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TRACECA

Kazakhstan’s TRACECA Chairmanship Pushes Transit Corridor Expansion

Kazakhstan has assumed the chairmanship of the Intergovernmental Commission of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), following a decision adopted during the organization’s 18th annual meeting in Astana on May 15. The TRACECA program was launched in 1993 with support from the European Union and the participation of post-Soviet states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Today, TRACECA includes 14 member states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport, Astana intends to focus its chairmanship on further developing the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor and strengthening the region’s transit potential. One of the organization's immediate priorities is to finalize its 10-year development strategy for 2027-2036, which officials aim to complete before the group's next forum, scheduled to take place in Bishkek in 2027. According to officials, the document intends to incorporate trends towards digitalization, evolving international supply chains, and emerging transport and logistics technologies, as well as accommodate the ever-increasing growth in transit traffic. An important step toward that goal came with the initial signing in Astana on May 15 of the Agreement on a Single Transit Permit for TRACECA member states. The agreement allows road freight carriers to conduct transit transportation through participating countries without obtaining separate national permits, significantly simplifying international cargo transport and improving the efficiency of transport routes. The plan is for single transit permits to be issued electronically through a unified digital information system. For now, the document has only been signed by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. While this is expected to simplify border crossings in Central Asia and across the Caspian, it has not solved the problems further down the line towards Europe. Other TRACECA member states are continuing domestic procedures required for future accession to the agreement. Kazakhstan's TRACECA chairmanship is seen by authorities in Astana as providing additional momentum for the development of international transport corridors and strengthening transport connectivity between Europe and Asia.

Forced Labor

Forced Labor in Turkmenistan the Target of New EU-ILO Project

A new joint project is being launched by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the European Union aimed at combating child and forced labor in Turkmenistan. Its focus is primarily on the country’s cotton sector, which has long faced criticism from human rights groups and international companies. The ILO announced the initiative on May 13. The program, titled Promoting Decent Work and Preventing Child and Forced Labour in Turkmenistan, is scheduled to run from 2026 to 2027 with the project’s budget estimated at approximately €2 million ($2.3 million). The initiative will focus on three main areas: updating labor legislation, implementing international labor standards, and strengthening institutional oversight mechanisms for the protection of workers’ rights. Organizers say the project’s ultimate goal is to prevent labor rights violations and create a more sustainable system for monitoring working conditions across the country. The initiative is directly linked to longstanding concerns over forced labor during Turkmenistan’s annual cotton harvest. Human rights organizations including turkmen.news, the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, Progres Foundation, and the Cotton Campaign previously released a joint report alleging that Turkmen authorities have only partially fulfilled commitments to reform the sector. According to the report, despite an official ban on child labor, minors continue to participate in cotton harvesting campaigns. Rights groups say some children assist relatives in meeting production quotas, while others work in the fields because of difficult economic conditions facing their families. The report also alleged that teachers, medical workers, utility employees, and other public-sector staff continue to be mobilized for cotton harvesting under state direction. The launch of the new project was discussed during a special event in Ashgabat attended by Turkmen Deputy Labor and Social Protection Minister Halbibi Tachjanova. “This project reflects Turkmenistan’s strong commitment to preventing child and forced labor, especially in the cotton sector, and to promoting decent working conditions,” Tachjanova said. European Union Ambassador to Turkmenistan Beata Pexa said the initiative should contribute to protecting labor rights and supporting sustainable economic development. However, it remains unclear whether the program will include mechanisms allowing workers subjected to forced labor to safely file complaints without fear of retaliation. The issue carries not only social but also economic significance for Turkmenistan. Cotton and textile products remain among the country’s key exports and an important source of foreign currency revenue. Both state authorities and private companies have been seeking to expand access to Western markets. In May, the textile company Batly Gadam from Balkanabat held talks with British retailer Primark and signed a memorandum of cooperation with Somerbond in London. Nevertheless, many international brands continue to avoid Turkmen textiles because of allegations involving forced labor practices. Against this backdrop, the new ILO-EU project is being viewed not only as an effort to prevent forced labor in Turkmenistan but also as a step toward rebuilding trust with international partners and global markets.

Oil Supply

Kazakhstan on Europe’s Oil Podium, but for How Long?

