Opinion: The Engine of Turkic Integration – Why TURKPA Is No Longer “Just Talk”
On June 12, in Astana, the 14th Plenary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TURKPA) was held under the theme: TURKTIME: The Role of Parliamentary Diplomacy.
TURKPA has existed since 2008, but it is only now that the multifaceted activities of Turkic states are drawing close attention from external observers, first and foremost, from Russia. This is unsurprising since the driving forces behind Turkic initiatives are often Ankara and Astana. While Turkey promotes its national interests, Kazakhstan appears to play both of its powerful neighbors, Russia and China, against each other. Moscow, at times, does not hide its ire, hinting that its influence over Astana is diminishing in favor of Beijing. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev skillfully engages with China, securing benefits such as investments and a visa-free regime, which gives Kazakhstani carriers an advantage over their Russian and regional competitors.
TURKPA was officially founded a year before its 'sister' organization, the Organization of Turkic States, was established. The first proposal to create TURKPA was made by Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the 8th Summit of Turkic Heads of States in November 2006.
Interestingly, TURKPA is also listed on the website of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), although it includes Turkey, a country outside the CIS and a geopolitical rival to Russia, which dominates the organization.
Equally interesting is the composition of TURKPA and its governance structure. Its full members comprise Turkey, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan, whilst Hungary and Turkmenistan are observers. The day-to-day operations of the organization are managed by a Secretariat headquartered in Baku, and the Secretary General of TURKPA is always an Azerbaijani citizen. Strategic direction is provided through annual plenary sessions, which are presided over by the Speaker of Parliament of the country currently holding the Chair.
“The chairmanship rotates annually in alphabetical order according to the Latin alphabet,” explained Kazakh MP Aigul Kuspan.
This brings us to a curious contradiction that nobody focuses much upon. It is believed that Azerbaijan is Turkey’s proxy state in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, to a lesser or greater degree, pursue a Russian policy in the region. As explained, in recent years Kazakhstan has also gravitated toward promoting Chinese interests. Thus, in practice, Turkey leads TURKPA through its own presidency and via Azerbaijan for two out of every four years, while Russia/China exert influence through Kazakh and Kyrgyz speakers in the other two.
In theory, this tug-of-war could have rendered both TURKPA and the OTS, where geopolitical tensions are similar, meaningless forums for routine summits. That was true until recently; however, now we observe a growing geopolitical subjectivity in Central Asia and a reorientation toward its own interests. Therefore, OTS summits and TURKPA plenaries have become more purposeful.
This is demonstrated by the words of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who met with delegates of the 14th Plenary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States.
“Last year, Kazakhstan chaired the Organization of Turkic States. Under the motto 'TURKTIME', we implemented a number of important projects. About 100 events were organized that gave impetus to deepening Turkic integration. The 5th World Nomad Games were held in Astana, which introduced the world to the civilization of the Great Steppe. The approval of a single version of the Turkic alphabet can be called a historic event.”
Tokayev reminded everyone that, in addition to the official summits, OTS now also holds informal meetings, the first of which was held this year in Budapest, Hungary. Tokayev announced preparations for a second meeting and suggested Turkestan in Kazakhstan as its venue. Kazakhstan is clearly striving to maintain leadership in both the OTS and TURKPA and prevent Turkey from monopolizing Turkic diplomacy. Hungary, too, leans more toward Moscow than Ankara in its foreign policy.
So how are the OTS and TURKPA connected, apart from being 'sister' organizations? The structure is as follows: initiatives aimed at strengthening ties between Turkic countries are discussed and approved at OTS summits. There are six Turkic nations worldwide: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Four of them are members of both OTS and TURKPA. Once initiatives are approved by OTS, TURKPA converts them into legislation by harmonizing the legal norms of Turkic states or by endorsing projects that bring these states closer together.
These initiatives cover a wide range of issues, from transport and logistics to culture and education. In the field of logistics and transport, the Middle Corridor or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, a key link in China's Belt and Road, comes back into focus. In culture and education, there are numerous initiatives, including a joint television platform, the promotion of Turkic cinema, and the unification of alphabets.
To an external observer, it is clear that centripetal processes are underway within the Turkic space, and Moscow is most likely worried that Turkey will become its center. But a view from the inside shows that all these processes started when the region became interesting to Beijing as a space for its new Silk Road. Without Chinese investment, both OTS and TurkPA would have remained platforms for “just talking.”
