Our People > Olzhas Baidildinov

Olzhas Baidildinov has experience working at the state-owned company KazMunayGas and private oil companies in Kazakhstan, as well as the Ministry of Energy. He is a member of the Public Council of Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund JSC, a member of the Club of Experts under the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, and a member of the Barriers Council of the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition. He heads a private holding company that invests in oil and gas chemical projects, and runs his own Telegram channel, “Baidildinov. Oil.”

Articles

Oil and Gas

Kashagan and Karachaganak: Will Kazakhstan’s Claims Lead to Changes in the Shareholder Structure?

The beginning of 2026 has been marked by a new round of confrontation between Kazakhstan and the international consortia developing the country’s largest oil and gas fields, North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (Kashagan) and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (Karachaganak). Below is an overview of the current situation and the possible scenarios. Arbitration proceedings initiated in early 2023 have expanded from $16.5 billion to more than $170 billion. Over three years, Kazakhstan has secured preliminary victories on several claims, enough, in my view, to suggest that the era of foreign oil consortia dominating Kazakhstan’s strategic projects may be coming to an end. Ecology and NCOC Violations This week, Bloomberg reported in its article “Oil Majors Seek Arbitration Over $5 Billion Kazakh Sulfur Fine” that the NCOC consortium is filing in international arbitration to challenge a Kazakh court decision to collect 2.3 trillion tenge (KZT). The Bloomberg headline, however, presents the issue inaccurately. Environmental violations, including the excessive storage of approximately 1 million tons of sulfur, were identified during an inspection in March 2023, when the exchange rate stood at 451.71 KZT per $1. The rate later rose to 520-540 and currently stands at around 500 KZT per $1. According to investment forecasts, it may reach 600 KZT per $1 by the end of 2026. As a result, the dollar equivalent of the fine has decreased significantly. At the March 2023 rate, 2.3 trillion KZT amounted to approximately $5.1 billion. At 500 KZT per $1, it equals about $4.6 billion. At 600 KZT per $1, it would fall to roughly $3.8 billion, a difference of about $1.3 billion. After my earlier publications arguing that foreign consortia should be fined in foreign-currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of filing, the proposal was also raised in Parliament. Such an approach would be logical: the consortia export their oil and receive revenue in foreign currency, yet fines are imposed in tenge. After several rounds of appeals, the consortium lost what became the largest environmental dispute in Kazakhstan’s history, initially involving more than 20 systematic violations of environmental legislation. Correspondence between consortium members published in Western media indicated they were aware of the violations but considered remediation and compliance financially costly. NCOC’s annual revenue is approximately $10 billion. Media reports also stated that the consortium offered around $110 million, roughly 50 times less than the fine, for regional social programs in exchange for waiving environmental claims. Neither NCOC nor the Kazakh government confirmed such negotiations. In 2010-2011, similar environmental and tax claims against the Karachaganak consortium resulted in Kazakhstan receiving a 10% stake in the project. The current ownership structure of NCOC is: ENI (Italy) - 16.81% ExxonMobil (U.S.) - 16.81% CNPC (China) - 8.33% INPEX (Japan) - 7.56% TotalEnergies (France) - 16.81% Shell (UK) - 16.81% KazMunayGas (Kazakhstan) - 16.88% Total investment in Phase One of Kashagan is estimated at $60 billion. By analogy with Karachaganak, the environmental fine could hypothetically lead to an increase in Kazakhstan’s share by 5-7 percentage...

1 hour ago

Oil and Gas

Opinion: Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan: Kazakhstan Asserts Contract Stability Amid Lawsuits Exceeding $170 Billion

Following statements by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the intrigue surrounding the PSA agreements for Kashagan and Karachaganak and the stabilized contract for Tengiz have taken on new dimensions. Previously, in the articles, Breaking Down Kazakhstan’s Claims Against International Oil Consortiums and Is Kazakhstan Preparing to Take on the Oil Consortium “Whales?, TCA examined the ongoing lawsuits filed by the government and the authorized body, PSA LLC, against the North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (NCOC) and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO), noting that the Ministry of Energy and KazMunayGas have not raised any claims against the joint venture Tengizchevroil LLP (TCO). While shares in NCOC and KPO are managed by PSA LLC, those in TCO are controlled by the national company, KazMunayGas. What did President Tokayev say? On January 28, President Tokayev held an expanded government meeting addressing the public and political debate surrounding PSA agreements. "Reforms in the subsoil use sector must continue, no matter what," Tokayev stated. "This is a fundamental position that the government should firmly adhere to. The implementation of production-sharing agreements (PSAs) for major oil fields has allowed Kazakhstan to become a reliable supplier of energy resources to the global market. These projects make a significant contribution to the country’s socioeconomic development. However, large investments require a long-term planning horizon. Therefore, the government must intensify negotiations on extending PSA contracts, possibly on updated and more favorable terms for our country." This statement sparked discussions among experts; who exactly was the president referring to? The major PSAs in Kazakhstan are the Karachaganak and Kashagan projects, with contracts expiring in 2038 and 2041, respectively. In contrast, Tengiz does not operate under a PSA but rather a stabilized contract, which is set to expire much sooner, in 2033. I have repeatedly emphasized the need for an audit of Tengiz before the contract expires and have proposed that it should not be extended. Kazakhstan can independently, or with the involvement of foreign oil service companies, develop this highly profitable field under more advantageous conditions. On January 29, Kazakhstan's Minister of Energy, Almassadam Satkaliyev, provided clarification, confirming that the president's directive was specifically about Tengiz. "The directive was given quite openly within the framework of international agreements and international law to conduct consultations with consortium participants. Given the development timelines, the most relevant project for us is Tengizchevroil, which operates the Tengiz field in partnership with Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Lukoil. We plan to start certain preliminary consultations with them, and once we are ready for negotiations, we will proceed with them. The government will first develop an agenda and a list of its demands. One possible demand is an increase in Kazakhstan’s stake in these projects." So, is Tengiz the primary target? Or is Kazakhstan preparing for a broader offensive on all three fronts? “There are Hardliners in the Government” On February 16, the international industry portal Upstream Online published an extensive article titled Kazakhstan Seeks Shake-Up at Crucial Foreign-Led Oil Projects. The article primarily focuses on the production-sharing agreements (PSAs) for Karachaganak...

