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Central Asia - Iran Relations

Opinion: Why Central Asia Cannot Afford to Abandon the Iranian Route

Kazakhstan had barely secured a foothold in Iran’s largest commercial port when renewed military escalation made the southern route risky again. The problem for Central Asia is that Iran is more than a trading partner. For a region without direct access to the open sea, it provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The agreement allocates two years for construction and the following 25 for operation. Astana expects the terminal to provide more direct access to markets in the Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The project almost immediately found itself in a different reality. In July, U.S. strikes hit Iranian railway and coastal infrastructure. The Aq Taqeh Khan bridge on a rail route connecting Iran with Turkmenistan and, further north, with Kazakhstan, was damaged. There was no confirmed halt to Central Asian freight traffic, but military risk was no longer an abstract concern for carriers. That risk has now been compounded by a new U.S. sanctions campaign. On August 24, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent launched what Washington calls Operation Economic Outcast, combining direct sanctions with pressure on Iran’s foreign economic partners. The United States said it would set timelines for other countries to shut down economic activity with Iran, while the scope of secondary sanctions was expanded to cover five areas: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping. Nearly 60 Iran-linked individuals, entities, and vessels were also sanctioned. The United States has not publicly identified which countries could face penalties first. War and sanctions can make the Iranian route more expensive, slower, and more dangerous. They cannot change geography. Iran gives Central Asia overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. From Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, cargo can move onward toward India, the Gulf states, and East Africa. Iran also provides a western overland route toward Turkey. This is one of the fundamental differences between the Iranian route and the Middle Corridor, which crosses the Caspian Sea before continuing through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor requires cargo to move between rail and maritime transport. Iran offers the possibility of a continuous overland chain while also providing access to ports connected to the Indian Ocean. For Kazakhstan, the southern route is already more than a plan. Trade with Iran increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor reached 3.5 million tons, while rail traffic between Kazakhstan and Iran increased by 69%. It is this expanding transport network that is now exposed to greater military and sanctions risks. There is another factor. A free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, entered into force on May 15, 2025. It significantly reduced tariff barriers to trade in goods between the two sides. Uzbekistan offers...

Energy Security

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Caspian Sea

Iran Moves to Ratify Caspian Sea Agreement Amid Tensions

Iran wants its parliament to ratify a long-delayed agreement among the littoral states of the Caspian Sea that it says could facilitate economic cooperation. The initiative comes as tensions between Iran and the United States remain high, increasing pressure on the Iranian economy. The Iranian government’s plan to submit the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea for ratification in the parliament “follows changes in the security environment” around the sea, according to Kazem Gharibabadi, deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs. Gharibabadi was quoted in an interview published by the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency, or IRNA, on Saturday. The IRNA report did not go into detail about those security changes, but Iran had blamed Ukraine for a Caspian Sea attack last month that it said resulted in an explosion on an Iranian commercial vessel, killing one sailor and injuring another. Ukraine has acknowledged conducting long-range strikes in the Caspian, saying it was targeting vessels transporting military cargo linked to Iran, an ally of Russia. The Iranian move in the parliament, which is dominated by conservatives, comes ahead of Iran´s reported plan to host a meeting of the Caspian littoral states next week. In 2018, the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea was signed in Aktau, Kazakhstan, by Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. The convention includes security provisions, including a ban on the presence of armed forces from non-littoral states. It also aims to assign territorial waters and regulate access to resources, including fisheries and offshore oil. However, some details were not clarified and, unlike the other countries, Iran´s parliament did not ratify the deal. Some critics in Iran had argued that the convention left the country at a disadvantage. Iran’s recent decision to urgently submit the convention to its parliament “comes amid public debate over the convention’s provisions, Iran’s rights and interests in the Caspian, and questions surrounding the country’s share of the sea,” IRNA reported. It quoted Gharibabadi as saying that, in addition to Caspian security concerns, there is a need to increase economic cooperation among the littoral states and resolve legal issues concerning the sea. Some Iranian commentators say Iran is under pressure to make concessions and could end up compromising the country’s rights in the Caspian. In the IRNA interview, Gharibabadi sought to downplay criticism, saying Iranian parliamentary ratification would have “no impact on the delimitation of the seabed and subsoil of the body of water,” and that those issues would have to be resolved through negotiations among states with adjacent Caspian coastlines. “By ratifying the Convention, Tehran could gain certain advantages, including legal certainty regarding the Caspian Sea and the preservation of its partnership with Moscow, which is pushing for the issue to be resolved. At the same time, the potential costs for Iran appear more significant,” said the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a research center in Armenia, a South Caucasus country that could be affected by developments in the Caspian Sea. The center’s analysis this month...