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
The Ripple Effects of the Israel-Iran Conflict on Central Asia
The Israel-Iran conflict has escalated dramatically, with Israel launching large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and military targets, including the killing of top Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists. Characterizing these attacks as a “declaration of war,” Iran has retaliated by deploying approximately 100 drones toward Israeli territory, which have been intercepted. The strikes, part of Israel's "Operation Rising Lion," aim to neutralize what it perceives as an existential threat from Iran's nuclear ambitions. The situation has triggered reactions globally, with heightened tensions and calls for de-escalation. Meanwhile, in an interview with ABC News, U.S. President Trump called the strikes "excellent" and vowed there was "more to come. A lot more." The rapidly escalating conflict between Israel and Iran will undoubtedly exert a tangible influence on Central Asia, a region that shares both historical and geographic proximity to Iran. Turkmenistan, which directly borders Iran, is at the forefront, demonstrating how Central Asia sits strategically within a broader landscape of global power struggles. Geopolitical Tensions Within Reach Central Asia’s geographic and political ties to Iran make the region a key area of influence for Tehran. Iran’s relationship with Turkmenistan, grounded in a shared border and energy cooperation, highlights its immediate relevance. Turkmenistan and Iran collaborate on trade and natural gas exports, ensuring intertwined economies. However, these connections make Central Asia exposed to the consequences of Tehran’s ambitions, particularly as tensions with Israel spill over. Israel, meanwhile, has been steadily cultivating its influence in the region through strategic partnerships. Its strong alliance with Azerbaijan, Iran’s neighboring competitor to the north, has allowed Israel to counter Tehran’s reach. Additionally, Israel has deepened ties with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, offering expertise in cutting-edge technologies in agriculture, water-saving technologies, defense, and cybersecurity. This influence balances Iran’s predominance but risks elevating the regional stakes should the conflict further intensify. The nations of Central Asia are navigating a multitude of competing external pressures close to home, relying on multi-vector diplomacy to manage relationships with Iran, Israel, Russia, China, and the West. Economic Interdependence and Vulnerabilities Central Asia’s landlocked geography makes trade routes essential, with Iran serving as a critical gateway to global markets. The Bandar Abbas port facilitates the export of Central Asian goods, particularly for Turkmenistan. In January, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia, and Iran reaffirmed their commitment to increasing cargo transportation along the North-South transport corridor. However, sanctions on Tehran and the conflict's unpredictability cast uncertainty over these vital corridors. The Chabahar port, developed in partnership with India, is another crucial lifeline for trade. Unlike Pakistan's China-aligned Gwadar port, Chabahar links Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, offering a more stable and independent trade route. For nations like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the port diversifies transit options and reduces reliance on routes controlled by Russia or China. Social Dynamics and Security Challenges Culturally and religiously, Sunni-majority countries like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan remain alert to both Iranian propaganda and organizations like Hamas, which are considered destabilizing actors. Governments actively look to suppress rhetoric or movements that could spark unrest, prioritizing internal stability. Cross-border dynamics, especially in Turkmenistan, amplify these issues. Reports of Iranian proxies recruiting militants from Central Asia emphasize the region’s growing security concerns. Late last year, the authorities in Israel labeled the murder of Rabbi Zvi Kagan in the UAE, purportedly carried out by three Uzbek nationals, an act of “terrorism”. In September 2024, meanwhile, Uzbekistan backed a UN General Assembly resolution calling for Israel to withdraw its forces from occupied Palestinian territories, whilst in November the Kyrgyz authorities were signatories to a Turkish call for an arms embargo against Israel. Global Powers and Their Roles Central Asia’s geopolitical relevance ensures interest from larger powers. Russia’s coordination with Iran underpins Tehran’s position in the region, though Moscow’s focus on Ukraine has somewhat diluted its influence. China, conversely, prioritizes stability to safeguard its Belt and Road Initiative, steering clear of deep involvement in the Middle East but subtly opposing U.S.-backed dynamics. For the United States, Central Asia offers a frontier to challenge Iranian and Russian influence. Through its C5+1 framework, Washington has sought to foster partnerships and mitigate Tehran’s regional power, while aligning with Israel as a key Middle Eastern ally. Regional Responses to the Escalation The Central Asian nations have reacted cautiously to the growing conflict. Kazakhstan’s embassy in Tel Aviv has issued safety advisories for its citizens, emphasizing the importance of following Israeli Home Front Command directives, staying vigilant, and utilizing emergency hotlines. Kazakh airlines, including Air Astana and FlyArystan, have rerouted flights to avoid Iranian and Iraqi airspace, impacting popular routes to destinations such as Dubai and Doha. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry has released similar warnings, urging its citizens in both Iran and Israel to remain cautious, carry essential documents, and follow instructions from the local authorities. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have yet to issue any formal statements but are said to remain on high alert. A Delicate Equation for Central Asia For Central Asia, and particularly Turkmenistan, with its direct border to Iran, the Israel-Iran conflict is neither distant nor abstract. The region’s proximity to this escalating rivalry amplifies its need for strategic diplomacy. Iran’s trade networks and energy links remain vital, while Israel offers modernization and technological advancements. Balancing these competing relationships without being drawn into broader conflicts will require calculated neutrality and adaptable policies. As tensions mount, Central Asian nations face both risks and opportunities. Protecting sovereignty, fostering balanced foreign relations, and preparing for potential regional disruptions are critical as the world watches this volatile situation unfold, with Central Asia occupying a crucial intersection.
