Uzbekistan, Pakistan Set $2 Billion Trade Target Following High-Level Talks in Islamabad
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev arrived in Islamabad on a state visit on February 5, marking a new chapter in Uzbekistan-Pakistan relations. According to official sources, the Uzbek leader’s aircraft was escorted by Pakistan Air Force fighter jets upon entering the country’s airspace. At Nur Khan Airbase, Mirziyoyev was received by President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and senior Pakistani officials. Shortly after his arrival, Mirziyoyev visited the headquarters of Global Industrial & Defence Solutions, where he met with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal Asim Munir. The two sides discussed strengthening the strategic partnership, with an emphasis on military and military-technical cooperation. Areas of focus included deepening collaboration between defense industry enterprises, expanding training for military personnel, sharing operational experience, and organizing joint exercises. Both countries agreed to draft a roadmap for future defense cooperation. Later that day, Mirziyoyev held one-on-one talks with Prime Minister Sharif and chaired the inaugural meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. At the meeting’s outset, the Uzbek president extended greetings in advance of the holy month of Ramadan and Pakistan Day. Discussions centered on implementing existing agreements and expanding cooperation across political, economic, and humanitarian spheres. Trade and economic cooperation featured prominently. Bilateral trade reached nearly $500 million by the end of last year, and approximately 230 Pakistani-capital companies are currently operating in Uzbekistan. Air connectivity and banking ties between the two countries are also expanding. Ongoing joint ventures span textiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, agriculture, and other sectors. An exhibition of Uzbek industrial products is being held in Islamabad as part of the visit. The two leaders agreed to set a goal of raising bilateral trade turnover to $2 billion in the near future. Key measures include expanding the list of goods under the Preferential Trade Agreement, easing phytosanitary requirements for Uzbek agricultural exports, and increasing the use of Uzbekistan’s trade houses in Lahore and Karachi. A joint project portfolio valued at nearly $3.5 billion has already been developed. Transport and logistics were another central topic. Both sides emphasized the strategic importance of advancing the Trans-Afghan railway and supporting the Pakistan-China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan transport corridor. They also agreed to establish an Uzbek-Pakistani Forum of Regions, with the inaugural meeting scheduled to take place this year in Uzbekistan’s Khorezm region. Cultural cooperation was also addressed. Plans include hosting Uzbekistan Culture Weeks and Uzbek Cinema Days in Pakistan and exploring the creation of a joint cultural center in Lahore dedicated to the Baburid heritage. The visit concluded with the signing of a Joint Declaration and a series of agreements spanning diplomacy, trade, defense, transport, agriculture, digital technologies, culture, security, and regional cooperation. Mirziyoyev also extended an invitation to Prime Minister Sharif for a return visit to Uzbekistan.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode – Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Reform – Coming Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will take a deep dive into Kazakhstan's new draft constitution with guests Yevgeniy Zhovtis, a Kazakhstan human rights activist and director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, and Aiman Umarova, a prominent lawyer in Kazakhstan and a member of the constitutional commission.
