OTS Summit in Turkistan Reveals Strains Beneath Turkic Unity
Last Friday, the Kazakh city of Turkistan, officially promoted as the “spiritual capital” of the Turkic world, hosted an informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The official theme was artificial intelligence and digital development, but the meeting also highlighted older questions about the OTS’s political identity, its relationship with Russia, and Ankara’s influence within the Turkic world. Because the gathering was informal, much of what took place remained behind closed doors. Yet public statements, official readouts, and subsequent commentary offered clues about the tensions and competing agendas within the organization. The summit brought together the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, as well as Tufan Erhurman, president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is recognized only by Turkey. The meeting followed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s state visit to Kazakhstan, during which the two countries signed 15 agreements, including a Declaration on Eternal Friendship and an Enhanced Strategic Partnership between Kazakhstan and Turkey. In Turkistan, summit participants visited the mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi, where Erdoğan donated a handwritten Quran manuscript to the historic site. Leaders also launched the construction of a Center for Turkic Civilization. The presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan separately visited a newly built mosque donated to Turkistan by Tashkent. Despite the atmosphere of symbolism and fraternity, however, the summit also exposed clear differences between Ankara’s wide-ranging vision for the OTS and Astana’s insistence that the organization should remain a practical cooperation platform. Those differences became especially visible in President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s speech at the summit. “Recently, opinions have been voiced portraying our organization as a military alliance. It is obvious that those spreading such speculation pursue malicious goals and seek to sow discord. Kazakhstan considers it necessary to reject such positions,” Tokayev said. “The Organization of Turkic States is neither a geopolitical project nor a military organization. It is a unique platform aimed at strengthening trade, economic, technological, digital, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation among brotherly nations.” Kazakh political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev argued that Tokayev’s remarks reflected a growing internal debate within the OTS. “On the one hand, some media interpreted his words as a response to foreign experts warning about the emergence of a ‘Turanic NATO.’ On the other hand, it should be noted that some fellow presidents within the OTS persistently promote the development of military cooperation. Kazakhstan is equally persistent in defining which forms of interaction it considers acceptable within the organization,” Ashimbayev wrote. Another analyst, Andrei Chebotarev, also argued that the core message of Tokayev’s speech was to frame the OTS primarily as a platform for economic, technological, digital, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. “In this context, he rejected the idea of transforming the organization into a military-political bloc. This sent a signal both to pan-Turkic political forces interested in such a transformation and to political elites in countries that view the organization’s activities with caution,” Chebotarev said. Chebotarev also noted that Tokayev referenced the “OTS+” format launched at the organization’s previous summit in Azerbaijan and voiced support for the Russian-backed initiative, “Altai, the cradle of Turkic civilization.” According to the analyst, this could be interpreted as a subtle invitation for Russia to potentially engage with the OTS+ framework. “At the very least, another initiative proposed by the Kazakh president, the creation of the ‘Altai Dialogue Platform’ forum, could become a subject of discussion with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his upcoming state visit to Kazakhstan,” Chebotarev suggested. Another indirect sign of internal disagreements was the incomplete attendance at the summit itself. “Delegations from Turkmenistan and Hungary, both OTS observers, were absent, while the Turks traditionally brought along the president of Northern Cyprus, something the other participants preferred not to mention in their official statements,” Ashimbayev observed. According to Ashimbayev, Erdoğan expressed hope that “the Turkic world will continue strengthening its political, economic, and cultural ties with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” Language policy also emerged as a sensitive issue during the summit, with Erdoğan reiterating Turkey’s long-standing proposal to promote the widespread adoption of a common Turkic alphabet. In his words, “initiatives based on AI, such as the Turkish language model, should be supported to better showcase the richness of our common language in the digital world.” Ashimbayev pointed out that Erdoğan specifically referred to a “Turkish” model rather than a broader “Turkic” one. Tokayev responded by proposing the creation of a shared terminological database for Turkic languages and suggested establishing an Interstate Terminology Commission as a first step. Chebotarev argued that Tokayev’s proposal could be viewed as a softer alternative to Ankara’s push for rapid implementation of a unified Turkic alphabet. That interpretation carries additional weight given Kazakhstan’s own politically sensitive debate over transitioning the Kazakh language to the Latin alphabet, a process that has effectively been postponed indefinitely. While Tokayev and Erdoğan’s remarks exposed the more sensitive political and cultural edges of the OTS agenda, other leaders used the summit to emphasize practical cooperation. That contrast was clearest on transport and technology, where the organization’s ambitions are easier to define and less diplomatically risky. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, for example, spoke about the Middle Corridor in connection with another infrastructure initiative. “Given the strategic role of the Middle Corridor, we are paying special attention to linking it with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway currently under construction,” Mirziyoyev said. Notably, the railway project has previously been viewed by some analysts as a potential alternative to existing east-west routes through Kazakhstan, although it is now increasingly being discussed as a link to the Middle Corridor rather than a replacement for it. Kazakh political analyst Marat Shibutov said one of the most significant developments at the summit was Kazakhstan’s effort to position artificial intelligence and digitalization as central themes within the OTS agenda. “We should understand that we are not simply emphasizing this topic; we are actively developing the AI industry and digital technologies in general. We have many strong solutions, but few export markets because Russia and China already have powerful domestic sectors. That is why we are trying to promote these technologies through the OTS platform; perhaps someone there will buy something,” Shibutov wrote. Taken together, the summit showed an organization trying to grow without agreeing fully on what it should become. For Ankara, the OTS remains a vehicle for deeper Turkic political, cultural, and linguistic alignment. For Astana, it is more useful as a practical platform for trade, transport, technology, and cultural exchange, but not as a bloc with military or geopolitical ambitions. The Turkistan meeting did not resolve that tension. It made it more visible.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be covering the highly successful OTS summit in Turkistan, alongside Putin's notably bad day at the Moscow Victory Day parade. We'll also break down the new ships launching in the Caspian Sea and what they signal for cross-Caspian trade, a long-awaited move from Kyrgyzstan's Prosecutor General that we've been tracking for months, another serious shootout involving counter-narcotics forces in Afghanistan, and Emomali Rahmon's trip to Beijing for talks with the Chinese leadership. And for our main story, we turn to Tajikistan's heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, the man widely tipped to become the country's next president On the show this week: - Salim Ayoubzod (Radio Free Liberty) - Edward Lemon (The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs)
Central Asia Enters the Minerals Race
Central Asia is entering the critical minerals race at a time when deposits alone no longer confer strategic advantage. The Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress, scheduled for June 11–12 at Hilton Astana, gives the issue operational form: supply chains, investment, and commercial projects. U.S. Under Secretary Jacob Helberg will participate there and in the preceding C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue on June 10–11. The Astana agenda also puts Central Asia’s role in global supply chains directly into view. The test is how quickly governments, investors, and industrial buyers can finance, process, move, and purchase minerals before they are locked into industrial supply chains. The G7 is moving in the same direction, but through institutional design rather than industrial action. The group is discussing a permanent critical minerals secretariat to maintain continuity across changing G7 presidencies, possibly at either the International Energy Agency or the OECD. The proposal acknowledges a real deficiency in Western coordination, but it also reveals the larger problem: continuity is useful only if it becomes execution. At the same time, reports have circulated about disagreements over stockpiling and leadership, including European resistance to both a single shared stockpile and a U.S.-led structure. For Central Asia, the practical question is not institutional architecture alone, but whether such coordination produces finance, processing capacity, and long-term offtake. The June dialogue in Astana is part of a wider C5+1 movement from diplomacy toward operational cooperation. Its participants are trying to convert the platform from a talk shop into a vehicle for business transactions. As TCA has reported, U.S. engagement in the region is increasingly tied to business mechanisms, export-credit support, and project finance. Kazakhstan has already moved into this framework track. Kazakhstan and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on critical minerals cooperation during Tokayev’s November 2025 visit to Washington, and the agreement took immediate shape through the Tau-Ken Samruk–Cove Capital tungsten project. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry later described the MOU as the first agreement of its kind in Central Asia, providing for processing capacity in Kazakhstan, technology transfer, and expanded access for Kazakh products to the U.S. market. In February 2026, Uzbekistan followed with its own U.S. critical minerals track: TCA reported that Tashkent signed a critical minerals MOU on February 4, and that DFC heads of terms for a Joint Investment Framework followed on February 19. Central Asian governments are not passive terrain for outside competition. Kazakhstan, with Central Asia’s most developed mining and metallurgical base, and Uzbekistan, with a rapidly expanding minerals program, are using minerals competition to attract capital and build processing capacity. They are seeking to diversify partners and move beyond dependence on raw material exports. The regional objective is industrial upgrading while preserving room for maneuver between China, Russia, the United States, Europe, and other partners. The minerals question cannot be separated from the larger Eurasian setting. Central Asia is trying to widen its own field of choice before its options are narrowed by what Hudson Institute senior fellow Ken Moriyasu called, in comments to The Times of Central Asia, a “sanctuary across the Eurasian Heartland.” The chief constraint is midstream capacity. Western access to Central Asian deposits does not by itself diversify supply chains, because China currently dominates refining and processing. The IEA projects that, by 2035, China will still supply more than 60% of refined lithium and cobalt and around 80% of battery-grade graphite and rare earth elements. Central Asia, therefore, needs additional processing, offtake, and industrial-use channels alongside existing ones. Otherwise, new upstream projects may reinforce today’s downstream concentration: ore mined in one country, concentrated in another, refined through established channels, and returned to global markets without materially widening the region’s commercial options. Central Asia’s mineral endowment gives the region strategic relevance, but not by itself full supply-chain power. The OECD has identified the region as a veritable periodic table of the elements: it holds significant shares of global reserves in aluminum, chromium, cobalt, copper, lead, manganese, molybdenum, titanium, and zinc. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and Central Asia’s dominant copper producer, while Uzbekistan also has major copper resources and ambitious expansion plans. Kazakhstan, however, is not a greenfield minerals economy. It already has a substantial mining and metallurgical base, including uranium, ferroalloys, copper, zinc, aluminum, titanium, and related industrial infrastructure. The policy question is therefore not whether Kazakhstan can produce minerals, but whether its existing base can be connected to international financing, higher-value processing, and diversified downstream offtake. Yet the same OECD work points to constraints ranging from exploration and geological-data reporting to state-owned-enterprise dominance, legacy investor concerns, and connectivity. Resource potential becomes investable only when reserves are documented to international standards, transport routes make commercial sense, licensing risks are bounded, and downstream buyers can see a credible industrial path from mine to processor. Kazakhstan’s tungsten is a case in point. Even as Kazakhstan has moved beyond preliminary interest through a U.S.-linked 70/30 joint venture to develop the North Katpar and Upper Kairakty deposits, recent concentrate exports have still flowed entirely to China. TCA reported that Kazakhstan exported 3,700 tons of tungsten concentrates worth $71 million in 2025, all of it to China. The case illustrates not a lack of Kazakh industrial competence, but the gap between a major project-development agreement and the still unfinished task of creating diversified processing and offtake channels. At the same time, Cove Kaz has acquired a 70% ownership interest in Severniy Katpar LLP, with Tau-Ken Samruk retaining 30%. The tungsten project is proceeding toward a definitive feasibility study, and U.S. financing agencies have issued letters of interest tied to financing and downstream development. Kazakhstan is also planning new non-ferrous metallurgy projects, including value-added products from copper and aluminum, to expand the value-added role of its existing metallurgical sector. Kazakhstan has promoted the Middle Corridor as part of its offer to U.S. investors, linking mineral development to broader east-west transit capacity while preserving its broader multi-vector approach to connectivity. Critical minerals move through rail systems, Caspian crossings, ports, customs procedures, and offtake contracts. In the same comments, Moriyasu warned that economic, logistical, and security networks can “reinforce each other,” pointing to the risk of path dependency: durable pathways can form before they are recognized as strategic facts. If midstream control, transit routing, financing habits, and industrial dependency align around one dominant channel, diversification becomes harder even when alternatives remain formally available. For U.S. and European policymakers, critical minerals are therefore part of a wider concern over whether Eurasian connectivity remains open and plural or gradually hardens into what Moriyasu, drawing on U.S. foreign policy scholar Hal Brands, calls “Fortress Eurasia.” For Central Asian governments, the same issue is more immediate and practical: preserving multiple routes, investors, processors, and buyers. Western partners, therefore, need to move from meetings and secretariats to coordinated finance, processing capacity, and offtake commitments. The proposed G7 unit may preserve institutional continuity. The C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue may give the United States and Central Asian governments a working channel. But routes have to be mapped, projects financed, and downstream buyers committed. Only then will Central Asia’s minerals be able to participate in multiple supply chains rather than remain routed primarily through existing concentrated downstream systems. The measure of success will be whether Central Asia can convert critical minerals diplomacy into a growing pipeline of bankable projects that multiply financing, processing, transport, and offtake across the region.
