Border Security - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 14

Border Demarcation

Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Border Fencing Complete in Batken, Demarcation Continues

Kyrgyzstan has completed the installation of nearly 328 kilometers of border fencing in the Batken region in the country’s southwest, where armed clashes with Tajikistan took place in 2021 and 2022. For some residents, the new boundary has also raised questions about compensation for lost homes and farmland. On October 29, the Batken regional administration confirmed completion of the fencing, two weeks after the State Border Service made the same announcement. During 2025–2026, 338.5 kilometers of patrol roads were built in the region’s Batken and Leilek districts, allowing patrols to reach previously difficult-to-access areas. The fencing covers part of the countries’ approximately 1,008-kilometer border. The two countries began installing border markers in July 2026 and are continuing this process of demarcation, alongside the preparation of formal boundary records. Three Decades of Disputes Batken lies in the densely populated Fergana Valley, which is divided among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. National borders here run close to villages and farmland, making disputes over territory particularly sensitive. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were unable to agree on the course of substantial sections of their shared border. Disputes over access to land and water were particularly frequent in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region and the neighboring Sughd region in northern Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan also had a longstanding border dispute with Uzbekistan, which the two countries settled in 2022. In April 2021 and September 2022, clashes escalated into armed conflicts involving heavy weapons. The September 2022 fighting killed more than 100 people across both sides and destroyed hundreds of homes. On the Kyrgyz side alone, more than 140,000 people were displaced. Cross-border movement was severely restricted following the 2021 violence, disrupting trade and visits between communities. Negotiations continued after the fighting, with the two countries’ security chiefs leading efforts to resolve the remaining territorial disputes. The eventual settlement involved exchanges of land, including in areas where communities had grown up close to one another. In December 2024, Bishkek and Dushanbe announced that they had reached agreement on the remaining disputed sections. The two sides completed a draft description of the border alignment and signed the corresponding protocol. In February 2025, negotiators also reached preliminary agreements on road use and access to water infrastructure, two longstanding sources of friction between border communities. On March 13, 2025, Presidents Sadyr Japarov and Emomali Rahmon signed a state border treaty in Bishkek, alongside agreements covering road access and water and energy facilities. That same day, the Kyzyl-Bel–Guliston and Kairagach–Madaniyat international border crossings reopened after being closed for nearly four years. Tajik entrepreneurs were able to return to markets in the Batken region. On March 31, 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on the junction of their three national borders as well as the Khujand Declaration on Eternal Friendship. Compensation Claims Remain Former Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Tokon Mamytov said in comments to the state news agency Kabar on April 29, 2025, that installing border fencing would help reduce the risk of renewed clashes...

CSTO

CSTO in No Hurry to Help Tajikistan

The authorities in Tajikistan have been ringing the alarm bells over events in neighboring Afghanistan for more than three decades. The Tajik government did so again after violence broke out along a small section of the Tajik-Afghan border in the last months of 2025, and specifically called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for assistance. The CSTO has responded, but the promised aid has yet to arrive as Tajikistan continues to seek stronger border defenses. The Perennial Border Problem There had been unrest in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, long before Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, and the instability along Tajikistan’s approximately 1,360-kilometer border with Afghanistan has continued ever since. Most of the border area is mountainous and sparsely inhabited, making it ideal for narcotics and weapons smuggling. Weapons smuggling was a huge problem during Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, when weapons were being brought back and forth across the Afghan frontier to fuel civil conflicts in both countries. From the first day of Tajikistan’s independence until June 2005, Russian border guards helped keep watch on Tajikistan’s Afghan frontier. At least several hundred Russian and Tajik border guards, and Tajik and Afghan smugglers and militants have been killed along the Tajik-Afghan border in the last 35 years. Many countries worried about Tajikistan’s border problems with Afghanistan. Neighbors such as China, the other Central Asian states, and not so far away, Russia did not want narcotics or militants from Afghanistan reaching their countries. In the mid- and late-1990s, the Taliban push through Afghanistan to the Central Asian border increased these neighbors’ concerns. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the United States and its allies used facilities in Central Asia to support troops in Afghanistan. All these countries, and more, contributed to Tajikistan’s border defenses in some way, either by simply donating housing materials or winter uniforms, or providing security monitoring equipment and weaponry. It has never been enough to totally stem the border problems, but the security aid Tajikistan received is far more than the country could ever have allocated for that purpose from its state coffers. Emomali Rahmon was Tajikistan’s president in the late 1990s when the Taliban first seized power in Afghanistan. Rahmon viewed the Taliban as a threat, and Tajikistan’s policies toward the Afghan militant group reflected that. Rahmon’s opinion of the Taliban did not change when they regained power in 2021, and despite the other Central Asian states establishing a dialogue and trade ties with the Taliban, Tajikistan has been slow to engage the returned rulers of Afghanistan. In June 2024, Rahmon’s eldest son and heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, told a meeting of the CSTO’s Parliamentary Assembly Council that “Afghanistan has once again become a breeding ground for terrorism.” Emomali said more than 1,000 radical madrassahs had been established in Afghanistan, some in areas close to Tajikistan’s border, and that these religious schools were also preparing suicide bombers. A Turbulent End to 2025 In late August 2025, Tajik border guards...