Facing Restrictions, Russian Skater Joins Uzbekistan´s Winter Olympics Team
Short track speed skater Daniil Eybog competed for Russia at the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This year, Eybog will represent Uzbekistan at the games in Italy, switching countries because of international restrictions that were placed on Russian athletes because of the war. Eybog will race the 500-meter distance for the Central Asian country at the games in Milan and other locations in northern Italy. Medet Nazarov, an alpine skier from Chimgan in Uzbekistan, will compete in the slalom and giant slalom events. Uzbekistan planned to send pair figure skaters, Dmitry Chigirev and Ekaterina Geynish, to Italy as well, but Chigirev suffered an injury that forced their withdrawal. “Good night or good morning, whichever you prefer. I'm off to the Olympic Games!” 28-year-old Eybog said this week on social media. “The route is a bit crazy. I'm flying via Tashkent. First stop. Then to Istanbul and from there to Milan. Let's go.” Eybog came seventh in the 500 meters while competing for Uzbekistan at the Asian Winter Games in Harbin, China, last year. Before switching his sporting nationality, he was part of the winning team in the 5,000-meter relay at the 2020 European Championships in Hungary. The executive board of the International Olympic Committee can approve a change in the country that an athlete represents, under certain conditions, and has done so for a number of competitors in this year’s winter games. In an interview last year with Russian outlet Tverisport.ru, Eybog described his experience at the Beijing Olympics as “chaotic,” saying he had been an alternate and then made the Russian team virtually at the last minute. “Since then, given my experience, I've developed a strong desire to compete in the Olympics again and this time try to fight for a medal,” Eybog said. “But, as you know, due to the political situation, the eligibility of Russian speed skaters and short track speed skaters for the 2026 Games in Italy is in question. Without serious motivation, maintaining high-level athletic fitness is quite difficult. Currently, the only way to qualify for international competitions, including the Olympic Games, is to compete for another country.” He said there were several countries that might have accepted him into their teams, but “the historical and geographical proximity of the countries played a role, including the familiarity of the Uzbek people with the Russian language." Eybog said short track speed skating is just starting to develop in Uzbekistan, whose Olympic committee has funded his training in Russia. Another Russian skater, Denis Ayrapetyan, also transferred to Uzbekistan at the same time, though he is not competing at the Winter Olympics. Some Russians, as well as competitors from Belarus, a close ally of Russia, are participating in the games under the designation of Individual Neutral Athletes. They must meet requirements to take part, including, for example, not actively supporting the war in Ukraine. The flags of Russia and Belarus won’t be displayed at the games, and their anthems won’t be played if any of their nationals win a medal. The opening ceremony is on Friday, and the games run until February 22.
What the U.S. Really Wants in Central Asia: Behind the B5+1 Forums
The B5+1 business forum continued in Kyrgyzstan’s capital on February 5, as government officials, regional business leaders, and a sizable U.S. delegation met to discuss trade, investment, and regulatory barriers shaping economic ties between Central Asia and the United States.
As Washington signals a more pragmatic, commercially driven approach to the region, questions persist over why U.S. investment has lagged behind political engagement and which markets are truly seen as priorities. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Dmitry Orlov, director of the Strategy: East–West analytical center, about the structural obstacles deterring American capital, the shift in U.S. policy thinking, and how Central Asian states are positioned within Washington’s evolving economic calculus.
TCA: What serious U.S. capital investments in Central Asia can we talk about today? ORLOV: It is important to understand the main point. Talk of large investments, the arrival of American business, and long-term economic cooperation only makes sense in one case: if the U.S. repeals the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which was adopted back in the 1970s and extended to all former Soviet republics after the collapse of the USSR. Today, it remains a formal and, in many ways, psychological obstacle to a fully-fledged business partnership. At the same time, it is necessary to establish contacts at a business level right now. This is because if the amendment is repealed - and such statements are regularly heard in Washington - it is difficult to predict which countries in the region will receive investment flows and in what volumes. Recent international forums, including Davos, have shown that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are of the greatest interest to the U.S. in Central Asia. Their economies are developing more dynamically, and they can offer large-scale projects and a clear export base. The other countries in the region, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, are still perceived by investors as lower priorities. TCA: Previously, the U.S. actively promoted a political agenda in the region, including human rights and freedom of speech. Now these are rarely mentioned. Why do you think this is the case? ORLOV: The approach has