Khiva Readies for Melon Festival: A Celebration of Heritage and Harvest
Khiva, the ancient Silk Road city in Uzbekistan’s Khorezm region, will host the traditional Melon Festival, or “Qovun sayli,” from August 8–10. The celebration will be held across the historic Itchan-Kala complex and the Arda Khiva cultural space.
Organized by the State Tourism Committee and the Khorezm khokimiyat (local government), the festival promotes regional identity and agritourism by highlighting Khorezm’s famed melons. Farmers from across the region will exhibit scores of different melon varieties — around 125 types were showcased last year — in pavilions decorated with traditional designs.
More than a fruit fair, the festival offers puppet shows, folk music, national costume displays, and culinary exhibitions, including Khorezm bread and other regional dishes. Artisans will host workshops on handicrafts such as silk weaving and pottery, giving visitors hands-on exposure to Uzbek heritage and traditions. Evening gala concerts featuring local and international performers will take place on August 8–9 in the Itchan-Kala and conclude on August 10 in Arda Khiva.
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Qovun sayli will also have a competitive edge, with awards sponsored by the regional khokimiyat and private sponsors recognizing standout agronomists, artisans, and performers.
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Melons occupy a special place in Uzbek tradition. Over 150 varieties are grown nationwide, many prized for their sweetness and storied past. In Khorezm, melons are more than food — they are cultural icons. Ancient Uzbek kingdoms would send the fruit as gifts by camel caravan to Baghdad, and to the Russian tsars and Mughal emperors. Writing in 1876, British colonel and explorer Frederick Burnaby noted that the “taste was so delicious that anyone only accustomed to this fruit in Europe would scarcely recognize its relationship with the delicate and highly perfumed melons of Khiva.”
The festival has become a cornerstone of Khiva’s cultural calendar, attracting approximately 30,000 foreign and 400,000 domestic visitors in 2024 alone. Tourism officials view Qovun sayli as essential to boosting regional visibility and economic growth, with Khiva’s festivals, including the Lazgi International Dance Festival, a key part of Uzbekistan’s broader push to spotlight cultural tourism.
The Turkic States Are Quietly Building a Geoeconomic Power Base
The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) has spent the past years assembling itself not through declarations or summit communiqués, but through shared transport and logistics, harmonized customs procedures, and coordinated capital flows. What began in 2009 as the Turkic Council, a lightly institutional and rhetorically cohesive forum for shared identity, has evolved, following its 2021 transformation into the OTS, into a logistical and regulatory organism. Its under-the-radar evolution has been systematized through agreed documents, deployed capital, and materialized infrastructure. The OTS has entered a phase of procedural coordination and structural intent. Its cooperation is now practical, strategic, and functionally embedded. This evolution has not followed a single arc, nor has it merely responded to outside pressures. Instead, it has progressed through an uneven sequence of internal adjustments, sometimes slow and technical, sometimes accelerated by external jolts such as the recent disruption in Azerbaijani–Russian relations. But such jolts only intensified a trajectory already underway. Member states had been converging long before this most recent bilateral crisis by aligning their policies, testing instruments, and developing the practical grammar of multilateral coordination. The current phase of renewed cooperation is not a reactive surge but a prepared transition that expresses an underlying structural shift in Eurasian geoeconomics at large. Digital Infrastructure and Networked Cooperation If there is a single domain where institutional convergence becomes immediately visible, this would be digital logistics. Once-fractured national processes — disjointed customs systems, mismatched permits, bureaucratic duplication — have begun to fold into a shared administrative architecture (including eTIR, eCMR, and ePermit) structured by international conventions that have been adapted to fit the particular alignments now emerging in the Turkic sphere. These procedures are no longer pilot projects but live systems. They digitize paperwork, synchronize border procedures, and build the kind of operational rhythms that trade corridors need in order to function. Negotiations continue, meanwhile, on a Free Trade in Services Agreement, targeted not at deregulation but at harmonization, viz., the alignment of technical and professional standards across a disparate set of economies. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, for example, are already piloting a Simplified Customs Corridor. Its eventual integration with the multimodal Uzbekistan–Türkiye axis is not a matter of if, but of how soon. Official observer states to the OTS are also beginning to move, with Hungary being the clearest case. Its $100 million injection into the Turkic Investment Fund made headlines, but the real story is downstream: Hungarian infrastructure now receives Azerbaijani gas via Türkiye. That is not diplomacy; that is energy dependence, structurally routed. Turkmenistan, long the holdout, has started to engage, first through planning meetings and now through signed agreements. Its ports, once idle in regional plans, are being fitted into the wider Caspian logistics network. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), formally recognized only by Türkiye, is also a functional participant through educational exchanges, shared language, and soft institutions. Reciprocal Trade and Development The shift underway is as much geographic as it is institutional. Central Asia is no longer on the margins of the OTS project but is becoming its frame, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan leading the transition. In 2023, bilateral trade between the two passed the $5 billion mark. Both sides expect to double that by 2028. Trade figures, however, are not the point; rather, the point is what lies beneath them: aligned tariffs, a joint investment fund already over $250 million, and operational industrial zones in Shymkent and Tashkent that bind the two economies together at the level of physical plant and labor mobility. Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have taken it further. Together, they have launched a $500 million fund to back joint hard-asset infrastructure, including a logistics center in Samarkand and a proposed petrochemical plant in Navoi. Kyrgyzstan has taken another route. It is not the largest actor, but it has served as a testbed for customs reforms, digital permitting, and early eCMR adoption. Its reward has been a 60% rise in trade with OTS members. Turkmenistan, once detached, is now offering unused port capacity and quietly participating in feasibility studies for the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. Türkiye, for its part, remains everywhere. In 2023, Turkish firms signed contracts exceeding $2.2 billion across Central Asia, covering construction, textiles, and light manufacturing. These are labor-absorbing sectors that embed Turkish capital still more deeply in the region’s employment ecosystems, not to mention its social-stability calculus. What is consolidating itself in this space is not a bloc or an alliance, but a logistical and institutional meshwork, emerging from administrative coordination, co-located infrastructure, and other commitments. Energy Coordination and Financial Convergence Energy came first, and it remains the deepest stratum. Before the OTS had a name, Azerbaijani gas was already flowing west. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP, from its Turkish initials) carries into Türkiye for domestic consumption as well as for re-export into the European grid. Now, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are exploring new routes, new off-takes, and new roles in the energy economy of the region. Azerbaijan is coordinating with them to enter the electricity export sector through feasibility studies for a submarine cable to Europe. Finance has begun to crystallize. The Turkic Investment Fund, launched in 2023 with $1 billion in starting capital, is small by global standards but structurally bold. It is not a grant mechanism; rather, it co-finances hard infrastructure and cross-border enterprise. Projects under consideration range from a green hydrogen facility in Uzbekistan to a logistics terminal in western Kazakhstan. A Council of Central Banks is under design with the policy goal of harmonizing currency regimes and macro-prudential rules across the region. Hungary, still nominally an observer, is adjusting its fintech regulations to stay in sync. Banks in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have begun partnerships with Turkish and Azerbaijani institutions. This evolution should not be misconceived as a financial bloc; it is becoming a zone of interoperable monetary systems, wiring a regional financial nervous system into place, segment by segment. Human Capital and Functional Differentiation Beyond the infrastructure, the joint ventures, and the funding, something slower but more decisive is happening. The capacity to sustain these projects is also being developed: human capital, vocational integration, and institutional depth. Over two million small and medium enterprises across the region are now in touch with the Union of Turkic Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), which links them to a platform providing legal services, licensing support, and training across national lines. The TOBB acts as an umbrella organization for local and national chambers of commerce, industry, and commodity exchanges, with the intention of reinforcing the private sector’s unity and solidarity, professional discipline, and ethical business practices. Education is adapting in parallel. Universities in Türkiye, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are collaborating on scholarship programs — not just in theory, but in applied fields: law, logistics, engineering. In Kazakhstan, the Turan Special Economic Zone (SEZ) has fused technical training with economic function. Customs officers, project managers, logistics coordinators — are being trained where the work happens. Uzbekistan is building out the same model. Across this network, roles are beginning to settle. Türkiye still leads in construction and defense. Azerbaijan holds the energy core and manages logistical throughput. Kazakhstan is increasingly the financial and infrastructural organizer. Uzbekistan is assembling industrial capacity. Kyrgyzstan is serving as a laboratory for digital services. Turkmenistan keeps its traditional position in hydrocarbons. Hungary provides the bridge to EU regulatory terrain. The TRNC contributes through its universities. This composite is what late 19th-century sociologists called the “division of labor” and what mid-20th-century political scientists called “functional differentiation”. From Adjacency to Centrality The OTS is not a single system, but it is also no longer a rhetorical idea. Its coherence is being produced in situ, not by design but through friction and iteration. Once institutional structures reach this level of entanglement, what holds them together is no longer aspiration but interdependence. What binds this system together is not any uniformity, but rather the very friction that has settled into structure. Across sectors and states, the OTS is producing coordination without centralization, alignment without hierarchy. Its coherence is not yet formal, but it is already operational. The region is ceasing to be “adjacent” to other regions; it is asserting its own “centrality” through autonomous integration and external networking.