Regional Security

The Taliban’s Road Reaches China, but the Border is Closed

After several years of slow progress, the road connecting Afghanistan to China is finally ready. On October 4, Taliban officials inaugurated the 121-kilometer road through Afghanistan’s remote and arid northeastern Wakhan Corridor. China, however, has not been too keen on the project, and, according to one report, when the Taliban reached the Chinese border, the way was barred, with Chinese border guards ordering the Taliban to leave the area. The Hard Road The Wakhan Corridor was part of ancient trade routes through Asia, but was clearly only used by hardy merchants. The area is one of the most isolated regions on the planet. Nearly all of it is 4,000 meters or more above sea level, mostly bare stone mountains with some grass and a few trees and bushes growing on hillsides and in the valleys. The Wakhan Corridor officially appeared on maps as part of Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century. It was a buffer zone agreed to by representatives of the British and Russian empires. Today, the far eastern section of the Wakhan Corridor is the only place where Afghanistan directly borders China. That 74-kilometer border was easy to ignore due to the remoteness of the area, but not long after the Chinese revolution in 1949, officials in Beijing still ordered it closed. The harsh climate and rugged mountains make most of the corridor virtually unhabitable, but that did not stop some from believing a modern trade route could be opened through Wakhan that would connect Afghanistan to China. Dirt roads reached a few of the larger settlements in the western part of the corridor, villages of, at most, several hundred people. The Taliban just finished building a gravel road and four bridges that finally make it all the way to the Chinese border. By itself, this is far from sufficient to qualify as a legitimate trade route. There is no infrastructure to serve traffic through the region, no petrol stations, no accommodation, no places to buy food or drink, and temperatures are well below freezing for at least half the year. China’s Big Objection The bigger obstacle is that China has no strong interest in opening this route, and in fact, would prefer the Afghan border to remain closed. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is still present in Afghanistan. ETIM is comprised mainly of ethnic Uyghurs from China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the same Chinese region that borders Afghanistan. ETIM’s goal is to topple Chinese rule in Xinjiang. ETIM fighters have been in Afghanistan for at least 25 years, and were allies of the Taliban during the years foreign troops were in Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province is active in northern Afghanistan, and that group has also made specific threats against the Chinese government. The Taliban have promised that they will not allow any group to use Afghan territory to plot or carry out attacks on neighboring countries. However, the Wakhan Corridor is part of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province, and the Taliban have...

CICA

Kazakhstan Proposes a Preventive Diplomacy Mechanism for CICA

Kazakhstan’s proposal to establish a preventive diplomacy mechanism presents the Asian forum with a specific task: determining who, with whose consent, and through what procedures can help reduce tensions before they escalate into open conflict. On October 15, 2026, at the seventh summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Baku, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed launching a preventive diplomacy mechanism. The initiative came amid efforts to transform CICA into a full-fledged international organization and make its activities more practical. However, the proposed mechanism’s process for requesting assistance, powers, funding, and operating procedures were not detailed in the summit announcement. For Central Asia, crisis prevention has direct practical significance. Disagreements over water use, transit restrictions, or disruptions to cross-border infrastructure can affect several countries simultaneously. Even a technical problem can take on a political dimension if the parties lack agreed-upon information and have no way to discuss the situation quickly. Preventive diplomacy is useful at a stage when there is still room for agreement, but routine working contacts are no longer sufficient. CICA already has a foundation for such work. Its activities are based on sovereign equality, noninterference, and consensus-based decision-making. The Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures covers military-political, economic, environmental, and human issues, as well as new challenges and threats. Its agenda includes transport corridors, energy security, and cooperation in the digital sphere. Discussions on crisis prevention can therefore be linked to existing areas of cooperation. As Aigerim Bakhtiyarova, deputy director of the Institute of Applied Research and Analytics at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, noted in comments to The Times of Central Asia, differences in the foreign policy doctrines and geopolitical positions of CICA member states do not diminish their shared interest in regional security. “Today, strategic predictability has become a very rare but very important condition for multilateral partnership, essential for peace, stability, and development,” the expert said. In her assessment, even countries engaged in open rivalry have an interest in maintaining channels of communication that can prevent conflicts from spreading and limit the associated economic and humanitarian costs. However, a shared interest in preventing conflicts does not necessarily mean that states are prepared to grant additional powers to a multilateral mechanism. The principle of consensus creates conditions for trust while also setting limits on the future mechanism. When members’ interests diverge, agreeing on a collective position may take longer than the pace of a developing crisis allows. Therefore, in developing the initiative, it is important to determine which actions require a separate decision by all member states and which can be carried out under a previously agreed mandate, at the request and with the consent of the parties directly concerned. The following are possible approaches to implementing the proposal, rather than announced components of the mechanism. One realistic option could be a system of national contact points authorized to receive requests for urgent consultations. Their task would be to quickly connect the...

