• KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
13 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 4

Kyrgyzstan Sanctions Crackdown Targets Companies and Bank Accounts

Amid growing pressure from Western countries to crack down on the evasion of sanctions against Russia, Kyrgyzstan says 52 companies have ceased operations and another 57 are undergoing compulsory liquidation. State-owned banks have closed more than 240 accounts. Economy and Commerce Minister Bakyt Sydykov outlined the measures on October 27, saying the figures were current as of October 20. Sydykov, who is also the president's special representative on sanctions policy, said Bishkek would continue cooperating with the European Union (EU). He also pledged continued engagement with the United Kingdom and the United States. He identified the A7 payment network and A7A5, a cryptocurrency designed to track the value of the Russian ruble, as major sources of concern for Western regulators. "Our position is unequivocal: the territory, jurisdiction, and banking and payment infrastructure of the Kyrgyz Republic must not be used for transactions intended to circumvent sanctions," the minister said. In August 2025, the U.S. sanctioned A7 and a Kyrgyz company involved in issuing A7A5. On October 1, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced further measures against A7, accusing it of disguising sanctioned transactions as legitimate commercial payments. The EU also expanded restrictions in July 2026 as part of its 21st sanctions package against Russia. The measures included transaction bans affecting a Kyrgyz bank and cryptocurrency operators. According to Sydykov, the financial regulator has revoked the licenses of several market participants linked to A7, while the government has approved the liquidation of several organizations. The overall figures for company and account closures are not limited to entities linked to A7 or A7A5. However, Sydykov did not identify the companies affected or specify how many were suspected of involvement in sanctions evasion. He also did not say when the closures began, making it difficult to assess the extent of the crackdown. The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic is working with commercial banks to review procedures for identifying customers and the individuals who ultimately own or control the companies involved. The review also covers the purpose of payments. Particular attention is being paid to transfers through intermediaries and affiliated companies, as well as transactions inconsistent with a customer's stated business activities. At an October 21 briefing, Sydykov reported that another 25 companies were under review and that international consulting firm Kroll was being brought in to assess sanctions compliance systems. Separate restrictions are being prepared for the cryptocurrency market. The National Agency for Virtual Assets and Blockchain Technologies is drafting a presidential decree to tighten sanctions compliance. The proposed measures include screening market participants against United Nations, EU, UK, and U.S. sanctions lists, as well as restricting transactions where there are legal grounds. The authorities are also developing a unified digital platform for licensing cryptocurrency companies and supervising their activities, including automated applicant screening. The system would also monitor transactions and analyze cryptocurrency wallets. Sydykov linked the ongoing reviews to the need to preserve access to international payments for Kyrgyz businesses and citizens and to safeguard their access to investment...

Central Asia at the UN: Iran Threats and Sanctions Disputes

U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to “annihilate” Iran brought the vulnerability of Central Asia’s southern trade routes into focus as the UN General Assembly’s general debate opened in New York. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov challenged unilateral sanctions, while diplomacy over Ukraine raised the prospect of a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. For landlocked Central Asia, these developments carry consequences far beyond the speeches. Iranian ports provide access to overseas markets, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely heavily on fuel from Russian refineries, and restrictions on international payments can complicate commerce even where transport links remain intact. Iran and Access to the Sea Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, Trump presented a choice between reaching an agreement with Tehran and carrying out his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” He also predicted that an agreement could follow the U.S. midterm elections, while defending U.S. military action against Iran. [caption id="attachment_56719" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: UN[/caption] That framing leaves Central Asian countries facing costs regardless of their position on Tehran. Iran provides overland connections to ports serving the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Damage to Iranian infrastructure can therefore disrupt trade between Central Asia and countries that are not parties to the conflict. Uzbekistan’s exposure illustrates the distinction. According to its Ministry of Economy and Finance, goods worth $3.9 billion entered Uzbekistan through Iran in 2025. That represented about 9% of total imports, including approximately $1 billion in technological equipment. Uzbek exports transiting Iran were worth another $1.4 billion. Those figures measure transit, not simply purchases from Iranian suppliers. Pressure intended to isolate Tehran can also obstruct Uzbekistan’s access to equipment and customers elsewhere. Kazakhstan has also sought a larger southern outlet. A 27-year agreement provides for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade says the project would expand access to Gulf markets and destinations in Asia and East Africa. The risks differ by port. Bandar Abbas faces the Strait of Hormuz, while Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Both depend on Iranian infrastructure and remain exposed to the wider conflict and sanctions environment. Developing alternative routes does not make these southern connections dispensable. Nor is exposure uniform. Kazakh officials have emphasized the limited existing role of Persian Gulf shipments in the country’s logistics. For Astana, the threat concerns future diversification as well as current trade. For Uzbekistan, the transit figures show a substantial flow already at risk. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has sought 2.55 million tons of Iranian crude oil and fuel following shortages in Russian supplies. Its search for an alternative leaves Dushanbe exposed to two conflicts, with attacks on Russian refineries disrupting its established supplier, and the conflict involving Iran threatening a potential replacement. Japarov Challenges Sanctions In his General Assembly address, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov argued that unilateral sanctions harm smaller developing states and can become instruments of political pressure. “The right to impose sanctions against a particular state should, in our view,...

