• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
20 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 45

Russia Demands NATO Stay Out of Central Asia, With Regional Governments Absent From Talks

Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping met in Shenzhen on November 19. Meanwhile, U.S. envoys headed to Berlin to discuss Ukraine’s postwar security guarantees with Ukrainian and European negotiators. Russia has demanded that NATO abandon military activity across Central Asia as part of negotiations over Ukraine, in talks that did not include representatives of the five countries whose security relationships could be affected. A Russian paper dated November 10 was circulated during U.S.-mediated negotiations in Abu Dhabi. The New York Times reported that the proposal would rule out NATO expansion and “any military activity” in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. It also demands a rollback of NATO forces and bases to the alliance’s 1997 positions. The wording is not new. Moscow proposed nearly identical restrictions in December 2021, shortly before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Article 7 of its draft Russia-NATO agreement called for NATO members to avoid military activity in Ukraine and other states in “Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia.” A separate 2021 draft treaty with Washington went further. Its Article 4 sought to prevent the United States from establishing military bases, using military infrastructure, or developing “bilateral military cooperation” with former Soviet republics outside NATO. That demand would have covered Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The November proposal revives that NATO restriction, though the available reporting does not establish that Moscow has also renewed its separate demand to end bilateral American military cooperation. All five countries are NATO partners through the Partnership for Peace program, with each government setting its own priorities. Kazakhstan has hosted the multinational Steppe Eagle peacekeeping exercises and works with NATO on military education and defense reform. Its partnership program also covers interoperability and training. Kazakhstan also deployed military engineers to Iraq as part of the U.S.-led multinational force between 2003 and 2008. Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry explicitly identifies preparing troops for UN peacekeeping as a principal objective of its NATO partnership. [caption id="attachment_61111" align="aligncenter" width="2048"] U.S. soldiers take part in a multinational military ceremony during the Steppe Eagle 2019 exercises in Kazakhstan. Image: U.S. Army.[/caption] Uzbekistan participates in NATO defense education and has conducted counterterrorism training. Tashkent hosted the alliance’s Central Asia liaison office from 2013 to 2017. Tajikistan has engaged with NATO on border security and counterterrorism. Kyrgyzstan cooperates on military education and UN peacekeeping preparation, and despite its permanent neutrality, even Turkmenistan works with NATO on border security and disaster preparedness, although it does not contribute troops to NATO operations. A blanket ban on NATO military activity could therefore affect programs that regional governments have chosen to pursue. Russia describes its wider proposals as security guarantees intended to limit NATO’s military reach. The 2021 documents invoked the principle of “equal and indivisible security,” arguing that one party should not strengthen its security at another’s expense. Moscow’s proposed restrictions would nevertheless limit security cooperation undertaken by governments that are not parties to the negotiations. Russia already has its own security arrangements in...

CSTO Without Armenia: What Keeps Yerevan From Leaving and What the Summit Means for Central Asia

Armenia has effectively stopped participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but has not formally withdrawn from the military alliance. At the November 11, 2026, summit in Moscow, Armenia lost its voting rights because of unpaid membership dues, while the CSTO's five other members — Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus — agreed to develop collective aviation forces and mobile air defense units. Kazakh political analyst Maksim Kaznacheyev explained to The Times of Central Asia why Armenia's leadership is reluctant to sever ties with the CSTO and what the new military agreements could mean for Central Asian countries. Why Armenia Has Not Left the CSTO Yerevan froze its participation in the organization in February 2024, accusing its allies of failing to ensure Armenia's security during armed clashes with Azerbaijan. Armenia stopped paying membership dues and sending representatives to CSTO bodies. At the November 11 summit, CSTO members decided that Armenia would lose its voting rights and the ability to nominate candidates for senior positions because of unpaid contributions. CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov said, however, that the organization was not considering expelling Armenia. Kaznacheyev attributes Yerevan's reluctance to sever ties with the CSTO to Armenia's domestic political situation. "If Armenia leaves the CSTO or the EAEU, pro-Western actions could trigger an internal crisis and destabilize the country," Kaznacheyev said. He believes Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is seeking to avoid deepening divisions within Armenia as his government pursues closer ties with the European Union. Yerevan, however, has pursued different policies toward the two organizations. Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO but continues to operate within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). On November 5, Pashinyan said the country was not preparing to leave the EAEU. The CSTO has experienced the departure of member states before. Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, declined to renew it in 1999, rejoined the CSTO in 2006, and suspended its membership again in 2012. Kaznacheyev believes Armenia's situation is substantially different. "Uzbekistan's experience does not apply to Armenia because Uzbekistan had a unified political elite when it left the CSTO," Kaznacheyev said. He noted that Tashkent also had a bilateral security agreement with Russia, allowing it to maintain military cooperation outside the CSTO. For Kazakhstan, Armenia's dispute with the CSTO does not create an immediate security threat. Kaznacheyev said Astana's restrained position reflects its limited direct interests in Armenia and its growing transport links through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Turkey. "That is why Kazakhstan maintains a restrained, neutral position," he said. What the New Air Defense Agreements Mean for Central Asia At the Moscow summit, CSTO members agreed to develop the organization's Collective Aviation Forces and approved plans for mobile air defense units to protect joint military formations. Plans call for incorporating combat aviation units alongside transport and special-purpose aircraft. Kaznacheyev believes the agreements could expand Russian military-technical assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. He argues that Russia could help other CSTO members modernize their air forces and air defenses, particularly in Kyrgyzstan...