UN Rules Gulnara Karimova’s Arrest Was Unlawful and Arbitrary
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has determined that the 2014 arrest of Gulnara Karimova, daughter of Uzbekistan’s late President Islam Karimov, was both unlawful and arbitrary. The finding was published in a recent report on the website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Working Group reviewed the case under its standard communications procedure following a petition submitted in late 2024. According to the report, Karimova was detained in February 2014 without a warrant and held under varying conditions, including 18 months of house arrest alongside her child. Her first judicial appearance occurred only on August 21, 2015, reportedly in a hearing conducted in her kitchen. During this period, she was denied a genuine opportunity to contest her detention or understand the charges brought against her. The UN body concluded that Uzbekistan violated several provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the rights to prompt judicial review, to be informed of the charges, and to access legal counsel. International and Domestic Legal Violations Parallel to domestic proceedings, legal action in a third country led to convictions of several co-defendants for laundering over $600 million through companies connected to Karimova. Although her legal team contested asset forfeitures abroad, Karimova has alleged that Uzbek authorities pressured her lawyers to withdraw their motions. The Working Group has called on the Uzbek government to provide Karimova with reparations, including financial compensation, and to conduct a “full and independent investigation” into her arbitrary detention. It also urged accountability for those responsible. The UN panel initially requested the government’s response by February 24, 2025. However, Uzbekistan submitted its response one day late, rendering it procedurally invalid. As a result, the Group issued its opinion based solely on the information available.
Both the Uzbek government and the petitioner have been requested to submit updates within six months. These should address whether compensation has been provided, whether an investigation has been conducted, and whether any legal reforms have been implemented in response to the ruling.
The decision strengthens the UN’s ongoing calls for Uzbekistan to bring its judicial practices in line with international human rights standards, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Asset Recovery Agreement with Switzerland In a related development, Uzbekistan and Switzerland signed an agreement in February 2025 to return approximately $182 million in assets confiscated from Karimova. The funds had been frozen by Swiss prosecutors in 2012 as part of a wide-ranging corruption investigation. Under the agreement, the funds will be transferred to Uzbekistan through the UN-administered Uzbekistan Vision 2030 Fund. This follows an earlier accord in August 2022 to return $131 million, bringing the total amount of repatriated assets to $313 million. The case of Gulnara Karimova continues to draw comparisons to that of Dariga Nazarbayeva, the eldest daughter of former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. While Karimova faced prosecution and widespread asset seizures, Nazarbayeva retained her political influence and substantial wealth.
