Inside Uzbekistan’s Regional Defense Strategy: An In-Depth Interview with Michael Hilliard
Michael Hilliard is Director of Defense & Security Analysis at the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, where he leads a specialist project analyzing the armed forces of Central Asia. The Oxus Society’s latest report, focusing on Uzbekistan’s military, has just been released. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Hilliard about the report, Uzbekistan’s evolving defense doctrine, and its future role as a military power in the region. TCA: In light of the new report on Uzbekistan’s military, how would you characterize Uzbekistan’s overarching security and defense doctrine, especially in relation to the broader Central Asian region? Michael Hilliard: Uzbekistan’s primary defense doctrine is essentially internally focused. Since independence, and particularly since the events in Andijan in 2005, Tashkent has concentrated on transforming its forces into a rapid-response military with specializations in counterterrorism, crowd control, and dispersal operations. When you speak with officers or policymakers within the defense establishment, 2005 is a recurring reference point. During those early hours, protestors overran a motor rifle unit and seized weapons. Many defense personnel still believe that if they had been able to react faster, the final outcome in the square might have been different. This need for rapid adaptability has driven much of Tashkent’s defense policy since then. TCA: The report notes that Kazakhstan has now overtaken Uzbekistan as the region’s leading military power and that this gap is likely to widen. To what extent does this reflect Tashkent’s greater emphasis on regional cooperation and the resolution of border disputes, rather than competition? Hilliard: Kazakhstan’s economic dominance makes this outcome unsurprising. The country now accounts for just under 60% of Central Asia’s total GDP as of 2024. With that level of wealth, Astana naturally has greater resources to allocate to defense. However, Uzbekistan traditionally spends a higher proportion of its budget on the military. Despite having only half of Kazakhstan’s GDP, it has often matched Kazakhstan’s defense spending in real terms. If Kazakhstan simply accelerates its defense spending to the regional average, it will quickly surge ahead. Ultimately, it’s an issue of economics; Kazakhstan has more money to spend. TCA: What is the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in shaping Uzbekistan’s regional military posture? Hilliard: While some once had ambitious visions for the SCO, today it’s primarily intelligence-focused. Joint exercises are still held but remain limited, and RATS’ influence has declined somewhat following China’s controversial maneuvering within the organization. At present, RATS focuses more on identifying individuals or groups, such as traffickers or terrorist networks, that all member states have a shared interest in apprehending. It’s quite different from the CSTO, where Moscow wields far greater control. TCA: How might Tashkent view the recent clashes between Taliban and Pakistani forces, given that Pakistan currently chairs RATS? Hilliard: Tashkent’s attention is mainly on northern Afghanistan, not the Taliban-Pakistan clashes in the southeast. These incidents appear limited, so they’re unlikely to alter Tashkent’s calculus significantly. However, they do make cross-regional initiatives such as the Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI)...