Russia Tries to Keep the CSTO Relevant in Central Asia

Russia used the November 11 CSTO summit in Moscow to promote closer military cooperation with allies increasingly looking elsewhere for partners. Plans to develop the collective aviation force and supply equipment for Tajikistan's Afghan border would keep their militaries working with Russia, but Armenia's estrangement shows how far confidence in Russian protection has fallen. The summit barred Armenia from voting and appointing representatives to senior posts in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced the restrictions, citing its failure to meet its membership obligations. Armenia remains a member, but has withheld contributions and frozen participation after accusing the alliance of failing to defend it. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan continue to participate. They still want military training, cooperation against terrorism, and help securing the region's southern border with Afghanistan. Moscow can offer those services, even as the Ukraine war damages its standing and China, Europe, and the U.S. expand their economic presence. At the previous summit in Bishkek, Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian weapons and closer military integration. The Moscow meeting continued that effort. Equipment and joint operations keep Russia involved in its neighbors' defense planning, while agreed declarations allow it to claim diplomatic support beyond Belarus. The Damage in Armenia Armenia's break with Moscow developed through successive security failures. The CSTO provided no military assistance after Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian territory in 2022, leading Yerevan to freeze its participation in 2024. The dispute over unpaid contributions followed the loss of confidence in the alliance, rather than causing it. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict deepened that rupture. Russian peacekeepers deployed after the 2020 war did not prevent Azerbaijan's September 2023 offensive. More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled, leaving Moscow's claim to be a reliable protector badly damaged. Nagorno-Karabakh was internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory and fell outside the CSTO's collective-defense guarantee. Russia's peacekeeping mission there was separate from the alliance. But that distinction offered little reassurance to an Armenian government that had already failed to obtain military assistance after attacks on Armenia itself. Kazakhstan has a different experience. During the January 2022 unrest, CSTO troops guarded key facilities. Moscow can therefore point to an actual deployment when arguing that membership remains useful, though Armenia's experience makes it harder to promise that help will arrive whenever another member requests it. The Border Program in Tajikistan Tajikistan takes over the CSTO chairmanship in January 2027, and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon used the summit to call for closer attention to carrying out existing commitments. Strengthening the organization should rest on “mutual trust, consideration of the interests of member states and consistent fulfillment of commitments undertaken,” Rahmon said. The Afghan border program has taken years to negotiate. The CSTO decided to develop it in 2013, but leaders approved it only in November 2024. Its published timetable assigned preparations to 2025, priority deliveries to 2026–2027, and further reinforcement through 2029. The border equipment program was still awaiting financing arrangements in April. On October 21, Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said Tajikistan had selected suppliers and...

CSTO in No Hurry to Help Tajikistan

The authorities in Tajikistan have been ringing the alarm bells over events in neighboring Afghanistan for more than three decades. The Tajik government did so again after violence broke out along a small section of the Tajik-Afghan border in the last months of 2025, and specifically called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for assistance. The CSTO has responded, but the promised aid has yet to arrive as Tajikistan continues to seek stronger border defenses. The Perennial Border Problem There had been unrest in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, long before Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, and the instability along Tajikistan’s approximately 1,360-kilometer border with Afghanistan has continued ever since. Most of the border area is mountainous and sparsely inhabited, making it ideal for narcotics and weapons smuggling. Weapons smuggling was a huge problem during Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, when weapons were being brought back and forth across the Afghan frontier to fuel civil conflicts in both countries. From the first day of Tajikistan’s independence until June 2005, Russian border guards helped keep watch on Tajikistan’s Afghan frontier. At least several hundred Russian and Tajik border guards, and Tajik and Afghan smugglers and militants have been killed along the Tajik-Afghan border in the last 35 years. Many countries worried about Tajikistan’s border problems with Afghanistan. Neighbors such as China, the other Central Asian states, and not so far away, Russia did not want narcotics or militants from Afghanistan reaching their countries. In the mid- and late-1990s, the Taliban push through Afghanistan to the Central Asian border increased these neighbors’ concerns. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the United States and its allies used facilities in Central Asia to support troops in Afghanistan. All these countries, and more, contributed to Tajikistan’s border defenses in some way, either by simply donating housing materials or winter uniforms, or providing security monitoring equipment and weaponry. It has never been enough to totally stem the border problems, but the security aid Tajikistan received is far more than the country could ever have allocated for that purpose from its state coffers. Emomali Rahmon was Tajikistan’s president in the late 1990s when the Taliban first seized power in Afghanistan. Rahmon viewed the Taliban as a threat, and Tajikistan’s policies toward the Afghan militant group reflected that. Rahmon’s opinion of the Taliban did not change when they regained power in 2021, and despite the other Central Asian states establishing a dialogue and trade ties with the Taliban, Tajikistan has been slow to engage the returned rulers of Afghanistan. In June 2024, Rahmon’s eldest son and heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, told a meeting of the CSTO’s Parliamentary Assembly Council that “Afghanistan has once again become a breeding ground for terrorism.” Emomali said more than 1,000 radical madrassahs had been established in Afghanistan, some in areas close to Tajikistan’s border, and that these religious schools were also preparing suicide bombers. A Turbulent End to 2025 In late August 2025, Tajik border guards...

India Says It Exported Akash Missile System to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan

India says Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are customers of its Akash surface-to-air missile system, which can be used to counter threats including drones, missiles, and fighter aircraft. The two Central Asian countries have not commented publicly on the Akash exports, and Indian officials have not provided details about the transactions. But Indian Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh has told Asian News International (ANI) that there is growing international interest in the Akash system, which Indian officials regard as a success of their indigenous defense industry. "Akash, I would say that it is one of our success stories. It shows the maturing of our indigenous missile design and production system. It is effective in dealing with high-velocity aerial targets,” Singh said. “The first customer was Armenia, which has taken multiple batteries. Thereafter, we've also exported it to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Production has stabilized.” He said there were “additional orders for our own services” and that more were expected from other countries, according to an ANI report on October 1. The agency described the sales to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as “an expansion of Indian arms exports into traditionally Russian-supplied markets.” While Tajikistan and Turkmenistan traditionally relied on Soviet and Russian military hardware, Turkmenistan has taken significant steps to diversify its arms suppliers, also buying weapons from China, Türkiye, and Italy. Tajikistan is more closely tied to Russia, though it has bought weapons systems from China. Tajikistan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a regional alliance that is led by Russia; Turkmenistan maintains a posture of self-declared neutrality and is not a member of the CSTO. Indian officials have promoted the Akash missile system as a relatively economical option in the international air defense market. India’s state-run Defence Research and Development Organisation started developing the Akash missile system in the 1980s. In the mid-2010s, it was inducted into the Indian army and air force, which ordered thousands of the missiles. The Indian government approved Akash exports in December 2020, according to Airforce Technology, a website that reports on procurement in the military aerospace industry. The Akash weapon system can target threats including drones, helicopters, and fighter aircraft at ranges of 4.5 to 25 kilometers and altitudes of up to 20 kilometers, India’s Defense Ministry said.

For the CSTO, Afghanistan Might Be the Last Credible Threat

The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization is conducting its “Rubezh (Frontier) 2026” military exercises from September 12-19. Those exercises are designed with Afghanistan in mind, a country that the CSTO has been talking about frequently in 2026, and also one where militant groups pose a shared threat to its members. And even the Taliban are no longer viewed as the threat they once were. Frontier 2026 The Frontier 2026 exercises are taking place at the Koktal training ground in southeastern Kazakhstan’s Zhetysu Province. The CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force is practicing to repel cross-border incursions in mountain and desert terrain. The exercises come this time as concerns about infiltration by militants in Afghanistan into CIS territory are increasing. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said on September 8 that Russia is paying special attention to strengthening Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. The Tajik authorities have been calling for additional aid for the country’s border forces since a series of attacks from Afghanistan in November 2025 left five Chinese workers in southern Tajikistan dead, followed by an attack in December that killed two Tajik border guards. Tajikistan has regularly asked for international help in guarding its frontier with Afghanistan since independence in 1991. But after the violence at the end of 2025, the Tajik government appealed especially to its fellow members in the CSTO for increased assistance. CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said at the end of August that the first shipment of weapons and equipment would be sent to Tajikistan this autumn. Raison D’être The Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 1992 by representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joined. The purpose was simple. If any of the member states was attacked by an external enemy, that state could request aid, including military assistance, from the other members. In the early 1990s, there were potential enemies for the Treaty members in practically every direction. The Soviet Union had collapsed in late 1991. There were questions about how the former Communist Bloc countries and their new Western allies might act. The theocratic regime in Iran was a possible threat to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the latter region had unstable Afghanistan to worry about also. China was a concern for Central Asia and Russia. Back then, banding together made sense for the nine newly independent states that signed the treaty. When Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan dropped out in 1999, it appeared the Collective Security Treaty was on the brink of becoming irrelevant. After Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president, he put a new emphasis on a security bloc within the CIS, and in 2002, the remaining six treaty members signed a new charter. However, now, in 2026, the list of the CSTO’s potential external threats is greatly reduced. Far from being a security concern, China is now a leading trade partner for Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and provides military assistance to all four countries. Iran’s relations with the West remain...