• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
05 October 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 56

Uzbek-U.S. Citizen Extradited from Georgia on Charges of Supporting ISIS and al-Nusrah Front

Davud Ansariy, an Uzbek citizen who is also a naturalized U.S. citizen, has been extradited from Georgia to New York. U.S. prosecutors accuse him of leading a network that raised money to support ISIS and the al-Nusrah Front and helped aspiring fighters travel to Syria. Ansariy, 41, also known as Kozimjon Gafurov and Kozim, was arrested in Tbilisi in August 2026 and extradited to the United States on September 23. He faces one count of conspiracy to provide material support and one count of providing and attempting to provide material support to ISIS and the al-Nusrah Front, both designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations at the time of the alleged conduct. If convicted, he faces up to 35 years in prison. The alleged conduct dates back more than a decade. According to prosecutors, Ansariy led a group based primarily in Brooklyn whose members either planned to travel to Syria to join ISIS or the al-Nusrah Front or helped finance such trips. Participants referred to the group as “chayxona,” an Uzbek word meaning “tea house” or “tea party.” Prosecutors allege that money collected through the network was used to pay for the travel of aspiring fighters to Syria and to support families left behind by those who traveled there, as well as the families of those killed while fighting. According to prosecutors, these collections helped finance the travel of at least three people to Syria in 2013. All three are believed to have been killed there. Investigators also link the network to Akhror Saidakhmetov, who was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport on February 25, 2015, while attempting to board a flight to Istanbul. According to court filings, the “chayxona” collections raised money for Saidakhmetov’s planned journey. He later pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Ansariy left the United States for Turkey in May 2016, buying a one-way ticket the day before his departure. He left five days after one of his alleged co-conspirators was arrested on May 11 and did not return to the United States until his extradition this month. A federal grand jury in Brooklyn indicted Ansariy in November 2021. Georgian authorities arrested him after he traveled from Uzbekistan to Tbilisi in August 2026. Ansariy pleaded not guilty on September 24 and was held without bail, the New York Post reported.

Syrian Security Forces Detain Uzbek Fighters During Operation in Idlib

Syrian security forces have detained a group of Uzbek fighters during a security operation in the country’s northwest, according to two Syrian security officials cited by Reuters. The arrests followed unrest in Idlib province after the authorities attempted to detain an Uzbek militant accused of opening fire in Idlib city. According to Reuters, the incident escalated when armed Uzbek fighters gathered outside a government security facility demanding the release of the suspect. The protests later triggered a broader security sweep in several parts of the countryside, including the towns of Kafriya and al-Foua. Locals and Syrian officials said security forces deployed military convoys and reinforcements to the area, where sporadic gunfire was heard during the operation. It remains unclear how many Uzbek fighters were detained. The Syrian Interior Ministry did not immediately comment on the reports. The latest incident highlights ongoing tensions between Syria’s Islamist-led authorities and foreign militants who traveled to the country during the civil war that began in 2011. Many foreign fighters, including Uzbeks, fought alongside factions linked to current Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa before he formally severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2016. Reuters previously reported, citing a Syrian security source, that around 1,500 Uzbek fighters were believed to be living in Syria, some accompanied by their families. The Syrian government has attempted to integrate thousands of foreign fighters into the country’s newly reorganized military structures following the December 2024 ouster of former President Bashar al-Assad. Some foreign militants have assumed senior state roles, including a Jordanian commander of the Republican Guard and an Australian head of a newly established sovereign fund. Others, however, have resisted joining state institutions, creating continuing security concerns for Damascus. The recent operation marks the second major confrontation in Idlib involving foreign militants in recent months. Last year, Syrian government raids targeting foreign fighters near the Turkish border drew in Uzbek militants after clashes erupted around a compound linked to French jihadist Omar Diaby, also known as Omar Omsen. At the time, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War said Syrian transitional authorities were conducting “a low-level effort to target foreign fighters in Syria who have not integrated into the Ministry of Defense.” The institute reported that Uzbek militants had deployed to reinforce foreign fighters during clashes in Harem, a city near the Turkish border. The same report stated that Syrian authorities had arrested two prominent Uzbek foreign fighters in August 2025, contributing to growing dissatisfaction among Central Asian militant groups operating in Syria.

