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Nuclear Diplomacy

Kazakhstan Offers the IAEA a Practical Option on Iran

On May 26, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev received IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in Astana. The meeting pointed beyond bilateral nuclear cooperation toward Kazakhstan’s possible role in wider nuclear-security problems. Tokayev welcomed a roadmap for deepening Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency through 2036, alongside documents on nuclear medicine and science. Grossi’s visit also followed Kazakhstan’s referendum on its first post-independence nuclear power plant, which has widened the civilian side of the country’s nuclear profile. Iran was not the subject around which the meeting was organized, but it is the issue that gives the meeting strategic weight. In particular, Kazakhstan’s established IAEA relationship could help give nuclear diplomacy a practical form if political agreement first creates a need for technical implementation. The potential is real, but it is narrow. Any political resolution of the Iran nuclear issue turns on decisions by Tehran, Washington, Israel, regional states, and the IAEA. The parties must first agree politically on an IAEA-led arrangement for Kazakhstan to enter the scene. Tokayev’s own formulation was appropriately limited: Kazakhstan’s assistance would be a gesture of good faith, and only if appropriate international agreements exist. Its involvement would come after the political bargain, not before it. Kazakhstan’s nuclear profile begins with the Soviet nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk, which made nuclear policy a shared public memory before it became a diplomatic profile. Between 1949 and 1989, this site became one of the central locations of the Soviet nuclear-weapons program. The Nevada–Semipalatinsk movement, founded in 1989 by Olzhas Suleimenov, turned public opposition to testing into a political force before the site was closed in August 1991. Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy still expresses a public memory of Soviet testing and its public-health consequences. That memory does not make Kazakhstani society simply anti-nuclear, but it means that the country's nuclear policy carries a sensitive history. From the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited on its territory one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. That arsenal included strategic nuclear warheads associated with intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers. Kazakhstan did not merely surrender an arsenal; it made renunciation part of its international profile. The country chose non-nuclear status, transferred the weapons to Russia, and joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. This renunciation gave political restraint an institutional form and gave Kazakhstan a special status in nuclear affairs. That standing has also appeared in earlier Iran-related diplomacy. Kazakhstan hosted two rounds of P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty in 2013, and in 2015 Kazatomprom supplied Iran with 60 metric tons of natural uranium as part of the internationally coordinated implementation of the JCPOA. That standing now operates most clearly through Kazakhstan’s long cooperation with the IAEA. The Tokayev-Grossi meeting and the 2026–2036 cooperation roadmap make Kazakhstan’s nuclear development part of a continuing institutional relationship. Grossi’s visit also included agreements on nuclear science, healthcare delivery, and agricultural applications under IAEA programs. Tokayev and Grossi are not improvising a political solution to Iran; they are strengthening an institutional channel through...

Iran

Kazakhstan Signals Nuclear Diplomacy Role as Iran Uranium Dispute Intensifies

Kazakhstan is seeking a place in the next phase of the Iran nuclear dispute, not as a direct mediator between Washington and Tehran, but as a possible technical partner if talks turn to the handling of enriched uranium. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has said Kazakhstan is ready to assist if international agreements are reached. The offer reflects Astana’s long effort to turn its Soviet nuclear legacy, disarmament record, and nonproliferation infrastructure into diplomatic capital. The dispute has become more urgent as U.S.-Iran talks come under growing strain. According to Iran’s Fars News Agency, Washington has demanded the transfer of approximately 400 kilograms of enriched uranium and major restrictions on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Tehran, in turn, has insisted on sanctions relief, the unfreezing of foreign assets, compensation for wartime damage, and security guarantees. U.S. President Donald Trump has described Iran’s demands as “unacceptable.” He later said he had postponed a possible military strike on Iran following appeals from the leaders of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, citing what he called ongoing “serious negotiations.” Against that backdrop, Tokayev said during a May 11 meeting with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira that Kazakhstan was ready, “as a gesture of goodwill,” to help resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. He said any such role would depend on relevant international agreements being reached and carried out in practice. According to Akorda, Tokayev also reiterated Kazakhstan’s commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under International Atomic Energy Agency oversight. The statement did not amount to an offer to mediate directly between Washington and Tehran. It was narrower and more practical. Kazakhstan is presenting itself as a state with broad international trust, technical experience, and nuclear infrastructure to support a settlement should the main parties agree on one. Tokayev placed that argument directly into the Iran debate at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April. “The core issue is the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must remain the central subject of negotiations in the context of the situation surrounding Iran,” he said. For Kazakhstan, that distinction is central to the way it presents itself internationally. The country has built much of its post-Soviet foreign policy identity around nuclear nonproliferation. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan’s anti-nuclear stance is not only a diplomatic position, but part of the country’s modern national identity. The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site between 1949 and 1989, leaving long-term environmental and public health damage in eastern Kazakhstan. After independence, Kazakhstan transferred its inherited nuclear warheads to Russia and joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Kazakhstan has direct technical experience with sensitive nuclear material. In 1994, under Operation Sapphire, roughly 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium were removed from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk and transferred to the United States. TCA previously reported that the operation remains one of the strongest examples of Kazakhstan’s role in practical nonproliferation work. Kazakhstan has been involved...

