Uzbekistan
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team is covering the Kurultai elections and what they mean for Kazakhstan. Special guest: Central Asia journalist Paul Bartlett.
Kyrgyzstan Hosts SCO Summit as Bloc Marks 25 Years
Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's ten member states are due in Bishkek on September 1 for the final summit of Kyrgyzstan's 2025-2026 chairmanship. The meeting is expected to produce a Bishkek Declaration marking the SCO's 25th anniversary, alongside thematic statements and other decisions. For Kyrgyzstan, the gathering is more than a turn in the organization's rotating chairmanship. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in the country during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. The summit coincides with Kyrgyzstan's Independence Day and the August 31 opening of the World Nomad Games. The member-state session will bring together Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with President Sadyr Japarov as host. Chinese President Xi Jinping will also make a state visit, giving the summit a substantial bilateral program alongside the formal meetings. Kyrgyzstan's Diplomatic Week The summit comes less than three months after Kyrgyzstan was elected to the UN Security Council for 2027-2028, its first term on the body. Hosting the SCO gives Japarov an opportunity to reinforce that diplomatic profile before the Security Council term begins in January. The SCO's foreign ministers reiterated in July that Central Asia is the organization's core and backed a larger role for it in the region's security and economic development. Their statement also praised Kyrgyzstan's chairmanship and confirmed that the Council of Heads of State and SCO Plus meetings would take place in Bishkek on August 31 and September 1. What Cholpon Ata Already Settled At their July 24 meeting in Cholpon Ata, SCO foreign ministers approved the draft declaration and accompanying documents as a basis for the summit. The language is therefore largely negotiated before the leaders arrive, although the final package can still change. The ministerial statement gives a clearer indication of the political agenda, supporting a multipolar world order and rejecting unilateral sanctions. It also calls for more intra-SCO trade. Terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime remain its stated security priorities. The statement says the SCO is entering a period of institutional reform, including changes to its legal framework and cooperation procedures. A Development Bank Still Taking Shape Economic cooperation will occupy a significant part of the summit. In Tianjin last year, interested member states reached political consensus to establish an SCO Development Bank. The institution is not yet operational. At the fourth consultation meeting in Shenzhen in June, delegates discussed its key elements and the next stage of negotiations. A timetable or capital commitments announced in Bishkek would move the proposal beyond its current design stage. The bank could eventually provide another source of finance for infrastructure, but its structure and membership remain unsettled. Currency diversification will also remain part of the discussion. The 2024 Astana Declaration called for gradual growth in the use of national currencies for settlements among interested members. Sanctions on Russia and Iran have increased the political importance of that effort, although the SCO has not created a common payment system. SCO Plus, but Not a Single Bloc The SCO has two observer states and 15 dialogue partners in addition to its ten members. SCO Plus allows selected partners and international organizations to join the wider discussion, but partner status does not guarantee attendance. Invitations are coordinated among the member states. The expanded format increases the summit's reach while exposing the differences inside the organization. India and Pakistan will again sit at the same table without a bilateral meeting having been announced. Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian will arrive as conflict involving his country and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz continue to affect energy markets and regional trade. The July ministerial statement condemned military strikes on Iran and called for a political settlement. That shared wording does not mean the member states have identical interests. The declaration is therefore a better indication of what members can agree to say than of what they will actually do. What Bishkek Can Deliver Japarov is already assured a large diplomatic gathering and an anniversary declaration. More durable results could emerge from the bilateral meetings. Xi's state visit is expected to include talks on the $4.7 billion China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, now under construction after decades of discussion. New financing or cross-border arrangements for the railway would give Kyrgyzstan a concrete outcome from the week. Progress on the Development Bank or agreed reforms to SCO institutions would add weight to the multilateral package. The summit will not resolve the conflicts involving its members, but it places Bishkek at the center of Eurasian diplomacy as Kyrgyzstan closes its chairmanship. The scale of the gathering gives Japarov rare international visibility. The agreements announced in Bishkek will determine whether the summit leaves Kyrgyzstan with anything more durable than diplomatic attention.
Xi Jinping Heads to Bishkek as Kyrgyzstan Prepares to Host 21 Heads of State
Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek and make a state visit to Kyrgyzstan, Beijing has confirmed. The trip, which also includes a state visit to Egypt, will run from August 30 to September 3. The formal meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State is scheduled for September 1. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in Kyrgyzstan during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. Xi had long been expected to be among the leaders traveling to the Kyrgyz capital, but the formal confirmation turns attention from the guest list to the business that may be conducted around the main session. For Kyrgyzstan, the most consequential part of the visit may come in Xi's talks with President Sadyr Japarov rather than in the summit hall.
