Middle Powers - The Times Of Central Asia

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Middle Powers

Kazakhstan’s Middle Power Moment: From Balancer to Regional Organizer

In “What Is the Status of Middle Powers?”, Michel Duclos of the Institut Montaigne presents Kazakhstan as a test case for whether middle powers can still influence outcomes in an era of intensifying great power rivalry. Writing after the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana, which brought together nine heads of state around President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Duclos notes that Kazakhstan “plays a leadership role” among states navigating pressures between China and Russia. He also argues that Tokayev, drawing on his experience as a former senior UN official, is seeking to elevate Kazakhstan into an intermediate power on multilateral issues. That is a useful lens for understanding Tokayev’s foreign policy. Rather than treating Kazakhstan’s position between larger powers as a liability, he has sought to turn geography, energy resources, logistics, diplomatic reliability, and convening power into regional agency. The result is an emerging model of middle power leadership rooted not in confrontation, but in coordination, credibility, and practical cooperation. That assessment places Tokayev’s foreign policy in a broader category than traditional balancing. Kazakhstan’s importance does not rest only on its raw assets — uranium, oil, minerals, logistics, or its position along Central Asian land routes. It also rests on how Astana uses those assets: as a convening state, a reliable partner, and a practical organizer of regional cooperation. Under Tokayev, multi-vector diplomacy has become less a defensive posture than an operating strategy, aimed at keeping Kazakhstan open to multiple partners while building platforms others have reason to use. In that sense, Kazakhstan is being presented not simply as a state located between great powers, but as one increasingly able to give structure to the space between them. Moving from “balancer” to “regional organizer” is only possible if Kazakhstan turns geography, resources, and diplomacy into practical systems others have reason to use. The clearest operational evidence of this shift is transport. Kazakhstan’s geography has often been described as a constraint. It is landlocked, vast, and positioned between larger powers. But the growth of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, allows Astana to recast that geography as a strategic advantage. In the first quarter of 2026, 125 container trains transited Kazakhstan via the Middle Corridor, a 34.4% increase from the same period in 2025. The Times of Central Asia also reported that freight volumes along the route through Kazakhstan have grown more than fivefold over seven years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.5 million tons annually. These figures show that Kazakhstan is not simply selling potential; it is building operational value into the corridor. This is where the idea of Kazakhstan as a regional organizer becomes concrete. A balancing state tries to avoid overdependence on any single power. An organizing state builds systems that others have a reason to use. If Kazakhstan can make the Middle Corridor faster, more predictable, more digitalized, and more commercially reliable, it is not merely balancing Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye, and the South Caucasus. It is creating connective tissue between them. World Bank analysis suggests that infrastructure...

Middle Powers

Opinion: Middle Powers and the “Voice of the Region” – Is Central Asia Becoming a Coordinated Actor?

