Regional integration - The Times Of Central Asia

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Middle Corridor

Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan Ties Could Reorient Central Asian Integration

The five Central Asian presidents met with Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev in Avaza on October 8 for the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s participation brings a principal outlet for Central Asian trade into the six governments’ economic deliberations. Within their consultative format, the states can coordinate industrial projects with the transport services through which regional producers reach foreign markets. If Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan connect cross-Caspian transport more closely to industrial cooperation, the corridor could become an organizing axis for regional integration. The Case for Trans-Caspian Integration Closer Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan cooperation would make cross-Caspian transport more dependable if trains reach Kazakhstani ports in time for Caspian sailings and cargo arriving at Azerbaijani terminals connects with onward services through Georgia. A 2023 assessment by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also called the World Bank, identified trade among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Europe as a driver of corridor demand, giving regional exporters a place alongside China–Europe transit traffic. Onward connections from the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway now under construction could run through Turkmenistan and across the Caspian to Azerbaijan, providing an alternative to routes through Iran. Conflict involving Iran strengthens Azerbaijan’s position as the more dependable western outlet for Europe-bound exports. Greater predictability could offset the cost of a Caspian crossing by reducing the stocks firms must hold against delays and the losses caused by interrupted deliveries. Extending the operating coordination developed with Kazakhstan to these southern connections could make Azerbaijan commercially preferable for Central Asian exporters serving European markets. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan occupy the principal positions in this prospective reorientation. Together, they represent approximately one-third of the six countries’ population but account for more than three-fifths of their nominal GDP. Yet bilateral merchandise trade amounted to only $470.7 million in 2025. Their combined economic weight is thus disproportionate to the commerce presently linking them. The infrastructure and institutions connecting industrial investment to markets across the Caspian could give the two countries a basis for organizing wider regional integration, provided firms sustain commercial relationships through those connections. The Bilateral Basis for Regional Integration Export commitments depend on the cost and timing of the complete transport service. At Avaza, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attached “particular importance” to developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. His Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, advocated joint investment, manufacturing, and entry into foreign markets. For firms undertaking joint production, the commercial viability of Aliyev’s proposal would depend on transport coordinated from departure to delivery. Kazakhstan is developing the Middle Corridor along with the eastern branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At Avaza, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov supported the development of North–South corridors in addition to East–West routes. Tokayev also highlighted the continuing importance to Kazakhstan of the North–South route in cooperation with Russia. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector approach thus extends to transport infrastructure: the Middle Corridor strengthens westward access without displacing the commercial connections maintained...

CAMCA

At CAMCA, Uzbekistan Revives Push for a Stronger Regional Body

Uzbekistan has renewed its call for a stronger regional institution, with senior senator Sodiq Safoev urging Central Asian leaders to move beyond their consultative meeting format. His remarks in Baku return attention to a proposal President Shavkat Mirziyoyev outlined last November, when he called for a Community of Central Asia. Safoev, first deputy chairman of Uzbekistan’s Senate, told the CAMCA Regional Forum on October 1: “I think the time has come to transform the Consultative Meeting … into another institutional structure, not simply a Consultative Meeting, but something more.” S. Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, also called for stronger regional institutions at the forum, arguing that institutional development needed to support the expansion of transport and commercial links across the region. At the November 16, 2025, summit in Tashkent, Mirziyoyev proposed a rotating secretariat and stronger rules governing the leaders’ meetings. He also proposed making national coordinators special presidential representatives, giving them greater political authority. The secretariat would coordinate work between summits. The machinery for regular cooperation is already developing. The Council of National Coordinators held its first meeting in Tashkent on January 30–31, 2025, where foreign ministry representatives from all five Central Asian states discussed preparations for Uzbekistan’s chairmanship and a schedule of joint events. Mirziyoyev returned to the institutional argument at the July 31 informal summit in Cholpon Ata, calling for closer contacts between government departments and long-term joint programs, alongside effective cooperation institutions. His agenda included further work on common digital services and investment platforms, as well as industrial links connecting production across national borders. He also urged stronger coordination in the Central Asia Plus diplomatic formats through which the region engages outside powers. Azerbaijan’s participation has widened the scope of those discussions. The five Central Asian presidents accepted Azerbaijan as a full participant in November 2025, extending the format across the Caspian. The six-country grouping, increasingly described as C6, connects Central Asian producers with a country whose ports and onward transport links provide access through the South Caucasus to European markets. At an August 12 discussion in Washington, Uzbekistan’s ambassador Furqat Sidiqov emphasized market access and called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. He said Uzbekistan had about 1,500 joint ventures with neighboring states, compared with close to 300 involving Central Asian countries in 2017. Turkmenistan’s ambassador, Esen Aydogdyyev, stressed simpler customs procedures and argued that his country’s permanent neutrality was compatible with deeper economic cooperation. The commercial ambition also extends to joint production. In Baku, Azerbaijan’s minister of the economy Mikayil Jabbarov urged countries to build regional value chains in sectors where their economies complement each other. “We should increasingly produce together,” he said, pointing to companies and financial institutions already operating in one another’s markets. Moving freight across the Caspian requires countries to coordinate customs procedures and transport services. The World Bank’s new Trans-Caspian corridor study identifies fragmented governance and uneven policy implementation as problems that compound infrastructure bottlenecks. It estimates that at least $25 billion is needed through 2040...

