• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09648 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09648 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09648 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09648 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09648 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09648 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09648 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09648 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 37

How Tokayev’s Kazakhstan Bridges Global Powers

Amid the ongoing reshaping of the global order, Kazakhstan is seeking to enhance its role as an emerging middle power. Preserving strong relations with all key geopolitical actors, strengthening its position as a de facto leader in Central Asia, and developing closer ties with other influential states on the world stage appear to be Astana’s top foreign policy priorities. The largest Central Asian state is one of the few countries that maintains good relations with geopolitical rivals such as China and the United States, as well as Russia and the European Union. At the same time, Astana is actively developing closer ties with the Turkey-led Organization of Turkic States, while firmly upholding its longstanding commitment to international law. It is, therefore, no surprise that, during the recently held EU- Central Asia summit in Samarkand, Kazakhstan, along with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, backed two UN resolution from the 1980s that reject the unilaterally-declared independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and deem all secessionist actions there legally invalid. Such a policy perfectly aligns with Kazakhstan President’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s 2022 statement, in which he affirmed Astana’s non-recognition of Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia, and the entities he described as quasi-states, namely Luhansk and Donetsk. “In general, it has been calculated that if the right of nations to self-determination is actually realized throughout the globe, then instead of the 193 states that are now members of the UN, more than 500 or 600 states will emerge on Earth. Of course, it will be chaos,” Tokayev stressed. In other words, Kazakhstan upholds the principle of territorial integrity for all UN-member states, a stance similar to China’s policy. Despite their history of often supporting the right to self-determination over the principle of territorial integrity, Russia and the West do not seem to oppose Tokayev’s approach. As a result, the President of Kazakhstan remains one of the few world leaders who can attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow, regularly meet with EU officials, and participate in China-led initiatives. As the first Central Asian leader to speak with newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump in December 2024, Tokayev is also signaling his intention to deepen relations with the United States. All these actions demonstrate that, for Kazakhstan under Tokayev, the well-known multi-vector foreign policy remains without an alternative at this point. Although it is Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president, who initiated this approach, it is Tokayev who has been actively implementing it since he came to power in 2019. That, however, does not mean that "multivectorism" has become Astana’s official ideology. It is rather a tool the energy-rich nation’s policymakers are using to improve their country’s position in the international arena. Nowhere is that more obvious than at the Astana International Forum – an annual summit taking place in Kazakhstan’s capital – where leaders from diverse countries, often with differing goals and values, come together to discuss global challenges, foster dialogue, and seek common ground. The fact that this year Astana will host...

Why Europe Is Betting Big on Kazakhstan’s Future

On April 3, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Samarkand, ahead of the Central Asia–European Union summit. Although the meeting was brief, it came at a key moment, bringing into focus a set of shared economic and technological priorities that both sides increasingly treat as strategic. Tokayev made his position plain: Kazakhstan is looking to push forward in four core areas of cooperation with the EU: energy, industrial infrastructure, transport and logistics, and digital technology. Each of these lines up with the country’s broader goals for economic modernization. The two leaders also acknowledged recent steps toward a simplified EU visa regime for Kazakhstani nationals, which would ease movement for businesses and professionals in both directions. The meeting itself fits into a growing pattern. It builds on the first five-country Central Asia–EU leaders’ summit held in Astana back in October 2022. That gathering marked a turning point, putting the EU’s regional engagement on firmer institutional footing. It went beyond symbolic gestures and aimed at unlocking concrete investment opportunities. Since then, the EU has moved quickly to back up its commitments with financial and logistical support. Much of this has flowed through the Global Gateway initiative, a flagship program designed to channel European investment into infrastructure projects in developing and strategically situated economies. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has had a visible role in this process, running studies and financing projects across the transport, energy, and trade connectivity sectors. One EBRD-backed report, published in 2023, offered a striking projection: around €18.5 billion would be needed to scale container transport between the EU and Central Asia by a factor of eight. The goal was to go from fewer than 100,000 TEUs per year to roughly 865,000 by 2040. In response, the EU and the EBRD convened an Investors' Forum in early 2024, bringing in more than €10 billion in early-stage pledges. A second forum is now scheduled for 2025, with new focus areas, including mining, supply chains, and processing industries. During the Samarkand discussion, von der Leyen underlined the strategic significance of the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). This project has been gaining traction in EU planning circles as an alternative to routes running through Russia or the Gulf. The corridor promises not only economic returns but greater resilience in east–west supply chains. Kazakhstan, by geography and by political posture, is positioned at the center of this shift. Its participation is not just beneficial but also structurally important. The timing of the meeting was also notable. Just a day earlier, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Construction had announced a major find: a substantial deposit of rare earth elements at the Kuirektykol site. State-supported geological teams working in that region reported an estimated one million tons of potential material. Preliminary surveys from two zones, Irgiz and Dos 2, showed mineral content exceeding 0.1%, with some samples reaching as high as 0.25%. This level is a strong signal...

How Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Are Rewiring the Middle Corridor

Kazakhstan's acceleration of its strategic alignment with Azerbaijan signals more than bilateral convergence. It reflects a deeper structural reconfiguration of Eurasian connectivity, a reconfiguration that is not additive but integrative. As documented in multiple announcements and institutional moves across March 2025, their cooperation has crossed the threshold from parallel development to systemic coordination. This evolving dynamic illustrates the emergence of a regionally endogenous axis that, without proclaiming itself as such, is shaping the wider functional geometry of Eurasia. At the material core of this shift is the Middle Corridor — the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) — linking China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus. While long viewed as a technical alternative to the Northern and Southern corridors, the Middle Corridor is now exhibiting the dynamics of what in systems theory would be called self-amplifying dynamic feedback loops. (The technical term is “autopoiesis,” literally “self-creation” of “self-production.”) In particular, institutional feedback, infrastructure reinforcement, and regulatory adaptation are all feeding into one another in ways characteristic of an autonomously emergent macroregional logic. Kazakhstan’s announcement in December 2024 of the financing of a new terminal at Alat port in Azerbaijan, on which construction began in 2025, illustrates this logic in material form. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan is upgrading its Aktau port, backed by Chinese capital from Lianyungang, to triple its container throughput by 2028. This situation exemplifies the transformation of quantity into quality. Specifically, the upgrades are instantiating a network strategy that values not only volumes but also redundancy, flexibility, and strategic optionality. The new fiber-optic cable agreement signed in March 2025 further reinforces this convergence. A 380-kilometer undersea connection between Sumqayit and Aktau — part of the broader Digital Silk Road — will reduce latency between the two countries from hours to milliseconds. In system-theoretic terms, this is not merely a technical augmentation. It converts the corridor from a physical transit route into a distributed digital platform capable of supporting real-time adaptive coordination. This shift from “throughput” to “synchronization” is foundational. It also deepens the infrastructure-energy-information triad that has become characteristic of new macroregional systems. Kazakhstan’s expanded use of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, projected to carry 1.7 million tons of its oil in 2025, is not simply diversification. It is the strategic concretization of Azerbaijan’s role as a downstream node for Central Asian hydrocarbons. This is occurring alongside green transition signaling, including a modest floating solar project at Lake Boyukshor and a trilateral renewable energy agreement between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. The repurposing of hydrocarbon corridors for hybrid energy flows is not substitution but overlay, in effect a dual-pathway system. Meanwhile, capital commitment is reinforcing the commercial aspect. A $300 million joint investment fund announced by the two countries has already designated the construction of an intermodal terminal at Alat as its inaugural project. Additional integration comes from the UAE-backed $50 million grain terminal at Kuryk, which will further diversify the system's carrying capacity by drawing agro-logistics into the corridor's functionality. In my recent article on the...

