• KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
13 October 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 641

Central Asia and Azerbaijan Discuss Trade Expansion at Turkmenistan Summit

The leaders of Central Asia and Azerbaijan met in Turkmenistan on October 8, with expanding trade between their countries high on the agenda. Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for trade among the six countries to rise to at least $20 billion, up from approximately $13 billion in 2025. The eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan was held in the resort of Avaza, with Azerbaijan participating as a full member of the grouping for the first time. According to Tokayev, trade between the six countries accounted for just 8% of their combined trade turnover last year. He proposed that governments develop a joint action plan to increase that share. Other leaders put forward proposals for closer economic ties. Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for greater cooperation in manufacturing and a Central Asia-Azerbaijan Business Forum in 2027, while Kyrgyzstan's President Sadyr Japarov proposed creating a shared e-commerce platform to make regional products more accessible. One problem is the insufficient integration of national markets. Even where countries share a border, trade is hampered by logistical constraints and differences in business operating conditions. Tokayev proposed bringing existing and planned cross-border trade and logistics complexes and industrial centers into a single network. The idea is to enable businesses from different countries to sell finished products to one another and produce them jointly. However, Kazakhstan's major transport projects are not designed solely for its neighbors. Astana is investing in railways and highways to increase freight transit between China, Central Asia, and Europe. The projects include the Moyynty–Kyzylzhar, Darbaza–Maktaaral, and Bakhty–Ayagoz railway lines, as well as the Aral–Caspian highway project. The Middle Corridor holds a particularly important place in these plans, running from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to Europe. It allows freight to bypass Russian territory and is viewed as an alternative to traditional northern routes. Kazakhstan is now proposing to explore linking the Middle Corridor with the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport project through Armenia intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. Plans for the route were outlined during talks in Washington in August 2025, and Armenia and the United States signed a framework agreement in June 2026. The route is to remain under Armenian sovereignty and jurisdiction. Astana has already established a technical group to assess its potential participation in TRIPP. For now, Tokayev is proposing that the integration of the two transport initiatives be discussed only at the expert level. At the Avaza summit, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov emphasized the importance of developing North–South transport corridors alongside East–West routes. Turkmenistan also supports the eastern branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which connects Russia with Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. However, an increase in freight traffic through Central Asia does not in itself mean that trade among its countries will grow. For that to happen, local producers need access to neighboring markets. The summit also addressed cooperation over shared water resources, with Tokayev proposing a regional framework...

How Central Asian Small Businesses Are Earning More From Local Products

For Ikhtiyor Alimov, finding foreign buyers was only part of the challenge. His dried-fruit business in northern Tajikistan also needed enough equipment to fill its orders. Alimov founded Mevai Zarrin in Isfara with eight workers and handmade machinery. Its processing capacity eventually reached 200 kilograms a day, but manual production limited further growth. With the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the company upgraded its equipment and packaging. It can now process 600–650 kilograms daily, according to the organization’s account of its development. “We were able to reduce our product waste by 20%,” Alimov said in UNDP’s regional account of the program. Across Central Asia, small producers face similar difficulties. Processing a harvest before selling it can increase producers’ earnings, but expansion requires investment that many family businesses struggle to afford. The Finland-funded Aid for Trade initiative, implemented by the UNDP, is closing after more than 15 years of work across Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. UNDP and Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of the Economy presented results in Bishkek on September 24, discussing which forms of support should continue beyond 2026. In Tajikistan, UNDP reported that the initiative helped create 147 jobs, including 90 for women since 2022. At Mevai Zarrin, support depended partly on buying fruit from local farmers and connecting producers in southern Tajikistan with processors in the north. The company signed contracts with ten farming households in Khatlon, securing supplies while giving growers another outlet for their harvests. Pooling smaller harvests can make deliveries large enough for a processor to buy. For farmers, those arrangements offer a route beyond nearby markets without requiring each household to become an exporter. Mevai Zarrin also obtained FSSC 22000 food safety certification to help it pursue new customers. In UNDP’s September profile, Alimov said the company had sent samples to prospective buyers in Germany and was awaiting their response. Processing the Harvest In Uzbekistan’s Andijan region, Dildora Nurmatova’s family business, ErElDi, has increased its profits by processing peanuts. Nurmatova began investigating the crop during her agricultural studies. By 2024, her enterprise was harvesting five metric tons from one hectare. According to UNDP’s regional retrospective, selling processed snacks rather than raw peanuts tripled her profits. [caption id="attachment_57615" align="aligncenter" width="1920"] Dildora Nurmatova in her peanut field in Uzbekistan’s Andijan region. Image: Elyor Nemat, UNDP Uzbekistan[/caption] Aid for Trade supplied processing and packaging equipment, alongside a separate workshop and a three-phase electricity connection. Business advice helped the family develop products and organize production. The company supplies packaged peanuts to Andijan’s wholesale market. Lower-grade kernels go into milled products for bakeries and ice-cream producers, giving the family a market for material that cannot be sold as premium snacks. ErElDi’s customers are close to home. The family can earn more from its harvest by doing the processing itself, before it considers the costs of finding buyers abroad. In Kyrgyzstan, UNDP reported that the project contributed to 837 new jobs, including 548 for women, and supported export contracts worth $17.1 million since 2022. [caption id="attachment_57610" align="aligncenter" width="2400"] Beekeepers...