Kyrgyzstan’s High-Wire Act: Sanctions, Compliance, and National Interest

On September 2, the day after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Heads of State Summit in Bishkek, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Bakyt Sydykov, Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of Economy and Commerce and Special Presidential Representative for Sanctions Policy. He outlined the government’s approach to sanctions compliance and protecting Kyrgyz businesses. Sanctions exposure can affect Kyrgyz banks and businesses, as well as their international partners. U.S. secondary sanctions and EU and UK measures affecting foreign entities operate through different legal mechanisms. Some portions of the text have been edited for clarity.   TCA: The sanctions against Russia adopted by the U.S., EU, and UK are not UN Security Council-mandated. Is it correct that Kyrgyzstan’s compliance policy addresses these measures rather than UN-mandated sanctions? Sydykov: That's correct. Secondary sanctions can affect non-U.S., non-EU, and non-UK entities or persons who knowingly facilitate transactions involving sanctioned parties. Our focus is on establishing better and better mechanisms and frameworks that address this bilateral dimension, that is, Kyrgyzstan's direct exposure through its relations with the sanctioning jurisdictions, in order to mitigate our exposure to potential secondary sanctions. TCA: Kyrgyz citizens and businesses can face sanctions exposure through dealings with sanctioned parties, including the risk of U.S. secondary sanctions. What are Kyrgyzstan’s main challenges in improving its compliance regime, and how are you addressing them? Sydykov: For technical reasons, our compliance regime is moving toward putting in place mechanisms that can flag or be anticipatory. I think you would agree that free markets are complicated and circumvention often comes to light only after it has occurred. We are largely equipped to manage these occurrences. We are moving to put in place firewall-like frameworks which would allow the country to identify and respond to occurrences before the fact. It is a great challenge — and one that every country operating in a free-market economy faces — to develop such a capacity, namely, to anticipate and prevent circumvention before it happens. Despite our best efforts, this remains a structural limitation. TCA: What concrete actions have you taken, or are you planning to take? Sydykov: We have established working groups, task forces, and interagency committees capable of swiftly halting the operations of any company engaged in sanctions circumvention. We are also working closely with commercial banks on these efforts. The banks, for their part, have introduced internal compliance committees and, in some cases, adjusted the composition of their boards of directors to strengthen governance and decision-making around potential circumvention risks. The banks are also developing a joint interbank blacklist of sanctioned entities, so that these entities are unable to operate through the banking system going forward. Those are steps to develop a working forward-looking, predictive approach — one that flags suspicious activity before it materializes – central to the comprehensive framework we are building. TCA: Some foreign investors may be reluctant to invest in Kyrgyzstan because of sanctions exposure. How could the measures you are taking address those concerns? Sydykov: Let me first say that we understand the rationale behind...

EU Sanctions Seminar in Bishkek Puts Kyrgyzstan’s Russia Trade Under Scrutiny

The European Union held a full-day sanctions seminar in Bishkek on June 9, aimed at Kyrgyz companies, banks, logistics operators and virtual-asset businesses. The session comes less than seven weeks after Brussels used its anti-circumvention tool against Kyrgyzstan for the first time. The EU Delegation to the Kyrgyz Republic said the seminar was designed to raise awareness of EU sanctions, explain their application, and improve cooperation to prevent circumvention. The published agenda set out a program covering the EU sanctions system, financial restrictions, dual-use trade controls, penalties, trade-flow risks, and practical compliance. It also included question-and-answer sessions on financial sanctions and dual-use goods. The Kyrgyz Chamber of Commerce and Industry said the event would cover sanctions policy. Trainers were expected to come from the European Commission, EU member states, international law firms, banks, logistics companies, technology firms, and the virtual-asset sector. The timing gives an otherwise technical seminar a political edge. On April 23, the Council of the EU adopted its 20th sanctions package against Russia. Brussels banned the export of computer numerical control machines and radios to Kyrgyzstan, where there is a high risk that the products could be re-exported to Russia. The Council said trade data showed a significant rise in the re-export of common high-priority items. Those narrow categories carry large compliance risk. They include machine tools, electronics, radio equipment and other components that can support military production, drones, communications systems, and advanced industrial supply chains. The EU is not attempting to stop Kyrgyz trade with Russia; it is trying to close routes for goods that European regulators say should not reach Russia through third countries. Kyrgyzstan has drawn closer EU scrutiny since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. A member of the Eurasian Economic Union, goods can enter Kyrgyzstan, clear customs, and then move through regional trade channels. That role has supported growth in Kyrgyzstan, but has placed freight forwarders, importers and banks under closer foreign review. The concern had been building before the April decision. During a February visit to Bishkek, EU sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan discussed Kyrgyz banks, cryptocurrency and sensitive imports with Kyrgyz officials. Local coverage said the EU was watching about 80 dual-use product categories shipped from Europe to Kyrgyzstan. Around 50 had been found directly in Russian weapons, while 30 more were described as economically critical industrial items used in their production. The April package also increased pressure on Kyrgyz financial channels. The EU placed a transaction ban on 20 Russian banks and targeted four financial institutions in third countries. Keremet Bank and Capital Bank were among the affected Kyrgyz lenders. The EU also designated a Kyrgyz entity operating a platform where large volumes of the government-backed A7A5 stablecoin are traded. Virtual assets remain one of the most sensitive areas. On June 3, Kyrgyzstan’s financial-market regulator revoked the license of CJSC TengriCoin as a virtual-asset trading operator. The regulator cited systematic legal violations, failure to comply with official requirements, and failure to submit required reports. It also reminded market participants...