become more pragmatic. The history of U.S. foreign policy shows that strategic and economic interests have always taken precedence. If a territory is attractive in terms of resources or transit routes, a format for cooperation will be found. In Europe, relatively speaking, the rule of law prevails. In Asia, the situation is different, and the Americans understand this perfectly well. Issues of ideology and human rights can move to the background if economic expediency comes first. This is especially true in Central Asia, where many issues are resolved through personal agreements and informal connections. Washington understands this. TCA: What exactly can Central Asia offer the U.S.? ORLOV: In terms of individual countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are again in the lead. They offer oil, gas, and, no less importantly, control over transit routes. There is currently a lot of discussion about rare earths and critical minerals, but their development is always long and expensive. As a result, interest in them is largely political and declarative. First and foremost, it is about signaling presence and intent. It may take decades before such projects actually materialize. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also have a resource base, but developing deposits there is difficult and costly. Turkmenistan stands apart as a special case. A significant share of its gas volumes has already been contracted by China in exchange for earlier infrastructure loans. At the same time, it has a petrochemical industry, transport arteries, and logistics potential. TCA: What does Central Asia expect from the U.S.? ORLOV: Beyond investment and technology, political balance is important for the region. Against the backdrop of talk about possible EU sanctions against Kyrgyzstan, diplomatic activity has intensified. In my view, the key question for the U.S. is what it can offer that Russia and China, already deeply integrated into the region’s economy, cannot. U.S. trade turnover with Kyrgyzstan, for example, does not even rank in the top ten. Therefore, there is not only economic but also political logic at work, an attempt to strengthen its presence in the region. Central Asia today is a space where the interests of China, Russia, Iran, and the West intersect. None of these actors has a monopoly on influence. That is why the region remains an area of balance. American and European companies extract oil in Kazakhstan. Chinese companies do as well. Russian companies are also present. So far, these interests have not come into direct conflict. As a result, we should not expect open confrontation between global players, at least in the near future. TCA: How realistic is it that repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment could change the investment landscape in Central Asia? ORLOV: For now, it is more of a political signal than an economic calculation. Western media have barely discussed potential investment volumes in the event of its repeal. No concrete figures are being cited. This resembles a situation in which a decision has ostensibly been “made,” but real steps remain distant. The amendment has been discussed since the Clinton administration, yet it has never progressed beyond declarations. In essence, it remains a carrot dangling in front of a donkey. TCA: Would it be fair to say, then, that regional forums, including the B5+1, are largely symbolic? ORLOV: Exactly. The first forum in Almaty in 2024 was a stage of familiarization and mutual assessment. The meeting in Bishkek is an attempt to outline the contours of possible cooperation. The key questions for both sides today are extremely pragmatic: what are we being offered, and what can we get in return?
B5+1 Forum Opens as U.S. Companies Expand Economic Footprint in Central Asia
Business leaders and government officials from Central Asia and the United States gathered in Kyrgyzstan’s capital on February 4 for the start of the second B5+1 Business Forum. Co-organized by the Kyrgyz government and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the event is intended to bring together private companies, business associations, officials, and experts interested in expanding U.S.–Central Asia commercial ties. More than 50 U.S. companies are participating in the event. The B5+1 is the business-track counterpart to the C5+1 diplomatic format that links the United States with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The B5+1 brings companies and policymakers together to identify barriers to investment and propose cross-border regulatory changes. This week’s meeting in Bishkek follows the inaugural B5+1 forum held in Almaty on March 14–15, 2024, which drew more than 250 stakeholders from across Central Asia and the United States. It produced 21 private-sector recommendations aimed at easing trade, improving regulations, and building regional economic integration. The Bishkek agenda is built around reviewing progress on those recommendations and setting priorities for the next phase of work. Central Asian officials have used the event to signal interest in region-wide coordination rather than country-by-country deals. In comments made in Bishkek, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry and Construction, Ersaiyn Nagaspaev, emphasized that foreign investors increasingly assess Central Asia as a single market, reflecting a push to align regulations and investment conditions across borders. Nagaspaev noted that more than 600 U.S. companies currently operate in Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, used the forum to highlight domestic