National Identity - The Times Of Central Asia

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National Identity

Kazakhstan Reclaims the Golden Horde

Kazakhstan’s symposium on the Golden Horde opens, in formal institutional terms, the question of where the country locates its statehood. Held in Astana on May 19–20 under UNESCO patronage, it brought together more than 300 scholars and experts, including 120 foreign researchers from more than 20 countries. Its title was “The Golden Horde as a Model of Steppe Civilization,” with history, archaeology, culture, and identity named as focal points of inquiry. The initiative places Kazakhstan’s history outside the narrow frame of post-Soviet chronology, treating the medieval past as a problem in the formation of Central Eurasia. Kazakhstan’s turn to the Golden Horde is not a decorative appeal to the medieval past, but a claim about statehood. It seeks to place Kazakhstan’s sovereignty within older Eurasian traditions of exchange, law, political authority, and movement across the steppe. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has put the claim in explicit form. In 2024, he described Kazakhstan as a successor to the nomadic civilization of the Great Steppe and called the Ulus of Jochi, known internationally as the Golden Horde, a pinnacle of state-building in Central Eurasia. At the Astana symposium, he returned to the same line, presenting the Golden Horde as an empire connecting East and West and influencing the development of civilizations and states. The point is not identitarian but genealogical: the recovery of a statehood tradition, not the retroactive conversion of a medieval formation into the present-day republic. The Golden Horde’s significance is as a political form whose relevance lies in rule, exchange, law, and mobility: this is where steppe history becomes state history. The symposium’s official framing emphasized the political, economic, cultural, and spiritual heritage of the Ulus of Jochi. Its final resolution was more specific, identifying the Golden Horde’s role in political traditions, international trade and diplomacy, legal institutions, numismatics, craft production, and the interaction of nomadic and urban societies. The Golden Horde thereby moves out of the narrow category of conquest and into the practical grammar of political and social order: administration, circulation, law, and exchange. The inherited Russian imperial and Soviet frame did not simply neglect the Golden Horde; it organized the question from outside Kazakhstan’s own statehood. A recent study in Nationalities Papers identifies a Soviet paradigm in which the Golden Horde was treated as foreign, destructive, and external to the emergence of the Kazakh Khanate, while the Ak Orda was favored as the more acceptable predecessor. This view did not disappear with independence. Under Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Golden Horde remained comparatively marginal in official historical narrative, even as Kazakhstan celebrated the Kazakh Khanate and the broader nomadic past. Ideological categories narrowed the possible interpretations of the past. The issue today is not reinvention but reordering. Presidential declarations provide the catalyst, not the machinery. The machinery is supplied by historians, institutes, universities, and conferences. The Nationalities Papers study describes historians as memory actors helping to move the Golden Horde from contested or marginal status toward official endorsement. It also identifies a dispute between older and newer schools of...

