EU Relations - The Times Of Central Asia

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A New Great Game: Multipolar Competition in Central Asia

At a time when the European Union, China, and Turkey are seeking to strengthen their presence in Central Asia, the United States administration is consumed with bilaterally implementing a seismic shift in its trade policy with the entire world. Although this region of post-Soviet space is widely seen as a new front of rivalry between Washington and Beijing, in many aspects, American influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan lags far behind that of other actors. Culture (soft power) has always played an important role in the foreign policy of every great power. The Soviet Union was no exception. As a result, even today, Russian, rather than English, is still the lingua franca in Central Asia, although Moscow, following its invasion of Ukraine, has had a hard time preserving remnants of its former dominance in the region. Russian cinema, however, maintains a notable presence in most, if not all, Central Asian states. While Hollywood movies have a strong global presence, Russian films in Central Asia often act as a link between Western content and the region's cultural traditions. Millions of Central Asian migrants working in Russia also serve as a bridge between their nations and the Russian Federation, facilitating cultural exchange, economic ties, and the spread of the Russian language. However, Russia’s fiasco in Ukraine has created space for the EU to assert its influence in a region that has traditionally been in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit. Nevertheless, although Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, are Tajikistan are members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, they have remained neutral in the Ukraine conflict. For Central Asian nations, the EU serves as a counterweight they can use to balance their relations with Moscow. The EU, however, faces strong economic competition from China. With a trade volume of $94.8 billion with Central Asian states, Beijing is positioning itself as the major economic power operating in the five regional nations. Although the European Union’s influence in Central Asia is expected to continue to grow in the coming years, if investment trends from recent years persist, the balance in the region will likely tilt towards China, which will increase its presence and influence at the expense of Russia. But where does the United States fit into this dynamic? Even though the U.S. is the largest economy in the world, with which almost everyone wants to engage, American bilateral trade with the region has never been particularly strong, with the exception of Kazakhstan. Interestingly enough, it is Astana that is expected to suffer the most among Central Asian actors due to U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs – 27% on Kazakhstan compared to 10% on all other nations in the region. Exceptions may be made for Kazakhstan’s critical minerals, however, which are now the third largest in the world based on a recent discovery, with reports suggesting that some goods, including “certain minerals that are not available in the United States,” as well as energy, will not be subject to the tariffs. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry...

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EU Pledges Steady Support for Tajikistan Ahead of Historic Central Asia Summit

The European Union will maintain its current level of assistance to Tajikistan despite the recent suspension of U.S. funding through USAID, EU Ambassador to Tajikistan Raimundas Karoblis has confirmed. He emphasized that European and American aid programs operate independently and that EU support will remain unaffected. “Aid from the EU will continue and will not be reduced,” Karoblis stated. He added that the EU's assistance framework for Tajikistan is already set through 2027 and cannot be revised before then. Discussions about increased support may take place after that period. EU and Central Asia: Toward a Historic Summit On March 27, Ashgabat will host the 20th meeting of foreign ministers from the European Union and Central Asia. The key objective of this gathering is to prepare for the first-ever EU-Central Asia Summit, scheduled for April 3-4 in Samarkand. The summit will bring together the President of the European Council, the head of the European Commission, and the leaders of all five Central Asian states. According to the EU Delegation in Tajikistan, the summit will mark a new milestone in EU-Central Asia relations, reflecting the EU’s deepening political engagement with the region. Financial Assistance and Strategic Priorities Between 2021 and 2027, the EU has committed more than €550 million in aid to Central Asia, with €142 million allocated to Tajikistan. The focus areas include building an inclusive green economy, investing in human capital, and ensuring sustainable management of natural resources. Under its Global Gateway initiative, the EU is working to develop smart and sustainable connectivity across transport, digital infrastructure, energy, and education. A key initiative is the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, to which the EU has allocated more than €88 million. Other efforts target enhanced digital and energy integration in the region. In the strategic domain of critical raw materials, the EU has earmarked €16 million to support local value chains and promote sustainable investments. Additionally, through the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), €30 million in guarantees have been allocated for renewable energy and raw material extraction projects. Security, Education, and Youth Engagement The EU plays an active role in regional security initiatives. Its BOMCA program supports border management and the fight against transnational crime, while the CADAP program focuses on drug use prevention. In Tajikistan specifically, the EU, in partnership with the OSCE, is implementing a project to strengthen the capacity of border guards along the Tajik-Afghan frontier. The EU also contributes to counter-terrorism efforts and collaborates with the government on related initiatives. Education and youth empowerment are additional EU priorities. From 2013 to 2027, €95 million has been directed toward reforming Tajikistan’s education sector. The Erasmus+ program received €73 million for 2021-2027, enabling students from Central Asia to study at European universities. Youth employment is also being addressed through the €10 million DARYA program, and the recently launched €4.5 million Regional Civil Society Fund (as of September 2024) is aimed at strengthening civic engagement. Karoblis reaffirmed the EU’s long-term commitment to Tajikistan, noting that assistance will remain consistent,...