Regional Security

China Seeks Closer Intelligence Cooperation with Tajikistan

China has called for closer intelligence cooperation with Tajikistan and stronger protection for Chinese citizens and businesses. Premier Li Qiang raised both issues during October 19 talks with President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe, following attacks that disrupted Chinese projects near the Afghan border. According to China’s Foreign Ministry, Li urged the two countries to “strengthen intelligence exchange and sharing” and deepen law enforcement cooperation. He also called for “strong measures” to protect Chinese nationals and enterprises in Tajikistan. Li placed those requests alongside proposals for closer economic ties, including cooperation in infrastructure and minerals. The Chinese account did not announce a new intelligence-sharing agreement or explain how the proposed cooperation would operate. Security concerns have already affected work on a major road connecting Tajikistan with China. Chinese specialists returned under armed protection to the Kalai-Khumb–Vanj section of the Dushanbe–Kulma highway earlier this year after construction stopped following the November 2025 killings. Tajikistan’s Transport Ministry said the specialists returned in April. Radio Ozodi subsequently described Tajik special forces guarding Chinese workers in Darvaz in late May. The project is funded by a $230 million Chinese grant and is being carried out by China Road and Bridge Corporation. The road runs through difficult mountain terrain toward the Kulma Pass on the Chinese frontier. Its reconstruction is intended to shorten journeys and improve year-round access. For workers on sections close to the Afghan border, however, returning to construction also required protection from armed attacks. On November 26, 2025, an assault on a company camp in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region killed three Chinese workers. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry said the attack came from Afghanistan and involved a drone carrying explosives. Four days later, gunmen targeted China Road and Bridge Corporation employees in Darvaz district. Two Chinese nationals were killed. Tajik border officials said the perpetrators came from Afghanistan, but did not publicly identify the organization responsible. Beijing subsequently pressed Dushanbe to protect its citizens. Rahmon convened senior security officials and ordered measures to prevent further attacks. Taliban officials announced two arrests in December 2025 in connection with the killings, but did not publicly identify the suspects. China’s economic connections with Tajikistan have continued to expand. On October 17, state-owned Tajiktelecom and China Mobile International launched a direct fiber-optic link through the Pamirs. The connection has an initial capacity of up to one terabit per second and provides an additional route to international communications networks. The Tajik section extends for 1,010 kilometers, including 435 kilometers through Gorno-Badakhshan, joining China’s network at the Kulma Pass. Together with the highway, the cable illustrates the importance of eastern Tajikistan to the countries’ cross-border infrastructure. For Tajikistan, the immediate issue is protecting the people building and operating these connections. Li’s request brings the protection of those workers into discussions about closer intelligence cooperation at the highest level.

Drug Smuggling

Russian Rapper Navai Detained at Kazakhstan Border on Suspicion of Drug Smuggling

Russian rapper Navai Bakirov, known professionally as Navai, was detained on October 13 while entering Kazakhstan from Kyrgyzstan. A Kazakh court has since ordered him held in custody as police investigate suspected drug smuggling and unlawful possession of narcotics. Police in Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl region said officers and border guards discovered and seized a narcotic substance during a search of his vehicle at the Korday checkpoint. They have not identified the substance or disclosed the quantity seized. Navai had performed in Bishkek the previous day as part of a Central Asian concert tour. His concert scheduled for October 14 in Astana was canceled, with organizers citing technical reasons. Kyrgyzstan’s State Border Service has launched an internal investigation into how the musician passed through its Ak-Zhol checkpoint. The service said it would take action if any violations by border officials were uncovered. Navai is a singer of Azerbaijani descent who rose to prominence as part of the duo HammAli & Navai. The duo’s popular songs include “Pustite Menya na Tantspol” (“Let Me on the Dance Floor”), “Pryatki” (“Hide and Seek”), and “Devochka-Voyna” (“Warrior Girl”).