U.S. Sanctions - The Times Of Central Asia

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С5+1

C5+1 Statement Omits Afghanistan, Prioritizes Trans-Caspian Trade

The United States and the five Central Asian republics have issued a joint statement on economic and security cooperation that makes no mention of Afghanistan, once a central concern of U.S. regional policy. The document followed the October 19 C5+1 ministerial meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Afghanistan's absence from the statement does not mean it has disappeared from negotiations or Washington's strategic interests. Nevertheless, a comparison with earlier C5+1 documents reveals a shift in the published agenda. Where Washington once placed considerable importance on connecting Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, the latest statement focuses on trade across the Caspian Sea and investment in the region's minerals. Afghanistan's Changing Place in C5+1 Talks In July 2021, just weeks before the Taliban retook Kabul, C5+1 participants at a conference in Tashkent explicitly supported closer trade and transport links between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan, as well as efforts to secure peace in the country. That month, the U.S., Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also announced plans for a quadrilateral platform to support trade and transportation projects linking the two regions. In July 2023, Afghanistan was the subject of a separate C5+1 special session in Astana. Officials called for an inclusive Afghan government that respected women's rights and backed further development of transport and energy links through the country. A joint statement issued by C5+1 leaders that September described Afghanistan as an important factor in Central Asian security. In the 2026 Samarkand statement, Afghanistan goes unmentioned even in the section on border security and terrorism. However, the October 2023 C5+1 connectivity statement had already highlighted the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, which connects Central Asia to Western markets, and also omitted Afghanistan. For Central Asian countries, the Afghan route remains important in practical terms. Uzbekistan is pursuing plans for a railway through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to Indian Ocean ports. Kazakhstan is already a major supplier of food to Afghanistan, exporting around $216 million worth of flour and $122 million of wheat in the first seven months of 2026. In September, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to study a railway corridor through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all share borders with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also face the prospect of reduced water supplies from the Amu Darya as Afghanistan builds its Qosh Tepa Canal. Afghanistan's omission from a joint statement should therefore not be taken as a complete account of the policies of all five Central Asian states. What Constrains Washington One possible explanation lies in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan's current authorities. Washington allows practical contacts with representatives of the Taliban but does not recognize the government it has formed. The movement remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, although it is not included in the U.S. Department of State's separate list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The designation restricts dealings with the Taliban, although U.S. sanctions rules permit many commercial transactions involving Afghanistan's governing institutions, including civilian infrastructure and transportation projects....

Fuel Supplies

Tajikistan Holds Fuel Talks With U.S. After Starting Imports From Iran

Tajikistan has discussed fuel supplies with the United States after beginning imports of petroleum products from Iran, whose oil sector is under U.S. sanctions. On October 8, Tajikistan's Minister of Energy and Water Resources Daler Juma met with Carson Relitz Rocker, chargé d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy, to discuss the country's petroleum supplies and other issues. Tajikistan depends almost entirely on imports of petroleum products. From January through September 2026, the country imported approximately 1.37 million metric tons of oil, petroleum products, liquefied gas, and related goods worth $1.13 billion. This included 333,200 metric tons of gasoline, 424,800 metric tons of diesel, and 321,300 metric tons of liquefied gas. Russia remains the country's main fuel supplier, accounting for more than half of its imports. It delivered approximately 708,000 metric tons worth $628.9 million over the nine-month period. Dushanbe purchases some of this fuel duty-free under intergovernmental agreements. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, accounts for a significant share of liquefied gas imports, supplying 225,600 metric tons worth $153.8 million. Imports of petroleum products from Iran totaled 15,600 metric tons worth $14.7 million over the nine-month period. In September, Tajikistan's Ministry of Energy and Water Resources confirmed that shipments of Iranian oil and petroleum products had begun in late August. The two sides had previously discussed potential purchases of up to 2.55 million metric tons annually, but this was a proposed volume rather than an existing contract. Tajikistan's authorities have not disclosed the exact composition of the shipments already received or how they were transported to the country. American restrictions cover Iran's oil sector and can affect international payments, insurance, and transportation. An official at the U.S. Department of the Treasury warned in comments to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in early October that companies operating in Iran's petroleum sector face sanctions risks, but declined to comment on specific possible violations. Washington has not publicly accused Tajikistan of breaching sanctions over the shipments. Separately, Tajikistan is preparing to host the third B5+1 Forum, bringing together business representatives and policymakers from the U.S. and the five Central Asian countries. The meeting is scheduled for April 20–21, 2027. It is being organized by the U.S.-based Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in cooperation with Tajikistan's government. B5+1 complements C5+1, the diplomatic format between the same six countries, and is intended to address trade, investment, and barriers to doing business. Previous forums were held in Almaty in 2024 and Bishkek in February 2026. According to CIPE, more than 15 memorandums were signed between American companies and Central Asian partners at the meeting in the Kyrgyz capital. The forum is expected to build on discussions of critical minerals, transport, and digitalization. However, CIPE has not announced a detailed agenda for the Dushanbe meeting, and there is no indication that American fuel supplies will be discussed.