The Times of Central Asia will be reporting from Bishkek as the delegations arrive, and from the opening ceremony of the World Nomad Games on August 31. Several visiting heads of state are expected to attend the ceremony, which will bring summit diplomacy and Kyrgyzstan’s biggest cultural showcase together on the eve of the SCO meeting. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has already confirmed that he will be there.
The spectacle will be considerable, but the substance is likely to emerge in the bilateral meetings, signed agreements, and final documents released around the September 1 summit.
The State Visit and the Railway The state visit format gives Xi and Japarov a bilateral program alongside the summit. The most prominent economic issue is likely to be the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, a project discussed for decades that is now under construction across some of Kyrgyzstan's most difficult terrain. The Kyrgyz authorities put the railway’s construction cost at about $4.7 billion. China holds 51% of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Company LLC, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. Roughly half of the cost is being financed through a 35-year Chinese loan to the company. The summit could bring clearer evidence of how quickly construction is progressing. Any new financing, contracts, or cross-border arrangements would be more significant than another general statement of political support. The railway also places Kyrgyzstan inside a larger shift in regional trade. Commerce between China and the five Central Asian states passed $100 billion in 2025. Bishkek wants a larger share of that traffic and more of the value created along transit routes. Xi's visit offers Japarov an opportunity to press the case for logistics hubs, local employment and supporting roads rather than transit alone. The Documents Behind the Ceremony The SCO's national coordinators have been finalizing the outcome documents in the weeks leading up to the summit. Under Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, the SCO has emphasized regional stability and economic cooperation, alongside digital transformation, cyber threats, environmental policy, and cultural exchange. SCO decisions require consensus, which tends to soften disagreements in final communiqués. Any agreements that specify funding, deadlines, or responsibility would give the Bishkek package more weight. Bilateral Meetings Around the Summit The summit will bring several difficult relationships into the same room. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif are both due in Bishkek, although no bilateral meeting between them has been announced. Russian President Vladimir Putin has said he plans to meet Modi during the SCO gathering. Putin is also set to meet Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, with Iran’s ambassador to Moscow confirming plans for talks on the sidelines of the summit. Meanwhile, any meeting between Xi and Modi would come amid a cautious improvement in China-India relations after years of border tensions. For Japarov, the concentration of leaders creates a dense bilateral calendar alongside the SCO program. Meetings announced in the final days before the summit may prove as important as the plenary itself, particularly where they produce agreements on infrastructure, trade, energy, or financing. Bishkek Before September 1 The first major wave of officials is expected to arrive in the Kyrgyz capital on August 31. Manas International Airport will restrict scheduled passenger flights from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. that day to accommodate aircraft carrying heads of state and official delegations. Restrictions will continue from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. on September 1. The September 1 session is expected to conclude with the Bishkek Declaration and a package of accompanying documents prepared during Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship. Foreign ministers have already approved drafts of the declaration, thematic statements, and other decisions as a basis for the summit. By then, however, much of the diplomacy may already have taken place in the meetings around it.
Can Uzbekistan’s Green Transition Offset Its Gas Decline?