Power Grid

August 14 Blackout: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Continue to Dispute Its Cause

The blame game over Central Asia’s August 14 blackout continues. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov says the large-scale blackout began with the shutdown of two generating units at the Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) in Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek does not dispute that the failure occurred but rejects the claim that it was the direct cause of the subsequent outages across several countries. Akkenzhenov identified the events in Kyrgyzstan as the starting point of the emergency. According to him, the initial disturbance occurred on August 14 at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time, or 3:37 p.m. in Kyrgyzstan, when generating units No. 1 and No. 2 at the Toktogul HPP went offline. The loss of generation altered operating conditions in Central Asia’s interconnected power system and led to a redistribution of power flows in southern Kazakhstan. A government commission in Kazakhstan is expected to make the final determination. Kazakhstan’s grid operator KEGOC had earlier provided a more detailed chronology. At 2:37 p.m., three 500 kV transmission lines tripped, separating southern Kazakhstan and the Central Asian grid from the rest of Kazakhstan’s power system. About 2,810 MW of consumer load was temporarily cut off. KEGOC later said that immediately beforehand, two generating units at the Toktogul HPP, with a combined capacity of about 600 MW, had gone offline. The resulting changes in power flows overloaded Kazakhstan’s North–East–South transmission corridor, triggering emergency protection systems. Akkenzhenov said the protection systems had worked effectively and praised KEGOC’s response. Kazakhstan’s power system was restored in approximately 2.5 hours. Kyrgyzstan acknowledges that the two units went offline. The country’s Energy Ministry described the incident as the “initial disturbance” in the interconnected power system, but stressed that the first event in an emergency sequence cannot automatically be considered the cause of all subsequent outages. According to its account, by 3:55 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time — 2:55 p.m. in Kazakhstan — the frequency in the interconnected power system had returned to the normal 50 Hz. At that point, Kyrgyzstan was also supplying neighboring power systems with about 250 MW. Bishkek maintains that the outage affecting the Almaty power hub occurred after normal frequency had already been restored. Kyrgyz energy officials therefore consider it premature to directly attribute all subsequent events to the failure at the Toktogul HPP. The disagreement, therefore, is less about what happened first than about the causal link between the initial failure and the chain of outages that followed. Why the Regional Grid Is Vulnerable The vulnerability is rooted in the architecture of the region’s power system itself. During the Soviet period, its power plants and high-voltage transmission lines were designed to operate as a single interconnected system rather than around today’s national borders. Energy ties weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in recent years the countries have again expanded parallel operation of their power systems. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are connected through the Integrated Power System of Central Asia. Cross-border power flows are coordinated by the Energia Coordinating Dispatch Center in Tashkent. Hydropower in Kyrgyzstan and...

Power Grid

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Give Conflicting Accounts of Four-Country Blackout