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Opinion: In Central Asia, the EU Defies Its “Geopolitical Dwarf” Label

As the United States and Russia reportedly aim to create a new global security architecture, other major actors in the international arena are working to improve their positions in the redefined world order. Often underestimated in terms of its geopolitical influence, the European Union has actively focused its attention on the post-Soviet space, particularly the strategically important Central Asian region. The EU, despite Russia’s and the United States' attempts to undermine its role in the settlement of the Ukraine War and to portray it as a “geopolitical dwarf”, is seeking to increase its presence in global affairs. In Central Asia, the 27-nation bloc is often viewed as a key actor that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan can rely on to balance China’s growing dominance, as well as their security and dependence on Moscow. The EU's desire to strengthen cooperation with Central Asia can be seen as Brussels’ attempt to reduce Russia's influence in the region. Indeed, bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow is slowly but surely being pushed out of Central Asia – a region that has traditionally been within the Kremlin’s geopolitical orbit. As a result, China has managed to significantly increase its economic presence in all five Central Asian nations. The EU is now attempting to do the same. The recent visit of the European Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela to Central Asia, as well as the upcoming EU-Central Asia summit scheduled for April 3-4, 2025 in Samarkand, clearly indicates the intensifying geopolitical competition between the EU and China over the region. One of Síkela’s major goals was to expand the scope of the EU's investment strategy, Global Gateway, in Central Asia. The project, launched in 2021, is often viewed as the EU’s version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As part of its strategy to increase its economic presence in Central Asia, the European Union seems to have four priorities: the development of transport infrastructure (particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor), cooperation in raw materials, digital connectivity, and the development of the water resources, energy, and climate sectors. The problem for Brussels is that China, due to its proximity to Central Asia and the lack of bureaucratic procedures, is ahead of the EU in most, if not all of these areas. Beijing has had 12 years to strengthen economic ties with the region through the BRI. As a result, in 2024, China’s overall turnover with Central Asia reached $94.8 billion, nearly double the EU's trade volume with the region in 2022, which stood at $47 billion. Last year, the world’s second-largest economy replaced Russia as Kazakhstan's biggest trade partner. In neighboring Uzbekistan, it remains the top trading partner, while in Tajikistan, over the past 18 years, China has become the major investor in the landlocked nation’s economy. The same applies to Tajikistan and China’s neighbor Kyrgyzstan. The European Union, however, is now intensifying its efforts to position itself as a major foreign power operating in Central Asia. According to...

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Does the European Parliament Judge Central Asia Fairly?

In 2024, European Parliament (EP) resolutions on Central Asia emphasized its increasing significance in a world that is being reshaped by Russia’s war on Ukraine and China’s growing assertiveness. They focused on strengthening the EU’s partnerships with Central Asia while seeking to advance democratic values and human rights. These Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements aim to support economic reforms, foster sustainable development, and encourage regional cooperation. At the same time, reflecting the EU’s strategic focus on stability and resilience in the region, the EP’s resolutions urged the Central Asian states to decrease their dependency on Russian energy and avoid facilitating sanctions evasion. For the Central Asian countries, all these initiatives present opportunities to address pressing challenges and pave the way for growth. Advancing democratic governance and protecting fundamental rights, for example, can foster more inclusive and stable societies. Deeper engagement with the EU also offers access to advanced technologies and investments (as well as global markets), which are necessary for innovation and infrastructure upgrades. Likewise, the diversification of energy sources enhances regional self-reliance, reducing vulnerabilities that are tied to over-dependence on a single partner. Alignment with EU priorities, including resistance to autocratic pressures, gives Central Asia a better chance to develop its resilience and interconnected future. Some voices in the region, however — particularly among government officials and more traditionally-minded citizens — view the European Parliament's 2024 resolutions as overly critical, indeed influenced by special interests that fail to take into account the region’s unique challenges and priorities. From a Central Asian perspective, the criticisms contained in the EP’s resolutions lack essential context, focus narrowly on perceived shortcomings, and fail to give adequate consideration to the complex situation underlying governmental decisions. Such a one-sided approach, they suggest, overlooks essential cultural, historical, socio-political, and geopolitical factors. The result is a significant gap between the EU’s expectations on the one hand, and, on the other, what is reasonable to expect given the realities on the ground. The drafters of these documents often focus excessively on identifying deficiencies in democratic processes. They report violations without contextualizing the governments’ choices and often omit any mention of the views of the general public. The unfortunate consequence is that such criticisms vitiate good-faith attempts to build cooperation and partnership. The ideal becomes the enemy of the possible. Most Europeans still have a poor understanding of Central Asia. Many MEPs lack the time or resources to grasp the region’s complexity. Instead, their decisions are too often informed by resolutions that are drafted by a small group of “experts”. The language of these resolutions often reflects the drafters’ personal biases, which in turn risk deforming Europe’s strategic relationships with the region. A lack of proper scrutiny is all the more alarming in light of the Qatargate scandal, which exposed how state-funded lobbyists can distort human rights narratives to advance specific agendas. Maria Arena, the former head of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), played a central role in shaping judgments on democratic practices in Central Asia,...