Uzbekistan faces a widening energy gap. Natural gas production peaked in 2008 and, after a partial recovery in the late 2010s, has fallen sharply. Official figures show output dropped from 61.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2018 to 41.5 bcm in 2024. Production fell another 15% year on year in the first quarter of 2026. The gap is already being filled from abroad. Russian gas deliveries rose 15% in 2025 to nearly 6.5 bcm, while Uzbekistan also imports gas from Turkmenistan. Renewable electricity cannot replace every household or industrial use of gas. It can reduce the volume burned in power stations, leaving more domestic fuel available elsewhere. Declining output is already changing Uzbekistan’s external position. The country, once a net gas exporter, became a net importer in 2023. Imports help protect households and factories from shortages, but they add costs and increase exposure to Russian and Turkmen supplies. Renewable generation therefore serves an energy security purpose even before its climate benefits are counted. Natural gas remains the central concern. In its 2022 review, the International Energy Agency said it provided about 85% of Uzbekistan’s total energy and electricity supplies. The government expected gas demand to rise by 30% to 65 bcm by 2030, while electricity demand would roughly double. The IEA also warned that reserves would last fewer than 20 years at the production rate then prevailing. This was a reserve-to-production estimate, not a fixed depletion date. New discoveries or investment could extend it. Lower consumption would do the same. The government has responded with a rapid renewable buildout. In 2025, solar and wind plants generated more than 10.5 billion kWh of electricity. Renewable generation, including hydropower, reached 16.8 billion kWh. The Ministry of Energy said this saved about 3.2 bcm of natural gas. That saving was equivalent to roughly half the volume Russia supplied during the year. It shows that renewables already ease the shortage. Yet 3.2 bcm remains far below the roughly 20 bcm fall in annual gas production since 2018. On current figures, the green transition is slowing the impact of the decline, not yet offsetting it. The buildout forms part of Uzbekistan’s 2019 Green Economy Transition Strategy. Renewable projects bring foreign investment and create opportunities for domestic suppliers. In December 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said local companies had supplied $700 million of materials and electrical equipment while also providing services to energy projects. Renewable generation also limits import demand by reducing the gas burned in power stations. Large projects depend heavily on decisions by the state. Procurement and land allocation affect who receives contracts. Grid access and investment approvals shape how quickly plants are completed. RFE/RL has documented concerns over opaque subcontracting in Uzbekistan’s solar sector. Its 2024 investigation found that two subcontractors on the Sherabad project were absent from publicly available documents. One company had been incorporated only two days after construction began. A founder denied accusations of corruption, while principal contractor Masdar did not respond to questions. The investigation did not establish that the wider renewable program was designed to benefit political insiders. It showed, however, how limited disclosure can weaken public confidence. Competitive procurement and clear identification of subcontractors would reduce that risk. Generating capacity is only part of the answer. Solar and wind require stronger transmission networks and storage. They also need flexible backup capacity to supply electricity when output falls. In December 2025, Mirziyoyev said planned industrial and infrastructure projects would raise electricity demand by at least 50%. Energy efficiency is equally important. The IEA said subsidized gas and electricity prices weaken incentives to conserve energy. Aging networks add further losses. Tariff reform could reduce waste, but the government would need to protect vulnerable consumers from higher prices. Every unit saved reduces both import demand and the need for new generating capacity. The government plans to commission more than 17 gigawatts of additional renewable capacity by 2030. It also plans 6,000 kilometers of new high-voltage lines to integrate that capacity. These targets show that Tashkent recognizes the grid constraint. Delivery will determine how much gas the new plants actually displace. Uzbekistan’s green transition can offset a growing share of its gas decline, but it is not yet moving fast enough to cover it. The 2025 gas savings were substantial but remained well below the loss in domestic output since 2018. Renewable plants must be matched by grid investment and storage. Faster efficiency gains and transparent procurement will also affect how much gas they displace. Until then, imports will continue to fill the gap. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Uzbekistan’s Reported Chinese Jet Deal in a Changing Arms Market
