• KZT/USD = 0.00227
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00227
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00227
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00227
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00227
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00227
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00227
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00227
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
30 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 128

ISKP and Central Asia: How the Threat Extends Beyond Afghanistan’s Borders

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is developing transnational networks, complicating assessments of the threat to Central Asia. The group also retains territorial ambitions. One conventional way to assess the threat is to look at a map: the situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces, their proximity to the borders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the number of militants, and the possibility of infiltration into neighboring states. An August report by the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, based on information received through June 9, said the ability of terrorist groups to operate in Afghanistan remained an enduring threat to neighboring countries and Central Asia. The report also said ISKP had reportedly moved toward northern Afghanistan. During the period under review, the group suffered serious setbacks amid Taliban and Pakistani operations and was in the process of rebuilding. But looking only at Afghanistan’s borders is no longer enough. The Central Asian dimension of ISKP encompasses the group’s activities in Afghanistan, risks to the five Central Asian states themselves, and the involvement of some individuals from the region in transnational networks operating outside it. Old Networks and New Structures ISKP’s Central Asian dimension did not emerge from nowhere. Even before the group appeared in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, armed organizations formed by people from Central Asia were active there. Among them was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). At different times, the IMU maintained ties with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In 2014, the Islamic State declared a “caliphate.” A year later, a faction of the IMU pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Lucas Webber, a researcher of extremist networks, and Bruce Pannier, a longtime analyst of Central Asian politics and security, have highlighted the role of an Uzbek-language propaganda infrastructure associated with the IMU in ISKP’s outreach to Central Asian audiences. Their analysis was published by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). The region’s older militant organizations have not simply been absorbed into ISKP. A July 2025 UN report separately mentions IMU members and fighters from other groups being used by Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities in law-enforcement and army units. A single “Central Asian network,” however, would misrepresent this fragmented environment of different connections and organizational affiliations. The same report described the recruitment of people from Central Asia, their significant presence among ISKP’s rank and file, and the group’s attempts to operate outside Afghanistan. In a 2024 article for CTC Sentinel, researchers Noah Tucker and Edward Lemon examined the involvement of Tajik citizens in a number of ISKP-linked attacks and networks. They argued that the recent surge in attacks and arrests was partly the “long tail” of the earlier Islamic State mobilization, including networks that had persisted after it. A February 2026 report by the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team said ISKP continued to develop a network of cells capable of projecting a threat across the region and internationally. Propaganda Does Not Equal Mass Support Central Asian audiences occupy a noticeable place in ISKP propaganda....

Kyrgyzstan Says 31 Suspected KTJ and Islamic State Members Detained in Southern Operation

Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security, or GKNB, said it detained 31 suspected members of Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and Islamic State during an overnight counterterrorism operation in the southern Osh and Batken regions. The operation took place on the night of June 8-9. Authorities imposed a legal counterterrorist-operation regime in Osh, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kara-Suu district, and Uch-Korgon village in Kadamjay district. The GKNB said the suspects had planned attacks against law enforcement officers and religious figures. Security officers detained 11 people in Osh region and 20 in Batken region. During searches, officers seized religious extremist literature, electronic storage devices with extremist materials, four unregistered firearms, symbols of terrorist groups, and money that the GKNB said was intended to finance terrorist structures abroad. The GKNB said its chairman, Jumgalbek Shabdanbekov, directed the operation in real time from a situation center. Operational headquarters included staff from the Interior Ministry, Border Service, Defense Ministry, Emergency Situations Ministry, Health Ministry, presidential envoys in the regions, and Osh city officials. “The special operation was carried out in strict accordance with the law,” the GKNB said in a statement carried by local media. The committee said its Main Investigation Department was checking the detainees’ links, possible accomplices, and financing channels. The suspects were not named, and the GKNB statement did not give their ages, citizenship, or the legal articles under which the case is proceeding. The detainees were placed in the GKNB’s temporary detention facility. Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad appears on the UN Security Council’s ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list as Khatiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, or KTJ. The UN added the group to the list on March 7, 2022, for its association with Al-Qaida-linked groups. The UN entry says KTJ was formerly known as Jannat Oshiklari and operated under Al-Nusrah Front in Syria. It also says the group had about 500 fighters. The UN entry says KTJ organized the 2016 attack on the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek. In that attack, a suspected suicide car bomber rammed the embassy gates, killing himself and wounding at least three other people, Reuters reported. Reuters later quoted the GKNB as saying, “The investigation established that the terrorist act was ordered by Uighur terrorist groups active in Syria.” U.S. sanctions records list Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity. Kyrgyzstan’s official list of banned organizations includes Islamic State, Jannat Oshiklari, and Jamaat at-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Islamic State was declared a terrorist and extremist organization by Bishkek’s Oktyabr District Court on February 13, 2015, and the ruling entered into force on March 16, 2015, 24.kg reported. No convictions have been announced in the June 9 case. The case remains under investigation.

