Energy Security - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 138

U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Bipartisan U.S. Congressional Visit Highlights Expanding Partnership with Kazakhstan

A bipartisan six-member delegation from the U.S. House of Representatives met with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana on August 25, two days after Kazakhstan elected the first members of its new unicameral Kurultai. Tokayev called the timing symbolic and proposed closer dialogue between Congress and the new legislature. The delegation was led by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Jason Smith and included Greg Murphy, Carol Miller, Ronny Jackson, Wesley Bell, and Ed Case. Smith said President Donald Trump had called him at 2 a.m., several hours before the meeting. Trump sent his regards, expressed appreciation for his relationship with Tokayev, and said he looked forward to the Kazakh president’s visit to Miami for the G20 summit. Smith said one purpose of the visit was to explore opportunities to expand economic ties and pursue a substantive bilateral dialogue. The visit reinforced Congress’s role in a relationship that has recently gained momentum at the presidential level. It also showed the breadth of the emerging agenda, from trade and investment to energy security, strategic supply chains, nonproliferation, and regional stability. A Delegation With Trade and Security Reach The delegation’s committee assignments closely matched that agenda. Smith, Murphy, and Miller serve on the Ways and Means Committee, which oversees trade and tariff legislation. Jackson serves on the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and Agriculture committees. Bell serves on the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Oversight and Government Reform committees. Case sits on the Appropriations Committee and its Defense and Homeland Security subcommittees. That mix places delegation members on committees with jurisdiction over many of the issues now shaping the bilateral relationship. Congress can advance cooperation through trade legislation, appropriations, oversight, and support for American companies entering or expanding in Kazakhstan. Smith’s committee has jurisdiction over H.R. 1024, the bipartisan U.S.-Kazakhstan Trade Modernization Act, which would authorize the president to end the application of the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik restrictions and extend permanent normal trade relations to Kazakhstan. Miller was among the bill’s original co-sponsors, although the issue was not mentioned in the public account of the meeting. Bipartisan congressional engagement could help translate recent presidential momentum into more durable institutional ties. Kazakhstan Has Made the U.S. Relationship a Priority From the Kazakh side, Tokayev has treated closer ties with Washington as a presidential priority. During his November 2025 visit to Washington, the two leaders welcomed commercial agreements worth more than $17 billion. Trump reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Enhanced Strategic Partnership, while the two presidents identified new areas for cooperation. The August 25 meeting also highlighted Kazakhstan’s support for the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace, as well as the countries’ longstanding work on nuclear security and nonproliferation. Trade, investment, advanced technology, science, education, and culture were also discussed. Tokayev’s proposal for closer dialogue between Congress and the Kurultai would strengthen the parliamentary channel alongside the relationship’s presidential and executive-level diplomacy. In January, Tokayev appointed veteran diplomat Erzhan Kazykhan as his representative for negotiations with the United States on priority bilateral issues....

Power Grid

August 14 Blackout: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Continue to Dispute Its Cause

The blame game over Central Asia’s August 14 blackout continues. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov says the large-scale blackout began with the shutdown of two generating units at the Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) in Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek does not dispute that the failure occurred but rejects the claim that it was the direct cause of the subsequent outages across several countries. Akkenzhenov identified the events in Kyrgyzstan as the starting point of the emergency. According to him, the initial disturbance occurred on August 14 at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time, or 3:37 p.m. in Kyrgyzstan, when generating units No. 1 and No. 2 at the Toktogul HPP went offline. The loss of generation altered operating conditions in Central Asia’s interconnected power system and led to a redistribution of power flows in southern Kazakhstan. A government commission in Kazakhstan is expected to make the final determination. Kazakhstan’s grid operator KEGOC had earlier provided a more detailed chronology. At 2:37 p.m., three 500 kV transmission lines tripped, separating southern Kazakhstan and the Central Asian grid from the rest of Kazakhstan’s power system. About 2,810 MW of consumer load was temporarily cut off. KEGOC later said that immediately beforehand, two generating units at the Toktogul HPP, with a combined capacity of about 600 MW, had gone offline. The resulting changes in power flows overloaded Kazakhstan’s North–East–South transmission corridor, triggering emergency protection systems. Akkenzhenov said the protection systems had worked effectively and praised KEGOC’s response. Kazakhstan’s power system was restored in approximately 2.5 hours. Kyrgyzstan acknowledges that the two units went offline. The country’s Energy Ministry described the incident as the “initial disturbance” in the interconnected power system, but stressed that the first event in an emergency sequence cannot automatically be considered the cause of all subsequent outages. According to its account, by 3:55 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time — 2:55 p.m. in Kazakhstan — the frequency in the interconnected power system had returned to the normal 50 Hz. At that point, Kyrgyzstan was also supplying neighboring power systems with about 250 MW. Bishkek maintains that the outage affecting the Almaty power hub occurred after normal frequency had already been restored. Kyrgyz energy officials therefore consider it premature to directly attribute all subsequent events to the failure at the Toktogul HPP. The disagreement, therefore, is less about what happened first than about the causal link between the initial failure and the chain of outages that followed. Why the Regional Grid Is Vulnerable The vulnerability is rooted in the architecture of the region’s power system itself. During the Soviet period, its power plants and high-voltage transmission lines were designed to operate as a single interconnected system rather than around today’s national borders. Energy ties weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in recent years the countries have again expanded parallel operation of their power systems. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are connected through the Integrated Power System of Central Asia. Cross-border power flows are coordinated by the Energia Coordinating Dispatch Center in Tashkent. Hydropower in Kyrgyzstan and...

