• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 44

Central Asia Came to Antalya With a Clearer Voice and a Wider Agenda

The Antalya Diplomacy Forum, from April 17 to 19, brought together heads of state, foreign ministers, and senior officials at a tense moment in international politics. The official theme, “Mapping Tomorrow, Managing Uncertainties,” reflected the backdrop: war in the Middle East, pressure on trade, and growing doubts about the strength of international institutions. Central Asia did not dominate the gathering, but the region was visible across the program and in the meetings around it. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was the highest-profile regional figure in attendance, while Kyrgyzstan sent Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev, Turkmenistan sent Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and Tajikistan sent Deputy Foreign Minister Farrukh Sharifzoda. Uzbekistan was also active through Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov in meetings held during the forum dates. The strongest Central Asian intervention came from Tokayev. Speaking at a panel session, he said the United Nations remains indispensable, but also made clear that its present structure is failing to keep up with current crises. “We must honestly acknowledge that the Security Council is the central element in the reform of the United Nations,” he said. He also warned that many key negotiations now take place outside the UN system, in separate capitals and closed rooms, rather than through the institution that was built for that purpose. Tokayev framed the problem in practical terms rather than abstract ones. He said global leaders must approach peace and security “with a strong sense of responsibility,” adding that “we must act more responsibly and exercise restraint.” Tokayev also said Kazakhstan calls on all countries involved in the Iran conflict to cease hostilities while keeping the focus on the core issue of nuclear proliferation. His language matched the line Astana has tried to hold for years: avoid escalation, preserve room for dialogue, and keep diplomatic channels open. Tokayev went further when he turned to the role of what he called “middle powers,” naming Kazakhstan and Türkiye among the states that, in his view, show a high degree of responsibility in both diplomacy and practice. He said it would “not be an exaggeration to say that today middle powers often demonstrate a greater degree of responsibility than major powers represented in the Security Council, which, regrettably, often obstruct the resolution of key global issues.” That was one of the sharper lines delivered at the summit. It also showed how Kazakhstan now wants to place itself in the world: not as a passive actor caught between larger powers, but as a state that can help steady an increasingly unstable system. Türkiye was central to that framing. At the start of his remarks, Tokayev praised President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s role in the region and said Kazakhstan was looking forward to Erdoğan’s state visit next month. That also reflects a broader trend of closer coordination between Kazakhstan and Türkiye, including in the Trans-Caspian transport route (Middle Corridor) and shifting Caspian dynamics. Uzbekistan approached the summit in Antalya differently. Tashkent did not have a presidential intervention on the main stage, but it used the gathering for...

Soft Power in Times of Geopolitical Turbulence: Kazakhstan’s Strategy as a Middle Power

For Kazakhstan, deeply embedded in global supply chains and international investment flows, soft power is evolving from an image-building asset into a strategic instrument of resilience. In an era of globalization, when even geographically distant conflicts can directly threaten national infrastructure and economic security, Astana’s ability to leverage institutional initiatives and investment interdependence as a form of diplomatic protection has become a decisive advantage. Over the long term, stability tends to characterize states whose infrastructure and economic interests are deeply interconnected with those of major global centers of power. A middle power and rational diplomacy Kazakhstan’s status as a middle power is not a matter of ambition, but a deliberate choice in favor of rational diplomacy, where flexibility and institutional engagement serve as key resources. Multilateral dialogue with the U.S., Russia, China, the EU, Turkey, and countries of the Middle East is being developed not as situational maneuvering but as a core strategy for minimizing external risks and preserving sovereignty. It is precisely the combination of proactive soft power, political neutrality, and economic openness that allows Kazakhstan to transform geopolitical turbulence into a strategic advantage, positioning the country as an indispensable hub of international stability. Ultimately, the rational diplomacy of a middle power transforms the country’s geographical position from a potential zone of conflict into a platform for dialogue, where pragmatism and institutional mediation become the principal guarantees of national sovereignty. The Ukrainian case: infrastructure protection as an element of soft power Developments surrounding Russia's war in Ukraine illustrate how Kazakhstan’s soft power can function as a form of economic protection. The attacks on infrastructure in the Novorossiysk area, through which the Caspian Pipeline Consortium exports oil, highlighted a distinctive mechanism for safeguarding national interests through investment interdependence. Strikes near the Black Sea hub posed a direct threat not only to logistics but also to the assets of major American investors in Kazakh energy projects, including Tengiz. According to reports cited in public discussions, the U.S. urged Ukraine to take into account the interests of American investors in Kazakhstan. If confirmed, such a step would represent an important precedent: even amid an intense military conflict, global actors remain attentive to protecting the economic interests tied to Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure. For Astana, this episode illustrates how decades of building strategic relations with Western partners have created a significant layer of economic security. In this context, soft power manifests itself as a form of “investment protection,” discouraging actions that could damage oil production or transport infrastructure linked to global stakeholders. Institutionalizing neutrality: why Kazakhstan needs a Board of Peace The creation of the Board of Peace by U.S. President Donald Trump and Kazakhstan’s active participation signals Kazakhstan’s transition from ad hoc mediation toward a more structured institutional architecture of soft power. The signing of the Board of Peace Charter by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev formally embeds peacebuilding activities within the state’s foreign policy framework. Kazakhstan’s developing participation in this initiative is also linked to its experience hosting the Congress of Leaders of World...

