• KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
12 August 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 129

Vance Personally Asked Zelensky to Halt CPC-Linked Tanker Strikes, FT Reports

U.S. Vice President JD Vance personally asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 31 to halt attacks on oil tankers serving the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, the Financial Times reported on August 12. Citing Ukrainian officials and others familiar with the call, the newspaper said Kyiv had agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or non-Russian vessels unless they were under Ukrainian sanctions or carrying Russian oil or other Russian cargo. Ukraine has not struck tankers near the CPC terminal since the July 31 call. Vance’s intervention came after repeated July attacks had disrupted Kazakhstan’s main oil-export route, halted loading several times, and forced producers to cut output. Washington was also concerned that the attacks were destabilizing oil markets and harming U.S. commercial interests. A U.S. official confirmed to the FT that Washington had warned Kyiv against attacks on non-Russian vessels and CPC infrastructure, describing the pipeline as “a vital conduit of Kazakhstan-origin energy for European markets” and an alternative to Russian energy supplies. The latest incidents before the call came on July 30, when two more tankers were attacked. NISSOS SIFNOS was struck while loading Tengizchevroil crude at CPC’s SPM-3 mooring, while MARATHI was attacked while awaiting a berth about six nautical miles offshore, forcing CPC to stop loading again. The Vance-Zelensky call took place the following day. Washington had already warned Kyiv about attacks affecting U.S. and Kazakh economic interests. Ukraine’s ambassador to Washington at the time, Olha Stefanishyna, disclosed in February that the State Department had delivered a formal démarche after an earlier strike on Novorossiysk. On July 23, Representative Bill Huizenga, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, told TCA that Ukraine had an obligation to avoid legitimate allied energy exports and infrastructure, and that further strikes would "not be tolerated." The Wall Street Journal later reported that Chevron CEO Mike Wirth had raised the tanker attacks with Trump administration officials, after which Washington cautioned Ukraine against targeting non-Russian vessels in the Black Sea. By early August, the disruption was showing clearly in export data. Reuters reported on August 7 that CPC loadings in July fell more than 20% behind schedule to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. The reduction amounted to a loss of about 400,000 barrels per day of CPC Blend from international markets in July. Kazakhstan’s oil production fell 14% in July from June. CPC is the dominant route for Kazakhstan’s oil exports and normally handles roughly 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day. The 1,511-kilometer pipeline runs from the Tengiz field through Russia to the Black Sea. Its shareholder structure also gives U.S. companies a substantial direct interest: Chevron owns 15%, while Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company, an ExxonMobil affiliate, owns 7.5%. Responsibility for the individual tanker attacks has remained politically sensitive. Russia has blamed Ukraine. Kyiv has not publicly claimed responsibility for attacks on vessels carrying predominantly Kazakh crude. According to the FT, the July 31 call resulted in a...

