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Nuclear Power Plant

Kazakhstan Plans to Build at Least Three Nuclear Power Plants by 2050

Kazakhstan plans to build at least three nuclear power plants (NPPs) by 2050, with implementation of the first project already underway, the country’s Atomic Energy Agency has said. The nuclear energy development strategy aims to ensure energy security, support sustainable economic growth, and meet international climate commitments, while fostering high-tech industries and strengthening Kazakhstan’s position in the global nuclear sector. “According to the Strategy, by 2050, at least three nuclear power plants will be operating in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The first NPP project is already being implemented, construction of the second is under consideration, and for the third NPP, the potential use of small modular reactor technologies is being explored,” the agency said. In addition to plant construction, the strategy provides for the rational use of uranium resources, localization of equipment and nuclear fuel production, and the development of national industrial capacity. Particular attention is being given to advancing nuclear science and applied technologies, creating a modern scientific and technological base, and establishing a system for training qualified personnel. The document also outlines measures for the safe management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel to minimize environmental risks. Plans include the introduction of digital solutions and ensuring a high level of information security at nuclear facilities. “The implementation of the Strategy will enable the creation of a modern and sustainable nuclear cluster in Kazakhstan, integrated into the global nuclear ecosystem,” the agency said. A Center of Competence for NPP construction will be established on the basis of Kazakhstan Nuclear Power Plants. This entity will serve as a project office, general contractor, and holder of state equity stakes in future plants. In the longer term, the country plans to create a specialized nuclear energy holding company that will unite project and operating organizations in the sector. According to expert estimates, construction of a single nuclear power plant will require up to 10,000 workers, including more than 3,000 technical specialists. “In this regard, active work is underway to update technical and vocational education programs,” the agency said. “Particular attention is being paid to training specialists such as turbine equipment operators, electricians, NPP equipment installers, and technicians responsible for plant operation and safety.” Programs for applied bachelor’s degrees in nuclear energy are also being developed, along with new specialties, including reactor equipment operators. The first plant will use Generation III+ reactors, which feature enhanced reliability and modern safety systems, including passive protection mechanisms capable of operating without human intervention or external power supply. According to the agency, the project incorporates international experience, including lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan, and includes measures to prevent radioactive releases even in severe emergencies. Contracts for the construction of the second and third NPPs have been awarded to China National Nuclear Corporation, while the first plant will be built by Russia’s state corporation Rosatom. The site for the first plant is located in the village of Ulken in the Almaty region, on the shores of Lake Balkhash, approximately 400 km northwest...

