How the Russia–Ukraine War Is Reshaping Central Asia’s Geopolitical Balance
More than four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict continues to alter political and economic relations across the former Soviet space. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Uzbek political scientist Mukhtor Nazirov examined Moscow’s evolving regional role, Central Asia’s search for wider external partnerships, and the areas in which Russia remains difficult to replace. “The war changed Russia,” Nazirov said. “It became more closed, more militarized, and its political logic increasingly became military. Central Asian countries suddenly found themselves dealing with a Russia that was no longer the same as it had been before the war.” Before 2022, Russia’s relations with Central Asia rested on long-established political, economic, and security ties. Since the invasion, international isolation and wartime pressures have complicated that relationship. “The war consumed everything,” Nazirov explained. “It influenced not only politics and the economy, but also public thinking, the country’s openness, its ideology, and the overall direction of the state. As Russia changed during the war, its dialogue with Central Asian countries became increasingly difficult.” “Central Asian states gained a moral justification to look for other options,” he said. “Russia is no longer the Russia it used to be.” Russia nevertheless remains deeply embedded in the region’s economy. Infrastructure, logistics networks, export routes, and labor migration still bind Central Asian states to the Russian market. Kazakhstan exports most of its oil through Russia’s Novorossiysk port, while trade from Uzbekistan and other countries continues to rely heavily on northern corridors. Millions of Central Asian citizens also work in Russia. “The economic foundation still exists,” Nazirov told TCA. “Much of Central Asia remains part of an economic structure that was formed during the Soviet period. Infrastructure is shared, and many export routes still pass through Russia.” However, the durability of Moscow’s influence is under closer scrutiny as other powers expand their regional presence. “Political closeness alone is not enough,” Nazirov said. “Any partnership eventually comes down to economics. If Russia wants to remain influential, it must have a strong economic foundation. If it cannot provide that, then others will naturally begin filling the gap.” China and the European Union have expanded their economic engagement as sanctions and wartime demands have constrained Russia. Interest has also grown in the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which offers an alternative to routes through Russia. “The rhetoric surrounding the Middle Corridor became much stronger during the war,” he said. “The project already existed, but the war created momentum.” The EU’s Global Gateway initiative and new connectivity financing have given Central Asian governments additional channels for trade, investment, and transport. “This space is being filled partly by China and partly by the European Union,” he said. “They are proposing alternatives, and naturally Central Asian countries are turning toward those opportunities.” Russia remains the main destination for Central Asian labor migrants, although governments are pursuing employment opportunities in South Korea, Europe, and the Gulf states. “I would not say diversification has already taken place,” Nazirov said. “But efforts in that direction are clearly underway.” Sanctions and concern over secondary exposure have added another consideration for governments and businesses across the region. “There is now a perception that cooperation with Russia has become more toxic,” Nazirov said. “In some cases, the reputational and economic risks outweigh the benefits.” Although they have intensified, discrimination and abuse against Central Asian migrants in Russia predate the invasion. Reports of pressure on detained migrants to sign documents leading to military contracts have raised additional concern. “They often do not want to go to war,” he said. “Various methods of pressure are used, and many of their relatives do not even know where they have been sent. People now understand what may happen if they are detained. That is one reason why mobilization among migrants has become more difficult.” The war has also affected Kazakhstan through its oil export infrastructure. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev recently suggested freezing the conflict after attacks damaged facilities linked to the Novorossiysk route, through which more than 80% of Kazakh oil reaches world markets. “The proposal was driven first of all by economic considerations,” Nazirov told TCA. “Kazakhstan’s main export route was affected, and that directly influences the country’s economic interests. Kazakhstan is suffering economic losses because of a conflict that is not its own. That was the main message.” Tokayev’s remarks also raised questions about whether Astana’s position represented a broader political shift. “There is no need to create a hero out of Tokayev,” Nazirov said. “Every politician acts according to the interests of their country, their economy, or their own political legitimacy. In this case, economic interests were the decisive factor.” Uzbekistan has also accelerated work on alternative trade and transport routes, including the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, as governments seek options beyond northern corridors. “Sanctions have affected logistics and trade with Russia,” Nazirov said. “That is one reason why alternative transport projects have become increasingly important.” The push for new transport links has coincided with closer coordination among the five Central Asian states. “Integration is often a reaction to instability,” he said. “As disorder around Central Asia increases, the countries of the region are becoming more united because they have little choice.” China’s role has grown through trade and investment, while Uzbekistan has expanded contacts with Western partners in areas including critical minerals and its bid to join the World Trade Organization. “Tashkent wants to demonstrate that Uzbekistan is a dynamically developing country and attract more international partners. Those signals are directed primarily toward Western investors rather than Russia.” Uzbekistan has also increased economic engagement with Afghanistan since the Taliban returned to power, while pursuing new transport and trade projects. “I think Uzbekistan has actively tried to diversify its trade and economic relations, and the war has been one of the factors encouraging that process,” Nazirov said. Central Asian governments have also sought closer ties with Washington as they broaden their external partnerships. “If cooperation serves American interests today, relations improve, and previous disagreements are quickly forgotten. But if those interests no longer align, the relationship can change just as quickly. It is a temporary alignment of interests rather than a traditional alliance.” Formats such as B5+1 have gained prominence alongside traditional diplomacy. “The emphasis has shifted toward economic cooperation,” Nazirov said. “There is always the question of what happens after Trump. Will these initiatives continue, or will they lose momentum once the officials leading them leave office?!” Across Central Asia, governments are preserving working relations with Russia while expanding cooperation with China, the European Union, the United States, and other partners. Kyrgyzstan faces growing secondary-sanctions risks, while Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are responding to the same shifting external environment from different political and economic positions. The five states have increasingly used regional coordination to present common positions and engage outside powers. “The region is surrounded by instability,” Nazirov told TCA. “Central Asia understands that individual countries are too small to attract sustained international attention on their own. By coordinating more closely, they become a much more significant partner.” The war has accelerated trends already underway across Central Asia, including the diversification of economic partnerships, development of alternative routes, and closer regional cooperation. Russia remains a major political and economic actor, but the region now has more partners and more avenues through which to reduce dependence on any single external power.
Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws
Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law.
Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data.
The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices.
Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage.
The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it.
The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent.
Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies.One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left them alone together, where the man fatally stabbed her. The killing provoked nationwide outrage. More than twenty police officers faced disciplinary measures, several lost their jobs, and the perpetrator was sentenced to twenty years in prison.
The case did not prove exceptional. In April 2021, 27-year-old Aizada Kanatbekova was abducted in broad daylight in Bishkek by a group led by a man who intended to force her to marry him. A witness alerted police, who also had access to security-camera footage, but Aizada was found strangled to death two days later. In September 2024, a Bishkek court upheld the acquittal of the former city police chief on negligence charges connected to the case.
Human rights organizations argue that the problem extends beyond criminal penalties. According to Human Rights Watch, women who survive abduction frequently face pressure from relatives and local communities to withdraw complaints or agree to the marriage. As a result, many kidnappings never lead to criminal investigations, leaving official statistics to capture only a fraction of the cases.
Kazakhstan has faced a different legal challenge. Rather than debating the severity of punishment, public discussion focused for years on the structure of the law itself.
Until September 2025, a person who abducted a woman could avoid criminal liability by voluntarily releasing the victim. In practice, that provision frequently allowed criminal proceedings to be terminated before reaching court. According to International IDEA, approximately 95% of criminal cases involving the abduction of women for forced marriage were closed on those grounds during the previous five years. The figure became one of the principal arguments for legislative reform.
Following a lengthy public debate, Kazakhstan amended its Criminal Code. The exemption from liability for voluntarily releasing a victim was removed, a separate offense of coercion into marriage was introduced, and penalties for abduction were strengthened.
The amendments took effect on September 16, 2025. By early November, the Interior Ministry said police had opened seven cases and detained 15 people. Convictions followed in 2026. In one case, three men abducted a 19-year-old woman in Taraz after she repeatedly refused to marry the man who organized the kidnapping. In May, all three received three-year sentences. These early prosecutions show that the law is being used, although it remains too soon to assess whether it has reduced the prevalence of bride kidnapping.
In Uzbekistan, bride kidnapping can begin with something as ordinary as accepting a lift home. One woman told Kun.uz that a man offered to drive her back, then took her instead to an unfamiliar house. When she tried to leave, an older woman blocked the doorway and warned that stepping over her would bring lifelong unhappiness. She stayed and married the man.
Uzbek law treats such cases as a crime. Article 136 prohibits abducting a woman for marriage, forcing her to marry or remain married, or preventing her from marrying someone of her choice. The maximum sentence is three years in prison. Yet cases continue to surface. In 2021, a 21-year-old woman in the Tashkent region escaped after being taken to a man’s home and pressured to marry him, prompting police to open a criminal investigation. The situation in Tajikistan remains less well documented. Human rights organizations report that many women avoid contacting law enforcement because they fear social stigma or pressure from relatives. Official statistics therefore reflect only a small proportion of cases, making it difficult to estimate the true scale of the problem. Even less information is available for Turkmenistan. Independent research is almost nonexistent, while the country's closed political environment severely limits journalists' and international organizations' ability to investigate such cases. In these circumstances, the absence of official data reflects a lack of information rather than evidence that the practice does not exist. Experience across Central Asia suggests that legislation alone is not enough. Even where criminal penalties have been strengthened or laws rewritten, many cases never reach the police. As long as social pressure, fear of public condemnation, and family expectations discourage women from reporting abductions, official statistics will continue to reveal only part of the picture.
Uzbekistan AI: Can Its Tech Boom Deliver an AI Economy?