The Board of Peace and Central Asia: Asserting Agency in a Fragmented Order

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s speech at the inaugural meeting of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace in Washington on February 19 was not only a foreign policy event, but one with significant domestic resonance. The initiatives announced include Kazakhstan’s participation in the reconstruction of Gaza, financial commitments, and readiness to send peacekeepers. Against the backdrop of economic challenges and ongoing constitutional reforms, however, a substantial segment of Kazakh society is questioning whether such an active foreign policy posture is justified at this time. The Board of Peace, the charter for which was ratified in Davos in January 2026 on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum, is positioned as an alternative to traditional multilateral institutions. According to Trump, the new body should not merely discuss conflicts, but will also "almost be looking over the United Nations and making sure it runs properly." Symbolically, the Board’s launch comes amid U.S. reductions and withholding of UN-related funding and withdrawals from multiple international bodies, alongside a partial U.S. payment toward UN arrears and the parallel creation of alternative financial and security mechanisms. According to the U.S. Mission to Kazakhstan, at the first meeting of the Board of Peace, nine members pledged a combined $7 billion aid package for the Gaza Strip. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait indicated their willingness to contribute. Additionally, Trump pledged $10B in U.S. funding, framing peace and reconstruction as a strategic priority. However, experts note that these sums fall far short of projected needs. According to joint UN-EU-World Bank estimates, the full reconstruction of Gaza could require up to $70 billion. In addition, the implementation of projects is complicated by the issue of disarming Hamas, which is designated as a terrorist organization in the U.S. and the European Union. At present, there is no indication that any Western or regional government intends to revise that designation. A notable feature of the Washington summit was the synchronized participation and subsequent public statements of key member states of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey effectively acted as what appeared to be an aligned geopolitical grouping, albeit without a formal declaration of joint action. What Is Kazakhstan Seeking? For Astana, participation in the Board of Peace appears to represent a renewed step in its multi-vector foreign policy doctrine. Tokayev directly stated Kazakhstan’s readiness to send medical units and observers to international stabilization forces and to allocate more than 500 educational grants for Palestinian students. In effect, Kazakhstan is reinforcing its image as a “Middle Power” prepared not only for diplomatic mediation but also for tangible contributions to international security efforts. This course aligns with the country’s existing participation in UN missions. Currently, 139 Kazakh military personnel are serving in the Golan Heights under the UN Disengagement Observer Force mandate. Nevertheless, the intensification of foreign policy engagement is raising domestic questions. Concerns voiced on social media and among experts include whether the international agenda risks diverting attention from internal economic pressures, including...

Central Asia and Azerbaijan on Board as the Gaza Peace Effort Gets Underway

As the Trump Administration is trying to drag the world toward the reconstruction of Gaza, an undertaking fraught with security, political, and economic challenges, a gap is emerging between the “old” Europe, skeptical of Trump, and nation-states seeking to expand cooperation with Washington. Central Asian and Caucasian "middle powers" are among the emerging allies in the Trump Administration's latest diplomatic gambit for peace. Kazakhstan took a leadership position as the first Muslim-majority state outside the Middle East to join the Abraham Accords in November 2025. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, an experienced diplomat, former Foreign Minister, and high-level U.N. official, represented his country at the Board of Peace inauguration during the January 2026 session of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. So did Ilham Aliev, President of Azerbaijan, and his First Lady and First Vice President, Mehriban, both of whom met with Trump in Davos. The attendance and participation of leaders of other majority-Muslim states outside the Middle East are also noteworthy. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan, Prabowo Subianto of Indonesia, Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu of Kosovo, and Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan signed the Charter on behalf of their respective nations. Those who chose not to participate are equally noteworthy. France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Portugal, Canada, and Australia, which publicly announced or reaffirmed recognition of a State of Palestine around the U.N. General Assembly in September 2025, each determined not to attend the signing ceremony at Davos, despite the fact that the establishment of the Board was officially welcomed by the UN Security Council in November 2025. This underscores the challenges that will arise as Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict enters its second phase, which foresees Hamas’ disarmament. Similarly, differences in policy toward Israel among the Muslim-majority countries that signed the Charter speak to the complexity of the Board’s task. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan have longstanding diplomatic and trade relations with Israel. This contrasts with the complex and often hostile stances of Qatar, long ruled by the Al Thani family, and Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, both of which support the Muslim Brotherhood and shelter Hamas terrorists. Then there are countries like Indonesia and Pakistan, which have never had diplomatic relations with Israel. Indonesia, under Subianto, continues to condition recognition of Israel on the creation of a Palestinian state. Pakistan has been officially hostile since its founding, and is particularly fearful of Jerusalem’s increasingly close relations with India, though it does have a history of covert information sharing and unofficial cooperation. Once again, navigating the political agendas and moving the reconstruction project forward will require a multi-dimensional chess game. Nevertheless, the Trump White House is working on the Board of Peace's first meeting, set for February 19th. Currently, there is no official word about whether the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will attend, while other leaders plan to, such as President Aliyev, who just signed a Strategic Partnership Charter during a visit by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance to Azerbaijan, and PM Nikol Pashinyan of...

