• KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 2

Kazakhstan’s Energy Sector Without Local Business: The Anatomy of Major Projects

In late June 2026, construction began on a 1 GW wind power plant in Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl Region. The project is valued at $1.4 billion. Companies based in the United Arab Emirates, Masdar and W Solar, hold 80% of the project, while Kazakhstan’s quasi-state sector holds the remaining 20% through Qazaq Green Power and the Kazakhstan Investment Development Fund. This ownership model has become typical across Kazakhstan’s energy industry. Nearly all major new energy infrastructure projects rely on foreign capital. The country’s largest renewable energy developments involve international investors, including France’s TotalEnergies and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power. Even when agreements collapse, the government continues to rely on foreign partners. After financing problems ended cooperation with Russia’s Inter RAO, construction of new thermal power plants in Semey and Ust-Kamenogorsk was quickly reassigned to a Kazakh-Singapore consortium. A similar pattern appears across the sector: foreign investors provide most of the capital and technology, while Kazakhstan’s state-linked companies take minority stakes through Samruk-Kazyna or its subsidiaries This has created an unusual situation. Despite an acute shortage of generating capacity and guaranteed long-term demand, Kazakhstan’s largest private businesses have largely stayed away from electricity generation. Instead, domestic capital continues to favor sectors with greater liquidity and shorter investment horizons, ranging from finance to residential real estate. The reasons lie in straightforward economics, where financing costs and regulatory conditions outweigh the sector’s potential returns. The Financial Equation Power generation is one of the most capital-intensive infrastructure industries, with investment payback periods typically ranging from 10 to 15 years. Such projects require access to long-term financing at low interest rates. For Kazakhstan’s private sector, those financing instruments are largely unavailable. Under the National Bank’s tight monetary policy, with the benchmark interest rate standing at 17%, commercial borrowing costs for businesses routinely exceed 20% annually. Financing the construction of a power plant with local-currency loans at those rates is, mathematically, unviable. Such projects are virtually guaranteed to become unprofitable. Rather than engaging in complex, long-term infrastructure financing, Kazakhstan’s banking sector has increasingly concentrated on faster and more profitable lending. Official statistics from the National Bank of Kazakhstan illustrate this imbalance. As of May 2026, banks’ claims on households had reached approximately $60 billion, while lending to non-financial private enterprises, the real economy,stood at about $29 billion, less than half that amount. In practice, commercial banks have largely withdrawn from financing major industrial investment projects, preferring consumer lending with higher liquidity and quicker returns. Foreign corporations, meanwhile, enter Kazakhstan with access to international capital markets. They secure financing from global development institutions or sovereign wealth funds in their home countries at significantly lower borrowing costs. As a result, domestic private investors often lose the competitive race before projects even reach the investment decision stage. Unequal Conditions for Investors A second obstacle for domestic investors lies in Kazakhstan’s regulatory framework. Electricity tariffs have historically been kept under government control to limit inflationary pressures and avoid sharp increases in household utility bills and production costs. To attract major international energy companies,...

Kazakhstan Targets 2027 Exit From Routine Russian Electricity Imports

Kazakhstan wants to stop buying electricity from Russia by 2027. The challenge is whether it can do so while keeping homes warm, mines running, and fast-growing regions supplied when demand peaks. The target is a test of whether the country can close a power deficit caused by years of underinvestment, rising demand, aging thermal plants, and uneven regional supply. The goal was restated this month by Deputy Energy Minister Sungat Yessimkhanov, who said Kazakhstan expects to reduce its electricity shortfall this year and bring it down to zero in 2027. The pledge builds on earlier government comments that Kazakhstan would cut imports as new domestic capacity comes online. In February 2025, Yessimkhanov told Kazinform that Kazakhstan planned to reduce electricity imports from Russia and could stop buying foreign electricity once planned capacity was commissioned in 2027. The gap is small on paper, but it carries political weight. Kazakhstan may be energy-rich, but its electricity system has been running short. The country produces coal, oil, gas, uranium, and growing volumes of renewable power, yet it still relies on imports from Russia to cover gaps between generation and consumption. In 2025, Kazakhstan generated 123.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity and consumed 124.6 billion kilowatt-hours, according to a January government meeting on new capacity. Installed capacity rose from 25.3 gigawatts to 26.7 gigawatts, but demand still exceeded domestic generation. Data from KEGOC, Kazakhstan’s national grid operator, shows how narrow the margin has become. In 2025, the gap between production and consumption was 1.4956 billion kilowatt-hours. KEGOC said the shortfall was covered by supplies from the Russian energy system. Kazakhstan received 4.6388 billion kilowatt-hours from Russia and sent 2.1595 billion kilowatt-hours back. That left a net power flow from Russia of 2.4793 billion kilowatt-hours, down from 3.4111 billion kilowatt-hours in 2024. The planned 2027 shift does not mean Kazakhstan will disconnect from Russia’s grid. The objective also fits a wider pattern in Astana’s energy policy: not breaking with Russia, but reducing the number of areas in which Russia is the default route, supplier, or emergency backstop. In oil and trade, Astana has been trying to expand alternatives to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route through Russia, including through the Middle Corridor. In electricity, the logic is narrower but similar. Ending Russian power imports would not make Kazakhstan energy-independent, but it would turn one more Russian-linked dependency from a structural need into a contingency option. Kazakh energy analyst Zhakyp Khairushev made this distinction in comments to LS, stating that Kazakhstan has a real chance to reach annual self-balance in 2027, but a stable surplus will be harder. The key issue is not only installed capacity, but available capacity during peak hours, winter demand spikes, and repair periods. A megawatt of wind or solar power does not play the same role as a megawatt of coal, gas, or flexible generation during a cold evening. Kazakhstan’s deficit is not only about total output; it is also about where electricity is produced, when it is available, and whether the grid...