Uzbekistan has spent the past several years positioning itself as a fast-growing Central Asian market for IT outsourcing. The government is now seeking to build an artificial intelligence economy on that export-oriented technology sector. While the state is investing in computing infrastructure and public-sector projects, Tashkent is looking to private technology companies to drive much of AI's commercial adoption. The strategy has produced visible activity, but whether it can develop into a sustainable AI economy remains an open question. Over the past five years, the government has expanded IT Park and its incentives, simplified rules for employing foreign specialists, and introduced tax breaks for resident companies. As digital service exports have grown, artificial intelligence has increasingly been positioned as the sector's next stage. According to IT Park, its resident companies were exporting services to more than 90 countries after the first seven months of 2025. North America accounted for 45% of exports, while the Asia-Pacific region and the Commonwealth of Independent States accounted for 26%, and the European Union and the United Kingdom for 24%. The figures show the sector's geographical reach. That export base gives Uzbekistan a plausible route into AI. Local companies can use existing engineering and outsourcing capacity to develop products for foreign clients, while private companies and software exports hold a prominent role in the government's commercial strategy. Uzbekistan has not yet built a fully fledged AI economy. Under targets set by an October 2025 presidential decree, at least 100 AI projects are to be implemented by the end of 2026, AI laboratories are to open at 15 universities, and more than $1 billion in foreign investment is to be attracted for AI infrastructure by 2030. These targets show the scale of the government's ambitions. Success will depend less on the number of approved programs than on whether they produce commercially viable AI products for international markets. Microsoft's Global AI Diffusion in Q1 2026 report estimated that 7.2% of Uzbekistan's working-age population used a generative AI product during the first quarter, compared with a global average of 17.8%. Uzbekistan was nevertheless among several Central Asian countries recording rapid growth from a relatively low base. Government policy is now shifting from creating favorable conditions toward supporting commercially oriented companies. In 2026, Uzbekistan launched the President AI Award, a national program combining startup acceleration with performance-based investment. Financing is linked to measurable business results and companies' ability to bring products to market. The government is also building a venture funding structure for technology startups. IT Park Ventures, established with the support of the Ministry of Digital Technologies, invests in technology startups, with artificial intelligence, fintech, DeepTech, and education technology among its priority sectors. The fund also helps portfolio companies enter international markets and connect with foreign investors. One Uzbek AI company active in this ecosystem is Repli AI. In March 2026, the startup secured $375,000 in cloud credits from Microsoft and Google to further develop its AI-powered sales and customer service platform. These were service credits rather than cash investment: $350,000 came through Microsoft Azure, and $25,000 through Google Cloud. The platform automates sales and customer service interactions on Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp. It uses natural language processing and retrieval-augmented generation, allowing its responses to draw on information provided by a business. The product is currently localized for Uzbek- and Russian-speaking markets, with the credits intended to help the company expand its infrastructure and enter new markets. Repli AI represents the type of company Uzbekistan hopes to cultivate through its emerging AI ecosystem: businesses that develop AI products and seek customers beyond the domestic market at an early stage. Support for such companies is also expanding. After a training phase in May and June 2026, selected teams entered a 10-week AI Incubator program in Tashkent in July. The program brings together engineers, entrepreneurs, and industry experts to refine AI products, develop business models, and prepare for market entry. Local founders and investors have also identified practical constraints. A February 2026 UNDP study, based on consultations with businesses, startups, investors, officials, academics, and industry groups in Uzbekistan, pointed to high computing costs, limited shared GPU capacity, gaps in access to usable data, and modest venture funding. It also said some standard investment instruments, including SAFE agreements and convertible notes, are not yet recognized under local law. The study noted efforts to expand domestic computing capacity, but these constraints can still slow the path from prototypes to commercial scale. Many of the country's visible AI initiatives remain at an early stage. The market for domestically developed AI products is still considerably smaller than Uzbekistan's established exports of traditional IT services. For now, it is more accurate to speak of an emerging AI ecosystem than a mature AI economy. However, recent international rankings suggest Uzbekistan's technology ecosystem is gaining momentum. According to the StartupBlink Global Startup Ecosystem Index 2026, Uzbekistan climbed to 79th place globally, recording the world's fastest annual increase in ecosystem score, and receiving the Country of the Year 2026 award. The report also identified Central Asia as the fastest-growing startup region in the world, with Tashkent emerging as one of its principal growth centers. The country's progress is also reflected in international assessments of government AI readiness. According to Oxford Insights, Uzbekistan rose from 87th place in 2023 to 62nd in 2025. The index measures a government's capacity to adopt and govern AI, rather than actual public use or the commercial success of domestic AI companies. These indicators show that Uzbekistan has assembled many of the institutions associated with an AI ecosystem. Its export-oriented IT sector now operates alongside tax incentives, venture funds, startup accelerators, and government AI programs. Uzbekistan's ability to turn those foundations into globally competitive companies will determine whether the sector develops into an AI economy. Software exports have already shown that local firms can compete internationally. Higher-value AI products that win customers beyond Uzbekistan will provide the clearest measure of progress.
