National Fund - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 11

devaluation

Devaluation in Kazakhstan: Grim Forecast or Financial Strategy?

Expectations of a potential devaluation of Kazakhstan's national currency, the tenge, are gaining momentum in the country, despite its recent strengthening against the dollar. While the government projects stability, some financial players and experts openly support a weaker tenge. But are these fears grounded in economic reality, or do particular interests drive them? Kazakhstan’s currency is particularly sensitive to global market shifts because around half of the country’s export revenues come from oil and other raw materials. When commodity prices fall or external demand weakens, pressure on the tenge increases. The currency is also affected by high import dependence: many consumer goods, industrial inputs, and food products are priced in foreign currencies, making the economy highly responsive to exchange-rate movements. One of the most vocal proponents of a free-floating tenge is economist Aidarkhan Kusainov, a former adviser to the head of the National Bank. A long-time advocate for a free-floating tenge, Kusainov maintains that the currency remains overvalued. In 2021, he predicted the exchange rate would reach 500 tenge to the $1. As of now, the rate hovers around 510. Kusainov has recently gained broader attention following his criticism of rising taxes and utility tariffs during an appearance on a YouTube podcast hosted by Senate Speaker Maulen Ashimbayev. “Today, the singer of devaluation, a well-known but unpopular economist, woke up as a competent people’s professional (judging by the comments),” Kusainov wrote, replete with smiling emojis in assessing his newfound popularity on his Telegram channel. His prediction of a $1-to-1,000-tenge exchange rate has indeed gone viral. “If our National Fund runs out today, the exchange rate will instantly soar above 1,000. As soon as we stop injecting petrodollars and transfers into the economy, the tenge will drop to 800–900, and then quickly weaken to beyond 1,000. I've always advocated for these measures," he said in an interview with Ulysmedia. These debates are unfolding against a backdrop of persistent inflationary pressure. Although headline inflation has moderated from its earlier peaks, price growth in consumer-credit-driven segments remains elevated. Any significant weakening of the tenge would likely feed directly into consumer prices, especially for imported goods, which still account for a large share of household consumption. Kusainov's projection is not shared by the majority of analysts, however, who see such a scenario occurring only under the weight of severe external shocks. In contrast, the National Bank’s forecasts remain more conservative. According to analysts surveyed by the Central Bank in November 2025, the exchange rate is expected to reach 525.8 tenge by the end of 2025. For 2026 and 2027, the tenge is projected to weaken gradually to 548.2 and 565, respectively. Economist Serik Kozybaev, among others, rejects the idea of a sharp devaluation. He has attributed the tenge’s recent strength to currency interventions by the National Bank: “There are no serious reasons for such a significant weakening. On the contrary, over the past month, the exchange rate improved from 540 to 518 due to announced interventions. I expect this trend to continue, possibly bringing...

Economy

IMF Links High Inflation in Kazakhstan to Overheating Economy

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has attributed rising inflation in Kazakhstan to signs of an overheated economy. In a mission conducted in early November, the IMF concluded that the country's GDP growth is exceeding its real potential, thereby fueling inflationary pressure. While economic activity remains robust, prices continue to climb. According to the IMF’s forecast, Kazakhstan’s real GDP is expected to grow by just over 6% in 2025, up from 5% in 2024. The main growth drivers are increased oil production and elevated domestic demand. The IMF estimates that inflation could reach nearly 13% by the end of the year. Kazakhstan’s fiscal policy remains expansionary. Transfers from the National Fund are a key contributor: in 2024, more than $12.1 billion was withdrawn from the fund, including $10.8 billion in direct transfers to the republican budget and $1.3 billion for the purchase of shares and bonds of Kazakhstani issuers. In 2025, the government plans to cut withdrawals from the National Fund nearly in half to $5.2 billion. However, the IMF warns that the non-oil budget deficit could still exceed 8% of GDP. Elevated demand, particularly from state-owned enterprises, has also contributed to a widening current account deficit, projected at 4% of GDP. Despite a slowdown in consumer lending and stabilization in oil production, domestic demand is expected to remain high in 2026. The IMF forecasts GDP growth at 4.5%. Over the medium term, the new Tax Code is expected to help bring inflation down to the 5% target, while GDP growth moderates to a sustainable level of around 3.5%. According to the National Statistics Bureau, year-on-year inflation in Kazakhstan stood at 12.9% in September 2025, easing slightly to 12.6% in October. Monthly inflation was reported at 0.5%. The IMF highlighted several risks that could exacerbate inflationary pressures. These include falling oil prices, slower economic growth among key trading partners, potential disruptions to crude exports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), delays in infrastructure projects, and sluggish fiscal consolidation. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan continues to maintain one of the lowest levels of public debt in the world. At 24.8% of GDP, the country ranks 25th globally in terms of debt burden.