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Soar in Lithuania’s Central Asian Migrant Population

Lithuanian intelligence reports that the number of Central Asian migrants in the country has increased 14-fold since 2021. According to Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė, the number overall is still relatively small and is not a cause for concern. She explained that the labor market, once filled by workers from Ukraine and Belarus, has shifted following the call for Ukrainian men to fight in the war. As a result, more Central Asian workers are being hired. Darius Jauniškis, head of Lithuania’s State Security Department, told LNK News that his agency cannot screen all migrants, raising counter-intelligence and terrorism concerns, and because the government is working on next year’s budget, his remark is perceived as a request for more funding for the VSD (State Security Department). In response, the Prime Minister said the growth in migrants, though large, isn't particularly high. She stated that only a few hundred foreign nationals had been issued with temporary residence permits in Lithuania this year, but added: “There were indeed problems. These problems were already partially regulated by existing laws- and - from 2025 onwards, when the quota [for workers from third countries] who can come to Lithuania will be in force, it will be possible to impose additional regulations on these issues." Data from the Migration Department shows that as of October 1, around 10,600 Uzbeks were living in Lithuania, compared to 8,200 at the start of the year, and the 998 recorded in early 2022. Thus, Uzbeks now make up the fourth-largest foreign community in Lithuania. The number of migrants from Tajikistan also increased from 5,700 to 7,200 in the first nine months of 2024.

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A Closer Look: Scholz Trip Shows Europe’s Interest in Central Asia

Energy, trade, climate change, geopolitical conflict. These are some of the big themes surrounding a trip by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Central Asia, whose countries seek to expand their range of international partners while securing their autonomy from outside, sometimes competing influences. Joined by German business leaders, Scholz was scheduled to arrive in Uzbekistan on Sunday and also visit Kazakhstan prior to a Central Asia-Germany summit there on Tuesday, the last day of his tour. It is Scholz’s first trip to Central Asia, signaling how important the region has become for Europe as it seeks new energy alternatives to reduce dependence on supplies from Russia since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Western-backed Ukraine in February 2022. The relationship goes beyond the stopgap purchase of energy and minerals, even though Russian officials has accused Western countries of trying to use Central Asia as a tool in their conflict with Russia. At an inaugural summit last year in Berlin, Germany along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan agreed to a “strategic regional partnership.” European countries recognize that the Central Asia is deeply bound to Russia and China, the regional powers, and that European and Central Asian goals and priorities won’t always align, according to Western analysts. However, Central Asian countries also recognize that engaging with Europe, the United States and other more distant partners is in their interests because it helps them to maintain strategic autonomy and leverage. “If the Central Asian states want to gain weight and be heard in the emerging multipolar world order, they must strengthen their technological, industrial and geopolitical independence,” analysts said in a commentary posted by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, which advises the German government and parliament. “This does not necessarily imply decoupling from Russia and China, but rather spreading risk through the addition (not substitution) of partners.” The analysts said Germany should bolster Central Asian autonomy by helping to strengthen the region’s “crisis resilience” via support on issues such as transport routes, electricity infrastructure and water management. They also said European efforts to “win the support of regional states for Western sanctions against Russia must be measured against the realities on the ground” – an apparent reference to the trade with Russia that Central Asia considers vital to its economies. Kazakhstan, which shares a long land border with Russia, has in particular faced a difficult balancing act on sanctions. At a press briefing with Scholz in Berlin in September 2023, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said his country would comply with Western sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine war while still cooperating with its neighbor. However, Serik Zhumangarin, Kazakhstan’s deputy prime minister and trade minister, told the Bloomberg news agency last month that Kazakhstan won’t always “blindly follow the sanctions” and will be looking out for its own economic interests. Human rights groups want Scholz to bring up freedoms and the rule of law during his trip to Central Asia. They argue that avoiding the topic will only hinder efforts to bring German investment...