Middle East Crisis

Turkmenistan Condemns Strike on Iranian Ship in Caspian Sea

Turkmenistan has criticized an attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea that the Iranian government blamed on Ukraine. In a statement on Monday, Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to media reports of an attack on a ship in the Caspian on July 25 and described “such actions” as unacceptable. “As a Caspian littoral state and the country with a status of permanent neutrality recognized by the United Nations, Turkmenistan underlines that the Caspian Sea is a sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness,” the ministry said, without specifically referring to Ukraine or Iran. The Caspian Sea is critical to Turkmenistan´s ambition to play a larger role in the Middle Corridor, a trade network linking Asia and Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran had blamed Ukraine for the attack that it said resulted in an explosion on an Iranian commercial vessel, killing one sailor and injuring another. It described the attack as “an act of aggression that could further inflame and expand the ongoing conflict.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said the Ukrainian military’s deep strike range is more than 3,000 kilometers, indicating that the Caspian Sea is within reach. “We also have very good results from long-range strikes in the waters of the Caspian Sea,” Zelenskyy said on July 25. “In particular, these are vessels that were involved in transporting military cargo from Iran, and a warship.” Iran has provided drone technology to Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The attack in the Caspian Sea comes amid heightened Mideast tension and open conflict between Iran and the United States. Earlier in July, Kazakhstan had condemned drone strikes on oil infrastructure in the Black Sea that is critical to Kazakhstan’s energy exports. Ukraine has said it was targeting Russian interests in the Black Sea. On July 25, in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for a freeze of the Russia-Ukraine war in some of his strongest comments about ending the fighting.

Middle East Crisis

Iran Says Trains Resume After Reported Strike on Railway Bridge to Turkmenistan

An alleged U.S. strike on a railway bridge on a northern Iranian line crossing into Turkmenistan highlighted concerns about Central Asian trade routes in the region. Iran, however, says it has repaired the tracks and trains are running again. The reported attack on the Aq Tekeh Khan bridge near Aqqala city in Golestan province on July 9 was part of a wave of U.S. military action against Iran after tensions over the disputed Strait of Hormuz, whose shipping lanes are key to global commerce, and the collapse of a shaky ceasefire. U.S. strikes were ongoing on Friday, while Iran has carried out drone strikes on U.S. allies in the Gulf region. There were no casualties in the strike on the bridge in Golestan, according to Iranian state-affiliated media that published photographs of what appeared to be an impact crater and twisted railway tracks. The Mehr news agency cited an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps statement that cruise missiles hit the bridge. Reconstruction began immediately and the railway was ready for traffic less than 24 hours after the attack, the chn.ir news site and other Iranian outlets reported. Washington has not publicly commented on reports of the attack on the Aq Tekeh Khan bridge, which is part of a railway line that crosses into Turkmenistan at the Iranian border city of Incheh Borun and is a key corridor for Iranian trade with Central Asia, Russia and China. An analysis by London-based Iran International said Iran, which is under pressure from economic sanctions as well as attacks on its maritime infrastructure, relies on the route for “military logistics, civilian trade, sanctions resilience and alternative transit routes.” The reported attack on the bridge is also significant for Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, according to the analysis. “These countries have invested in diversified transit routes through Iran to reach Gulf ports and global markets while reducing dependence on Russian or Chinese-controlled corridors,” Iran International said. “If Iranian routes are viewed as vulnerable during conflict, governments and commercial operators may reassess their reliability.” East of the Incheh Borun railway line, another railway line between Iran and Turkmenistan crosses at the Iranian border town of Sarakhs. Iran has also been developing railway infrastructure at the border city of Loftabad, which lies between the Incheh Borun and Sarakhs lines. Shortly before Israel and the United States launched air strikes on Iran on Feb. 28, initiating the ongoing war, top railway officials from Iran and Turkmenistan met in Sarakhs to discuss ways to strengthen their cross-border railway routes. The talks were part of Iran’s effort to build “its position as a land bridge linking Central Asia to open waters,” the Tehran Times reported.