Iran

Kazakhstan Sends Humanitarian Aid to Iran

Kazakhstan has dispatched 30 railway wagons of humanitarian aid to war-ravaged Iran, the country’s Foreign Ministry announced on May 16. The shipment – which included staple food supplies such as canned meat, sugar, flour, as well as medicines – is intended to support the Iranian population and help meet essential social needs. A diplomatic handover ceremony to mark the occasion was arranged at Serakhs railway station, on Turkmenistan's border with Iran. Those present included Ontalap Onalbayev, Kazakhstan's ambassador to Iran; representatives of the Iranian Red Crescent Society; and the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s representative office in its northwestern province of Razavi Khorasan. “Friends are revealed in difficult times. Kazakhstan has consistently supported the people of Iran in times of hardship,” said Ambassador Onalbayev. Kazakhstan has attempted to tread a careful line towards Iran since the US/Israeli offensive which began on February 28. Astana had gone out of its way to court the Trump administration, with President Tokayev describing his US counterpart as "sent by heaven" in November 2025. Tokayev has also signed Kazakhstan up to Trump's Board of Peace initiative. Meanwhile, Iran is seen as an important part of Kazakhstan's future infrastructure links to the outside world, with its Indian Ocean ports viewed as a valuable alternative to land-based routes via Russia and China. Kazakhstan and Iran continue to maintain trade and economic cooperation. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan began exporting vegetable oil to Iran via the Caspian Sea in spring 2026. That said, in April, Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Issetov noted that several joint projects between Kazakhstan and Iran had been frozen because of military tensions in the region. A representative of the Iranian Red Crescent Society thanked Kazakhstan for the humanitarian assistance and said the gesture would help strengthen bilateral relations and mutual support between the two countries.

Vegetable Oil Exports

Kazakhstan Begins Vegetable Oil Exports to Iran via Caspian Route

Vegetable oil producers in Kazakhstan have launched a new export route to Iran across the Caspian Sea, completing several trial shipments of rapeseed and sunflower oil in spring 2026, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Agriculture said. According to Kazakhstan’s National Association of Oilseed Processors (NAOPK), the first shipment, consisting of 5,000 tons of rapeseed oil, departed from the Port of Aktau on April 4. The buyer was the Iranian company Kourosh Food Industry, while the supplier was one of Kazakhstan’s largest oil-processing plants affiliated with the association. On May 13, loading was completed for a second vessel carrying 5,000 tons of sunflower oil. The Agriculture Ministry said the shipments demonstrate strong interest among Iranian importers in products from Kazakhstan and point to the potential of the Caspian export corridor. NAOPK Chairman Yadykar Ibragimov said the Iranian market holds significant potential for exports of Kazakhstan’s oil and fat products. According to Ibragimov, Iran imports around 3.5 million tons of vegetable oils and oilseed meal annually, including approximately 1.5 million tons of vegetable oils. “Our countries share a border across the Caspian Sea and also benefit from a preferential customs regime under the free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran,” Ibragimov said. He noted that Kazakhstan exported more than 100,000 tons of oil and fat products to Iran over the past three years, with around 94% consisting of oilseed meal. “The launch of vegetable oil transshipment through the Port of Aktau will significantly increase supply volumes,” he added. According to association estimates, the Aktau route could handle three to four shipments per month, allowing annual exports of 150,000-200,000 tons of vegetable oil through the new corridor. In the longer term, exports of vegetable oils and oilseed meal to Iran could exceed 500,000 tons annually. Kazakhstan’s Agriculture Ministry said development of the route will help diversify export destinations and reduce pressure on existing logistics corridors. “The launch of this new supply channel will help move closer to the goal of increasing the sector’s foreign currency revenues to $1 billion, as outlined in the 2026-2028 Road Map,” the ministry said. Kazakhstan previously reported record sunflower oil exports: between January and October 2025, the country exported more than 523,000 tons of sunflower oil worth approximately $532 million. Authorities aim to position Kazakhstan among the world’s top three vegetable oil exporters. At the same time, Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Issetov said in April that several joint projects between Kazakhstan and Iran had been frozen amid military tensions in the region. Despite geopolitical tensions, Astana and Tehran continue expanding trade and economic cooperation. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan and Iran aim to increase bilateral trade turnover to $1 billion in the coming years, with plans to eventually double that figure.