Data Center Valley

Can Kazakhstan Power Its AI Ambitions?

For now, it is only a vast construction site lost in the steppe, a few kilometers from Ekibastuz, a mining city in northern Kazakhstan. Cranes move behind fences in the shadow of a Soviet-era power station. It is hard to imagine that, from 2027, this site is supposed to become the first piece of a giant artificial intelligence campus. Known as Data Center Valley, the project is eventually expected to reach one gigawatt. At full capacity, it could consume as much as 8.8 terawatt-hours a year, Kazakh media Qyzyq estimated, around 7% of Kazakhstan’s current electricity generation. Development will be gradual, with an initial 50-megawatt facility scheduled to enter service in June 2027. U.S.-based Firebird.ai and state-controlled Kazakhtelecom are leading the industrial project. Yet the futuristic bet collides with a more prosaic reality. “Economic and industrial growth in Kazakhstan is currently outpacing the rate of commissioning and modernization of generating capacity,” the Ministry of Energy acknowledged in a response to The Times of Central Asia. In 2025, the gap between domestic generation and consumption reached 1.5 terawatt-hours, forcing the country to import electricity, mainly from Russia. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has acknowledged the scale of the challenge. At the National Kurultai in January, he said data centers consume electricity on a scale comparable to metallurgical plants and that Kazakhstan’s existing generation was “clearly insufficient” for its development plans. He called energy self-sufficiency a key state priority and ordered an expansion of generating capacity, including new coal-fired power. How, then, can Kazakhstan power a campus that could consume almost six times that shortfall? More strikingly, when the government prepared its 2026 electricity forecast, neither Data Center Valley nor any other AI or data-center project was included. The ministry says they will enter its calculations from 2027 - the same year the first facility is due to start operating. [caption id="attachment_54529" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] The mine of Bogatyr is expanding to increase production[/caption] From Coal to Algorithms In Ekibastuz, the answer comes down to one word: coal. “In essence, Kazakhstan is turning Ekibastuz coal into export digital revenue,” Kazakhtelecom chairman Bagdat Musin has said. Electricity generated locally would be converted into computing services sold internationally. No major named customer contract has been announced, although Firebird says it holds guaranteed service contracts with global players. Amazon and G42 have been named as companies entering the ecosystem, while Kazakhstan has also held talks with Microsoft and OpenAI. The landscape appears built for that ambition. Nearby lies Bogatyr, one of the world’s largest open-pit coal mines. From the observation deck, terraces of rock descend 300 meters into the earth. Excavators and haul trucks look like toys at the bottom. “Ekibastuz is a very smart choice: energy is abundant and cheap here, while proximity limits transmission losses between the power station and the consumer,” Yevgeny Masternak, CEO of mine operator Bogatyr Komir, told TCA. To keep pace with anticipated demand, the company plans to raise annual production from 42 million tonnes in 2024 to more than 56 million...

