KEGOC - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 4

Electricity supply

Kazakhstan Targets End to Electricity Deficit by 2027

Just days after a major disruption hit power systems across Central Asia, Kazakhstan reaffirmed its plan to fully cover domestic electricity demand by the first quarter of 2027. By the end of next year, the Energy Ministry expects the country to have a surplus of about 1.3 billion kWh. That margin would still leave relatively little room for error because it is equivalent to only about 1% of the electricity Kazakhstan consumed in 2025, when demand grew by 3.8%. The August 14 outage affected parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Power was cut to some consumers in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city, which has a population of about 2.4 million. The precise chain of events remains unclear. Kazakhstan’s national grid operator KEGOC said the disruption began when two hydrogenerators at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant shut down, sharply changing power flows and overloading Kazakhstan’s North-East-South transmission corridor. Kyrgyzstan’s Energy Ministry later acknowledged that the Toktogul shutdown was the initial disturbance but said it should not automatically be treated as the direct cause of the subsequent outages elsewhere in Central Asia. A special commission is investigating the incident, although public statements so far have not identified its chair. The outage exposed a risk in regional grid connections. Kazakhstan’s grid is connected to Russia and neighboring Central Asian systems. These links allow electricity to move across borders, but a sudden loss of generation or a major transmission failure can also affect several countries in quick succession. Kazakhstan has been a net electricity importer for several years. In 2025, the country generated 123.1 billion kWh and consumed 124.6 billion kWh. Electricity imports from Russia totaled 4.64 billion kWh, compared with exports of 2.16 billion kWh in the opposite direction. The net inflow from Russia fell from 3.41 billion kWh in 2024 to 2.48 billion kWh in 2025. Electricity consumption increased by 3.8% in 2025, while peak demand reached a record 17.724 GW on December 18. Kazakhstan is also seeking to attract energy-intensive industries and large data centers. Those expectations are reflected in longer-term development plans, which already include 7.8 GW of new and modernized coal-fired generation by 2030, with investment estimated at more than $15.5 billion. The authorities expect to close the remaining short-term deficit by rapidly commissioning new generating capacity. Around 2.6 GW is scheduled to come online in 2026. Four gas-fired power plants and expansion projects at two existing power stations account for part of that capacity, while ten new renewable energy facilities are also planned. The Energy Ministry says these projects should allow Kazakhstan to fully meet its electricity needs by the end of the first quarter of 2027. A further 845 MW is planned for 2027, of which 570 MW would come from renewable projects. By the end of that year, the ministry expects an electricity surplus of around 1.3 billion kWh. Renewable energy is expanding alongside Kazakhstan’s continued reliance on conventional generation. Thermal power plants accounted for 74.4% of electricity generation in 2025. Solar and wind facilities, along with biogas plants, provided 6.1%. The...

Power Outage

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Dispute Cause After Regional Power Failure Hits Almaty

A major power failure affected parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on August 14. In Almaty, electricity went out at 2:38 p.m. local time in four districts, disrupting transport and traffic in Kazakhstan’s largest city. Traffic lights stopped working and some businesses closed. The metro suspended service, and passengers still underground were evacuated. At several busy intersections, motorists and delivery couriers began directing traffic themselves. In Kyrgyzstan, outages affected parts of Bishkek and Issyk-Kul Region. “An accident in the power system of a neighboring country affected the Central Asian power grid. As a result, power supply disruptions were observed in the Surkhandarya region and several other regions,” Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry said. In Tajikistan, electricity went out in Dushanbe at about 3 p.m. and in numerous other cities and districts. Later that day, the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources said it had formed a working group to determine the cause. The ministry also denied reports of an accident at the Nurek Hydropower Plant. The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) later issued a preliminary account attributing the blackout to an emergency at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant. “Due to the emergency shutdown of two hydropower units with a combined capacity of 600 megawatts at the Toktogul HPP in the Kyrgyz Republic, there was a power surge on the North-South transit line, causing an overload and its disconnection by emergency protection systems. As a result, Kazakhstan’s southern zone was separated from the country’s unified power system,” KEGOC explained. Kyrgyz energy officials offered a different account. They said an external outage occurred at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time on a high-voltage transmission line connecting northern and southern Kazakhstan. The disturbance split the Central Asian grid into isolated sections, leaving Kyrgyzstan temporarily operating autonomously while automatic protection safeguarded equipment. Both accounts illustrate the interdependence of the Central Asian Power System (CAPS). The Soviet-era network connected the region’s electricity systems across borders that were then internal. It was part of a regional water-and-energy arrangement in which hydropower releases from upstream republics supported irrigation downstream. Cross-border power exchanges declined after the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1999, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed a parallel-operation agreement. Turkmenistan disconnected from CAPS in 2003, while Tajikistan was disconnected from Uzbekistan in December 2009. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an electricity-trade agreement in March 2018. The southwestern section of Tajikistan’s grid reconnected to CAPS in June 2024, but the northern connection was still under development in July 2026. Turkmenistan remains outside the system. In an assessment published on August 16, Zhakyp Khairushev, chairman of the Public Council under Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, called the incident a serious test of the country’s southern power system. He said emergency protection contained the disruption and allowed electricity to be restored in stages. Power restrictions in Kazakhstan were lifted by 5 p.m., but Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continued to disagree over where the failure began.