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have given differing accounts of what triggered the August 14 blackout that cut electricity across swathes of Central Asia. Three days later, the initiating event remains unresolved, and the times released by the two sides do not fit neatly into the same sequence. Kazakhstan’s national grid operator KEGOC says two hydrogenerators at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant, with a combined capacity of 600 MW, disconnected at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time. KEGOC said the sudden loss of generation overloaded the North-East-South transit corridor, separating southern Kazakhstan from the rest of the national grid and the interconnected systems of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. A special commission is investigating the causes. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s National Electric Grid has given a different chronology. It said that at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time, an external disconnection occurred on a high-voltage line linking the northern and southern parts of Kazakhstan’s power system. The Central Asian network then split into an isolated section, and Kyrgyzstan temporarily operated separately while automatic protection systems worked to protect equipment. The one-hour difference between the countries’ clocks makes the discrepancy clearer. Kazakhstan has used UTC+5 nationwide since 2024, while Kyrgyzstan uses UTC+6. That puts Kyrgyzstan’s reported line disconnection at 2:34 p.m. Kazakhstan time, three minutes before KEGOC’s stated 2:37 p.m. Toktogul shutdown. The two times may describe different stages of a fast-moving cascade, but they do not establish the same starting point. A third timestamp complicates the sequence. Alatau Zharyq Company said three 500 kV KEGOC transmission lines shut down at 2:38 p.m., and that those lines triggered automatic load-shedding and frequency protection in Almaty and the surrounding region. Taken together, the public statements leave a sequence of 2:34 p.m., 2:37 p.m., and 2:38 p.m. that investigators will need to reconcile. TCA reporters in Almaty and Bishkek experienced power cuts, while local media reported outages in Dushanbe, Khujand, and southern parts of Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, the disturbance affected consumers in the Zhambyl, Turkistan, Kyzylorda, Zhetysu, and Almaty regions, with further restrictions in Karaganda, Ulytau, and Abai. KEGOC said supplies were restored across the affected regions later that afternoon. The four-country impact reflects how tightly the systems are connected. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan operate in parallel through the Central Asian power system. Cross-border links allow operators to share electricity and reserve capacity, but also mean that a sudden loss of generation or a major transmission line can be felt beyond one national grid before protection systems isolate the disturbance. Central Asia has been here before. In January 2022, a major blackout hit southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The event also involved a sharp imbalance on the regional network and the separation of Kazakhstan’s northern and southern grids. Its precise starting point was disputed in the immediate aftermath. The regional grid dates to the Soviet period. Uzbekistan later withdrew from the old electricity ring, leaving Tajikistan largely isolated for years. Regional links have since been rebuilt; Tajikistan began reconnecting to the unified system in 2024. An Asian Development Bank project is adding...

Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization...

Middle Corridor

Central Asia and Azerbaijan Extend Cooperation Across the Caspian

Central Asia’s presidential forum now spans both shores of the Caspian. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan anchor the principal Caspian crossing at the center of the Middle Corridor, the rail-and-sea network linking Central Asia to European markets through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Azerbaijan’s full participation brings the corridor’s eastern and western Caspian gateways into the same regular political setting. The six governments can use it to coordinate the transport, energy, digital, and investment links already developing across the Caspian, even though Georgia and Türkiye remain essential to the route’s westward operation. On July 31, 2026, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan signed the Cholpon-Ata Declaration at an informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan in Kyrgyzstan. The Declaration gave formal political expression to cooperation that had already been developing. Official accounts said the leaders emphasized expanded regional cooperation, including trade, transport and logistics, and energy. The full text has not been released, so those priorities come from official accounts rather than the declaration itself. Proposed by Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2017 and first convened in Astana in March 2018, the Consultative Meetings brought together the five Central Asian states in an informal presidential format. They expanded in November 2025 with Azerbaijan’s admission as a full-fledged participant, while retaining their consultative character. Azerbaijan attended in 2023 and 2024 as a guest; Cholpon-Ata was its first informal meeting in the new capacity. Official documents continue to call the format “Central Asia and Azerbaijan.” C6 is analytical shorthand for the enlargement, not the name of a new bloc or formal organization. Azerbaijan’s admission follows several years of practical cooperation. At a ministerial meeting in Aktau on November 25, 2022, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye signed a 2022–2027 roadmap for the simultaneous elimination of bottlenecks and development of the Middle Corridor. At its 2023 Baku summit, the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) adopted a digitalization roadmap and established a multi-partner trust fund, followed by work on digital data exchange and port-to-port cooperation. The transport roadmap includes Georgia and Türkiye, while SPECA also includes Afghanistan; neither is institutionally identical to C6. The enlarged format gives the six governments a regular political setting in which to coordinate existing transport, digital, and investment mechanisms. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association reports that freight through the seaports of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan reached 3.3 million tons in 2024, 20% above the 2023 level, while container traffic within the same scope rose 176% to 56,500 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). Freight remains the principal basis of integration. Oil transit, prospective electricity links, and joint investment instruments are extending cooperation into adjacent sectors. Kazakhstan's use of the route for oil exports is also rising: according to KazMunayGas reports, Kazakhstani oil shipments from Aktau through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan route increased by 34% to 1.4 million tons in 2024. At COP29 in Baku on November 13, 2024, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic-partnership agreement on producing and transmitting green energy,...