• KZT/USD = 0.00214
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 91

Kashagan Operator Faces July 20 Deadline to Pay $4.9 Billion Environmental Fine

Kazakhstan says it will begin compulsory collection proceedings against the North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC), operator of the giant Kashagan oil field, if it does not pay a 2.3 trillion tenge ($4.9 billion) environmental fine by July 20. The deadline follows a domestic court ruling that has entered into legal force, even as the project’s foreign shareholders pursue international arbitration over the penalty. Deputy Minister of Justice Daniyel Vaisov announced the deadline on July 14. “Foreign companies currently have an obligation to pay 2.3 trillion tenge. If they fail to pay the fine by July 20, the Republic of Kazakhstan will proceed in accordance with the law, including enforcement proceedings and compulsory collection measures,” Vaisov said. However, in a statement to The Times of Central Asia, NCOC said a tribunal in parallel UNCITRAL arbitration proceedings had issued a restraining order prohibiting Kazakhstan from taking any measures to enforce the fine while the arbitration is pending. The company said the UNCITRAL proceedings had been initiated by Kazakhstan itself. NCOC and the contracting companies said they reject both the fine and the allegations underlying it and are contesting them through the UNCITRAL proceedings as well as the ICSID arbitration. They called on Kazakhstan to comply with the restraining order. The dispute stems from a 2022 inspection of Kashagan’s onshore processing facilities in the Atyrau Region. Environmental authorities said the operator had exceeded its permitted sulfur-storage limits, and the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources imposed the 2.3 trillion-tenge penalty in 2023. NCOC said it had obtained and maintained all required permits and had always conducted its sulfur management in full compliance with the law. The case has passed through several rounds of domestic litigation. On August 1, 2025, the Administrative Chamber of Astana City Court annulled the original penalty order because of procedural violations, without ruling on the substance of the environmental allegations. The ministry subsequently corrected the procedural defects and reissued the penalty later that month. An Astana court left the reissued fine in force on April 8, 2026. Vaisov said on July 14 that the ruling had entered into legal force. NCOC brings together Kazakhstan’s state-owned KazMunayGas and six foreign partners: Shell, TotalEnergies, Eni, ExxonMobil, CNPC, and Inpex. NCOC and the project’s six foreign shareholders have initiated treaty arbitration through the Washington-based International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), arguing that Kazakhstan’s conduct breaches protections owed to investors. Vaisov said the parties were finalizing the composition of the ICSID tribunal, which is expected to be completed by the end of July. “We believe the Republic’s actions regarding the alleged sulfur-storage permit violations are inconsistent with its obligations under international investment treaties, including its obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment to investors,” NCOC said. The Kazakh authorities maintain that the sulfur was stored in breach of environmental rules. The mechanics of compulsory collection may prove difficult. Nurlan Zhumagulov, executive director of the Energy Monitor Foundation, said that NCOC acts as the project’s operator while each shareholder markets its own...

Russian Fuel Shortages Revive Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas

On July 10, Tajikistan’s Energy Minister Daler Juma said the country had enough fuel to last two more months. This situation is due to Tajikistan’s dependence on Russian petroleum products, which are in short supply in Russia itself because of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries. Located in the southeast corner of Central Asia and ringed by mountains on three sides, Tajikistan has few options to replace those Russian supplies, so the Tajik authorities are preparing to try again to find domestic hydrocarbon supplies. Looking to Strike Oil at Home Estimates of the share of Tajikistan’s petroleum imports supplied by Russia range from 70% to 80%. Tajikistan’s head of civil aviation, Habibullo Nazarzoda, said on July 9 that his country is facing shortages of airplane fuel and is in talks with Turkmenistan. Russia has a prohibition on exporting aviation kerosene that runs from June 1 to November 30. Tajikistan does have hydropower and coal, but neither one of those helps with shortages at petrol stations, and much of the internal transport of people and goods in mountainous Tajikistan is done via the road network. So, Tajikistan is again looking at the potential to develop domestic hydrocarbon fields, this time with the help solely of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). On July 7, the head of the Tajik government’s Geological Department, Ilhom Oymuhammadzoda, said CNPC was already carrying out exploration at several potential hydrocarbon deposits in Tajikistan. “I think [CNPC] will present a progress report on the seismic survey operations by the end of the year,” Oymuhammadzoda told a press conference in Dushanbe. He named the Tajik Depression, in southwestern Tajikistan, and the Ferghana Basin, in northwestern Tajikistan, as two of the more promising sites. However, Oymuhammadzoda indicated that work in northern Tajikistan could require drilling down to a depth of 7,000 meters. Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas Past studies of Tajikistan’s potential oil and gas fields point especially to the southwest of the country as a logical place to seek these hydrocarbons. Southwest Tajikistan is adjacent to gas and oil fields in southern Uzbekistan that have been producing for decades, to fields in northern Afghanistan, where exploration has confirmed commercial flows, and not too far east from the giant gas fields in Turkmenistan. Looking at a map, it seems logical that southwest Tajikistan is part of this same hydrocarbon structure. In 2008, Canadian company Tethys started exploring the Bokhtar area about 100 kilometers south of Dushanbe. Tethys found both oil and gas in the area. In 2012, the Canadian company estimated the area’s gross prospective resources at 8.5 billion barrels of oil and condensate and 3.22 trillion cubic metres of gas. For a small country like Tajikistan, it was potentially enormous, although these resources remained unconfirmed and commercially unproven. However, getting to that oil and gas required drilling wells that were 3,500 meters or deeper, which greatly added to production costs. In 2013, Gazprom International drilled a well at the Sarykamysh field in southwest Tajikistan that was...