Erdoğan Visit Puts Trade, Transit, and Turkic Economic Integration at Center of Kazakhstan’s OTS Push
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Kazakhstan comes as Astana is trying to give the Organization of Turkic States a more practical economic role, linking trade, investment, transport, digital development, and business financing across the Turkic world.
The visit centered on three connected events: Erdoğan’s official visit to Astana, the sixth meeting of the Kazakhstan-Turkey High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, and the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Turkistan. Erdoğan arrived in Astana ahead of talks with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, while Turkish media reported that the agenda included transport links through the Middle Corridor, Caspian transit routes, energy security, logistics, defense industry cooperation, trade and investment.
The visit also carried strong symbolic staging. According to Akorda, Erdoğan’s aircraft was escorted by Kazakh Air Defense fighter jets after entering Kazakhstan’s airspace. At Astana airport, he was greeted by an honor guard, children waving the flags of Kazakhstan and Turkey, and military helicopters displaying the national symbols of both countries. Erdoğan later said the welcome had brought his delegation “enormous joy,” adding, “We certainly will not forget this.”
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Kazakh aircraft fly over Astana during the ceremonial welcome for Erdoğan. Image: Akorda[/caption]
The OTS summit is being hosted by Kazakhstan on May 15 in Turkistan under the theme “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” According to the organization, the summit is intended to advance cooperation on artificial intelligence, digital innovation, emerging technologies, public services, sustainable economic growth, and regional connectivity.
The digital theme reflects Kazakhstan’s effort to give the OTS a more practical economic role, beyond its cultural and diplomatic foundations. Ahead of the summit, Astana hosted a business forum on May 13 under the title “Economic Integration and Cooperation of the OTS Countries: New Opportunities in Industry, Agro-Industrial Complex, Logistics and Digitalization.” Kazakhstan’s prime minister’s office said the forum brought together state bodies, financial institutions, chambers of commerce, international organizations, and business representatives from OTS countries.
Kanat Sharlapayev, chairman of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Turkic States and of the presidium of Kazakhstan’s Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, urged Turkic countries to move toward deeper industrial and digital integration. He said the task was to create a unified digital environment, reduce the distance between producers and consumers, increase transparency, and speed up transactions.
The forum also discussed plans for joint industrial facilities and manufacturing zones along transport corridors, an idea that would push OTS cooperation beyond transit toward processing and value-added production.
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin used the forum to frame OTS cooperation as one of Kazakhstan’s foreign economic priorities. He said the OTS countries form a market of more than 170 million people and have significant industrial, transport, agricultural, and human potential. He also said the main task was to move from declarations to joint projects, new production, technology alliances, and mutual investment.
Silk Way TV reported that Murat Karimsakov, chairman of the Kazakh Chamber of International Commerce, said trade turnover among OTS countries increased by more than 36% in 2025, while direct investment from Turkic states into Kazakhstan reached nearly half a billion dollars. Karimsakov also said Turkish investment in Kazakhstan had exceeded $6 billion over the past 20 years.
The trade target remains ambitious. At the council meeting in Astana, Erdoğan said Kazakhstan and Turkey had reaffirmed their goal of raising bilateral trade turnover to $15 billion. He also emphasized the importance of implementing the action plan adopted at the 14th meeting of the Joint Economic Cooperation Commission, held in Astana on April 15. The April commission meeting had already pointed to the practical areas behind the new trade push. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan was seeking to expand agricultural exports to Turkey, with the two sides discussing trade in grain, oilseeds, livestock products, sugar, confectionery, and processed foods.
Tokayev placed the investment relationship in similar terms, stating that Turkish investment in Kazakhstan had reached $6 billion, while Kazakh investment in Turkey had approached $2.5 billion. He also described Turkey as one of Kazakhstan’s top five trading partners and said the two countries would sign a Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Expanded Strategic Partnership.
The business forum gave that political language a more practical layer. Kazakhstan’s Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs signed an agreement with the Turkic Investment Fund aimed at expanding investment cooperation and supporting joint projects. A separate memorandum was signed between the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Turkic States, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Trade Chamber, and the National Association of Cooperatives and Other Economic Communities.