Kazakhstan-U.S. Relations

No Longer a Startup Market: Kazakhstan Makes Its Case to U.S. Investors

Washington D.C. - Acting on President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s push to convert strategic alignment with Washington into tangible commercial gains, senior Kazakh officials told U.S. investors on April 14 that the bilateral relationship is entering a deeper phase focused on energy, critical minerals, and transport infrastructure. Within that context, the country has undertaken constitutional reforms and other modernization efforts to digitize and improve the investment climate. The Kazakhstan delegation was led by Erzhan Kazykhan, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s Special Representative for Negotiations with the United States on priority issues of bilateral cooperation, and included National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov and Deputy Foreign Minister Alibek Kuantyrov, who traveled to Washington for the meetings. Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to the United States, Magzhan Ilyassov, also participated. A Delivering Partner, Not a Prospective One Kazykhan presented the new commercial push as a direct outgrowth of Tokayev’s November 2025 Oval Office meeting with President Trump, casting the Kazakh leader as a partner in a more ambitious phase of U.S.-Kazakhstan relations aimed at converting political trust into practical cooperation on energy security, critical minerals, and strategic transport corridors. He placed that agenda within the framework of Kazakhstan’s participation in U.S.-backed regional diplomacy as well, pointing to Kazakhstan joining the Abraham Accords and President Trump’s broader peace initiatives. Kazykhan also highlighted Kazakhstan’s role as a founding member of the Board of Peace, noting that Tokayev signed its charter in Davos in January and participated in its inaugural meeting in Washington on February 19. Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a constructive U.S. partner not only in Eurasian connectivity and resource security, but also in Middle East stabilization through support for reconstruction, healthcare, education, and longer-term peace-building efforts. Kazakhstan is seeking to set itself apart as a partner that delivers. While many countries pitch cooperation with Washington in terms of future potential, Astana’s message is that engagement has already produced tangible commercial outcomes. Following the Oval Office meeting, 29 agreements had been signed, including with Cove Capital, Boeing, Cerberus Capital Management, and Wabtec, with a combined value of more than $17 billion. Kazykhan added that more than 600 American companies operate in Kazakhstan and that cumulative U.S. investment has exceeded $60 billion, making the United States the country’s largest foreign investor. [caption id="attachment_47222" align="aligncenter" width="1429"] Kazakhstan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin; Special Representative for Negotiations with the United States, Erzhan Kazykhan; and Kazakhstan's Ambassador to the United States Magzhan Ilyassov meet with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on April 15 to strengthen commercial ties and advance regional cooperation. Image: USDOS[/caption] No Longer a Startup Market Ambassador Ilyassov said the discussion was more in-depth than a typical roundtable, because the relationship with U.S. partners has matured over many years. The tone of the session matched that description. The discussion centered on specifics of expansion, supply chains, regulation, and long-term capital rather than general market entry. [caption id="attachment_47219" align="aligncenter" width="2048"] Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to the United States, Magzhan Ilyassov; image: Kazakhstan Embassy, U.S.[/caption] Unlike the rest of Central Asia,...

Oil and Gas

Kazakhstan Gains Weight in China’s Energy System

The newly extended U.S. waiver for Russian oil transit through Kazakhstan and the reported giant onshore hydrocarbon discovery in western Kazakhstan point in different directions, yet they belong in the same analytical frame. One concerns an existing flow that already reaches China through working infrastructure, while the other concerns a possible future source that has not yet reached the stage of commercially proven reserves. Together, they mark a change in Kazakhstan’s position. The country is increasingly important to China both as a corridor and as a possible larger upstream partner. The U.S. waiver now runs until March 19, 2027. Kazakhstan is not a giant direct oil supplier to China in the way that Russia or Saudi Arabia is; China’s import structure is broader. But Kazakh-origin oil shipments, Russian transit oil, and adjacent energy links now constitute a single, more complex relationship. According to official Chinese sources, oil imported from Kazakhstan enters mainly through the China-Kazakhstan crude pipeline. More Than Kazakhstan’s Own Barrels Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP reported that in 2024, the Atasu-Alashankou route carried 1.2 million tons of oil and 9.989 million tons of transit oil, against a design capacity of 20 million tons a year. Official Chinese figures sharpen the point. By the end of 2024, total cumulative throughput on the pipeline had reached 280 million tons, including 19.139 million tons in 2024, while cumulative crude imported from Kazakhstan was lower. Kazakhstan’s significance to China is therefore larger than Kazakhstan’s own volumes would suggest, because the route carries more than Kazakhstan’s own oil. A glance at Europe keeps that proportion straight. Eurostat reports that Kazakhstan supplied 12.7% of the European Union’s petroleum oil imports in 2025. The European External Action Service said that Kazakhstan accounted for 10.9% of EU oil imports in the first quarter of 2024. This made it the bloc’s third-largest supplier in that period, and a more important direct oil supplier to Europe than to China. The significance of Kazakhstan’s geographic proximity to China becomes clearer when one looks beyond crude oil. Kazakhstan is not only a direct oil supplier, but also a transit corridor for multiple China-bound energy flows. The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline is one of China’s major import routes. At the same time, while Kazakhstan’s own gas exports to China remain limited due to rising domestic demand, gas from Turkmenistan and Russia both pass through its territory. Oil and gas do not form a single operational system, but together they show that China’s energy connection with Kazakhstan extends beyond one commodity and beyond Kazakhstan’s own barrels. The Source Side May Be Growing In this context, the reported discovery on the Zhylyoi carbonate platform makes a difference because it widens the source side of the relationship without changing present flows. According to public statements by KazMunayGas officials, the Karaton, Kazhygali, and Zhylyoi formation has resource potential of 4.7 billion metric tons of hydrocarbons, and the broader Zhylyoi carbonate reservoir may hold as much as 20 billion metric tons of oil equivalent. The field is onshore in...

