• KGS/USD = 0.01138 -0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09353 0.97%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01138 -0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09353 0.97%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01138 -0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09353 0.97%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01138 -0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09353 0.97%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01138 -0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09353 0.97%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01138 -0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09353 0.97%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01138 -0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09353 0.97%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01138 -0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09353 0.97%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 18

Almaty Hosts Russia’s Defense Head Belousov in First of a Series of CSTO Events

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is holding several events in Almaty, Kazakhstan's biggest city, between 30 May and 6 June. The CSTO is a regional organization in the field of collective security. It comprises six states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. On May 30 a meeting was held between the defense ministers of Kazakhstan and Russia, Ruslan Zhaksylykov and Andrei Belousov. According to a statement from the Kazakh defense ministry, the parties discussed bilateral military cooperation, touching on training and joint activities, including exercises within the CSTO. “Its practical realization is carried out, among other things, within the framework of multilateral exercises. Colonel General Ruslan Zhaksylykov informed the interlocutor about holding the exercise “Birlestik” (Unity) in July this year in western Kazakhstan. According to its plan, military contingents of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan will jointly work out training and combat tasks related to the localization of armed conflict and countering illegal formations,” the ministry said. Almaty's police have warned that given the scale of the events and the number of participants, the city will be partially restricted to traffic until 6 June.

Russia pushes CSTO countries to legalize private military and security companies

BISHKEK (TCA) — The Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is pushing legalization of private military and security companies. The move, if successful and replicated by Russia and other CSTO member states, will potentially enable citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to take part in Russia’s military operations abroad, becoming another labor migration opportunity for people from Central Asia. We are republishing this article on the issue by Anna Gussarova, originally published by The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor: The Secretariat of the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) Parliamentary Assembly is currently examining a bill on private military and security organizations (Private Military Companies—PMC) (RIA Novosti, February 5). If adopted inside the Moscow-led alliance, the individual CSTO member states will then be tasked with introducing domestic laws to legitimize the activities of such commercial paramilitary groups. This issue is relatively new to all CSTO countries except Russia. In 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed full support for establishing an official PMC system in his country. Since that time, however, the Kremlin has experienced certain difficulties in dealing with these organizations. On the one hand, the country has widely relied on PMCs—for example, Slavonic Corps Limited as well as Wagner Group (Vz.ru, February 21)—in Ukraine, Syria and, according to some reports, Sudan (UAWire, December 5, 2017) to protect “its national interests and people.” But on the other hand, Russia’s Penal Code officially still prohibits citizens from becoming mercenaries—Russians face three to seven years of imprisonment for participating in a foreign armed conflict or military operation outside the regular Armed Forces. Whereas the Russian parliament has been unsuccessfully trying to legalize PMCs for the past five years, the country’s Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of Defense have more recently stepped up their own efforts to push through the law (Rosbalt, February 19). And in January 2018, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also announced the need to legally protect Russians who participate in PMCs outside the country (RBC, January 15). Finally, the growing number of incidents of regular Russian military personnel killed in Syria (see EDM, January 11, 16, 17, February 8) has put increasing pressure on the Kremlin to provide additional support to the Armed Forces fighting abroad. Whereas the exact text of the proposed CSTO law on PMCs is unavailable, Victor Ananiev, the director of the Moscow-based Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, which was in charge of drafting this legislation, has outlined some key features found therein. First, the document apparently denotes non-combatant status on such organizations. However, this point is still unclear, particularly since Russian State Duma representatives believe PMC personnel could protect allies from external aggression and participate in counter-terrorism operations—meaning they would effectively have to have combatant status (Dailystorm.ru, January 18). Another issue involves the potential social benefits a person receives while working for private military and security companies. For instance, the draft law mandates that a PMC contractor receive compulsory insurance in case of death, injury or damage, kidnapping and ransom demands,...

