KazMunaiGas - The Times Of Central Asia

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Oil and Gas

KMG Pushes Back on Reports of European Asset Sale Amid Romania Refinery Losses

KazMunaiGaz (KMG) says it has no concrete plans to sell any of its European assets, though pressure is building to at least sell off some of the Kazakh company’s shares in oil refineries in Romania. Reports on November 21 said KMG was looking to privatize up to 50% of its shares in its subsidiary KMG International’s (KMGI) European operations in Europe. The reports were based on a list of recommendations from Kazakhstan’s Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition (APDC), which proposed, as part of the 2026-2027 strategy, that KMGI should have a two-stage tender to sell up to 50% of its stakes. On November 26, KMG denied making any decisions about KMGI businesses in Europe, adding that the APDC’s list of recommendations “includes assets from different sectors, but this in itself does not automatically trigger a sale.” Rompetrol KMGI has 28 companies operating in seven countries, four of them European, but the focus of reports was on the two oil refineries KMGI owns in Romania. KMGI purchased 75% of the shares in the Romanian oil company Rompetrol in 2007, and in 2009 bought the remaining 25% of shares in the company. That sale included the Petromidia oil refinery, with a capacity of some five million tons annually, and the smaller Vega refinery, with a capacity of some 350,000 tons that Rompetrol owns. KMGI also took ownership of the oil terminal near Constanta on the Black Sea coast, some 20 kilometers from the Petromidia refinery. The terminal imports mainly Kazakh oil. KMGI invested billions of dollars in upgrades and modernization of the refineries and the terminal, and finally, in 2017, operations of subsidiary Rompetrol Rafinare (54.63% KMGI and 44.7% Romanian state through the energy Ministry) showed a profit - $80 million. By 2022, profits had slightly increased to $90.3 million, but in December that year, the Romanian authorities changed tax regulations, and in 2023, Rompetrol Rafinare registered a net loss of some $270.5 million, and in 2024, a loss of $78 million. In the first six months of 2025, the company lost $53 million and paid some $771 million in taxes to the Romanian government. Rompetrol Rafinare has complained to the Romanian government that the tax burden is preventing the company from investing in new projects and has brought a legal challenge to the solidarity tax in court. In such a situation, it seems unlikely KMG would easily find a party interested in buying up to 50% of KMGI’s Romanian operation, unless the price was very low. Opponents of the proposed arrangement point to the $7 billion in investment KMG has made over nearly 20 years into upgrading the Romanian refineries as a reason to be patient for a while longer. KMGI KMG has subsidiaries operating in Switzerland, Bulgaria, Turkey, Moldova, and Georgia, as well as in Romania and Kazakhstan. At the start of 2025, there were reports that KMG was considering the acquisition of an oil refinery in Bulgaria from Russia’s LUKoil, so it appeared the Kazakh company...