Uzbekistan and China Deepen Ties Across Strategic, Economic, and Soft-Power Fronts
Uzbekistan and China have significantly expanded their bilateral relationship in the last month. The meeting between Presidents Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Xi Jinping on June 17, 2025, in Astana, during the second China–Central Asia Summit, formally endorsed what both states termed a “multi-dimensional strategic partnership.” The occasion marked the conclusion of bilateral negotiations on Uzbekistan's accession to the World Trade Organization. This membership is both procedural and symbolic, as it signals Uzbekistan's intensifying participation in global economic architecture. In particular, it serves to legitimize the country's market-opening reforms in the eyes of international partners. Strategic Dialogue and the Evolution of Political Ties The June 2025 summit meeting built upon groundwork laid during Mirziyoyev's January 2024 state visit to China, when a suite of agreements were reached that catalyzed the creation of a Strategic Dialogue between the two countries' foreign ministries. A year later, in January 2025, this was formally upgraded to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership”. This phrase signifies that the dialogue was acquiring operational substance in the form of diversified sectoral initiatives spanning infrastructure, innovation, security, and energy. For Uzbekistan, this initiative marks a sustained effort to define itself not only as a recipient of foreign capital but as a co-architect of regionally significant configurations. Trade and investment data point to a structurally intensifying relationship. Bilateral trade stood at $14 billion in 2024, up from $13 billion the previous year, with both sides aiming for $20 billion in the near term. As of February 2025, 3,467 Chinese firms were active in Uzbekistan, an increase of over 1,000 from the prior year. However, the $9.8 billion trade deficit in China's favor remains politically sensitive, highlighting asymmetries even as cooperation deepens. Sectoral Investment and Institutional Coordination A joint investment portfolio exceeding $60 billion undergirds this integration. Key projects include special economic zones, technoparks, and localized production of BYD electric vehicles. The sectoral spread extends to renewable energy, mining, logistics, metallurgy, pharmaceuticals, and smart agriculture. Financial institutions such as the Silk Road Fund and China Eximbank are underwriting emblematic initiatives, including the Olympic Village in Tashkent. On June 28, 2025, Uzbekistan's Deputy Minister of Investments, Industry and Trade met with Chinese leather industry representatives to coordinate manufacturing projects in Andijan and Ohangaron. These dynamics were further institutionalized at the Uzbekistan–China Interregional Forum held June 1–2, 2025, in Samarkand, where Uzbekistan's Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev emphasized that Chinese investment has increased fivefold since 2017. Although this was technically a regional event, it reinforced — as a public-facing moment of alignment between central planning and international economic engagement — a national-level policy architecture receptive to external capital, particularly from China. Infrastructure and Energy At the infrastructural core of bilateral cooperation stands the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. Both presidents re-emphasized the project's strategic relevance, identifying it as essential to transcontinental logistical continuity from East Asia to Europe. The project has not only economic but also geopolitical significance, situating Uzbekistan as a connective node rather than a peripheral conduit. If completed on time, it may also reduce Uzbekistan's dependency on northern or western transit corridors. Uzbekistan’s natural gas exports to China saw a substantial increase of over 60% year-on-year in the first five months of 2025. According to official data from Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee, gas exports to China reached $288 million between January and May 2025. Interestingly, physical volumes have not been officially reported or unofficially hinted at. Based on typical regional prices, however, a reasonable estimate of quantities would be 1.0–1.5 billion cubic meters (bcm), or an annual rate of 2.4–3.6 bcm. This development reinforces the dual commercial and energy linkages that increasingly characterize the bilateral channel. China’s expanding role in Uzbekistan’s energy sector now also includes a strategic shift toward green infrastructure and technological modernization. Since 2023, Chinese state and private enterprises have committed to over 5,000 megawatts (MW) of new solar and wind capacity in Uzbekistan, including flagship facilities in Andijan, Karakalpakstan, and Jizzakh. Uzbekistan’s Atomic Energy Agency is also in exploratory talks with China National Nuclear Corporation to deploy small modular reactors and expand uranium production, signaling a long-term alignment on low-carbon energy strategies. Human Mobility and Soft-Power Engagement Effective June 1, 2025, a mutual 30-day visa-free regime was implemented for citizens of both countries. Announced by Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Bakhtiyor Saidov, the policy aims to facilitate not just tourism and business but also people-to-people connectivity. The agreement is expected to normalize short-term mobility for professionals, students, and cultural figures. In this connection, Beijing has established a branch of Northwest Agricultural and Forestry University and the International Mathematics Center with Peking University in Uzbekistan. Public sentiment within Uzbekistan remains, nevertheless, cautious. A mid-June 2025 incident in which a local official appeared to suggest farmland transfers to Chinese investors ignited controversy. The Ministry of Agriculture swiftly denied any such transactions, but the viral video triggered a broader reaction over land sovereignty and, by extension, economic dependency. These concerns are not new but have gained visibility as China's economic footprint expands. Tashkent has sought to manage public discourse with narratives emphasizing national benefit and regulatory oversight, all while denying the reports. While elite consensus remains favorable toward Chinese investment, societal