Uranium

Kazakhstan’s Uranium Advantage Is Difficult to Replicate

Kazakhstan supplies about two-fifths of the world’s mined uranium, making it a critical supplier to nuclear markets in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. What sets it apart is not simply its resource base, but its ability to produce and deliver uranium at scale. Kazakhstan already dominates global uranium mining. It produced 25,839 tonnes in 2025, about 40% of world mine output, and production rose another 9% in the first half of 2026. It has been the world’s largest producer since 2009. Kazakhstan holds about 14% of identified global uranium resources, while Australia, Canada and others also have large deposits. Its advantage is that production capacity is already in place. Developing comparable new supply elsewhere would take years. Demand is meanwhile expected to rise. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency project annual uranium requirements could rise by about 50% by 2050 in their lower case, and more than double in their higher case. In either scenario, Kazakhstan’s existing production base would be hard to quickly replace. A Uranium Supplier Across Major Markets Kazakhstan supplies markets whose fuel-security priorities increasingly differ. Asia accounted for 56% of Kazatomprom’s consolidated uranium sales in 2025, according to its May 2026 investor handout. The Americas accounted for 25%, and Europe for 19%. The sales map gives commercial weight to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. China is a major customer and industrial partner. Russia remains an important partner through joint ventures, enrichment services, and long-term supply arrangements. European and North American utilities, meanwhile, buy Kazakh uranium as part of increasingly diversified procurement portfolios. Kazatomprom widened that customer base in 2025, adding buyers in Switzerland and the Czech Republic, and expanding relationships with Japan and India, according to its full-year financial results. What distinguishes Kazakhstan is the combination of scale and cross-market integration. It supplies Asian, European, and North American markets while maintaining industrial ties with China, Russia, and Western partners. That gives Kazakhstan room to tailor commercial arrangements to different markets. For Western buyers, this could support additional processing and transit options that meet their commercial and regulatory requirements. Kazakhstan could develop these while continuing to serve established Asian markets, attracting new investment while preserving its multi-vector position. Kazakhstan’s importance to the U.S. market is substantial. Kazakh-origin uranium accounted for 28% of deliveries to American civilian reactor operators in 2025, second only to Canada, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Kazakhstan was also the EU’s second-largest source of natural uranium in 2025, accounting for 20.3% of deliveries to EU utilities, according to the Euratom Supply Agency. Kazakhstan’s production share does not mean that equivalent volumes are available for new customers. Twelve of Kazatomprom’s 14 mining operations are partially owned through partnerships, and much of their output is already committed under long-term contracts. Budenovskoye’s 2026 production, for example, is reserved under an existing offtake agreement for Russia’s civilian nuclear industry. Additional capacity would give Kazakhstan more flexibility to respond to demand across multiple markets. Kazakhstan’s Stability Underpins Global Uranium Supply Kazakhstan’s importance to uranium...

Nuclear Energy

Uzbekistan Plans Second Nuclear Power Plant Before First Is Ready

Uzbekistan will soon begin preparations for the construction of a second nuclear power plant (NPP), President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced during an August 17 visit to Khorezm region. The announcement came a little more than two months after construction officially began on the country’s first NPP. The authorities have not yet disclosed where the new plant will be located or how much capacity it will have. They have also not named a technology partner. Discussing energy in connection with new industrial projects, Mirziyoyev said investors need an acceptable electricity price and a guarantee of uninterrupted supply. Uzbekistan is building its first NPP with the participation of Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom. On June 4, first concrete was poured for the foundation of the first unit of the integrated NPP in Farish district, Jizzakh region, officially marking the start of construction. Mirziyoyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the project by video link. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi also participated in the ceremony. The project itself has changed considerably over the past two years. In 2024, Uzbekistan and Russia agreed to build a small nuclear power plant with six RITM-200N reactors, each with a capacity of 55 MW. Tashkent later decided to combine small modular and large-scale nuclear generation at a single site. Under the current configuration, the Jizzakh project will have two large VVER-1000 units and two small RITM-200N units. The complex will have a total capacity of 2.11 GW and is expected to generate about 15.4 billion kWh of electricity annually. The first small reactor is expected to come online in 2029. The first large unit could begin operating in 2033, with the entire complex expected to be commissioned by 2035. Plans for a second NPP come as electricity demand is rising rapidly. Uzbekistan’s 2020–2030 electricity plan aimed to raise annual generation from 63.6 billion kWh to 120.8 billion kWh by 2030. A more recent government forecast puts electricity consumption at 121 billion kWh by 2035. Some of the growing demand is expected to be met by solar and wind power. Nuclear energy is intended to provide baseload generation, including for industry. Mirziyoyev specifically linked preparations for the second plant to investors’ need for a stable electricity supply. Uzbekistan is therefore expanding its nuclear program before its first reactor has entered operation. The country is continuing to develop the infrastructure and expertise needed for the new industry. Following a June review, the IAEA said Uzbekistan had made significant progress but needed to complete work on its nuclear regulatory body and finalize feasibility studies. So far, Mirziyoyev has said only that preparations for the second NPP will begin. Its cost, timetable, capacity, and technology have not been announced, nor has a potential contractor been named. The first NPP involves long-term cooperation with Russia’s nuclear industry. Rosatom is participating in the project, which will use its reactor technology. Mirziyoyev said in June that Uzbekistan planned further nuclear power projects with Russia, but whether the same model will be used for the second plant or Tashkent will consider...

Energy Security

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...