Middle East Crisis

Central Asia Welcomes Ceasefire, Urges Talks as Energy Risks Persist

Central Asian governments have cautiously welcomed the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, describing it as a necessary pause in a conflict that has already begun to affect regional stability, trade, and energy flows. Across the region, official statements struck a consistent balance: support for the truce, alongside calls to translate it quickly into negotiations rather than allow it to become a temporary pause in hostilities. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the agreement as a “ceasefire and truce” reached through international mediation, including efforts involving Pakistan’s leadership. According to the presidential press service, Tokayev said that “this agreement became possible due to the goodwill and wisdom of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the senior leadership of Iran, as well as all countries involved in the military conflict.” Tokayev went on to express his hope that the agreement would prove sustainable and contribute to global trade and economic stability. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry described the ceasefire as an “important step toward de-escalating tensions” and stressed that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tashkent called for “all parties to exercise restraint, [and] refrain from actions that could further escalate the situation, warning that further escalation risks widening the conflict and undermining regional stability. The statement reaffirmed Uzbekistan's “unwavering position on the need to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that the ceasefire would open the way to a comprehensive and long-term peace. Dushanbe emphasized that the conflict has “no military solution and its continuation will only worsen the already difficult situation in the Middle East and cause colossal damage to all countries in the region.” The statement urged all parties to “abandon the use of force” and use political and diplomatic mechanisms in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said it “welcomes the achievement of a ceasefire agreement in the Middle East,” highlighting the role of Pakistan’s mediation efforts in reducing tensions. Bishkek reaffirmed that disputes must be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the UN Charter and international law, and expressed its “hope for achieving sustainable and long-term peace in the region.” Turkmenistan had not issued an official public statement on the ceasefire at the time of publication, in line with its longstanding policy of neutrality and cautious approach to external conflicts. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the “announced ceasefire” and praised the efforts of mediators who helped broker the agreement. Baku called on all parties to “engage in productive dialogue aimed at resolving existing problems and strengthening mutual trust” and signaled its readiness to “support initiatives aimed at strengthening lasting peace, security, and cooperation in the region.” The convergence in tone reflects more than diplomatic routine. The conflict has already spilled into Central Asia’s political and humanitarian agenda, prompting coordination on evacuations, aid deliveries, and contingency planning....

Iran

The Iran War Is Repricing Central Asia’s Connectivity

Europe’s aviation regulator has extended its current conflict-zone bulletin for the Middle East and Persian Gulf through April 10 and continues to advise operators to avoid Iranian and adjacent airspace at all altitudes. Reuters reported soon after that the squeeze on normal flight paths was pushing more traffic into narrower routes, notably over Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The Strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, has not returned to normal commercial use. A limited number of exempted vessels have crossed, but passage remains selective, politicized, and uncertain rather than routine. The question, consequently, is no longer only whether Central Asia has alternatives to single-route dependence but whether those alternatives remain commercially usable, taking into account the increased risk, delay, insurance, fuel burn, and congestion. What has changed is the cost of maintaining reliable connectivity. The Cost of Reliability The Iran conflict imposes higher operating costs on the wider Eurasian air corridor that is now taking displaced traffic. EUROCONTROL estimates that about 1,150 flights a day continue to be affected by re-routing linked to the Middle East crisis. These add roughly 206,000 kilometers of flying and 602 tons of extra fuel burn per day. Maritime trends are similar. In March, war-risk premiums in or near the Gulf had risen more than tenfold in some cases, with hull war premiums moving from about 0.25% of vessel value to as much as 3%. Air-freight rates on some routes rose by as much as 70% as shippers redirected urgent cargo away from disrupted sea lanes and restricted airspace. Higher surcharges and narrower margins for operational error can make routes lose commercial value even if they remain formally open. The wider macroeconomic setting has also made resilience more expensive. Higher oil prices make every detour costlier, raising freight charges, power costs, and production costs across the region’s trading partners. Even where Central Asian cargo does not move through Iranian waters, the same pattern is still present. Asian policymakers were already confronting a combined oil-price and currency shock at a moment when roughly 80% of the oil shipped through Hormuz normally goes to Asia. The World Bank’s March food and nutrition security update notes that around 20% of global oil supplies and about one-third of global fertilizer trade transit the Strait of Hormuz. Urea prices, for example, surged by nearly 46% month on month between February and March 2026. Importers in Central Asia, as well as in Europe and the South Caucasus, remain under pressure from higher household food costs and tighter producer margins. The price of resilience is now showing up in increased costs for farm inputs, food costs, and household budgets. How the Burden Falls Kazakhstan remains the best placed in the region to absorb the shift. The CPC pipeline still carries about 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports; oil income contributes 52% of the state budget. Earlier disruptions had constrained Kazakhstan to reroute 300,000 tons of crude, and the country continues to rely on supplementary outlets such as Ust-Luga, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and China when its main...