Up to 300 Tajik Women and Children Remain in Syria and Iraq

An estimated 250 to 300 Tajik women and children remain in Syria and Iraq, according to Suhaili Kodiri Abduhafizzoda, Head of the Department for State Protection of Children's Rights at the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner of Tajikistan. Abduhafizzoda stated that the repatriation process, previously overseen by a dedicated Tajik working group, has stalled since the change of government in Syria. At its peak, approximately 800 Tajik nationals, mainly women and children, were believed to be in the two countries. While more than half have returned home, hundreds remain stranded. Four Repatriation Waves Since 2019 Tajikistan has conducted four formal repatriation missions since 2019, resulting in the return of 382 individuals. These included: 2019: 84 children repatriated 2022: 144 women and children 2023: 104 individuals 2024: 47 women and children In addition, roughly 90 Tajik citizens returned independently, although their exact routes and methods of escape from conflict zones have not been officially disclosed. Final Stage Falls Short Officials had hoped the 2024 operation would mark the final stage of the repatriation effort. However, Abduhafizzoda confirmed that not all remaining women and children agreed to return. “We planned to return all remaining women and children, but this was not possible, primarily because they themselves refused,” he explained. Fear of legal consequences was the most commonly cited reason. Many of the women expressed concern that they would face criminal prosecution upon returning to Tajikistan. However, authorities insist these fears are largely unfounded. According to the ombudsman’s office, none of the women previously repatriated have been charged or prosecuted. Instead, they were reportedly met with state support and reintegration programs. “Some of the women who had already returned had similar fears. But once they came back, they saw that no criminal cases were initiated, and they were all forgiven,” Abduhafizzoda noted. Children Reunited With Families Officials report that all repatriated children have been reunited with relatives and received assistance in resuming their education and adjusting to civilian life. Nonetheless, the fate of those still in Syria and Iraq remains unclear. Legacy of the Islamic State According to official figures, more than 2,500 Tajik citizens joined the Islamic State group after 2013. Many men took their families with them to Syria and Iraq. By 2017, most of the men were reported killed or missing, and some women and children are also believed to have died during the conflict. With no current framework for further repatriation, the future of the remaining Tajik women and children in the region remains uncertain.

Riot in Tajik Prison Leaves Several Inmates Dead

On February 3, a riot broke out in Tajikistan's Vahdat Penitentiary No. 3/2, 15 miles from Dushanbe, resulting in the deaths of several prisoners. According to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Justice, the incident occurred when nine inmates - convicted over links to Islamic State and the Jihadi Salafi movement - launched an armed attack on prison staff using improvised weapons. “As a result of the attack, three guards were seriously injured,” the ministry’s statement said. The prisoners, armed with makeshift knives, refused to comply with prison authorities and attempted to kill security personnel in an escape attempt. According to the authorities, the prison guards responded with firearms, killing three of the attackers and detaining the others. The injured staff members received medical treatment and were reported to be in stable condition. Authorities also confirmed that security at the facility has been fully restored. While official reports initially listed three inmate fatalities, some sources suggest that the actual number of prisoner deaths may be higher. Condemning the treatment of detainees by officials at the prison, the Civil Committee for the Rescue of Hostages and Political Prisoners of Tajikistan (CCHP) stated that “at least 10 prisoners were killed and a number were injured as a result of guards shooting at prisoners.” Despite reports that the detainees had briefly raised the Islamic State flag over the prison, CCHP claimed that those killed were political prisoners who had no connection to ISIS or any other banned group.   History of Prison Riots in Tajikistan This is not the first violent uprising within Tajikistan’s penitentiary system. In May 2019, inmates in the same facility armed with knives took three staff members hostage and killed them. They also executed five fellow prisoners before security forces suppressed the riot. Among those killed was Behruz Halimov, son of Gulmurod Halimov, a former Tajik special forces officer who later joined ISIS. The riot left 29 prisoners dead, and Tajikistan’s Supreme Court subsequently increased the sentences of 28 convicts involved in the incident. ISIS claimed responsibility for the riot. In November 2018, a similar riot occurred in a high-security prison in Khujand, where 21 inmates and two prison staff members were killed. Five guards were also injured. Following an investigation, 33 prisoners stood trial, and nine prison officials, including the warden, received prison sentences for negligence. Broader Security Concerns In recent years, Tajikistan has witnessed numerous escape attempts from detention facilities, though nearly all have ended in failure. Most escape organizers have either been killed during apprehension or recaptured. These recurring incidents highlight ongoing security challenges within the country’s prison system and underscore the need for further reforms to prevent future outbreaks of violence.