economic performance within that regional context. In a speech at the forum, Kyrgyzstan’s First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Daniyar Amangeldiev, said Kyrgyzstan’s economy grew by 11.1% in 2025, which he described as one of the highest growth rates in the region. Addressing the forum, U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor stated that the United States intends to expand its economic engagement with Central Asia. “The private sector, not intergovernmental agreements, will become the key instrument of interaction," he told those in attendance, identifying electronic commerce, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, agriculture, and transport infrastructure as priority areas. Gor noted that the American companies present at the forum represent the largest and most comprehensive U.S. commercial delegation ever to visit Central Asia. The U.S. recognizes the importance of Central Asia in global trade and connectivity, he stated. "The United States is open for business. We're open for peace. We're opening to strengthen our ties around the world. So that’s why it's fitting that the first C5 event in 2026 is this B5 + 1 forum,” Gor said, linking the Bishkek discussions to economic commitments made at the C5+1 summit in Washington in November 2025. “The Transport Corridor for Peace and Prosperity will provide reliable connectivity from Central Asia through the South Caucasus to global markets,” Gor said. “This is a historic opportunity to strengthen economic integration and long-term prosperity across the region.” During his visit to Bishkek, Gor also met with Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, with the meeting covering economic cooperation and U.S. business engagement in Kyrgyzstan, including the participation of American companies in the B5+1. The Kyrgyz presidency said the two sides also discussed prospects for expanding trade, attracting investment, and developing cooperation in priority economic sectors. Discussions in Bishkek highlighted how the B5+1 is being positioned as a standing mechanism rather than a one-off meeting. CIPE has framed the forum as part of an ongoing cycle in which private-sector proposals are developed through working groups and carried forward between annual meetings. U.S. officials have linked the B5+1 more directly to Washington’s broader economic approach toward Central Asia. During his regional trip, which also includes Uzbekistan, Sergio Gor’s schedule has centered on business engagement and investment promotion rather than security or political consultations. For the Kyrgyz authorities, hosting the forum is part of a broader effort to position the country as a regional convening hub. A December notice from Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Economy and Commerce described the B5+1 as a regional business mechanism within the C5+1 framework, rather than a Kyrgyz-specific initiative. Previous B5+1 recommendations have focused on regulatory alignment, trade facilitation, and investment conditions, but no public timeline has been announced for publishing updated recommendations from the Bishkek meeting. CIPE has said outputs from earlier forums were compiled after consultations rather than issued as immediate communiqués. The absence of signed agreements or joint statements on the opening day has kept attention focused on whether the forum produces measurable follow-up. Earlier B5+1 recommendations from the 2024 Almaty meeting were published weeks after the event, following additional consultations with governments and business groups. The B5+1 concludes on February 5. Any updated recommendations or sector-specific commitments are expected to emerge after the forum rather than during the event itself.
The “Central Asia 2030” Roundtable in Astana: From External Interest to Regional Choice
Discussions about Central Asia’s long-term strategic future are increasingly shifting from a focus on external attention to one of growing regional agency. On Monday, Astana International University hosted the first roundtable in the series Central Asia 2030: Strategic Horizons and Regional Choices. Speakers included Andrew D’Anieri, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center; Yerkin Tukumov, Special Representative of the President of Kazakhstan; Ambassador-at-Large Zulfiya Suleimenova; and Dauren Aben, Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan. Pragmatism, Regional Choice, and the Logic of the “Grand Bargain” In his remarks, Andrew D’Anieri emphasized that Central Asia is increasingly viewed in the U.S. not as a peripheral zone but as an independent strategic partner. He noted that “environmental, water, and climate issues considered within a regional framework are fully supported by the U.S.” However, he added that “long-term commercial and investment projects are impossible without long-term stability, which in turn requires coordination between neighbors, engagement on sensitive issues, and pragmatic regional cooperation.” D’Anieri also pointed to Afghanistan as “an integral part of regional logic,” and described formats such as C5+1 as evidence of Central Asia’s growing subjectivity. He highlighted the first-ever C5+1 summit at the presidential level in Washington as a landmark event, especially under the administration of Donald Trump, known for its preference for bilateral over multilateral formats. Trump and the Possibility of a Visit: Only with a “Big Deal” When asked whether a visit by President Trump to Central Asia is realistic, D’Anieri offered a candid assessment: “Such a visit is only possible if there is a