National Identity

Kazakhstan Looks to the Golden Horde for a Deeper National Narrative

A major international symposium dedicated to the Golden Horde opened this week in Kazakhstan’s capital, underscoring the country’s growing effort to redefine its historical narrative and national identity through the legacy of the Great Steppe. The symposium, held under the patronage of UNESCO and titled “The Golden Horde as a Model of Steppe Civilization: History, Archaeology, Culture and Identity,” brought together more than 300 scholars, including 120 foreign researchers from over 20 countries. The event reflects Kazakhstan’s effort to align its national narrative with a growing body of scholarship that treats nomadic societies not as a “backward” alternative to sedentary civilizations, but as a distinct and highly sophisticated model of statehood shaped by the economic realities of the Eurasian steppe. Opening the symposium, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that “no historian today questions the power of the Golden Horde, the empire that ruled the Great Steppe and occupied vast expanses of Eurasia. The empire that connected East and West and exerted a profound influence on the development of civilizations and the formation of states was unquestionably one of the largest political structures in history,” Tokayev said. [caption id="attachment_49194" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: Akorda[/caption] The Legacy of the Great Steppe The Golden Horde, also known as the Ulus of Jochi, emerged from the empire created by Genghis Khan across the Eurasian steppe. The wider Eurasian steppe stretched from Eastern Europe toward Mongolia, while the Golden Horde controlled a vast western portion of that world. The region long served as home to Indo-European, Turkic and Mongol nomadic peoples. Its open geography, largely free of impassable mountain barriers, enabled the large-scale movement of herds of horses, sheep and cattle in search of pastures and water sources. It was in this region, on the territory of present-day northern Kazakhstan, that horses were first domesticated about 5,500 years ago near the settlement of Botai. The archaeological Botai culture dates back to roughly 3700-3100 BCE. The Golden Horde itself traces directly to Jochi, the eldest son of Genghis Khan, whose descendants ruled the Ulus of Jochi across a vast territory from the Irtysh to the Danube. Over time, the Ulus of Jochi was divided between Jochi’s sons into western and eastern wings known respectively as the White Horde (Ak-Orda) and the Blue Horde (Kok-Orda). By the middle of the 15th century, the Ulus of Jochi had fragmented into successor polities, including the Siberian, Uzbek, Kazan, Crimean, and Kazakh khanates, as well as the Nogai Horde. Moscow’s rise also unfolded in the shadow of this post-Horde order before it later became the core of the Russian Empire. [caption id="attachment_49193" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Image: Akorda[/caption] Between Myth and Statehood Because written sources on the Golden Horde remain fragmented, much of its legacy survived through oral traditions, epics, myths, and legends. In Kazakh tradition, for example, khans continued to be chosen from among the Chinggisids, direct descendants of Genghis Khan, and elevated on a white felt carpet during coronation ceremonies. The period also produced oral epics preserved through the tradition of the...

Independence Day

The Contested Legacy of Kazakhstan’s Independence Day: From Sovereignty to Unrest and Reinvention

On December 16, 2025, Kazakhstan marks the 34th anniversary of its independence. The story of this national holiday mirrors the nation’s own complex path toward sovereignty and statehood. A Difficult Legacy On December 16, 1991, Kazakhstan adopted the Law “On State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” officially becoming the last Soviet republic to leave the USSR. The date came at the tail end of the so-called “parade of sovereignties,” when other republics had already declared independence. This delay led to a popular saying: “Kazakhstan turned off the lights in the USSR.” In the early years of independence, the holiday was celebrated widely, often with several days off. Yet the date also evokes painful memories. Just five years earlier, in December 1986, the capital city of Alma-Ata (now Almaty) witnessed what are now known as Jeltoqsan köterılısı - the December Events. On December 16, 1986, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan abruptly dismissed First Secretary Dinmukhamed Konaev and replaced him with Gennady Kolbin, a party official from the Russian city of Ulyanovsk with no ties to the republic. This Moscow-imposed decision sparked protests by students and young people that turned violent. While the full causes and consequences remain partially unexplored, the uprising is widely seen as an early expression of resistance to Soviet central control and the imposition of non-Kazakh leadership. The protests were brutally suppressed. For several days, unrest continued in the city, with some incidents fueled by ethnic tensions. In the years since, the December Events have become symbolic of both state repression and the early stirrings of Kazakh nationalism. Because of the proximity of dates, many citizens continue to conflate the date of independence with the December Events. For years, the national holiday was therefore overshadowed by grief and division. Unrest in the Oil Region Independence Day was further marred in 2011 by violent unrest in the oil-rich Mangistau region after months of unresolved labor disputes. On December 16 of that year, striking workers from the OzenMunaiGas company in the town of Zhanaozen clashed with police after demanding higher wages. The protests escalated into riots, with government buildings, hotels, and vehicles set ablaze. ATMs were looted, and a state of emergency was declared. Official figures state that about 20 people were killed and over 100 were injured. The Zhanaozen tragedy underscored deep socioeconomic disparities, particularly in regions rich in resources but lacking infrastructure and basic services. From Old to New Kazakhstan Over time, Independence Day became closely associated with unrest and national trauma. Analysts suggest that full investigations into the December 1986 and 2011 events were hindered by the political legacy of Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president. Nazarbayev held senior posts during the Soviet period and later presided over the country during the Zhanaozen crackdown. In June 2019, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev succeeded Nazarbayev as president and launched a platform of gradual political reform. However, his efforts were reportedly obstructed by entrenched elites aligned with the Nazarbayev era, often referred to as “Old Kazakhstan.” Public discontent boiled over again in January...