Turkmenistan Tightens Diesel Limits as Fuel Shortages Persist

Turkmenistan has halved the amount of diesel that vehicles may carry in their tanks when leaving the country, cutting the limit from 300 to 150 liters from August 10. The charge for every liter above the limit has also risen from 20 manat (about $1) to 30 manat (about $1.50). The move is the second tightening of the rules in several months. According to Chronicles of Turkmenistan, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov signed the relevant decree on August 5. At the beginning of April, vehicles leaving Turkmenistan were limited to 300 liters of diesel in their tanks, with a charge of 20 manat, or about $1 at the market exchange rate, for every additional liter. Enforcement was assigned to the border and customs services, as well as the state-owned concern Turkmenneft, The Times of Central Asia reported. The large price difference between Turkmenistan and neighboring markets creates an incentive to take fuel across the border. In April, The Times of Central Asia reported that diesel in Turkmenistan cost around $0.05 per liter, compared with approximately $1 in Uzbekistan, $0.60 in Kazakhstan, and $0.90 in Russia. Low regulated prices extend beyond diesel. In July, petrol in Turkmenistan cost around $0.43 per liter, placing the country among the world's cheapest markets. By comparison, AI-95 petrol cost about $0.68 in Kazakhstan, approximately $1.02 in Kyrgyzstan, and around $1.34 in Uzbekistan, according to Chronicles of Turkmenistan. Independent media have also reported persistent shortages of petrol and diesel inside Turkmenistan, particularly outside Ashgabat. In July, Turkmen.news reported large queues at filling stations and shortages of both petrol and diesel in the regions. The outlet also published documents indicating problems with aviation kerosene supplies at Ashgabat International Airport. One document from June 2024 said the airport had 2,500 tons of kerosene available, enough for only two to three days at prevailing consumption levels. By December 2024, another document showed reserves had fallen to 728 tons, less than one day's supply. Turkmen.news reported that problems with kerosene allocations continued into 2026. The situation is notable because Turkmenistan produces and refines its own oil. The country has two major refining centers, the Turkmenbashi oil refinery complex on the Caspian Sea and the Seydi refinery in the east. Petroleum products are supplied to the domestic market and also exported. Fuel shortages have occurred repeatedly. In 2024, eastern regions of Turkmenistan experienced serious petrol shortages. Drivers in the Lebap and Mary regions waited for hours at filling stations, while some stations imposed purchase limits. The shortage also disrupted public transport and contributed to higher food prices, The Times of Central Asia reported. The latest border restrictions add another element to this picture. Independent outlets have linked the limits to the wide gap between heavily regulated domestic fuel prices and prices abroad, which creates opportunities for cross-border resale. Halving the diesel allowance to 150 liters further restricts the amount that can leave Turkmenistan in vehicle tanks as reports of domestic shortages continue.

Kazakh Uranium for Asia: Japan Returns for Fuel, South Korea Expands Cooperation

Kazakhstan accounts for around 40% of global uranium production. China already receives not only raw material from the country but also finished fuel assemblies; Japan is signing new contracts after bringing some of its reactors back online; and South Korea is expanding cooperation with Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry. Kazakhstan itself, which for decades exported almost all of its uranium, is preparing to build its own nuclear power plants. These developments are gradually changing the country’s place in Asia’s nuclear energy sector. In December 2025, Kazatomprom, the world’s largest producer of natural uranium, agreed on new supplies with Kansai Electric Power, one of Japan’s major nuclear power operators. The agreement for the supply of uranium oxide concentrate, U₃O₈, was signed during events connected with a visit by a Kazakh delegation to Japan. This is not finished reactor fuel. U₃O₈, known in the industry as yellowcake, must undergo conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication after mining. For Kansai, the agreement provides another source of raw material for its nuclear fleet, while for Kazakhstan it continues cooperation with the Japanese company that began almost two decades ago. Japanese demand is rising again after a prolonged decline. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in March 2011 led to the gradual shutdown of all the country’s commercial reactors. Restarts began in 2015 after new safety requirements were introduced. In February 2025, the Japanese government approved an energy policy that envisages increasing nuclear power’s share of electricity generation to around 20% by 2040. To achieve this, Tokyo will need not only to restart existing reactors but also to secure their fuel supply. Kansai has a particularly important role in this process. The company operates seven reactors at three sites: Mihama, Takahama, and Ohi. In 2025, it also resumed work to assess the possibility of building a new reactor at the Mihama site. No final decision on construction has yet been made. Kansai’s links with Kazakhstan began long before the current revival of Japan’s nuclear energy sector. In 2006, the company and Sumitomo joined the APPAK uranium mining project in southern Kazakhstan. Kazatomprom currently owns 65% of the company, Sumitomo 25%, and Kansai 10%. APPAK develops the western section of the Mynkuduk deposit in the Turkistan region. For the Japanese company, this provides a presence directly at the source of the raw material. For Kazakhstan, the partnership became one of the first major examples of Asian energy companies participating in its uranium mining industry. China Already Receives Finished Fuel Kazakhstan has gone further with China than simply supplying uranium concentrate. Ulba-FA operates in Ust-Kamenogorsk as a joint venture between the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and China’s CGNPC-URC. The Kazakh side owns 51% and the Chinese side 49%. The plant produces fuel assemblies for Chinese nuclear power plants. Industrial production began in 2021. In December 2022, the first shipment was sent to China, containing just over 30 tonnes of low-enriched uranium in finished fuel assemblies. By the end of 2024, the plant had reached its design capacity of 200 tonnes a year....

