• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10678 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 126

Opinion: Kazakhstan, Oil, the Iran War and Dutch Disease

In 1977, The Economist coined a new term for the (potential) negative consequences of a short-term boom in natural resources: “Dutch disease.” The phenomenon got its name from an analysis of the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands following the 1960s natural gas discoveries at Groningen, in the northeastern Netherlands. The theory was that a surge in the price of a natural resource like oil or gas would likely cause currency appreciation, making imports cheaper and other sectors, like manufacturing, less competitive. Whether the recent spike in oil prices will contribute to Dutch disease in oil-rich Kazakhstan will likely depend on the length of the Iran war’s effect on oil prices (which could last well beyond the end of the conflict itself) and the government’s stewardship of Kazakhstan’s economy. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev deserves credit for the government’s efforts to diversify the national economy. Investing in the nation’s manufacturing base, especially SMEs, educating the Kazakh workforce, and improving healthcare are all helping broaden the Kazakh economy and reduce the country’s dependence on oil. But oil is the main driver of Kazakhstan’s wealth, and while other sectors are increasing their share of Kazakhstan’s economy, oil and the wider extractive sector remain central to public finances, accounting for over 40% of government revenues. So, let’s do a deep dive on Kazakhstan’s oil. Most of Kazakhstan’s oil comes from the west of the country, including the Tengiz field near the Caspian Sea and the offshore Kashagan field in the northern Caspian. The Tengiz oil field is one of the deepest and largest oil fields in the world, while Kashagan, an offshore deposit, ranks as one of the largest global oil discoveries since the 1960s. Kazakhstan’s main export blend, CPC Blend, is a light, sweet crude, a desirable oil type that’s easy to refine into gasoline and diesel. Because the Iran war and restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted tanker traffic and raised fears of supply shortages, global oil prices have climbed. And while high oil prices are generally a net positive for Kazakhstan, the current price - Brent crude was trading above $100 per barrel in mid-May 2026 - could present problems. In the short term, high oil prices tend to boost government revenues and budget surpluses. They can increase inflows to Kazakhstan’s National Fund, depending on production, tax receipts, transfers, and government withdrawal policy, and provide resources for government spending on infrastructure and social programs. They can also stimulate demand in related sectors, boosting Kazakhstan’s oil-related industries. And since oil exports typically make up more than half of the nation’s export revenues, high oil prices generally lead to a rise in Kazakhstan’s GDP. So far, so good. But high oil prices also carry risks. For one thing, they can strengthen the tenge and add to domestic demand, especially if higher revenues feed into faster government spending. Which is where Dutch disease comes in. As the stronger currency makes non-oil exports less competitive, capital and labor shift toward the energy...

