Energy Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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Power Grid

Central Asia Electricity Demand Surges in Summer Power Reckoning

At 5:22 p.m. on July 20, after days of extreme heat, Uzbekistan's electricity system hit its highest load on record. Air conditioners were running on overdrive across the country as demand reached 14.2 gigawatts. Over the full day, consumers used 301.9 million kWh, almost 11% more than the previous year's summer peak. The pressure was visible elsewhere. In Kyrgyzstan, electricity consumption jumped 18% year-on-year on July 19. Parts of Bishkek and the Chui Region lost power for periods of up to two hours as operators tried to stop overloaded equipment from failing. In Almaty, where temperatures reached 40°C, 35 repair crews were deployed as record demand triggered faults across parts of the city's electricity network. Central Asia has spent years preparing for power shortages during freezing winters. July demonstrated that 40°C-plus summer days can now pose a different version of the same problem. The Demand Problem Governments across Central Asia have largely approached energy shortages from the supply side: more generation, new plants, stronger transmission, and greater investment. The summer peak exposed another weakness, however: demand is rising faster than many networks can comfortably absorb it. The pressure comes from new apartment blocks, shopping centers, construction sites, cooling systems, and the rapid spread of air conditioning. In Tashkent, Almaty, Bishkek, and other expanding cities, hotter summers also intensify the urban heat-island effect as concrete and glass retain heat and increase cooling demand. Much of the region's electricity infrastructure was built for a different pattern of consumption. That makes demand-side management increasingly important alongside new generation. Building another plant increases the amount of electricity available, but does little by itself to control when households and businesses consume it. Efficiency standards, more responsive tariffs, modern metering, and investment in distribution networks will become more important as peak demand rises. Four Systems, Shared Pressure Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are not facing identical problems, but July highlighted a common vulnerability: electricity systems are being asked to meet demand patterns for which they were not originally designed. Kazakhstan is pursuing major long-term additions to generation. In May 2026, it signed a $16.5 billion agreement with Russia's Rosatom for its first nuclear power plant near Lake Balkhash. Construction is expected to begin in 2027, with the first reactor scheduled for commissioning in early 2034. For a coal-heavy system facing rising demand, the baseload argument is clear. But new capacity will take years to arrive. Tariff reform and modernization of existing infrastructure remain politically sensitive, especially if households are asked to pay more before improvements in reliability become visible. Uzbekistan is racing to add capacity, especially solar, in response to a rapidly growing population and dwindling gas reserves. Solar can reduce daytime strain and free gas for other uses, but it does not resolve the evening peak. Cooling demand can remain high after sunset, when solar output falls. Without sufficient storage, flexible backup generation, and stronger transmission and distribution networks, rapid additions of renewable capacity can coexist with local shortages and outages. Uzbekistan's July records underline the...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Shipowners Pull Back from CPC as Export Recovery Falters

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Black Sea export operations have become intermittent once again following a brief restart. Eight trading sources told Reuters that CPC repeatedly suspended operations this week and was closed again on August 5, as safety concerns made shipowners reluctant to accept CPC voyages. Four tankers completed loading after the July 30 attacks, and two had left the terminal area by early this week. Those departures confirmed that cargo could still move, but they did not show that the terminal had returned to normal. Russian transport group FESCO suspended operations in the area on August 4, while one CPC Blend seller needed several attempts to secure a vessel for a recent cargo. CPC declined to comment. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry had said on August 1 that a complete shutdown was not under consideration and the situation was under control. A Brief Restart The latest disruption followed two attacks near the terminal on July 30. NISSOS SIFNOS was struck while loading Tengizchevroil crude at single-point mooring SPM-3. MARATHI was hit while waiting about six nautical miles offshore. Both crews were unharmed, fires were extinguished, and no pollution was reported. Chevron told The Times of Central Asia at the time that it was “aware of reports of an incident involving a vessel loading at Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) facilities near Novorossiysk. The safety of personnel, the protection of the environment and integrity of assets are our top priorities.” CPC stopped oil loading after the event, but said its pipeline facilities were operating normally. On July 31, Chevron CEO Mike Wirth said that oil was flowing and tankers were loading. By August 3, four tankers had completed loading at the terminal; two had departed, while at least three more remained nearby. Exports had resumed briefly, but the restart proved fragile. The Energy Ministry said CPC was receiving 100,000 metric tons of crude a day on August 1, equal to about 730,000 barrels per day. “The CPC continues to receive oil from shippers, while storage tanks are being filled,” the ministry said. It added that higher intake depended on tankers arriving on time. The 1,511-kilometer pipeline can continue moving crude into terminal storage while maritime exports slow or stop. If the tanks fill, CPC may have to restrict intake, forcing producers in Kazakhstan to cut output. Freight costs reflected the risk. The daily charter rate for a tanker calling at CPC reached $338,000 by the end of last week, almost double the level from a month earlier. August-loading CPC Blend cargoes were offered this week at nearly $4 a barrel below Brent. The grade had traded at a premium only a few weeks earlier. War-risk insurance for calls at Black Sea terminals has risen to as much as 2% of a vessel’s value, from around 1% two weeks earlier, according to insurance sources. Production Damage Spreads Preliminary operational data put Kazakhstan’s crude oil and gas condensate production for July at 7.6 million metric tons, or about 1.85 million barrels per day. That was...