12 months ago

Oil and Gas

Kazakhstan Ends Era of Cheap Fuel: Price Controls Set for Abolition

On January 17, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan published a number of draft orders on the Open NLA (normative legal acts) portal, which were to be discussed within five days. In total, the Ministry proposed the abolition of eleven orders regulating wholesale and retail prices for petroleum products, which have been under price control since 2014. In addition, it intends to change the calculation formulas and price ceilings for wholesale and retail sales of liquefied and natural gas. I have been writing about the need for price liberalization since 2018, as seen in articles such as “#Kazneft, part 2: The Bermuda Gasoline Triangle - Why Prices Will Rise” and “#Kazneft, part 4: We Rank Seventh in the World for the Cheapest Gasoline. Is It Sold at a Loss?” This is a landmark event for the Government of Kazakhstan, which has long maintained not only the lowest fuel prices in the region but some of the lowest globally. The country consistently ranks among the top ten nations with the cheapest energy resources, including fuel, natural gas, coal, and electricity. Cheap and Even Cheaper According to Global Petrol Prices, as of January 20, 2025, fuel prices per liter in dollar terms across the EAEU, CIS, and neighboring countries are as follows: (Table 1) Country RON-95 Diesel Turkmenistan 0,43 0,29 Kazakhstan 0,47 0,55 Russia 0,61 0,71 Azerbaijan 0,65 0,59 Belorussia 0,75 0,75 Kyrgyzstan 0,81 0,81 Afghanistan 0,83 0,83 Uzbekistan 0,99 0,95 Georgia 1,09 1,06 China 1,15 1,02 Ukraine 1,39 1,37 Mongolia 1,49 1,19 Kazakhstan ranks seventh globally for the affordability of RON-95 gasoline, trailing behind Angola, Egypt, Algeria, Kuwait, Turkmenistan, and Malaysia. At the same time, there are “throwaway” prices in Iran, Libya, and Venezuela, but these price indicators do not reflect the actual availability of fuel in these countries. Turkmenistan also shows relatively low fuel prices, primarily due to the use of alternative fuels, such as methane, in transportation. Kazakhstan has historically had nearly double the price gap compared to its neighboring countries, which has facilitated the shadow export of fuel despite an official ban on exporting petroleum products. A Leaky Bucket I have described Kazakhstan's domestic fuel market as a "leaky bucket"— no matter how much fuel is produced, it is constantly in short supply. In 2024, the country processed about 18 million tons of oil, with its three major refineries — Atyrau: 99% owned by the national company KazMunayGas (KMG), Shymkent: 51% owned by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and 49% by KMG, and Pavlodar: 100% KMG — accounting for approximately 17 million tons. Mini-refineries produced an additional one million tons. The production of petroleum products (excluding fuel oil) amounted to around 14.5 million tons. The balance of petroleum products for 2025 is as follows, million tons: (Table 2) Product Production in the Republic of Kazakhstan Import from Russia Import to production, % RON-92, RON-95, RON-98 5,0 0,29 6 % Diesel fuel 5,1 0,45 9 % Jet fuel 0,75 0,3 40 % Bitumen/tar 1,1 0,50 45 % For 2025,...

1 year ago

Oil & Gas

Is Kazakhstan Preparing to Take on the Oil Consortium “Whales”?

