Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at OTS cooperation, Azerbaijan President Aliyev's decision not to attend the OTS summit in Ankara, and the Middle Corridor. Special guest: Dr. Robert Cutler
$6.3 Billion Binance Cyberattack Comes as Exchange Expands in Central Asia
The world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, has reported a cyberattack affecting approximately $6.3 billion in digital assets. Blockchain analysts say the October 29 attack is the largest cryptocurrency theft on record. The company says around $3 billion has been frozen and withdrawals have been temporarily suspended. The attack comes as Binance expands its presence in Central Asia, with a licensed exchange in Kazakhstan, a local partner in Uzbekistan, and cooperation with Kyrgyzstan on blockchain development. How the Attack Unfolded According to preliminary findings released by Binance on October 30, the attackers may have used a software development and operations engineer’s compromised laptop to access an internal service and initiate unauthorized cryptocurrency withdrawals. Binance has pledged to cover all losses using its own funds and the Secure Asset Fund for Users, an emergency reserve. TRM Labs, an American blockchain analytics firm named for Token Relationship Management, said the attackers moved assets across ten blockchain networks, conducting most of the transactions in approximately 20 minutes. The firm attributed the attack to TraderTraitor, a North Korean state-sponsored hacking group, with high confidence. Binance Kazakhstan Responds Following reports of the breach, Kazakhstan-based news outlet Digital Business contacted Binance Kazakhstan to ask about the safety of local customers’ funds. "We have found no evidence of any compromise of wallet private keys. Users' funds are safe. Once the incident response work is complete, we will also publish an updated proof-of-reserves report," the exchange said. Private keys are the secret codes used to authorize cryptocurrency transfers; a proof-of-reserves report compares an exchange’s asset holdings with its customers’ balances. Binance Kazakhstan operates under the supervision of the Astana Financial Services Authority at the Astana International Financial Centre. In September, the National Bank of Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of understanding with Binance Investments Co. to establish a regional settlement hub for international payments, including digital asset transactions for customers in Central Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Eastern Europe. The project involves registering a Binance Group entity in Kazakhstan and obtaining a Category I payment organization license from the National Bank. The settlement hub remains a proposal and has not begun operating. Binance's Operations in Uzbekistan In Uzbekistan, Binance serves customers through its licensed local partner, Coinpay. The partnership was announced in January 2025, following a regulatory dispute that resulted in Binance paying a fine for violating Uzbekistan’s cryptocurrency regulations. The service officially launched on January 28, 2025, allowing customers to deposit and withdraw funds through domestic payment systems. Direct peer-to-peer transactions through Binance, in which users trade with one another, are prohibited for residents of Uzbekistan under national regulations. Kyrgyzstan's Blockchain Partnership In October 2025, authorities announced the launch of KGST, a stablecoin designed to maintain the value of one Kyrgyz som, on BNB Chain, a blockchain network whose initials stand for Build and Build. Binance founder Changpeng Zhao became an adviser on digital assets to the president of Kyrgyzstan in May of that year. BNB Chain and Binance’s cryptocurrency exchange are separate systems. A breach of the exchange does not automatically mean that Kyrgyz projects using the blockchain have been compromised.
Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Border Fencing Complete in Batken, Demarcation Continues
Kyrgyzstan has completed the installation of nearly 328 kilometers of border fencing in the Batken region in the country’s southwest, where armed clashes with Tajikistan took place in 2021 and 2022. For some residents, the new boundary has also raised questions about compensation for lost homes and farmland. On October 29, the Batken regional administration confirmed completion of the fencing, two weeks after the State Border Service made the same announcement. During 2025–2026, 338.5 kilometers of patrol roads were built in the region’s Batken and Leilek districts, allowing patrols to reach previously difficult-to-access areas. The fencing covers part of the countries’ approximately 1,008-kilometer border. The two countries began installing border markers in July 2026 and are continuing this process of demarcation, alongside the preparation of formal boundary records. Three Decades of Disputes Batken lies in the densely populated Fergana Valley, which is divided among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. National borders here run close to villages and farmland, making disputes over territory particularly sensitive. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were unable to agree on the course of substantial sections of their shared border. Disputes over access to land and water were particularly frequent in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region and the neighboring Sughd region in northern Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan also had a longstanding border dispute with Uzbekistan, which the two countries settled in 2022. In April 2021 and September 2022, clashes escalated into armed conflicts involving heavy weapons. The September 2022 fighting killed more than 100 people across both sides and destroyed hundreds of homes. On the Kyrgyz side alone, more than 140,000 people were displaced. Cross-border movement was severely restricted following the 2021 violence, disrupting trade and visits between communities. Negotiations continued after the fighting, with the two countries’ security chiefs leading efforts to resolve the remaining territorial disputes. The eventual settlement involved exchanges of land, including in areas where communities had grown up close to one another. In December 2024, Bishkek and Dushanbe announced that they had reached agreement on the remaining disputed sections. The two sides completed a draft description of the border alignment and signed the corresponding protocol. In February 2025, negotiators also reached preliminary agreements on road use and access to water infrastructure, two longstanding sources of friction between border communities. On March 13, 2025, Presidents Sadyr Japarov and Emomali Rahmon signed a state border treaty in Bishkek, alongside agreements covering road access and water and energy facilities. That same day, the Kyzyl-Bel–Guliston and Kairagach–Madaniyat international border crossings reopened after being closed for nearly four years. Tajik entrepreneurs were able to return to markets in the Batken region. On March 31, 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on the junction of their three national borders as well as the Khujand Declaration on Eternal Friendship. Compensation Claims Remain Former Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Tokon Mamytov said in comments to the state news agency Kabar on April 29, 2025, that installing border fencing would help reduce the risk of renewed clashes and restore economic ties. "It is important to emphasize that borders are not an 'Iron Curtain,' but a tool for organizing interaction," Mamytov said. But the agreement has created difficulties for some residents whose property was affected by changes to the border. During Japarov’s October visit, residents of the Batken region raised compensation concerns. A representative of the village of Zhany-Dostuk spoke on behalf of 73 families. According to her, some compensation had been paid, but disputes remained over the amounts and the allocation of housing. Japarov instructed officials to resolve the complaints, provide housing to people who had lost their homes, and allocate replacement land plots. Authorities said most compensation had already been paid, although the number of families still awaiting replacement housing or land was not specified. Trade After the Border Reopened Trade between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan reached $33.1 million in 2025, compared with $12.2 million a year earlier, according to Tajikistan’s official statistics cited by Asia-Plus. Bishkek and Dushanbe aim to increase bilateral trade to $500 million by 2030. As of March 2026, however, border markets in the Kyrgyz village of Arka and Tajikistan’s Khistevarz had not yet resumed regular cross-border trading, the news outlet reported. The restoration of transit through Kyrgyzstan is also important for Tajikistan. Before the border closure, some freight from Kazakhstan and China passed through Kyrgyz territory, and part of that traffic has now resumed.
OTS Summit in Ankara: Türkiye Looks to Strengthen Its Position as Central Asia Competes for Transit Routes
Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev arrived in Ankara on October 28, the day he delivered his annual State of the Nation Address, in which he announced plans to expand transport routes between China and Europe. On October 30, he will attend the 13th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Turkey is preparing to take over the organization's chairmanship from Azerbaijan, and Central Asian countries are seeking to accelerate freight transportation across the Caspian Sea. Behind the shared rhetoric of Turkic unity lie specific economic interests. Kazakhstan is building railways and expanding its capacity to handle transit cargo from China. Azerbaijan is developing Caspian ports and transport infrastructure in the South Caucasus. Turkey wants to attract more freight moving between China and Europe through Central Asia, increasing its role as a transit hub. A unified route looks much simpler on a political map than it does in the daily operations of transport companies. Between China and Europe, cargo crosses several borders, is transferred from trains to ships and back, undergoes customs clearance, and is subject to tariffs set by different operators. Interest in alternative Eurasian transport routes has grown since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but the competition extends beyond freight. Ankara is looking to strengthen its political presence in Central Asia, where Russia and China retain considerable influence. Summit events begin on October 29 with a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, chaired by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The nation’s presidents will meet on the following day. Participants are expected to adopt the Ankara Declaration, discuss investment, energy, digitalization, security, and