Kazakhstan Targets 2027 Exit From Routine Russian Electricity Imports

Kazakhstan wants to stop buying electricity from Russia by 2027. The challenge is whether it can do so while keeping homes warm, mines running, and fast-growing regions supplied when demand peaks. The target is a test of whether the country can close a power deficit caused by years of underinvestment, rising demand, aging thermal plants, and uneven regional supply. The goal was restated this month by Deputy Energy Minister Sungat Yessimkhanov, who said Kazakhstan expects to reduce its electricity shortfall this year and bring it down to zero in 2027. The pledge builds on earlier government comments that Kazakhstan would cut imports as new domestic capacity comes online. In February 2025, Yessimkhanov told Kazinform that Kazakhstan planned to reduce electricity imports from Russia and could stop buying foreign electricity once planned capacity was commissioned in 2027. The gap is small on paper, but it carries political weight. Kazakhstan may be energy-rich, but its electricity system has been running short. The country produces coal, oil, gas, uranium, and growing volumes of renewable power, yet it still relies on imports from Russia to cover gaps between generation and consumption. In 2025, Kazakhstan generated 123.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity and consumed 124.6 billion kilowatt-hours, according to a January government meeting on new capacity. Installed capacity rose from 25.3 gigawatts to 26.7 gigawatts, but demand still exceeded domestic generation. Data from KEGOC, Kazakhstan’s national grid operator, shows how narrow the margin has become. In 2025, the gap between production and consumption was 1.4956 billion kilowatt-hours. KEGOC said the shortfall was covered by supplies from the Russian energy system. Kazakhstan received 4.6388 billion kilowatt-hours from Russia and sent 2.1595 billion kilowatt-hours back. That left a net power flow from Russia of 2.4793 billion kilowatt-hours, down from 3.4111 billion kilowatt-hours in 2024. The planned 2027 shift does not mean Kazakhstan will disconnect from Russia’s grid. The objective also fits a wider pattern in Astana’s energy policy: not breaking with Russia, but reducing the number of areas in which Russia is the default route, supplier, or emergency backstop. In oil and trade, Astana has been trying to expand alternatives to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route through Russia, including through the Middle Corridor. In electricity, the logic is narrower but similar. Ending Russian power imports would not make Kazakhstan energy-independent, but it would turn one more Russian-linked dependency from a structural need into a contingency option. Kazakh energy analyst Zhakyp Khairushev made this distinction in comments to LS, stating that Kazakhstan has a real chance to reach annual self-balance in 2027, but a stable surplus will be harder. The key issue is not only installed capacity, but available capacity during peak hours, winter demand spikes, and repair periods. A megawatt of wind or solar power does not play the same role as a megawatt of coal, gas, or flexible generation during a cold evening. Kazakhstan’s deficit is not only about total output; it is also about where electricity is produced, when it is available, and whether the grid...

Uzbekistan’s Gas Output Falls by 15% as Imports Rise

Uzbekistan’s natural gas production fell by 15% in the first quarter of 2026, adding pressure to an energy system already strained by rising demand, aging infrastructure, and lower hydrocarbon output. The country produced 9.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas in January-March, down from 11.3 billion in the same period last year. The figures are based on data from Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee, which also listed declines in oil, coal, and gas condensate production. Oil output fell to 157,300 tons in the first quarter, compared with 160,800 tons in the same period last year. Coal production declined from 1.2 million tons to 1.1 million tons, while gas condensate output fell even more sharply, dropping from 296,600 tons to 242,300 tons. Motor gasoline production rose to 313,200 tons, while diesel output increased to 280,900 tons. The latest data reflect a longer shift in Uzbekistan’s energy balance. Uzbekistan was long a net gas exporter, supported by large Soviet-era fields, a broad domestic gas network, and access to the Central Asia-China pipeline system. That position has weakened as older fields have declined and domestic use has grown. Uzbekistan now has to cover demand from households, power plants, industry, and transport while trying to modernize the sector. That task is getting harder. The country’s permanent population reached 38.2 million people as of January 1, 2026, according to official statistics, leading to more strain on the grid. Imports have risen sharply to meet these needs. Uzbekistan spent $360.5 million on natural gas imports in the first quarter of 2026, a 2.2-fold increase from the same period last year. Meanwhile, gas export revenues fell to $36.7 million, down from $94.3 million a year earlier. That shift has regional weight. Uzbekistan imports gas from Russia and Turkmenistan. Russian gas reaches Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan, using a Soviet-era pipeline route that once moved gas in the opposite direction. Uzbekistan began receiving Russian gas in 2023, as Moscow sought new markets after losing much of its European gas business. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russian gas exports to Uzbekistan rose by about 30% in 2025, reaching more than 7 billion cubic meters through the Central Asia-Center pipeline system. Tashkent and Moscow have since discussed larger energy supplies. In April, Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin agreed to increase deliveries of Russian oil and gas to Uzbekistan. The talks also covered wider cooperation in energy, industry, transport, and agriculture. More imports can help Uzbekistan avoid shortages, especially in winter, while supporting power generation and reducing pressure on households. But they also bring new costs, with higher imports weighing on the trade balance and increasing reliance on outside suppliers. That is a sensitive issue for a country trying to expand its domestic industry and keep energy prices stable. The government is trying to slow the production decline. Uzbekneftegaz has said that exploration work added 2 billion cubic meters of gas reserves and 40,000 tons of liquid hydrocarbon reserves in the first quarter. The company...