The filed lawsuits and environmental claims totaling $159.6 billion against the consortiums operating the Kashagan and Karachaganak fields reflect the Kazakhstani government’s intention to revise the largest oil & gas contracts. Kazakhstan, due to drought in Central Asia and a drop in oil production after the expiration of major oil & gas contracts by 2040, will likely look like Arrakis, the fictional desert planet from Dune: Part Two over whose valuable commodity the Great Houses struggle. Meanwhile, the Dune sandworms, which produce the spice needed by all the planets, resemble the consortiums developing the Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan fields – just as huge and just as rare, with almost no such production sharing agreements (PSAs) with 40-year stabilization contracts left in the world. In Kazakhstan, the three operators are known as the “three whales.” What’s going on At the beginning of April 2024, Bloomberg published an article about the claims exceeding $16.5 billion brought forward by Kazakhstan, through PSA LLP, against the consortiums North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC), which is developing the offshore Kashagan field, and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating (KPO). The environmental regulator for the Atyrau region has additionally filed a claim for $5.1 billion against NCOC, while another lawsuit for $138 billion of lost revenue has been launched. Consortium Amount of PSA claim Environmental fine Total NCOC $13 billion + $138 billion $5.1 billion $156.1 billion KPO $3.5 billion $3.5 billion The total amount is possibly the largest in the world for the oil & gas sector. Since 2016, PSA LLP has been the authorized state institution in the production sharing agreements for NCOC, KPO, and the Dunga project (previously owned by Total E&P Dunga GmbH; in November 2023, the state-owned KazMunayGas bought the TotalEnergies stake for an estimated $300 million). Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy is currently entrusted to run PSA LLP, while the stakes in Karachaganak and Kashagan are held by KazMunayGas (KMG) and the sovereign wealth fund Samruk-Kazyna (SK). The international arbitration claims followed inspections in 2013-20 that revealed costs not agreed upon with the Kazakhstani government (costs are reimbursed from oil revenues), along with failure to hit planned oil production targets and violations during tenders, etc. The initial amount of the lawsuit against NCOC was raised from $13 billion to $15 billion. The new claim for $138 billion relates to lost revenue “reflecting the calculation of the value of oil production that was promised to the government but not delivered by the field developers,” Bloomberg reported, citing sources familiar with the matter. The $5.1 billion fine levied by regional environmental regulators against NCOC has to do with the storage of excessive amounts of sulfur on site (more than a million tons more than permitted), as well as 10 other Administrative Code violations. Later, however, a court partially satisfied the consortium’s appeal. Deputy General Director of PSA LLP Nurlan Serik has made clear that Kazakhstan intends to challenge the consortium’s costs and failure to fulfil plans only through courts. According to various estimates, about $60...

2 years ago

European Union

Will Europe Learn Lessons From Central Asian Gas Failures to Secure Oil Imports Bypassing Russia?

Despite loud statements and reports, alternative routes for transporting oil from Kazakhstan and Central Asia to Europe remain only intentions. The desire of the EU to diversify its hydrocarbon suppliers is running into internal bureaucracy and a lack of understanding of how things work in Central Asia, which is in fact seeking to ship its energy in different directions. Lost gas To start, it is worth recalling the Turkmenistan-Russia gas dispute of 2009. Before that, Gazprom bought gas from Central Asian countries at the border, swapping some volumes of domestic supplies with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and buying gas at prices lower than EU export rates. Gazprom explained this practice rather simply: there is no economic sense in transporting the gas through Russian territory, so at the border the price cannot be European (minus transportation) – this gas was consumed in Russia or supplied at preferential prices to Ukraine, while Russian gas was sent to Europe. In 2008, Turkmenistan produced 70.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas, exporting 47 bcm, with an increase in production and exports planned for 2009. According to the Energy Institute, gas consumption by European countries in 2022 amounted to 498.8 bcm, meaning Turkmenistan alone, assuming export volumes stabilized at 50 bcm per year, could cover 10% of Europe’s needs. That amount, 50 bcm of gas, is the annual consumption of Switzerland, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway and North Macedonia combined. However, Turkmen gas would never reach Europe. When an agreement on the volumes and prices of gas purchases by Gazprom failed to be reached, 15 years ago, on April 9, 2009, there was an explosion and fire on the eastern branch of the Central Asia-Center (CAC) gas pipeline, at CAC-4. Subsequent negotiations to resume the transport of Turkmen gas between Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Turkmen leader Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, which took place in September 2009 in Moscow, could not resolve the dispute. All these years, the media and European leaders have been talking about building the so-called Nabucco gas pipeline, which was to go from Central Asia, along the bottom of the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan and on to Germany and Austria. Its design began back in 2002. Note that by 2009, had the project been energetically implemented, Nabucco could have been built and the first deliveries would have begun. In 2022, gas consumption in Germany and Austria amounted to 77.3 bcm and 7.9 bcm, respectively, meaning supplies from Central Asia could cover at least half of their needs. This seemed like the perfect opportunity for a large-scale gas pipeline. The Central Asian countries wanted to supply gas to Europe via alternative routes, receiving European prices for their commodities, and Europe could have significantly diversified its gas imports. Another player, however, was closely watching Europe’s red tape and indecision – China. Hidden dragon China understands how to work with Central Asia, and in 2007 construction of the first line of...

2 years ago