Uzbekistan Turns to Georgia and Iraq as Jet Fuel Demand Rises 27%
Uzbekistan says it has arranged aviation fuel imports from Georgia, Iraq, and other countries as changes in regional air traffic drive up demand. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's office said on August 3 that demand for aviation fuel will reach an estimated 375,000 metric tons from July through December, 27% higher than in the same period in 2025. The government linked the increase to more flights through Central Asia and a rise in services to Uzbekistan, according to an official statement. “Most of this demand will be met by domestic oil refineries,” the president’s office said, adding that alternative import channels, including supplies from Georgia and Iraq, had been established in response to export restrictions imposed by certain partner countries. The statement did not identify the countries imposing the restrictions. It also gave no details about suppliers, import volumes, prices, delivery routes, or whether shipments from Georgia and Iraq have begun. Batumi Oil Terminal resumed handling European-produced aviation fuel in July, while Georgia’s Kulevi refinery does not plan to begin producing aviation kerosene until 2027. Uzbekistan has not said whether the supplies listed as coming from Georgia are produced there or re-exported through the country. State-owned Uzbekneftegaz aims to produce 310,000 tons of aviation fuel in 2026. This is only the company’s production target, not Uzbekistan’s total domestic output. The government has not said how much of the country’s aviation fuel demand will be met by Uzbekneftegaz, other domestic producers, or imports. Uzbekistan's airports handled 64,831 flights during the first half of 2026, up 8% from a year earlier. Passenger traffic rose 16% to more than 8.15 million, according to Uzbekistan Airports data. International services accounted for 47,371 flights and nearly 6.7 million passengers, with Tashkent International Airport handling 40,283 flights, up 7%, while passenger traffic increased 17% to 5.36 million. Tourism is also adding to passenger demand. Uzbekistan recorded 6,565,410 foreign visits for tourism purposes in January-June, up 24.9% from a year earlier, according to the National Statistics Committee. The increase forms part of a wider regional travel boom. However, almost three-quarters of those came from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, which together accounted for 4.9 million arrivals. The total therefore includes substantial land-border traffic and cannot be read solely as an air-passenger figure. Geopolitical disruption is another factor driving demand. The war involving Iran has constricted a main Europe-Asia aviation corridor and forced airlines away from high-risk airspace. Some services are now using a northern arc through the Caucasus and Central Asia, increasing the value of the region’s airspace. Pressure from the north predates the Iran conflict. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many Western carriers have avoided Russian airspace. Uzbekistan Airways began routing Europe services around Russia and Belarus in January 2025. Its Tashkent-Munich route grew by 307 kilometers, adding 30 to 40 minutes to the journey time. Uzbekistan already had a growing air transit base. Uzaeronavigation served 188,000 flights in 2023, including 143,000 by foreign airlines. More than 74,000 flights were handled in Uzbek airspace during January-April 2024 alone. More traffic raises revenue for airports and air navigation providers, but it also increases demand for fuel and ground services, especially when carriers make technical stops or fly longer routes. Meanwhile, Russia introduced a temporary ban on aviation fuel exports on May 30, a restriction that runs through November 30 but exempts deliveries made under intergovernmental agreements. Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry said its bilateral agreement with Russia would keep supplies flowing. The regional market has nevertheless come under pressure. Russian jet fuel shipments by rail to Central Asia and Afghanistan fell by more than 92% in June from May, to 3,800 tons, Reuters reported. Ten days after the Uzbek ministry’s assurance, Uzbekistan Airways reduced frequencies on some routes to Russia. “Due to a shortage of aviation fuel and the increase in its cost, we are forced to reduce flight frequencies on certain routes between cities of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation,” the airline said in a June 12 statement. The airline did not say whether the shortage was linked to Russian deliveries. The August 3 government statement also did not identify which partner countries had imposed the export restrictions that prompted the new supply channels. Tashkent is expanding domestic production and airport storage. A government transport plan has set a target of 600,000 tons of aviation fuel output a year by 2030. Airport storage capacity is due to rise from 49,000 to 80,000 tons, with new facilities planned in Navoi, Andijan, Bukhara, Urgench, and New Tashkent. The Fergana Oil Refinery began serial production of Jet A-1 fuel with a synthetic component from the Uzbekistan GTL plant in June. The blend contains 40% synthetic kerosene and 60% conventional fuel. Operator Saneg JetWhites said initial production could reach 10,000 tons a month, with a later increase to 20,000-25,000 tons. The company said the project could raise the domestic share of Uzbekistan’s aviation fuel supply from 40-50% to 70-80%. Uzbekistan Airports has also signed an agreement linked to a proposed $6.1 billion biofuel project. It is intended to supply sustainable aviation fuel and electro-synthetic fuel from 2030, so will not help meet the immediate rise in conventional demand. Domestic refineries and new imports must cover a 375,000-ton requirement over six months. The government has not published monthly import volumes or contract details, leaving the scale of the Georgian and Iraqi supplies unclear.