Nuclear Power Plant

Kyrgyzstan Weighs Nuclear Power as Rosatom Talks Advance

Kyrgyzstan is still in talks with Russia’s state-owned nuclear power company Rosatom about building a nuclear power plant (NPP) in Kyrgyzstan. But on March 3, Kyrgyz Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Daniyar Amangeldiyev, was already speaking about conducting a national referendum on the construction of a nuclear power plant. It is clear why Rosatom is anxious to build the NPP, but it is less clear why Kyrgyzstan needs it. Kyrgyzstan’s Road to Nuclear Power Rosatom is active in Central Asia, receiving the contract to build Kazakhstan’s first NPP in June 2025. Uzbekistan had already signed a contract with Rosatom in May 2024, and in late March 2026, the first concrete was poured for the NPP that Rosatom is constructing in Uzbekistan. At first glance, Central Asia might not seem like an ideal market for nuclear power. But after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Finland canceled its contract for Rosatom to build the Hanhikivi-1 NPP, and while several European countries are building or considering building NPPs, Hungary is the only country committed to partnering with Rosatom. With limited prospects for new contracts in Europe, Rosatom is likely to focus on securing additional deals in non-European markets to expand its already extensive portfolio. Kyrgyzstan’s Energy Ministry and Rosatom signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a small NPP in January 2022. The initial plan for Kyrgyzstan’s NPP was to build a small RITM-200N with a 55-megawatt (MW) capacity. In May 2025, Director General of Rosatom, Alexey Likhachev, said his company was offering Kyrgyzstan a modular NPP project that could generate anywhere from 110 MW to 440 MW using RITM-200N reactors, equivalent to two to eight units. In late March 2026, Likhachev said current talks with Kyrgyzstan were not only focused on the construction of a small NPP but also a medium-sized NPP. Kyrgyz Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Amangeldiyev said in June 2025 that Kyrgyz officials and Rosatom representatives were already looking at potential sites for the NPP. Reports about the planned NPP in Kyrgyzstan don’t mention the cost of construction, and it remains unclear how many and what size reactors will be installed. According to Uzbek officials, the six 55-MW units that Rosatom was initially contracted to build (the project has since changed) would have cost “less than $2 billion.” An Agreement or Not In March 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Energy Minister Taalaybek Baygaziyev signed an agreement with Rosatom on the development and implementation of the NPP investment project. In September 2025, Altynbek Rysbekov was appointed Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Energy Minister, and he said, “There is a possibility of building a (nuclear power) station, but no fundamental decision has been made yet.” However, Rysbekov’s further comments indicated he supported the idea of building an NPP in Kyrgyzstan, and he reconfirmed that the search for an appropriate site for the NPP continued. On April 3, 2026, Amangeldiyev said negotiations with Rosatom are continuing. “We are collaborating with Rosatom on infrastructure development and personnel training,” Amangeldiyev stated. “Only after...