Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline - The Times Of Central Asia

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Iran

How an Incident on the Azerbaijan-Iran Border Became a Test for Diplomacy in the Region

The drone strike on Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic on March 5 has become one of the most serious incidents in relations between Baku and Tehran in recent years. Azerbaijani authorities described the incident as a terrorist act and demanded explanations and an apology from Iran. Tehran, in turn, rejected the accusations, suggesting the possibility of a provocation by “third forces.” Following the drone incident, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held a phone call with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss regional security. According to the Azerbaijani presidency, Aliyev thanked Tokayev for condemning the attack on Nakhchivan and for voicing support for Azerbaijan. What began as a local security incident has raised concerns about regional stability in the South Caucasus. Terrorist Act Against the State Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev issued a statement strongly condemning "this despicable terrorist act. Those who committed it must be brought to justice immediately,” Aliyev said. According to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one drone hit the terminal building of Nakhchivan International Airport, while another crashed near a school in the village of Shekerabad. Two civilians were reportedly injured. Baku stressed that the attack, allegedly launched from Iranian territory, violated international law and could lead to a dangerous escalation of tensions in the region. Diplomatic Escalation Despite the harsh rhetoric in the first hours after the incident, Baku opted to rely primarily on diplomatic tools. The Iranian ambassador was summoned to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry and handed a formal note of protest requesting official explanations. Azerbaijan said on Friday that it was evacuating staff from its embassy in Tehran as well as its consulate in the city of Tabriz. At the same time, Azerbaijani security forces were placed on high alert. According to Aliyev, the country’s armed forces were instructed to prepare possible countermeasures. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke by phone with Aliyev, condemning the attack and expressing support for Azerbaijan, according to official statements. Reports of alleged Iranian-linked sabotage plots also surfaced, with the Azerbaijani authorities stating that several terrorist attacks had been prevented on the country’s territory. According to the State Security Service, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was behind the plots. Among the alleged targets was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, a strategic energy corridor linking the Caspian region with Turkey and one of the main routes for exporting Azerbaijani oil. According to Azerbaijani sources, other potential targets included the Israeli embassy, a synagogue in the capital, and a leader of the local Mountain Jewish community. The security service reported that three explosive devices had been brought into the country but were discovered and defused before they could be delivered. The development of the crisis has prompted increased diplomatic contact between world leaders. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian amid the growing regional tensions. Shortly thereafter, Russia’s Foreign Ministry called on both sides to exercise restraint and emphasized the need for a thorough investigation into the drone strike. On March 7, the foreign ministers of all the Central...

Iran

OTS Faces Security Test from Turkey to Central Asia

Iran's widening war has now reached the institutional space linking Turkey, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Turkey said on March 4 that NATO air defenses destroyed an Iranian ballistic missile entering Turkish airspace, while Azerbaijan said the next day that four Iranian drones crossed into Nakhchivan, injuring four people, and damaging civilian infrastructure at the exclave’s airport. Iran denied targeting Nakhchivan; in the Turkish case, the missile’s intended target has not been fully clear in public reporting. Even so, the combined effect was unmistakable. By March 7, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) had become more than a bystander to a Middle Eastern war that had earlier seemed outside its main agenda. This is what gave the OTS foreign ministers’ meeting in Istanbul its significance. The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced on March 6 that the informal meeting of the OTS Council of Foreign Ministers would be held in Istanbul on March 7, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosting. After the meeting, the ministers adopted a joint statement declaring that threats to the security of any OTS member are a matter of concern for the whole organization. That language does not make the OTS a military alliance. It does, however, show the organization moving more openly into collective political-security signaling when member states come under attack. Why Nakhchivan Matters Nakhchivan is central to the logic of this story. The exclave is an integral part of Azerbaijan, but is separated from the rest of the country. It borders Armenia, Iran, and Turkey, making it significant out of proportion to its size. A military strike there is not a routine border incident. It reaches one of the most sensitive nodes in the wider Turkic political space: it is a meeting point for Azerbaijani sovereignty, Turkish strategic concern, and Iranian proximity. Until recently, Nakhchivan’s special status and borders were anchored in the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties, which gave Turkey and Soviet Russia a formal say over the exclave’s autonomy and, it could be argued, its external security. But last year, Baku folded Nakhchivan more tightly into Azerbaijan’s domestic legal order by removing those references (along with other changes) from the constitution of the exclave, which has suddenly become a target in a much wider regional confrontation. Baku’s response to the Iranian attack showed that it saw the incident in political as well as tactical terms. President Ilham Aliyev said Azerbaijan would prepare retaliatory measures. Reuters later reported that Azerbaijan had ordered the evacuation of its diplomats from Iran, citing safety concerns. This is understandable, particularly in light of the January 27, 2023, incident when an armed attacker entered Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran and opened fire, killing the head of the embassy’s security and wounding two other staff. Baku called this a terrorist attack, evacuated most of its diplomatic personnel, and suspended embassy operations. Azerbaijani officials also said the March 5 attack on Nakhchivan violated international law, rejecting any implication that it could have been a technical mishap. The stakes widened further after...