The Turkic Investment Fund is central to that effort. Kazakhstan views the fund as one of the main financial mechanisms for supporting joint OTS projects. Zhumangarin said the fund was ready to allocate at least $20 million at the initial stage for co-financing projects, and that talks were underway on possible participation in financing infrastructure development at Almaty International Airport.
For Kazakhstan, the OTS connects bilateral ties with Turkey to a wider regional corridor. The organization’s members are Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Its observer states are Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, while the Economic Cooperation Organization has observer organization status.
This gives the OTS a geographic logic that is increasingly economic as well as cultural and political. It links Central Asia with Azerbaijan and Turkey across the Caspian, overlapping with Kazakhstan’s long-running effort to expand the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, often called the Middle Corridor. Azerbaijan is the pivotal Caspian link in Kazakhstan’s westward corridor to the South Caucasus and Europe, with Astana also pursuing Caspian fiber-optic and power-cable projects alongside transport cooperation.
Zhumangarin separately highlighted the importance of sustainable transport routes, including the modernization of rail and port infrastructure to expand transit and trade between East and West.
Transport and logistics remain the key test. Kazakhstan wants more reliable export and transit options across the Caspian, while Turkey wants to strengthen its role as the western gateway for goods moving between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. The business forum’s focus on logistics shows the OTS economic agenda is now being tied directly to corridor development rather than solely to identity politics or diplomatic language.
Energy is part of the same corridor question, with energy security expected to feature prominently in the discussions. Any increase in Caspian-linked exports depends not only on political will, but also on port capacity, rail connections, pipeline standards, financing, and predictable customs procedures.
The visit also carries a cultural and humanitarian layer. Qazinform, citing Akorda, reported that Kazakhstan has built a school named after Khoja Ahmed Yassawi in Turkey’s Gaziantep province, which was affected by the 2023 earthquake. The two sides also agreed to open Maarif Foundation schools in Astana and Almaty. Around 14,000 Kazakh students are currently studying in Turkey, while about 260 Turkish students are studying in Kazakhstan.
Tokayev also said the newly established Khoja Ahmed Yassawi Order would be awarded to Erdoğan in recognition of his contribution to strengthening bilateral cooperation. The award reinforces the symbolic side of the visit, particularly because the OTS summit is being held in Turkistan, a city closely associated with Yassawi’s legacy.
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Ceremonial welcome for Erdoğan in Astana. Image: Akorda[/caption]
The symbolism of the visit carries weight, but the larger question is whether the organization can turn shared identity into a working economic infrastructure. For Kazakhstan and Turkey, that means fewer declarations and more usable routes, financing tools, customs links, and projects that businesses can actually rely on.
Erdoğan’s visit does not settle that question, but it shows where Astana wants the OTS to go. The organization is being framed less as a cultural club and more as a platform for trade, transit, investment, and digital cooperation. Whether that platform can deliver will depend on what follows after the summit: signed projects, funded corridors, and simpler movement of goods across the Caspian.
Uzbekistan Expands U.S. Labor Migration Talks in New York
A delegation from Uzbekistan held a series of meetings with international organizations, educational institutions, employers, and law firms during the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) in New York, as Tashkent seeks to expand legal labor migration opportunities in the United States. According to Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency, the delegation included officials from the agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Uzbekistan’s embassy in Washington. The push comes as labor migration remains a major part of Uzbekistan’s economy. The Central Bank of Uzbekistan said remittance inflows reached high levels in 2025, with $9.9 billion arriving through traditional money transfer systems and another $8.6 billion credited directly to bank cards through P2P transfers. That scale has made overseas employment both a household income issue and a policy priority for Tashkent. The forum opened with remarks by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Amy Pope, director general of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), who outlined priorities for global migration policy and international cooperation. During the event, Behzod Musayev, the head of Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency, presented information on migration reforms underway in Uzbekistan, including vocational and language training programs designed to prepare citizens for overseas employment. Musayev said labor migration should be viewed as an economic necessity and an investment in human capital. The delegation also met with Ugochi Daniels, IOM’s deputy director general for operations, to discuss protecting the rights of citizens of Uzbekistan working abroad and organizational issues related to an international