Central Asia and Azerbaijan: What the Region’s Leaders Agreed at Issyk-Kul
The Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, briefly became Central Asia’s political capital as it hosted a series of high-level meetings, including bilateral talks between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Only a few years ago, such a format would have seemed unlikely. Today, however, regional leaders are discussing joint railway projects, energy security, transport corridors, investment, and foreign-policy coordination rather than managing old disputes. The agreements reached in Cholpon-Ata suggest that the consultative format is gradually evolving from a platform for political dialogue into a mechanism for practical regional cooperation. From Conflict to Alliance Ahead of the informal multilateral meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held bilateral talks that set the tone for the broader regional meeting. Relations between the two countries now stand in sharp contrast to the situation sixteen years ago. Following the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, relations between Bishkek and Tashkent entered one of their most difficult periods since independence. The agenda between the two neighbors has since changed dramatically. Speaking in Cholpon-Ata, Mirziyoyev said relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had reached “a historic peak.” Bilateral trade has increased almost tenfold in recent years, reaching $1.2 billion last year. The two countries now have around 450 joint ventures, operate a joint Development Fund to support cooperative projects, and have established 15 air routes and five bus services linking their cities. Mirziyoyev described the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway as one of the most important joint initiatives between the two countries, arguing that the project would reshape transport links across Eurasia. “This railway will fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape. Those who understand what it took to make this happen know what a major achievement it is,” Mirziyoyev said. The talks concluded with the signing of a Treaty on Allied Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two sides also exchanged several bilateral documents, including agreements covering sections of their common border and the joint use of the Chashma spring. A Broader Regional Agenda While the Japarov-Mirziyoyev talks focused primarily on bilateral relations, the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan broadened the discussion to regional integration, transport connectivity, energy security, and foreign-policy coordination. Opening the meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said one of the clearest results of closer regional cooperation had been the Central Asian countries’ growing support for one another on the international stage. As an example, he cited the region’s joint support for Kyrgyzstan’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term. Japarov also revived the idea of introducing a single tourist visa for foreign visitors traveling across Central Asia, proposing that the region’s foreign ministries intensify consultations on the initiative. Azerbaijan’s participation as a full member gave the meeting additional significance. Baku joined the consultative format as a full participant in November 2025, reflecting the growing importance of trans-Caspian connectivity and the increasingly close economic ties linking the South Caucasus with Central Asia. During his state visit to Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that the two countries had signed a package of bilateral agreements, including a Treaty on Allied Relations, elevating cooperation to a new level. The sides also agreed to increase the capital of the Kyrgyz-Azerbaijani Development Fund from $100 million to $200 million. According to Aliyev, the fund has already financed several projects, some of which are now operational, while considerable scope remains for further investment cooperation. Mirziyoyev argued that Central Asia should now be viewed within a broader geopolitical framework. In his view, a region that was once fragmented is gradually consolidating around a shared development agenda, while Azerbaijan’s participation extends that process beyond Central Asia itself. “A historic opportunity is opening before us to create a common space for development linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Afghanistan. We must seize this moment to build lasting ties and good-neighborly relations in the heart of Eurasia,” Mirziyoyev said. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also emphasized the institutional dimension of regional cooperation. He described the current period as the most successful in Central Asia’s modern history and proposed developing an implementation roadmap for the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the 21st Century, which had previously been signed by the region’s leaders. Transport and Energy Take Center Stage Beyond political coordination, the leaders devoted considerable attention to practical projects aimed at strengthening regional connectivity and reducing Central Asia’s vulnerability to external economic pressures. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon proposed exploring the construction of a large regional oil refinery equipped with modern technologies. He argued that continued volatility in global and regional energy markets had highlighted the importance of energy security as one of the key conditions for sustainable economic development. “Given today’s realities, we should jointly consider this extremely important issue,” Rahmon said. The proposal comes amid continued turbulence in regional fuel markets. In summer 2026, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan experienced fuel shortages and price increases as Russian exports fell, exposing the region’s dependence on external suppliers and lending additional weight to calls for expanding domestic refining capacity. Transport connectivity was another dominant theme. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, highlighted by Japarov and Mirziyoyev during their bilateral talks, was repeatedly presented as a project capable of reshaping trade flows across Eurasia. Together with the continued development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, it is expected to strengthen Central Asia’s role as a major transit region linking Asia and Europe. As the principal gateway across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan has become an essential link between Central Asia and European markets. Transport infrastructure is increasingly emerging as one of the strongest drivers of cooperation between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The Next Meeting Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov announced that the eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan is scheduled for October 8, 2026, in the Avaza National Tourist Zone on Turkmenistan’s Caspian coast. According to Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan has already circulated a draft agenda covering five priority areas: regional security; deeper cooperation between Central Asia and Azerbaijan; energy and transport connectivity; joint efforts to address environmental challenges, climate adaptation, water resource management, and the restoration of the Aral Sea; and expanded cooperation in education, science, culture, and youth exchanges. From Political Dialogue to Regional Integration The informal meeting concluded with the adoption of the Cholpon-Ata Declaration, reaffirming the participating countries’ commitment to expanding cooperation in economic development, transport, energy, security, and humanitarian exchanges. According to Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, the document reflects the level of trust that has developed among the region’s states and their shared determination to deepen cooperation further. Yet the meeting’s significance extends beyond the documents signed. Sixteen years ago, relations between some Central Asian neighbors were overshadowed by border disputes, political tensions, and mutual distrust. At Cholpon-Ata, by contrast, discussions centered on railway construction, transport corridors, energy security, investment mechanisms, and the coordination of regional policies. The meeting also highlighted the changing geography of regional cooperation. Azerbaijan, once viewed primarily as an external partner, is becoming an integral participant in Central Asia’s broader economic agenda. Together with the continued development of the Middle Corridor, this is gradually linking Central Asia and the South Caucasus into a wider economic space built around shared transport, trade, and infrastructure interests. The consultative format has evolved as well. What began as a forum for rebuilding political dialogue is increasingly becoming a mechanism for coordinating practical regional initiatives. Judging by the agreements reached at Issyk-Kul, the emphasis is shifting from declarations of intent toward projects capable of reshaping Central Asia’s economic geography over the coming years.
