Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be speaking with former Kyrgyz Ambassador to the U.S. Kadyr Toktogul about what it means for Kyrgyzstan to get a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

UNDP Opinion: Central Asia – Shared Wildlife, Shared Landscapes, Shared Responsibility

As global leaders gather for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly in Samarkand, Central Asia has an opportunity to send a clear message to the world: protecting biodiversity is not only about saving species — it is about securing water, livelihoods, resilience and long-term stability for millions of people across our region. From the glaciers of the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains to the deserts, steppes and river basins downstream, Central Asia’s ecosystems are deeply interconnected across borders. Rivers flow between countries. Wildlife migrates through shared landscapes. Mountain ecosystems regulate water systems that sustain agriculture, energy production and communities far beyond the highlands themselves. Among the most powerful symbols of this shared natural heritage is the snow leopard — the silent guardian of Central Asia’s mountains. The snow leopard represents far more than a rare and iconic species. Its survival reflects the health of entire ecosystems that millions of people depend upon every day. Healthy mountain landscapes help secure freshwater resources, reduce disaster risks, sustain pastures and agriculture, preserve biodiversity, and strengthen resilience to climate change across the region. But today, these ecosystems are under growing pressure. Climate change is accelerating glacier melting and intensifying water stress. Land degradation, unsustainable grazing, habitat fragmentation and biodiversity loss are placing increasing pressure on fragile mountain environments and rural livelihoods. Communities living closest to nature are often the first to feel the consequences — through declining water availability, degraded pastures, reduced agricultural productivity and increasing climate-related risks. These challenges do not stop at national borders. And neither can the solutions. Only a coordinated regional response can match the scale of the challenge. Protecting Central Asia’s mountain ecosystems requires countries to work together to conserve ecological corridors, strengthen transboundary protected areas, improve water and land governance, and invest in climate-resilient livelihoods for communities whose futures are closely tied to nature. There are already successful examples of regional agreements. For example, a highly successful transboundary nature conservation agreement in Central Asia protects the Ustyurt Plateau and the Turan Temperate Deserts. Spanning across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this initiative has successfully safeguarded vulnerable ecosystems and migratory species like the saiga antelope and snow leopard. [caption id="attachment_50004" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Photo: Saiga calf. Kazakhstan/UNDP Kazakhstan[/caption] It is encouraging that transboundary cooperation has already taken shape across the region. Across Central Asia, governments, communities and development partners are already demonstrating that conservation and development can advance together. While each country's experience is unique, the lessons are remarkably similar: when communities benefit from healthy ecosystems, nature and people both thrive. In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard has become one of the clearest examples of how coordinated conservation efforts can help restore fragile ecosystems across borders. The species inhabits mountain systems that extend beyond national boundaries into China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, making its protection inseparable from regional cooperation. Over the past decade, habitat countries have strengthened efforts to protect the species through national conservation strategies, expanded protected areas, and improved ecosystem monitoring. Supported by cooperation between the Government, UNDP, the Global Environment Facility, and the scientific community, large-scale monitoring and habitat conservation initiatives have generated new data on snow leopard populations and migration routes across the Tien Shan and Altai Mountain systems. In Kazakhstan, the snow leopard population had declined to an estimated 80–100 animals by the mid-1990s, as habitat degradation, human pressure, and ecosystem fragmentation intensified across mountain landscapes. Over the years, systemic interventions, including digital monitoring, the establishment of a genetic bank, and studies of behavior and migration routes, helped support the creation of the Merke Regional Nature Park in 2026, strengthening the protection of critical habitats and ecological corridors shared across borders. Today, the population is estimated at 152–189 snow leopards, with around 70 percent of the species’ range in Kazakhstan now falling within protected areas. The growing snow leopard population, a symbol of the “health” of mountain ecosystems, shows that countries can create the conditions needed to conserve this rare and majestic species. It also demonstrates how biodiversity conservation in Central Asia increasingly depends on long-term regional cooperation, scientific collaboration, and shared responsibility for ecosystems that connect communities across borders. For Kyrgyzstan, the snow leopard has become far more than a symbol of a rare species. It represents a broader commitment to safeguarding the mountain ecosystems that underpin water security, biodiversity, climate resilience, and the well-being of millions across Central Asia. A longstanding symbol of strength, freedom, and harmony with nature, the snow leopard was officially designated a national symbol of the Kyrgyz Republic, reflecting the country’s deep connection to its mountain heritage. As one of the world’s most mountainous countries, Kyrgyzstan views the conservation of snow leopard landscapes as both a national and regional priority. Protecting these habitats also means safeguarding forests, pastures, glaciers, snowfields, and watersheds that sustain communities and economies far beyond national borders. Recognizing their critical role in maintaining biodiversity and freshwater resources, Kyrgyzstan has established a legal basis for the protection of glaciers and snowfields and is developing mechanisms for their long-term conservation. [caption id="attachment_50005" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Photo: UNDP Kyrgyzstan/Vlad Ushakov[/caption] Kyrgyzstan has also used snow leopard conservation as a platform for advancing mountain resilience and regional cooperation. The country championed the UN Five Years of Action for the Development of Mountain Regions (2023–2027), supported the establishment of International Snow Leopard Day, and promotes transboundary cooperation through GSLEP, regional agreements, and joint conservation efforts among range countries. Kyrgyzstan’s experience demonstrates how conserving one iconic species can unite countries around a shared agenda for mountain resilience, biodiversity conservation, water security, and sustainable development. [caption id="attachment_50006" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Photo: Snow leopard’s habitat/UNDP Tajikistan[/caption] High in the mountains of Tajikistan, people have lived alongside snow leopards for generations. But for many years, life was becoming harder for both. Shrinking pastures and disappearing wildlife pushed