Opinion: China–Central Asia Partnership – Seeking Opportunity in a World of Uncertainty
Leaders from China and the five Central Asian countries will gather in Astana on Monday, two years after their inaugural summit in the Chinese city of Xi’an. However, as Chinese President Xi Jinping has often noted, “Our world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century." The geopolitical landscape is markedly different from that of their first meeting, with both China and the Central Asian nations now facing a world of increasing uncertainty.
In April, foreign ministers from China and the Central Asian countries convened in Almaty, Kazakhstan, where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed concern over the rising tide of protectionism and unilateralism. He criticized the United States for launching a tariff war against more than 180 countries, saying it undermines international trade and destabilizes the global economy. Wang reaffirmed China’s commitment to openness. “China will consistently promote a high degree of openness, share opportunities with the world, and take responsibility for upholding international norms,” he said.
Wang’s remarks were echoed by the Central Asian representatives, who voiced strong support for China’s vision of building a “community with a shared future” and pledged to deepen cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, said that China and Central Asian nations have set clear guidelines for collaboration in trade, energy, transport and logistics, education, and science.
The ties between China and Central Asia stretch back to the ancient Silk Road camel caravans that carried not only goods but also cultures. At the first China-Central Asia summit in Xi’an, Chinese President Xi said: “Back in 2013, I put forward the initiative of jointly building a Silk Road Economic Belt during my first visit to Central Asia as Chinese president.” Like an echo of millennia past, the ancient Silk Road now finds its modern expression through connectivity and cooperation.
In May, the first tourist train linking the Chinese city of Xi’an and Almaty, the largest city in Kazakhstan, made its inaugural journey. Also in May, Kyrgyzstan’s State Civil Aviation Agency reached an agreement with Chinese aviation authorities to open a new air route to the Chinese city of Kashgar. As part of the Air Silk Road initiative, this will become the second direct air link between Central Asia and Western China.
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The first tourist train between Xi'an and Almaty; image: CGTN[/caption]
This is in addition to a key milestone in the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project. In April, construction began on a 12-kilometer tunnel in Kyrgyzstan’s Jalal-Abad region. At the groundbreaking ceremony, Kyrgyz Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Bakyt Torobayev, stated: “This project is not only of infrastructural importance. It paves the way for improved quality of life, economic growth, and stronger ties between regions and peoples.”
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China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway; image: CGTN[/caption]
Beyond infrastructure, Kyrgyzstan is working to integrate with China’s banking payment system. A significant step was taken during a recent meeting in Beijing, where the finance ministers of both countries agreed to establish financial infrastructure for cross-border settlements and deepen interbank cooperation.
Meanwhile, in June, Kazakhstan and China launched a high-tech chip manufacturing project with an investment of $50 million. Once completed, the plant in Semey will produce microchips, microcircuits, optoelectronic modules, intelligent host controllers, and electronic displays.
As the world undergoes profound and unprecedented change, Central Asia — strategically positioned between East and West, endowed with abundant natural resources, and emerging as a vital hub for diplomatic engagement — stands at the forefront of global relevance. In this context, China and its partners in the region are advancing a powerful narrative of mutual benefit and shared prosperity.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned, including CGTN.