Aviation

Uzbekistan Turns to Georgia and Iraq as Jet Fuel Demand Rises 27%

Uzbekistan says it has arranged aviation fuel imports from Georgia, Iraq, and other countries as changes in regional air traffic drive up demand. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's office said on August 3 that demand for aviation fuel will reach an estimated 375,000 metric tons from July through December, 27% higher than in the same period in 2025. The government linked the increase to more flights through Central Asia and a rise in services to Uzbekistan, according to an official statement. “Most of this demand will be met by domestic oil refineries,” the president’s office said, adding that alternative import channels, including supplies from Georgia and Iraq, had been established in response to export restrictions imposed by certain partner countries. The statement did not identify the countries imposing the restrictions. It also gave no details about suppliers, import volumes, prices, delivery routes, or whether shipments from Georgia and Iraq have begun. Batumi Oil Terminal resumed handling European-produced aviation fuel in July, while Georgia’s Kulevi refinery does not plan to begin producing aviation kerosene until 2027. Uzbekistan has not said whether the supplies listed as coming from Georgia are produced there or re-exported through the country. State-owned Uzbekneftegaz aims to produce 310,000 tons of aviation fuel in 2026. This is only the company’s production target, not Uzbekistan’s total domestic output. The government has not said how much of the country’s aviation fuel demand will be met by Uzbekneftegaz, other domestic producers, or imports. Uzbekistan's airports handled 64,831 flights during the first half of 2026, up 8% from a year earlier. Passenger traffic rose 16% to more than 8.15 million, according to Uzbekistan Airports data. International services accounted for 47,371 flights and nearly 6.7 million passengers, with Tashkent International Airport handling 40,283 flights, up 7%, while passenger traffic increased 17% to 5.36 million. Tourism is also adding to passenger demand. Uzbekistan recorded 6,565,410 foreign visits for tourism purposes in January-June, up 24.9% from a year earlier, according to the National Statistics Committee. The increase forms part of a wider regional travel boom. However, almost three-quarters of those came from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, which together accounted for 4.9 million arrivals. The total therefore includes substantial land-border traffic and cannot be read solely as an air-passenger figure. Geopolitical disruption is another factor driving demand. The war involving Iran has constricted a main Europe-Asia aviation corridor and forced airlines away from high-risk airspace. Some services are now using a northern arc through the Caucasus and Central Asia, increasing the value of the region’s airspace. Pressure from the north predates the Iran conflict. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many Western carriers have avoided Russian airspace. Uzbekistan Airways began routing Europe services around Russia and Belarus in January 2025. Its Tashkent-Munich route grew by 307 kilometers, adding 30 to 40 minutes to the journey time. Uzbekistan already had a growing air transit base. Uzaeronavigation served 188,000 flights in 2023, including 143,000 by foreign airlines. More than 74,000 flights were handled in Uzbek airspace during January-April...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Chevron Says CPC Is Loading Tankers as Kazakhstan Restores Oil Intake