China’s J-10CE could become Uzbekistan’s first new combat fighter in decades that was designed neither in Russia nor the Soviet Union. This summer, defense publications and analysts reported that Tashkent had allegedly already received the first aircraft and could eventually acquire 24 jets. Neither Uzbekistan nor China has confirmed the deal. If the reports prove accurate, the purchase would mark a notable shift for a region whose armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-made equipment. For decades, Russia was the natural source of new weapons, spare parts and maintenance. Its position is no longer unchallenged. China can offer combat aircraft and air-defense systems, Turkey has established itself in the drone market, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are developing their own defense industries. Whether or not the reports prove accurate, they point to two broader trends: Central Asian countries are increasingly looking beyond Russia for newer military technology, while some are also trying to produce more equipment at home. Shadow Purchase In July, reports emerged of the alleged delivery of four J-10CEs to Uzbekistan. The aircraft is the export version of the Chinese J-10C multirole fighter manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Its export variant has already been purchased by Pakistan. Subsequent reports spoke of a possible contract for 24 aircraft and of Uzbek pilots undergoing training in China. Uzbek news outlet Kun.uz attempted to verify the claims and contacted the country’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry responded that it had no information it could provide on the matter. Chinese authorities and manufacturers have also made no public announcement of a sale. Nevertheless, throughout the summer, reports of Uzbekistan purchasing J-10CEs have refused to die down. Russian Weapons Remain the Backbone of Existing Arsenals Uzbekistan inherited a combat aircraft fleet from the Soviet Union built primarily around MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. These aircraft were developed in the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remained the main source of compatible spare parts, weapons, repairs, and upgrades. The reports about the J-10CE challenge this established model. A new fighter comes with a different weapons, maintenance and training ecosystem. Over time, this creates dependence on a new supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, Russian exports of major arms in 2021–2025 were 64% lower than during the previous five-year period. Russia’s share of global arms exports fell from 21% to 6.8%, leaving it the world’s third-largest supplier after the United States and France. Those figures do not mean that China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s dominant arms supplier. Russia retains a strong position, above all because of the equipment Central Asian militaries already operate. Kazakhstan is perhaps the clearest example. According to SIPRI data for 2021–2025, Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms. Spain accounted for 7.9% and France for 3.6%. Kazakhstan operates Russian Su-30SM fighters, as well as helicopters, armored vehicles and air-defense systems. Any abrupt change in procurement policy would raise questions over the compatibility of ammunition, communications systems, maintenance, and the training of crews and technical personnel. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain similarly reliant on Soviet- and Russian-made equipment and are closely tied to Russia’s regional security architecture. But Russia’s dominance of existing arsenals does not necessarily extend to every newer category of military technology. New Niches Are No Longer Guaranteed to Russian Suppliers While existing arsenals continue to bind Central Asian militaries to Moscow, newer categories of weapons present a different picture. When Kyrgyzstan sought modern combat drones, it turned to Turkey, first buying Bayraktar TB2s and later adding Aksungur and Anka aircraft. Kazakhstan has also pursued unmanned aviation cooperation with Turkey through an agreement between Kazakhstan Engineering and Turkish Aerospace to produce and maintain Anka drones domestically. Turkmenistan began diversifying its military procurement earlier than its neighbors. Ashgabat has acquired Russian, Chinese, Turkish and European equipment, including Turkish drones and naval vessels. Tajikistan has also looked elsewhere for newer systems. In May 2022, Iran opened a facility in Dushanbe to produce Ababil-2 drones, while the United States announced plans to provide its border forces with Puma reconnaissance drones. What is emerging, then, is not so much a rejection of Russian weapons as a more fragmented and competitive Central Asian arms market. China can offer fighter aircraft, air-defense systems, armored vehicles and drones. Turkey is strong in UAVs, armored vehicles and several other areas. Iran has established a presence in Tajikistan. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Want to Produce More at Home Central Asia’s two largest economies are gradually expanding domestic military production, a trend that could ultimately affect the market more than individual foreign contracts. By regional standards, Kazakhstan already has a developed armored-vehicle manufacturing industry. Kazakhstan Paramount Engineering produces Arlan and Alan-2 vehicles, along with the Barys armored-vehicle family. As of August 2026, the company had manufactured more than 400 vehicles and had annual production capacity of up to 500 units, according to the government. Its order book through 2028 includes another 224 vehicles. In February 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev visited the Defense Industry Agency’s Center for Innovative Technologies, which produces around 80 types of military equipment and dual-use products. Uzbekistan is also developing domestic drone production through Sahro Drone Industry, part of its defense-industrial system. The company produces mini-drones and quadcopters for surveillance and search-and-rescue operations, alongside reconnaissance drones and models that provide operators with a first-person view. The Defense Industry Agency’s mandate also includes replacing imports with locally produced equipment and expanding the sector’s export potential. Russia remains central to the region’s arms market but is losing its status as the default supplier. The change is clearest when Central Asian militaries seek technologies absent from their Soviet-era arsenals or turn to domestic manufacturers. Whether or not the alleged J-10CE deal is confirmed, governments now have a wider choice of foreign suppliers and domestic alternatives.
Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible establishment of sleeper cells, while members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM, also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party or TIP) had increasingly concentrated in Badakhshan. No evidence links ISKP or ETIM/TIP to Fateh or to the separate opposition activity described above. Their presence nevertheless gives an independent security basis to Tajikistan’s concern over prolonged disorder in Badakhshan. Since 2021, Dushanbe’s relationship with the Taliban authorities has moved from pronounced estrangement toward pragmatic engagement. Cross-border markets reopened, a high-level delegation from Tajikistan visited Kabul in late 2025, and Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin said in February that his country’s security institutions were cooperating with the Taliban to prevent border tensions. Mistrust remains, especially over armed groups and repeated frontier incidents. The August incident therefore tests newly established channels of cooperation without reversing the broader movement toward pragmatic engagement. Current evidence does not show the Badakhshan fighting spreading westward into Kunduz or Balkh. ACLED recorded an increase in Badakhshan from four anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in June–December 2025 to 22 in January–July 2026; Kunduz fell from 23 to 16, while Balkh rose only from one to three. ACLED therefore continues to assess local-commander and opposition campaigns as likely to remain localized. Separate opposition activity in Kunduz does not establish propagation from Badakhshan. Taliban reinforcements reportedly moved from Kunduz and Balkh, as well as Kabul and Takhar, into Badakhshan, but there is no credible evidence that Fateh-linked fighting spread into either province. So far, reinforcements have moved toward Badakhshan rather than the fighting spreading outward from it. Uzbekistan’s principal trade and transport interests in Afghanistan lie farther west, around Balkh and the Hairatan–Mazar-i-Sharif corridor. Available reporting shows no direct public response by Uzbekistan to the August fighting and no verified disruption to bilateral trade, customs, rail operations, or electricity supplies. Afghanistan nevertheless remains Uzbekistan’s third-largest export market. Uzbekistan’s exports to Afghanistan reached $817.8 million in January–May 2026; bilateral turnover reached $915.8 million, making Afghanistan Uzbekistan’s fifth-largest overall trading partner during the same period. The scale of bilateral trade gives Tashkent a substantial current commercial stake in Afghanistan’s stability, although the August fighting has not been shown to have caused economic disruption. Uzbekistan’s most concrete transport stake in northern Afghanistan is the operating Hairatan–Mazar-i-Sharif railway and its associated freight infrastructure. The line connects Uzbekistan’s border with Balkh’s principal commercial center. It continued to receive investment in 2026. A 1,000-meter siding completed at Naibabad in April was intended to increase freight handling and reduce congestion. No evidence indicates that the railway or its associated freight infrastructure has been affected by the present Badakhshan instability. Its expansion does, however, deepen Uzbekistan’s material stake in continued security in Balkh and along the corridor immediately south of Uzbekistan’s frontier. Uzbekistan continues to promote trans-Afghanistan connectivity as a strategic route to South Asian markets, although the principal railway project through Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan remains prospective. Official statements in 2026 describe access through Afghanistan toward Pakistani ports and South Asian markets as a major transport objective. In July, Mirziyoyev made clear that it remains a future corridor rather than an operating route by referring to benefits that would follow “once” it was commissioned. Since Uzbekistan’s trans-Afghanistan connectivity strategy depends on Afghanistan functioning as a reliable transit state across a route extending well beyond the existing Hairatan–Mazar line, wider insecurity across northern Afghanistan would affect more than a single rail link. Tajikistan has already experienced limited physical spillover from fighting in a province directly adjoining its frontier; Uzbekistan has not. Its exposure lies farther west, in an established commercial and transport system and in a broader connectivity strategy that assumes continued access through Afghanistan. Badakhshan is already a border-security issue for Dushanbe. For Tashkent, the risks mainly rise if instability begins to affect the northern zones of Afghanistan through which its trade and transport interests run. For now, the evidence still favors localization. Fateh’s surrender has reduced the immediate intra-Taliban confrontation, and the available conflict data does not show comparable escalation in Kunduz or Balkh. ACLED nevertheless identifies several northern provinces as vulnerable to future localized outbreaks where local grievances and armed opposition activity coincide. Badakhshan’s elevated armed activity has already produced a direct consequence for Tajikistan. Uzbekistan’s exposure remains less immediate, but it would become materially greater if deterioration extended across northern Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan Target $1 Billion in Trade as Investment and Transit Links Expand
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have set a target of increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030, as economic ties expand from a relatively low base into vehicle manufacturing, oil and gas, investment, and transport across the Caspian Sea.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Uzbekistan on August 23–24 added new projects to that list. The two presidents signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship and a program aimed at increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030.
Political relations, meanwhile, have been moving faster than economic ties. In 2023, the two countries established the Supreme Interstate Council, and a year later they signed a Treaty on Allied Relations. The latest trip was Aliyev’s third state visit to Uzbekistan in five years and his seventh visit overall.