large, symbolically and economically significant deal.” Whether in aviation, technology, or infrastructure, these high-visibility projects are typically what draw Trump’s engagement. He added that “the region has work to do in developing a package of initiatives that could interest the U.S. president and justify a high-level visit.” Potential areas include mining, transport, and logistics. Reframing Afghanistan’s Role in the Region Special Representative Yerkin Tukumov focused on the importance of reframing the region’s relationship with Afghanistan. For too long, he said, Afghanistan has been viewed primarily “through the prism of security threats,” resulting in a narrow and often misleading approach. Tukumov argued for a broader, more pragmatic view that considers economic, humanitarian, and cross-border dimensions. He described the C5+1 format not as a replacement for bilateral diplomacy, but as “an additional level of coordination where Central Asia can speak with a more consolidated voice without losing national autonomy in foreign policy.” He stressed the need to move beyond “ideological and declarative approaches,” toward practical, interest-based mechanisms of cooperation. Ecology, Water, and the Case for a Global Water Agency Ambassador-at-Large Zulfiya Suleimenova addressed the strategic urgency of regional coordination on water and climate. She emphasized that “water issues are transboundary in nature,” and that efforts to resolve them solely within national frameworks are bound to fall short. “Regional coordination in Central Asia is not a political slogan, but a functional necessity,” she said. Suleimenova argued that jointly promoting initiatives in international forums “strengthens the region’s negotiating position, reduces mistrust, and increases legitimacy.” She described water as “not a factor of division, but a platform for cooperation.” She also criticized the inefficiency of current global water governance mechanisms. “International formats are overloaded, poorly managed, and often fail to yield results, particularly in the water sector,” she said. In this context, she expressed support for President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal to establish a dedicated UN water agency. Regional Choice as Strategic Imperative Throughout the roundtable, the theme of Regional Choices emerged as central. As Dauren Aben noted, “Central Asia remains a region of natural competition and differences in national interests.” Attempts to reduce it to integrationist or geopolitical binaries, he warned, oversimplify a far more complex reality. Aben posed what he sees as the defining question: “To what extent are Central Asian states ready to define who they want to be by 2030 and what projects should shape their future?” Conscious coordination, he argued, is essential to resisting imposed external frameworks and maintaining control over internal agendas. A Strategic Message from the Caspian Policy Center A written message from Efgan Nifti, Director General of the Caspian Policy Center, was also presented. Though unable to attend, Nifti offered his perspective on the regional moment. He described 2025 as “a year of alignment and strategic rapprochement in the Trans-Caspian region,” highlighting Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia as key pillars of the emerging Middle Corridor. These states, he argued, “possess unique tools to strengthen economic and logistical connectivity between Europe and Asia.” Nifti also noted that the European Union stands to benefit significantly from the development of trans-Caspian routes, gaining more secure and diversified supply channels. Toward 2030: From Reaction to Institution-Building The roundtable demonstrated that Central Asia is increasingly moving beyond reactive politics. The region is beginning to see itself not as a subject of external agendas, but as a planner of its own future, one in which security, ecology, water, the economy, and diplomacy are part of a shared strategic framework. The challenge now is to transform that agency into durable institutions and implementable projects by 2030.
Opinion – Qosh Tepa Canal: Transboundary Impacts Without a Transboundary Mechanism
In recent months, media attention has increasingly focused on infrastructure projects underway in Afghanistan. Chief among them is the Qosh Tepa Canal, widely seen not only as an irrigation initiative but as a development with significant transboundary implications for the Amu Darya River basin.
The canal draws water from one of Central Asia’s most critical transboundary rivers. For downstream countries, primarily Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya is a vital water source, directly linked to agricultural output and the sustainability of rural communities. As such, the conversation surrounding Qosh Tepa extends well beyond Afghanistan’s domestic agenda.
Concerns voiced by experts and analysts stem from both the scale of the project and the absence of an inclusive, basin-wide mechanism that includes Afghanistan, which is not a party to the main post-Soviet Amu Darya allocation frameworks. As a result, discussions regarding the canal’s potential impacts are taking place largely outside formal multilateral frameworks.
One positive development is the increasing presentation of Qosh Tepa within a broader context, where water flow management is recognized as a factor shaping regional political and economic relations. However, these assessments often highlight not the canal’s stated purpose, but rather the absence of a sustainable mechanism for coordinating discussion of its cross-border effects.
