In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia.
This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession.
The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called “gun-carriage race.” As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor.
A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan.
Turkmenistan’s first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency.
After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor’s personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation.
In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to “give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country.” Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy.
That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People.
Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances.
Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan.
When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days before being officially confirmed. Mirziyoyev, then prime minister, was appointed chairman of the state funeral commission. Under the constitution, Senate Chairman Nigmatilla Yuldashev should have become acting president, but he stood aside and parliament appointed Mirziyoyev instead.
During his presidency, Mirziyoyev has transformed Uzbekistan’s economy, opened the country to foreign investment, and pursued a far more active foreign policy. Yet the political system has retained its strongly presidential character. The appointment of his daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, as Head of the Presidential Administration in June 2025 has fuelled renewed speculation about possible future succession scenarios, even though the authorities have never publicly discussed the issue.
Tajikistan arrived at its current political model by a different route. Emomali Rahmon emerged as the country’s leader during the civil war after becoming Chairman of the Supreme Council following the resignation of President Rahmon Nabiyev. When the presidency was restored in 1994, Rahmon assumed the office and has remained there ever since.
For years, political analysts and representatives of the Tajik opposition have regarded Rahmon’s eldest son, Rustam Emomali – Chairman of the National Assembly and Mayor of Dushanbe – as the most likely successor. Under Article 71 of Tajikistan’s Constitution, the president’s duties pass to the Chairman of the Majlisi Milli in the event of death, resignation, or incapacity until a newly elected president takes office.
Kazakhstan long appeared to be the exception. In March 2019, First President Nursultan Nazarbayev unexpectedly resigned, and under the Constitution the presidency passed to Senate Speaker Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Nazarbayev later acknowledged that he had viewed Tokayev as his preferred successor well before the formal transfer of power.
The January 2022 unrest marked a turning point in Kazakhstan’s political development. After the crisis, Tokayev significantly strengthened his position, while the reforms that followed eventually culminated in a new Constitution, approved in March 2026 and in force from July 1, which created a vice presidency and further reshaped the architecture of the state.
Whether the current model represents another stage in its evolution remains to be seen. In July 2026, the Constitutional Court ruled that Tokayev may seek another presidential term under the new constitutional order, although he has not announced that he will do so.
Kyrgyzstan occupies a unique place in this story.
President Sadyr Japarov came to power in the aftermath of yet another political upheaval following the disputed parliamentary elections of October 2020. The protests that swept the country led to his release from prison and propelled him to the presidency. One of the central figures behind those events was Kamchybek Tashiyev, who became one of the most influential figures in Kyrgyz politics.
Japarov is already the sixth president in Kyrgyzstan’s history as an independent state. The 2017 handover from Almazbek Atambayev to Sooronbay Jeenbekov was the country’s first peaceful transfer from one elected president to another. Kyrgyzstan has nevertheless experienced repeated presidential upheavals, including revolutions in 2005, 2010, and 2020.
For years, Western observers described Kyrgyzstan as Central Asia’s “island of democracy.” Yet repeated political crises have gradually changed the country’s trajectory. The current leadership has steadily strengthened presidential authority, tightened control over political life, and made little secret of its determination to prevent a repeat of past upheavals. The presidential election scheduled for January 2027 is expected to show how firmly that strategy has taken hold.
Thirty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has developed its own approach to political succession. It is not a single model. In some countries, continuity increasingly revolves around political families; in others, carefully prepared successors inherit power through established institutions. Kazakhstan has followed a different course, combining constitutional procedures with political reform, while Kyrgyzstan continues to search for a formula capable of delivering stability without repeating the turbulence that has defined much of its modern history.
The region’s systems differ in form, but they share one objective: ensuring that political transitions remain as controlled and predictable as possible.
Perhaps the greatest irony is that Kyrgyzstan – the only Central Asian state where power has repeatedly changed hands through popular protest – is now moving closer to the governance model long associated with its neighbors.
How far that transformation will go may become clearer after the presidential election in January 2027.