Repatriating Islamic State Fighters and Families: Balancing Security and Humanity

With the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, repatriating foreign fighters is a pressing issue at the intersection of global security, humanitarian principles, and national responsibility. Central Asian governments — namely, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan — have emerged as proactive players in repatriating their citizens from camps in northeastern Syria. While these efforts are laudable, they come with challenges and unanswered questions. Tens of thousands of people, many of them women and children associated with former ISIS or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - a terrorist organization known for its extreme ideology and violent actions of its’ fighters — remain trapped in the camps of northeastern Syria. Their lives are defined by squalor and uncertainty, and they face a bleak future. Central Asian nations have stepped up where many others have faltered, asserting their responsibility to help their citizens who languish there. Yet, this commitment is not without its limits. Repatriating men — many of whom were fighters — remains a challenge that even the most ambitious programs have struggled to address. This issue looms large, as it intertwines with broader questions. These include reintegration, security risks, and the potential for radicalization, both in prison systems and broader society. The scale of efforts undertaken by four of the Central Asian countries is significant. Together, they have repatriated around 2,200 citizens: Kazakhstan, the most, 754 individuals, followed by others with numbers ranging from 381 to 533. These figures represent more than just logistical achievements. They reflect these governments' commitment to humanitarian principles. However, the path has not been entirely smooth, as some of the repatriated women and children have returned back to conflict zones. As counterintuitive as this may seem, they might do so out of ideological commitment, social ties, coercion or threats, trauma bonding, or difficulty reintegrating into their home societies. All this suggests cracks in reintegration programs that must be addressed. The strategies employed by the Central Asian states, despite their common goal, differ in focus and execution. Kazakhstan’s “Operation Zhusan” is often mentioned as a model of coordination and commitment. It has gone beyond mere repatriation to a vision embracing comprehensive reintegration, including other services, such as DNA testing to identify orphaned children. Yet such efforts rely heavily on state resources and long-term political will, neither of which can be taken for granted. Uzbekistan’s Mehr ("Kindness") initiative has particularly focused on protecting children and supporting the unification of families. Yet even with international appreciation, Uzbekistan faces the same challenges as its neighbors: how to sustain this momentum and address lingering societal stigmas toward returnees. Kyrgyzstan paused its repatriation operations in Iraq due to legal roadblocks and has turned its attention to Syria. However, Kyrgyzstan relies significantly on international cooperation, as its own economic resources for such activities are comparatively limited. So far, it has repatriated 511 citizens. Tajikistan’s steady progress highlights even more pointedly the role of international cooperation with organizations like UNICEF and the European Union. The Tajik authorities have worked closely with...

Investigation into ISIS-linked Group Smuggling Uzbek Migrants into the U.S.

The US Department of Homeland Security is investigating a cross-border group that smuggled more than 400 migrants into the country in connection with ISIS, CNN reported. Officials said the group claimed it was smuggling migrants into the country, not terrorists. However, another criminal organization related to this group was “blacklisted” last summer due to its links with ISIS. This led to all those associated being added to the list of suspects. It has been confirmed that the group being investigated for its ties to ISIS, brought more than 400 people to the United States. The majority were citizens of Central Asia, and particularly, Uzbekistan. In a press report issued on June 26, Secretary of Internal Security of the United States, Alejandro Mayorkas stated that no evidence had been found regarding connections between the 400 migrants and ISIS. However, it was noted that the group that brought them into the country may have provided indirect support to the terrorist organization. Over the past month, the United States has intensified checks on immigrants from Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In recent raids, eight citizens of Tajikistan were arrested on suspicion of being connected to terrorist groups. The state leadership has been tasked to determine whether citizens of Uzbekistan are associated with criminal groups.