Middle Corridor - The Times Of Central Asia

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Middle Corridor

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Are Reinforcing the Middle Corridor’s South Caucasus Link

On April 7 Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev visited Tbilisi to hold talks with Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Bochorishvili and sign a 2026–2027 foreign-ministry cooperation program. He called Georgia “a key link” in the Europe–Asia transport architecture and said the common task was to raise corridor capacity, improve service predictability, and ensure tariff transparency. The materialization of the bilateral cooperation is already evident from last June’s opening of the Poti multimodal terminal by a joint Kazakhstani-Georgian company. The real meaning of Kosherbayev's discussions in Tbilisi lies in their context. On April 2 in Baku, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov said Kazakhstan plans an intergovernmental agreement with Azerbaijan this year to strengthen the status of the Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor, TITR), and he proposed moving quickly on the Digital Monitoring Center under the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). On April 6 in Tbilisi, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev called the Azerbaijan–Georgia segment the corridor’s “main transport artery.” Then on April 8 in Baku, Aliyev received Kosherbayev together with Kazakhstan’s transport minister. The official readout ranged from the Middle Corridor to joint investment, green-energy, and fiber-optic projects. Kosherbayev’s April 7 stop in Tbilisi thus belongs to a short Kazakhstan-led diplomatic run across the corridor’s western nodes. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Tighten the Corridor Kazakhstan’s early-April engagement in the South Caucasus rests on its eastward-looking framework with China. Two China–Kazakhstan documents were already in evidence in October 2023: a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on deepening the development of the China-Europe Railway Trans-Caspian route, and an intergovernmental agreement on developing that route. China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) subsequently clarified that the agreement focused on stronger transit organization, fewer administrative barriers, and improved logistics and transport operations. In July 2024, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping jointly attended the opening of the Trans-Caspian direct fast transport service; NDRC then recorded a work mechanism with Kazakhstan’s transport ministry to carry that cooperation forward. On January 1, the first Trans-Caspian train of 2026 departed Xi’an for Baku carrying 45 containers of photovoltaic equipment. Chinese reports assert that the route had accumulated 466 runs by the end of November 2025, moved onto a weekly six-outbound and three-inbound timetable, and cut travel times from the roughly 20-day average recorded in 2025 to a standard 15 days, with the fastest runs taking 11 days. On April 3, it was also reported that there were 85 Xi’an Trans-Caspian trains in the first quarter of 2026, up 150% year-on-year, while the Kazakhstan–Xi’an terminal in Almaty handled more than 6,000 containers in that quarter alone, a 60% increase from a year earlier. A separate quasi-official Chinese trade-services portal reported that Trans-Caspian trains had reached daily service and that 371 such trains had run in January–October 2025, up 33%. China’s NDRC also said in late 2025 that Aktau and Baku should be strengthened as hub nodes in this corridor system. Azerbaijan is the indispensable partner without which the route’s western logic does not function. Bektenov’s...

Oil and Gas

Kazakhstan Gains Weight in China’s Energy System

The newly extended U.S. waiver for Russian oil transit through Kazakhstan and the reported giant onshore hydrocarbon discovery in western Kazakhstan point in different directions, yet they belong in the same analytical frame. One concerns an existing flow that already reaches China through working infrastructure, while the other concerns a possible future source that has not yet reached the stage of commercially proven reserves. Together, they mark a change in Kazakhstan’s position. The country is increasingly important to China both as a corridor and as a possible larger upstream partner. The U.S. waiver now runs until March 19, 2027. Kazakhstan is not a giant direct oil supplier to China in the way that Russia or Saudi Arabia is; China’s import structure is broader. But Kazakh-origin oil shipments, Russian transit oil, and adjacent energy links now constitute a single, more complex relationship. According to official Chinese sources, oil imported from Kazakhstan enters mainly through the China-Kazakhstan crude pipeline. More Than Kazakhstan’s Own Barrels Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP reported that in 2024, the Atasu-Alashankou route carried 1.2 million tons of oil and 9.989 million tons of transit oil, against a design capacity of 20 million tons a year. Official Chinese figures sharpen the point. By the end of 2024, total cumulative throughput on the pipeline had reached 280 million tons, including 19.139 million tons in 2024, while cumulative crude imported from Kazakhstan was lower. Kazakhstan’s significance to China is therefore larger than Kazakhstan’s own volumes would suggest, because the route carries more than Kazakhstan’s own oil. A glance at Europe keeps that proportion straight. Eurostat reports that Kazakhstan supplied 12.7% of the European Union’s petroleum oil imports in 2025. The European External Action Service said that Kazakhstan accounted for 10.9% of EU oil imports in the first quarter of 2024. This made it the bloc’s third-largest supplier in that period, and a more important direct oil supplier to Europe than to China. The significance of Kazakhstan’s geographic proximity to China becomes clearer when one looks beyond crude oil. Kazakhstan is not only a direct oil supplier, but also a transit corridor for multiple China-bound energy flows. The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline is one of China’s major import routes. At the same time, while Kazakhstan’s own gas exports to China remain limited due to rising domestic demand, gas from Turkmenistan and Russia both pass through its territory. Oil and gas do not form a single operational system, but together they show that China’s energy connection with Kazakhstan extends beyond one commodity and beyond Kazakhstan’s own barrels. The Source Side May Be Growing In this context, the reported discovery on the Zhylyoi carbonate platform makes a difference because it widens the source side of the relationship without changing present flows. According to public statements by KazMunayGas officials, the Karaton, Kazhygali, and Zhylyoi formation has resource potential of 4.7 billion metric tons of hydrocarbons, and the broader Zhylyoi carbonate reservoir may hold as much as 20 billion metric tons of oil equivalent. The field is onshore in...