perception introduces an enduring constraint, shaping how far and how fast integration can proceed without risking political backlash. Beyond trade and infrastructure, the relationship is being expanded to issue areas of human and social development. The two governments have pledged cooperation on poverty reduction initiatives, aligning with Uzbekistan’s domestic policy agenda. Coordination in smart agriculture, logistics, and green energy development has also been framed as a long-term platform for mutual benefit. Whether such diversification will insulate the relationship from any geopolitical shocks remains uncertain, but the effort to institutionalize its breadth is evident. Balancing Growth and Sensitivities Uzbekistan and China have consolidated a high-density bilateral relationship, combining formal diplomatic upgrades with tangible projects and policy coordination. The July 2025 milestone of mutual visa liberalization and expanding logistical access serves as both a signal and substance of this convergence. However, structural asymmetries and public sensitivities temper the otherwise smooth trajectory. The Uzbek government must now navigate between the material benefits of Chinese capital and the symbolic costs perceived domestically. Going forward, the pace of implementation, particularly of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, and the durability of public consent will serve as bellwethers for the sustainability of this accelerated bilateralism. Much will hinge on whether economic gains are sufficiently distributed to justify the strategic momentum.
#SaveChorvoq: Experts and Bloggers Demand Answers on Sea Breeze Uzbekistan Project
The Times of Central Asia earlier reported that Azerbaijani businessman Emin Agalarov plans to build “Sea Breeze Uzbekistan,” a huge tourist complex on the shores of the Charvak (Chorvoq) reservoir. The center will cover 500–700 hectares and include hotels, cottages, pools, sports areas, shops, restaurants, and a bridge connecting both sides of the reservoir. It will also host festivals, concerts, and cultural events. News of this project has sparked a strong public reaction. Many people wonder why such a big plan was made without any open discussion. The project is discussed under the hashtag #SaveChorvoq, which many use to call for action. The idea first appeared in December when Agalarov presented it to President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. In April, the president reviewed the master plan. Since then, social media has been full of debates about the environmental risks and possible water shortages. An Instagram video by environmental blogger Urikguli (Mutabar Khushvaqtova) gathered opinions from experts and influencers about how Sea Breeze Uzbekistan might affect Charvak’s water balance. Temur Ahmedov, a sustainable construction specialist, said: “Tashkent has 3.5 million people, and New Tashkent is being built too. Where will all that water come from? If Charvak’s balance is broken, we have a big problem.” Dr Yulduzkhon Abdullaeva, a doctor of natural sciences, warned: “First, biodiversity will suffer. Charvak reservoir and its surroundings house rare plants and animals. A lot of materials must be brought in that way. Because we don’t have waterways, transport will use roads, which can pollute the air. Pools and fountains will need water from Charvak, which may disturb its hydrological balance. An environmental impact assessment is necessary. The results must be made public. If the assessment is negative, the project should be cancelled. That’s why public involvement is very important.” Abdullaeva also noted: “Rare plants grow near the reservoir, and animals live there. Pools and fountains will use Charvak water, which could upset its balance. A project evaluation must be done, and if bad, construction should be stopped.” Urban planner Iskandar Soliyev expressed doubts about the developer’s promises. “I think building such a large project around the reservoir is a mistake. Even Agalarov says in his videos that first we will install water-cleaning devices, then start construction. But we know those promises are often broken. That is the main worry.” Urikguli stressed: “If errors happen or water is polluted at Charvak, we could lose our only source of drinking water. That is why a thorough environmental check and transparency are essential.” Alisher Khudoyberdiev, a hydrometeorology researcher, pointed out that motorboats could pollute the water and harm both drinking supplies and farmland. Blogger Samandar Nizomov questioned the idea of a VIP zone. “Why let the rich go in and make the poor watch from afar? Charvak is not a sea or an ocean. I don’t want to drink water with impurities.” His view echoed that of Umida Odilova: “Our reservoir is our drinking water source—for us and our children. There’s already too much building in the city. Only the mountains have clean air.” The Times of Central Asia asked Urikguli whether the Ministry of Ecology or other officials had responded to the study of these concerns. She informed that Rasul Kusherbayev, advisor to the Minister of Ecology, expressed his opinion on this matter. “I am against any construction near Charvak reservoir. Not only Sea Breeze but also hotels or recreation areas, even boat rides—I reject them fully. The more we protect Charvak, the more we will thrive. If we pollute it, we force future generations to abandon this place. The Ministry of Ecology is now reviewing this matter. We don’t have full documents yet. The Ministry has publicly opposed motorboats on the reservoir since last year. Our response will reflect this position,” said Kusherbayev. The Times of Central Asia also emailed Agalarov Development to request details about the environmental side of the Sea Breeze Uzbekistan project. In our message, we asked: Did you carry out any environmental assessments or consult local ecological experts before proposing the project? How do you respond to concerns from environmental activists and bloggers about risks and the lack of public discussion? So far, Agalarov Development has not replied to our request. With so many voices calling for caution, it is clear that people want to protect Charvak’s unique ecosystem. The debate shows the need for careful planning, open dialogue, and strong environmental safeguards before building such a large project near this vital water source.