Kazakhstan Recasts Its Nuclear Past

At the United Nations in late April, Robert Floyd, executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, warned that any renewed nuclear test by Russia, the United States, or another state could draw other nuclear powers back into testing. His remarks followed the re-emergence of nuclear testing as an issue in international political debate. Kazakhstan enters this debate from the opposite side of nuclear history. It is a former Soviet nuclear test ground that now defines its nuclear policy through civilian power, peaceful use, and non-proliferation. Kazakhstan’s nuclear future is shaped by its nuclear past. The country was a Soviet nuclear test ground at Semipalatinsk, now Semey, where late-Soviet public-health concerns helped force nuclear testing into public politics before the site’s closure. After independence, Kazakhstan renounced the Soviet-era nuclear weapons it inherited on its territory. Its present nuclear-energy policy begins from that record. It is not a search for nuclear status, but a civilian program formed by restraint, public memory, and national development. Semipalatinsk is the source of Kazakhstan’s authority on nuclear testing. Between 1949 and 1989, the Soviet Union used the site as one of its principal nuclear testing grounds. In total, 456 nuclear tests were conducted there, including 340 underground and 116 atmospheric tests. Kazakhstan closed the site in 1991. These facts remove the subject from arms-control abstraction. For Kazakhstan, nuclear testing is a territorial, social, public-health, and political inheritance, bound to the eastern steppe and the communities around the former test range. Atomic Lake gives that history a single, physical form. In January 1965, the Soviet Union carried out the Chagan underground nuclear explosion at the Semipalatinsk Test Site. The blast, with a yield of 140 kilotons, was part of a Soviet program for using underground nuclear explosions in civil engineering, including reservoirs and channels in water-scarce regions. It created the crater later known as Atomic Lake. The site remains a physical residue of the Soviet claim that nuclear explosions could serve economic and social development. This is why nuclear technology in Kazakhstan cannot be politically neutral. Independence gave Kazakhstan agency in that history. Kazakhstan transferred Soviet-era nuclear weapons to Russia by April 1995 and took part in cooperative threat reduction, including the sealing of test-site boreholes and tunnels. More recently, it became host to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Low Enriched Uranium Bank at Ulba, in Oskemen. The bank is an IAEA-owned fuel-assurance reserve for peaceful nuclear power, designed to support access to nuclear fuel without encouraging additional enrichment programs. Kazakhstan’s civilian nuclear claim, therefore, rests on practice: disarmament, threat reduction, and non-proliferation infrastructure. The policy now turns on a practical paradox. Kazakhstan has been the world’s leading uranium producer since 2009 and produced about 40% of the world’s uranium in 2025. Yet it has no operating nuclear power plant. Its Soviet-era BN-350 reactor, near Aktau on the Caspian Sea, was decommissioned in 1999 after decades of electricity generation and desalination. Kazakhstan is central to the global nuclear fuel cycle but has...