communities and predators into conflict. When snow leopards attacked livestock, families suffered. And when wild prey disappeared, the future of the snow leopard became uncertain. Today, there is hope. According to the 2025 edition of Tajikistan’s national Red Book, the country’s snow leopard population has grown to around 500 individuals — nearly double the estimated 250 recorded in 2017. Behind these numbers is a powerful lesson: protecting nature only works when local people are part of the solution. A conservation project led by UNDP and funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) helped mountain communities enhance their livelihoods while protecting wildlife. Women in remote villages were trained in wildlife monitoring and ecotourism, gaining new opportunities while helping monitor and protect nature. Altogether, 450 people from remote mountain areas, including protected area rangers and community members, strengthened their skills in smart patrolling and wildlife monitoring through project-supported trainings. These enhanced capacities improved wildlife tracking and threat detection, contributing to reduced illegal hunting and tree cutting. The project also introduced a simple but effective solution to reduce conflict between people and snow leopards. Communities received hay to feed livestock for just 20 extra days in spring, allowing mountain pastures to recover and wild prey to return. With more food in the wild, snow leopards were less likely to attack farm animals. Most importantly, communities were trusted to lead. Through small grants and local initiatives, they supported restoration of degraded pastures and forests, adoption of sustainable livestock practices, and reduced pressure on fragile mountain ecosystems, helping conserve iconic species while strengthening local livelihoods. The story of the snow leopard in Tajikistan shows that when communities are empowered, nature can recover too. Importantly, conservation success was not driven by communities alone. It was also enabled by stronger institutions, enhanced protected area management, expanded wildlife monitoring, and closer cooperation among scientists and conservation agencies. At the same time, while biodiversity frameworks are in place, their implementation depends on the capacities of staff at national and subnational levels. Continued education, skills development, awareness raising and, overall, investment in people remain essential to sustaining conservation efforts. The return of the snow leopard reflects the recovery of entire mountain ecosystems. [caption id="attachment_50007" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Photo: UNDP Turkmenistan / Dovlet Rejepov[/caption] In Turkmenistan, in the Aral Sea Basin, communities are restoring degraded pastures and adopting more sustainable land management practices to improve productivity while reducing pressure on fragile ecosystems. These efforts are helping rural households strengthen resilience to climate change while supporting biodiversity conservation. Environmental degradation has had significant social and economic consequences, particularly for women and vulnerable households that depend heavily on natural resources for livelihoods and food security. As climate-related pressures such as declining agricultural productivity, degraded grazing lands and increasing water stress intensify, strengthening women’s participation in sustainable resource management and local decision-making is becoming increasingly important. Across affected landscapes, practical efforts are helping reduce pressure on natural resources while supporting livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. Communities are increasingly engaged in identifying solutions that strengthen resilience, improve resource management, and promote inclusive participation in sustainable local development. [caption id="attachment_50008" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Photo: UNDP Uzbekistan[/caption] In Uzbekistan, community-led solutions in biodiversity-rich landscapes are demonstrating how ecosystem protection can go hand in hand with improving everyday life. Among many locally driven initiatives, families like Gulnoza Nuriddinova’s benefited from practical measures such as fencing, which helped protect household gardens and crops from wildlife intrusion and uncontrolled grazing, improving food security and reducing economic losses. For families like Sharofat Fayziddinova’s, access to piped water within the village transformed daily life by eliminating the need for frequent journeys to remote water sources, saving time and effort while improving living conditions. While these were individual solutions tailored to local needs, together they helped reduce pressure on sensitive natural areas, lower the risk of human-wildlife encounters, and strengthen the relationship between communities and the ecosystems on which they depend. They reflect an important lesson: conservation efforts are most effective when communities benefit directly from environmental protection and become active partners in safeguarding nature. For people living in mountain and rural areas, biodiversity is not an abstract concept. It is directly connected to water access, food security, incomes, health and resilience. The experiences of communities across Central Asia show that conservation is most effective when it improves people's lives while protecting the ecosystems on which they depend. Healthy mountain ecosystems help regulate river systems that sustain economies and populations across borders. Degraded forests, pastures and watersheds increase erosion, water insecurity and disaster risks for entire regions downstream. Protecting nature is therefore also an investment in regional stability, economic resilience and human security. The region has already demonstrated growing cooperation on climate action, biodiversity protection and sustainable natural resource management. Countries are expanding protected areas, strengthening environmental governance and investing in ecosystem restoration. Regional dialogue and collaboration are increasing. But much more is needed to match the scale of today’s environmental challenges. If Central Asia is to safeguard its shared natural heritage, three priorities deserve greater attention: investment in transboundary ecological corridors; stronger cooperation on water, land and biodiversity governance; and expanded support for communities whose livelihoods depend directly on healthy ecosystems. The GEF Assembly provides an important opportunity to strengthen this momentum. As Resident Representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Central Asia, we believe that with the leadership of the five Central Asian countries, the region can become a global example of how biodiversity conservation, climate resilience and sustainable development can advance together across borders. The future of the snow leopard, like the future of Central Asia’s shared mountain ecosystems, depends on continued cooperation across borders. At this moment, we call for stronger partnerships and greater investment in transboundary biodiversity conservation across Central Asia — investment that protects ecosystems while creating opportunity, resilience and hope for the people who call these mountains home. The snow leopard does not recognize national borders. Neither do rivers, droughts, dust storms or climate impacts. Our response cannot stop at borders either. By investing together in nature, Central Asia can strengthen resilience, create opportunity and protect the ecosystems that sustain future generations.