appoint a new OTS secretary-general. Tokayev and Kazakhstan's Route to Europe Tokayev's visit to Turkey follows directly after his State of the Nation Address, much of which focused on infrastructure, including plans to open the 272-kilometer Bakhty–Ayagoz railway in 2027. The line is expected to add 20 million metric tons of annual freight capacity between Kazakhstan and China. Tokayev also discussed construction of the Aral–Caspian highway. The project would establish a new transport connection between western and central Kazakhstan. According to government estimates, it could shorten certain freight routes between China and Europe by approximately 1,000 kilometers and reduce delivery times by up to three days. Both projects are part of a broader effort to increase Kazakhstan's revenue from international logistics. The country currently earns a substantial share of its transit revenue directly from freight transportation. Developing warehouses, terminals, processing facilities, and distribution centers could generate additional income. Turkey occupies an important position in this network. An overland branch of the Middle Corridor passes through its territory en route to European markets; the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway connects Azerbaijan to Turkey's rail network through Georgia. On the sidelines of the Ankara summit, Turkish business associations plan to discuss border crossing operations, transportation costs, and the development of the Middle Corridor. Transport geography, however, does not fit neatly within the OTS's political boundaries. Georgia, through which the railway connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey passes, is not a member of the organization. China, which generates a substantial share of potential freight traffic, also remains outside it. The Caspian section presents additional challenges. The capacity of the ports of Aktau, Kuryk, and Baku depends on the availability of vessels, weather conditions, and coordination of railway schedules. A delay along one section can eliminate the advantage of a shorter overland route. Ankara Expands Its Influence, Astana Draws Boundaries Turkey has steadily strengthened its ties with Central Asia through trade, education, defense cooperation, and infrastructure projects. The OTS brings these areas together within a permanent framework for high-level negotiations. But the five member states do not share a unified foreign policy. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan belong to the Eurasian Economic Union alongside Russia, Belarus, and Armenia. Both countries are also members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, while Turkey is a NATO member, and Uzbekistan maintains a policy of nonparticipation in military blocs. Central Asian members also balance their ties with Turkey against relationships with China, Russia, and the European Union. Those outside partnerships complicate efforts to forge a common OTS foreign policy. At the May summit in Turkestan, Tokayev rejected portraying the organization as a military or geopolitical alliance, emphasizing practical cooperation, a position analysts interpreted as evidence of differing visions within the OTS. Turkey's upcoming chairmanship brings these differences back into focus. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to increase the OTS’s international standing, while its Central Asian members are pursuing closer cooperation without limiting their wider diplomatic and economic partnerships. Uzbekistan Seeks Leadership of the Secretariat Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is set to visit Turkey on October 29–30, with Tashkent announcing plans for discussions covering trade, investment, transport logistics, tourism, environmental issues, and education. Uzbekistan joined the OTS in 2019, after the organization's other current members. According to Uzbekistan's government, it has since proposed more than 85 initiatives across various areas. The summit is expected to appoint a new secretary-general. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, president of the Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM), anticipates an Uzbek representative taking the role for the first time. Such an appointment would strengthen Tashkent’s presence within the organization’s permanent institutions. In his assessment, cooperation between Turkey and Uzbekistan could accelerate the organization's work in trade, investment, energy, digitalization, and transportation. Uzbekistan is seeking new transport links to international markets. As a landlocked country, it relies on neighboring states and transit partners to move goods westward. However, Tashkent and Astana have competing transit interests. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, now under construction, could divert some freight from routes through Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan proposes linking the railway to the Middle Corridor, but the routes would still compete for cargo. The OTS can help coordinate these projects, but its secretary-general cannot settle competing national priorities. Decisions on infrastructure financing and transport policy remain with national governments. A Shared History Has Not Created a Common Market The Organization of Turkic States was established in 2009 as the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States and adopted its current name in 2021. Its full members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. Hungary, Turkmenistan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the Economic Cooperation Organization have observer status. Northern Cyprus is recognized as an independent state only by Turkey, and its participation in the OTS has been a source of friction, according to analysts. In recent years, the OTS has established several economic mechanisms, including the Turkic Investment Fund. Members are also expanding cooperation among customs authorities, transport operators, and business associations. But there is no common market within the organization. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan follow the customs rules of the Eurasian Economic Union, while the other members operate under their own trade regimes and international agreements. Yaşar Sarı, a professor at Istanbul's Ibn Haldun University and director of the Heydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies, considers strengthening existing institutions more important than expanding the OTS or attempting to form a new geopolitical bloc. In an interview with CASPIA Lab, he advocated developing economic integration, transport cooperation, and regional coordination. The OTS can help finance projects and coordinate negotiations, but national governments retain control over transport policy. Its members also have commitments to partners outside the organization, limiting how far they can act together. Agreeing on a joint statement is easier than negotiating lower freight charges or shorter border delays across several countries.
