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Oil Supply

Kazakhstan on Europe’s Oil Podium, but for How Long?

Kazakhstan has strengthened its position as one of the key suppliers of oil to the European Union, capitalizing on the redistribution of energy flows following the reduction of Russian crude imports. However, declining production and vulnerabilities in export infrastructure cast doubt on the country’s ability to maintain this position in the medium term. According to official EU data, the EU remains one of the world’s largest oil importers, meeting about 97% of its demand through external supplies. In 2025, EU countries imported approximately 435 million tonnes of crude oil worth more than €212 billion. The reduction in Russia’s share from 25.8% in 2021 to 2.2% in 2025 led to a significant redistribution of flows in favour of alternative suppliers, including the United States (14.6%), Norway (12.8%), and Kazakhstan (12.8%) by crude-oil import volume. Kazakhstan has been among the main beneficiaries of these changes. According to an Econovis Economic Research Laboratory report, the share of Kazakh supplies in European imports has increased for several consecutive years. This growth has been driven by strong demand from European refineries for light, low-sulfur CPC Blend crude. Alongside Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan has also strengthened its position, benefiting from Europe’s diversification efforts. A notable example is the Czech Republic, where, following the cessation of deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline, Azerbaijan accounted for more than 42% of oil imports in 2025, according to Czech import data. Kazakhstan ranked third in the Czech market with a share of around 18%, indicating the emergence of a new energy balance in the Caspian region. Despite this favorable external environment, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector has faced a significant downturn. According to government data, in the first quarter of 2026, oil and gas condensate production amounted to 19.7 million tonnes, 20% less than in the same period of 2025. Oil exports declined by approximately 22% to 15.3 million tonnes, while the annual export forecast stands at about 76 million tonnes. By mid-April, however, CPC exports had risen from February levels as Tengiz resumed production, suggesting that some of the early-year disruption had eased. The decline is linked to disruptions in the operations of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and temporary shutdowns at major fields, including Tengiz. The CPC remains the key export route for Kazakh oil to Europe, transporting most of the crude through the terminal in Novorossiysk. Economic analyst Olzhas Baidildinov said the consequences of attacks on the consortium’s infrastructure could have long-term implications. “Oil and gas condensate production in Kazakhstan fell by 20% in the first quarter compared to January-March 2025, 19.7 million tonnes versus 24.6 million tonnes. Oil exports decreased by approximately 22% to 15.3 million tonnes. The export forecast for this year is 76 million tonnes,” he wrote on his Telegram channel. According to his estimates, the country will once again fail to surpass the psychologically significant threshold of 100 million tonnes of annual production. “As a result of the attacks on the CPC, at least 6 million tonnes of oil worth no less than $3.4 billion were...

CIS

Moldova Moves to Leave CIS as Post-Soviet Bloc Loses Another Member

Moldova’s parliament approved, in final reading on April 2, the country’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with 60 deputies voting in favor. President Maia Sandu then promulgated the denunciation decrees, which were published in the Official Journal on April 8 and entered into force, with the Foreign Ministry set to notify the CIS. If Moldova’s withdrawal takes full legal effect after notification and the relevant notice period, eight CIS member states would remain: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The CIS was created immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a framework to manage the breakup and maintain post-Soviet cooperation among former republics. Moldova’s denunciation concerns a structure originally formed by 11 former Soviet states, not all 15 Soviet republics. Moldova’s exit further weakens the CIS politically, though the bloc will continue to exist if the remaining member states stay in place. Moldova has already approved the denunciation of the 1991 Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS, the related Protocol, and the 1993 CIS Statute. The Moldovan authorities say the CIS’s core values and principles are no longer being respected, especially the recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. They cite Russia’s war against Ukraine, acts of aggression against Georgia, and the illegal military presence of Russian troops on Moldovan territory. Chisinau says the move is consistent with Moldova’s European path, while the European Union remains its main economic partner. Economic ties with the Commonwealth have significantly declined: in 2025, CIS countries accounted for 5.9% of Moldova’s exports, while the European Union accounted for 67.5%. Moldova’s final withdrawal from the CIS may not, therefore, come as a surprise to its other members. On January 19, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi announced the start of the process to denounce the three core CIS agreements underpinning Moldova’s membership. “We are already in the process of getting approvals for the denunciation of three agreements with the CIS. They are the agreements that form the basis of our affiliation to the CIS, namely: the CIS Statute, the CIS Founding Agreement, and the Annex to this agreement,” Popșoi said. He added that this would mean Moldova was no longer a CIS member legally, while participation had already been suspended de facto. Moldova set a course toward breaking its remaining ties with its Soviet past after the 2020 presidential elections, when new president, Maia Sandu, announced a path toward EU integration and refused to participate in CIS summits. Moldova has spent the past several years unwinding CIS-linked agreements. As of January 2026, Moldovan officials said the country had signed 283 CIS agreements, of which 71 had already been rescinded, and about 60 more were in process. On December 12, 2025, Moldova’s parliament approved the denunciation of the 1992 Bishkek agreement on visa-free travel for CIS citizens. For Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and several other states, visa-free travel with Moldova remains in place under bilateral agreements. Moldovan authorities said the denunciation of the Bishkek agreement would affect...