Syria After Assad: What the New Regional Order Means for Central Asia

The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 fundamentally reshaped Syria’s regional position. The collapse of the old power structure weakened Iran’s entrenched military and economic networks and left Russia’s previously secured foothold uncertain. As Damascus enters a new political phase, external actors are recalibrating their strategies in a landscape that looks markedly different from that of the past decade. For Central Asian governments, the shift is not merely regional. Syria is becoming a testing ground for how mid-sized states navigate post-conflict environments shaped by larger powers, and a potential arena for economic and diplomatic outreach. As influence is redistributed and new investment and trade corridors are reconsidered, decisions taken in Damascus will increasingly intersect with Central Asia’s own foreign policy and economic calculations. In this emerging landscape, a power vacuum is being filled by states seeking to advance their interests. From the earliest days of Syria’s post-Assad transition, Turkey has been particularly active. As part of its declared comprehensive support for the new Syrian authorities, Ankara has taken steps to consolidate its position in the Syrian Arab Republic. Turkey is actively participating in infrastructure reconstruction, investing in economic projects, and expanding military-technical cooperation with Damascus. In August 2025, Syria and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement covering areas including counterterrorism training, cybersecurity, demining, military engineering, logistics, and enhanced coordination between their armed forces. That same month, the two sides agreed to establish an intergovernmental business council under the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board to promote trade and investment cooperation between public and private companies. Turkish exports to Syria reached $3 billion in 2025, reflecting the rapid expansion of Ankara’s economic presence. For Central Asia, Ankara’s activism carries particular weight. Turkey has simultaneously deepened its political, economic, and security cooperation across the Turkic world, meaning its posture in Syria intersects with its broader regional strategy. A central element of Turkey’s Syria policy remains the issue of refugee returns. However, the prospect of large-scale repatriation is complicated by several factors, notably the long-term presence of around 2.5 million Syrian displaced persons in Turkish society and the absence of stable socio-economic conditions in Syria to support reintegration. Over more than a decade of conflict, a generation of Syrians has grown up in Turkey, many of whom are deeply embedded in the country’s social and economic life. Turkey’s obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, including the principle of non-refoulement, further constrain policy options. Taken together, these factors make large-scale return unlikely until Syria achieves sustained political stabilization and adequate living conditions. In the longer term, Turkey’s objective of neutralizing what it describes as the Kurdish threat emanating from Syrian territory will continue to shape its strategy. Israel has also intensified its military and political engagement since the change of power in Damascus. It has taken steps to establish control over areas adjacent to the Golan Heights and to create a buffer zone, arguing that such measures are necessary to safeguard national security against potential terrorist threats. Israeli officials...

Over 5,700 ISIS Detainees Transferred from Syria to Iraq, Including Central Asians

A total of 5,704 ISIS detainees have been transferred from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq, including dozens of citizens from Central Asian countries, according to data from Iraq’s Ministry of Justice shared by journalist and Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights founder Mustafa Saadoun on X. The figures, issued by the Iraqi Correctional Service under the Ministry of Justice, detail the number of inmates held at Al-Karkh Central Prison by nationality. Among them are 36 citizens of Uzbekistan, 63 of Tajikistan, 42 of Kyrgyzstan, and four of Kazakhstan. The list also includes 165 individuals identified as “Turkestan,” 130 from Russia, and 3,544 Syrians, who make up the largest group. Saadoun told Shafaq News that the transfer of ISIS detainees from camps and detention centers in northeastern Syria could place “extreme pressure” on Iraq’s already overcrowded prison system. He warned that overcrowding levels could exceed 300% if facilities are not properly equipped to absorb the influx. “The success of the transfer depends primarily on the prisons’ ability to absorb detainees through modern isolation and classification mechanisms,” Saadoun said. He urged authorities to develop rehabilitation and reform programs that uphold the rule of law and prevent ideological spillover caused by the improper mixing of prisoners. He also described deteriorating infrastructure inside detention facilities. “Inmates are often forced to sleep in shifts in narrow, poorly ventilated corridors without sunlight,” he said, adding that such conditions create breeding grounds for contagious diseases, including scabies and tuberculosis. Last month, United States Central Command announced it had begun a “safe and systematic” transfer of around 7,000 ISIS detainees from northeastern Syria to what it described as secure facilities in Iraq, in coordination with Iraqi authorities. However, Reuters later reported that fewer than 500 detainees had been transferred in the initial phase after Baghdad requested a slowdown to negotiate with foreign governments over the repatriation of their nationals and to prepare additional detention capacity. Iraqi officials have cautioned that accepting the full number of detainees could overwhelm the judicial system, particularly as many foreign fighters may face the death penalty under Iraqi law. Central Asian governments have previously faced challenges repatriating their citizens from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq, conducting special operations in recent years to return women and children, while cases involving male detainees have remained more complex.