Uzbekistan restoring closer military ties with Russia

TASHKENT (TCA) — Moscow is taking steps to restore its military cooperation with Tashkent, in an apparent move to lure Uzbekistan back to the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, and possibly make the Uzbek leadership think about joining another Russia-led bloc — the Eurasian Economic Union. We are republishing this article by Joshua Kucera on the issue, originally published by EurasiaNet.org: Uzbekistan has agreed to buy Russian attack helicopters, the latest sign that the new leadership in Tashkent is committed to reversing the country's previous policy of shunning Moscow's military advances. The purchase of the 12 Mi-35 helicopters wasn't formally announced, but reported by Russian news agency TASS, citing a “diplomatic source.” The source said the deal was reached after “prolonged negotiations” during the visit of Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev to Tashkent in November. The deal appears to be the first significant arms purchase made under the leadership of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who assumed power last year after the death of longtime president Islam Karimov. Mirziyoyev has been opening up the country in a variety of directions, including in the military sphere. And he seems to be opening up to no one as much as Russia. In October the two countries held their first joint military exercises since 2005. Uzbekistan also took part, albeit in a limited fashion, in Russia-led exercises in Tajikistan earlier this year, which would not have happened under Karimov. Karimov had distrusted Russia, and many of Uzbekistan's most noteworthy arms acquisitions under him came from Europe, the United States, or China. Given the apparent new pro-Russian mood in Tashkent, Moscow's arms manufacturers have high hopes. Viktor Murakhovskiy, editor of the Russian military magazine Arsenal Otechestva, said Uzbekistan has a large shopping list from Moscow, from small arms to Su-30SM fighter aircraft. “They have out-of-date armored vehicles, out-of-date air defense systems, out-of-date aviation, strike aircraft,” Murakhovskiy said in an interview with Pravda. In the interview, published before the Mi-35 deal became public, he also called attention to their out-of-date helicopters: “In terms of quantity they have quite a few helicopters, but we have to remember that a large part of them are not flightworthy.” He also said that Tashkent was seeking loans from Moscow for the purchases, “taking into account the need to renovate or modernize all their weapons systems.” The repairing of defense ties with Moscow actually began in the twilight of the Karimov administration. In 2014 Karimov managed to settle Uzbekistan's old debts with Russia, which was portrayed as a way of opening up new lines of credit for new weapons sales. And Karimov in April 2016 also managed to negotiate Uzbekistan's right to buy Russian weapons at the discounted rates that Russia generally reserves for its partners in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. These gestures may in fact be aimed at getting Uzbekistan to rejoin the CSTO, as well as its sister economic organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, argued analyst Fozil Mashrab in a recent piece in Eurasia Daily Monitor. Uzbekistan dropped out of the...

What does Kazakhstan’s new military doctrine reveal about relations with Russia?

BISHKEK (TCA) — Although a close political and economic ally of Russia, Kazakhstan remains cautious about Moscow’s growing influence and expansionist ambitions. This made Astana adopt a new military doctrine which reflects the new challenges the Central Asian country may potentially face. We are republishing this article by Deirdre Tynan* on the issue, originally published by EurasiaNet.org: Continue reading

Kyrgyzstan new president’s visit to Russia signals foreign-policy vector

BISHKEK (TCA) — The newly inaugurated President of Kyrgyzstan Sooronbai Jeenbekov will make his first foreign visit to Russia today, November 29, at the invitation of the Russian side. He will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Aizada Subakojoeva, head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Kyrgyz Presidential Administration, told a briefing on November 28. Continue reading

Russia tacitly entices Uzbekistan with benefits of EEU, CSTO membership

TASHKENT (TCA) — After the death of longtime Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who preferred that Uzbekistan stay away from any Russia-led economic or military bloc, Moscow is currently taking active steps to get Tashkent involved in Russia’s sphere of economic, and political, influence. Will Tashkent continue its new rapprochement with Moscow? We are republishing this article by Fozil Mashrab on the issue, originally published by The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor: Since President Shavkat Mirziyaev’s state visit to Moscow in April 2017, bilateral relations between his country of Uzbekistan and Russia have been steadily expanding. And the frequency of subsequent bilateral exchanges suggests that this trend will most likely continue with the full support of both governments (RIA Novosti, November 2). This “new phase in Uzbek-Russian relations” was cemented during Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s recent official trip to Uzbekistan, on November 2–3. Medvedev led a high-level delegation to attend the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meeting in Tashkent. During a bilateral intergovernmental meeting on the sidelines of the CIS summit, both sides confirmed their commitment to further deepening relations and signed a package of new cooperation and investment agreements (Vesti, November 2). According to Russian officials, bilateral trade between Uzbekistan and Russia in the first eight months of 2017 grew by 21 percent to reach $2.1 billion. Russian exports to Uzbekistan grew by 15.9 percent, and Uzbekistani exports increased by more than 30 percent (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 2). Uzbekistan is Russia’s fourth-largest trading partner among the CIS countries. Between January and August 2017, 18.5 percent of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade turnover was with Russia. The latter country has regained its status as Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, which was briefly lost to China in the recent past (Interfax, November 2). During his visit to Tashkent, the Russian prime minister also observed that “it was absolutely obvious trade-economic relations between the two countries were gaining in weight and were being enhanced more energetically, with significant growth in such important areas as agriculture, food exports, [as well as] industrial and military-technical cooperation” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 2). The Russian government has not only shown a willingness to supply Tashkent with modern weapons at favorable terms but also agreed to help Uzbekistan develop its own military-industrial complex (see EDM, February 15; Ozodlik.org, October 30). Moreover, Medvedev stated with satisfaction that “practically in all possible areas of cooperation both countries are witnessing the intensification of contacts.” Since Mirziyaev’s state visit to Russia last April, more than 20 Russian delegations of different levels have visited Uzbekistan, including two deputy prime ministers, ministers of internal affairs, agriculture, trade and industry, heads of the Russian Security Council and military intelligence, leaders of Tatarstan and Chechnya, the governor of St. Petersburg, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as trade union leaders and migration officials. A similar number of Uzbekistani delegations also made reciprocal trips to Russia (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 2). Moreover, in early October, the two countries carried out their first joint military exercises in 12 years,...

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