• KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
18 August 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 2

EU Deepens Central Asia Ties as Rights Record Varies Across Region

The European Union is rapidly deepening its trade, investment, and political ties with Central Asia, even as its latest assessment points to worsening human rights conditions across much of the region. The latest assessments are contained in the EU’s annual Human Rights and Democracy in the World country reports, which separately examine all five Central Asian states. In Kazakhstan, the EU notes judicial and political reforms, as well as continued implementation of measures aimed at strengthening protection against gender-based violence. Brussels also points to a shrinking space for civil society, growing pressure on journalists and independent media, increased oversight of NGOs, and continued restrictions on peaceful assembly. As part of the UN Universal Periodic Review, Kazakhstan accepted 259 of the 294 recommendations it received. The assessment of Kyrgyzstan is notably harsher. The EU says the human rights situation continued to deteriorate and highlights the new media law, mandatory registration for all media outlets, a 35% cap on foreign ownership, and prosecutions of media workers that it describes as seemingly politically motivated. Another source of concern was the closure of the National Center for the Prevention of Torture, whose functions were transferred to the Ombudsperson’s Office. In Tajikistan, the main concerns include pressure on independent media and human rights defenders, restrictions on freedom of expression and association, reports of torture and ill-treatment in detention, and the situation of Pamiri activists and journalists. Citing Human Rights Watch, the EU report says at least seven journalists were imprisoned on charges related to their reporting or coverage of protests. Turkmenistan remains subject to some of the region’s most extensive restrictions. Brussels points to continuing restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, the media, association, assembly, and religion, as well as reports of torture and ill-treatment in prisons. The EU also notes some improvements in detention conditions, gender equality and gender-based violence, and cooperation with the International Labour Organization on eliminating forced labor. The EU’s assessment of Uzbekistan is quite severe. According to the EU, the human rights and democracy situation continued to steadily deteriorate in 2025, with backsliding in nearly every area. Brussels points to legal action and imprisonment targeting journalists, bloggers, and human rights defenders, restrictions affecting NGOs, and worsening media freedom. The full report on the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan had still not been made public by the end of 2025. The EU nevertheless notes some positive developments, including new measures to protect children, changes to divorce law, and improved representation of women in parliament. The severity of these assessments contrasts with the pace at which Europe is expanding its relationship with the region. The first EU-Central Asia summit, held in Samarkand in April 2025, elevated relations to a strategic partnership. Brussels also announced a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package covering transport links, critical raw materials, digital connectivity, water, and energy. The Times of Central Asia has reported on efforts to move from political agreements toward specific projects. Human rights, however, remain part of the relationship with Brussels. This has been...

Germany Builds a Z5+1 in Central Asia

Germany’s meeting on February 11 with the five Central Asian foreign ministers in Berlin formalized the Z5+1 (“Z” for “Zentralasien”) format as a standing work channel. It joins other “plus-one” formats now crowding Central Asia that function as instruments of influence. The United States is using C5+1 to push a more deliverables-oriented agenda, including critical raw materials, and China has institutionalized leader-level summitry with accompanying treaties, grants, and transport-centered integration. The EU has elevated its relationship to a strategic partnership and is putting Global Gateway branding behind connectivity and investment. Germany’s Z5+1 is best understood as Europe’s effort to add a practical, tool-driven channel that can move faster than EU consensus in some domains while still feeding EU programming rather than competing with it. The concluding Berlin Declaration reads like a program sheet with named instruments, sector priorities, and established a direct link to the EU’s broader “Team Europe” posture through the participation of EU Special Representative Eduards Stiprais. Germany’s Z5+1 fits this competitive field as a European execution lane that can move projects forward with German instruments while staying aligned with EU programs. Berlin Defines the Tools The Z5+1 meeting in Berlin drew on a sequence that Germany has been building since its 2023 “Strategic Regional Partnership” and subsequent summits in Berlin (2023) and Astana (2024), with an explicit emphasis on Central Asian regional cooperation as a counterpart to bilateral ties. The Berlin meeting, therefore, did not attempt to invent a new regional architecture but rather added a stable ministerial format for pushing forward project lists, regulatory expectations, and finance conditions between higher-level meetings. In Berlin, Germany committed €2.7 million to a cooperation platform for the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor: a small sum by infrastructure standards, but targeted at unglamorous coordination like data-sharing, planning discipline, and institutional continuity, i.e., standards and transborder management regimes where corridor initiatives often stall. This profile complements the EU-backed Trans-Caspian Coordination Platform track, which is explicitly tied to a wider €10 billion commitment announced at the January 2024 Global Gateway investors forum for EU–Central Asia transport connectivity. and which has addressed the corridor less as a construction problem than as a finance-and-sequencing problem. Berlin also explicitly supported the commercial participation of German rail and logistics firms in transport and consulting projects, aligning with the intent to keep firm-level engagement attached to ministerial diplomacy. The declaration references export credits and investment guarantees, and links them to business-environment expectations. On the same day, the German Eastern Business Association convened a “Wirtschaftsgespräch” (economics talk) in the Foreign Office with the Central Asian delegations. There, the region was framed as strategically significant for Germany’s diversification agenda, and it was signaled that an autumn leaders’ summit is already in view. Germany’s public accounting of its regional engagement in Central Asia stresses its already-deep base of activity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular, including dozens of projects and multi-billion-euro volumes. The energy transition was mentioned, as the Berlin Declaration points to renewables, hydrogen, and climate programming that Germany is already funding...