In Memory of Roza Aitmatova
Roza Aitmatova died on October 26, 2026, at the age of 89. She was the younger sister of Chingiz Aitmatov, one of the most important writers of the 20th century. With her death, Kyrgyzstan has lost an invaluable witness to its history. She succeeded in turning the tragedies endured by her family into part of her nation's collective memory. Roza was born in Moscow on March 8, 1937. She was just six months old when her father, Torekul Aitmatov, a prominent political figure who had played a role in establishing the state institutions of the young Kyrgyz Republic, was arrested during Stalin's purges. He was executed in November 1938, but his family remained unaware of his fate for decades. His wife, Nagima Abduvalieva, left alone with four children, continued to hope that her husband was still alive, somewhere in a distant Soviet labor camp. Roza grew up alongside her brothers and sister, Chingiz, Ilgiz and Lyutsiya, in an atmosphere of hardship and uncertainty. As the children of an "enemy of the people," they faced discrimination and financial difficulties. During the war, the family lived in modest homes in the Talas region, relying on the support of relatives and fellow villagers. Chingiz, the eldest child, had to take on adult responsibilities at an early age: while still a teenager, he worked as secretary of the village council. For Roza, her elder brother had been a source of support and a role model since childhood. It was Chingiz, then a young agronomist, who told the family in 1953 that they might be able to move to the capital, Frunze, now Bishkek. Before leaving, Nagima wanted to have a photograph taken with all four of her children. As Roza later recalled, this seemingly simple gesture symbolized the end of their most difficult years and the beginning of a new life. In the years that followed, Chingiz gained international recognition with works such as Jamila, The First Teacher and Mother Earth. Roza had by then devoted herself to the natural sciences, having studied physics and mathematics. She followed her brother's literary achievements closely. Yet their relationship remained, above all, a deeply personal family bond, built on intimate conversations, shared memories and boundless love for their mother. One episode recounted by Roza reveals just how closely the writer's work was connected to his family history. In 1962, following a severe deterioration in Nagima's health, Roza went into her brother's study to tidy his desk. Among the pages of a new manuscript, she discovered a dedication to their parents: to their father, whose burial place was still unknown, and to their mother, who had raised four children on her own. It was the first draft of Mother Earth, a novella in which Roza recognized many aspects of Nagima's life, her courage and her resilience. When their mother died in 1971, Roza saw her brother, by then a celebrated writer, weeping inconsolably in a hospital corridor. Behind the image of a man known throughout the world was still the boy who had lost his father and feared losing the last remaining link to his childhood. A turning point came in 1991, when a mass grave containing victims of Stalin's purges was discovered at Chon-Tash, near Bishkek. Among those buried there was Torekul Aitmatov. After more than half a century, the family finally learned the truth. Chingiz took part in the ceremony to rebury the remains and proposed naming the site Ata-Beyit, meaning "Grave of the Fathers." For Roza, who had never had the chance to truly know her father, the discovery marked a new mission. She sought to reconstruct his life and restore the names and personal histories that the years of terror had sought to erase. The result of this work was the book White Pages of History, first published in 2009. Other books and memoirs followed, devoted to her parents and to her brother, who had died in 2008. Alongside this work, Roza made a significant contribution to education and women's rights, heading Kyrgyzstan's Women's Assistance Center. In the final years of her life, she continued to collect memories and personal accounts, including in collaboration with her nephew, Asan Akhmatov. In a work published in 2024, by which time she was the last surviving child of Torekul and Nagima Aitmatov, Roza recalled her brother Chingiz's words: "You can always come to an understanding with another person, whoever they may be. But there is one thing you cannot negotiate with. That is time." While Chingiz used literature to tell the stories of his people's suffering and hopes, Roza devoted much of her life to reconstructing her family's history and preserving the memory of those who had been consigned to oblivion. She gathered documents, photographs and testimonies so that future generations, too, could know their past. Now that she, too, is gone, the responsibility of keeping her memory alive falls to others.