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

U.S. Sanctions

U.S. Sanctions Uzbek Citizen Over Alleged Cybercrime Links

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed sanctions on an Uzbek citizen over alleged involvement in cybercrime activities linked to Russian actors, according to an official press release published on the agency’s website. OFAC reported that Azizjon Mamashoyev, a citizen of Uzbekistan born in 1987, was added to the sanctions list under regulations related to Russia-linked activities. U.S. authorities allege that he participated in cyber operations and maintained connections with individuals suspected of conducting malicious cyber activities. The announcement included identifying details, listing Mamashoyev’s date of birth as February 20, 1987, and confirming his Uzbek nationality. The designation was issued under the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations and forms part of measures targeting cyber-enabled threats. According to OFAC, Mamashoyev is linked to Sergey Zelenyuk, who has also been associated with cybercrime investigations. The sanctions were introduced pursuant to authorities under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and a cyber-related sanctions program identified as CYBER4. The U.S. Treasury also designated Advance Security Solutions, a company reportedly connected to Mamashoyev. The firm, described as operating in computer programming, is registered in Dubai’s Jumeirah Living Marina Gate area and also lists operations in Tashkent. U.S. officials stated that the company was established in 2025 and may have engaged in activities posing secondary sanctions risks. Under OFAC sanctions, designated individuals and entities are generally subject to asset freezes within U.S. jurisdiction, and U.S. persons are typically prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.

U.S. Sanctions

U.S. Waiver of Sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port is Good News for Central Asia

U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman have been on again/off again since 2013, when the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) to curb Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities through targeted economic pressure, aka sanctions. In the decade following IFCA’s passage, Washington’s sanctions on Chabahar had a negative impact on Central Asia, largely by complicating its efforts to deepen economic ties with South Asia and the Gulf. But geopolitics are shifting. Washington is increasing its involvement in Central Asia and India, and is doing the same in Afghanistan. These factors may well induce the U.S. Department of State to keep the waiver in place. Washington first waived its sanctions on Chabahar in 2018—a strategic move to support India's role in Afghanistan's post-war development and to provide a crucial trade route for that landlocked country. Six years later, India's Indian Ports Global Limited secured a 10-year deal with Iran to manage Chabahar port, in part, to offset Pakistan’s Gwadar port at the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a mere 100 miles from Chabahar. For all the fanfare, Central Asia held little real priority in Washington in those years. Seven years later, the U.S. changed course. It announced on September 16, 2025, much to Central Asia’s surprise and concern, that “the State Department has revoked the sanctions exception issued in 2018 under the IFCA”, making individuals involved in Iran’s Chabahar port operations subject to penalties, resulting in another snag in Central Asia’s desire for a southern breakout route. And then, in a swift reversal, the U.S. restored India’s sanctions waiver some six weeks later, on October 30. Whatever might explain the sudden change, Central Asia breathed a sigh of relief, and, by all accounts, now feels confident that the waiver will be evergreened. Time will tell if this confidence is justified. The U.S. waiver enables India to work to enhance Chabahar’s infrastructure and functionality, offering Central Asian exporters a more direct and profitable trade route than those via China, Russia, or the Middle Corridor, which stretches from East Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. As a result, goods like minerals, cotton, and energy products can reach regional and global markets faster. Central Asian capitals are quietly reveling in Washington’s flexible realpolitik in the face of convulsive U.S.-Iranian relations and heated Indo-Pakistan tensions. Without fear of punitive measures, India can now continue its work at Chabahar. To be sure, the waiver affirms India’s rising global presence and accelerates New Delhi’s drive into Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Washington’s decision signaled to traders, investors, and think tankers that it has no intention of spoiling India’s export ambitions and Central Asia’s desire for north-south economic integration. The waiver shows Washington’s pragmatism—and is welcomed by those who have little or no use for Washington’s penchant for foreign policy moralism. Chabahar Port complements not only the Trans-Caspian corridor—a multimodal trade route connecting Asia and Europe by linking China to Europe through Central...