Kyrgyzstan Eases State Fuel Price Controls as Supply Shortages Persist

Kyrgyzstan has partially rolled back its temporary state regulation of motor fuel prices, removing AI-95 gasoline from price controls and abandoning plans to impose maximum retail fuel prices in an effort to stabilize supplies. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the Kyrgyz government introduced temporary state regulation of fuel prices on May 25 amid continued increases in gasoline and diesel prices, driven largely by the country’s dependence on imports from Russia. The government had approved subsidies for imports of gasoline, diesel fuel, and liquefied petroleum gas through September 30, 2026, while setting benchmark import prices at $860 per ton for AI-92 gasoline, $940 per ton for AI-95 gasoline, $950 per ton for diesel fuel, and $575 per ton for liquefied petroleum gas. Under a new resolution signed on July 7 by Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Adylbek Kasymaliev, AI-95 gasoline has been removed from the list of socially significant goods subject to temporary state price regulation. The decision effectively cancels the state price controls introduced just two weeks earlier. It follows reports that AI-95 gasoline had disappeared from several filling stations in Bishkek. The July 7 resolution also abolishes the maximum allowable retail fuel prices established under the May 25 decree. According to the government, the changes are intended to ensure uninterrupted fuel supplies to consumers. The policy adjustment comes as Russia continues to tighten fuel exports. In recent weeks, several Russian regions have imposed restrictions on gasoline sales following reduced refinery output caused by Ukrainian drone strikes on oil-processing facilities. Moscow has already restricted gasoline exports and imposed a temporary ban on jet fuel exports. Kyrgyzstan remains heavily dependent on imported fuel. The country imports approximately 1.2 million tons of petroleum products annually, while domestic refineries meet only about 5% of national demand. Total annual fuel consumption is estimated at 1.6 million tons, with more than 90% supplied by Russia. First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiyev told the 24.kg news agency that the government is actively diversifying fuel imports through negotiations with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, European suppliers, Türkiye, China, Russia, Belarus, and Azerbaijan. According to Amangeldiyev, China has confirmed a contract to supply the first 3,000 tons of jet fuel to Kyrgyzstan, while negotiations are underway for an additional 5,000 tons of diesel fuel. The Kyrgyz government has also signed agreements with Belarus covering 3,000 tons of jet fuel and approximately 10,000 tons of diesel fuel. The reversal shows how quickly price controls can collide with supply constraints in a market still heavily dependent on Russian fuel.