Aliyev said ahead of his trip to Tashkent that bilateral trade more than tripled in 2025 to reach $795 million. Uzbekistan’s Center for Economic Research and Reforms, however, reported a much lower total of $307.3 million for the same year. Neither side has explained the discrepancy, which may reflect different definitions of trade. Sustaining growth toward the $1 billion target will require broader trade and more joint production, including goods aimed at markets beyond the two countries.
From Trade to Investment
The Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan Investment Company is intended to help turn some of these plans into operating businesses. Established in 2023 with $500 million in capital, the company finances projects in both countries.
Some areas of cooperation have already reached the production stage. Azerbaijan’s Azermash CP works with Uzbek manufacturers to produce Chevrolet and Isuzu vehicles in Azerbaijan. By July, more than 10,700 Chevrolet vehicles and 275 Isuzu buses had been produced. More than 130 commercial entities with Uzbek investment are registered in Azerbaijan.
During the latest visit, the two sides opened a gypsum plant. They also laid foundations for five SOCAR filling stations and a silver-ore enrichment plant.
For Baku, the interest in Uzbekistan is understandable. With a population of more than 38 million, Uzbekistan is Central Asia’s most populous country. The Uzbek economy is growing rapidly, while the authorities are opening more sectors to private and foreign capital. For Azerbaijani companies, this offers access to a market considerably larger than their own as well as a foothold in Central Asia.
For Tashkent, Azerbaijan offers investment and expertise in the oil and gas sector. SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company, has been operating in Uzbekistan for years. A joint venture between Uzbekistan’s Oâ€ZLITINEFTGAZ and the Azerbaijani company’s research institute has been operating since 2016. Cooperation is now gradually moving from engineering services toward much larger exploration and potential production projects.
The main project is on the Ustyurt Plateau in western Uzbekistan. BP joined the project in May 2026 with a 40% stake, while SOCAR, which is the operator, and Uzbekneftegaz each hold 30%. Total investment could reach around $2 billion if commercially viable reserves are found and the project proceeds to development.
As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the project envisages extensive seismic surveys followed by exploratory drilling. If sufficient reserves are discovered, the next stage could involve the development of full-scale production infrastructure.
During the latest visit, Aliyev said he hoped drilling of production wells could begin in 2027 if the exploration work produces positive results. This would be significant for bilateral relations: oil and gas cooperation would move beyond research and exploration into major capital-intensive projects.
In the longer term, however, Azerbaijan’s geography may be no less important for Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan is one of only two doubly landlocked countries in the world: to move cargo to the open sea, it must cross the territory of at least two other countries. This makes the cost and reliability of transport routes a distinct factor in the competitiveness of the Uzbek economy.
Azerbaijan provides a key western link for routes across the Caspian. Uzbek cargo can travel through Kazakhstan to Aktau or Kuryk, or through Turkmenistan to Turkmenbashi, before crossing the Caspian to Azerbaijan and continuing through Georgia and Turkey.
This is why transport is appearing increasingly often on the agenda of talks between Tashkent and Baku. Uzbekistan is interested in expanding shipments across the Caspian, while Azerbaijan wants a larger share of Central Asia’s rapidly growing trade with Turkey and Europe to move through its ports and railways.
The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway could eventually provide an additional source of cargo. Construction began in December 2024 and was continuing in 2026. If connected with Caspian routes, it would give Tashkent another option for moving both Chinese cargo and Uzbek products westward. For Baku, it would offer an opportunity to become part of a longer transport chain linking China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe.
Here, however, the gap between plans and existing infrastructure remains more pronounced than it is in trade.
The Middle Corridor requires several trans-shipments: from rail to ship on the eastern shore of the Caspian and then back onto rail in Azerbaijan. Its capacity remains constrained by port and ferry bottlenecks and the need for coordination across several countries. The route therefore expands Uzbekistan’s options, but it does not yet remove the country’s main logistical constraints.
The transport link is gradually being complemented by an energy component. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are working on a “green” energy corridor across the Caspian.
In 2025, the three countries established Green Corridor Union LLC to coordinate plans to export renewable electricity from Central Asia across the Caspian and through Azerbaijan toward Europe.
Azerbaijan has been steadily expanding its relations with Central Asia as a whole. It is developing transport projects with Kazakhstan, and in November 2025 became a full participant in the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia.
For both sides, the logic is straightforward: Uzbekistan gains another western transport route and source of investment, while Azerbaijan gains freight traffic and greater access to Central Asia’s most populous market.