A First for Kyrgyzstan – Japarov’s Historic Visit to Armenia
For the first time, a Kyrgyz head of state has made an official visit to Armenia. President Sadyr Japarov arrived in Yerevan on October 15 at the invitation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and called the three-day trip “historic.” Talks remained firmly bilateral and produced ten signed agreements, a joint commitment to protect Lake Issyk-Kul and Lake Sevan (Armenia), and a stated interest in expanding transit links. Nothing in Japarov’s statement framed cooperation as directed against any third country. He presented it in terms of trade, cooperation, and friendly relations, with dialogue and peace underpinning regional stability. Japarov opened his remarks by noting that Pashinyan had visited Kyrgyzstan twice this year, including the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council session in Cholpon-Ata in August. Pashinyan, for his part, said Japarov’s first official visit to Armenia would open a new page in bilateral relations. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia have been independent since 1991, and both belong to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a five-nation bloc with a common market for goods, services, capital, and labor. Even so, their leaders have mostly met on the sidelines of multilateral summits. Quiet to Active Diplomacy Under Japarov, Kyrgyzstan has abandoned its quiet diplomacy and begun taking a more active role in international affairs. This year, Japarov has traveled to Armenia (October 15-17), Azerbaijan (October 14-15 and May 17), Turkmenistan (October 8-9), the United States (from September 19), South Korea (September 15-18), Kazakhstan (July 29, May 28-29, and May 15) and Russia (April 23). He reached Armenia fresh from the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Baku, where Central Asian leaders linked trade and security issues. Bishkek’s shift in foreign policy emphasis owes less to geopolitics than to economic necessity and a practical, non-ideological pursuit of national interests. Its commitment to dialogue, regional stability and good-neighborliness is central to a foreign policy aimed at win-win results. Biodiversity Diplomacy In Yerevan, Japarov attended the opening of the Leaders' Summit within the 17th UN Conference of the Parties on Biological Diversity (COP17). On October 16, he addressed the plenary, presenting initiatives on glacier melt and biodiversity in Central Asia, and met UNESCO Director-General Khaled El-Enany. Among the specific proposals, Japarov recommended a special mountain program within the Global Environment Facility at the World Bank to fund environmental projects in mountain regions, and a UN-backed trust fund for Issyk-Kul, to which Kyrgyzstan proposed an initial $10 million contribution from its state budget. He also called for a Global Center for Mountain Region Resilience in Bishkek, where countries could share knowledge and experience on environmental protection. Japarov further backed a debt-for-nature swap mechanism, which would let countries use financial resources more effectively to protect ecosystems, and urged stronger regional cooperation to protect rare animals and birds. The Yerevan Declaration followed the usual diplomatic template, restricted mainly to high-level language. Japarov invited Pashinyan to attend “Bishkek+25,” the Second Global Mountain Summit, on 21–23 October 2027, to mark the culmination of Kyrgyzstan’s Five Years of Action for Mountain Development. Transport at the Centre As expected, Japarov “highlighted transport cooperation as one of the promising areas of interaction,” a view Pashinyan shared. Both countries are landlocked and depend on routes crossing other countries’ territory. Expanding these links could lower trade costs and open markets for exporters in both countries. Talks also covered agriculture, information technology, education and tourism, sectors that likewise depend on reliable connections. Geoeconomics According to press releases from the U.S. Department of State and elsewhere, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is advancing, with Armenia’s parliament set to debate ratification of the U.S. framework agreement on October 27, following a committee review on October 21. The framework provides for a U.S.-Armenia joint venture, but Armenia still lags behind Azerbaijan: engineering surveys are only underway on its side, while Baku has nearly finished its connecting highway and railroad. Bishkek has a stake in moving TRIPP forward. Moscow has also weighed in. On October 15, after the CICA summit in Baku, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was asked about Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and TRIPP at a press conference. He said Moscow welcomed normalization and is ready to join infrastructure projects, noting that Russian Railways holds a concession and operates the South Caucasus Railway. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Lavrov also promoted the 3+3 regional cooperation format initiated by Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The format brings together the three South Caucasus states—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—with Russia, Türkiye, and Iran, although Georgia has not formally participated. In the volatile South Caucasus, Japarov’s message was unambiguous: peace and stability underpin prosperity, and dialogue must intensify. Kyrgyzstan’s playbook is straightforward: build ties, expand cooperation, keep channels open, and stick to business.