Opinion: Multi-Vectorism 2.0 – Kazakhstan Seeks Balance in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

The world is reverting to the logic of bloc confrontation. Sanctions regimes, technological barriers, and deepening mistrust between major powers are compelling medium-sized states to chart independent courses. Kazakhstan stands at the center of this evolving geopolitical matrix. While Moscow remains a vital partner in defense and energy, Astana is simultaneously cultivating strong ties with other global power centers, including China, the U.S., Turkey, the European Union, and the Gulf states. Yet Kazakhstan refuses to align with any single bloc, adhering instead to a strategy of "flexible autonomy", cooperating broadly while preserving its sovereignty. Russia: Alliance with Strategic Boundaries On November 11-12, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The two leaders signed a declaration on a comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance, reaffirming cooperation on security, energy, and logistics projects. Key discussions included the gasification of border regions, the modernization of energy infrastructure, and the transit of Russian energy via Kazakhstan. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan’s interest in a stable and prosperous Russia, calling Putin a “statesman of global stature.” Still, this alignment does not supplant Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy. The Moscow visit directly followed Tokayev’s talks in Washington, underscoring that Astana views relations with Russia as one of several strategic pillars. The U.S.: Investment and Critical Minerals Diplomacy During Tokayev’s visit to the U.S. in early November 2025, he and President Donald Trump oversaw the signing of 29 agreements totaling approximately $17 billion. The deals spanned industry, energy, digitalization, education, and innovation. Highlights in recent collaboration between Kazakhstan and the U.S. include a $2.5 billion John Deere production facility in Kostanay and Turkestan, a $1.1 billion development of tungsten deposits, and over $1 billion in digital infrastructure cooperation with companies such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, Oracle, and Starlink. Leading global funds also pledged roughly $1 billion in new investments. These agreements reflect growing trust and a shared commitment to investment-driven, high-tech cooperation. China: Strategic Synergy and Technological Convergence China remains Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner and a cornerstone of its eastern vector. During Tokayev’s October 17, 2023 visit to Beijing, he and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” built on political trust and economic cooperation. In June 2025, Xi Jinping visited Astana for the second China-Central Asia Summit, where he and Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev reinforced their countries’ “comprehensive strategic partnership”, oversaw deals spanning energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and digital technology. Later that year, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, the two leaders used the platform to deepen cooperation within a multilateral framework, promoting connectivity and regional trade under the Belt and Road Initiative. Turkey: Civilizational Ties and Strategic Growth Ties between Kazakhstan and Turkey are underpinned by shared cultural and historical foundations. At the fifth High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting in Ankara on July 29, 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed Tokayev, reaffirming Turkey’s role as a major investor and educational partner. More than 12,000 Kazakh students are enrolled in Turkish universities. Defense cooperation is expanding under the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and tourism and...

Which Central Asian States Qualify as Middle Powers in 2025?

As global power shifts toward multipolarity, Central Asia’s states are emerging as active regional players. This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. 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This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. Economic Power Economic autonomy is a defining attribute of middle-power capability, enabling states to project influence, sustain policy independence, and finance external engagement. In Central Asia, dependence on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and remittances often reflects constrained fiscal capacity and limited domestic capital formation, while diversified, resilient economies underpin strategic autonomy. Key indicators—GDP per capita, credit ratings, debt sustainability, and export diversification—illuminate the region’s economic hierarchy. Kazakhstan stands as Central Asia’s only consolidated economic middle power. Resource-backed growth, a prudent fiscal regime, and a sovereign wealth fund (the National Fund of Kazakhstan) have anchored macroeconomic stability. With a “BBB” credit rating or equivalent from major agencies, Kazakhstan demonstrates sound debt management and policy credibility. Ongoing diversification efforts under the new economic policies—from renewables to financial modernization—aim to reduce hydrocarbon dependence and deepen integration into global supply chains. Its role as a trans-Caspian logistics hub enhances both strategic and commercial influence. Uzbekistan, by contrast, is an emerging frontier market propelled by post-2017 reforms in currency liberalization, taxation, and state-enterprise restructuring. Rapid GDP growth and expanding private-sector activity mark its trajectory toward fiscal autonomy, though continued ODA inflows averaging around $1.1 billion to 1.3 billion annually, primarily from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and bilateral partners such as Japan, the United States, and the European Union, highlight its residual dependence on external concessional financing. To achieve genuine middle power status, Uzbekistan must roughly double its real economic output over the next decade, a scale of growth aligned with the shift...