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan Forge $1B Trade Vision
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan arrived in Baku on July 2 for a state visit at the invitation of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. He was received at the airport by Deputy Prime Minister Yagub Eyyubov and other senior officials, with an official reception taking place at the presidential residence in Zagulba. A Thirty-Year Economic Partnership During bilateral talks, Presidents Mirziyoyev and Aliyev reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing the strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan as the two nations mark 30 years of diplomatic ties. “Never in history have our relations been at such a high level as they are today,” said Mirziyoyev. Economic cooperation was a key focus of the discussions. Trade between the two countries has increased by 25% over the past year, and there are now approximately 300 joint ventures with a combined project portfolio valued at $4 billion. The leaders agreed to a new goal of boosting bilateral trade and investment to $1 billion annually by 2030. A comprehensive cooperation program was adopted to facilitate this, covering sectors such as industry, infrastructure, agriculture, healthcare, tourism, and banking. Advancing Transport and Logistics Links Significant progress was reported in the transport and energy sectors. The two presidents welcomed the growth of cargo transit along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the “Middle Corridor.” Uzbek cargo volumes on the route rose by 25% in 2024, surpassing one million tons, a development supported by the launch of a new electronic permit system in March. The leaders also committed to accelerating work on a joint green energy export initiative targeting European markets. Institutionalizing Strategic Ties Several bilateral documents were signed to formalize cooperation. These included a roadmap for implementing the 2023 Treaty on Alliance Relations through 2029, as well as agreements in environmental protection, science, higher education, and industry for the 2025-2026 period. Additional deals addressed agriculture, food security, social protection, maritime navigation, and municipal partnerships. New sister-city agreements were signed between Tashkent and Sumgayit, and between Navoi and Gabala. At a joint press briefing, Mirziyoyev lauded Azerbaijan’s efforts to restore its UN-recognized territorial integrity, stating, “You have fulfilled the long-standing dream of your father and every citizen of Azerbaijan.” He also praised infrastructure development in formerly disputed territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and described Azerbaijan as a “reliable ally and strategic partner.” The two leaders emphasized their shared positions on regional and global issues and pledged continued coordination in international forums. Mirziyoyev reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s commitment to the diplomatic resolution of conflicts. Cultural Diplomacy and Symbolism The visit featured symbolic and cultural highlights. In Baku’s Ag Sheher district, the presidents laid the foundation for Uzbekistan Park, a 4.5-hectare space celebrating Uzbek culture and architecture. They also inaugurated Uzbekistan’s new embassy in Baku, which includes halls named after different Uzbek regions, with Mirziyoyev proposing to name one of the halls after Karabakh as a gesture of friendship. The two leaders later toured the Sea Breeze resort complex on the Caspian coast, part of the broader Caspian Riviera tourism project. A similar development, Sea Breeze Uzbekistan, is being considered near Tashkent by private investors. On July 3, Mirziyoyev and Aliyev attended the 17th summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Aghdam, Karabakh. They visited the restored Imaret complex, including the mausoleum of Panah Ali Khan, founder of the Karabakh Khanate. The visit concluded with a cultural event titled Zafar (Victory), featuring music and Karabakh horse performances. The leaders agreed to deepen collaboration in trade, logistics, education, and culture, and announced a series of joint cultural and youth events this fall to commemorate 30 years of bilateral ties. Mirziyoyev expressed confidence that the outcomes of the visit would enhance the prosperity of both nations. A Shifting Geopolitical Landscape Since 2022, particularly after the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has pursued a policy of geopolitical multi-vectorism, intensifying ties with Turkey, Israel, the European Union, and the Central Asian states. In 2024-2025, Baku’s relationship with Moscow soured due to shifts in the South Caucasus power balance and the downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines flight over Kazakhstan, said to have been caused by accidental Russian ground fire. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, in January, Aliyev stated that the "guilt for the deaths of Azerbaijani citizens in this accident lies with the representatives of the Russian Federation. We demand justice, we demand punishment of the guilty." Against this backdrop, Uzbekistan has emerged as a key ally for Azerbaijan on its eastern flank. Uzbek-Azerbaijani relations exemplify the evolving geopolitical architecture of Eurasia, where regional powers are seeking greater autonomy, a balanced approach to global powers, and the increasing assertion of national identity. The growing partnership between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan strengthens both countries' positions on the international stage and elevates the Trans-Caspian corridor as a strategic priority in Eurasian policy.
From Migrant to Militant: Uzbekistan Sentences Jihadist
A district court in Uzbekistan just sentenced a 46-year-old Uzbek citizen, Obid Saparov from Kashkadarya Province, to 16 years in prison for joining the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) militant group and being involved in a 2022 rocket attack on an Uzbek border city. Saparov’s involvement with Islamic militant groups predates the rocket attack by nearly a decade, and the evidence gathered by investigators offers a rare and fascinating look at this Uzbek citizen’s journey into jihadism. From Migrant Laborer to Islamic Militant The beginnings of Saparov’s radicalization are a common story for hundreds of Central Asian citizens who joined militant groups in the Middle East or Afghanistan. Saparov went to Ufa, Russia, as a migrant laborer in June 2013. He found audio and video material on the internet produced by extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Turkestan and the “Jihodchilar” (“Jihadists). Saparov came into contact with members of the Jihadists in Ufa and in August 2013 left Russia for Baku, and from there went to Zahedan, Iran, and in March 2014 crossed into Afghanistan and eventually reached the town of Mirali in Waziristan, Pakistan. There, according to Uzbek media reports, he joined the Islamic Movement of Turkestan. The name of this group is interesting because in a kun.uz report, it mentions that when Saparov was in Ufa, some of the extremist material he found online was based on the ideas of Tohir Yuldash. Yuldash helped found the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) terrorist organization and led the group until he was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan in August 2009. The IMU aimed to overthrow the Uzbek government and staged armed incursions into Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000. The IMU were allies of the Taliban and were in Afghanistan when the U.S.-led military operations started in late 2001. The IMU suffered heavy losses, and the remnants of the group, including Yuldash, fled across the border into Pakistan. Ten Years of Militancy Saparov underwent training at camps in Pakistan after he arrived, and later worked in a militant “supply center.” According to the Uzbek media reports, the Islamic Movement of Turkestan splintered at the start of 2016, and Saparov joined a militant group from the Islamic State that was operating in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The IMU was still based in Pakistan in August 2015 when its leader, Usman Ghazi, swore an oath to the Islamic State, and the IMU split. Part of the IMU followed Ghazi into Afghanistan (where most were killed in fighting in Zabul and Herat provinces), and most of the others went into northeastern Afghanistan. However, the ISKP did have a presence in Jalalabad that lasted until after the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. Uzbek investigators said Saparov joined the ISKP and was with the group from 2016 to 2024. Saparov was involved in staging attacks in Jalalabad, Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kabul. Saparov’s group fought against the Afghan government and foreign troops, and against the Taliban. Saparov was also engaged in recruitment, media propaganda, and preparing terrorist attacks. Uzbek prosecutors said Saparov helped organize the bombing of the Sikh temple in Kabul in June 2022. The bomb was planted by a citizen of Tajikistan who went by the name “Abu Muhammad Tojiki.” Saparov was also involved in the bombing at the Russian embassy in Kabul in September 2022. The suicide bomber in the terrorist act at the Russian embassy was a citizen of Uzbekistan who used the name “Ibrohim.” He stayed at the same Kabul flat as Saparov for two days before the attack, and Saparov allegedly drove “Ibrohim” to the embassy. Saparov was operating