U.S. Sanctions

U.S. Eases Sanctions on Key Kazakh Oil Projects

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), oil producer Tengizchevroil (TCO), and the Karachaganak field have been granted permission to resume services and conduct transactions related to their operational activities, following a United States Treasury Department decision to ease sanctions. The Tengiz and Karachaganak fields are located in Kazakhstan, and Kazakh oil is exported through the CPC system. In October, the U.S. Treasury added Russian oil giants Lukoil and Rosneft, along with 34 of their subsidiaries, to its latest package of sanctions. However, experts now suggest that the exemption of key projects in Kazakhstan could have a stabilizing effect on the country's oil sector and its broader economy. The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License No. 124B, allowing services and other transactions required to maintain the operations of the CPC, Tengizchevroil, and the Karachaganak project, even when sanctioned entities such as Lukoil and Rosneft are involved. The license does not permit any transactions related to the sale or transfer of shares in these projects. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy, Yerlan Akkenzhenov, confirmed on November 12 that the government is working to have the Karachaganak field fully exempt from the U.S. sanctions regime. The CPC system links oil fields in western Kazakhstan and parts of Russia with a marine terminal in Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast. It remains the main export route for Kazakh oil, carrying more than 80% of the country’s crude. The system has an annual capacity of about 83 million tons. CPC shareholders include Kazakhstan, holding a combined 20.75% through KazMunayGas (19%) and Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC (1.75%). Other shareholders include Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium Company (15%), Lukoil International GmbH (12.5%), Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company (7.5%), Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures Limited (7.5%), BG Overseas Holdings Limited (2%), Eni International N.A. N.V. (2%), and Oryx Caspian Pipeline LLC (1.75%). The Russian government and Transneft also hold significant stakes. Tengizchevroil LLP, the operator of the Tengiz field, is a joint venture between Chevron (50%), ExxonMobil Kazakhstan Ventures Inc. (25%), KazMunayGas (20%), and Lukoil (5%). Tengiz is one of Kazakhstan’s largest oil fields, with reserves estimated at 3.1 billion tons. The Karachaganak field is among the world’s largest, with development carried out by the Karachaganak Petroleum Operating consortium. Shell and Eni serve as joint operators, and the partnership also includes Chevron (18%), Lukoil (13.5%), and KazMunayGas (10%). On November 13, it was reported that KazMunayGas is considering acquiring Lukoil’s stake in the Karachaganak project, reflecting efforts to manage shifting ownership dynamics under the sanctions environment.

Oil and Gas

Tokayev Moves to Reclaim Kazakhstan’s Energy Future

In January 2025, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev instructed the government to seek revisions to the nation’s production-sharing agreements (PSAs). The first known result of that directive has now surfaced, with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) publishing a report regarding a confidential interim ruling in an arbitration case. According to this information, Kazakhstan is pursuing a $160 billion claim against the North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC), the consortium managing the Kashagan oil field. The ruling states that after royalty payments, NCOC receives 98% of remaining revenue from Kashagan’s output. The document concerns a narrower environmental dispute, but the 98% figure alters the landscape. The contract in question dates to the 1990s, when Kazakhstan — newly independent, fiscally constrained, and eager for technical expertise — entered into deals that prioritized attracting investment over securing long-term national benefit. The government now argues that those historical constraints no longer apply, while the revenue-sharing terms remain effectively frozen in place. Rather than seek unilateral redress or executive override, Tokayev’s administration has turned to arbitration. The venue, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and the legal framing mark a continuation of Kazakhstan’s methodical approach to reasserting national interests in its domestic political economy. This latest move cannot be understood as an isolated decision. It reflects a trajectory of state behavior extending back three decades. In the early 1990s, when Chevron’s bid for Tengiz was effectively imposed as a condition for U.S. bilateral assistance, Kazakhstan lacked both the leverage and the institutional competence to resist — a dynamic I analyzed in detail at the time. Chevron’s refusal to direct more than a token amount of investment to social infrastructure nearly sank the agreement. A similar dynamic surrounded the financing and structuring of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Kazakhstan’s attempts to assert greater influence were often thwarted, not least by the asymmetry of legal expertise and negotiating experience. That imbalance began to shift by the early 2000s. The creation of KazMunaiGas (KMG) in 2002 consolidated the state's participation in the energy sector and enabled its strategic action to become more coordinated. By 2003, Kazakhstan was insisting on conformity with international accounting standards at Tengiz, not only to ensure transparency but also to block attempts by foreign operators to defer investment obligations. Environmental enforcement became more assertive as well, with fines imposed on Tengizchevroil for massive open-air sulfur storage, a practice that had long provoked public concern. The Kashagan field, discovered in the late 1990s and described as the largest oil find since Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay in 1968, became the focal point of these tensions. From the outset, Kazakhstan’s participation in the consortium was marginal. A restructuring of the consortium in the early 2000s brought KMG back in, but cost overruns and delays continued. By 2007, the government had suspended work at Kashagan, citing both ecological violations and spiraling expenditures, in a sequence of events I traced contemporaneously during the legislative and consortium restructuring that followed. Amendments to the Law on the Subsurface followed, granting...