Kyrgyzstan: Film Festival Showcases Central Asian Talent, New and Old
An international film festival in Kyrgyzstan this week is celebrating the past, present, and future of Central Asian cinema. The Bishkek International Film Festival features a retrospective of the work of Kyrgyz director Tolomush Okeev, whose films include The Ferocious One, The Red Apple, and The Descendant of the Snow Leopard; a presentation of ten film projects by emerging directors in Central Asia; and a competition among nine films whose directors are from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The June 11-15 festival also has master classes for those who really want to dig into the craft of making films. Hosts of some of the classes include actor and educator Olesya Gribok, who will talk about working with emotions, self-presentation, and other core actor values; designer Alex Rosno, who will discuss using AI tools to create scenes and build storyboards; and Andrzej Bartkowiak, a cinematographer and director with decades of experience with lighting, movement, and composition. Films from India, Mongolia, Germany and other countries will vie for an international prize. A separate contest involves nine films from Central Asia, seeking to highlight the region’s movie-making talent. There’s also “KyrgyzBox” - a competition just for movies, including box office standouts, from Kyrgyzstan. In another contest, film project contenders are “accepted only from citizens from Central Asian countries – Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan - with strong potential for international distribution,” according to the film festival. The project must be a feature film that is at least 75 minutes long and filming must be planned in Central Asia or have a “close connection” to the region. The retrospective of Okeev, who died in 2001 at age 66, showcases a screenwriter and director who made films over several decades of the Soviet era and was known for filming in the majestic mountains and deserts of Kyrgyzstan. The Bishkek festival, the third edition of the event, will screen several of Okeev’s films, including The Descendant of the Snow Leopard, a 1984 film that draws inspiration from Kyrgyz tales about hunters who follow ancient laws. “When a young chief, Kojozhash, breaks a sacred ancestral taboo, it leads to tragic consequences for the entire tribe,” the festival says in a description of the film. The snow leopard is a national symbol of Kyrgyzstan, which is taking steps to protect the vulnerable species.
Opinion: Xi Jinping Heads to Astana – What’s at Stake in the Central Asia-China Summit?
On June 16-17, President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China will visit Kazakhstan. The second Central Asia-China summit is scheduled for June 17 in Astana. Leading up to the event, a series of forums, meetings, and conferences have been unfolding across Central Asia and China, drawing experts, journalists, diplomats, and energy-sector representatives. These activities suggest that the upcoming summit is poised to overshadow its predecessor. While U.S. analysts continue debating the viability of their own C5+1 framework for engaging with Central Asia, and the European Union advanced its outreach with the inaugural EU-Central Asia summit, China has relied on a well-worn path. The thousand-year legacy of the Middle Kingdom is filled with moments when it had to engage with the complex mosaic of Central Asia, once a turbulent region of khanates, emirates, and nomadic tribes. Despite the chaos, China succeeded in carving out a secure overland corridor, the Great Silk Road, which threaded through what are now the independent Central Asian republics, linking them like beads in a continental necklace. Then, as now, China is seeking stability in the region, not just for political influence but to safeguard its global supply chains. Beijing’s modern initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative and its broader “community of shared future” concept, aim to establish global “islands of comfort” conducive to Chinese interests. At the heart of this strategy lies a deeply embedded worldview: that China represents civilization itself. The Chinese learned long ago to deal with their neighbors not with violence, but through economic incentives, a method which is proving just as effective today. This layer of understanding is notably absent in many Western and post-Soviet analyses of China’s actions in Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and beyond. The reasons for this are twofold. First, Chinese officials are careful never to state views about cultural hierarchies explicitly; doing so would risk alienating partners. This reticence is a feature of traditional Eastern diplomacy. Second, Beijing has cultivated its own expert ecosystem within the post-Soviet sphere. In response to a wave of Sinophobia that swept through Central Asia a decade ago, China now primarily engages with favorable media outlets and Sinologists, many of whom are nurtured through carefully managed media tours. One such tour, organized by People’s Daily, is currently underway ahead of the Astana summit. As a result, the discourse surrounding the summit is shaped less by hard policy proposals than by diplomatic pageantry, with everything presented in the best possible light. At the recent 5th Forum of Think Tanks, “Central Asia-China: New Horizons for Regional Partnership,” Kazakhstan's State Councilor Yerlan Karin likened China and Central Asia to “the two