migration forum scheduled to be held in Tashkent. Several meetings focused on expanding cooperation with U.S. educational institutions and employers. Uzbekistan signed a cooperation agreement with Logan University in Missouri on training medical personnel for the U.S. labor market, launching joint educational programs, and developing human resources. Representatives of Missouri Trucking School discussed creating a 160-hour training program to prepare drivers from Uzbekistan according to U.S. standards and support their employment opportunities. Talks with the National Council of Agricultural Employers focused on organizing labor forums with employers and expanding seasonal work programs for citizens of Uzbekistan. The delegation also reached agreements with the recruitment organization Head Honchos on H-2A visa processing, promoting agricultural workers from Uzbekistan in the U.S., and launching preparatory programs lasting eight to ten weeks. In meetings with the New York-based law firm Ballon Stoll, officials discussed work opportunities through O, H-2A, H-2B, H-1B, and E visas, as well as stronger legal protections for citizens of Uzbekistan employed in the U.S. The U.S. route is still at an early stage and will depend on American visa rules and employer demand. Under U.S. regulations, H-2A and H-2B petitions are generally limited to nationals of countries designated by the Department of Homeland Security, though USCIS can approve petitions for workers from non-designated countries on a case-by-case basis if it determines that doing so is in the U.S. interest. The discussions follow statements made earlier this year by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who instructed Uzbekistan’s diplomats to begin talks with Washington on including the country in U.S. seasonal labor recruitment programs. The effort also reflects Tashkent’s broader attempt to diversify labor migration routes. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that around 106,000 Uzbek citizens went to Russia in 2025 through organized recruitment programs, while an estimated 1.3 million Uzbek citizens were working there temporarily.
Uzbekistan Startups Win Two Honors at Global Startup Awards
Uzbekistan’s startup ecosystem received international recognition this week after two projects from the country won top honors at the Global Startup Awards Grand Finale, held during the EU-Startups Summit in Valletta, Malta. The event brought together startup founders, investors, and technology leaders from more than 54 countries. The Global Startup Awards is considered one of the world’s leading platforms for recognizing innovation ecosystems, selecting finalists through regional and national competitions across multiple continents. According to organizers, Uzbek representatives won in two global categories. Rakhimakhon Nugmanova, founder of the startup Peritech, received the “Ecosystem Hero of the Year” award, while Catextra was named “Best Greentech Startup of the Year.” Speaking to Times of Central Asia, Nugmanova said the recognition carried special meaning because it reflected support from the international startup community itself. “For me, this award is very important because it means people themselves chose me,” she said. “It shows that the work we are doing to develop the ecosystem has been noticed and appreciated by the people it is meant for.” She added that representing both Uzbekistan and Central Asia on the global stage was significant at a time when the region is drawing increasing international attention. “I think people were able to feel my sincerity and my passion for this work,” Nugmanova told The Times of Central Asia. “For many years, I have worked at the intersection of education, technology, and the public sector, and I hope I am making a meaningful contribution to people’s lives, from children to adults.” The success in Malta follows the Global Startup Awards Central Asia regional final held in Tashkent during ICT Week in September 2025 with support from IT Park Uzbekistan. The event helped regional startups connect with investors and international technology networks. Catextra’s victory highlighted growing international interest in sustainable technologies developed in Uzbekistan. The platform focuses on transparency and traceability in the textile industry, helping manufacturers track every stage of their supply chains and verify compliance with international ethical and production standards. A member of the Catextra team, Amal Isamukhamedov, told The Times of Central Asia that the award demonstrated international confidence in an idea developed in Uzbekistan. “For our team, winning at the Global Startup Awards means recognition and trust from European technology structures in our Uzbek idea,” he said. “We realized that our idea can work not only in our region, but also beyond it.” According to Isamukhamedov, the platform is designed to help textile and agricultural exporters from Uzbekistan and Central Asia access higher-value markets in Europe, the United States, and Asia, where buyers increasingly demand proof of product origin and transparent supply chains. “Our platform helps local producers export faster, more cheaply, and more easily,” he said. He also credited growing state support for the startup sector, including initiatives backed by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and IT Park Uzbekistan, with helping local startups enter international markets. “Five years ago, these ideas and this political will were only beginning to form,” he said. “Now a new generation of students and founders is emerging that can compete internationally.”