Chevron CEO Mike Wirth said that oil was flowing through the CPC pipeline and tankers were being loaded on July 31, one day after two vessels were attacked near its Black Sea terminal. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said intake reached 100,000 metric tons a day from August 1 and rejected reports of a complete shutdown. “The pipeline is flowing. We’ve been loading ships this week,” Wirth said during Chevron’s second-quarter earnings call. He said two of CPC’s three single-point moorings were in service. The third was undergoing refurbishment and was expected to return during the third quarter. The ministry said CPC temporarily suspended pipeline system operations on July 31 but continued receiving crude and filling storage tanks. A complete shutdown “is not being considered,” it said. Further increases would depend on tankers arriving for loading near Novorossiysk. The two statements indicate that loadings restarted quickly after the July 30 attacks, but do not establish a full return to planned export volumes. CPC can receive crude while storage space remains available, but if tanker loadings fall behind, storage fills and producers must cut output as they did in late July. On August 2, OPEC+ raised Kazakhstan’s September target by 10,000 barrels per day to 1.628 million barrels. The increase formed part of a combined 188,000-barrel-per-day rise for Kazakhstan and six other producers. The group said countries that had exceeded their quotas since January 2024 would make up for the excess by producing less in future months. A separate OPEC+ monitoring committee, which includes Kazakhstan, stressed the “critical importance” of safeguarding international maritime routes and expressed concern about attacks on energy infrastructure. Its statement did not name CPC or the Black Sea incidents. For Kazakhstan, the higher quota may have little immediate effect if export flows remain constrained. Reuters has reported that OPEC+ may pause further increases after September while it reviews production capacity for quota baselines which will apply in 2027. The immediate risk is a repeat of late July, when disrupted loadings filled storage and forced sharp production cuts at Tengiz and other major fields. CPC loadings had resumed on July 27 after a week-long suspension. Three days later, two more tankers were attacked near the terminal. NISSOS SIFNOS was struck while loading Tengizchevroil crude at the SPM-3 offshore mooring, while MARATHI was hit while waiting for a berth about six nautical miles offshore. Both fires were extinguished, and no injuries to the crews or pollution were reported. Neither CPC nor Kazakhstan publicly identified an attacker. Ukraine’s drone forces later said they had struck four Russian tankers in the Black and Azov seas, but did not name the vessels or locations. The earlier stoppage had already demonstrated how swiftly export disruption can reach Kazakhstan’s oilfields. National oil and gas condensate production fell to about one million barrels per day on July 26, less than half the June average of 2.16 million barrels per day. CPC runs for about 1,510 kilometers from western Kazakhstan through Russia to the Black Sea. It handles...

Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Europe Must Defend the Distinction It Has Made Between Kazakhstani and Russian Oil