Lavrov in Astana as Kazakhstan Prepares for Putin State Visit

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has visited Astana for talks with Kazakhstan’s leadership, as the two countries prepare for a planned state visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin in late May. Lavrov arrived in Kazakhstan on April 29. The main working part of the visit took place on April 30, with meetings with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev. Russia’s Foreign Ministry said the agenda covered political, trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties, as well as cooperation in the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At expanded talks in Astana, Kosherbayev said Russia remains one of Kazakhstan’s key trade partners. Bilateral trade exceeded $27 billion last year, and the two governments are working toward a target of $30 billion. Kosherbayev said the talks covered energy, transport, logistics, industry, digitalization, cultural ties, and international issues. The foreign ministers signed a cooperation plan between the two ministries for 2027-2028 during the visit. Kosherbayev said the plan reflected close coordination between Astana and Moscow on bilateral and international issues. The visit also comes ahead of Putin’s expected trip to Kazakhstan. The Kremlin said in February that Putin had confirmed his participation in the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting in Astana in late May and accepted Tokayev’s invitation to make a state visit linked to the event. For Kazakhstan, relations with Russia remain a central part of its multi-vector diplomacy, alongside growing ties with China, the European Union, Turkey, the Gulf states, and the United States. The two countries share a long border, have deep trade links, and work together through several regional organizations. Russia also remains central to Kazakhstan’s energy export network. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal near Novorossiysk handles roughly 80% of Kazakhstan’s crude exports. That gives Astana a strong reason to keep stable ties with Moscow, but it also explains why Kazakhstan is pushing to diversify transport routes. The government has promoted the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, as a way to move freight between China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Europe with less reliance on Russian territory. The war in Ukraine has made that approach harder to sustain. Kazakhstan has kept ties with Moscow, but Tokayev has also stressed the importance of the UN Charter, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on August 10, 2025, Tokayev said Kazakhstan supported the UN Charter, the inviolability of sovereign borders, and the territorial integrity of sovereign states. Economic pressure has also grown. Western governments have increased scrutiny of trade routes that could be used to bypass sanctions on Russia. Kazakhstan has tried to protect its own trade from that pressure while avoiding a direct break with Moscow. Energy adds another dimension. Any disruption to the CPC route can quickly become a national economic issue for Kazakhstan. In April, Kazakhstan’s energy ministry said CPC exports through the Black Sea remained stable after Russia reported...

Russia to Halt Kazakh Oil Flow to Germany, Exposing Europe’s Transit Vulnerability

Russia will stop the transit of Kazakh oil to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline from May 1 according to Reuters, disrupting a route that Berlin had built up after ending direct Russian crude imports. The move affects supplies to the PCK refinery in Schwedt, a major fuel plant for Berlin and Brandenburg. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the change would begin because of “technical possibilities.” Germany’s economy ministry said Rosneft Germany, which remains under German trusteeship, had informed the Federal Network Agency that transit of Kazakh crude through Russian territory to PCK would be prohibited from that date. The ministry added that the Russian government had not directly notified Berlin. Germany’s economy ministry said the stoppage did not threaten fuel supply and that existing alternatives would be used. About 17% of PCK Schwedt’s current crude supply comes from Kazakh oil delivered through the Druzhba pipeline. Germany’s economy ministry said that “existing options will be utilized to ensure security of supply in Germany” and that the halt “did not put the security of supply of petroleum products in jeopardy.” [caption id="attachment_47676" align="aligncenter" width="1038"] Image: pck.de/[/caption] However, the halt still exposes Germany’s reliance on a route that runs through Russia. Schwedt can process up to 12 million metric tons of oil a year and is a major fuel supplier for Berlin and Brandenburg, so any disruption attracts close attention even if replacement volumes can be found elsewhere. Germany has already looked at alternative deliveries through Rostock and Gdansk. Since 2023, Kazakh crude has reached Germany through Russia and Belarus via the Druzhba pipeline, giving Berlin a non-Russian source of oil and expanding Astana’s role in the European market. But the route still relied on Russian transit approval. The halt comes after two years of growth. Regular deliveries of Kazakh crude to Germany began in 2023, and in October 2025, the supply arrangement was extended through the end of 2026. Kazakhstan had been planning to expand that trade further. During an April 7 meeting with Bavarian State Minister Eric Beißwenger, Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said it aimed to raise oil exports to Germany to 2.5 million tons in 2026. Reuters reported that 2.146 million metric tons were delivered in 2025 and that 730,000 tons were supplied in the first quarter of 2026. KazTransOil has separately published its first-quarter operating results. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov confirmed that Druzhba transit to Germany would be halted. “For May, transit through Atyrau-Samara in the direction of the Druzhba pipeline and further to the Schwedt refinery is zero,” Akkenzhenov stated. He added that the Russian side, according to unofficial information, said it lacked the technical capability to pump Kazakh oil and that this was “most likely” linked to recent strikes on Russian infrastructure. He said transit would resume once the technical issue was resolved. Kazakh crude sent to Germany through Druzhba first moves via the Uzen-Atyrau-Samara pipeline and then through Transneft’s system to the Adamova Zastava delivery point before reaching Schwedt. The oil is sold as...