Opinion: Beyond Multivectorism – What Kyrgyzstan’s UN Security Council Win Really Shows

Kyrgyzstan's election to the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term is more than a diplomatic milestone. It is a case study in how a small state can create political weight without possessing a large economy, military power, or a dominant regional position. On June 3, Kyrgyzstan won its first-ever seat on the Security Council after a competitive four-round contest with the Philippines for the Asia-Pacific Group vacancy. Bishkek led from the first round, with 105 votes against Manila's 85, and increased its support through each subsequent ballot. It finished with 142 votes to 49. The result is significant because this was not an uncontested regional rotation. Kyrgyzstan had to assemble a qualified two-thirds majority across the wider UN General Assembly. That required more than support from its immediate neighbors. Bishkek had to build support across regions, institutions, and political blocs. The deeper lesson is that small-state agency should not be measured only by material resources. It should also be measured by the ability to assemble coalitions. A Campaign Larger Than Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan's campaign was not presented simply as a request for national recognition. President Sadyr Japarov framed the bid as a question of representation. When Kyrgyzstan intensified its campaign in 2024, he drew attention to the number of UN member states that had never served on the Council and argued for broader representation, particularly for African countries. Bishkek also positioned itself as a voice for small, developing, landlocked, and mountainous states facing security, climate, and connectivity challenges. That framing gave the vote wider political weight. Kyrgyzstan could not outspend larger states; it could not offer a large domestic market or a major security umbrella. But it could translate its limitations into a broader political language: underrepresentation, sovereign equality, regional balance, and the need for smaller states to have a voice in global decision-making. The campaign also received visible regional backing. In December 2025, all five Central Asian presidents endorsed Kyrgyzstan's candidacy, presenting the bid as a regional effort rather than a purely national one. That was the first layer of the coalition. The second was broader. In May 2026, the African Group at the United Nations received a dedicated briefing on Bishkek’s candidacy from Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s newly appointed ambassador to the United States and a special envoy of the president. This followed Kyrgyzstan's public support for wider African representation in the Security Council. Because the UN ballot was secret, it would be impossible to claim that African votes delivered Kyrgyzstan's victory. Nor would it be accurate to reduce the campaign to a simple exchange of support. But the African track was an observable part of a wider coalition strategy. Bishkek aligned its own candidacy with an issue that mattered to a much larger group of states: the imbalance of representation inside the Security Council. From Multivectorism to Coalition Brokerage Central Asian foreign policy is often described through the language of multivectorism. The term usually refers to balancing among Russia, China, the West, Turkiye, and other external powers without becoming dependent on any single patron. It is useful, but it is no longer sufficient. Kyrgyzstan's Security Council campaign points to something more active. Bishkek did not merely balance among large powers. It tied Central Asian regional solidarity to wider arguments about small and landlocked states, developing countries, African underrepresentation, and demands for a more inclusive international order. This was not passive balancing. It was active coalition-building. A small state acts as a broker when it can translate its national interest into several political languages at once, without allowing any single patron to own the campaign. That is what Kyrgyzstan achieved. It presented itself simultaneously as a Central Asian state, a landlocked mountainous country, a member of the Global South, a supporter of African representation, and a pragmatic actor able to engage across geopolitical divides. The campaign worked because these identities were not mutually exclusive. They overlapped. The African Track The result also gives more context to Kyrgyzstan's recent outreach to Africa. Earlier this year, Bishkek intensified engagement with African states, including the high-profile visit of Togo's leader Faure Gnassingbé. That visit was easy to read as an isolated diplomatic curiosity, but the Security Council campaign suggests a broader pattern. Smaller Central Asian states are not only looking vertically toward great powers. They are also building horizontal relationships with states in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and other parts of the Global South. These relationships may be economic, logistical, diplomatic, or normative. In economic terms, they can create new routes and markets. In diplomatic terms, they can create voting coalitions inside international organizations. In normative terms, they allow small states to position themselves around shared issues: representation, development, connectivity, sanctions exposure, climate vulnerability, or sovereign equality. Kyrgyzstan's Security Council bid demonstrates the diplomatic version of this horizontal agency. Central Asian Agency Is Not Hierarchical The Kyrgyz case also complicates a common simplification about Central Asia. Regional agency is often measured hierarchically. Kazakhstan is treated as the primary regional actor because of its economy, energy resources, diplomatic visibility, and institutional weight. Uzbekistan is increasingly recognized for its population, reform trajectory, and central geographic position. Those assessments are reasonable. But they are incomplete. Agency is not concentrated in only one regional capital. It is distributed across arenas. Kazakhstan may carry greater economic weight and play a larger role in energy, trade, and middle-power diplomacy. Uzbekistan may be the most important demographic and reform story in the region. But Kyrgyzstan has now demonstrated a separate competence: the ability to assemble support across regions in a competitive multilateral contest. This suggests a more accurate way to read the region: influence is not held by one capital alone. Different Central Asian states can matter in different arenas. Different states can become consequential in different fields. A country that is small in GDP terms may still become important in corridor politics, multilateral diplomacy, water negotiations, digital governance, sanctions-era adaptation, or Global South coalition-building. The Security Council vote makes that visible. A Diplomatic Win, Not a Blank Check A Security Council seat does not automatically give Kyrgyzstan major power. Non-permanent members do not have veto rights. They must navigate conflicts shaped by larger states. Their room for maneuver is real but limited. The practical test will begin in January 2027. Kyrgyzstan will have to vote on sanctions, peacekeeping mandates, conflicts, humanitarian crises, and statements involving major powers. It will also hold the rotating presidency of the Council for one month during its two-year term. The campaign demonstrated coalition-building skill. Membership will test whether Bishkek can convert that skill into a coherent diplomatic position. The Real Question Kyrgyzstan's victory is significant because it challenges the standard way of looking at small states. The usual question is: Which great power is Kyrgyzstan moving closer to — Russia, China, the West, or Türkiye? But the Security Council campaign suggests that this may be the wrong question. Kyrgyzstan did not choose one center of power - it worked across dividing lines. It used regional solidarity without becoming only a regional candidate. It engaged the African Group without claiming to represent Africa. It appealed to small states without limiting itself to one institutional bloc. It positioned itself inside the Global South while maintaining pragmatic relations with larger powers. This is more than multivectorism. It shows how a small state can gain room for maneuver by working across systems it does not control. That may be the deeper meaning of Kyrgyzstan's Security Council win. A small country did not become powerful in the conventional sense. But it demonstrated that diplomatic relevance can be assembled — one coalition, one constituency, and one overlapping political world at a time.