Peace Initiative

Opinion: Washington Meeting and the Shifting Geopolitics of the Caspian

The Washington meeting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hosted by President Donald Trump on August 8, 2025, may go down as a pivotal moment in the geopolitics of the Caspian and the wider Eurasian space. While on the surface the talks aimed to normalize relations between the two South Caucasus neighbors, the ripple effects extend far beyond bilateral reconciliation. For Azerbaijan, the meeting is not only about ending three decades of conflict with Armenia but also about positioning itself as a central bridge linking the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, and even Europe. The Caspian region has always been a security crossroads, where energy interests, military presence, and trade routes overlap. Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Iran-Israel conflict, and shifting Western engagement have made the region more volatile. In this context, a potential Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement offers a chance to stabilize the South Caucasus - the natural gateway between the Caspian and Europe. For Azerbaijan, peace with Armenia would solidify its position in the region where Baku has promoted several important transregional projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Southern Gas Corridor, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Azerbaijan is heavily investing in the development of the Caspian trade routes, energy infrastructure, and regional connectivity projects such as the Middle Corridor. Stability in the South Caucasus also makes it harder for external actors to exploit divisions - an especially significant factor given the previous attempt to exploit Armenia against Azerbaijan and Türkiye. That strategy brought no tangible results to Armenia, which remained regionally isolated and dependent on Russia. After the military defeats in 2020 and 2023, the Armenian leadership realized that peace and respect for the principle of territorial integrity is a much greater opportunity for the country rather than an irredentist project, which Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan dubbed “mythical.” At the same time, a peace framework reduces the risk of military escalation spilling into the Caspian region. Naval modernization efforts by Russia and Iran in recent years have heightened anxieties. In short, normalization indirectly enhances Azerbaijan’s capacity to act as a stabilizing actor within the Caspian basin. Increasingly, Iran has also spoken about peace and cooperation, especially with Azerbaijan. Relations were tense a few years ago, but the incumbent President, Masud Pezeshkian, questioned the strategy employed previously by the Iranian clerics regarding Azerbaijan, which failed to gain any benefits. Perhaps the most significant geopolitical dividend for Azerbaijan lies eastward, across the Caspian. The Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan - have long sought secure, diversified links to Europe. Russia’s war has made northern routes through its territory unreliable, while instability in the Red Sea undermines the traditional supply route. That leaves the Trans-Caspian link through Azerbaijan as promising. The Washington meeting, by promoting the peace agenda, reassures Central Asian partners that Baku is a reliable hub. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed an MOU about the transfer of alternative energy sources to Europe through another potential project – a Black Sea electricity cable from Georgia to Romania and Hungary. Azerbaijan...

Middle Corridor

How Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace Lowers Corridor Risk for Central Asia