Kazakhstan has strengthened its position as one of the key suppliers of oil to the European Union, capitalizing on the redistribution of energy flows following the reduction of Russian crude imports. However, declining production and vulnerabilities in export infrastructure cast doubt on the country’s ability to maintain this position in the medium term. According to official EU data, the EU remains one of the world’s largest oil importers, meeting about 97% of its demand through external supplies. In 2025, EU countries imported approximately 435 million tonnes of crude oil worth more than €212 billion. The reduction in Russia’s share from 25.8% in 2021 to 2.2% in 2025 led to a significant redistribution of flows in favour of alternative suppliers, including the United States (14.6%), Norway (12.8%), and Kazakhstan (12.8%) by crude-oil import volume. Kazakhstan has been among the main beneficiaries of these changes. According to an Econovis Economic Research Laboratory report, the share of Kazakh supplies in European imports has increased for several consecutive years. This growth has been driven by strong demand from European refineries for light, low-sulfur CPC Blend crude. Alongside Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan has also strengthened its position, benefiting from Europe’s diversification efforts. A notable example is the Czech Republic, where, following the cessation of deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline, Azerbaijan accounted for more than 42% of oil imports in 2025, according to Czech import data. Kazakhstan ranked third in the Czech market with a share of around 18%, indicating the emergence of a new energy balance in the Caspian region. Despite this favorable external environment, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector has faced a significant downturn. According to government data, in the first quarter of 2026, oil and gas condensate production amounted to 19.7 million tonnes, 20% less than in the same period of 2025. Oil exports declined by approximately 22% to 15.3 million tonnes, while the annual export forecast stands at about 76 million tonnes. By mid-April, however, CPC exports had risen from February levels as Tengiz resumed production, suggesting that some of the early-year disruption had eased. The decline is linked to disruptions in the operations of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and temporary shutdowns at major fields, including Tengiz. The CPC remains the key export route for Kazakh oil to Europe, transporting most of the crude through the terminal in Novorossiysk. Economic analyst Olzhas Baidildinov said the consequences of attacks on the consortium’s infrastructure could have long-term implications. “Oil and gas condensate production in Kazakhstan fell by 20% in the first quarter compared to January-March 2025, 19.7 million tonnes versus 24.6 million tonnes. Oil exports decreased by approximately 22% to 15.3 million tonnes. The export forecast for this year is 76 million tonnes,” he wrote on his Telegram channel. According to his estimates, the country will once again fail to surpass the psychologically significant threshold of 100 million tonnes of annual production. “As a result of the attacks on the CPC, at least 6 million tonnes of oil worth no less than $3.4 billion were...

CIS

Moldova Moves to Leave CIS as Post-Soviet Bloc Loses Another Member

Moldova’s parliament approved, in final reading on April 2, the country’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with 60 deputies voting in favor. President Maia Sandu then promulgated the denunciation decrees, which were published in the Official Journal on April 8 and entered into force, with the Foreign Ministry set to notify the CIS. If Moldova’s withdrawal takes full legal effect after notification and the relevant notice period, eight CIS member states would remain: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The CIS was created immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a framework to manage the breakup and maintain post-Soviet cooperation among former republics. Moldova’s denunciation concerns a structure originally formed by 11 former Soviet states, not all 15 Soviet republics. Moldova’s exit further weakens the CIS politically, though the bloc will continue to exist if the remaining member states stay in place. Moldova has already approved the denunciation of the 1991 Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS, the related Protocol, and the 1993 CIS Statute. The Moldovan authorities say the CIS’s core values and principles are no longer being respected, especially the recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. They cite Russia’s war against Ukraine, acts of aggression against Georgia, and the illegal military presence of Russian troops on Moldovan territory. Chisinau says the move is consistent with Moldova’s European path, while the European Union remains its main economic partner. Economic ties with the Commonwealth have significantly declined: in 2025, CIS countries accounted for 5.9% of Moldova’s exports, while the European Union accounted for 67.5%. Moldova’s final withdrawal from the CIS may not, therefore, come as a surprise to its other members. On January 19, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi announced the start of the process to denounce the three core CIS agreements underpinning Moldova’s membership. “We are already in the process of getting approvals for the denunciation of three agreements with the CIS. They are the agreements that form the basis of our affiliation to the CIS, namely: the CIS Statute, the CIS Founding Agreement, and the Annex to this agreement,” Popșoi said. He added that this would mean Moldova was no longer a CIS member legally, while participation had already been suspended de facto. Moldova set a course toward breaking its remaining ties with its Soviet past after the 2020 presidential elections, when new president, Maia Sandu, announced a path toward EU integration and refused to participate in CIS summits. Moldova has spent the past several years unwinding CIS-linked agreements. As of January 2026, Moldovan officials said the country had signed 283 CIS agreements, of which 71 had already been rescinded, and about 60 more were in process. On December 12, 2025, Moldova’s parliament approved the denunciation of the 1992 Bishkek agreement on visa-free travel for CIS citizens. For Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and several other states, visa-free travel with Moldova remains in place under bilateral agreements. Moldovan authorities said the denunciation of the Bishkek agreement would affect...