Özgecan Kesici-Ayoubi

Özgecan Kesici-Ayoubi on How the Alash Movement Is Studied in the West

Özgecan Kesici-Ayoubi is a poet and academic whose work bridges literature and Kazakh intellectual history. Though born and raised in Europe, her writing and scholarship show a deep affinity with the Kazakh people. Her early poetry earned attention and acclaim, and during her university studies she began researching the Alash Movement, work that culminated in a PhD completed in Ireland. We recently spoke with her in a short but insightful interview. TCA: Your academic research focuses on the Alash Party. How did you come to choose this topic while studying in a Western country? Özgecan: Growing up as a Kazakh in Germany, I was always interested in the formation of my identity and cultural heritage. I studied Political Science at both undergraduate and master’s level, and for my master’s thesis, I explored the process of Kazakh nation-building after independence. I then wanted to delve deeper into the foundations of the modern Kazakh nation, which I believe were significantly shaped by the Alash movement in the early 20th century. In Sociology, there's a major subfield focused on the historical sociology of nations and nationhood, which I used as a framework to study the Alash movement. TCA: In developed countries, academic standards are typically very high. What kind of support did your supervisor provide? Özgecan: My supervisor, Professor Siniša Malešević, is a Full Professor of Comparative Historical Sociology at University College Dublin. He was extremely supportive of my research. His expertise in historical sociology and theories of nationalism gave me the academic guidance I needed. Moreover, Ireland’s own colonial past means that its universities have research profiles that aligned well with my work on the Alash movement. TCA: Conducting research on the Alash movement from abroad must have presented challenges. How did you overcome them? Özgecan: It’s important to note that my research was sociological, not purely historical. I wasn’t aiming to discover new archival materials but rather to position the Alash movement within the broader sociological field of nations and nationalism and explore its theoretical implications. That said, I did require primary sources, which I accessed during fieldwork. I connected with local Kazakh scholars who helped me find the necessary materials and books, and I’m very grateful for their support. TCA: Are Western scholars aware of the Alash intellectuals' civic ideals and national identity struggles? Has the topic been studied where you lived? Özgecan: In Ireland, where I was based, the topic hadn’t been studied. However, the Alash movement has been examined by a number of Western scholars. When I began my PhD, several articles and dissertations had already been written in English, many by Kazakh scholars themselves. TCA: You previously mentioned you're working on a book. Can you tell us more about it? Özgecan: Since completing my PhD, I’ve been writing a novel based on my grandparents’ migration from the Altay region in China during the 1930s to Turkey and later the West. The novel is written from a female perspective. TCA: I've read your poems. What inspired your shift...