The framework announced on 8 August 2025 in Washington for Armenia–Azerbaijan peace and development resets the security–economics equation in the South Caucasus and holds deep implications for Central Asia. At its core is the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, renunciation of force, and a transit arrangement under Armenian jurisdiction linking mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan across the Syunik province. For Central Asia, the immediate significance is the de-risking of the westbound Caspian–Caucasus–Anatolia artery centered on Azerbaijan’s Alat Port and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) rail route. As reported by Azerbaijan Railways, BTK’s operating capacity was lifted to 5 million tons/year (t/y) in May 2024 and has a path for expanding to 17 million tons in later phases. Alat currently lists 13 berths and dedicated ferry roll-on/roll-off (“ro-ro”) facilities. A dependable Armenian-jurisdiction link would create a second, legally unambiguous passage across the South Caucasus. Single-route dependence through Georgia would be reduced, as would the variance of end-to-end journey times. That reliability directly benefits Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, whose westbound flows move by rail-ferry from Aktau/Kuryk to Alat and from Turkmenbashi to Alat before continuing overland toward Türkiye. Peace Reframes the Middle Corridor These developments also strengthen the business case for incremental investments in ports, ferries, rail paths, and energy interconnectors tied to the Middle Corridor, including swap-based energy routing already practiced between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. At Alat, confirmed as the hinge of the Middle Corridor, political risk converts into bankable time, which prices into contracts, which later in turn finances small but decisive capacity steps; bankable time begets bankable trade. Conflict risk in the South Caucasus has been a priced variable since 2020. A durable peace narrows that risk band and yields three operational effects with country-specific salience. First, marine war-risk and cargo premiums in nearby high-risk theaters such as the Gulf, typically ranging from 0.2–0.3% of hull value, rose to 0.5% during recent tensions. This figure offers a benchmark for how underwriters re-price routes as perceived closure risk changes. Second, forwarders can trim buffer time, improving asset utilization for rail paths and ro-ro (roll on, roll off) rotations pairing the Caspian ports (Alat, Aktau/Kuryk, Turkmenbashi). Third, carriers gain confidence to publish regular rotations and pre-position equipment; the Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company notes 1–2-day intervals in favorable conditions and shows multiple departures on a given day (e.g., August 15 listed Alat–Kuryk, Alat–Turkmenbashi, etc.). Lower variance is not cosmetic; it is collateral for contracts. Banks recognize collateral. Insurers do, too. When variability falls, rate discovery improves; as a result, multi-month slots or rail-path agreements become financeable. This is precisely the mechanism exporters from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan need to secure predictable capacity into Azerbaijan and onward to Türkiye. Reliability also changes routing choices. At Alat, rail-ferry cargo arriving from Aktau/Kuryk or Turkmenbashi can be planned to run either via Georgia or via Syunik toward Kars, whichever route minimizes dwell time and schedule variance for the onward leg. Even where pure distance savings are modest, gains in reliability reduce movements of empty containers. They also...

oil export

Kazakhstan to Boost Oil Exports to Turkey via BTC Pipeline

Kazakhstan plans to increase crude oil exports to Turkey through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced following bilateral talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara. “Currently, 1.4 million tons of Kazakh oil are transported annually to Turkey through the BTC pipeline. We discussed the possibility of expanding volumes and welcomed Turkish Petroleum’s plans to enter the Kazakh market. Kazakhstan is also interested in Turkish companies’ investment potential and expertise in energy diversification and power plant construction. We are ready to implement large-scale joint projects,” Tokayev stated at a joint press conference. Kazakhstan began exporting oil via the BTC pipeline in 2008, initially at just 300,000 tons per year. Expansion has since been limited by the pipeline’s capacity, 50 million tons annually, with Kazakhstan allocated a quota of 1.5 million tons and by the restricted tanker fleet of KazTransOil, the transport subsidiary of the national oil and gas company KazMunayGas (KMG), which ships crude across the Caspian Sea from the port of Aktau. In 2022, President Tokayev prioritized the development of the Trans-Caspian corridor as part of Kazakhstan’s export diversification strategy. That same year, Azerbaijan signaled readiness to raise Kazakhstan’s BTC quota to 2.2 million tons. As a result, shipments surged 5.5-fold to 1.392 million tons in 2023 and surpassed 1.4 million tons in 2024. The government now aims to reach 1.5 million tons in 2025. During the Ankara visit, KMG Chairman Askhat Khasenov met with Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) President Ahmet Türkoğlu to discuss potential cooperation in exploration, transport, and oil and gas sector development. “Currently, KMG and TPAO working groups are assessing prospects for joint initiatives in geological exploration in Kazakhstan,” the press release stated. Khasenov emphasized that strengthening ties with Turkey’s leading energy firms aligns with Kazakhstan’s strategic foreign policy. He expressed confidence that enhanced collaboration with TPAO would boost economic relations between the two countries. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan has encountered growing challenges in transporting oil via Russian ports due to new regulations and export bottlenecks.