lungs of Asia,” emphasizing the symbolic depth of their growing relationship. The 6th Central Asia-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, chaired by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and held in Almaty in April, likewise offered little in terms of concrete summit outcomes. According to a general statement from Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, topics included political dialogue, trade, connectivity, sustainable development, and security cooperation, subjects which were broached in broad, diplomatic language. Adil Kaukenov, chief expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan, has suggested that the summit’s agenda likely extends far beyond regional issues. He hinted that U.S. tariffs and China’s response may be among the more pressing topics discussed. In essence, the lead-up to the second Central Asia-China summit has resembled a well-coordinated media campaign, one emphasizing deepening ties and mutual benefit. But what concrete agreements or strategic shifts lie behind this ornate façade? That, we will shortly discover. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
Experts Warn of Escalating Climate Risks for Central Asia
As global temperatures rise, Central Asia is emerging as one of the world’s most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change. This warning comes from three recent reports by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which predict intensified warming, more frequent droughts, and rapid glacier retreat in the region. Without urgent adaptation and coordinated policy responses, the region faces growing risks to its water resources, agriculture, and energy systems. Beyond the Climate Norm According to the WMO’s Climate Outlook for 2025-2029, Central Asia is projected to experience sustained warming and greater variability in precipitation. Every year in the 2025-2029 period is expected to be hotter than the 1991-2020 average. Particularly troubling is the growing likelihood that global temperatures may temporarily exceed +1.5°C above pre-industrial levels in the near term. One contributing factor is the heightened intensity of the South Asian monsoon, which is 82% more likely to be stronger than normal. While this could increase rainfall, the unpredictability raises concerns, periods of heavy rain could be followed by prolonged droughts, severely impacting regional agriculture. Another alarming development is the rapid retreat of glaciers in the Pamirs, which feed the region’s primary waterways, including the Amu Darya and its major tributary, the Vakhsh. The loss of these glaciers threatens long-term water availability and necessitates a rethinking of regional water management strategies. The WMO forecasts that the 2025-2029 period could be the warmest on record, with global temperatures projected to rise by 1.2-1.9°C. Although the chance of exceeding +2°C during this period is currently low, about 1%, the probability is rising. Spring Floods, Summer Droughts A second WMO report, though focused on the Pacific region, reinforces global climate trends relevant to Central Asia. It confirms that 2024 was the hottest year on record, with global average temperatures 1.55°C above pre-industrial levels. For high-altitude countries like Tajikistan, the implications are already evident. Snow is melting earlier, shortening the runoff season. Water that once lasted through summer now disappears within weeks in the spring, heightening the risks of spring flooding followed by summer droughts. The region lacks sufficient reservoir infrastructure to capture and store water during periods of excess. The report also highlights the looming disappearance of Indonesia’s glaciers by 2026, a fate that may soon await Central Asia’s glaciers. The consequences are serious, particularly for countries like Tajikistan, where over 90% of electricity is generated by hydropower. Climate anomalies across the region are increasing, including dust storms, intense rainfall, extreme heat, and landslides. The WMO stresses the urgent need for adaptation measures such as modernized infrastructure and improved climate monitoring and water management systems. The Need for a Regional Strategy The third WMO report emphasizes Central Asia’s unique vulnerability to droughts, which often cross national borders. This underscores the need for a coordinated regional approach, especially in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya river basins. The report advocates for transboundary mechanisms for monitoring, data sharing, and joint response strategies. While Central Asia is part of the Global Network of Climate-Resilient River Basins, progress on actual programs remains limited. The outlook is sobering: without a unified strategy, escalating drought and climate instability could fuel socio-economic tensions, mass migration, and even conflict over water resources. Though the reports lack specific data on Tajikistan, experts agree it is among the most vulnerable in the region. Glacier retreat, erratic precipitation, and prolonged droughts pose immediate threats to the country’s food security, energy supply, and ecosystems. All three WMO reports paint a stark picture: without urgent and coordinated action, Central Asia and Tajikistan in particular, faces a dramatically altered climate future. The time for comprehensive decisions and international cooperation is now. Whether the region can adapt or suffer irreversible losses, will depend on the steps taken today.