Swiss Court Fines Lombard Odier $3.7 Million in Karimova Money-Laundering Case
Switzerland’s Federal Criminal Court has fined Geneva-based private bank Lombard Odier 3 million Swiss francs, or about $3.68 million, after finding that it failed to take adequate organizational measures to prevent money laundering in a case linked to Gulnara Karimova, the eldest daughter of Uzbekistan’s late President Islam Karimov. The court also dismissed criminal proceedings against Karimova without ruling on the allegations against her. The ruling was delivered on July 27 in Bellinzona, following a trial that began in April. Swiss prosecutors had accused Karimova of accepting bribes and leading a criminal organization known as “The Office,” which allegedly channeled hundreds of millions of dollars through Swiss bank accounts between 2005 and 2013. Lombard Odier and one of its former account managers were accused of helping conceal assets derived from the group’s activities. The former employee was found guilty of aggravated money laundering. The court concluded that the bank had failed to take “all reasonable and necessary organizational measures” to prevent the offense. The former account manager, identified only as “C.,” received a fully suspended 24-month prison sentence. The court also ordered the confiscation in Switzerland of more than 400 million Swiss francs in assets originating from the money-laundering offense or controlled by “The Office.” In a statement, Lombard Odier said the case began after it voluntarily reported suspicious transactions to the Swiss authorities in 2012. It maintained that robust anti-money-laundering controls were in place and said it would appeal. The first-instance judgment is not final. The court dismissed the proceedings against Karimova on procedural grounds. The judges concluded that there was no realistic prospect of her release from prison in Uzbekistan or extradition to Switzerland before the limitation period expired. The court did not rule on the allegations against her. Proceedings were also dismissed against another defendant, identified only as “B.,” who lives in Russia and could not travel to Switzerland through no fault of his own. The sentences imposed on Lombard Odier and its former employee were reduced because of the time elapsed since the offenses in 2011 and 2012. Charges covering events before July 27, 2011, were dismissed as time-barred. Karimova, now 54, has consistently denied wrongdoing. She has been imprisoned in Uzbekistan since March 2019, when she was moved from house arrest after the authorities said she had breached its conditions. She is serving a 13-year sentence for offenses including organizing a criminal group, extortion, and embezzlement. The Swiss investigation began in 2012 and concerns conduct dating back more than two decades. In May 2025, the Federal Criminal Court joined the proceedings against Karimova and Lombard Odier. The wider international investigation has involved assets across several jurisdictions. Assets associated with Karimova in Switzerland, France, and the United States have previously been estimated at nearly $1.4 billion. The case has also led to efforts to return confiscated assets to Uzbekistan. In February 2025, Uzbekistan and Switzerland signed an agreement covering approximately $182 million confiscated by the Swiss authorities. The funds are to be transferred through the Uzbekistan Vision 2030 Multi-Partner Trust Fund for social projects, including health and education programs. An earlier agreement covered about $131 million, bringing the total under the two restitution agreements to approximately $313 million. In July 2025, Uzbekistan rejected Opinion No. 17/2025 from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which found Karimova’s detention arbitrary. Tashkent said the criminal cases had complied with national law and the country’s international obligations.
As Two Wars Reach the Caspian, Central Asia’s Middle Corridor Holds
On July 25, two wars met in waters that Central Asian governments had tried to keep apart. Ukraine reported successful long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the targets included vessels involved in carrying military cargo from Iran and a warship. Tehran said an Iranian commercial vessel had been struck, killing one sailor and injuring another, and accused Kyiv of trying to widen the war. It remains unclear whether the vessel identified by Iran was among the targets described by Zelenskyy. Diplomacy produced a limited off-ramp. On July 28, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, that the strike on the Iranian ship was unintended. Both governments said they wanted to avoid further escalation. The call reduced the immediate risk of retaliation, but it did not remove the new danger. The Caspian is now one of the places where Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States intersect. Central Asia is exposed through the infrastructure and trade routes linking them. A “Sea of Peace” Under Pressure Turkmenistan responded to the incident with unusually direct language. Its Foreign Ministry called attacks on vessels in the Caspian “inadmissible” and described the waterway as a “sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness.” Ashgabat did not name Ukraine or endorse Iran’s account. Its restraint was characteristic, but the public criticism was unusual. Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality normally produces guarded statements during external conflicts. The intervention showed that Ashgabat viewed the attack as a challenge to the regional order. Turkmenistan faces Iran across a 1,148-kilometer land border and the southern Caspian. Turkmenbashi port is also central to its plans for a larger role in Eurasian trade. The principle is set out in the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, signed in Aktau in 2018. Its text calls for the peaceful use of the sea, prohibits the use or threat of force, and bars armed forces belonging to non-Caspian states. The convention has not entered into force because Iran has not ratified it. Its provisions were designed to govern relations among the five littoral states. They do not address a long-range strike carried out by a non-littoral state. But modern drones can cross distances that once provided strategic shelter. A landlocked sea can no longer be assumed to sit beyond the reach of surrounding wars. The Iran-Russia Link Ukraine has clear military reasons to look toward the Caspian. Iran has supplied Russia with drone technology used against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The sea also provides a direct commercial route between Iranian ports and Russia’s Volga region. Kyiv now treats vessels on that route carrying military cargo as part of Russia’s military logistics. Iran described the vessel struck on July 25 as civilian. The dispute over the ship’s cargo is central because commercial and military supply chains can overlap. A vessel may be civilian by flag and registration while carrying goods that Ukraine considers part of Russia’s war effort. That uncertainty reaches beyond Iran and Russia. Commercial vessels use the same ports and sea lanes as military-linked traffic. Insurers respond to perceived risk rather than diplomatic distinctions. Ashgabat has invested in new cargo vessels for the Middle Corridor. The July 25 strike did not interrupt freight on the route. Kazakhstan’s Main Oil Export Route Is Disrupted The clearest Central Asian disruption occurred on the Black Sea. Four tankers