SCO Economic Ambitions Outpace Agreement
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) renewed calls for a development bank at its October 20 heads of government meeting in Dushanbe, but the institution remains under negotiation more than a year after members reached political agreement on its creation. Participants adopted a joint communiqué and decisions on economic cooperation, including joint manufacturing and transportation. Financing those ambitions remains a central challenge. Members backed the bank at their September 2025 summit in Tianjin. A year later, the Bishkek summit ended without a founding agreement or capital commitments, and no launch date was set. The SCO brings together ten countries whose economic priorities differ sharply. China and India are among the world's largest economies, while Russia and Iran face Western sanctions. For Central Asian members, the organization offers another route to investment, but agreement on shared goals has yet to produce a common financing institution. Different Priorities Tajik Prime Minister Kohir Rasulzoda reported that SCO countries accounted for 70% of Tajikistan's foreign trade turnover in January–August 2026. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment from member states amounted to just $350 million for the whole of 2025. "These figures demonstrate the enormous untapped potential of our investment cooperation, which significantly lags behind the dynamics of trade relations," Rasulzoda said. Iran has different concerns. First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref called for wider use of national currencies in trade, alongside export insurance and investment protection. Tehran has long sought to reduce its foreign trade dependence on Western financial infrastructure. Sanctions make this an urgent priority, but Iran's interests in international settlements differ considerably from those of India or China, for example. Beijing and New Delhi conduct extensive trade with Western countries, so a single financial model for all SCO members is unlikely to satisfy everyone. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin encouraged joint manufacturing projects using Russia's special economic zones and investment protection agreements. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, is seeking investors for the Tamchy special investment and financial territory, established in July 2025 in the Issyk-Kul region. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev invited SCO partners to develop joint projects there. Financing the Bank A development bank could provide a common source of funding for such projects. In Dushanbe, Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin renewed calls to accelerate its establishment. "We consider it fundamentally important that this institution become a multilateral development bank with a unique mandate, providing access to long-term investment financing without political conditions," he said. Kyrgyzstan also supported establishing the bank. Amangeldiev urged members to draw on existing financing channels, including the SCO Interbank Consortium, while negotiations continue. Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov confirmed Astana's willingness to host the bank's headquarters. Bishkek had already put forward its candidacy at the September summit. Choosing a headquarters is only part of the task. Members must agree on their financial contributions and how the bank will operate, including who decides which projects receive loans. China has far greater financial resources than most of its SCO partners, giving it the potential to become the bank's principal source of capital. Its role in funding the institution would make the distribution of voting power particularly important. For smaller members, the terms would determine how far the bank broadens their financing options. Central Asian governments have reasons to seek a wider choice of lenders. China is already a major source of investment and credit, while Russia remains important for trade and labor migration. The region is also developing economic ties with partners outside the SCO. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are cultivating relations with the European Union and the U.S., as well as Turkey, the Gulf states, and international financial institutions. An SCO bank would enter a region where governments already have competing offers and their own investment priorities. Why the SCO Is Not Becoming an Economic Union The difficulty of establishing the bank reflects the limits of the SCO as an economic institution. Over a quarter of a century, it has built an extensive system of meetings and agreements, but it has no single market or common customs territory. The organization emerged out of security cooperation. Unlike the European Union, its members have not transferred authority over economic policy to supranational institutions. All major decisions are made by consensus. This principle allows every member's position to be taken into account, including those of smaller states. But serious disagreements can also stall decisions. Political tensions also persist among SCO members. India and Pakistan have a long history of conflict, while India and China have unresolved border disputes. Sanctions on Russia and Iran affect their foreign trade and banking operations, while Central Asian countries are pursuing their own multi-vector foreign policies. Joint projects can still proceed without agreement across the entire organization. A railway or industrial facility needs an arrangement among the participating countries and their financiers, rather than approval from every SCO member. Such arrangements can deliver investment, but they leave the SCO primarily as a forum for negotiations. A development bank would give it a more direct role in financing projects across its membership. For now, political support for the bank has yet to translate into an agreed institution. How much members will contribute, and what influence those contributions will confer, remain central questions.