Foreign Investment

Iranian Company to Build Oil Plant and Poultry Farm in Kazakhstan

Iranian companies are increasingly looking to Kazakhstan for investment and production as tensions between the United States and Iran continue. Iran’s Golrang Industrial Group plans to implement two major projects in Kazakhstan: the construction of a sunflower oil production plant and a poultry farm for meat production. Agreements on the projects were reached on May 4 between Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of Agriculture Yermek Kenzhekhanuly and Golrang’s leadership, with total investment estimated at approximately $120 million. At the meeting, Golrang Industrial Group expressed strategic interest in developing its business in Kazakhstan and localizing production. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the first project involves the construction of an oil extraction plant with a processing capacity of up to 3,000 tons of sunflower seeds per day, with direct investment of approximately $70 million. The project is expected to increase the processing depth of Kazakh agricultural raw materials and boost the added value of finished products. Investment in the second project, a poultry meat farm, is estimated at approximately $50 million. The projects come against a backdrop of steadily growing cooperation between Kazakhstan and Iran. In 2025, bilateral agricultural trade increased by 55.8%, exceeding $341 million. Exports of Kazakh products, primarily wheat and barley, have also grown significantly.

Diplomacy

Turkmenistan Highlights International Outreach at Cabinet Meeting

A recent Cabinet meeting in Turkmenistan highlighted contacts with many countries and international organizations, reinforcing a perception that the tightly managed nation is taking more steps, however limited, to engage the world. Appearing via video link, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov presided over the May 1 meeting of ministers who covered economic growth, oil and natural gas production, scientific research, and other national priorities in a review of the year so far. But international outreach was a big part of the high-level discussion in an energy-rich Central Asian country often defined as opaque and restrictive. An account of the meeting by the Turkmenistan State News Agency (TDH) ticked off statistics: 220 delegations visited Turkmenistan this year, 400 delegations from Turkmenistan visited other countries, 711 negotiations and other meetings occurred in the country with foreign states and international agencies, and 57 more international documents were added to Turkmenistan’s legal code. “The development of diplomatic relations through foreign embassies is one of the important directions of the foreign policy work of neutral Turkmenistan,” said the report, referring to the country’s policy of non-alignment and not getting involved in the internal affairs of other countries. “Work on promoting relations with the countries of the Middle East is also ongoing,” it said. Iraq opened its embassy in Ashgabat in March, 17 years after Turkmenistan and Iraq established diplomatic relations in 2009. On May 4, Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s foreign minister, spoke by telephone with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi about regional security, Caspian issues, and other matters, according to the Turkmen Foreign Ministry. The ministry’s statement did not mention the Iran conflict or uncertainty surrounding the ceasefire with the United States. Turkmenistan’s international campaign is consistent with a pattern seen across Central Asia, where governments have sought to diversify their trade and diplomatic ties while maintaining close relations with the region’s major powers, Russia and China. Turkmenistan, however, still exports most of its natural gas to China, its largest trading partner. At the same time, Turkmenistan is intensifying efforts to integrate into the global trading system, with officials reaffirming plans to move towards membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is the last post-Soviet republic to start WTO accession talks. Turkmenistan’s leaders are also working on their international profiles. Berdimuhamedov attended an ecological summit of regional leaders in Kazakhstan last month. His father and predecessor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, traveled to the U.S. in February, China in March, and Austria in April. This month, he is due to travel to the Russian city of Kazan. Although government transparency is limited in Turkmenistan, father and son appear to run the country through a power-sharing arrangement. Outsiders are getting more glimpses of Turkmenistan. The capital, Ashgabat, hosted an international tourism conference in April. This month, the Reuters news agency reported on a trip there after being given what it said was “rare access” to travel in the country. It remains unclear, however, whether any efforts to engage with the outside world will materially change daily life in Turkmenistan, where people...