Against the backdrop of growing global fragmentation and the weakening of universal international institutions, the role of so-called middle powers is increasing. These are states able to influence regional agendas without possessing great-power status. In this changing system, Central Asia is gradually moving beyond its long-standing image as a geopolitical periphery and is beginning to act more like a region with shared interests. For decades, the region was viewed mainly as a space where the interests of external powers, including Russia, China, the U.S., and others, intersected. Today, that paradigm is beginning to shift. Central Asia is showing greater signs of agency through what may be described as a cluster effect: individually, the countries have limited influence, but collectively they form an important transit hub between Europe and Asia, a growing market, a significant resource base, and a strategic security zone. This creates the conditions for a more coordinated regional position, even if a single regional voice is still emerging rather than fully formed. C5+Azerbaijan as a Foundation for Regional Architecture The institutional foundation of this process is the Central Asian leaders' consultative format, which is now expanding through Azerbaijan's participation. That is turning what was once a C5 dialogue into a looser C5+Azerbaijan, or C6, framework focused on transport, energy, and practical cooperation. Within this framework, the countries of the region are learning to act in a more coordinated manner without supranational pressure. In practice, this process is developing through three main areas. The first is transport and logistics. Azerbaijan's participation has strengthened efforts to make the Middle Corridor more coherent, though the route still faces bottlenecks in capacity, customs coordination, and Caspian crossings. Through tariff coordination, simplified border procedures, and investment in port and rail infrastructure, Central Asia and the Caucasus are increasingly functioning as parts of a single transport artery. That gives the region a faster option for cargo between China and Europe, even if it remains far smaller than traditional maritime routes. Shipping goods via the Suez Canal or the northern route can take between 35 and 45 days, whereas the Middle Corridor can reduce transit times to around 13-21 days under favorable conditions. According to forecasts cited by BCG, shipping volumes along the route could increase three- to fourfold during the current decade. Beyond logistics, the project is creating a new economic framework for the region. Its status as a crossroads is attracting investment in transport hubs and manufacturing facilities along the route, with the potential to turn transit corridors into zones of economic growth. This gives participating countries not only transit revenue but a stronger basis for long-term strategic resilience. The second major area is energy integration, where historical disputes over water and fuel resources are increasingly being supplemented by models of joint development. The Kambarata HPP-1 hydropower project in Kyrgyzstan, being developed with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has created an important precedent for shared management of water and energy interests. The project is expected to support cleaner electricity generation while helping stabilize irrigation flows...

Oil Prices

Opinion: Kazakhstan, Oil, the Iran War and Dutch Disease

In 1977, The Economist coined a new term for the (potential) negative consequences of a short-term boom in natural resources: “Dutch disease.” The phenomenon got its name from an analysis of the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands following the 1960s natural gas discoveries at Groningen, in the northeastern Netherlands. The theory was that a surge in the price of a natural resource like oil or gas would likely cause currency appreciation, making imports cheaper and other sectors, like manufacturing, less competitive. Whether the recent spike in oil prices will contribute to Dutch disease in oil-rich Kazakhstan will likely depend on the length of the Iran war’s effect on oil prices (which could last well beyond the end of the conflict itself) and the government’s stewardship of Kazakhstan’s economy. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev deserves credit for the government’s efforts to diversify the national economy. Investing in the nation’s manufacturing base, especially SMEs, educating the Kazakh workforce, and improving healthcare are all helping broaden the Kazakh economy and reduce the country’s dependence on oil. But oil is the main driver of Kazakhstan’s wealth, and while other sectors are increasing their share of Kazakhstan’s economy, oil and the wider extractive sector remain central to public finances, accounting for over 40% of government revenues. So, let’s do a deep dive on Kazakhstan’s oil. Most of Kazakhstan’s oil comes from the west of the country, including the Tengiz field near the Caspian Sea and the offshore Kashagan field in the northern Caspian. The Tengiz oil field is one of the deepest and largest oil fields in the world, while Kashagan, an offshore deposit, ranks as one of the largest global oil discoveries since the 1960s. Kazakhstan’s main export blend, CPC Blend, is a light, sweet crude, a desirable oil type that’s easy to refine into gasoline and diesel. Because the Iran war and restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted tanker traffic and raised fears of supply shortages, global oil prices have climbed. And while high oil prices are generally a net positive for Kazakhstan, the current price - Brent crude was trading above $100 per barrel in mid-May 2026 - could present problems. In the short term, high oil prices tend to boost government revenues and budget surpluses. They can increase inflows to Kazakhstan’s National Fund, depending on production, tax receipts, transfers, and government withdrawal policy, and provide resources for government spending on infrastructure and social programs. They can also stimulate demand in related sectors, boosting Kazakhstan’s oil-related industries. And since oil exports typically make up more than half of the nation’s export revenues, high oil prices generally lead to a rise in Kazakhstan’s GDP. So far, so good. But high oil prices also carry risks. For one thing, they can strengthen the tenge and add to domestic demand, especially if higher revenues feed into faster government spending. Which is where Dutch disease comes in. As the stronger currency makes non-oil exports less competitive, capital and labor shift toward the energy...