EU Sanctions

EU Targets Kyrgyz Financial Sector Over Russia Sanctions Evasion

At the beginning of the year, the news agenda surrounding Kyrgyzstan shifted dramatically. Several media outlets reported that the European Union is considering restrictive measures affecting Kyrgyzstan as part of its 20th sanctions package against Russia. This does not imply direct sanctions against the state itself, but rather potential measures targeting banks, oil companies, and cryptocurrency services that, according to Brussels, may facilitate circumvention of the sanctions regime. For Kyrgyzstan’s economy, which is highly sensitive to cross-border capital flows, this represents a serious warning signal. EU Special Envoy for Sanctions David O’Sullivan, who visited Bishkek, outlined Brussels’ principal concern: a sharp increase over the past year in imports of machine tools and radio equipment into Kyrgyzstan. According to O’Sullivan, exports of certain categories of goods have risen by several hundred percent compared with the pre-war period. These goods fall into the category of dual-use products, and even relatively inexpensive components can be incorporated into drones or missile systems. The EU’s core argument is that such goods are neither produced nor consumed in significant volumes within Kyrgyzstan but are imported from Europe for subsequent re-export to Russia. Brussels views this pattern as evidence of systematic transit. The European Commission is also advocating restrictions on exports of certain machine tools and radio equipment to Kyrgyzstan. According to cited sources, exports of sanctioned technologies to Kyrgyzstan have increased eightfold since the start of the war in Ukraine, while shipments of equipment from Kyrgyzstan to Russia have risen by approximately 1,000%. O’Sullivan stated that the EU “does not impose sanctions on countries,” but rather on specific companies and banks. In practical terms, however, the distinction can be largely formal for the national economy. In October 2025, the EU added two Kyrgyz banks, Tolubay Bank and Eurasian Savings Bank, to its sanctions lists. According to the special envoy, the measures do not prohibit domestic operations, but they do restrict transactions with European financial institutions. In practice, this means the loss of correspondent banking relationships and limited access to SWIFT. Previously, Keremet Bank, Capital Bank, and the cryptocurrency platforms Grinex and Meer were sanctioned by the United Kingdom and the United States. In November 2025, Canada imposed sanctions on Capital Bank of Central Asia and the A7 platform. Brussels has formally stated that it respects Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty and its legitimate trade relations with Russia and does not seek to halt lawful trade or remittance flows from migrant workers. According to O’Sullivan, preventing transit should not generate significant economic losses, as the goods in question represent only a “tiny fraction” of trade and do not create substantial added value within Kyrgyzstan. A Delicate Balancing Act The situation is further complicated by the lack of full consensus within the EU itself regarding the new sanctions package. Kyrgyzstan finds itself at a difficult intersection of interests. On one side are longstanding economic ties with Russia; on the other, the growing importance of the EU as a source of investment, grants, and institutional support. Following an extended meeting between First...

Alisher Usmanov

German Court Restricts Media Claims About Russian-Uzbek Billionaire Alisher Usmanov

A German court has ruled in favor of Russian-Uzbek billionaire Alisher Usmanov, barring the publication of several contested statements made about him by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), according to court documents cited by Reuters. In a decision dated January 23, the Hamburg Regional Court prohibited FAZ from further disseminating specific sections of its April 2023 article titled On the Kremlin’s Instructions. The statements in question allegedly linked Usmanov to senior Russian officials. The court determined that these claims may no longer be repeated in their current form. Usmanov, who was born in Uzbekistan, has an estimated net worth of $18.8 billion, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index. He is subject to European Union and United States sanctions, including a travel ban, imposed following the start of the war in Ukraine. Over the past two years, he has launched multiple legal challenges in European courts, contesting media reports that he argues were used as justification for the sanctions. Reacting to the ruling, Usmanov’s lawyer, Joachim Steinhöfel, said the statements banned by the court “repeated essential parts of the reasoning behind the sanctions against Mr. Usmanov.” He added that the decision supports the argument that the sanctions were based on what he described as “defamatory and groundless allegations,” Reuters reported. FAZ said it is considering an appeal. A spokesperson for the newspaper warned that the court’s legal criteria could make it more difficult to report on individuals in authoritarian systems, raising broader concerns about press freedom. Separately, in 2024, another Hamburg court ruled against the German broadcaster ARD over a report that linked Usmanov to a scheme involving alleged bribes to judges at the International Fencing Federation. The court banned further distribution of the report, describing it as “news based on suspicion.” Violations of the order could lead to fines of up to €250,000 per incident or imprisonment. Reuters also reported that German authorities agreed last month to close a foreign trade law investigation involving Usmanov after he paid €10 million. A separate money laundering probe was dropped in 2024.