Kyrgyzstan Wins First-Ever Seat on UN Security Council

Kyrgyzstan has been elected to the United Nations Security Council for the 2027–2028 term, securing a non-permanent seat after a closely watched contest for the Asia-Pacific Group’s vacancy. The election marks the first time Kyrgyzstan will serve on the Security Council, the UN’s most powerful body for matters of international peace and security. It also returns Central Asian representation to the Council for the first time in nearly a decade, following Kazakhstan’s 2017–2018 term. Kyrgyzstan defeated the Philippines for the Asia-Pacific seat in the General Assembly vote, joining the incoming class of non-permanent members that will serve two-year terms from January 1, 2027, through December 31, 2028. The 2026 election filled five seats: one for Africa, one for Asia-Pacific, one for Latin America and the Caribbean, and two for the Western European and Others Group. The contest went to four rounds of voting before Kyrgyzstan secured the required two-thirds majority, defeating the Philippines by 142 votes to 49. Austria, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe were also elected to the Council. Kyrgyzstan will replace Pakistan when the new term begins. The Asia-Pacific race was the only contest involving Central Asia, but the wider election produced a surprise in the Western European and Others Group, where Germany failed to win one of the two available seats. Austria and Portugal were elected instead. For Bishkek, the result represents a major diplomatic breakthrough. Kyrgyz officials had framed the campaign as an opportunity to give greater voice to states that have never served on the Council, particularly landlocked and mountainous countries facing security, development, climate, and connectivity challenges. As of 2027, 59 UN member states will still have never served on the Security Council. President Sadyr Japarov had urged world leaders to support Kyrgyzstan’s bid, framing it as a chance to give small, developing, and landlocked states a stronger voice on the UN Security Council. Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev also framed the campaign in broader multilateral terms, arguing that smaller states need a greater role in responding to global security challenges. “No single state can address modern-day threats alone; that is why multilateral diplomacy is critical,” he said, speaking before the vote. The victory also carries broader regional significance. Central Asia sits at the intersection of several issues regularly discussed at the Security Council, including Afghanistan, counterterrorism, water security, transnational crime, and regional stability. Kyrgyzstan’s term is expected to give the region a more direct platform in Council deliberations. The seat will not give Kyrgyzstan veto power, which is held only by the five permanent members. But non-permanent members vote on resolutions, sanctions, peacekeeping mandates, and statements, and each member holds the rotating presidency of the Council for one month during its term. For Central Asia, the timing is significant. Afghanistan remains a recurring security concern, while terrorism, border security, narcotics trafficking, and climate-related instability all carry direct regional implications. Kyrgyzstan’s presence will give Bishkek a formal role in debates that often affect the region but are usually shaped by larger powers. The Security Council has 15 members: five permanent members with veto power, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for staggered two-year terms. Kyrgyzstan’s election follows years of campaigning and comes as many UN member states continue to call for broader representation in global security decision-making. For Bishkek, the seat is both a national diplomatic milestone and a chance to present Central Asian security concerns from inside the Council. The practical test will come in 2027, when Kyrgyzstan moves from campaign language to votes on conflicts, sanctions, peacekeeping mandates, and crisis diplomacy.