were struck near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal at Novorossiysk between July 17 and 20, including two vessels loading Kazakh crude. Russia accused Ukraine of carrying out the strikes. Ukraine’s ambassador to Kazakhstan told The Times of Central Asia that there was “no evidence whatsoever” that Kyiv had carried out the attacks on July 17 and 19. Washington has raised the issue directly with Kyiv twice. In February, Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States disclosed that the State Department had delivered a formal démarche after a Ukrainian attack on Novorossiysk affected American and Kazakh economic interests. On July 21, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration had again urged Kyiv to avoid attacks on non-Russian vessels serving the terminal. Together, the two interventions draw a clear boundary around damage to American and Kazakh interests and attacks on non-Russian vessels serving CPC. On July 23, Representative Bill Huizenga, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, reinforced that position publicly. “Further strikes will not be tolerated,” he told The Times of Central Asia. In total, six tankers were struck near CPC during July. The disruption left terminal storage tanks full. Three industry sources said CPC had stopped accepting crude from Kazakhstan. Producers then reduced output to prevent crude from backing up through the pipeline system. By July 26, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production had fallen to about one million barrels per day, less than half the June average of 2.16 million barrels per day. Tengiz, the country’s largest oilfield, bore the heaviest initial cut. Its output fell by 56%, from a July average of 925,000 barrels per day to around 406,000. By July 26, an industry source said production at Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak was between 70% and 90% below June levels. Loading resumed on July 27, but the shutdown exposed the cost of Kazakhstan’s geographic dependence. The 1,510-kilometer CPC pipeline carries more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Despite its name, the pipeline does not cross the Caspian. It runs from western Kazakhstan through Russia to the Black Sea. The interruption strengthened the case for alternatives rather than showing that diversification had failed. The Middle Corridor remained operational, while Kazakhstan’s separate trans-Caspian oil route provided a limited outlet. The Middle Corridor Becomes More Important The July 25 strike introduced a new security concern around the Caspian leg of the Middle Corridor. Yet the alternatives carry greater immediate risks. Northern routes through Russia remain exposed to the war and sanctions-related or political disruption. Southern routes through Iran now face direct military danger, alongside sanctions and banking constraints. The route across the Caspian through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye therefore remains Central Asia’s main established westbound alternative. Its maritime leg, however, can no longer be assumed to remain insulated from surrounding conflicts. Azerbaijan, the corridor’s western landing point, has already experienced direct spillover from the Iran conflict. In March, drones that Baku said were launched from Iranian territory struck the terminal at Nakhchivan International Airport and crashed near a school. Civilians were injured, while Iran denied responsibility. The incident did not interrupt the Middle Corridor, but it showed that the South Caucasus section is also exposed to regional escalation. The corridor is also becoming more capable. Freight volumes transported through Kazakhstan rose from 0.8 million to about 4.5 million metric tons over seven years. The 2026 plan targets 600 container trains from China, while Kazakhstan is also expanding its port and vessel capacity. An $846 million World Bank guarantee approved in February is intended to mobilize $1.41 billion in long-term financing for a major rail project on the Kazakh section. These investments will not remove border crossings or the need to transfer cargo between rail and ship, but they should gradually ease several of the corridor’s main bottlenecks. The route now has wider strategic value. Washington is seeking closer critical minerals partnerships with Central Asia through the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue. Europe also has a direct interest in preserving access to Kazakh oil. Across 2025, Kazakhstan accounted for 12.7% of the value of EU imports of petroleum oils from outside the bloc, behind only the United States and Norway. The Middle Corridor cannot match the northern rail network at its current capacity. Kazakhstan’s separate trans-Caspian oil route also cannot replace CPC. Trans-Caspian oil shipments offer only limited relief, while the corridor’s immediate strength lies in containerized and industrial freight, including selected critical mineral supply chains. Its value comes from giving exporters another route. The Caspian strike makes the protection of civilian shipping and contingency planning more urgent. It also strengthens the case for expanding Central Asia’s main established westbound corridor that avoids both Russia and Iran. Washington wants resilient access to Central Asian minerals, while Europe relies on Kazakhstan as a major oil supplier. That redundancy has growing importance for global supply-chain security. Pressure from the North and South The war involving Iran has also complicated Central Asia’s southern outlets. Routes through Iran offer access to Persian Gulf ports and connections toward Türkiye, but U.S. strikes on Iranian rail and coastal infrastructure have made security concerns more concrete. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have invested in those routes for years. Uzbekistan also stands to benefit from reliable rail access through Iran. The conflict has not severed every southern connection, but it has made planning less predictable. Higher insurance costs and cautious banks can divert ordinary freight without a formal border closure. Russia’s war threatens the northern routes inherited from the Soviet period. Novorossiysk lies about 115 kilometers across the Black Sea from Russian-occupied Crimea. The tanker attacks show how quickly fighting can reach Kazakhstan’s exports, even when the cargo is Kazakh and commercially traded. The Middle Corridor has become more valuable as northern and southern routes face disruption. The July 25 strike did not make the corridor unworkable; it showed why governments must protect the commercial shipping and infrastructure on which it depends. The two wars have not formally merged. Kyiv and Tehran still have incentives to contain their confrontation. Central Asian governments also retain working relations with both sides. Repeated Ukrainian strikes on Iranian shipping could trigger direct retaliation. Another incident involving Azerbaijan could draw Baku and Türkiye more deeply into the Iran war. Neither outcome is inevitable. For Central Asia, the immediate lesson is not that diversification has failed. CPC restarted, the Middle Corridor remained open, and southern connections through Iran were not severed. A system with several imperfect routes is safer than overwhelming dependence on one. The Caspian no longer offers complete distance from surrounding wars, but it remains central to the solution. As two wars reach the sea, Central Asia needs more routes and stronger safeguards for commercial shipping.