Lukoil

Lukoil ‘Garage Sale’ – Uzbekistan Bows Out, Kazakhstan Keeps Its Options Open

The story of the disposal of foreign assets by Lukoil, which has fallen under U.S. sanctions, is reaching its closing stages. A shortlist of potential buyers has already emerged, and in Kazakhstan intrigue remains: will the country’s national oil and gas company capitalise on the opportunity to acquire Lukoil’s shares in major projects? A recent Reuters report noted that potential buyers of Lukoil’s assets face two key complications: first, U.S. firms, such as Carlyle, Chevron, and Exxon, are seen by analysts as more likely to get licensed, meaning deals will only be recognised after proper U.S. licence approval. Second, Lukoil itself had preferred to sell its assets as a package deal rather than piecemeal. However, after a deal to offload assets to Guvnor collapsed, several analyses now say a full package sale is unlikely and that piecemeal deals are more realistic or even more profitable. A new negotiation deadline has now been set for December 13, 2025, for the completion of authorised transactions. Kazakhstan-based oil and gas market observer Oleg Chervinsky suggests that this could increase the likelihood of a “twostage process”. “Most likely, a single buyer with sufficient resources will purchase all of Lukoil’s foreign assets at a significant discount, then sell them off in parts,” Chervinsky said. Some media reports point to the U.S. investment firm Carlyle Group as showing interest in Lukoil’s assets. The firm is considered a plausible main buyer due to its former ties to U.S. presidents Bush senior and junior. In this scenario, Carlyle would act both as buyer and organiser of the subsequent 'garage sale' of individual assets. Other firms, such as Chevron Corporation and ExxonMobil, have already been linked in reports with interest in Lukoil’s Kazakh stakes in the Tengiz and Karachaganak oil fields, while Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) has shown interest in Lukoil’s Uzbek gas projects. Meanwhile, three weeks ago, Uzbekistan made its position clear: it will not participate in the acquisition of Lukoil’s assets. Uzbekneftegaz Chairman Bahodir Sidikov said that "Buying out Lukoil’s assets in Uzbekistan is not on the table right now.” In Kazakhstan, energy sector experts believe that this moment presents a real window of opportunity to acquire Lukoil’s shares in systemically important oil and gas projects. “Why hasn’t our Ministry of Energy asked: does the Ministry approve changes in the shareholder structure under the terms of the stabilized contracts for Tengiz and Karachaganak? These shares (if a sale takes place) should go to KazMunayGas. If KMG doesn’t have the cash, then the Chinese state-owned CNPC should be brought in. To balance interests, it would be optimal for one of the world’s largest oil corporations to enter Tengiz and Karachaganak,” argues specialist Olzhas Baidildinov. Baidildinov cited a review by Norway’s Rystad Energy estimating that Lukoil’s net cash flow from its Tengiz stake over the next five years will total $2.8 billion, and from Karachaganak $2.1 billion. However, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov recently stated that the government is not considering a purchase of Lukoil’s shares. At the same time,...