At CAMCA, Uzbekistan Revives Push for a Stronger Regional Body

Uzbekistan has renewed its call for a stronger regional institution, with senior senator Sodiq Safoev urging Central Asian leaders to move beyond their consultative meeting format. His remarks in Baku return attention to a proposal President Shavkat Mirziyoyev outlined last November, when he called for a Community of Central Asia. Safoev, first deputy chairman of Uzbekistan’s Senate, told the CAMCA Regional Forum on October 1: “I think the time has come to transform the Consultative Meeting … into another institutional structure, not simply a Consultative Meeting, but something more.” S. Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, also called for stronger regional institutions at the forum, arguing that institutional development needed to support the expansion of transport and commercial links across the region. At the November 16, 2025, summit in Tashkent, Mirziyoyev proposed a rotating secretariat and stronger rules governing the leaders’ meetings. He also proposed making national coordinators special presidential representatives, giving them greater political authority. The secretariat would coordinate work between summits. The machinery for regular cooperation is already developing. The Council of National Coordinators held its first meeting in Tashkent on January 30–31, 2025, where foreign ministry representatives from all five Central Asian states discussed preparations for Uzbekistan’s chairmanship and a schedule of joint events. Mirziyoyev returned to the institutional argument at the July 31 informal summit in Cholpon Ata, calling for closer contacts between government departments and long-term joint programs, alongside effective cooperation institutions. His agenda included further work on common digital services and investment platforms, as well as industrial links connecting production across national borders. He also urged stronger coordination in the Central Asia Plus diplomatic formats through which the region engages outside powers. Azerbaijan’s participation has widened the scope of those discussions. The five Central Asian presidents accepted Azerbaijan as a full participant in November 2025, extending the format across the Caspian. The six-country grouping, increasingly described as C6, connects Central Asian producers with a country whose ports and onward transport links provide access through the South Caucasus to European markets. At an August 12 discussion in Washington, Uzbekistan’s ambassador Furqat Sidiqov emphasized market access and called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. He said Uzbekistan had about 1,500 joint ventures with neighboring states, compared with close to 300 involving Central Asian countries in 2017. Turkmenistan’s ambassador, Esen Aydogdyyev, stressed simpler customs procedures and argued that his country’s permanent neutrality was compatible with deeper economic cooperation. The commercial ambition also extends to joint production. In Baku, Azerbaijan’s minister of the economy Mikayil Jabbarov urged countries to build regional value chains in sectors where their economies complement each other. “We should increasingly produce together,” he said, pointing to companies and financial institutions already operating in one another’s markets. Moving freight across the Caspian requires countries to coordinate customs procedures and transport services. The World Bank’s new Trans-Caspian corridor study identifies fragmented governance and uneven policy implementation as problems that compound infrastructure bottlenecks. It estimates that at least $25 billion is needed through 2040...

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan Target $1 Billion in Trade as Investment and Transit Links Expand

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have set a target of increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030, as economic ties expand from a relatively low base into vehicle manufacturing, oil and gas, investment, and transport across the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Uzbekistan on August 23–24 added new projects to that list. The two presidents signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship and a program aimed at increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030. Political relations, meanwhile, have been moving faster than economic ties. In 2023, the two countries established the Supreme Interstate Council, and a year later they signed a Treaty on Allied Relations. The latest trip was Aliyev’s third state visit to Uzbekistan in five years and his seventh visit overall. Aliyev said ahead of his trip to Tashkent that bilateral trade more than tripled in 2025 to reach $795 million. Uzbekistan’s Center for Economic Research and Reforms, however, reported a much lower total of $307.3 million for the same year. Neither side has explained the discrepancy, which may reflect different definitions of trade. Sustaining growth toward the $1 billion target will require broader trade and more joint production, including goods aimed at markets beyond the two countries. From Trade to Investment The Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan Investment Company is intended to help turn some of these plans into operating businesses. Established in 2023 with $500 million in capital, the company finances projects in both countries. Some areas of cooperation have already reached the production stage. Azerbaijan’s Azermash CP works with Uzbek manufacturers to produce Chevrolet and Isuzu vehicles in Azerbaijan. By July, more than 10,700 Chevrolet vehicles and 275 Isuzu buses had been produced. More than 130 commercial entities with Uzbek investment are registered in Azerbaijan. During the latest visit, the two sides opened a gypsum plant. They also laid foundations for five SOCAR filling stations and a silver-ore enrichment plant. For Baku, the interest in Uzbekistan is understandable. With a population of more than 38 million, Uzbekistan is Central Asia’s most populous country. The Uzbek economy is growing rapidly, while the authorities are opening more sectors to private and foreign capital. For Azerbaijani companies, this offers access to a market considerably larger than their own as well as a foothold in Central Asia. For Tashkent, Azerbaijan offers investment and expertise in the oil and gas sector. SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company, has been operating in Uzbekistan for years. A joint venture between Uzbekistan’s O‘ZLITINEFTGAZ and the Azerbaijani company’s research institute has been operating since 2016. Cooperation is now gradually moving from engineering services toward much larger exploration and potential production projects. The main project is on the Ustyurt Plateau in western Uzbekistan. BP joined the project in May 2026 with a 40% stake, while SOCAR, which is the operator, and Uzbekneftegaz each hold 30%. Total investment could reach around $2 billion if commercially viable reserves are found and the project proceeds to development. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the project envisages extensive seismic...

Patient Capital, Fast Deals: Japan and South Korea Take Different Paths into Central Asia

Japan and South Korea have reached the same strategic conclusion: Central Asia matters to their economic security. Yet they are pursuing that goal through markedly different playbooks. In December 2025, Tokyo hosted the first leaders' summit of the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue, 21 years after the format was launched. All five Central Asian presidents attended. Japan set a target of three trillion yen in business projects across the region over five years - roughly $19 billion at the time - while placing critical-mineral supply chains among the summit's priority areas. The bilateral announcements were equally significant. Uzbekistan presented a proposed project portfolio worth more than $12 billion and called for a joint investment platform to advance it. Kazakhstan and Japan announced a package of public- and private-sector agreements worth $3.7 billion. These included a long-term uranium contract and an offtake agreement under which Kazakhstan's Eurasian Resources Group would supply gallium to Mitsubishi Corporation RTM Japan. The timing was no accident. By May 2026, Chinese shipments to Japan of dysprosium and terbium remained close to zero, while exports of finished rare earth magnets to Japan fell 35% from the previous month. These materials are essential to high-performance magnets. For Tokyo, diversifying critical mineral supply is no longer a distant policy objective; it is an immediate industrial requirement. South Korea has been moving toward the same destination by a different route. During then-President Yoon Suk Yeol's state visit to Kazakhstan in 2024, the two countries signed a critical minerals memorandum allowing Korean companies to participate in the exploration and development of lithium, chromium, uranium, and rare earths. Seoul is now preparing to host the first Korea-Central Asia summit on September 16-17, 2026, elevating years of bilateral and multilateral engagement to the leaders' level. [caption id="attachment_52351" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: Japan Cabinet Public Affairs Office[/caption] Why Central Asia Counts Both Japan and South Korea are resource-poor manufacturing powers whose leading industries depend on secure supplies of imported minerals. South Korea imports more than 95% of the critical minerals it consumes. Japan received its own warning in 2010, when Chinese rare earth shipments were disrupted during a territorial dispute, and the pressure has returned in a sharper form in 2026. Central Asia cannot replace China in the short term, but it offers Tokyo and Seoul a credible route toward diversification. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan combine substantial mineral potential with governments eager to attract investment, technology, and new export markets. Kazakhstan is already a major producer of uranium and chromium, and has significant copper, titanium, and rare earth prospects. In April 2025, Kazakhstan announced the possible discovery of a rare earth deposit containing more than 20 million metric tons of resources. If further exploration confirms that estimate, the country could possess one of the world's largest rare earth resource bases. However, the distinction between a resource estimate and a usable supply chain is crucial. A discovery is not a producing mine, and a mine is not a processing industry. Exploration, environmental approvals, infrastructure, separation, refining, and...

Uzbekistan and Belarus Establish Strategic Partnership in Minsk

Uzbekistan and Belarus have established a strategic partnership following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's official visit to Minsk, where the two governments signed a broad package of economic, labor, scientific, and cultural agreements. According to the Uzbek presidential press service, Mirziyoyev visited Minsk on July 8-9 at the invitation of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. He was welcomed with an official ceremony at the Palace of Independence before the two leaders held both one-on-one and expanded talks with their delegations. The visit marked a notable milestone in a relationship that has expanded steadily in recent years. Diplomatic relations between Uzbekistan and Belarus were established on January 21, 1993, but Uzbekistan opened its first embassy in Minsk only in March 2018. Before that, the Uzbek Embassy in Russia also covered Belarus. The relationship is developing while Belarus remains under extensive European Union sanctions over human rights abuses and its support for Russia's war against Ukraine. Speaking after the talks, Mirziyoyev said the visit had become “a historic event in the development of Uzbek-Belarusian relations.” He said the newly signed declaration “marks the beginning of a new chapter in strengthening interstate cooperation” and demonstrates both countries’ commitment to long-term partnership. The leaders highlighted the rapid growth in economic ties. According to the Uzbek side, bilateral trade has nearly tripled over the past five years and approached $1 billion by the end of 2025, while trade during the first months of 2026 rose by another 30%. Official figures differ according to methodology. The Uzbek side said bilateral trade approached $1 billion in 2025, while Belarusian trade figures put goods trade at almost $855 million and services at $207.9 million. Belarusian state news agency BelTA also said around 230 enterprises with Belarusian capital are registered in Uzbekistan and that Belarus had a positive trade balance of more than $517 million. Both presidents said the target of $2 billion in annual trade is achievable by 2030. To support that goal, the two governments adopted a 2026-2030 action plan covering trade, economic, social, and humanitarian cooperation. The plan includes measures to expand collaboration in agriculture, mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, electrical engineering, microelectronics, textiles, furniture production, and other manufacturing sectors. One of the most significant areas discussed was nuclear energy. The Uzbek presidential press service said the parties agreed to draw on Belarusian experience in the construction of Uzbekistan’s first nuclear power plant and related infrastructure. Belarus operates the Russian-financed Ostrovets plant, whose two VVER-1200 units were built by Atomstroyexport. Uzbekistan’s own project is being developed with Russia’s Rosatom and is planned to combine two VVER-1000 reactors with two smaller RITM-200N units. Political analyst Mukhtor Nazirov said the declaration represented a qualitative change and could create opportunities for investment, technology transfer, and industrial cooperation. He described nuclear cooperation as “one of the most important components of the strategic partnership,” arguing that it required a particularly high level of trust. Labor migration also emerged as a major theme. During the talks, Lukashenko invited Uzbek citizens, especially families, to move to Belarus to...