Energy Investment

Kazakhstan’s Energy Sector Without Local Business: The Anatomy of Major Projects

In late June 2026, construction began on a 1 GW wind power plant in Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl Region. The project is valued at $1.4 billion. Companies based in the United Arab Emirates, Masdar and W Solar, hold 80% of the project, while Kazakhstan’s quasi-state sector holds the remaining 20% through Qazaq Green Power and the Kazakhstan Investment Development Fund. This ownership model has become typical across Kazakhstan’s energy industry. Nearly all major new energy infrastructure projects rely on foreign capital. The country’s largest renewable energy developments involve international investors, including France’s TotalEnergies and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power. Even when agreements collapse, the government continues to rely on foreign partners. After financing problems ended cooperation with Russia’s Inter RAO, construction of new thermal power plants in Semey and Ust-Kamenogorsk was quickly reassigned to a Kazakh-Singapore consortium. A similar pattern appears across the sector: foreign investors provide most of the capital and technology, while Kazakhstan’s state-linked companies take minority stakes through Samruk-Kazyna or its subsidiaries This has created an unusual situation. Despite an acute shortage of generating capacity and guaranteed long-term demand, Kazakhstan’s largest private businesses have largely stayed away from electricity generation. Instead, domestic capital continues to favor sectors with greater liquidity and shorter investment horizons, ranging from finance to residential real estate. The reasons lie in straightforward economics, where financing costs and regulatory conditions outweigh the sector’s potential returns. The Financial Equation Power generation is one of the most capital-intensive infrastructure industries, with investment payback periods typically ranging from 10 to 15 years. Such projects require access to long-term financing at low interest rates. For Kazakhstan’s private sector, those financing instruments are largely unavailable. Under the National Bank’s tight monetary policy, with the benchmark interest rate standing at 17%, commercial borrowing costs for businesses routinely exceed 20% annually. Financing the construction of a power plant with local-currency loans at those rates is, mathematically, unviable. Such projects are virtually guaranteed to become unprofitable. Rather than engaging in complex, long-term infrastructure financing, Kazakhstan’s banking sector has increasingly concentrated on faster and more profitable lending. Official statistics from the National Bank of Kazakhstan illustrate this imbalance. As of May 2026, banks’ claims on households had reached approximately $60 billion, while lending to non-financial private enterprises, the real economy,stood at about $29 billion, less than half that amount. In practice, commercial banks have largely withdrawn from financing major industrial investment projects, preferring consumer lending with higher liquidity and quicker returns. Foreign corporations, meanwhile, enter Kazakhstan with access to international capital markets. They secure financing from global development institutions or sovereign wealth funds in their home countries at significantly lower borrowing costs. As a result, domestic private investors often lose the competitive race before projects even reach the investment decision stage. Unequal Conditions for Investors A second obstacle for domestic investors lies in Kazakhstan’s regulatory framework. Electricity tariffs have historically been kept under government control to limit inflationary pressures and avoid sharp increases in household utility bills and production costs. To attract major international energy companies,...

Energy Security

Kazakhstan Targets 2027 Exit From Routine Russian Electricity Imports

Kazakhstan wants to stop buying electricity from Russia by 2027. The challenge is whether it can do so while keeping homes warm, mines running, and fast-growing regions supplied when demand peaks. The target is a test of whether the country can close a power deficit caused by years of underinvestment, rising demand, aging thermal plants, and uneven regional supply. The goal was restated this month by Deputy Energy Minister Sungat Yessimkhanov, who said Kazakhstan expects to reduce its electricity shortfall this year and bring it down to zero in 2027. The pledge builds on earlier government comments that Kazakhstan would cut imports as new domestic capacity comes online. In February 2025, Yessimkhanov told Kazinform that Kazakhstan planned to reduce electricity imports from Russia and could stop buying foreign electricity once planned capacity was commissioned in 2027. The gap is small on paper, but it carries political weight. Kazakhstan may be energy-rich, but its electricity system has been running short. The country produces coal, oil, gas, uranium, and growing volumes of renewable power, yet it still relies on imports from Russia to cover gaps between generation and consumption. In 2025, Kazakhstan generated 123.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity and consumed 124.6 billion kilowatt-hours, according to a January government meeting on new capacity. Installed capacity rose from 25.3 gigawatts to 26.7 gigawatts, but demand still exceeded domestic generation. Data from KEGOC, Kazakhstan’s national grid operator, shows how narrow the margin has become. In 2025, the gap between production and consumption was 1.4956 billion kilowatt-hours. KEGOC said the shortfall was covered by supplies from the Russian energy system. Kazakhstan received 4.6388 billion kilowatt-hours from Russia and sent 2.1595 billion kilowatt-hours back. That left a net power flow from Russia of 2.4793 billion kilowatt-hours, down from 3.4111 billion kilowatt-hours in 2024. The planned 2027 shift does not mean Kazakhstan will disconnect from Russia’s grid. The objective also fits a wider pattern in Astana’s energy policy: not breaking with Russia, but reducing the number of areas in which Russia is the default route, supplier, or emergency backstop. In oil and trade, Astana has been trying to expand alternatives to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route through Russia, including through the Middle Corridor. In electricity, the logic is narrower but similar. Ending Russian power imports would not make Kazakhstan energy-independent, but it would turn one more Russian-linked dependency from a structural need into a contingency option. Kazakh energy analyst Zhakyp Khairushev made this distinction in comments to LS, stating that Kazakhstan has a real chance to reach annual self-balance in 2027, but a stable surplus will be harder. The key issue is not only installed capacity, but available capacity during peak hours, winter demand spikes, and repair periods. A megawatt of wind or solar power does not play the same role as a megawatt of coal, gas, or flexible generation during a cold evening. Kazakhstan’s deficit is not only about total output; it is also about where electricity is produced, when it is available, and whether the grid...