Central Asia’s Fuel Squeeze Becomes a Winter Energy Security Problem

Central Asia’s fuel squeeze is moving from filling stations into winter planning. Governments are now tracking gasoline and diesel, gas pipelines, coal deliveries, power imports, jet fuel, and emergency repair crews. Seasonal fuel and power stress is familiar across the region, but the current pressure - tied to Russia, the main supplier for several regional fuel flows - has arrived early. Russia’s own fuel crisis has sharpened the risk. Ukrainian drone attacks and repair work have cut refinery output, while export limits have pushed more Russian supplies back into the domestic market. Reuters reported queues, regional restrictions, and gasoline above 100 roubles a liter at some independent stations. President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the strain on June 28. “You are well aware that problems for drivers and for businesses persist,” he said, adding that “the harvest depends on” keeping seasonal fuel schedules for farms. For Central Asia, Russian shortages travel through contracts, rail slots, import prices, and public nerves. Kyrgyzstan is among the most exposed. The country consumes about two million tons of fuels and lubricants each year, and almost 95% comes from Russia, according to Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov. “Due to the lack of adequate oil and gas production, we remain a country dependent on imports,” Kerimov said. Bishkek has asked Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for help securing supplies. That dependence is now impacting households, farmers, and small transport firms. The cabinet has capped pump prices and set a subsidy mechanism through September 30. Kerimov said importers were seeing offers at several prices, but promised that “there should be no shortage on the domestic market.” Oil traders put AI-92 stocks at 30 to 45 days, while diesel remained available for harvest work. Kyrgyzstan is trying to buy time through domestic refining. The modernized Junda refinery in the Chuy Region has been pressed to raise gasoline output to 24,000 tons a month soon, then 50,000 tons a month by the end of 2026, with finished products directed to the domestic market. Those gains would help, but Russian supply still sets the pace. Uzbekistan has the Bukhara and Fergana oil refineries, the Altyaryk unit of the Fergana refinery, and the Uzbekistan GTL complex, but demand has still moved faster than domestic supply. In January-April 2026, gasoline imports reached 568,700 tons, worth $327.1 million, more than double the same period in 2025. Local refineries produced 417,500 tons over those four months. A shift away from AI-80 gasoline has also pushed drivers toward AI-92 and AI-95. The pressure reached the exchange in late June. AI-92 gasoline climbed to a record 13.919 million soums per ton on June 29, about $1,160, after an 11.8% rise since the start of the month. Jet fuel has become an issue, too. Uzbekistan Airways reduced some Russia flight frequencies in June, citing aviation fuel shortages and higher costs. Tashkent is now preparing for winter in concrete volumes. On July 6, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reviewed measures for the 2026-2027 autumn-winter season. The plan includes replacing 53.7...

Russia’s Fuel Crisis Tests Kazakhstan’s Energy Resilience

Kazakhstan is being pulled into a new energy paradox. As Russia's fuel crisis deepens, the country is being discussed as a potential gasoline supplier to its largest neighbor. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is tightening controls at home, building reserves around refinery maintenance, and weighing fuel imports from China to protect its own market. On June 24, Reuters reported that Russia was in talks with Kazakhstan to import about 50,000 metric tons of AI-92 gasoline, citing four industry sources. The discussions followed refinery outages and unscheduled repairs in Russia after Ukrainian drone attacks, which had led to shutdowns at several large refineries in central Russia and cut Russian gasoline output by roughly 25% year-on-year by late June. The news was striking because Russia is normally a major exporter of petroleum products. The need to consider gasoline imports, including seaborne imports and emergency market-stabilization measures, underlines the scale of disruption in Russia's refining system. Kazakhstan's Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov said Astana had not received an official request from Moscow, but the question remains politically and economically sensitive for Kazakhstan: can it afford to send fuel abroad if its own margin of safety is narrowing? Officially, the domestic picture remains stable. Kazakhstan's government said on June 20 that national stocks of gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel exceeded 1 million tons, enough to cover current demand. It said supplies were being prioritized for filling stations, agricultural producers, and domestic airlines, and that no shortage of fuels and lubricants had been observed. Yet those assurances sit alongside a more fragile structural reality. Kazakhstan's refining system depends heavily on three large refineries: Atyrau in the west, Pavlodar in the north, and Shymkent in the south. Last year, it was reported that, after modernization, the three plants had a combined annual output of about 17 million metric tons. Such a system can function efficiently when all units are operating normally, but it leaves limited room for simultaneous shocks. One of those shocks is already present. The Atyrau Oil Refinery began scheduled preventive maintenance on June 26 under a timetable approved by the Ministry of Energy. KazMunayGas said the work includes inspections of 20 reactors, 213 storage tanks, 32 columns, and 231 heat exchangers, as well as replacement of more than 335 tons of catalysts. The refinery entered maintenance with 38,000 tons of gasoline, 31,300 tons of diesel, and 6,800 tons of jet fuel. KazMunayGas said national stocks of AI-92 gasoline and diesel covered 34 and 32 days of demand, respectively, and that the phased restart of processing units was scheduled to begin on July 10. Those figures show resilience, but not abundance. Summer brings higher consumption from agriculture, passenger travel, freight, and aviation. For the government, managing this period means monitoring refinery output, shipments, inventories, and preventing fuel from leaving the country through unauthorized channels. After a June 20 meeting, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov ordered tighter border controls; the government said vehicles are restricted from crossing the state border by road more than once per day as part of...

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....