In the early hours of July 30, drones struck two tankers at the marine terminal of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) near Novorossiysk: the Nissos Sifnos while it was loading Tengizchevroil crude at Single Point Mooring 3, and the Marathi as it approached the terminal. Loading was temporarily suspended, although the pipeline remained operational. Neither vessel sank; no casualties or oil spill were reported. Earlier attacks in July had already interrupted CPC loading operations and prompted a formal protest from Kazakhstan. Astana said that an agreed mechanism for exchanging information about civilian vessels entering the Black Sea to load CPC oil had been disregarded. The recurrence was more important than the damage: it could alter commercial expectations and behavior. The pipeline is not the relevant analytical unit; the export chain is. It can remain operational even when the maritime egress of its oil to world markets has ceased to function. Once loading stops and terminal storage fills, CPC must restrict intake from Kazakhstan, transmitting the interruption backward through the system until producers reduce output. After two tankers bound for the CPC terminal were struck in January, Black Sea war-risk premiums rose from 0.6–0.8% to 1% of vessel value, while insurers shortened their review of terms from every 48 hours to every 24 hours. By July, vessels were avoiding the terminal on safety grounds even though no structural damage to it had been reported. Commercial use of CPC was thus impaired despite the integrity of its infrastructure. The concentration of Kazakhstan’s exports magnifies the effect. CPC carries approximately four-fifths of its oil exports, including production from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak. The July interruption exposed the consequence: full terminal storage obliged CPC to halt intake, while the Kazakhstani government confirmed that producers had reduced output because of export constraints. The vulnerability reaches backward from maritime egress into production. Crude from Kazakhstan occupies a material place in the EU’s non-Russian import structure, giving Europe a direct interest in the matter. Kazakhstan supplied 11.5% of EU petroleum-oil imports in 2024 and 9.6% in the first quarter of 2026, ranking among the Union’s three largest suppliers in both periods. The EU’s sanctions architecture already recognizes that Kazakhstani oil passing through Russian territory does not thereby become Russian oil. Commission guidance treats CPC crude as originating in Kazakhstan when supported by certificates of origin or other documentation, notwithstanding unavoidable admixture with Russian oil. EU legislation also provides targeted derogations permitting goods, technology, and services required for the operation and maintenance of CPC infrastructure. The differentiated treatment is narrow: it attaches to the origin and documentation of the cargo, not indiscriminately to every vessel, facility, or transaction associated with CPC. Cargo, route, terminal, and vessel remain legally separable. The distinction became especially salient when the sanctioned Nelsa, which had carried Russian Urals crude, was attacked at the same terminal after vessels loading Kazakhstani crude had been struck. Europe nevertheless lacks a CPC-specific public-policy position on repeated disruption of the export chain carrying exempted crude, even though its...

Energy Security

Kazakhstan Weighs Proposal to Process Russian Crude

Kazakhstan is considering a plan to process Russian crude at its refineries, a step Astana says could support plant utilization and domestic fuel supplies but could also raise sanctions-compliance and diplomatic questions, depending on its scale and structure. The Energy Ministry said on July 30 that discussions cover refining oil “of Russian origin,” selling part of the output in Kazakhstan, and exporting part back to Russia. It did not identify the refineries, volumes, counterparties, or commercial terms. The talks come as parts of Russia face fuel shortages following repeated Ukrainian strikes on refineries. Moscow has extended export restrictions on gasoline, diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils until January 31, 2027, although producers regain exemptions for several products from September 1. The two countries already exchange crude, feedstock, and refined products. Russia discussed buying about 50,000 metric tons of Kazakh gasoline in June. Astana said at the time that it had received no formal request and would protect domestic supply. Trade has since moved beyond discussion. Kazakhstan's Condensate refinery is processing Russian naphtha and exported gasoline to Russia for the first time in July. Kazakhstan has a practical industrial case for considering the proposal. Although the ministry has not identified any refinery involved in the talks, the Pavlodar refinery was designed to process West Siberian crude and remains connected to Russian supply routes. The two countries share extensive energy transport systems and coordinate annual fuel balances. The ministry said steady feedstock would support refinery utilization and domestic supply. The wider regional focus on fuel security was evident on July 31, when Tajik President Emomali Rahmon proposed building large oil refineries in Central Asia, prioritizing domestic demand for essential petroleum products. Decades of infrastructure integration also constrain Kazakhstan’s room for maneuver. More than 80% of its oil exports cross Russian territory through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Much of Kazakhstan’s rail trade is tied to Russian networks. These links narrow Kazakhstan’s near-term options and raise the economic cost of abrupt changes to established energy arrangements. The scale and destination of the resulting fuel would determine much of the political meaning. Small volumes sold mainly in Kazakhstan could resemble established regional commerce. A larger export-oriented program supplying Russia during a period of refinery disruption would draw more scrutiny, particularly if it materially eased pressure on Russia’s fuel system. The sensitivity has been heightened by renewed disruption around the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. On July 30, attacks hit NISSOS SIFNOS and MARATHI near the CPC terminal at Novorossiysk. Oil loading stopped only three days after Kazakhstan resumed exports following a week-long disruption. The route is Kazakhstan’s principal oil export artery. The earlier stoppage cut national oil and gas condensate output to about one million barrels per day by July 26, less than half the June average. Russia explicitly blamed Ukraine. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called the July 30 strikes “actions of a terrorist nature” and said they harmed Kazakh and U.S. economic interests. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry confirmed the incidents but did not name an attacker....