Washington Links TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik Repeal in Push Toward Central Asia

A notable strategic shift is taking place in U.S. foreign policy, one that could have a long-term impact on the economic architecture of Eurasia. After decades in which Central Asia and the South Caucasus were viewed largely through the lens of security, counterterrorism, and competition with Russia and China, Washington is increasingly emphasizing trade, investment, transport routes, and access to critical minerals. One of the clearest signs of this shift came during a recent hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Senator Steve Daines and Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the implementation of the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) framework, as well as the need to remove the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. At first glance, these may appear to be separate issues: the peace process in the South Caucasus and Cold War-era trade legislation. In reality, however, they are closely connected. Together, they point to a broader U.S. effort to link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Western markets through trade, transport, and investment. In recent years, Republican Senator Steve Daines of Montana has emerged as one of the most active advocates of expanding America’s presence in Central Asia. As co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus and one of the leading proponents of legislative efforts to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions, Daines has consistently argued for stronger trade and investment ties between the United States and the countries of the region. During the hearing, Daines placed particular emphasis on the importance of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, describing it as one of the most underappreciated diplomatic efforts of recent years. According to the senator, resolving the conflict could open the door to a large-scale economic transformation of the wider region. Particularly noteworthy was his reference to a geopolitical concept associated with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In Daines’ formulation, Central Asia represents the “bottle,” while Azerbaijan serves as its “cork.” Opening transport routes through the South Caucasus, he argued, would allow flows of oil, gas, critical minerals, and other resources to move toward Western markets rather than toward Russia, China, or Iran. Daines said this approach helped address some of the most difficult issues in the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement process and laid the foundation for what he called a “landmark agreement” after nearly four decades of conflict. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described TRIPP as an initiative capable of fundamentally transforming Armenia’s economic role in the region. According to Rubio, the framework not only addresses the issue of transport access, which had long been a source of disagreement between Baku and Yerevan, but also creates an opportunity for Armenia to become a major trade and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia. Rubio described TRIPP as central to the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement framework, emphasizing that the project could generate substantial investment flows and attract U.S. companies to infrastructure and transport projects across the region. Washington’s argument is that trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure can give the political settlement a stronger economic base. Unlike many previous peace initiatives, TRIPP is built around tangible economic incentives: trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure development. It is within this broader strategy that the question of repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment acquires new significance. The amendment was adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1974 as a means of pressuring the Soviet Union and other non-market economies that restricted freedom of emigration. The law denied such countries most-favored-nation trade status and imposed additional trade restrictions. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union more than three decades ago, the amendment formally remains in effect for several post-Soviet states, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. Although most of these countries receive annual waivers and effectively enjoy normal trade relations with the United States, the legislation itself remains on the books. At the hearing, Daines described Jackson-Vanik as one of the principal irritants in U.S. relations with both Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia. The senator argued that the restrictions have long since lost their original relevance and continue to impede the development of economic ties. Rubio’s response when asked about the Jackson-Vanik amendment was unequivocal. “It's a detriment. We'd like to see it removed,” the Secretary of State said. Kazakhstan’s ambassador to the United States, Magzhan Ilyassov, welcomed the exchange. “U.S.-Kazakhstan relations are at new heights and your engagement with Central Asia has played a pivotal role in that progress,” Magzhan Ilyassov said on X. He said that removing the “relic” of the Jackson-Vanik amendment would support “the new chapter in the partnership.” For many American policymakers, the issue has long ceased to be merely a trade matter. Today, Jackson-Vanik is increasingly viewed as a symbolic reminder that U.S. policy toward Central Asia still relies in part on instruments inherited from the Cold War era. For business, the issue is certainty. Major investment projects in mining, energy, transport infrastructure, and manufacturing are planned over decades. If normal trade relations depend on annual waivers, companies face an added layer of political and regulatory risk. This is why Congress regularly sees initiatives aimed at granting Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states permanent normal trade relations status. In recent years, such initiatives have attracted support from both Republicans and Democrats. That leaves Washington with a policy contradiction: it is encouraging American companies to invest billions of dollars in the region while maintaining legislative restrictions adopted more than half a century ago for an entirely different geopolitical era. The principal driver of growing U.S. interest in the region remains the desire to diversify global supply chains and reduce dependence on China. Today, Beijing occupies a dominant position in the production and processing of rare earth elements that are essential for batteries, semiconductors, defense products, and technologies associated with the energy transition. According to available estimates, approximately 170 rare earth deposits have been identified across the region. Kazakhstan possesses substantial reserves of tungsten, uranium, and other strategic metals, while Uzbekistan is actively attracting foreign investors to projects involving the extraction and processing of mineral resources. At the C5+1 Summit in Washington in November 2025, Kazakhstan signed agreements with American companies worth approximately $17 billion in aviation, digital technologies, and critical minerals. Uzbekistan also concluded major commercial agreements in the aviation and energy sectors. These projects suggest that Washington increasingly views Central Asia not as a temporary foreign policy priority, but as a long-term component of its economic security strategy. Despite growing U.S. engagement, competition in the region remains intense. China remains Central Asia’s largest single-country trading partner, while the EU is also one of the region’s main trade and investment partners. In 2025, trade between China and the countries of the region reached $106.3 billion. By comparison, trade between the United States and Kazakhstan, Washington’s largest partner in Central Asia, stands at approximately $5.5 billion. Moreover, governments in the region have increasingly pursued multi-vector foreign policies and have shown little interest in choosing openly between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. This means that attitudes in Central Asia and the South Caucasus depend far less on high-profile political statements than on the ability to offer real investment, technology, financing, and infrastructure solutions. The hearing featuring Daines and Rubio was therefore a revealing moment in understanding how Washington’s view of Eurasia is evolving. In that sense, TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik repeal now sit in the same policy frame. One is meant to open new trade and logistics routes. The other would remove a Cold War-era barrier that still complicates American business engagement across the region.