Black Sea Risks Elevate Azerbaijan and Turkey in Kazakhstan’s Export Strategy

Bloomberg reported on August 8 that the Turkish authorities were withholding or delaying transit permission for some vessels bound through the Dardanelles for Novorossiysk. Some applicants were reportedly told that permits were not being issued, while others faced additional review. The practice appeared selective: vessels bound for some other Black Sea destinations continued to transit, while some Ukraine-bound vessels were also reportedly affected. On August 9, however, Turkish officials told Reuters that shipping through the Turkish Straits was proceeding smoothly and described the actions as temporary security measures rather than an ongoing restriction. The reported restrictions followed a sharp increase in attacks on commercial shipping around the Black Sea, including Turkish-linked vessels near Novorossiysk. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry expressed concern after attacks on the Turkish-owned Yaşar and Nadezhda and called on Russia and Ukraine to ensure navigational safety. Novorossiysk is especially important for Kazakhstan, because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal there handles the overwhelming majority of its oil exports. Although the CPC pipeline itself remains operational, the episode showed how quickly traffic serving Kazakhstan’s principal oil-export outlet could face an additional constraint. The events shed light on an export strategy Kazakhstan began developing several years before the current problems. Tokayev’s July 2022 instructions addressed both oil-export diversification through the Trans-Caspian route and alternative transport chains for other cargo. In particular, he called for greater use of Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports and the development of alternative railway routes. Later that year, KazMunayGas (KMG) and SOCAR established a framework for moving Kazakhstani oil from Aktau across the Caspian Sea and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, initially for up to 1.5 million tons annually. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey also adopted a 2022–2027 roadmap to remove bottlenecks along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan continued to develop transport links with Russia and China as it expanded Trans-Caspian routes through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The strategy extended Kazakhstan’s longstanding geopolitical multi-vector policy, which balances relations with partners in multiple directions, into the geoeconomic sphere. Tokayev made the combination explicit in his 2023 State of the Nation address. Relations with Turkey had meanwhile been elevated to an enhanced strategic partnership in May 2022, including transport cooperation and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan deepened their strategic and allied cooperation later that year, likewise emphasizing transport and logistics. Closer ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey widened Kazakhstan’s options without displacing established routes through Russia. The CPC pipeline remains so dominant in Kazakhstan’s oil exports that no other existing route approaches its present scale. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, the Energy Ministry reported the volume moving through the CPC pipeline at 64.8 million tons (the CPC itself reported about 63 million tons), meaning that more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s exported oil depended on the CPC system. Kazakhstan moved only about 1.4 million tons through the Aktau–Baku–Ceyhan (ABC) route in 2024, and about 1.3 million tons in 2025. Diversification cannot at present mean replacing CPC. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline gives Kazakhstani oil a westbound egress...

