CSTO - The Times Of Central Asia

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CSTO to Begin Arms Supplies to the Tajik-Afghan Border in 2026

Beginning in 2026, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) will start delivering weapons and military equipment to bolster the alliance's southern borders, particularly to reinforce the Tajik-Afghan frontier. This development was announced on May 19 by CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov during a meeting of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly in Bishkek. Armed Response to Regional Threats Tasmagambetov highlighted that the initiative stems from the Targeted Inter-State Program (TIP), approved in Astana in November 2024. This program reflects the CSTO's collective resolve to address security vulnerabilities along its southern periphery. “The task now is to implement it in full,” he stated. These security issues were previously discussed during an April 2025 meeting in Dushanbe with Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon. Despite regional stabilization efforts, Afghanistan continues to pose serious risks, including terrorism, arms trafficking, and the narcotics trade. Tasmagambetov emphasized, “The Taliban regime is proving to be a long-term political factor.” He noted that CSTO members, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, have intensified diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan to support regional stability. The CSTO Secretariat will maintain vigilance and enhance coordination to counter emerging threats. Signs of Regional Progress In contrast to the ongoing security challenges, Tasmagambetov acknowledged promising developments in Central Asia. He pointed to the March 13 state border agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as the March 31 tripoint agreement involving Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. These steps are seen as crucial in easing regional tensions. Tajik-Afghan Border a Strategic Focus Through 2029 The TIP for strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border is scheduled to be implemented in three stages and will run until 2029. Its goals include reinforcing southern Tajikistan’s military infrastructure and improving the region’s capacity to respond swiftly to cross-border threats. The program outlines measures for allied coordination, arms deliveries, and enhancements to logistics, communications, and border infrastructure.

CSTO Russia Armenia Criticism NATO Ukraine War Nagorno-Karabakh Forecast Collective Security Treaty Organization

Controversies and Rejections: What Future Awaits the CSTO?

Armenia has officially refused to contribute financially to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a bloc tasked with ensuring the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its member states. Meanwhile, the organization’s Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov, has come under scrutiny for remarks he made related to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Shifting Alliances and Regional Tensions Founded in 1992, the CSTO comprises Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan have withdrawn from the organization at various times. While the CSTO regularly conducts joint military exercises and cooperates on counter-terrorism and anti-narcotics efforts, the war in Ukraine has exposed internal divisions and challenged the bloc’s cohesion. Tasmagambetov Responds to Criticism In March, Secretary General Tasmagambetov raised eyebrows in an interview with a Russian outlet, warning that any deployment of EU troops to Ukraine could escalate regional tensions. He stated that the CSTO would be ready to provide assistance “within the framework of the organization’s charter and subject to approval by all member states.” The remarks sparked a backlash, particularly on social media in Kazakhstan, where some users accused Tasmagambetov, the former prime minister, of adopting a pro-Russian stance. Responding in late March, Tasmagambetov recorded a rare video message clarifying his position. “How can one calmly react to baseless claims that I would send my compatriots to war?” he asked. “There will always be those who distort my words. I have always remained loyal to my people; the interests of our country have always come first.” Tasmagambetov went on to urge viewers to think critically about information shared online. This controversy follows an earlier statement by Aibek Smadiarov, spokesperson for Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who said in October 2022 that the CSTO had no plans to involve itself in the Ukraine conflict. “The CSTO's jurisdiction is limited to the internationally recognized territories of its member states,” Smadiarov stated. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, is reviewing a report by a Ukrainian institution that said about 661 Kazakh citizens have fought for Russia since it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The I Want To Live center, which is run by the Ukrainian security services and assists with surrender requests from soldiers fighting for Russia, published a list of what it said were the Kazakh nationals. Of the 661, at least 78 have been killed, according to the center. Without providing details, it said it received the list from its own sources within the Russian military. Kazakh media quoted Igor Lepekha, Kazakhstan’s deputy interior minister of internal affairs, as saying the numbers have to be checked because it is unclear whether they are reliable. Kazakhstan bans mercenary activities in foreign conflicts and has opened a number of related investigations in the last few years. Last year, a court in Kazakhstan sentenced a Kazakh national to more than six years in jail for fighting with Russia’s Wagner Group in Ukraine. Armenia Pulls Back Adding to the bloc’s instability, Armenia recently announced that it would no longer finance the...

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One Military Alliance (CSTO) Monitors Woes of Another (NATO)