Up to 300 Tajik Women and Children Remain in Syria and Iraq

An estimated 250 to 300 Tajik women and children remain in Syria and Iraq, according to Suhaili Kodiri Abduhafizzoda, Head of the Department for State Protection of Children's Rights at the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner of Tajikistan. Abduhafizzoda stated that the repatriation process, previously overseen by a dedicated Tajik working group, has stalled since the change of government in Syria. At its peak, approximately 800 Tajik nationals, mainly women and children, were believed to be in the two countries. While more than half have returned home, hundreds remain stranded. Four Repatriation Waves Since 2019 Tajikistan has conducted four formal repatriation missions since 2019, resulting in the return of 382 individuals. These included: 2019: 84 children repatriated 2022: 144 women and children 2023: 104 individuals 2024: 47 women and children In addition, roughly 90 Tajik citizens returned independently, although their exact routes and methods of escape from conflict zones have not been officially disclosed. Final Stage Falls Short Officials had hoped the 2024 operation would mark the final stage of the repatriation effort. However, Abduhafizzoda confirmed that not all remaining women and children agreed to return. “We planned to return all remaining women and children, but this was not possible, primarily because they themselves refused,” he explained. Fear of legal consequences was the most commonly cited reason. Many of the women expressed concern that they would face criminal prosecution upon returning to Tajikistan. However, authorities insist these fears are largely unfounded. According to the ombudsman’s office, none of the women previously repatriated have been charged or prosecuted. Instead, they were reportedly met with state support and reintegration programs. “Some of the women who had already returned had similar fears. But once they came back, they saw that no criminal cases were initiated, and they were all forgiven,” Abduhafizzoda noted. Children Reunited With Families Officials report that all repatriated children have been reunited with relatives and received assistance in resuming their education and adjusting to civilian life. Nonetheless, the fate of those still in Syria and Iraq remains unclear. Legacy of the Islamic State According to official figures, more than 2,500 Tajik citizens joined the Islamic State group after 2013. Many men took their families with them to Syria and Iraq. By 2017, most of the men were reported killed or missing, and some women and children are also believed to have died during the conflict. With no current framework for further repatriation, the future of the remaining Tajik women and children in the region remains uncertain.

Uzbek Militants Become Mediators in Syria Stand-Off

Brandishing assault rifles, the Uzbek fighters in Syria arrived ready to fight. They ended up helping to mediate an end to a confrontation between another group of militants and government security forces.  Fighting broke out early last week when Syrian forces raided a stronghold of the Islamic militant group Fiqrat al-Ghuraba, whose leader, identified as Omar Diaby, is a French national of Senegalese origin. Authorities accused the group of kidnapping and other crimes, though some analysts say the government is under international pressure to rein in foreign fighters who helped oust former leader Bashar al-Assad last year but have resisted integration into the military of Syria’s new, relatively moderate leadership. The confrontation erupted in the city of Harem in Idlib province in northern Syria. Ethnic Uzbek fighters deployed to the area, saying they were prepared to reinforce the so-called French jihadis. Uzbek combatants play a prominent role in two groups of foreign fighters in Syria that are known by the acronyms KIB and KTJ and retain ties to al-Qaida and the Taliban, according to a recent West Point analysis. But the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which tracked the country’s long civil war, said an agreement to end the fighting was reached with the mediation of Uzbek fighters and members of the Turkistan Islamic Party, a mostly Uyghur extremist movement. As part of the deal, heavy weapons were to be withdrawn from the region and the mediators were “entrusted to track the fate” of Omar Diaby, according to the observatory.  While the agreement resolved the local stand-off, it didn’t address the broader question of how the Syrian government will deal with the many foreign militants who joined the fight against al-Assad and remain, with their weapons, in the country. At least in the short term, the deal seemed to benefit the extremists who demonstrated leverage in their talks with authorities. Foreign fighter groups had shared the same goal as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a group with al-Qaida roots that led the rebel push to overthrow al-Assad and whose leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is now trying to project an inclusive image as Syria’s president.  The French-led extremists have accused Syrian authorities of collaborating with France to detain them and turn them over to French authorities. China, which is concerned about Uyghur militants, has also urged Syria’s transitional government to crack down on designated terror groups.