U.S. Reportedly Secures Ukrainian Pledge to Avoid Strikes on CPC Infrastructure

Turkey has begun restricting some commercial vessels from entering the Black Sea on voyages to Novorossiysk, adding a potential new obstacle to Kazakhstan’s oil exports through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium amid reports that Ukraine has agreed to spare CPC infrastructure and qualifying non-Russian tankers from attack. Turkey’s Directorate-General of Coastal Safety has told multiple ships bound for Novorossiysk that it is not currently issuing transit permits for those voyages or needs more time to review applications through the Dardanelles. The authorities have not publicly explained the measure. Some vessels were told the restriction also applied to ships heading to Ukraine, while traffic bound for Bulgarian and Turkish ports continued. There is no confirmation that any tanker scheduled to load Kazakh crude at the CPC terminal has been denied passage. The measure nevertheless comes at a difficult point for CPC, where repeated attacks and stoppages have already made some shipowners reluctant to accept voyages to the terminal near Novorossiysk. On August 7, Reuters reported that CPC loadings fell more than 20% behind schedule in July, to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. That removed about 400,000 barrels a day of CPC Blend from the international market. Loadings averaged roughly 1.1 million to 1.2 million barrels per day in the first week of August, while Kazakhstan’s oil production has fallen 14% from June. CPC normally handles around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day and carries more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Four tankers completed loading after the July 30 attacks, but operations remained intermittent as tanker availability and security concerns continued to limit the recovery. The Turkish restrictions emerged on the same day as a potentially important change in the security picture around CPC. According to an unnamed U.S. government official cited by Bloomberg, Ukraine has agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or qualifying non-Russian vessels bound for the terminal, provided they are not under Ukrainian sanctions, are not carrying Russian cargo, and are not owned by Russian individuals or entities. Ukraine has also established points of contact through which commercial shippers can provide vessel information and seek safe passage. The arrangement follows months of U.S. pressure over the exposure of Kazakhstan-origin crude and Western commercial interests at CPC. During a July 29 call, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev discussed the need for “reliable and uninterrupted” exports of Kazakhstan-origin oil through the system. The commitment could reduce one source of risk for ships serving CPC, but it does not immediately resolve the commercial disruption. Previous attempts by companies to identify vessels that should not be targeted did not prevent all attacks, while war-risk insurance and charter costs have risen sharply. Ankara has become increasingly vocal as attacks spread across the Black Sea. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said the Turkish-owned civilian vessels Yaşar and Nadezhda were attacked by drones on August 3 after leaving Novorossiysk, injuring crew members including Turkish citizens. It warned that further escalation could have broader consequences, including...

Central Asia Electricity Demand Surges in Summer Power Reckoning

At 5:22 p.m. on July 20, after days of extreme heat, Uzbekistan's electricity system hit its highest load on record. Air conditioners were running on overdrive across the country as demand reached 14.2 gigawatts. Over the full day, consumers used 301.9 million kWh, almost 11% more than the previous year's summer peak. The pressure was visible elsewhere. In Kyrgyzstan, electricity consumption jumped 18% year-on-year on July 19. Parts of Bishkek and the Chui Region lost power for periods of up to two hours as operators tried to stop overloaded equipment from failing. In Almaty, where temperatures reached 40°C, 35 repair crews were deployed as record demand triggered faults across parts of the city's electricity network. Central Asia has spent years preparing for power shortages during freezing winters. July demonstrated that 40°C-plus summer days can now pose a different version of the same problem. The Demand Problem Governments across Central Asia have largely approached energy shortages from the supply side: more generation, new plants, stronger transmission, and greater investment. The summer peak exposed another weakness, however: demand is rising faster than many networks can comfortably absorb it. The pressure comes from new apartment blocks, shopping centers, construction sites, cooling systems, and the rapid spread of air conditioning. In Tashkent, Almaty, Bishkek, and other expanding cities, hotter summers also intensify the urban heat-island effect as concrete and glass retain heat and increase cooling demand. Much of the region's electricity infrastructure was built for a different pattern of consumption. That makes demand-side management increasingly important alongside new generation. Building another plant increases the amount of electricity available, but does little by itself to control when households and businesses consume it. Efficiency standards, more responsive tariffs, modern metering, and investment in distribution networks will become more important as peak demand rises. Four Systems, Shared Pressure Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are not facing identical problems, but July highlighted a common vulnerability: electricity systems are being asked to meet demand patterns for which they were not originally designed. Kazakhstan is pursuing major long-term additions to generation. In May 2026, it signed a $16.5 billion agreement with Russia's Rosatom for its first nuclear power plant near Lake Balkhash. Construction is expected to begin in 2027, with the first reactor scheduled for commissioning in early 2034. For a coal-heavy system facing rising demand, the baseload argument is clear. But new capacity will take years to arrive. Tariff reform and modernization of existing infrastructure remain politically sensitive, especially if households are asked to pay more before improvements in reliability become visible. Uzbekistan is racing to add capacity, especially solar, in response to a rapidly growing population and dwindling gas reserves. Solar can reduce daytime strain and free gas for other uses, but it does not resolve the evening peak. Cooling demand can remain high after sunset, when solar output falls. Without sufficient storage, flexible backup generation, and stronger transmission and distribution networks, rapid additions of renewable capacity can coexist with local shortages and outages. Uzbekistan's July records underline the...