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

TCA Interviews

Kazakhstan Pushes to Unlock Private Investment as IFC Backs Reform Drive

Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a more attractive destination for private investment, as authorities push to expand infrastructure, improve access to capital, and strengthen its role along key Eurasian trade routes. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Lisa Kaestner, the new Regional Director for Türkiye, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), outlines how the World Bank Group’s private sector arm plans to support that shift, from backing transport corridors to mobilizing capital for businesses and infrastructure projects. TCA: Since taking up your new role, how has your career path and leadership experience shaped your approach to this position? Kaestner: I joined IFC as Resident Representative in Georgia in 1999, and that early experience shaped how I approach working directly with local partners and stakeholders. Since then, I've held several leadership roles across IFC and the World Bank, primarily in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, while also expanding into Africa, where I led advisory services to governments across Eastern and Southern Africa — working across sectors like agribusiness, tourism, housing, technologies and financial services to support private sector-led growth. More recently, I served as Country Manager for Ukraine and earlier also Moldova, where I led IFC's strategic work on expanding support for businesses and financial institutions and helping lay the groundwork for private sector participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction. In March 2026, I stepped into my current role as Director overseeing IFC's activities in Türkiye, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, focused on mobilizing private investment and advancing reforms in close partnership with governments and the private sector. TCA: How do you assess the investment attractiveness of Kazakhstan at present? Kaestner: Kazakhstan presents a compelling investment story. The country benefits from a strategic geographic position at the heart of Eurasia, significant natural resources, and a government that has demonstrated a genuine commitment to reform and private sector development. From our point of view, several factors stand out as particularly encouraging. Kazakhstan has made meaningful progress in strengthening financial sector regulation and advancing infrastructure development. At the same time, we recognize that challenges remain. One key factor is the dominant role of the state in the economy, which represents roughly 40% of GDP, especially in major sectors like natural resources, electricity, telecommunications, and infrastructure. In this regard, we support the government’s efforts to increase private sector participation through privatization, IPOs, and public-private partnerships (PPPs). Additionally, maintaining steady progress on governance, transparency, and the rule of law remains crucial for sustaining investor confidence in the long term. Diversifying the economy away from commodity dependence — while significant strides have been made — remains a priority, as does deepening domestic capital markets to reduce reliance on external financing. Broader reforms are needed to achieve stable economic growth and improve the business climate, which will allow Kazakhstan to reach the level of developed countries. Significant efforts to develop the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC)—also known as the Middle Corridor, which is becoming increasingly important as an alternative trade route between Asia and Europe are...

Iran

The Iran War Is Repricing Central Asia’s Connectivity

Europe’s aviation regulator has extended its current conflict-zone bulletin for the Middle East and Persian Gulf through April 10 and continues to advise operators to avoid Iranian and adjacent airspace at all altitudes. Reuters reported soon after that the squeeze on normal flight paths was pushing more traffic into narrower routes, notably over Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The Strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, has not returned to normal commercial use. A limited number of exempted vessels have crossed, but passage remains selective, politicized, and uncertain rather than routine. The question, consequently, is no longer only whether Central Asia has alternatives to single-route dependence but whether those alternatives remain commercially usable, taking into account the increased risk, delay, insurance, fuel burn, and congestion. What has changed is the cost of maintaining reliable connectivity. The Cost of Reliability The Iran conflict imposes higher operating costs on the wider Eurasian air corridor that is now taking displaced traffic. EUROCONTROL estimates that about 1,150 flights a day continue to be affected by re-routing linked to the Middle East crisis. These add roughly 206,000 kilometers of flying and 602 tons of extra fuel burn per day. Maritime trends are similar. In March, war-risk premiums in or near the Gulf had risen more than tenfold in some cases, with hull war premiums moving from about 0.25% of vessel value to as much as 3%. Air-freight rates on some routes rose by as much as 70% as shippers redirected urgent cargo away from disrupted sea lanes and restricted airspace. Higher surcharges and narrower margins for operational error can make routes lose commercial value even if they remain formally open. The wider macroeconomic setting has also made resilience more expensive. Higher oil prices make every detour costlier, raising freight charges, power costs, and production costs across the region’s trading partners. Even where Central Asian cargo does not move through Iranian waters, the same pattern is still present. Asian policymakers were already confronting a combined oil-price and currency shock at a moment when roughly 80% of the oil shipped through Hormuz normally goes to Asia. The World Bank’s March food and nutrition security update notes that around 20% of global oil supplies and about one-third of global fertilizer trade transit the Strait of Hormuz. Urea prices, for example, surged by nearly 46% month on month between February and March 2026. Importers in Central Asia, as well as in Europe and the South Caucasus, remain under pressure from higher household food costs and tighter producer margins. The price of resilience is now showing up in increased costs for farm inputs, food costs, and household budgets. How the Burden Falls Kazakhstan remains the best placed in the region to absorb the shift. The CPC pipeline still carries about 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports; oil income contributes 52% of the state budget. Earlier disruptions had constrained Kazakhstan to reroute 300,000 tons of crude, and the country continues to rely on supplementary outlets such as Ust-Luga, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and China when its main...

Southern Corridor

The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks...