• KZT/USD = 0.00213
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
07 August 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 2

The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules

In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days...

Dynastic Politics Take Shape in Uzbekistan

More than a week after President Shavkat Mirziyoyev restructured Uzbekistan’s presidential administration — formally elevating his daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, to one of the most powerful posts in the country — the political ramifications are still unfolding. The move, which reintroduced the post of Head of the Presidential Administration and placed it in family hands, has drawn both domestic scrutiny and international attention for what it signals: the clearest step yet toward dynastic succession in post-Soviet Central Asia. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reinstated the position of Head of the Presidential Administration through a presidential decree. The office had previously been abolished in August 2023, but her appointment formalizes what had become an influential de facto position. Since 2019, Saida Mirziyoyeva has steadily risen through the ranks of Uzbekistan’s political system, from deputy director of the Agency for Information and Mass Communications to head of the Information Policy sector, and most recently, First Assistant to the President. Her meeting with the Russian presidential administration in June 2025 is seen as a sign of international positioning, with Moscow reportedly signaling that it would not oppose a dynastic transition as long as its strategic interests remain intact. Analysts have pointed out that this appointment cements Saida’s formal role, casting her status within the government apparatus in stone and making any reversal unlikely. While some see this as a move toward a dynastic handover, others argue she still faces competition from within the elite. One such rival is Otabek Umarov, the president’s son-in-law, who holds a powerful position in the Security Service and is considered the 'gray cardinal' of Uzbek politics. In a dramatic twist, Komil Allamjonov — former head of the Information Policy Department and a close ally of Saida — has returned as her advisor. He previously resigned in September 2024 amid a reported feud with Umarov and survived an assassination attempt in October 2024. His return is seen by many as a sign of Umarov’s waning influence, though analysts caution that he still retains significant power in security structures. The rivalry could deepen internal fractures within the ruling elite, raising the risk of future instability.