TASHKENT (TCA) — After the death of longtime Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who preferred that Uzbekistan stay away from any Russia-led economic or military bloc, Moscow is currently taking active steps to get Tashkent involved in Russia’s sphere of economic, and political, influence. Will Tashkent continue its new rapprochement with Moscow? We are republishing this article by Fozil Mashrab on the issue, originally published by The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor: Since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s state visit to Moscow in April 2017, bilateral relations between his country of Uzbekistan and Russia have been steadily expanding. And the frequency of subsequent bilateral exchanges suggests that this trend will most likely continue with the full support of both governments (RIA Novosti, November 2). This “new phase in Uzbek-Russian relations” was cemented during Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s recent official trip to Uzbekistan, on November 2–3. Medvedev led a high-level delegation to attend the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meeting in Tashkent. During a bilateral intergovernmental meeting on the sidelines of the CIS summit, both sides confirmed their commitment to further deepening relations and signed a package of new cooperation and investment agreements (Vesti, November 2). According to Russian officials, bilateral trade between Uzbekistan and Russia in the first eight months of 2017 grew by 21 percent to reach $2.1 billion. Russian exports to Uzbekistan grew by 15.9 percent, and Uzbekistani exports increased by more than 30 percent (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 2). Uzbekistan is Russia’s fourth-largest trading partner among the CIS countries. Between January and August 2017, 18.5 percent of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade turnover was with Russia. The latter country has regained its status as Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, which was briefly lost to China in the recent past (Interfax, November 2). During his visit to Tashkent, the Russian prime minister also observed that “it was absolutely obvious trade-economic relations between the two countries were gaining in weight and were being enhanced more energetically, with significant growth in such important areas as agriculture, food exports, [as well as] industrial and military-technical cooperation” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 2). The Russian government has not only shown a willingness to supply Tashkent with modern weapons at favorable terms but also agreed to help Uzbekistan develop its own military-industrial complex (see EDM, February 15; Ozodlik.org, October 30). Moreover, Medvedev stated with satisfaction that “practically in all possible areas of cooperation both countries are witnessing the intensification of contacts.” Since Mirziyoyev’s state visit to Russia last April, more than 20 Russian delegations of different levels have visited Uzbekistan, including two deputy prime ministers, ministers of internal affairs, agriculture, trade and industry, heads of the Russian Security Council and military intelligence, leaders of Tatarstan and Chechnya, the governor of St. Petersburg, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as trade union leaders and migration officials. A similar number of Uzbekistani delegations also made reciprocal trips to Russia (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 2). Moreover, in early October, the two countries carried out their first joint military exercises in 12 years,...