Opinion: China’s Regional Strategy Meets Central Asia’s National Bargains
The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway spent decades on the drawing board. Disagreements over its route and financing held it up long after the three governments endorsed the project. In 2024, a Kyrgyz parliamentarian asked railway officials a simple question: “Where will we find $1 billion?” A financing agreement signed in Bishkek on December 16, 2025, cleared a major obstacle. The railway is estimated to cost $4.7 billion. Chinese banks will lend about $2.3 billion to the joint project company over 35 years. China holds 51% of the company, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. The partners will provide the remaining funding as equity. In June 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament approved in the first reading a separate $304.5 million loan from China’s Export-Import Bank to help fund its own contribution. That loan has a 25-year term. The joint company’s debt and Kyrgyzstan’s borrowing for its stake are different obligations, but both affect how much value the country will need to earn from the line. Kyrgyzstan wants business around the railway, including terminals and freight services; Uzbekistan gains a direct rail link toward China, while Beijing gains another route west. The governments agreed to build the line, but tariffs and terminal operations will help decide how the returns are shared. The same division between shared goals and separate deals runs through China’s C+C5 relationship with the five Central Asian states. At the second China-Central Asia summit in Astana in June 2025, the six countries signed a treaty on eternal good-neighborliness. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also published a list of 55 cooperation documents. The first 14 cover the regional China-Central Asia framework. The other 41 involve Chinese institutions and counterparts in individual Central Asian countries, including local authorities and companies. The count reflects how the agreements are organized rather than their financial weight. The regional documents cover road permits, customs procedures and green minerals. The country-specific agreements extend into particular industries and investment relationships. Customs cooperation shows how regional talks can lead to bilateral action. At a meeting on May 21–22, 2025, customs chiefs from China and Central Asia agreed to joint border inspections. The next day, Chinese and Kazakh officials conducted an inspection of Nur Zholy-Khorgos. They agreed to accept more trucks from Kazakhstan and recognize each other’s X-ray inspection images to reduce repeat checks. Kazakhstan’s customs authority explicitly linked the inspection to the regional meeting. The agreement illustrates how governments can address a shared concern through negotiations at an individual crossing. The Astana investment agreements reflected different national priorities. Kazakhstan pursued investment protection and applications for China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, while Kyrgyzstan signed documents on an AI application center and processing industries. These were country-specific arrangements within the wider regional framework. The railway illustrates why some projects require only a few governments to agree. After recurring disagreements over its route and funding, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reached a financing settlement in 2025. They did not need all five Central Asian governments to negotiate a single position. Kazakhstan already has direct rail links with China; Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan stand to gain a new one. Their interests in future cargo flows may overlap without being identical. Trade gives those choices greater weight. China’s Ministry of Commerce reported bilateral trade with Central Asia of $106.3 billion in 2025, up 12% on the previous year. China sold $71.2 billion in goods to the region and purchased $35.1 billion. Those totals conceal different trade patterns in each country. They also give governments a reason to seek more production and processing at home. The Astana summit produced a regional memorandum on green-minerals investment. Actual mines and processing plants will still need contracts specifying who finances them and where the processing takes place. Customs technology raises a similar question. Shared electronic permits can speed freight, but countries must agree which systems can exchange data and who can access it. Central Asian leaders already consult among themselves before many meetings with outside powers. Their own regional process has developed alongside the expanding C5+ diplomatic formats. Cooperation with China gives them further reason to coordinate where their commercial interests overlap. The public record offers evidence of joint procedures and some action after regional meetings. It offers less detail on cases where all five governments secured shared financing conditions or common requirements for Chinese investment. Private negotiations may go further than the documents reveal. Closer coordination need not mean adopting a single commercial policy. Governments could compare financing risks before committing to cross-border projects, giving each a fuller basis for negotiating its own terms. The railway contracts and the Khorgos agreement show how China’s regional agenda takes shape through individual negotiations. For the countries hosting new connections, the terms will determine how much control they retain and how much income remains after the costs are paid. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Short Stories from the Region
