Kazakhstan wants to stop buying electricity from Russia by 2027. The challenge is whether it can do so while keeping homes warm, mines running, and fast-growing regions supplied when demand peaks. The target is a test of whether the country can close a power deficit caused by years of underinvestment, rising demand, aging thermal plants, and uneven regional supply.
The goal was restated this month by Deputy Energy Minister Sungat Yessimkhanov, who said Kazakhstan expects to reduce its electricity shortfall this year and bring it down to zero in 2027. The pledge builds on earlier government comments that Kazakhstan would cut imports as new domestic capacity comes online. In February 2025, Yessimkhanov told Kazinform that Kazakhstan planned to reduce electricity imports from Russia and could stop buying foreign electricity once planned capacity was commissioned in 2027.
The gap is small on paper, but it carries political weight. Kazakhstan may be energy-rich, but its electricity system has been running short. The country produces coal, oil, gas, uranium, and growing volumes of renewable power, yet it still relies on imports from Russia to cover gaps between generation and consumption.
In 2025, Kazakhstan generated 123.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity and consumed 124.6 billion kilowatt-hours, according to a January government meeting on new capacity. Installed capacity rose from 25.3 gigawatts to 26.7 gigawatts, but demand still exceeded domestic generation.
Data from KEGOC, Kazakhstan’s national grid operator, shows how narrow the margin has become. In 2025, the gap between production and consumption was 1.4956 billion kilowatt-hours. KEGOC said the shortfall was covered by supplies from the Russian energy system. Kazakhstan received 4.6388 billion kilowatt-hours from Russia and sent 2.1595 billion kilowatt-hours back. That left a net power flow from Russia of 2.4793 billion kilowatt-hours, down from 3.4111 billion kilowatt-hours in 2024.
The planned 2027 shift does not mean Kazakhstan will disconnect from Russia’s grid. The objective also fits a wider pattern in Astana’s energy policy: not breaking with Russia, but reducing the number of areas in which Russia is the default route, supplier, or emergency backstop. In oil and trade, Astana has been trying to expand alternatives to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route through Russia, including through the Middle Corridor. In electricity, the logic is narrower but similar. Ending Russian power imports would not make Kazakhstan energy-independent, but it would turn one more Russian-linked dependency from a structural need into a contingency option.
Kazakh energy analyst Zhakyp Khairushev made this distinction in comments to LS, stating that Kazakhstan has a real chance to reach annual self-balance in 2027, but a stable surplus will be harder. The key issue is not only installed capacity, but available capacity during peak hours, winter demand spikes, and repair periods.
A megawatt of wind or solar power does not play the same role as a megawatt of coal, gas, or flexible generation during a cold evening. Kazakhstan’s deficit is not only about total output; it is also about where electricity is produced, when it is available, and whether the grid can move it to regions that need it.
The government is trying to solve this problem on several fronts. At a January meeting, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan was working on 81 projects with a total capacity of 15.3 gigawatts and investment of more than 13 trillion tenge ($25 billion). He said the work now under development should allow Kazakhstan to cover the economy’s electricity demands by the end of the first quarter of 2027 and move out of energy-deficit status. By 2029, the government expects a more stable surplus.
The list is broad, including flexible generation, coal capacity, combined heat and power plants, grid upgrades, and renewable projects. The government has named several major facilities, including Ekibastuz GRES-3 with 2,640 megawatts, a 700-megawatt plant in Kurchatov, and new combined heat and power plants in Kokshetau, Semey, and Ust-Kamenogorsk. Almaty CHP-2 is also being modernized, with commissioning scheduled for October 2026.
The grid is another constraint. KEGOC is building the 500-kilovolt Shu-Zhambyl-Shymkent line to strengthen the Southern Zone, a 475-kilometer project due for completion in 2027. It is also working on the 604.3-kilometer Olke-Karabatan line to integrate Western Kazakhstan with the unified power system. These projects are necessary because the current power system is uneven. The north has large coal-fired generation, the south has high demand growth, while the west has long been more isolated from the national grid.
KEGOC said electricity consumption rose by 4.611 billion kilowatt-hours in 2025, a 3.8% increase from 2024. The fastest regional growth came in the Western and Southern zones. Atyrau Region alone increased consumption by 2.0324 billion kilowatt-hours, or 24.7%. Almaty, Turkistan, and Zhambyl regions also saw strong rising demand.
That is where the 2027 target becomes fragile. Even if new capacity arrives on time, new industrial loads could quickly absorb it. Khairushev pointed to data centers, mining, industrial projects, electrified transport, water infrastructure, and other large consumers. He noted that the first stage of Kazakhstan’s planned data center valley could require 300 megawatts of load, equal to roughly 2.6 billion kilowatt-hours a year if it operates around the clock.
Renewables can help, but they do not remove the need for backup, storage, and grid investment. Kazakhstan is attracting large renewable projects, including TotalEnergies’ $1.2 billion Mirny wind project, a 1-gigawatt wind farm with a 600-megawatt-hour battery system. The wind farm is expected to reach full capacity in 2029. That timing improves the medium-term picture, but it will not help meet the 2027 deadline.
Much of that rests on new capacity arriving on schedule. Delays would leave Kazakhstan exposed to the same pressures it is trying to reduce: winter peaks, regional imbalances, aging plants, and temporary reliance on Russian supplies.
The shift would also be felt in Russia’s electricity-export business, even if the wider economic effect would be limited. Reuters reported that Kazakhstan was Russia’s largest electricity export market in 2024, accounting for nearly 54% of exports. Inter RAO, Russia’s main power export operator, was already expecting export volumes to fall because of lower supplies to China.
A reduction in purchases would not end energy ties with Russia. Kazakhstan still has oil export routes through Russia, planned nuclear cooperation with Rosatom, fuel links, and a shared history of grid integration. But electricity imports are politically visible because they touch households, industry, winter reliability, and national resilience.
The practical test is whether Kazakhstan can make that shift without creating new vulnerabilities inside its own system. The 2027 target is possible, but it depends on timing. Astana must commission generation, finish grid projects, control delays, and keep demand from outrunning supply again. Kazakhstan has narrowed the deficit. Keeping it closed will be harder than announcing the end of Russian imports.