Finance

Kazakhstan Weighs Converting Part of National Fund into Cryptocurrency

Kazakhstan’s monetary authorities are considering the possibility of converting a portion of the country’s National Fund assets and gold and foreign exchange reserves into cryptocurrency. The proposal was announced by Berik Sholpankulov, Deputy Chairman of the National Bank, during a session of the Mazhilis (lower house of parliament). “We are considering the possibility of using part of the National Fund’s assets and gold and foreign exchange reserves for investment in crypto assets,” Sholpankulov stated. He emphasized that any such operations would be conducted solely through a state-managed crypto asset fund, the creation of which is currently under government discussion. “First of all, confiscated crypto assets will be transferred to the state digital asset fund, where they will be stored as a strategic reserve of the government,” Sholpankulov explained. He added that the Ministry of Digital Development has proposed allowing state-owned mining enterprises to supply energy to private mining companies in exchange for payment in cryptocurrency. According to the National Bank, the assets of the National Fund rose by $990 million in September compared to August, reaching $62.7 billion. Gold and foreign exchange reserves increased by $3.1 billion to $57.4 billion. However, foreign exchange assets declined by $1.9 billion to $17.7 billion, while gold reserves grew by more than $5 billion, reaching $39.7 billion. Previously The Times of Central Asia reported that the National Bank had approved a concept for forming a national reserve of crypto assets. The reserve is expected to be managed through a new subsidiary focused on alternative investments. The government is also exploring the establishment of crypto banks and a licensed national cryptocurrency exchange to operate across Kazakhstan. As also previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, authorities have shut down 130 illegal cryptocurrency exchanges suspected of laundering criminal proceeds since the beginning of the year. Virtual assets worth $16.7 million were seized in connection with the crackdown. Sholpankulov previously noted that approximately $15 billion in cryptocurrency has left the country due to gaps in legislation governing digital assets.

Oil

What Will Kazakhstan Make of the Novorossiysk Constraint?

