Tokayev Expects Kazakhstan-Russia Trade to Exceed $30 Billion

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia could surpass $30 billion in 2026, following a slight decline last year. Speaking during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Tokayev said Russia remains one of the largest investors in Kazakhstan. “Over the past five years, Russia has been one of the main investors in the Kazakh economy. Trade is developing successfully. According to forecasts, this year we will confidently surpass the $30 billion mark, this is a good indicator,” Tokayev said. Trade turnover between the two countries increased by 3% in 2024 to reach $27.8 billion, but declined to $27.4 billion in 2025, Kazakhstan’s Trade Minister Arman Shakkaliyev previously reported. Kazakhstan's trade turnover with Russia has long been eclipsed by that with China and the European Union – both of which have reached around $50 billion per year. Tokayev was in Moscow on a working visit ahead of Victory Day commemorations – a visit which had appeared in doubt following the threat of Ukrainian strikes on Moscow. During the talks, the two sides discussed bilateral economic cooperation, preparations for Putin’s upcoming state visit to Kazakhstan, and the Eurasian Economic Union summit scheduled to take place in Astana on May 28-29. According to Tokayev, Kazakhstan and Russia have implemented 122 joint industrial cooperation projects out of 177 planned over the past 20 years. Tokayev also congratulated the Russian leader on the anniversary of victory in World War II. “We honor the heroes of the bloodiest war in human history,” he said, noting that 57 World War II veterans remain alive in Kazakhstan. Putin, in turn, thanked Tokayev for the visit and praised his contribution to bilateral relations. “The fact that you found it possible to come to Moscow and be with us these days is the best proof of the level of relations between Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation,” the Russian president said. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russia had tightened foreign trade procedures at the beginning of the year, a move that could affect logistics and trade flows across Central Asia.

Can the New Multimodal Route Become a Sustainable Corridor for Central Asia?

The launch of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Caspian multimodal corridor has generated significant interest as another attempt to expand Eurasian transport connectivity. A pilot shipment in the fall of 2025 demonstrated the technical feasibility of the new route: cargo transported from Kashgar, China, passed through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, reached Turkmenistan, and was then delivered to Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea, continuing along the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway toward Europe. Despite its evident geopolitical appeal, questions remain over the route’s long-term sustainability and commercial viability. The central question is whether this demonstration project can evolve into a regularly functioning transport corridor. A Third Alternative Between the Northern and Middle Corridors This multimodal route can be seen as a potential alternative to the two existing pathways: the northern route, China-Kazakhstan-Russia-Europe; and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or Middle Corridor, which passes through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. The growing geopolitical risks along the northern route since 2022, combined with capacity limitations on the Caspian segment of the TITR, have spurred interest in a third option, a so-called “southern belt” traversing Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Each country along this route has its own strategic calculus. Uzbekistan is seeking to overcome its “double continental isolation” and elevate its role as Central Asia’s transit hub. Kyrgyzstan is aiming to monetize its geographic position between China and the Ferghana Valley. Turkmenistan is developing the port of Turkmenbashi as an alternative to the increasingly congested hubs of Aktau and Alat. China, meanwhile, continues to diversify its westward overland trade routes. The Uzbek Factor: Geoeconomics vs. Logistics From Tashkent's perspective, this corridor aligns with its long-term transport strategy. Analysts frequently cite Uzbekistan’s ambition to transition from a landlocked to a “land-linked” state with direct access to China, the Caspian Sea, and southern routes to the Indian Ocean. The new route offers Uzbekistan three strategic advantages: alternative access to China via Kyrgyzstan, enhanced status as a regional transit hub, and deeper transport cooperation with Turkmenistan, including potential joint development of the Turkmenbashi port. However, when shifting from geopolitical ambition to logistical execution, serious limitations emerge, many outside Uzbekistan’s control. Kyrgyzstan: A Bottleneck in the Chain Documents from the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program highlight the continued challenges facing multimodal transport in the region, namely slow transit, poor modal integration, border delays, and outdated logistics technologies. Within this corridor, Kyrgyzstan remains the primary bottleneck. Approximately 82% of its foreign trade by weight is transported by road, making the route through this mountainous country highly seasonal, expensive, and unpredictable. According to the International Road Transport Union, Kyrgyzstan’s transport system faces severe constraints from alpine terrain, avalanches, and impassable mountain passes that render winter transport nearly impossible in many areas. It is therefore unsurprising that, following the pilot shipment, no major logistics operators committed to shifting regular cargo to this route. The Caspian Sea: Structural Constraints The Caspian Sea leg, anchored by Turkmenbashi port, presents another critical challenge. The limitations here are systemic rather than national. Key issues include insufficient...