Antalya Diplomacy Forum

Central Asia Came to Antalya With a Clearer Voice and a Wider Agenda

The Antalya Diplomacy Forum, from April 17 to 19, brought together heads of state, foreign ministers, and senior officials at a tense moment in international politics. The official theme, “Mapping Tomorrow, Managing Uncertainties,” reflected the backdrop: war in the Middle East, pressure on trade, and growing doubts about the strength of international institutions. Central Asia did not dominate the gathering, but the region was visible across the program and in the meetings around it. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was the highest-profile regional figure in attendance, while Kyrgyzstan sent Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev, Turkmenistan sent Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and Tajikistan sent Deputy Foreign Minister Farrukh Sharifzoda. Uzbekistan was also active through Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov in meetings held during the forum dates. The strongest Central Asian intervention came from Tokayev. Speaking at a panel session, he said the United Nations remains indispensable, but also made clear that its present structure is failing to keep up with current crises. “We must honestly acknowledge that the Security Council is the central element in the reform of the United Nations,” he said. He also warned that many key negotiations now take place outside the UN system, in separate capitals and closed rooms, rather than through the institution that was built for that purpose. Tokayev framed the problem in practical terms rather than abstract ones. He said global leaders must approach peace and security “with a strong sense of responsibility,” adding that “we must act more responsibly and exercise restraint.” Tokayev also said Kazakhstan calls on all countries involved in the Iran conflict to cease hostilities while keeping the focus on the core issue of nuclear proliferation. His language matched the line Astana has tried to hold for years: avoid escalation, preserve room for dialogue, and keep diplomatic channels open. Tokayev went further when he turned to the role of what he called “middle powers,” naming Kazakhstan and Türkiye among the states that, in his view, show a high degree of responsibility in both diplomacy and practice. He said it would “not be an exaggeration to say that today middle powers often demonstrate a greater degree of responsibility than major powers represented in the Security Council, which, regrettably, often obstruct the resolution of key global issues.” That was one of the sharper lines delivered at the summit. It also showed how Kazakhstan now wants to place itself in the world: not as a passive actor caught between larger powers, but as a state that can help steady an increasingly unstable system. Türkiye was central to that framing. At the start of his remarks, Tokayev praised President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s role in the region and said Kazakhstan was looking forward to Erdoğan’s state visit next month. That also reflects a broader trend of closer coordination between Kazakhstan and Türkiye, including in the Trans-Caspian transport route (Middle Corridor) and shifting Caspian dynamics. Uzbekistan approached the summit in Antalya differently. Tashkent did not have a presidential intervention on the main stage, but it used the gathering for...

Geopolitics

Soft Power in Times of Geopolitical Turbulence: Kazakhstan’s Strategy as a Middle Power