Russia’s July decree requiring FSB approval for foreign vessels entering Novorossiysk introduces a new procedural constraint into the regional export environment. Modest in scope, the measure nevertheless grants Moscow a latent mechanism for influencing Kazakhstan’s primary oil export route via the CPC pipeline, and by extension, its westward orientation. The CPC terminus, long treated as infrastructurally neutral, has been “recoded” as a site of discretionary oversight. This development coincides with the gradual erosion of the energy governance model inaugurated by foreign concessions at Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan, where Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) created juridical islands largely external to domestic legal and fiscal regimes. It is possible that a new phase is emerging whereby infrastructural flows are re-anchored in sovereign discretion, as an accumulation of procedural instruments favors regional currencies and reduces Western intermediation. Kazakhstan’s energy model was built on upstream Western capital and downstream Russian transit. The fragility of that erstwhile equilibrium has now been revealed, even though the disrupter is not a single actor but a convergence of pressures. This dual-dependency now appears more vulnerable, unsettled by converging geopolitical and institutional pressures. The superficial continuity of physical infrastructure masks deeper shifts in logistical autonomy, fiscal sovereignty, and international alignment. Structural Exposure and Strategic Compression The fiscal layer exposes the shifts. Revenues from Western-operated concessions are routed into the National Fund, which reinvests them into foreign debt instruments, often issued by the same economies that operate Kazakhstan’s extractive infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s export of physical assets and reinvestment into external liabilities constitutes a structural contradiction. The state’s constitutional control over subsoil resources is not matched by operational authority. The CPC pipeline, though formally multinational, is routed entirely through Russian territory. The new decree does not immediately alter its function, but it inserts a potential instrument of political leverage. The bargaining terrain has consequently already shifted: what was previously a matter of contractual detail is now entangled with external discretion. For the present, the decree’s practical impact is limited, but it reveals the current system’s embedded asymmetry. Moscow’s move signals a readiness to formalize political leverage. It lays the groundwork for a possible reconfiguration of Eurasian energy flows under post-conflict conditions. In this vision, transactions would be conducted through sovereign institutions, denominated in rubles, tenge, or other regional currencies. The intent is clear: to reduce reliance on Western frameworks and to re-anchor Russia’s “peripheries” within its institutional orbit. The maneuver unfolds within a broader context of strategic adjustment. Europe is searching for non-Russian energy inputs. Turkey is expanding corridor-based integration. China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to institutionalize long-term infrastructural absorption. Kazakhstan has become a contested node within overlapping geopolitical networks that pull it in different vectorial directions. Against this backdrop, the once legal-technical re-negotiations over Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan are situated within a tectonically shifting geopolitical matrix. Trans-Caspian connectors, digital corridors, and regulatory frameworks are coalescing into a new infrastructural logic. The decree has little practical effect for now, but it points to a deeper condition where sovereignty is declared but not...

National Fund for Children National Fund Social Legislation Finance Economy Banking Investments

Will Kazakhstan Manage to Save the National Fund?

Experts report that Kazakhstan's National Fund has seen cumulative withdrawals of $100 billion over the past decade. The sovereign wealth fund, managed by the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, has often been used to meet state needs. Despite this, with the National Fund for Children program set to launch in 2024, President Tokayev has instructed an increase in its assets. The National Fund was established in 2000 by a decree from former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. It consolidates state assets held in the national bank account of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The fund's income is derived from two sources: tax receipts from the oil and gas sector and earnings from managing its assets. Starting in 2024, the National Fund for Children program will receive 50% of the fund's annual income. Business analyst Abzal Narymbetov explained that the fund's initial influx came from the sale of a 5% stake in the Tengiz oil field for $660 million in 2001. At its inception, the fund was intended to benefit future generations. However, various crises and management errors have frequently forced the government to dip into what is often called the "people's piggy bank." Likening the National Fund to a similar structure in Norway, Narymbetov states that the fund's accumulation peaked at more than $70 billion in 2014. "Since then, the NF has diverted money to 'urgent current needs,' such as bailing out commercial banks, supporting national companies, and filling holes in the state budget. At the moment, less than $60 billion remains in the fund. Kazakhstan began accumulating oil money with the production of 0.8 million barrels in 2001. Norwegian and Kazakh oil production has been in the same range of 1.8-2.0 million barrels for the last eight years. In other words, Kazakhstan and Norway have been producing in the same range for the last eight years; however, we spend significantly more. "For example, the Norwegian Petroleum Fund (renamed the state pension fund) was established by the government in 1990. Money was first invested in 1996, but the first figures that can be traced are $23 billion in 1998. The oil money, in my opinion, has been wisely invested in different assets. As a result, it has reached a record level of $1.4 trillion today," said Narymbetov. The analyst pointed to research by economists indicating that if money from the National Fund of Kazakhstan had not been used for current spending needs, it would now exceed $150 billion. He also cited a study suggesting that if oil prices drop to $30 per barrel, the fund's reserves could be depleted within five years. Twenty years ago, Kazakhstan had high expectations for the National Fund, hoping it would act as a financial savior during crises and provide support for young citizens. In 2022, President Tokayev announced plans to increase the National Fund's assets to $100 billion. "Everything that rightfully belongs to the people of Kazakhstan will serve their interests. For this purpose, we will ensure effective fund management and enhance its investment income,"...