As Armenia Looks West, Could Uzbekistan Move Closer to the EAEU?

Armenia’s increasingly uncertain future within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to have entered a new phase. On May 29, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement calling on Yerevan to clarify whether it intends to pursue deeper integration with the European Union or remain committed to the Eurasian bloc. The four leaders announced that members of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council would present a report at the next meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2026 outlining the possible consequences of suspending Armenia’s participation in the EAEU treaty framework. “We share the view that the Republic of Armenia should, within the shortest possible timeframe, hold a nationwide referendum on joining the European Union or continuing its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union,” the statement said. Speaking to journalists after the summit in Astana, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew parallels between Armenia’s current trajectory and the developments that preceded the crisis in Ukraine. “I have mentioned this before: the crisis in Ukraine began with attempts to join the EU,” Putin said. He added that significant differences between European and EAEU standards, particularly in agriculture and industry, make simultaneous participation in both integration projects difficult. “Combining the two is practically impossible,” Putin said. “Therefore, we would be forced to curtail much of our economic integration work with Armenia.” The following day, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations amid Yerevan’s growing engagement with the European Union. According to Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, the move was a clear diplomatic signal of Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the pro-European course pursued by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government and indicated a downgrading of bilateral relations. Dubnov also argued that Armenia’s representative at the Astana summit, Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, avoided harsher criticism from Putin partly because of the position taken by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Kazakhstan itself signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2020,” Dubnov noted, suggesting that arguments about Armenia’s European integration harming the EAEU are largely political rather than economic in nature. One recent poll appears to reinforce confidence within Armenia’s ruling camp. A survey conducted ahead of parliamentary elections indicates that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party could secure nearly 65% of decided voters, positioning it for a convincing victory and a substantial parliamentary majority. Against that backdrop, Moscow’s pressure on Yerevan may be less about influencing the outcome of Armenia’s elections than about preparing for a longer-term strategic realignment. Supporters of Pashinyan increasingly associate his political project with closer ties to Europe, a perception reinforced not only by European leaders but also by U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently expressed support for Pashinyan’s re-election campaign. For his part, Pashinyan appears focused on a broader regional recalibration. Speaking via Facebook Live on May 31, he emphasized the importance of normalizing relations with neighboring states. “I am convinced that we will achieve the goal of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye,” he said. “This means that a balanced and balancing foreign policy will achieve its objectives, creating new opportunities for Armenia in building a state of a new quality.” Such a shift could further reduce Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus, while increasing the role of Türkiye as a regional powerbroker. Moscow, meanwhile, appears eager to deepen ties with another strategically important partner: Uzbekistan. On May 22, Putin held a telephone conversation with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. A week later, Mirziyoyev participated in the expanded-format meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Astana. Uzbekistan currently holds observer status in the EAEU. “For Uzbekistan, expanding practical cooperation with EAEU member states remains one of the key priorities of our foreign economic policy,” Mirziyoyev told participants. “Our interaction with the Union’s countries has evolved into a comprehensive economic partnership.” Mirziyoyev proposed creating a unified digital trade space within the EAEU, including harmonized approaches to e-commerce regulation, customs procedures, phytosanitary and veterinary controls, certificates of origin, and mutual recognition of electronic documents. He also highlighted labor mobility as a priority area, calling for the integration of national employment platforms into a common digital system that would provide citizens with access to vacancies, labor regulations, and migration-related information across member states. For Uzbekistan, labor migration remains a critical component of economic relations with Russia, which continues to employ large numbers of Uzbek migrant workers. As a result, the December meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council could bring two questions into sharper focus: the future of Armenia’s participation in the EAEU, and the extent to which Uzbekistan is prepared to deepen cooperation with the bloc. Whether Uzbekistan ultimately moves from observer to full member remains uncertain. However, as Armenia moves closer to Europe and Uzbekistan deepens economic engagement with Eurasian partners, the balance within the EAEU may be entering a period of significant transformation.