GBSF 2026 Highlights Uzbekistan’s Push for Global Business Services and AI
More than 450 participants from business and government, representing over 45 countries, gathered in Tashkent on July 24–25 for the Global Business Services Forum 2026. The event centered on Uzbekistan’s effort to become a regional center for global business services and business process outsourcing (BPO), with artificial intelligence (AI) also a major focus. Organizers described it as Central Asia’s largest international forum devoted to global business services and the digital economy.
The forum follows May’s Global Tech Weekend in Tashkent, which brought more than 2,500 technology and investment professionals to the capital.
Opening the forum, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Digital Technologies Sherzod Shermatov said recent reforms had improved conditions for international technology companies considering investment or expansion in the country.
Shermatov said companies could draw on qualified specialists and modern digital infrastructure while reaching a fast-growing regional market. He also invited international firms to invest and develop long-term partnerships.
Azamat Karamatov, CEO of IT Park Uzbekistan, said the organization now has more than 3,800 resident companies, including over 1,000 international businesses. Exports of technology services have surpassed $1 billion.
He said IT Park gives foreign companies a route into Uzbekistan’s technology sector while helping develop local talent.
Sessions examined AI and talent development. Other discussions covered international investment and outsourcing. Speakers also outlined tax incentives and support available to foreign companies entering the Uzbek market. The Soft Landing program and Zero Risk initiative are among the available schemes. Key Account Management services provide additional assistance.
One speaker was Arseny Kucheryuk, an expert at Antal Uzbekistan, part of the British recruitment company Antal International. He drew on the firm’s recruitment work and salary surveys to describe changes in the labor market.
Kucheryuk, who moved to Uzbekistan nearly five years ago, said employers once struggled to find highly qualified candidates. The market has since become more balanced, although strong candidates can still receive several offers within weeks.
He said companies seeking experienced professionals often need to offer salaries well above candidates’ current income. Antal research found that more than 60% of candidates expect an increase of at least 20% when changing jobs.
Kucheryuk added that pay alone does not determine retention. Career prospects and management quality also influence whether skilled staff remain with an employer. He said workplace culture is especially important when addressing religion or family.
Speaking to The Times of Central Asia after his presentation, Kucheryuk said foreign investment was creating career opportunities in Tashkent and elsewhere in Uzbekistan.
He attributed Uzbekistan’s appeal to cooperation between the government and private sector, which he said helps international companies enter the market and supports local businesses.
Kucheryuk advised foreign investors to understand local business culture before entering the market. Although companies may bring senior executives from abroad, he said operational roles requiring knowledge of local law and business practice should generally be filled in Uzbekistan.
Iyad Hafez, CEO and managing partner of Staff Arabia, said his first visit to Uzbekistan exceeded expectations.
“I’m positively surprised,” he told The Times of Central Asia. “Very good infrastructure, very good people, a strong workforce, and lots of support from the government.”
Hafez said Uzbekistan needed greater visibility in the global outsourcing industry and expected the forum to bring new business and jobs.
Asked whether AI could reduce employment, Hafez compared the debate with earlier concerns about the internet.
“When the internet started, people said technology would reduce jobs,” he said. “Actually, it didn’t. It changed the nature of jobs.”
He said AI could create jobs of a different kind and that education must prepare younger workers for changing requirements.
Rami Sweis, global chief operating officer of iSONXperiences, said his company was considering opening operations in Uzbekistan.
“We manage global business process outsourcing across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and we are here today to explore setting up a new location in Uzbekistan,” he said.
Sweis cited tax advantages and a three-year extension of government support. He also welcomed plans to expand IT Park into additional cities.
Sweis described Uzbekistan as a mature IT market and said, “If you have the IT capabilities, it becomes easier to adopt AI.”
He said universities were helping prepare a new generation of AI specialists.
Sweis identified cloud infrastructure and data protection as areas that still require attention. The government, he said, is developing new guidelines and regulatory frameworks.
Talent was his main consideration when assessing a new location, and he pointed to Uzbekistan’s large pool of IT graduates.
He also cited the country’s international connections and the infrastructure available through IT Park.
Sweis said investment near IT Park in a data center valued at nearly $5 billion indicated long-term government commitment to AI.
Several companies at the forum said they were actively considering operations in Uzbekistan.
The event presented Uzbekistan as an increasingly credible option for international technology and outsourcing companies. Foreign executives praised the available workforce and government support. They also identified gaps in market visibility and regulation.
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