A “zombie” alliance, one Western analysis said. A “paper tiger,” said another. The Collective Security Treaty Organization, a regional group of post-Soviet states that includes Russia and several countries in Central Asia, has come in for some harsh criticism over the years because of perceptions that it is ineffective. Now, the CSTO, described in some circles as a smaller, Russia-dominated counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is closely monitoring a widening split in the NATO security alliance between the United States and Europe. It’s a stunning turnaround that raises questions on both sides about whether and to what extent countries would honor alliance obligations as U.S. President Donald Trump shakes up the global order. While he pushes Ukraine to make a peace deal with Russia, Europe is pledging more support for Ukraine, and deadly fighting continues after three years of war. Overnight, Russia attacked Ukrainian energy infrastructure with drones and missiles, officials in Ukraine said Friday. The Collective Security Treaty Organization has appeared to struggle for cohesion and purpose at times. Its members are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. While Belarus is loyal to Russia, Armenia has frozen its participation in the group because it felt abandoned by Russia during recent military losses to Azerbaijan. None of Russia’s partners in the CSTO have deployed troops to support its war in Ukraine. But a rise in Russia’s military and diplomatic stature, buoyed by perceptions that Trump favors rapprochement with President Vladimir Putin, could inject some momentum into the regional alliance. At the same time, the Central Asian states, at least, are likely to keep a pragmatic course, balancing international relationships and trying to avoid the perception of taking sides. In an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia published on Thursday, CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov was asked about reports that some European countries could send troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force. Tasmagambetov, a former Kazakh prime minister, downplayed the possibility, saying it would create “a dangerous situation on a regional scale” and that the CSTO was following the situation. “In addition, it is unlikely that the population of European countries, tired of the growing negative phenomena in the economy and social sphere, will approve of such a decision by their governments. After all, this will be an additional burden on the shoulders of society, even if these contingents are not involved in offensive operations, but will, for example, perform police or surveillance functions,” he said. “If such risks arise, the CSTO will be ready to offer various options for assistance within the framework provided for in the organization’s statutory documents and, of course, approved by all member states,” Tasmagambetov said. Russia has been blunt on the issue, saying it opposes any arrangement in which European peacekeepers are deployed in Ukraine.

Geopolitics Organization of Turkic States EAEU Multi-vector Foreign Policy CSTO Turkey Russia

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...

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CSTO to Strengthen Tajik-Afghan Border in 2025

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) will begin implementing a program to reinforce the Tajik-Afghan border in 2025, CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov announced during a meeting in Moscow on Thursday, according to Interfax. Tasmagambetov explained that the program outlines concrete measures to enhance security along the southern boundary of the CSTO’s area of responsibility. This announcement was made during a meeting reviewing the CSTO secretariat’s and joint staff’s activities in 2024, as well as outlining objectives for 2025. The meeting was attended by Andrei Serdyukov, head of the CSTO joint staff. In 2024, the CSTO finalized and signed agreements related to equipping its collective forces with modern weapons and military equipment. The organization also conducted joint operational and combat training exercises and actively collaborated with international organizations. As it looks ahead to 2025, the CSTO is drafting an action plan to focus on key priorities, including securing the Tajik-Afghan border, which has long been a source of concern for member states. The organization includes six member countries: Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, though in December 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that his country’s relations with the CSTO have passed the “point of no return.” The Shamsiddin Shokhin section of the Tajik-Afghan border, spanning more than 100 kilometers, has been particularly problematic for years. This area has witnessed numerous security incidents, including hostage-taking and attacks on Tajik citizens and military personnel. The CSTO’s planned measures aim to address these challenges and bolster the security of this vulnerable region. By strengthening border security, the organization is seeking to reduce the risks posed by cross-border threats, including illegal trafficking and extremist activity.

Russia Security CSTO Ukraine Bilateral Relations Nuclear power Russia's War Putin State Visit

Russia’s Strategic Posturing and Putin’s November Visit to Kazakhstan

On November 27, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan underscored the complex geopolitical and security challenges facing the region. Hosted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana, the visit took place amidst heightened tensions following Russia’s deployment of its Oreshnik hypersonic missile in Ukraine on November 21. This escalation has reshaped the regional security environment, compelling Kazakhstan to confront potential spillover effects of the Ukraine conflict. Energy remained a central focus during the visit. Kazakhstan remains heavily reliant on oil exports through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through southern Russia. This cooperation benefits Kazakhstan economically but, by tying Kazakhstan further into Russian energy networks, it further complicates Astana's efforts to balance relations with Moscow and Western powers. Following periodic closures of the CPC route on various pretexts, Kazakhstan has resolved to diversify its energy export strategy. It has increased shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which terminates on Turkey's coast in the eastern Mediterranean. One should not be surprised if ideas about the old Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline (TCOP) project are taken out of deep storage for reanimation. The TCOP is an undersea link first discussed in the late 2000s between then-Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Nicolas Sarkozy of France. It was shelved at the time because it did not seem geoeconomically necessary. Since then, relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been complicated by the periodic CPC closures that, although they are given technical justification, appear politically motivated by Moscow to squeeze Astana. Kazakhstan's short-term solution, to increase oil shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to Baku for insertion into the BTC pipeline, simply cannot attain the volumes necessary to provide a strategic alternative to the CPC. The BTC, at present, would be able to accommodate whatever volumes Kazakhstan would be able to transit to Azerbaijan including via a prospective TCOP, for export to world markets from Ceyhan. One would suppose that bilateral discussions also covered the possible participation of Rosatom in the construction and operation of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). However, no mention of this topic was made in public statements. Kazakhstan would prefer to escape the vise-like pressure between Russia and China on this matter. That is why Tokayev has discussed participation by the French firms Orano and EDF with France's President Emmanuel Macron. It has recently been suggested that it would be technically feasible for Kazakhstan to find a group of Western companies capable of executing the project. A Western consortium would have no reason to hesitate to include Kazatomprom in an appropriate role, not excluding capacity-building. The Russia-only and China-only options for the NPP's construction would be less welcoming to such a possibility. Kazakhstan's leadership has become properly sensitive to how energy partnerships are not just economic decisions, but strategic calculations in Central Asia's volatile geopolitical landscape. Indeed, Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine has created an entirely new security situation. It has raised concerns that...