• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 3

Tajikistan Launches Program to Reintegrate Convicted Extremists into Society

Tajik authorities have launched a state-backed program aimed at reintegrating citizens convicted of extremism and terrorism into peaceful civilian life. The initiative, which will run from 2025 to 2029, seeks to reduce the likelihood of re-engagement with radical movements and support the return of these individuals to society. New State Initiative: Goals and Budget According to official documents, the program is set to receive 38.5 million Tajikistani somoni (approximately $3.6 million) in funding. Nearly half of the funds will come from the state budget, with the remainder provided through international grants and extra-budgetary sources. The initiative includes a comprehensive set of measures: physical and psychological rehabilitation, vocational training, employment support, and involvement in patriotic and cultural activities. These components are designed to assist former prisoners in adjusting to life outside correctional facilities. Upon release, participants will be closely monitored to prevent any return to extremist ideologies. Implementation and oversight will be managed by local authorities and specialized agencies under the Ministry of Justice, which is tasked with submitting regular progress reports to the government. Understanding Pathways to Radicalization The drivers of radicalization in Central Asia are complex and multifaceted. Rustam Azizi, a specialist in countering violent extremism, told Asia-Plus that economic hardship alone does not account for why some individuals are drawn to extremist groups such as ISIS, Ansarullah, or the Taliban. “Economic difficulty doesn't automatically lead to radicalization, other negative outcomes like crime or social withdrawal are also possible,” Azizi explained. “Moreover, real-life cases show that not all recruits come from impoverished backgrounds.” Migration, while often discussed as a risk factor, does not directly cause radicalization, according to Azizi. Rather, it can create an environment where individuals are more exposed to recruitment efforts, particularly among youths aged 18 to 26. Azizi identifies three main categories of individuals most susceptible to radicalization: 1. Identity crisis: Often from secular, modernized, or mixed-background families, these individuals turn to religion as a way to find belonging, purpose, or self-worth. Frequently recent converts or newly observant Muslims, they may express a sentiment such as: “I may not be a good Tajik, but I am a very good Muslim.” 2. Individuals with criminal tendencies: For this group, terrorist organizations offer a platform to continue illicit activities under the cover of religious struggle. Notable examples include Abu Khalid Kulobi (Nusrat Nazarov) and Abu Usama Noraki (Tojiddin Nazarov), both of whom were involved in drug trafficking before joining ISIS. 3. Marginalized citizens: Representing the largest group, these individuals often come from remote areas and have limited access to education and economic opportunity. Lacking formal religious training, they are especially susceptible to simplistic, binary religious narratives—such as Muslims versus infidels, halal versus haram, jihad versus martyrdom—and are particularly vulnerable to recruitment. It is this demographic that the new government program primarily targets, with an emphasis on prevention, education, and structured support after incarceration. Authorities believe these efforts will promote national stability and help curb the threat posed by radical movements.

Central Asia Leads in Repatriating Citizens from Syrian Camps

Central Asian governments are at the forefront of efforts to repatriate their citizens from camps in northeastern Syria, according to Khalid Koser, head of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). In an interview with RIA Novosti, Koser highlighted that, unlike European nations, Central Asian states have taken responsibility for their nationals. GCERF is an international organization supporting local initiatives to prevent extremism and violence by fostering partnerships between governments, civil society, and the private sector. Koser noted that approximately 2,200 Central Asian citizens have been repatriated from these camps. Kazakhstan has brought back 754 individuals, Kyrgyzstan 533, Tajikistan 381, and Uzbekistan 531. By contrast, Koser criticized European nations for neglecting their citizens in the camps. “Tajikistan says, ‘These are our citizens, and we are responsible for them,’” Koser stated. “Meanwhile, Western Europe hopes the problem will disappear, leaving people to die in camps.” The head of GCERF also pointed out the challenges of repatriating men, many of whom were combatants. “The question now is how to handle those who fought, were involved in terrorism, and face difficulties reintegrating. Most will end up in prison, which could lead to further radicalization within the prison system,” Koser warned. The camps in northeastern Syria, managed by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the United States, house 65,000 to 70,000 people. Most of the residents are women and children from families of ISIS militants. While the camps are not officially prisons, movement is restricted, and Kurdish forces prevent residents from leaving. The Times of Central Asia has previously reviewed the repatriation operations undertaken by Central Asian countries, which continue to set a global example in addressing this humanitarian and security challenge.

Central Asia Braces for Return of Radical Islamists Amid Syrian Turmoil

According to experts, the recent collapse of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria raises concerns about potential destabilization in Central Asia. This development may force regional governments to repatriate citizens who were lured by Islamist propaganda, while the future of the Astana format negotiations on Syria remains uncertain. The swift coup d'état in Syria saw opposition forces capture Damascus and much of the country within days. Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, leaving a chaotic landscape dominated by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, often described as a successor to ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The situation has plunged Syria into further instability. The Impact of Operation Zhusan Kazakhstan has firsthand experience dealing with the repercussions of Syria's instability. Between 2013 and 2017, hundreds of Kazakh citizens succumbed to Islamist propaganda, crossing borders illegally to join the conflict, often with their families. In response to the humanitarian crisis, Kazakhstan launched Operation Zhusan ("Wormwood") in January 2019 to repatriate citizens trapped in Syria. The operation, conducted in five stages and completed by February 2021, repatriated 607 citizens, 37 men, 157 women and 413 children (34 of whom were orphans). The government set up a rehabilitation center near Aktau on the Caspian Sea to provide treatment, restore documents, and offer vocational training for adults and education for children. All 37 repatriated men were detained and later convicted of terrorism-related activities, receiving sentences ranging between 6 and 14 years, whilst 18 women faced prosecution. Despite the operation’s success, many in Kazakhstan fear the returnees and their children might spread radical ideologies within the country. Lessons from the Region Other Central Asian countries have also grappled with the challenge of repatriating citizens from Syria. Bakhtiyor Babadjanov, an expert from the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under Uzbekistan’s president, detailed the experiences of Uzbek women lured to conflict zones. These women often found themselves deceived and abandoned in dire conditions, as described in an interview. "The 'happy caliphate' turned out to be a myth," Babadjanov explained, recounting stories of women and children abandoned without food or shelter during battles in Mosul. Survivors reported forced marriages, child abuse, and exploitation under the guise of religious duty. The Uncertain Future of the Astana Process Another significant connection between Central Asia and Syria has been the Astana process, a series of negotiations aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict. Since 2017, Kazakhstan has hosted 22 rounds of talks, including discussions on hostages, missing persons, and settlement efforts. However, the recent escalation in Syria casts doubt on the process. In late November and early December, armed opposition groups launched a large-scale offensive, capturing key cities, including Aleppo and Damascus. Despite this upheaval, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov insisted the Astana process remains relevant as a platform for dialogue and consultation, notwithstanding the fact that Assad is now in Moscow. Heightened Risks of Destabilization Experts in Kazakhstan and Central Asia have warned that the fall of Assad's regime could lead to prolonged anarchy, ethnic and religious conflicts, and a refugee crisis. Political scientist,...