EU Sanctions

EU Targets Kyrgyz Financial Sector Over Russia Sanctions Evasion

At the beginning of the year, the news agenda surrounding Kyrgyzstan shifted dramatically. Several media outlets reported that the European Union is considering restrictive measures affecting Kyrgyzstan as part of its 20th sanctions package against Russia. This does not imply direct sanctions against the state itself, but rather potential measures targeting banks, oil companies, and cryptocurrency services that, according to Brussels, may facilitate circumvention of the sanctions regime. For Kyrgyzstan’s economy, which is highly sensitive to cross-border capital flows, this represents a serious warning signal. EU Special Envoy for Sanctions David O’Sullivan, who visited Bishkek, outlined Brussels’ principal concern: a sharp increase over the past year in imports of machine tools and radio equipment into Kyrgyzstan. According to O’Sullivan, exports of certain categories of goods have risen by several hundred percent compared with the pre-war period. These goods fall into the category of dual-use products, and even relatively inexpensive components can be incorporated into drones or missile systems. The EU’s core argument is that such goods are neither produced nor consumed in significant volumes within Kyrgyzstan but are imported from Europe for subsequent re-export to Russia. Brussels views this pattern as evidence of systematic transit. The European Commission is also advocating restrictions on exports of certain machine tools and radio equipment to Kyrgyzstan. According to cited sources, exports of sanctioned technologies to Kyrgyzstan have increased eightfold since the start of the war in Ukraine, while shipments of equipment from Kyrgyzstan to Russia have risen by approximately 1,000%. O’Sullivan stated that the EU “does not impose sanctions on countries,” but rather on specific companies and banks. In practical terms, however, the distinction can be largely formal for the national economy. In October 2025, the EU added two Kyrgyz banks, Tolubay Bank and Eurasian Savings Bank, to its sanctions lists. According to the special envoy, the measures do not prohibit domestic operations, but they do restrict transactions with European financial institutions. In practice, this means the loss of correspondent banking relationships and limited access to SWIFT. Previously, Keremet Bank, Capital Bank, and the cryptocurrency platforms Grinex and Meer were sanctioned by the United Kingdom and the United States. In November 2025, Canada imposed sanctions on Capital Bank of Central Asia and the A7 platform. Brussels has formally stated that it respects Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty and its legitimate trade relations with Russia and does not seek to halt lawful trade or remittance flows from migrant workers. According to O’Sullivan, preventing transit should not generate significant economic losses, as the goods in question represent only a “tiny fraction” of trade and do not create substantial added value within Kyrgyzstan. A Delicate Balancing Act The situation is further complicated by the lack of full consensus within the EU itself regarding the new sanctions package. Kyrgyzstan finds itself at a difficult intersection of interests. On one side are longstanding economic ties with Russia; on the other, the growing importance of the EU as a source of investment, grants, and institutional support. Following an extended meeting between First...

Alisher Usmanov

German Court Restricts Media Claims About Russian-Uzbek Billionaire Alisher Usmanov

A German court has ruled in favor of Russian-Uzbek billionaire Alisher Usmanov, barring the publication of several contested statements made about him by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), according to court documents cited by Reuters. In a decision dated January 23, the Hamburg Regional Court prohibited FAZ from further disseminating specific sections of its April 2023 article titled On the Kremlin’s Instructions. The statements in question allegedly linked Usmanov to senior Russian officials. The court determined that these claims may no longer be repeated in their current form. Usmanov, who was born in Uzbekistan, has an estimated net worth of $18.8 billion, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index. He is subject to European Union and United States sanctions, including a travel ban, imposed following the start of the war in Ukraine. Over the past two years, he has launched multiple legal challenges in European courts, contesting media reports that he argues were used as justification for the sanctions. Reacting to the ruling, Usmanov’s lawyer, Joachim Steinhöfel, said the statements banned by the court “repeated essential parts of the reasoning behind the sanctions against Mr. Usmanov.” He added that the decision supports the argument that the sanctions were based on what he described as “defamatory and groundless allegations,” Reuters reported. FAZ said it is considering an appeal. A spokesperson for the newspaper warned that the court’s legal criteria could make it more difficult to report on individuals in authoritarian systems, raising broader concerns about press freedom. Separately, in 2024, another Hamburg court ruled against the German broadcaster ARD over a report that linked Usmanov to a scheme involving alleged bribes to judges at the International Fencing Federation. The court banned further distribution of the report, describing it as “news based on suspicion.” Violations of the order could lead to fines of up to €250,000 per incident or imprisonment. Reuters also reported that German authorities agreed last month to close a foreign trade law investigation involving Usmanov after he paid €10 million. A separate money laundering probe was dropped in 2024.

Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Security Risks Around Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports Ripple Through European Markets

Europe’s oil market is becoming increasingly exposed to disruption as security risks rise along export routes used by Kazakhstan, which the European Union has long viewed as a reliable alternative to Russian supply. The risks extend far beyond Ukraine itself. “Russia continues escalating its attacks and targeting civilians and civilian infrastructures,” an EU spokesperson told The Times of Central Asia. “Russia’s brutal and unacceptable attacks have left people without hot water, heating and electricity in the current weather conditions. Russia’s war of aggression has also severely impacted Black Sea maritime security, including through its use of shadow fleet vessels to circumvent international sanctions, and the persistent attacks on civilian and port infrastructure in Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine has accepted an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025. It shows that Russia does not want peace. The EU and the entire international community need to put pressure on Russia to stop its war. “Kazakhstan plays a crucial role for Europe’s energy security and has been for years a reliable partner in diversifying energy sources and ensuring a stable supply for European markets. More than 12% of all the oil imported by the EU comes from Kazakhstan, contributing to the diversification of energy sources and reducing dependency on a limited number of suppliers. The continuous and safe functioning of the supply chain is hence key also for Europe. “Maritime safety and security in the Black Sea is a fundamental component of the new EU strategic approach to the region, adopted in May 2025. The Black Sea is a critical connector between Europe, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. Ensuring maritime security and safety in this region is vital not only for the littoral States but also for broader European interests and for many partner countries, as it supports trade flows, sustainable supply chains and enhanced connectivity.” Kazakhstan produced roughly 1.8 million barrels per day in 2024 and exported the bulk of that volume. More than 80% of its crude exports move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, or CPC, which links oil fields in western Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. From there, tankers ship the oil mainly to European refiners. Under normal conditions, the pipeline carries roughly 1.3 million barrels per day, making it one of the most important single supply routes for non-Russian crude entering Europe. Recent events have shown how sensitive European markets are to any disruption along that corridor. On January 14, Bloomberg reported that oil prices in Europe strengthened after shipments of CPC Blend fell short of expectations. Traders cited reduced availability of the light, low-sulfur crude, which is favored by European refiners, forcing buyers to seek alternative grades at higher prices. Despite the recent tightening, traders say the market has so far absorbed disruptions without severe shortages, reflecting high inventories and flexible refinery operations, though that buffer could narrow if attacks persist. That supply pressure followed a series of security incidents in the Black Sea, where commercial shipping and port infrastructure have...

KazTransOil

KazTransOil Opens First EU Office in Poland to Boost Oil Transit and Exports

Kazakhstan’s national oil pipeline operator KazTransOil has announced the opening of its first representative office in the European Union, selecting Poland as the location. The decision, approved by the company’s board of directors, aims to strengthen Kazakhstan’s presence in European energy markets, the company said in a statement. The new office will focus on protecting KazTransOil’s commercial interests in Poland and facilitating the transit of Kazakh crude oil through Belarus and Poland. It will also oversee the handover of oil at the Adamova Zastava delivery point on the Belarusian-Polish border, from where it is transported to the Schwedt refinery in eastern Germany. KazTransOil stated that the move is intended to expand alternative export routes, enhance supply reliability, and reinforce Kazakhstan’s role as a strategic energy partner to Europe. The expansion comes amid deepening oil cooperation between Kazakhstan and European countries. On December 18, KazTransOil and Russia’s state-owned pipeline operator Transneft signed a transit agreement for 2026, allowing Kazakh oil to continue flowing through Russian territory. While specific volumes were not disclosed, the agreement covers shipments to Russian ports such as Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga, and to the Russia-Belarus border for onward delivery to EU countries. Germany, in particular, has ramped up imports of Kazakh oil as part of its broader effort to reduce reliance on Russian energy. Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent EU sanctions, Berlin halted Russian oil imports and began receiving regular shipments of Kazakh crude in 2023. In 2024, Germany imported 1.5 million tons of Kazakh oil and plans to increase that to 1.7 million tons in 2025, with a long-term target of 2.5 million tons annually. In October 2025, KazMunayGas, Kazakhstan’s national oil and gas company, signed an updated agreement with Rosneft Deutschland GmbH to extend oil supply arrangements through the end of 2026. The revised deal boosts monthly deliveries from 100,000 to 130,000 tons. Additional volumes are expected from the Karachaganak field, while supplies from the Kashagan and Tengiz fields are set to begin in 2024 and 2025, respectively. According to KazMunayGas, approximately 1.5 million tons of Kazakh oil were delivered to the Schwedt refinery between January and September 2025. Rosneft Deutschland GmbH, which holds a stake in the refinery, remains under German government trusteeship as part of Berlin’s effort to minimize exposure to Russian energy assets. Deliveries of Kazakh oil to Europe are conducted via the Druzhba pipeline. Originating in Samara, Russia, the pipeline splits near Bryansk and Mozyr into two branches: the northern route through Belarus and Poland to Germany, and the southern route through Ukraine to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.