Kyrgyzstan Weighs Higher Sugary Drink Taxes as Child Health Concerns Rise

Kyrgyzstan is considering higher taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages, including a new sugar-content-based excise system, as officials seek to curb rising rates of obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease among children and adolescents. On May 26, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Health organized a high-level policy dialogue on the taxation of sugary drinks as part of the country’s strategy to prevent noncommunicable diseases and promote healthier diets. According to the ministry, noncommunicable diseases, including cardiovascular illnesses, cancer, and diabetes, remain the leading cause of premature deaths in Kyrgyzstan. Excessive consumption of sugary beverages is increasingly recognized as a major risk factor for obesity and diabetes, especially among younger age groups. The proposal would replace the current flat excise rate with a tiered system in which drinks with higher sugar content are taxed more heavily. The Ministry of Health has also proposed a separate excise tax on energy drinks, citing their sugar and caffeine content and potential risks for adolescents. The policy discussion brought together representatives of the Ministry of Health, parliament, international development organizations, civil society groups, and public health experts to review international experience, economic evidence, and possible approaches to taxing sugary beverages. According to the World Health Organization, more than 115 countries worldwide, including 22 countries in the WHO European Region, have already implemented various forms of taxation on sugar-sweetened beverages as part of efforts to improve public nutrition and reduce the health and economic burden caused by chronic diseases. International studies show that increasing the price of sugary drinks can reduce consumption and encourage healthier dietary habits. “Today, we are facing a significant increase in diabetes, obesity, and cardiovascular diseases, and the situation among children and adolescents is particularly alarming,” Deputy Health Minister Gulbara Ishenapysova said during the dialogue. “Sugar-sweetened beverages form unhealthy eating habits from an early age while providing no nutritional value. The state already incurs enormous costs for treating complications of diabetes, including hemodialysis, heart attacks, strokes, amputations, and disability.” According to Ishenapysova, increasing taxes on sugary drinks should be viewed “first and foremost as an investment in public health and the prevention of chronic diseases.” WHO Representative to Kyrgyzstan, Dr. Liviu Vedrasco, said the taxation of sugary beverages is not only a health policy measure but also an investment in the country’s future productivity and economic resilience. “International experience convincingly demonstrates that well-designed fiscal policy helps reduce sugar consumption, encourages producers to manufacture healthier products, and helps prevent noncommunicable diseases, especially among children and adolescents,” Vedrasco said. UNICEF Representative in Kyrgyzstan, Samman Thapa, warned that the situation in the country is becoming increasingly concerning. “According to the 2023 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 78% of children aged six to 23 months already consume sugary beverages,” Thapa said. “At the same time, the rate of overweight and obesity among children continues to rise.” The World Bank backed the proposal, citing modeling that projected long-term health and fiscal benefits. “Our analysis of the Kyrgyz Republic shows that there are practical measures capable of delivering significant benefits for both public health and public finances,” said Hugh Riddell, country director of the World Bank Group in Kyrgyzstan. According to World Bank estimates, raising taxes on sugary beverages could help prevent more than 50,000 cases of obesity, 41,000 cases of type 2 diabetes, and thousands of cases of cardiovascular disease and stroke over the next 25 years. The measure could also generate revenue comparable to current tobacco excise receipts, according to the World Bank. “This is a smart measure that will help improve the nation’s health, strengthen public finances, and support the country’s long-term development,” Riddell said. Participants in the dialogue reviewed the results of economic modeling and discussed draft regulatory proposals currently being developed in Kyrgyzstan. The Times of Central Asia previously reported on the Ministry of Health’s proposed reforms to the country’s excise tax system targeting sugary drinks and salty foods. At present, Kyrgyzstan applies a uniform excise tax of approximately $0.03 per liter on sugar-sweetened non-alcoholic beverages, regardless of sugar content. The Ministry of Health now proposes a differentiated excise system based on sugar concentration. Drinks containing up to 5 grams of sugar per 100 ml would be taxed at about $0.06 per liter; those with 5-8 grams at about $0.08; those with 8-11 grams at about $0.10; and those with more than 11 grams at about $0.12. Officials say the proposed system would encourage beverage producers to reduce sugar content, promote healthier consumer habits, and reduce consumption of high-sugar products. The ministry has also proposed introducing a separate excise tax of approximately $0.20 per liter on energy drinks, citing their high sugar and caffeine content and potential health risks, especially for adolescents.