How the Middle Corridor Is a Game-Changer for Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has been working to enhance its role in the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). This push reflects Uzbekistan’s strategic aim to diversify trade routes and reduce dependence on Russia. However, it is not just a diversification effort. It is an aspirational strategic pivot whereby Tashkent seeks to recalibrate its position and enhance its resilience within the ongoing geoeconomic restructuring of Eurasian trade. In January 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev outlined a five-year plan to upgrade infrastructure and streamline trade. The measures enumerated in the decree include improving road and rail connectivity, expanding truck stops, and enhancing border-crossing efficiency at key points.  Uzbekistan’s infrastructural investments, diplomatic realignments, and institutional relations with regional stakeholders reinforce one another. Moreover, they are co-dependent mechanisms in a larger recalibration of Eurasian trade. Azerbaijan is a case in point. The diplomatic realignment under way was exemplified in August 2024, when Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan signed their bilateral Treaty on Allied Relations, which supports infrastructure projects and the amelioration of trade coordination. In this connection, Uzbekistan is currently investing $18 million in construction of logistics terminal in the Poti Free Industrial Zone in Georgia, an initiative that could streamline transit to Europe, provided that regulatory alignment keeps pace. The country’s increased reliance on Georgian ports has paralleled efforts to coordinate rail administration across multiple transit states. So in September 2024, Uzbekistan took a decisive step by co-founding the Eurasian Transport Route Association along with Austria, Azerbaijan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. These partners are converging on a framework to standardize freight policies, minimize regulatory unpredictability, and optimize throughput along the corridor. As a demonstration of the corridor’s expanding logistical reach, Uzbekistan dispatched its first block train to Brazil in December 2024, demonstrating the potential for new international market connections through modular trade integration. The container train carried 28 tons from Tashkent through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia before reaching Brazil by sea. Following a similar strategy, earlier this year, at the end of January in Ankara, Uzbekistan participated in its second trilateral meeting with Turkey and Azerbaijan, focusing on developing trade, investment, and transport links through the Middle Corridor. A set of interdependent “adaptive constraints” (in systems-theory language) constrains the Middle Corridor’s long-term viability. For example, infrastructure bottlenecks do more than cause delays. They exacerbate cost unpredictability, instilling hesitation among investors, who remain wary of investment to an unpredictable transit network. Such reluctance to commit capital in turn limits the very infrastructure improvements needed to resolve the said bottlenecks. To overcome these challenges, Uzbekistan is investing in infrastructure improvements, in the expectation that these will help attract foreign direct investment while also improving trade efficiency over time. Yet beyond the standard geopolitical risks of political instability in transit countries, shifting geoeconomic alignments, and competition from other routes, there are infrastructural and operational challenges. Broadly summarized, these include bottlenecks (such as just mentioned), regulatory inconsistencies, and environmental concerns. External assessments nevertheless suggest long-term structural advantages for Uzbekistan’s deeper engagement in the Middle Corridor. A...

