ISKP and Central Asia: How the Threat Extends Beyond Afghanistan’s Borders

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is developing transnational networks, complicating assessments of the threat to Central Asia. The group also retains territorial ambitions. One conventional way to assess the threat is to look at a map: the situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces, their proximity to the borders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the number of militants, and the possibility of infiltration into neighboring states. An August report by the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, based on information received through June 9, said the ability of terrorist groups to operate in Afghanistan remained an enduring threat to neighboring countries and Central Asia. The report also said ISKP had reportedly moved toward northern Afghanistan. During the period under review, the group suffered serious setbacks amid Taliban and Pakistani operations and was in the process of rebuilding. But looking only at Afghanistan’s borders is no longer enough. The Central Asian dimension of ISKP encompasses the group’s activities in Afghanistan, risks to the five Central Asian states themselves, and the involvement of some individuals from the region in transnational networks operating outside it. Old Networks and New Structures ISKP’s Central Asian dimension did not emerge from nowhere. Even before the group appeared in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, armed organizations formed by people from Central Asia were active there. Among them was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). At different times, the IMU maintained ties with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In 2014, the Islamic State declared a “caliphate.” A year later, a faction of the IMU pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Lucas Webber, a researcher of extremist networks, and Bruce Pannier, a longtime analyst of Central Asian politics and security, have highlighted the role of an Uzbek-language propaganda infrastructure associated with the IMU in ISKP’s outreach to Central Asian audiences. Their analysis was published by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). The region’s older militant organizations have not simply been absorbed into ISKP. A July 2025 UN report separately mentions IMU members and fighters from other groups being used by Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities in law-enforcement and army units. A single “Central Asian network,” however, would misrepresent this fragmented environment of different connections and organizational affiliations. The same report described the recruitment of people from Central Asia, their significant presence among ISKP’s rank and file, and the group’s attempts to operate outside Afghanistan. In a 2024 article for CTC Sentinel, researchers Noah Tucker and Edward Lemon examined the involvement of Tajik citizens in a number of ISKP-linked attacks and networks. They argued that the recent surge in attacks and arrests was partly the “long tail” of the earlier Islamic State mobilization, including networks that had persisted after it. A February 2026 report by the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team said ISKP continued to develop a network of cells capable of projecting a threat across the region and internationally. Propaganda Does Not Equal Mass Support Central Asian audiences occupy a noticeable place in ISKP propaganda....