Identity

Only Turkmen Names Allowed

Ethnic minorities in Turkmenistan are reportedly being told they must give their newborn children tradition Turkmen names. The process of “Turkmenization” has been underway in Turkmenistan for many years, but until recently it had not affected the proper names of non-Turkmen citizens. According to a recent report from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Turkmen service, known locally as Azatlyk, officials in the eastern Lebap Province were previously urging the Uzbek and Tajik communities in the province to give their newborns Turkmen names. Now this is no longer a suggestion, but a requirement. Lebap borders Uzbekistan. Many Uzbeks and Tajiks lived in this area long before Soviet mapmakers finally drew borders that after the collapse of the USSR in late 1991 became the frontier of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan for Turkmen [caption id="attachment_30930" align="aligncenter" width="1115"] stat.gov.tm[/caption] The credibility of official statistics from the Turkmen government has been called into question many times over the years, and the size and ethnic make-up of the population are no exception. According to the most recent census figures (released in 2023), Turkmenistan’s population is just over seven million people, though the real figure is almost certainly less than that, and could be as low as four or five million. Turkmenistan has been experiencing significant economic problems for some ten years, and many citizens have left the country. For example, as of December 2024, more than 205,000 Turkmen citizens are officially registered as living In Turkey, and that figure could be three times higher or more, including those Turkmen citizens who are illegally residing there. The census released by the Turkmen authorities lists the populations of 14 specific ethnic minority groups. Roughly one million Turkmen citizens are ethnic minorities. The top three are Uzbeks, numbering 642,476, Russians, 114,447, and Baluch, 87,503. These figures might be lower soon, however, at least officially. Authorities in Lebap are also reportedly recommending people from non-Turkmen groups give their nationality as Turkmen in their documents. Being an ethnic Turkmen matters when seeking employment in Turkmenistan, so there is an added incentive for minorities to claim they are Turkmen in official documents. Turkmenistan would not be the first country in Central Asia to have rules on naming newborns. Authorities in Tajikistan banned children from being given foreign names some eight years ago. The Language and Terminology Committee of Tajikistan’s Academy of Science produced a list of more than 3,000 approved Tajik names for children; however, that rule applies only to ethnic Tajiks. Minority groups in Tajikistan are free to name their children as they wish. Azatlyk reports that the authorities are also warning ethnic Turkmen about giving their children non-Turkmen names. Turkish names were becoming popular among Turkmen in Turkmenistan, and some Turkmen families living near Uzbekistan were giving their children Uzbek names. The difficulties in obtaining information from Turkmenistan make it difficult to know if the naming policy being enforced in Lebap exists in other parts of the country. Turkmenistan’s government has, to the greatest extent possible, sealed the country off from...

National Identity

Kyrgyzstan’s Rebrand: New Country, or New Distractions?

On January 29, in what became a viral social media post, Seide Ibraimova and her mother drove to the site of VDNKh, the exhibition center built in the Kirghiz SSR to demonstrate the achievements of socialist science and culture. Her mother, wrapped in a white headscarf, reminisced happily about the times she’d spent there, surrounded by poplar trees in the shadow of the mountains. Seide’s father was one of the architectural team who built the main pavilion in 1974. But as they arrived at the site, they found nothing but rubble. The government had bulldozed the pavilion to make way for a new congress hall. “How could they?” said the old lady in a choked whisper. “Your father gave his heart and soul to this, for the people of the republic. The number of delegations who came here… how could they?” In the post’s comments section, an intense debate began. Some lamented the loss of the exhibition center: “Without this historic architecture, Bishkek will be nothing more than a concrete jungle,” said one. Another invoked Chingiz Aitmatov’s famous mankurt metaphor, describing those who had destroyed the site as having “no sense of memory or feelings, without attachment, who do not know who they are or where they come from.” Others were less sentimental, pointing out that VDNKh had been left to rot for two decades, and that those venerating the Soviet relics were the real mankurts, “forgetting your language, preaching the history and ideology of the fascists who invaded and occupied our country.” “You can forget the USSR,” said another. “We live in a sovereign state, the Kyrgyz Republic!” These online spats come at a time when Kyrgyzstan is going through a form of national branding under the government of Sadyr Japarov. But is the country really shedding its Soviet skin, or are the changes mere window dressing? [caption id="attachment_29217" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] The ruins of the VDNKh pavilion, February 2025; image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] Around two hundred meters from the wreckage of the pavilion is Yntymak-Ordo, or the “new White House”. This is the newly-constructed official administrative building of Kyrgyzstan’s president – a squat structure with thick columns, topped by a glass dome and surrounded by iron bars and armed guards. Reminiscent of many of the other presidential palaces that have sprung up across Central Asia over the past thirty years, it is an assertion of power. Further along Chinghiz Aitmatov Avenue (which was called Prospekt Mira until 2015) are scores of new high-rise residential buildings. Each month, new approvals are granted for more of these in the city center, contributing to a construction boom. Some see this as a deliberate attempt to erase the Soviet past from the city and replace it with their own idea of a modern Kyrgyz capital. The aesthetic shift is not just architectural. The government recently launched a competition for a new Kyrgyz national anthem. Aspiring composers have been invited to submit their proposals, the commission recently confirming that 23 have been accepted so...