For Kazakhstan, deeply embedded in global supply chains and international investment flows, soft power is evolving from an image-building asset into a strategic instrument of resilience. In an era of globalization, when even geographically distant conflicts can directly threaten national infrastructure and economic security, Astana’s ability to leverage institutional initiatives and investment interdependence as a form of diplomatic protection has become a decisive advantage. Over the long term, stability tends to characterize states whose infrastructure and economic interests are deeply interconnected with those of major global centers of power. A middle power and rational diplomacy Kazakhstan’s status as a middle power is not a matter of ambition, but a deliberate choice in favor of rational diplomacy, where flexibility and institutional engagement serve as key resources. Multilateral dialogue with the U.S., Russia, China, the EU, Turkey, and countries of the Middle East is being developed not as situational maneuvering but as a core strategy for minimizing external risks and preserving sovereignty. It is precisely the combination of proactive soft power, political neutrality, and economic openness that allows Kazakhstan to transform geopolitical turbulence into a strategic advantage, positioning the country as an indispensable hub of international stability. Ultimately, the rational diplomacy of a middle power transforms the country’s geographical position from a potential zone of conflict into a platform for dialogue, where pragmatism and institutional mediation become the principal guarantees of national sovereignty. The Ukrainian case: infrastructure protection as an element of soft power Developments surrounding Russia's war in Ukraine illustrate how Kazakhstan’s soft power can function as a form of economic protection. The attacks on infrastructure in the Novorossiysk area, through which the Caspian Pipeline Consortium exports oil, highlighted a distinctive mechanism for safeguarding national interests through investment interdependence. Strikes near the Black Sea hub posed a direct threat not only to logistics but also to the assets of major American investors in Kazakh energy projects, including Tengiz. According to reports cited in public discussions, the U.S. urged Ukraine to take into account the interests of American investors in Kazakhstan. If confirmed, such a step would represent an important precedent: even amid an intense military conflict, global actors remain attentive to protecting the economic interests tied to Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure. For Astana, this episode illustrates how decades of building strategic relations with Western partners have created a significant layer of economic security. In this context, soft power manifests itself as a form of “investment protection,” discouraging actions that could damage oil production or transport infrastructure linked to global stakeholders. Institutionalizing neutrality: why Kazakhstan needs a Board of Peace The creation of the Board of Peace by U.S. President Donald Trump and Kazakhstan’s active participation signals Kazakhstan’s transition from ad hoc mediation toward a more structured institutional architecture of soft power. The signing of the Board of Peace Charter by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev formally embeds peacebuilding activities within the state’s foreign policy framework. Kazakhstan’s developing participation in this initiative is also linked to its experience hosting the Congress of Leaders of World...

Board of Peace

The Board of Peace and Central Asia: Asserting Agency in a Fragmented Order

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s speech at the inaugural meeting of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace in Washington on February 19 was not only a foreign policy event, but one with significant domestic resonance. The initiatives announced include Kazakhstan’s participation in the reconstruction of Gaza, financial commitments, and readiness to send peacekeepers. Against the backdrop of economic challenges and ongoing constitutional reforms, however, a substantial segment of Kazakh society is questioning whether such an active foreign policy posture is justified at this time. The Board of Peace, the charter for which was ratified in Davos in January 2026 on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum, is positioned as an alternative to traditional multilateral institutions. According to Trump, the new body should not merely discuss conflicts, but will also "almost be looking over the United Nations and making sure it runs properly." Symbolically, the Board’s launch comes amid U.S. reductions and withholding of UN-related funding and withdrawals from multiple international bodies, alongside a partial U.S. payment toward UN arrears and the parallel creation of alternative financial and security mechanisms. According to the U.S. Mission to Kazakhstan, at the first meeting of the Board of Peace, nine members pledged a combined $7 billion aid package for the Gaza Strip. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait indicated their willingness to contribute. Additionally, Trump pledged $10B in U.S. funding, framing peace and reconstruction as a strategic priority. However, experts note that these sums fall far short of projected needs. According to joint UN-EU-World Bank estimates, the full reconstruction of Gaza could require up to $70 billion. In addition, the implementation of projects is complicated by the issue of disarming Hamas, which is designated as a terrorist organization in the U.S. and the European Union. At present, there is no indication that any Western or regional government intends to revise that designation. A notable feature of the Washington summit was the synchronized participation and subsequent public statements of key member states of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey effectively acted as what appeared to be an aligned geopolitical grouping, albeit without a formal declaration of joint action. What Is Kazakhstan Seeking? For Astana, participation in the Board of Peace appears to represent a renewed step in its multi-vector foreign policy doctrine. Tokayev directly stated Kazakhstan’s readiness to send medical units and observers to international stabilization forces and to allocate more than 500 educational grants for Palestinian students. In effect, Kazakhstan is reinforcing its image as a “Middle Power” prepared not only for diplomatic mediation but also for tangible contributions to international security efforts. This course aligns with the country’s existing participation in UN missions. Currently, 139 Kazakh military personnel are serving in the Golan Heights under the UN Disengagement Observer Force mandate. Nevertheless, the intensification of foreign policy engagement is raising domestic questions. Concerns voiced on social media and among experts include whether the international agenda risks diverting attention from internal economic pressures, including...