Central Asian Glaciers Shrinking Irreversibly, Expert Warns
Glaciers in Central Asia are melting at an alarming rate with no signs of recovery, according to Tohir Majitov, head of the Uzbek public organization "Suvchi," in an interview with Kazinform. Majitov highlighted the escalating pressure on water supplies due to population growth and agricultural expansion across the region. "In 1991, Central Asia had nearly 6 million hectares of irrigated land. By 2024, this figure has grown to over 10 million hectares. The population has also increased from around 45 million to more than 80 million. Water supply for this growing population is now a serious issue," he explained. He noted that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan heavily depend on the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, which originate in the mountainous regions of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A critical challenge arises from the differing water needs: upstream countries store water during summer for hydropower generation in autumn and winter, while downstream nations like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan require substantial water primarily during the summer growing season. Majitov issued a stark warning about the region's largest glacier, Tajikistan's Fedchenko Glacier, which has reportedly lost over 40% of its mass. "Between 1990 and 2005, the glacier shrank by 50 meters," he stated. "Its length is 77 kilometers, width 2.4 kilometers, and depth reaches one kilometer. Glaciers in Kyrgyzstan have also lost over 30% of their mass." To tackle these pressing water challenges, Majitov proposed the formation of a regional body. "We suggest creating an Aral Sea Committee to improve water management and ensure food security. It may take several years, but all Central Asian countries should take part," he urged. He believes that efficient water use could enable the region to expand irrigated land by 2-3 million hectares, potentially feeding up to 100 million people. Previously, The Times of Central Asia reported concerns from other experts on the region's water crisis. A fundamental conflict exists between upstream countries, like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have water but need to release it in winter for electricity generation, and downstream countries, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, that require that water in summer for agricultural purposes. What was once primarily a technical concern has now evolved into a complex regional problem, exacerbated by climate change. Nations are increasingly constructing dams, engaging in disputes over water allocation, and experiencing a decline in mutual trust. The future stability of Central Asia may hinge on its capacity to effectively manage this escalating water crisis.
Investors Push Back Against New Renewable Energy Bill in Kyrgyzstan
A new draft law proposed by Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy has sparked concern among renewable energy investors. The legislation, currently under public review until June 20, 2025, imposes new financial and technical obligations on owners of small hydropower plants as well as solar and wind power installations. Following the review period, the bill will be submitted to the president for approval. Key Provisions and Investor Backlash Under the proposed law, operators of small hydroelectric and other renewable energy facilities would be required to pay 1% of their electricity sales revenue to local authorities. Additionally, they must maintain the ability to accumulate at least 30% of the station’s installed capacity. The draft also stipulates that electricity generated from renewable energy sources (RES), which is neither consumed by the producer nor sold under contract, will be priced at the average tariff of the previous year. Lawmakers claim the bill ensures transmission support for RES providers, mandating that distribution companies and relevant organizations enable the smooth delivery of electricity from private generators to consumers, provided the infrastructure allows. However, industry representatives argue that the legislation could stall growth in the sector. A letter from a consortium of small hydropower companies in the Chui and Issyk-Kul regions warns that the proposed changes create unnecessary obstacles and risk deterring both domestic and foreign investment. “No domestic, let alone foreign, investor will be interested in implementing renewable energy projects if the payback period at a tariff of 1.71 KGS ($0.020) per kWh is extended to 20-25 years,” said Rakhatbek Irsaliyev, director of the consortium. “This is especially true given that such projects are not implemented for personal use or resale, but to cover the country’s growing electricity deficit.” The consortium is urging the government to revisit its tariff policy. Specifically, they are calling for a system that allows energy producers to sell at updated, higher rates, rather than last year’s average. In Kyrgyzstan, electricity tariffs are typically adjusted annually on May 1. Broader Energy Context Kyrgyzstan has long touted its substantial energy potential, particularly in hydropower. With abundant rivers and glaciers, it ranks third in hydropower resources among CIS countries, following Russia and Tajikistan. Yet, less than 10% of this potential is currently being utilized. Government efforts to address the energy shortfall include the commissioning of 18 small hydropower plants in 2025 and the expansion of wind and solar infrastructure nationwide. A major project, Kambarata HPP-1 on the Naryn River, is also in development, involving cooperation with neighboring countries. Meanwhile, the CASA-1000 initiative is nearing completion. This project aims to export summer surplus electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan. Despite this progress, international organizations like the World Bank have urged Kyrgyzstan to raise electricity tariffs for both residential and commercial users. Since 2024, the government has begun implementing gradual tariff hikes, but experts argue that the pace is insufficient. “The tariffs set for industrial and commercial consumers allow costs to be recouped. These categories pay a fair price,” said Katarina Gassner, a World Bank expert on Kyrgyzstan. “But tariffs for domestic consumers are leading to a deficit in the sector. As a result, the electricity sector covers only 20% of its own costs. Every kilowatt of energy produced does not cover its own cost.” As the public consultation process continues, stakeholders in the renewable energy sector are urging lawmakers to revise the bill to ensure a more viable and attractive investment climate.
Sunkar Podcast
Astana International Forum 2025: Rethinking Global Dialogue
