours in 2025. In December 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev launched and commissioned a new package of energy facilities. The presidential website said the facilities would generate 15 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity a year once fully operational and reduce natural gas consumption by nearly 7 billion cubic meters. The package included ten energy-storage systems with a total capacity of 1,245 megawatts. Batteries can store power from solar and wind plants, then release it when demand rises, reducing the need for gas-fired backup generation at peak hours. Uzbekistan’s clean-energy targets are also tied to lower gas use. Its third nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement says renewable energy capacity should exceed 50% of total generation capacity by 2030. It also projects that natural gas consumption could fall by 30.26 billion cubic meters in 2030. Those targets are ambitious, particularly given that demand is rising. Uzbekistan wants faster industrial growth, more domestic processing, and higher living standards. That means more factories, housing, cooling, heating, transport, and digital infrastructure. New renewable capacity may be needed to meet extra demand before gas use can be sharply reduced. The gas figures from the first quarter show why the timetable is tightening. Uzbekistan is moving quickly on renewable energy, but gas still anchors the country’s power system, heating network, and industrial base. The next test will come before winter. If production keeps falling through 2026, Tashkent will need more imports, faster repairs, lower export volumes, or swifter savings from new energy projects. Each option carries a cost, and none offers a quick fix. Uzbekistan’s energy strategy now rests on four linked tasks: slowing the fall in gas output, reducing waste in old infrastructure, managing imports, and bringing new power capacity online. The first-quarter numbers show that there is little room for delay.
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