Opinion: A New Southern Gate – How the EU-Armenia Summit Unlocks a Critical Branch for the Middle Corridor
For the first time in its history, the European Union held a full summit with Armenia. The meeting, which took place in Yerevan on 4–5 May 2026, was not merely a diplomatic milestone for Armenia. It also sent a signal to governments thousands of kilometers away in Central Asia that the trade route linking Asia to Europe through the South Caucasus is becoming more real, and more politically backed, than ever before.
The centerpiece of the summit saw the signing of a “Connectivity Partnership” between Brussels and Yerevan. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, described Armenia as "uniquely positioned" to connect Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Under the EU's Global Gateway program, investments in Armenia are expected to reach €2.5 billion. A further €3 billion is earmarked specifically for the Middle Corridor – the trade route that runs from China across Central Asia, over the Caspian Sea, through the South Caucasus, and into Europe.
“We will support your integration into key transport networks like the Trans-Caspian Corridor. It is a route that is also of strategic importance for Europe, given the growing flows of trade between our two regions,” von der Leyen stated.
A Route That Is Already Moving Fast
The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has grown at a pace that few predicted. Cargo volumes rose 70 percent in the first nine months of 2024 alone, reaching 3.4 million tons. By the end of that year, the total had climbed to 4.1 million tons – up from just 350,000 tons in 2021. The World Bank projects that the route could handle up to 11 million tonnes a year by 2030.
It's important to maintain some perspective. These numbers are small fry when compared to the billions of tons of trade that moves between Europe and Asia by sea. However, the Middle Corridor does offer important diversification, particularly given the spillover effects of wars in the Middle East and piracy in the Red Sea.
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Image: Trans Caspian International Transport Route and it’s southern part, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway project. Source: middlecorridor.com[/caption]
Where Uzbekistan Stands
For Uzbekistan, the Middle Corridor is both an opportunity and a work in progress. In January 2025, President Mirziyoyev signed a decree to upgrade road and rail connectivity, and in September 2024, Tashkent co-founded the Eurasian Transport Route Association alongside Austria, Azerbaijan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. In December 2024, Uzbekistan sent its first block train all the way to Brazil – through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and the Georgian port of Poti – proving the route is operationally viable.
But costs remain a challenge. Shipping a 40-foot container via the Middle Corridor currently costs between $3,500 and $4,500, compared to $2,800–$3,200 on the Northern Corridor through Russia. Europe, meanwhile, accounts for only around 3 percent of Uzbekistan's exports and 13 percent of its imports — a share that Tashkent wants to grow significantly.
The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway — a $8 billion, 573-kilometre project whose joint construction company was established in July 2024 — is the most consequential single piece of infrastructure in play. Once complete, it will give Uzbekistan an alternative means to access China by rail, bypassing Kazakhstan. As a 2025 analysis by Trends Research noted, the CKU will reduce transit time between China and Europe and lower export costs for the Fergana Valley — Uzbekistan's industrial heartland.
Where Armenia Fits In
For three decades, Yerevan has been cut off from regional logistics networks after Azerbaijan and Turkey closed their borders in the early 1990s. The EU summit this week marks the clearest signal yet that this isolation is ending.
Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, speaking at an EU connectivity ministerial in Luxembourg last October, framed the stakes directly: "Being at the crossroads, Armenia can play a crucial role in the chain connecting Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia." He also echoed von der Leyen's earlier assessment that opening Armenia's borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey would be, in the Commission President's words, a "game-changer" for the entire corridor.
Such an endeavor is likely to be contingent on the Armenian elections, which take place on June 7. Current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is bidding to earn himself a two-thirds majority in the country’s parliament, which will enable him to change the constitution to remove Armenia's claims on the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has made this a prerequisite for any final agreement on opening the TRIPP route through Armenia.
But he has his work cut out to achieve this. Russia has acted in its traditional role of spoiler, funneling money to various opposition parties in order to try to keep Armenia within its orbit.
Should Pashinyan prevail, the combined southern route, combining the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and the TRIPP corridor through Armenia, could allow cargo to be transported from Kashgar to European markets in about 10-14 days – about 900 kilometers shorter than the existing northern routes – which could reduce land costs per container by 20-30 percent compared to current prices.