EAEU Leaders Meet in Astana Amid Growing Internal Trade Disputes

Astana is hosting Eurasian Economic Union events on May 28-29, with leaders arriving on Thursday and the main meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council scheduled for Friday, May 29. The first part of Thursday was dominated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his delegation during Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan. At the Palace of Independence, Tokayev and Putin introduced their official delegations to each other during the Russian president’s state visit, while Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov said the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting would begin on Friday morning in narrow and expanded formats. The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the highest body of the Eurasian Economic Union, which came into force on January 1, 2015. Now more than a decade old, the bloc is facing deepening internal contradictions driven largely by external economic pressure on Russia, the Union’s core member. Some of those tensions are linked to the bloc’s expansion beyond its original Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan core. To understand the current state of Eurasian integration, it is necessary to revisit its origins, particularly the role played by Kazakhstan and its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had sought to preserve a looser union among the Soviet republics as the USSR collapsed. As prime minister and later president of the Kazakh SSR, Nazarbayev understood the economic consequences that would follow the collapse of the integrated Soviet economic system, and how deeply Kazakhstan remained tied to Soviet-era supply chains, infrastructure, and decision-making structures centered in Moscow. Nazarbayev first publicly proposed the idea of Eurasian integration in 1994 during a lecture at Moscow State University. At the time, however, the administration of Russian President Boris Yeltsin showed little interest in the concept. That changed after Vladimir Putin came to power. In 2001, the Eurasian Economic Community, known as EurAsEC, was established, bringing together Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. The founding agreement had been signed in Astana in October 2000. Uzbekistan joined EurAsEC in 2006, but suspended its membership only two years later. Meanwhile, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan launched work in 2007 on creating a Customs Union, which officially came into existence in 2010. In the autumn of 2011, Putin announced plans to establish a Eurasian Economic Union based on a future Single Economic Space. Two years later, Nazarbayev proposed dissolving EurAsEC in connection with the planned creation of the EAEU by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia were invited to join the Customs Union. However, by 2014, when the treaty establishing the EAEU and dissolving EurAsEC was signed, neither Armenia nor Kyrgyzstan had initially been central to the Eurasian project. At that stage, much of the discussion revolved around the possible accession of Ukraine. Russian political commentator and current State Duma deputy Anatoly Wasserman devoted several books to the idea of integrating Ukraine into the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan project, including Ukraine and the Rest of Russia. Wasserman argued that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine needed to move away from a raw-materials-based economic model by creating a unified market for industrial production. At the time, Ukraine’s population of around 40 million would have expanded the EAEU’s consumer market to more than 200 million people, making large-scale industrial production economically viable. Today, the combined population of EAEU member states is usually estimated at more than 185 million. “Raw material exports have exhausted their potential,” Wasserman said in an interview during that period. “I also believe that an economy focused on foreign investment is a flawed model. The new economic system should be oriented not toward foreign capital, but toward development within the Eurasian Economic Union, toward the creation of a single interconnected economic complex in which all participants are equally interested in the development of the common economy.” Around the same time, the project was drawing sharper scrutiny from Washington. In 2012, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described Russian-led Eurasian integration efforts as an attempt to “re-Sovietize the region.” By early 2014, hopes of bringing Ukraine into the EAEU had collapsed. In one interpretation, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became the next additions to a project whose earlier economic logic had assumed a larger Ukrainian market. Some studies of Kazakhstan’s role in the EAEU have noted that Astana opposed the accession of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, reflecting concern that the bloc was moving beyond its original core. In recent years, Moscow’s relations with Armenia have deteriorated. The rupture with Yerevan deepened after Azerbaijan’s 2023 takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, when Armenian officials increasingly blamed Russia and the Russian-led security framework for failing to protect Armenian interests. Russia has since imposed restrictions on several Armenian products amid the diplomatic fallout from Yerevan’s tilt toward the West. Tensions rose further after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Armenia in May, prompting Moscow to summon the Armenian ambassador and accuse Yerevan of giving Kyiv a platform for anti-Russian statements.

Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, remains heavily exposed to Russia through labor migration and remittances, making any dispute with Moscow politically and economically sensitive. Even so, Bishkek has taken Russia to the EAEU Court over health insurance rights for migrant workers’ families, underscoring how practical disputes inside the bloc can spill into formal legal channels.