Opinion: Washington Needs a Stronger Policy for the Middle Corridor

The inauguration of President Donald Trump marks a new phase in U.S. foreign policy with direct implications for the Middle Corridor, a key trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has been gaining increasing strategic importance as global trade patterns shift and great-power competition intensifies. During Trump’s first term, U.S. engagement in the region was sporadic and lacked a comprehensive strategy. While some policy initiatives were undertaken to counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence in Eurasia, these efforts remained piecemeal. The Biden administration attempted to address this gap by allocating limited funding for infrastructure development and engaging in regional negotiations aimed at fostering greater connectivity. However, Biden’s approach ultimately fell short of a coherent, long-term policy, allowing Moscow and Beijing to consolidate their positions in the region. The significance of the Middle Corridor has been underscored by increased international investment. Beyond economic concerns, the Middle Corridor plays a critical role in Europe’s energy security. The corridor facilitates the westward flow of Caspian resources, providing an alternative to Russian energy exports. The development of the Middle Corridor offers a strategic means of achieving this goal, reinforcing the EU’s energy independence while simultaneously strengthening economic ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Azerbaijan has emerged as a central player in the development of the Middle Corridor. As a crucial transit country, Baku has actively pursued infrastructure investments to bolster the corridor’s efficiency. Azerbaijan’s role is further magnified by its growing energy exports to Europe, solidifying its position as a strategic partner in regional energy security. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, a vital component of the corridor, has received continued investment, underscoring Azerbaijan’s commitment to enhancing trade and transit connectivity. However, Azerbaijan’s increasing importance also intersects with ongoing geopolitical complexities, particularly its relationship with Armenia. The absence of Armenian participation in the Middle Corridor remains a notable gap, one that is directly tied to the resolution of long-standing territorial disputes. The prospect of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty has gained traction in recent years, supported by Western diplomatic efforts. U.S. policymakers have recognized that sustainable peace between the two nations would not only stabilize the South Caucasus but also unlock Armenia’s potential role in the corridor. Armenia’s geopolitical realignment presents both opportunities and challenges. While Yerevan has signaled its interest in deepening ties with the West, it remains economically dependent on Russia, particularly in energy and financial sectors. Increased Armenian exports to Russia, some of which analysts suspect may involve re-exports of sanctioned goods, further complicate efforts to shift its economic orientation. Recent discussions within U.S. policy circles indicate a growing recognition of the Middle Corridor’s strategic importance. American policymakers have begun exploring ways to expand support for infrastructure development in the region, recognizing that a proactive approach could yield multiple geopolitical and economic benefits. By investing in the Middle Corridor, the U.S. has an opportunity to enhance regional stability, strengthen economic ties with key partners, and counterbalance Russian...

Kazakhstan is Striving for Investment Amid “Resource Nationalism”

Amid the war in Ukraine, as well as various geopolitical turbulences that threaten to fundamentally change the current global order, Kazakhstan is aiming to attract more foreign investment. The war in Ukraine has so far had a relatively positive impact on the economies of most Central Asian nations, giving Astana room to achieve its ambitious goal of attracting $150 billion in foreign direct investment by 2029.  Kazakhstan, along with other neighboring actors, used the Russian invasion of Ukraine to develop closer economic ties with the West, namely with the European Union. It is therefore no surprise that, in 2022 and 2023, the EU member Netherlands invested over $12 billion in the Kazakh economy, making it the leading foreign investor. The United States, according to the official statistics, is the second-largest investor, with Switzerland rounding out the top three. Although between 2005 and its total foreign direct investment (FDI) reached $402 billion, Kazakhstan’s innovation agenda aims to attract $150 billion of FDI in the next five years while doubling the country’s GDP. The problem is that in 2023 the inflow of foreign direct investment into Kazakhstan decreased by 32.3%, which suggests that Astana may have a hard time finding ways to attract more capital into the Kazakh economy. Experts claim that there is no comprehensive development strategy for both industries and regions in Kazakhstan, which limits investments in its economy. But the creation of platforms with tax preferences, an independent regulator, and a regulatory environment based on the principles of British law are believed to contribute to the active development of entrepreneurship. In other words, the authorities in Kazakhstan are using a model based on practices in Britain and the United Arab Emirates to attract investment, drawing inspiration from the British Common Law system, as well as the Dubai International Financial Center, which served as a reference for the Astana International Financial Center. Given that both Kazakhstan and the UAE are economies based on fossil fuel exports, it is unlikely to be a coincidence that Astana aims to use Abu Dhabi’s experiences to improve its existing arrangements with foreign corporations operating in Kazakhstan.  "Large investments require a long-term planning horizon. Therefore, the government will have to intensify negotiations regarding the extension of production sharing agreements contracts on the updated terms, favorable to the country," Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said on January 28, as foreign companies reportedly claim that Astana is seeking to increase its shares in key oil and gas projects in what amounts to "resource nationalism".  At the same time, the Kazakh government seeks to create a favorable investment climate for foreign companies by reducing bureaucratic obstacles, introducing tax breaks, eliminating financial audits, and ensuring the protection of the legal rights of investors. Kazakhstan has also recently introduced a Digital Nomad visa (also called a 'Neo Nomad' visa), which grants foreign nationals the right to reside in the country while working for a foreign employer. Such a move can be interpreted as another attempt to attract foreign investment in Kazakhstan. ...