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Image: TCATCA[/caption]
A recurring concern among experts is the lack of a structured multilateral platform that enables early-stage evaluation of such projects before they are perceived as risks. Infrastructure development in the region frequently outpaces the establishment of mechanisms for joint impact assessment and management.
In this light, Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish a specialized structure within the UN system, the International Water Organization, acquires particular relevance. This proposal is not about building a theoretical global agenda but about addressing a specific institutional gap: the lack of a neutral forum for technical and expert discussion of transboundary water projects at an early stage.
The Qosh Tepa Canal, currently a unilateral infrastructure undertaking rather than the result of an international agreement, could serve as a test case for such a preventive mandate. While the project is already underway and its transboundary implications are actively being discussed among experts, it has not yet escalated into a regional dispute. This creates an opportunity for professional dialogue, without entanglement in political or status-related debates.
The present situation can be summarized as one of “transboundary implications without a transboundary mechanism.” The project, while entirely within Afghan territory, objectively affects the interests of downstream states, yet it remains disconnected from any multilateral framework for consultation or agreement.
Is it in Afghanistan’s interest to engage in multilateral formats? Though the question is often left unanswered, the answer is a clear “yes.” Such engagement would help dispel suspicion not only among Central Asian states, but also in Iran and Pakistan, both of which have voiced concerns over shared water resources.
First, it would reduce negative external rhetoric. Currently, Qosh Tepa is largely discussed via external media with alarmist scenarios and with little to no Afghan participation. This reinforces the image of Afghanistan as a unilateral actor, whose intentions are open to interpretation.
Second, involvement in regional dialogue would help the Islamic Emirate legitimize its flagship project, even in the absence of formal political recognition. This could help mitigate the risk of diplomatic or political pressure.
Third, multilateral engagement would enhance the long-term sustainability of the canal. Without regional coordination and an international mechanism, the risk of water disputes and broader politicization of water will rise, making the Qosh Tepa project itself increasingly vulnerable.
Some may ask whether this would amount to a “water for recognition” deal. The answer is, most likely not. The Taliban has generally rejected framing recognition as something to be traded for concessions. But Kabul must understand that water is a strategic resource, not a bargaining chip. The more likely outcome is a pragmatic calculation: reducing external risk surrounding the canal project while maintaining a firm stance on sovereignty.
Ultimately, the Qosh Tepa situation calls not for media dramatization, but for institutional dialogue rooted in technical cooperation and involving Afghanistan in regional water governance.
For the countries of Central Asia, Afghan participation in multilateral water frameworks could help reduce risks, not create new ones. Strengthening Afghanistan’s food and water security serves the interests of the entire region. Within the C5 format, a stable Afghanistan is not an end in itself but a prerequisite for long-term development, deeper connectivity, and a stronger, more autonomous regional position in a shifting global landscape.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Rhetoric, Disinformation, and Regional Responses: Central Asia Reacts to Debates in the Russian Media Space
In recent months, a series of sharp and at times openly threatening statements circulating within the Russian media space have drawn growing attention in Central Asia. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, rhetoric targeting several Central Asian states has become increasingly frequent on Russian television and social platforms, raising concern among analysts and the public over issues of sovereignty, coercive tactics, and broader regional security.
Russian officials have repeatedly stressed that commentary aired on television talk shows or circulated on social media does not necessarily reflect official state policy. Moscow has, on several occasions, distanced itself from provocative remarks made by media personalities, emphasizing that Russia’s foreign policy is articulated only through formal government channels.
Analysts note that such episodes unfold within a highly polarized information environment, where sensational or confrontational statements can spread rapidly online, often detached from their original context or intent. Even when later denied or debunked, these narratives can contribute to heightened tensions by reinforcing existing anxieties and testing political and societal reactions in neighboring states.
One recent and widely discussed episode involved a video that went viral on social media, allegedly showing Russian State Duma deputy and former heavyweight boxing champion Nikolai Valuev calling for a shift in Russia’s approach toward former Soviet republics from “carrots” to “sticks”, while also hinting at the possibility of a “special operation” in Central Asia. The footage sparked an immediate backlash and skepticism, particularly in Uzbekistan.
According to RIA Novosti, Valuev later publicly denied the authenticity of the video, asserting that it was a deepfake. The Russian news agency quoted him as saying the video “has nothing to do with me” and had been produced using AI. “I’m glad that technologies are developing so fast, but this was done with artificial intelligence,” he said, noting that he often discusses AI and deepfakes and that “apparently, AI has taken offense at me.”
Doubts about the video’s authenticity emerged almost immediately. Among those questioning it was Ruslan Chagaev, the former world boxing champion from Uzbekistan and one of Valuev’s former opponents, who publicly expressed his disbelief that the statements reflected Valuev’s actual views. Nonetheless, the incident fueled broader discussions in Central Asia about information manipulation, the role of deepfakes, and how aggressive narratives can gain traction, even when later debunked.
These concerns were echoed at a recent session of the analytical forum “Fikrat,” held in Tashkent under the theme National Interest and Global Pressure. The gathering brought together political scientists, economists, and historians to assess the growing volume of inflammatory rhetoric emerging from Russia and its implications for Central Asia. Participants stressed that, even when such narratives do not reflect or translate directly into policy, they can shape public perception and test societal and governmental responses.
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The Firkat Forum in Tashkent; image: TCA, Sadokat Jalolova.[/caption]
Economist Abdulla Abdukadirov, First Deputy Director General of Uzbekistan’s Agency for Strategic Reforms under the President, addressed the ideological underpinnings of these narratives, identifying Russian nationalist figure Alexander Dugin as a central figure promoting imperialist ideas. “Dugin is an ideologue of Russian imperialism and a creator of narratives,” Abdukadirov stated. “It is not necessary that this narrative will be adopted by the authorities in Russia as a guide to action. But a narrative is a harbinger of popular and state ideology. It lays the groundwork and tests reactions.”
Abdukadirov emphasized that Central Asia’s response should be direct and unequivocal. “Enough talk about our sovereignty. You did not give it to us, and it is not for you to take it away,” he declared. Referencing the war in Ukraine, he called it a “hard and unambiguous lesson,” cautioning that reliance on coercion and violence would only provoke greater resistance. He further warned that external pressure could eventually backfire due to the strong centrifugal forces within the Russian Federation itself.
When asked by The Times of Central Asia whether Russia holds significant economic leverage over Uzbekistan, Abdukadirov identified labor migration as a key vulnerability. “First of all, migrants are our biggest vulnerability,” he said. He also noted that by 2022, Russian companies had acquired substantial assets in Uzbekistan’s energy, telecommunications, and media sectors. “They have very large control,” he said, though he added that their influence should not be exaggerated.
At the same time, Abdukadirov argued that control of assets alone is not decisive if market dynamics shift. “If the state manages the market correctly, a thousand assets can turn into nothing in one day,” he said. He pointed to China as a country that understands how market conditions determine asset value. “The market environment is more important than assets. The state creates that environment together with society,” he said, underscoring the need for continued dialogue.
Political scientist Hamid Sodiq focused on how the tone of external pressure has evolved, observing that rhetoric once limited to fringe voices has become mainstream. “Today, it has taken a naked form. No one is ashamed anymore,” he said, recalling that in earlier years, even provocative commentators were more cautious when discussing Uzbekistan’s sovereignty. According to Sodiq, this change reflects a shift in the nature of geopolitical discourse and heightens the need for internal resilience.
Sodiq warned that mounting external pressure can result in internal consequences, including the risk of political tightening if societies are unprepared. In such an environment, he argued, it is vital to maintain a balance, defending sovereignty while preserving the relationship between the state and society. “This is the time when we must join hands and act together,” he said, urging solidarity and open discourse.
The discussion in Tashkent also reflected on regional and global dynamics. Abdukadirov cited remarks by Canada’s prime minister at the World Economic Forum in Davos: “The middle powers must act together, because if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu.” He added that when Central Asian nations act collectively, “we will not be on the menu, but among those placing the order.”
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
