Internet Restrictions in Central Asia: How the Five Countries Differ

There is no single Central Asian internet. Crossing a border can turn a freely accessible website into one that is blocked or reachable only through a virtual private network (VPN). The contrast is starkest in Turkmenistan, where years of censorship have created a black market for access to the open internet. Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom on the Net assessment covers three of the five Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan scored 47 out of 100 and retained its Partly Free status. Kazakhstan scored 37, while Uzbekistan scored 29; both were classified as Not Free. Turkmenistan has the most restrictive system in the region. The largest measurement study of its internet censorship to date tested 15.5 million domains and found that more than 122,000 were blocked. Researchers also identified filtering rules that inadvertently made more than 5.4 million additional domains inaccessible. Bypassing these restrictions has developed into a market of its own. In July 2025, VPN keys were being sold for around $50 a month, while access through a connection exempt from government filters cost up to $2,000. Turkmen officials were also alleged to have been involved in selling such access. Such claims are difficult to verify independently inside one of the world’s most closed countries. Even so, the market illustrates the effect of years of blocking: for some residents, a working VPN can provide access to large parts of the internet that would otherwise remain unavailable. The situation in Kazakhstan is different. The internet is far more accessible than in Turkmenistan, although the authorities also use technical controls. A study published by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) found evidence that at least 17 news websites and 73 sites for circumvention tools were blocked between June 1, 2023, and June 1, 2024. The affected sites included independent media and major VPN services. Researchers also found evidence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) man-in-the-middle attacks, in which a third party intercepts an encrypted connection between a user and a website. This can allow the third party to read or alter the data passing through the connection. Similar technology prompted an international dispute in 2019, when internet service providers in Kazakhstan instructed users to install a government-issued security certificate capable of intercepting encrypted web traffic. Major browser developers responded by blocking the certificate or preventing their software from trusting it. Kazakhstan does not, however, operate a closed network. OONI found that some circumvention tools remained accessible, unlike in Turkmenistan, where stable access to the open internet can itself be difficult. Kyrgyzstan’s online environment has traditionally been more open than those of its Central Asian neighbors, though restrictions have increased in recent years.  Freedom House kept the country in the Partly Free category in 2025, lowering its score from 48 to 47. It cited the detention of journalists and activists, as well as pressure on online media. Government control has also extended to internet infrastructure. In July 2025, President Sadyr Japarov signed a decree giving state-owned operator ElCat a temporary monopoly on international internet traffic. The decree set the one-year trial...

A Signal from Uzbekistan: How Turkmen Border Villages Reach the Outside World

In Diýýar, a village in northern Turkmenistan close enough to catch Uzbekistan’s mobile signal, a foreign SIM card inserted into a small Wi-Fi router can turn a barely functioning 2G connection into usable home internet. In early July, police reportedly entered around ten households in the village, identified Uzbek-connected routers, and confiscated the SIM cards. Similar inspections have been under way across close to 60 settlements in Dashoguz Province, according to Radio Azatlyk, the Turkmen Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The campaign covers parts of Shabat and Görogly districts, including Kirov, Diýýar, Bedirkent, Aýlak, and Nyýazow, in areas where Uzbek mobile signals cross the border. The Internet Across the Border What the authorities are removing is more than a foreign phone number. Residents told Radio Azatlyk that Turkmen Telecom internet is either unavailable or extremely slow in several border villages. TMCell, the mobile brand operated by the state-owned Altyn Asyr network, often provides only 2G service, while home Wi-Fi is unavailable. Households able to obtain an Uzbek SIM card use networks such as Ucell and Uztelecom, placing the card in a router that supplies internet throughout the home. Residents said YouTube and Instagram become accessible through these connections, although TikTok and many foreign websites still require a VPN. One resident described the Uzbek service as “300 times” faster than the Turkmen alternative, a personal estimate rather than a measured comparison. The cards arrive through an informal chain of traders and other residents who regularly cross into Uzbekistan. A Dashoguz source said they sell for around 200 manats and that sellers also help buyers complete the registration. The arrangement depends on geography, personal contacts, and a signal strong enough to reach across the frontier. One local source said many people from Dashoguz work abroad, including in Russia, Poland, and Germany. For households with relatives overseas, a usable connection can provide a direct link beyond the village. It also opens independent news sites and social platforms that remain blocked or unreliable on Turkmen networks. Residents confronted by police sometimes say they use the internet only to pass the time, reportedly hoping to avoid a fine. A Signal Treated as Suspicion The reported consequences vary. Some first-time offenders receive a warning, particularly when they cannot afford a penalty. Others are threatened with fines of up to 50,000 manats or imprisonment. That amount is about $14,300 at Turkmenistan’s official exchange rate and roughly $2,500 using the widely reported informal rate. Residents said officers described the use of foreign telecommunications services as possible espionage on behalf of another country. The reports cite no court case or published provision under which simply possessing an Uzbek SIM card constitutes espionage. The threat itself, however, raises the stakes around an ordinary household connection. Police and security officers reportedly do not use specialist equipment to locate the routers. Local sources said they rely instead on informants in villages, schools, and local administrations. They allegedly gather information through schoolchildren as well. Residents who travel regularly to Uzbekistan, including small...