under the command of someone called “Torik,” who had a stepson using the name “Zubair.” “Zubair” was a citizen of Kyrgyzstan. For Uzbekistan, Saparov’s most egregious act of terrorism occurred between the bombings at the Sikh temple and the Russian embassy. On July 5, 2022, five rockets, assembled by “Torik,” were launched from Afghanistan, across the Amu-Darya River that divides the two countries, into the Uzbek border city of Termez. Uzbek prosecutors presented evidence that Saparov “personally stored, transported, and prepared” the rockets launched at Termez. The rockets caused property damage but no casualties among the population. However, that attack followed an earlier attempt in April that year to shoot rockets from Afghanistan into Termez. Ten rockets were fired, but all of them landed in the river. Prosecutors did not connect Saparov to that attack. The Taliban were detaining Saparov’s cohorts during the summer of 2022, and Saparov fled to Pakistan, where he found refuge with unnamed militant groups. In September 2024, Pakistani security forces detained 20 of Saparov’s accomplices, among them “citizens of Uzbekistan from Andijan, Namangan, and Syrdarya.” In January 2025, Saparov was detained and extradited to Uzbekistan. According to reports, Saparov “partially” admitted his guilt and repented for his actions. As reported by gazeta.uz, “He asked the court to take into account that he had no previous convictions and has a family and three children.” It is difficult to gauge how much of the prosecutors’ evidence is accurate, and maybe all of it is. Saparov was almost surely in the IMU, but Uzbek prosecutors and the court seemed not to want to mention Uzbekistan’s most infamous homegrown terrorist group, instead using a more generic name that implied members from all around Central Asia and China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. However, Saparov was in ISKP, and most ISKP militants are killed during their attacks or in security operations. Very few make it into a courtroom, so the account of Saparov’s activities over the course of some 12 years offers a compelling insight into the path of a militant, in this case from Uzbekistan, as he moved from country to country and exchanged one militant group for another.
Opinion: Regional Power Starts at Home – Central Asia’s Path to Autonomy
The world is once again in a phase of systemic uncertainty. As conflicts proliferate and global governance splits, small and medium states must grapple with the consequences. For Central Asia, these external crises are not distant events; they are transmitted through trade, remittances, energy prices, and diplomatic pressure. But while exposure is unavoidable, dependence is not. The region’s future lies not in aligning with competing hegemons, but in constructing durable institutions of regional cooperation and self-governance. Over the last two decades, Central Asian countries have existed in a delicate balance. Security guarantees from Russia, infrastructure finance from China, and development assistance from the West provided a measure of stability, but they also bred institutional inertia. Today, that equilibrium is breaking down. Russia is preoccupied and sanctioned. China’s external ambitions are increasingly self-serving. The West is distracted. The resulting vacuum could leave Central Asia either exposed or, more optimistically, empowered to shape its own destiny. Uzbekistan's Institutional Recalibration Uzbekistan's pivot after 2016 was more than a diplomatic rebranding. It marked a nascent effort to build regional institutional trust, which was long absent in Central Asia. For the first time since independence, disputes over borders, transit, and trade were addressed not through coercion or isolation, but negotiation. The Khujand Declaration, signed by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, offered a blueprint for how local capacity, rather than external mediation, can resolve long-standing frictions. This was a decisive shift from extractive bilateralism to inclusive multilateralism. But diplomatic normalization is only a prelude. The deeper question remains: Can Central Asia institutionalize integration? Can it create shared rules and enforcement mechanisms strong enough to withstand both internal and external shocks? If Central Asian countries want to succeed, they should invest in four areas of regional institution-building, which will bring collective autonomy to the region.
- Mobility without bureaucracy
- Strategic alignment through membership discipline
- Energy security through joint investment and governance
- Investment in Afghanistan as a regional stability mechanism
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Astana International Forum 2025: Rethinking Global Dialogue