The conflicting 2025 trade figures complicate any assessment of the $1 billion target. A more telling measure of the partnership will be how many announced projects enter production and how quickly freight traffic across the Caspian grows.
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan Show What Diplomacy Can Deliver as Vast Rail Project with China Advances
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met on July 30 on the shores of Kyrgyzstan’s Lake Issyk-Kul, in Cholpon Ata, to sign the Treaty on Allied Relations. It was much more than business as usual.
In their press conference, the leaders largely set aside the diplomatic boilerplate and expressions of mutual approbation that usually attend such summits. Instead, the meeting focused on putting a decisive end to mutual Kyrgyz-Uzbek grievances and rivalry, opting for dialogue over confrontation, stability over tension, and partnership over the quest for primacy in their bilateral relationship.
Without ceding any of their sovereignty, they stressed that teamwork and shared responsibility—not the pursuit of great-power patronage or one-upmanship—are the surest way to advance common interests. Japarov, like Mirziyoyev, made clear that strategic-level collaboration always trumps short-term transactional gains.
One of the biggest takeaways from the Japarov–Mirziyoyev summit was the confident demeanor and optimism with which they spoke about the future of Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations. Veering from his scripted notes and speaking in Russian to the press, Mirziyoyev said: “What an atmosphere we have today [here in Kyrgyzstan]. Look at what we're doing today— we're making history. This alliance — all of this will remain in history forever and ever.” Friendship, mutual respect, and hard work will produce “dynamic development” and “steady economic growth,” leading to “the well-being of peoples.”
Business Development and Ahead of Schedule
Once dismissed as an engineer's pipedream or a financier's nightmare, Japarov and Mirziyoyev said they’re staying the course on building strategic connectivity, energy, and water infrastructure, singling out the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Kambarata-1 Hydropower Plant (HPP), projects that some considered unrealistic.
The leaders made it plain that this railway will deliver huge benefits. As Mirziyoyev put it: "We will work together non-stop to develop trade and logistics infrastructure along this railway route."
Beyond offering transit times faster than the northern routes, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway will boost tourism and bring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan hundreds of millions of dollars in transit revenue. Most importantly, it will unlock untapped economic resources, fueling new jobs, businesses, and logistics hubs along the corridor.
After the Japarov-Mirziyoyev meetings, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Akramjon Nematov, First Deputy Director of Uzbekistan's Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies. Having been on site, he noted that the numbers and progress on the ground speak louder than any words or communiqués: "Construction is active at 83 of 107 planned sites on the Kyrgyz line, with over 10,000 workers and 7,000 units of heavy machinery deployed. Crews are drilling 26 tunnels through the Tian Shan, with over 13.5 kilometers of the main tunnel already cut, while 38 of 50 bridges are underway. The pace is staggering. I've watched this railway move Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations from friction to cooperation – and I measure progress not in words, but in cubic meters of earth moved."
China has committed to supplying most of the capital and engineering capacity.  The project carries a total capitalization of roughly $4.7 billion, structured as a $2.3 billion, 35-year debt tranche from China—extended directly to the special purpose joint venture and serviced from project cash flows—alongside a matching $2.3 billion equity contribution. China holds 51% of the equity, with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each holding a 24.5% stake.
Nematov explains that “Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan's relationship with China is built on a shared pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes.”
Open.kg reports that, following his meeting with Mirziyoyev, Japarov revealed in Bishkek on August 13 that Moscow has accepted the necessity of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project. That may surprise some observers, but Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as longtime practitioners of a clear-eyed, non-ideological, multi-vector foreign policy, have a realistic sense of what Moscow is about.
As Japarov put it, the signing of the Treaty on Allied Relations is “a historic decision” that “cements the level of trust we have achieved, gives our relations a new political and legal foundation, and opens a long-term agenda for joint development.”
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Image: Office of the President of Uzbekistan[/caption]
After Japarov awarded the Order of Manas to the President of Uzbekistan, Mirziyoyev stated that, “Years of effort, grounded in mutual goodwill, have allowed us to resolve our issues. We have pursued the highest level of diplomacy, and we've elevated our cooperation to an alliance. What does this tell us? That we've gone through many stages of hard, difficult work, and now we've achieved the goal of truly being allies.” That’s what smart diplomacy is.
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan aren't choosing sides—they're choosing each other, leaving Great Game thinking to those who have trouble thinking otherwise. For this reason, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project is bound to continue to move forward, barring force majeure and external meddling.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
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