It's a prize that many in Central Asia are quietly hoping for.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
ADB Annual Meeting in Samarkand Unveils Major Energy, Climate, and Development Initiatives
The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) 59th Annual Meeting concluded in the historic Uzbek city of Samarkand after four days of discussions focused on energy connectivity, climate financing, and economic resilience across Asia and the Pacific. Held from May 3 to 6, the gathering brought together government officials, development institutions, economists, and private sector representatives at a time of growing geopolitical and economic uncertainty. It marked the second time Uzbekistan has hosted the ADB Annual Meeting, following the 43rd edition in Tashkent in 2010.
A central announcement at the meeting was the unveiling of a broader $70 billion regional infrastructure program aimed at accelerating energy and digital connectivity across Asia and the Pacific.
The initiative is structured around two major pillars: a $50 billion Pan-Asia Power Grid Initiative focused on cross-border electricity systems, and a $20 billion digital connectivity component aimed at strengthening broadband and data infrastructure across the region.
Together, these programmes are intended to reduce energy costs, improve reliability, and deepen regional economic integration.
The Pan-Asia Power Grid Initiative (PAGI)
In his address to delegates, ADB President Masato Kanda noted that PAGI seeks to support more interconnected and resilient infrastructure systems. "To survive and thrive in this new era, we must build deeply connected and resilient systems," he said, adding that stronger regional grids and digital networks can help countries manage rising energy demand whilst also accelerating the transition to cleaner power sources. The initiative seeks to integrate around 20 gigawatts of renewable energy capacity and the develop enough transmission infrastructure to expand electricity access for up to 200 million people. ADB officials said the bank would use its role as a regional convener to bring together governments, regulators, and private investors to overcome barriers that often slow regional infrastructure projects. The bank pointed to earlier success stories, including the Bangladesh-India power grid interconnection and the Monsoon Wind Power Project in Laos, as examples of cross-border cooperation supported through blended finance mechanisms. [caption id="attachment_37211" align="aligncenter" width="1536"]
Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption]
Climate and Food Security Concerns
Climate and environmental financing also featured prominently during the Samarkand meetings. On May 5, the ADB announced that the German government had joined the bank’s Nature Solutions Finance Hub with €5.5 million ($6.5 million) in grant co-financing, some of which has been earmarked for sorely needed watershed rehabilitation in Uzbekistan.
The discussions also reflected growing concern over global food security and supply chain vulnerabilities linked to the ongoing war in Iran.
Qingfeng Zhang, Senior Director of ADB’s Agriculture, Food, Nature, and Rural Development Sector Office, warned that disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz were increasing the cost of everything from energy to insurance, freight to fertilizer – placing additional pressure on food systems across Asia and the Pacific, including Central Asia.
Unlike the shock caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which directly disrupted grain and fertilizer exports, Zhang said the current crisis was affecting agriculture primarily through higher operating and transportation costs.
The Strait of Hormuz handles roughly one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade and around one-third of fertilizer exports. Rising costs, Zhang said, are already affecting farmers’ planting decisions across the region.
Uzbekistan's Role
In his address to participants, the host, Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, took the opportunity to reel off a series of figures trumpeting Uzbekistan's economic success story of recent years. The president claimed the country had attracted $150 billion in foreign investment, tripled exports of goods and services, and expanded the size of the economy from $50 billion to $147 billion since he took power in 2016.
While many of these statements were factually incorrect or overblown – the last time Uzbekistan's GDP was as low as $50 billion was in 2010 – Mirziyoyev was right about the country's positive direction. He added that Uzbekistan aims to expand its economy to more than $240 billion by 2030, fully eliminate poverty, and transition toward innovation-driven growth.
The ADB has taken note and become one of Uzbekistan’s largest development partners, with the joint portfolio of completed and ongoing projects approaching $16 billion.
A new addition to that portfolio will be the 300-megawatt Bash 2 Wind Power Project in Uzbekistan’s Bukhara Region. The ADB signed a $116 million financing package with ACWA Power to support the construction of 39 wind turbines with capacities of up to eight megawatts each, whilst connecting them to the national grid.
The financing package includes $50 million from ADB’s ordinary capital resources, as well as money from commercial leaders and infrastructure investment funds.
Uzbek journalist and Doctor of Science Beruniy Alimov said the new cooperation priorities between Uzbekistan and ADB reflected the country’s ambition to become a more open and innovation-oriented economy integrated into global markets.
The bank’s next Annual Meeting will take place in Nagoya, Japan, from May 2-5, 2027, coinciding with the institution’s 60th anniversary.
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